

Container Security and Multi-Tenancy Tales from Kata and Nabla

Ricardo Aravena (rico)

branch.io

@raravena80

James Bottomley

IBM Research

@jejb_



KubeCon



CloudNativeCon

North America 2018



Who Are We?



James Bottomley

Distinguished Engineer @ IBM
Working on Nabla Containers



Ricardo Aravena (rico)

Work @ Branch Metrics


Cloud Ops

Kata Containers contributor

[@raravena80](https://twitter.com/raravena80)
[@jejb_](https://twitter.com/jejb_)




Containers @ Branch




Outline



Traditional Containers




Traditional Containers



Prone to exploits



Kernel Footprint




Exploits target vulnerable part of kernel via syscalls

If we restrict the number of syscalls

- Less reachable kernel functions
- Less potential vulnerabilities




Docker Default Seccomp Policy



Seccomp Profiles

1578 lines



```
{  
    "defaultAction": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",  
    "architectures": [  
        "SCMP_ARCH_X86_64",  
        "SCMP_ARCH_X86",  
        "SCMP_ARCH_X32"  
    ],  
    "syscalls": [  
        {  
            "name": "accept",  
            "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",  
            "args": []  
        },  
        {  
            "name": "accept4",  
            "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",  
            "args": []  
        },  
        {  
            "name": "access",  
            "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",  
            "args": []  
        },  
        .... 1578 Lines!  
    ]  
}
```

<https://github.com/docker/labs/blob/master/security/seccomp/seccomp-profiles/default.json>



Linux Capabilities

 **13 +**

- CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL
- CAP_AUDIT_READ
- CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
- CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
- CAP_CHOWN
- CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
- CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
- CAP_FOWNER
- CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH;
- CAP_FSETID
- CAP_IPC_LOCK
- CAP_IPC_OWNER
- CAP_KILL

 **13 +**

- CAPLEASE
- CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE
- CAP_MAC_ADMIN
- CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE
- CAP_MKNOD
- CAP_NET_ADMIN
- CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
- CAP_NET_BROADCAST
- CAP_NET_RAW
- CAP_SETGID
- CAP_SETFCAP
- CAP_SETPCAP
- CAP_SETUID

 **13 = 39**

- CAP_SYS_ADMIN
- CAP_SYSLOG
- CAP_SYS_BOOT
- CAP_SYS_CHROOT
- CAP_SYS_MODULE
- CAP_SYS_NICE
- CAP_SYS_PACCT
- CAP_SYS_PTRACE
- CAP_SYS_RAWIO
- CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
- CAP_SYS_TIME
- CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
- CAP_WAKE_ALARM



contained.af

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://contained.af> in the address bar. The page content is as follows:

Know your surroundings...
The hottest, nerdiest new game in town.

/ #

CAP_NET_RAW allows you to use RAW and PACKET sockets and bind to any address for transparent proxying.

Do you have access to **CAP_NET_RAW**?

Yes No Hint me!

JessFraz!

JessFraz!



<https://contained.af>

@raravena80
@jejb_

SELinux

Building the Base Policy Module

This exercise will build the mandatory base policy module that uses the same policy source file as the monolithic policy discussed above.

The basic steps to produce a simple base test policy are:

- Ensure you are logged on as root and SELinux is running in permissive mode (setenforce 0) to perform the build process. It is assumed that you have already completed the monolithic policy exercise.
- Produce a base policy source file with a text editor (such as vi or gedit) containing the following contents: [base.conf](#).
- Produce a base file contexts file with the following contents: [base.fc](#). This will be used to relabel the file system.
- Produce a default_contexts file with the following contents [default_contexts](#). This will be used to ensure that the correct context is used when files are created (unless they are explicitly built).
- Produce an seusers file with the following contents: [seusers](#).
- Produce a dbus_contexts file with the following contents: [dbus_contexts](#). This is required for X-Windows to load as it uses the dbus object manager.
- Produce a x_contexts file with the following contents: [x_contexts](#). This is required for the X-Windows object manager.
- Compile the policy with checkmodule to produce an intermediate binary policy file:

```
checkmodule -o base.mod base.conf
```



SELinux



SELinux - Disable!

/etc/selinux/config

```
# This file controls the state of SELinux on the system.  
# SELINUX= can take one of these three values:  
#       enforcing - SELinux security policy is enforced.  
#       permissive - SELinux prints warnings instead of enforcing.  
#       disabled - No SELinux policy is loaded.  
SELINUX=disabled  
# SELINUXTYPE= can take one of these two values:  
#       targeted - Targeted processes are protected,  
#       mls - Multi Level Security protection.  
SELINUXTYPE=targeted
```



AppArmor

Installation

AppArmor is available in `linux` (since 4.18.8.arch1-1), `linux-zen` (since 4.18.8.zen1-1) and `linux-hardened` (since 4.17.4.a-1).

To enable AppArmor as default security model on every boot, set the following [kernel parameters](#):

```
apparmor=1 security=apparmor
```

Install `apparmor` for userspace tools and libraries to control AppArmor. To load all AppArmor profiles on startup, [enable](#) `apparmor.service`.

Custom kernel

When [compiling the kernel](#), it is required to set at least the following options:

```
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y  
CONFIG_AUDIT=y
```

To use AppArmor as the default Linux security model and omitting the need of setting kernel parameters, also set the following options:

```
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1  
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
```




OMG




Kata Containers



Kata Containers



Speed vs Security



Kata Requirements

Machine	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Bare Metal• Nested Virtualization
OS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Linux
Public Cloud	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• GCP - Nested• Azure - Nested• AWS - i3.metal instances
Private Cloud	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Openstack• Bare-metal & Nested Virt Providers
Platform	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Kubernetes - CRIo/Containerd• Docker



Kata Installation

Requirements

- `$ kata-runtime kata-check`

Kubernetes

- github.com/egernst/kata-deploy
- **Kata Installation guide**

Docker

- **Kata Installation guide**



Containerd Shim V2



@raravena80
@jejb_

Containerd Shim V2

Problem

- Kata-shim for every containerd-shim

Solution


- Containerd-shim per pod
- Containerd handles I/O (stdout)
- No Kata-shim anymore
- No Kata-proxy with vsock support

Kata CLI


- No need to implement a runC compatible CLI



Containerd Shim V2 - Before



Containerd Shim V2 - After




Nabla Containers





@raravena80
@jejb_

Nabla Containers



Inside Nabla



Nabla Requirements

Machine	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Bare Metal• Regular Virtualization
OS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Linux
Public Cloud	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Anything
Private Cloud	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Openstack• Bare-metal & Regular Virt Providers
Platform	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Kubernetes - CRIO/Containerd• Docker



Nabla Installation

Requirements

- Build runnc
- Pull node, go, python, etc image

Kubernetes

- Containerd or CRIOS
- RuntimeClass or annotation


Docker

- `docker run --rm -p 8080:8080 -- runtime=runnc nabla/node-express-nabla`

Side by Side



Metrics



Throughput



HAP

What?

- **Horizontal Attack Profile**

Who?

- IBM Research

Method

- Bug density of the Linux Kernel code
- Multiply it by the amount of unique code traversed

How?


- Ftrace (function trace)

Runtimes


- Kata
- Nabla
- Docker
- gVisor



Ftrace Measurements



Lower is better



Measuring number of boxes
Touched.



CVE-2018-10840

Filesystem
Vulnerability

Kata is vulnerable
with 9p

A simple VM isn't enough
for full isolation
Consider interface choices



Kata & Nabla

Kata

- VM Isolation
- All syscalls with no mod
- Can run any workloads
- Needs bare metal or nested virt
- Established community
- Any Linux workload compatible out of the box

Nabla

- Solo 5 Unikernel
- 7 syscalls
- Specific workload builds
- Can run on any server
- Growing community
- Compatible with NetBSD workloads



Kubernetes



Kubernetes



How?

- CRIOS 
- Containerd 
- RuntimeClass w/K8s 1.12 or later

Kata Requirements

- Bare Metal
- Nested Virtualization
- QEMU/NEMU

Nabla Requirements

- Bare Metal or VM



RuntimClass

"

The EC2 for K8s



RuntimeClass

What?

- Use different runtimes in K8s
- K8s 1.12 (alpha)

How?

- **RuntimeClass Feature gate**
- **Install CRD**
- **Configure Containerd/CRI**
- **`runtimeClassName` spec in Pod**



RuntimeClass

```
# RuntimeClass is defined in the node.k8s.io API group
apiVersion: node.k8s.io/v1alpha1
kind: RuntimeClass
metadata:
  # RuntimeClass is a non-namespaced Resource
  # The name the RuntimeClass will be referenced by
  name: myclass
# The name of the corresponding CRI configuration
spec:
  runtimeHandler: myconfiguration
```



RuntimeClass - PodSpec

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: mypod
spec:
  runtimeClassName: myclass
# ...
```



Containerd Config

```
[plugins.cri.containerd.runtimes.kata-runtime]
    runtime_type = "io.containerd.runc.v1"
[plugins.cri.containerd.runtimes.runc.options]
    NoPivotRoot = false
    NoNewKeyring = false
    ShimCgroup = ""
    IoUid = 0
    IoGid = 0
    BinaryName = "/opt/kata/bin/kata-runtime"
    Root = ""
    CriuPath = ""
    SystemdCgroup = false
```



Dynamic Runtime Class

New: Dynamically
Register and
Provision Additional
Runtime


Use CRI to do It

```
service CRIRuntimePlugin {  
    // ListAndWatch returns a stream of List of RuntimeHandler  
    // Whenever the status of CRI Runtime, the status of Container Runtime  
    // or the Config file is changed, ListAndWatch returns the new list  
    // $ kubectl get runtimeclass  
    rpc ListAndWatch(Empty) returns (stream ListAndWatchResponse) {}  
}
```

Workloads



Kubernetes + Service Mesh



Sample Workloads

APIs or Microservices


Credentials Store

Databases

Big Data & Analytics



Microservices



Credentials Store



User
 → Vault Active

Vault Standby



TLS




TLS




TLS


Vault Standby



Relational DBs



Multitenancy



Credit: <https://blog.jessfraz.com/post/hard-multi-tenancy-in-kubernetes/>

Demo



Kata & Nabla Demo

Kata and Nabla Containers

Kubernetes

RuntimeClass

Show Both Runtimes



Future



Kata Containers - Future

Hypervisors	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Hyper-V• VMware• Xen
Public Cloud	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• AWS Nested Virtualization• More Bare Metal Offerings• GKE, AKS, ACS (?)
Features	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Firecracker support• Hotplug networking, cpus




Nabla Containers - Future

Workloads	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Kubernetes integration• More languages and apps
Public Cloud	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• GKE, AKS, ACS (?)
Features	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tooling around rumprun image builds• Buildless containers



Nabla Containers - Future



Future Workloads

NFV	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Multus• https://github.com/intel/multus-cni
Edge Computing	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 5G• IoT
AI/HPC	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tensorflow / Kubeflow• GPUs• ML model training



A Word on Serverless



How?

- Serverless frameworks

Frameworks

- Riff
- Serverless
- Nuclio
- Fission
- Dispatch
- AWS Chalice

Middleware & Event Managers

- Knative (GKE)
- Event Gateway



Resources

Kata Containers

- <https://katacontainers.io>

Nabla Containers

- <https://nabla-containers.github.io/>

RuntimeClass

- <https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/containers/runtime-class/>

Multitenancy

- <https://github.com/kubernetes/community/tree/master/wg-multitenancy>

K8s Security Context

- <https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/>

Istio Soft Multi-tenancy

- <https://istio.io/blog/2018/soft-multitenancy/>



Thank you!

