2 Heatins of the Value Huatin als.: Vo(Si) = 19,0 Vo(52)=1.0 No (53) 20.0 Step 1: 9, (s, a, )= R(s, a, ) + V(P(s, a, s, ) Vols,) P(s.a., s2) V. (s2)) = 8.0 + 1.0(0.2-10.0+0.6.1.0) 9, (s1, a2) = R(s,, a2) + M(P(s,, a2, s1) Vo(s) P(s, 92, S2) vo (s2) = 10.0 + 1.0 (0.1.10.0 + 0.2.1.0) 9, (S2, a) = R(S2, a,)+ + (P(S2, a,, s,) Vo(s,) P (52, 91, 52) v9(52)

= 1.0 + 1.0(0.3.10 + 0.3.1.0)


9, (52, a2) = R(S2, a2)+ HP(S2, a2, S,) Vo(S) P(S2,92,52) Vo(S2)) = -1.0+1.0 (0,5.10+0,3.1.0) V, (s,) = max & 9, (s,, a) } V, (52): max & 9, (52, a) } = 4,3, TT, (S,) = az It, (52)= a. (a, and az produce an egyinalent greedy improvements. Step 2. 92(s,,a)= R(s,a)+V(P(s,,a,,s)),(s,)

 $P(s, a_1, s_2) V_1(s_2)$ = 8.0 + 10 (  $a_1 2.11.2 + 0.6.4.3$ )
= 12.82

92(S1, az)= P(S1, az)+ V(P(S1,92,5)) V(S) P(s, ,az, 52) V, (52) - 10,0 +1.0(0,1,11,2 +0,2.4,3) = 11,98 92 (52, a.) = R(52, a.) + & P(52, a., s.) V.(s.) P(Sz, a,, Sz) V, (Sz) = 1.9+1.0(0.3.11,2+0.3.4.5) = 5,65 92(52,a2) = R(52,a2)+ V(R(52,a2,5,)V,(S)) P(Szazsz) V, (sz) = -1 + 1 (0,5.11,2+0,3.4.3) = 5,89 1/2(s,) = max 3 92(s, e)} - 12,82 V2 (52) = max 3 72 (52,a) 3 = 5,89 TI= (5,) = a, 112 (sz) = a,

b) for k=3,4... we have: 9 (s, a) - 9 (s, az) = R(S, a, ) - R(S, az) + d(\(\frac{2}{5\colored}\) + \(\frac{2}{5\colored}\) \(\frac{1}{5\colored}\) \ = -2 + (0,1 VK-1(S,) + 0,4 VK-1(S2)). at k=3, Vk-1(5,)= 12,82, Vk-1(52)=5,89. =) 0,1.12,8210,4.5,89=3,638>2 => 9k=35,19, )-9 (5,192)>0. =) TTk=3(5,)=9, Since Vkii (S) > Vk(S) for all k , all S by Banach's Thin, then for all k=3,4..., 9k (51,91)-9k (51,92) > 0

Similar argument for TK (SZ).



The set of possible actions depends on the state. We express that as L(s), where se S.

A("Imempleyed"; ) = \( \frac{2}{\text{accept", "decline"}} \), \( \frac{1}{\text{emplayed"; j.}} = \( \frac{2}{\text{inerthiness}} \), \( \frac{1}{\text{emplayed"; j.}} = \( \frac{2}{\text{inerthiness}} \), \( \frac{1}{\text{inerthiness}} \), \(

(Ph), if s = ("immphyed"; j;), a="decline" S'= ("imemployed", jh) ;=1.-, n; h=1...,n (x. Ph) sif S=("unemployed", j;), a= "accept" S'=("unemployed", j, );=1...,h S'= ("memplyed" ja) i=1..., n; h=1..., n (1-x) sif s= ("ememployed" j:), a= "accept" S'= ("employed" j:), i=1...n P(S,a,s') = { (x. Ph), if s= ("employed", j;), a="hothing" S'= ("unemployed", jh), i=1..., S'= ("unemployed", j, ) i=1,...,n; h=1,...,n (1-x),  $i\neq S=$  ("employed", j, ), a="nothing" S'= ("employed", j, )

· R\_(s,a,s'): 5xAx5-> R+

 $R_{+}(s, a, s') = \begin{cases} w_{0}, & \text{if } s = (\text{"unemployed"}; i) \\ a = \text{"decline}, & \text{i=1}, ..., h. \end{cases}$   $w_{i}, & \text{if } s = (\text{"unemployed"}; i), & \text{i=1}, ..., h. \end{cases}$   $\alpha = \text{"accept"}$ 

· Bellman Optimality Equation:

V\*(s)= max ael SES [P(s,a,s') (R(s,a,s')+/V\*(s'))]}