

The Legacy of Cultural Revolution on Occupational Choice

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*"Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances... **The tradition of all dead generations** weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living."*

— Karl Marx



Motivation

- Histories may remain influential on modern-day behavior
  - e.g., property rights (Acemoglu et al., 2001), trust (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011), human capital (T. Chen et al., 2020), ...
- Occupational choice is one of the most important individual decisions
  - **Economic development** (Baumol, 1990; Eeckhout and Jovanovic, 2012; Murphy et al., 1991; Banerjee and Newman, 1993): economic conditions influence occupational choice, which in turn affects development
  - **Social mobility** (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008): profession-specific spirits made the middle classes become industrial capitalists and replace landed elites in British Industrial Revolution
- Occupational choice may have its historical roots, which can be important for understanding a society's evolution

This Paper

- The long-run occupational effects of Cultural Revolution (1966–1976, CR) in China
- The Revolution was an ideological campaign against the bourgeoisie, featuring intensive violence
- The bourgeoisie associated with professional occupations
- Traumatic memories from the Revolution might generate distaste of these occupations, and it can be persistent across generations

This Paper

- **How does parental revolutionary experience influence their children?**
- A DiD strategy exploits *cohort-level* variations in revolutionary exposure and *prefecture-level* variations in violence intensities
- Results show that children are less likely to be a professional if their parents were exposed to the Revolution
  - Besides persistent destructive impacts on human capital, distaste of professional jobs plays some role
  - Suggestive evidence is found that the distaste may be further transmitted to the third generation

Literature

1. **Occupational choice**
   - Jointly determined by **preferences** and **feasible alternatives**. Most research focuses on the latter (Heckman et al., 2006; Nicolaou and Shane, 2010; Jia et al., 2021)
   - Some recent papers start to focus on the role of preferences/norms (Fehr and Hoff, 2011; Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015; Bertrand, 2020)
2. **Long-run effect of historical events**
   - "Depression babies": recession's effects on risk, redistribution, and job preferences (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Cotofan et al., 2020; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014)
   - Legacy of violence, e.g., on political preferences (Rozenas et al., 2017; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017; Leon, 2012)
   - Cultural Revolution's effects on trust (Bai and Wu, 2020; Yuhua Wang, 2021)
3. **Parenting**
   - Parents may pass on their worldviews to children (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008; Doepke, Sorrenti, et al., 2019; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017; Bisin and Verdier, 2001)
   - Most are theoretical. Recent papers provide empirical evidence (Alesina et al., 2021; Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015)

Roadmap

1. Context and Data
   - Sample construction
   - Treatment = prefecture-level intensity $\times$ cohort-level exposure
2. Empirical Strategy
3. Results
4. Mechanisms
5. Preference Transmission
6. Conclusions

Outline

Cultural Revolution: 1966–1976

- "Mao's Last Revolution"
- He thought although a socialist state was founded, bourgeois culture was still prevalent and penetrated into all aspects of society
- Cultural Revolution (CR) was "needed" to crack down bourgeois culture: stated by official documents
- Massive mobilization and indoctrination:
  - Students were encouraged to participate in revolutionary activities; curriculum featured communist classic readings when schools reopened (Y. Chen et al., 2020; Deng and Treiman, 1997; Meng and R. G. Gregory, 2002; Meng and R. Gregory, 2007)
  - Media disseminated anti-bourgeoisie ideologies (Ou and Xiong, 2021)

Mass Violence in CR

- CR stigmatized the bourgeoisie, targeting at both capitalists and **intellectuals**. Many were "struggled" and suffered from violence
  - Unlike Marxism and Leninism, Maoism classified intellectuals as the bourgeoisie
  - This targeting may lead to potentially broader impacts
- The bourgeoisie associated with professional occupations, e.g., entrepreneurs, teachers, scientists, etc. (Bai and Wu, 2020; Su, 2011; Youqin Wang, 2001)
  - Well known student attacks on teachers ("reactionary intellectuals"): in Red August 1966, 1,772 people were killed in Beijing, including many teachers and principals (an official stat in 1985 showed total deaths in Red August were 10,275)
  - The Revolution even spread to scientists working in the nuclear project
- By experiencing violence, anti-bourgeoisie attitudes might be developed

Mass Violence in CR

- Data source: (Walder, 2014)
- About 1.1–1.6 million perished in the violence
- Most occurred in 1966–1971

Data Compilation



Figure: Temporal Distribution of Deaths in Dated Events

Data Source: (Walder, 2014)

Mass Violence in CR

- There are large geographical variations in violence ($R = \frac{Deaths}{Population} \times 100\%$)
- Mean(R) = 0.041%, SE(R) = 0.070%
- R is used to measure revolutionary intensities and potential ideological impacts

Toll Deaths



Figure: Spatial Distribution of $\frac{Deaths}{Population} \times 100\%$

Data Source: (Walder, 2014)

Census Data

- Chinese censuses: 2000 & 2005: most recent available censuses
- Focus on children's occupational choice
  - Parents might not be able to respond to CR in a planned economy (before 1978)
  - But they could pass their attitudes to children and influence choice
- Restricted to children born after 1960 and $\geq$ 25 yo at the time of survey
  - Born after 1960: long enough after CR when making occupational choice
  - $\geq$ 25 yo: most should have finished schooling by then
- Professional occupation = entrepreneurs, teachers, scientists, engineers, technicians, health professionals, legal professionals, financial professionals, culture professionals, etc. (Bai and Wu, 2018)
- Identify parent-child relations by *"relation to household head"*

Exposure to CR

- Who were most vulnerable to to CR's ideological impacts?
- **Impressionable years hypothesis** (IYH, Krosnick and Alwin 1989): people form beliefs in late adolescence and early adulthood, and change little afterwards
- Critical ages are 18–25 (Cotofan et al., 2020; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014)
- Following IYH, exposure to CR is defined as:

$$D = \mathbb{1}\{\text{18–25 y/o during 1966–1971}\} \tag{1}$$

  - Many young people were engaged in the Revolution
  - The time when violence was most rampant in 1966–1971

Exposure to CR

- All children in the sample (born after 1960) were not exposed. But their parents might be exposed



Figure: Cultural Revolution Exposure (D)

Outline

Empirical Strategy: Diff in Diff

- Geographical variations in intensity R + cohort-level variations in exposure D:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{icb} = \alpha + \beta(R_c \times D_i^f) + \pi D_i^f \\ + X_i'\delta + (X_i \times D_i^f)'\theta + \lambda_c + \gamma_{p(c)} \times \mu_b + \varepsilon_{icb} \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

- y_{icb}: $= 1$ if i (born in prefecture c and year b) is a professional
- R_c: $\frac{Deaths}{Population}$ (in %) of prefecture c
- D_i^f: $= 1$ if i's father was 18–25 (impressionable years) during 1966–1971
- X_i: gender, *hukou*, ethnicity, marital status, parental occupation
- λ_c: prefecture FE; $\gamma_{p(c)} \times \mu_b$: province $\times$ cohort FE
- **Identifying assumption:** if there were no CR, high and low intensity regions have the same path of occupational choice $\Rightarrow$ β identifies ATE of a marginal increase in R_c (Callaway et al., 2021; Chaisemartin et al., 2022)

Outline

Revolution & Occupation



(a) Proportion of Population Killed



(b) Share of Professionals

Summary Statistics

Table: Summary Statistics for Census Data

	High Intensity ($>$ Median)			Low Intensity ($\leq$ Median)			
	$D=1$ (1)	$D=0$ (1)	Diff. (1)-(2) (3)	$D=1$ (4)	$D=0$ (5)	Diff. (4)-(5) (6)	DiD (3)-(6) (7)
(A) Outcomes							
Professional	0.076	0.084	-0.008	0.069	0.067	0.003	-0.011**
	(0.265)	(0.278)	(0.004)	(0.254)	(0.250)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Years of schooling	9.427	9.370	0.057	9.302	9.049	0.253	-0.196***
	(2.739)	(2.963)	(0.064)	(2.615)	(2.869)	(0.032)	(0.072)
College	0.093	0.099	-0.006	0.074	0.071	0.003	-0.010
	(0.290)	(0.299)	(0.006)	(0.262)	(0.257)	(0.002)	(0.006)
(B) Individual Covariates							
Age	27.859	30.829	-2.970	27.705	30.538	-2.833	-0.137
	(2.741)	(4.364)	(0.135)	(2.643)	(4.141)	(0.065)	(0.150)
Han ethnicity	0.888	0.885	0.003	0.949	0.943	0.006	-0.003
	(0.315)	(0.319)	(0.005)	(0.219)	(0.231)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Female	0.222	0.203	0.019	0.210	0.177	0.033	-0.014***
	(0.416)	(0.402)	(0.003)	(0.407)	(0.381)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Married	0.617	0.640	-0.023	0.644	0.656	-0.012	-0.011
	(0.486)	(0.480)	(0.007)	(0.479)	(0.475)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Urban *hukou*	0.284	0.355	-0.071	0.251	0.296	-0.045	-0.026*
	(0.451)	(0.478)	(0.013)	(0.434)	(0.457)	(0.007)	(0.015)
Professional father	0.063	0.024	0.039	0.062	0.022	0.041	-0.001
	(0.243)	(0.152)	(0.002)	(0.242)	(0.145)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Obs.	90956	97251		97436	93466		

Mean in cells, and SDs/SEs in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

Historical Var.

Main Table

- 1SD increase in R, i.e., **0.07% more** population killed $\Rightarrow$ **0.28% decrease** in Pr(professional)
- Only fathers' experiences are impactful

Table: Effect of Parental CR Experience on Children

	D.V.: $100 \times \mathbb{1}\{\text{in professional occupation}\}$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$R \times D^f$	-4.264**	-4.469**	-4.076***	-4.999***
	(1.853)	(1.883)	(1.483)	(1.768)
$R \times D^m$				1.597
				(1.578)
D.V. mean	7.425	7.425	7.425	7.425
R mean	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.041
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Province $\times$ cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Parents cohort FE		Y	Y	Y
Covariates			Y	Y
Obs.	379109	379109	379109	379109
R^2	0.032	0.034	0.095	0.106

Covariates: han ethnicity, female, married, urban *hukou*, professional parents.
* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

Event Study

- Exposure **after** impressionable years had no impact



Figure: Effect of Father CR Experience on Children by Cohort

Event Study

- CR had effects on children whose fathers experienced it **during** impressionable years



Figure: Effect of Father CR Experience on Children by Cohort

Event Study

- Exposure **before** impressionable years also had no impact



Figure: Effect of Father CR Experience on Children by Cohort

Robustness Checks

1. Controlling correlates of CR intensities CR Correlates Add CR Correlates
2. Selection on migration Migration
3. Selection on coresidence Coresidence
4. Timing and spatial placebo tests Time Placebo Spatial Placebo
5. Alternative specification of R and D Alternative R Alternative D
6. Estimation issues of DiD with continuous treatment (Callaway et al., 2021; Chaisemartin et al., 2022) Heterogeneity

Outline

Underlying Mechanisms

- Both **job availability** and **preferences** can affect occupational choice
- Hard to examine preference changes directly. First assess how much effect can be explained by availability
  - **Economic conditions:** CR might have be destructive to the local economy (Bai and Wu, 2018), making professional jobs under supplied
  - **Social capital:** CR might affect parents' choice in the first place, making children lacking in connections to some occupations
  - **Human capital:** schools (colleges in particular) were shut down in CR $\Rightarrow$ persistent damages of human capital. Children lack skills to enter a professional occupation (Y. Chen et al., 2020; Meng and R. G. Gregory, 2002; Meng and R. Gregory, 2007)
- Add mediator Z to the baseline regression (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Imai et al., 2011): how does it change $\hat{\beta}$

Job Availability 1: Economic Conditions

- Use FDI, GDP per capita, and #firms as proxies for local economic prosperity

Table: Mechanism: Economic Conditions

	D.V.: $100 \times \mathbb{1}\{\text{in professional occupation}\}$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$R \times D^f$	-4.225***	-4.240***	-4.264***	-4.201***
	(1.601)	(1.598)	(1.600)	(1.601)
ln(FDI)		0.648***		
		(0.206)		
ln(GDP per capita)			1.577***	
			(0.536)	
ln(Firms)				0.641
				(0.401)
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Province*cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Parent cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	349663	349663	349663	349663
R^2	0.095	0.095	0.095	0.095

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

Job Availability 2: Social Capital

- Despite direct experiences, parental occupations were not influenced by CR
- Parental occupation is already controlled $\Rightarrow$ can't explain CR's effect on children

Table: Mechanism: Parents' Occupation

	D.V.: $100 \times \mathbb{1}\{\text{in professional occupation}\}$		
	(1) Both	(2) Father	(3) Mother
$R \times D$	-1.199	-3.045	0.222
	(1.125)	(2.285)	(0.908)
D.V. mean	2.897	4.267	1.527
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y
Province $\times$ cohort FE	Y	Y	Y
Covariates	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	656528	328264	328264
R^2	0.083	0.088	0.065

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

Job Availability 3: Human Capital

- Educational attainment as a proxy for human capital. CR did have an adverse impact on educational attainment, but only explains about 45% of CR's effect
- Considerable room for other channels, e.g., occupational preferences

Table: Mechanism: Educational Attainment

	(1) Schooling	(2) College	(3) Professional	(4) Professional
$R \times D^t$	-0.564***	-0.052**	-2.386**	-2.241**
	(0.166)	(0.021)	(1.165)	(0.994)
Schooling			2.997***	
			(0.109)	
College				35.116***
				(0.423)
D.V. mean	9.287	0.084	7.425	7.425
%Effect explained			0.415	0.450
95% CI			[-0.018, 0.848]	[0.078, 0.822]
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Province*cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Parent cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	379109	379109	379109	379109
R^2	0.281	0.162	0.169	0.211

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

Outline

Evidence for Preference Transmission

- Preference transmission is rendered by parenting, which is hardly observable
- **Heterogeneity of effects:** how much efforts parents make to instill values to children may vary by specific conditions
  - I build a model of preference transmission following Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015), and test its implications
- **Attitudes:** children may exhibit attitudes against professional occupations if some values have been transmitted

A Simple Model of Preference Transmission

- 2 occupations to choose from: 0 = non-professional, 1 = professional
- 2 types of preferences: type-0 and type-1, in favor of occupation w/same index
- Two ways to influence a child's preferences
  1. **Parenting:** parents invest in a costly activity (e.g., time with children), which makes a child type-0 w/prob τ. Convex cost function $c(\tau)$
  2. **Socialization:** the societal environment influences children — if parenting fails, then a child has a prob q to become type-0
- Thus, children's preferences follow the rules:

$$\Pr(\text{type-0 child}) = \tau + (1-\tau)q \tag{3}$$

$$\Pr(\text{type-1 child}) = (1-\tau)(1-q) \tag{4}$$

A Simple Model

- Parents internalize children's utility from career with a factor $\lambda > 0$. They evaluate occupation i at v_i
- Parents' utility function:

$$\underbrace{-c(\tau)}_{\text{parenting costs}} + \underbrace{\lambda \{[\tau + (1-\tau)q]v_0 + (1-\tau)(1-q)v_1\}}_{\text{expected child utility internalized}}. \tag{5}$$

- Parents choose efforts of parenting, τ, to maximize utility

$$FOC: \quad c'(\tau) = \lambda(1-q)(v_0 - v_1). \tag{6}$$

Predictions

$$FOC: \quad c'(\tau) = \lambda(1-q)(v_0 - v_1). \tag{7}$$

$$\frac{\partial \tau}{\partial (v_0 - v_1)} = \frac{1}{c''(\tau)} \lambda (1-q) \tag{8}$$

$(v_0 - v_1)$ = utility premium of non-professionals; λ = how much child utility is internalized; $(1-q)$ = prob of children socialized into a professional

1. $\frac{\partial \tau}{\partial (v_0 - v_1)} > 0$: CR experience ($v_0 - v_1 \uparrow$, greater stigma of professionals) motivates parenting towards non-professional jobs
   - In line with previous findings
2. $\frac{\partial^2 \tau}{\partial (v_0 - v_1) \partial \lambda} > 0$: more parenting efforts if parents care more about children's choice ($\lambda \uparrow$)
3. $\frac{\partial^2 \tau}{\partial (v_0 - v_1) \partial (1-q)} > 0$: more parenting efforts if more worried about children being "misled" by external factors ($1 - q \uparrow$)

Evidence for Predictions 2 & 3

- P2: λ = son, parents care more about sons due to son preferences (Col 1–2)
- P3: $1 - q$ = share of professionals/professional wage rate — stronger external pull towards professional occupations (Col 3–6)

Table: Mechanism: Preference Transmission

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$R \times D^f$	1.354	1.626	-4.083***	-2.356**	-5.243***	-2.950**
	(2.603)	(2.095)	(1.439)	(1.016)	(1.777)	(1.157)
$R \times D^f \times$ Son	-6.866*	-4.889*				
	(3.834)	(2.820)				
$R \times D^f \times$ %Professionals (std.)			-7.047***	-2.679**		
			(2.441)	(1.248)		
$R \times D^f \times$ Professional wage (std.)					-5.731*	-3.130**
					(2.990)	(1.228)
College		35.114***		35.137***		35.119***
		(0.422)		(0.434)		(0.431)
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Province*cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Parent cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	379109	379109	349663	349663	359315	359315
R^2	0.095	0.211	0.095	0.212	0.095	0.212

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

CR Effects on Specific Attitudes

- Use individual survey (China Family Panel Study). Regressions control for han ethnicity, *hukou*, marital status, education, communist partisanship
- Cols 1–2: replicate main findings using survey data
- Cols 3–8: risk aversion, attitudes toward wealth, beliefs in efforts

Table: Effects on Preferences and Attitudes

	Professional Job		Certainty Equivalent		Wealth = Success		Efforts Rewarded	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$R \times D$	-5.469*	-10.149***	-13.409*	-14.032*	-0.291**	-0.279**	-0.032	-0.008
	(3.251)	(2.953)	(7.596)	(8.276)	(0.116)	(0.122)	(0.063)	(0.064)
D.V. mean	5.561	5.698	70.088	70.088	0.766	0.766	0.880	0.880
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Parents cohort FE		Y		Y		Y		Y
Covariates		Y		Y		Y		Y
Obs.	10897	10636	10430	10430	10636	10636	10636	10636
R^2	0.043	0.212	0.046	0.060	0.095	0.105	0.034	0.050

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

On the Third Generation

- Previous: parent → child
- Now: parent → child → **grandchild**, how does a child educate grandchild?
- Lower expectations on third generation's occupation and educational attainment

Table: Effects on Expectations for on Children

	Professional Job Expected (0/1)		Schooling Expected (Cont.)		College Expected (0/1)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$R \times D^f$	-0.390	-0.388	-2.349***	-2.007***	-0.192*	-0.149
	(0.295)	(0.234)	(0.815)	(0.641)	(0.102)	(0.125)
D.V. mean	0.619	0.620	15.647	15.647	0.851	0.851
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Father cohort FE		Y		Y		Y
Grand parents cohort FE		Y		Y		Y
Covariates		Y		Y		Y
Obs.	2357	2357	2754	2754	2754	2754
R^2	0.075	0.190	0.111	0.170	0.109	0.164

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

Outline

Conclusions

- CR has long-run effects on occupational choice. Children are less likely to be a professional if their fathers were exposed to rampant violence at the time
- Some of the effect is rendered by stigma associated with professionals during CR
- The distaste has been transmitted across generations and influence attitudes

Appendix

Data Compilation

- Stanford sociologist Andrew Walder complied the data, based on local annals
  - Local annals are published by governments to document local histories, which have contents about political events and causalities in CR
- These data inevitably contain measurement errors. If they were random, then they just attenuate estimates. Two possibilities are concerning:
  1. **State capacity:** lower death tolls may mean that less resources can be used in compilation
  2. **Censoring:** the govt may be incentivized to deliberately underreport
- If true, two concerns are in favor of finding a **positive** relationship b/t being a professionals and the Revolution: low death tolls represent worse economic conditions and/or a leadership caring more about political control than development
- Taken into account in empirics: (1) DiD relies on exposure variations for identification; (2) flexible controls; (3) robustness of including correlates of reported death tolls

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Spatial Distribution of Toll Deaths



Figure: Spatial Distribution of Toll Deaths

Historical Variables

Table: Summary Statistics for Historical Variables Back

	(1) High Intensity	(2) Low Intensity	(3) Diff. (1)-(2)
%CPC members, 1960s (ppt.)	2.387	2.153	0.233
	(0.721)	(0.599)	(0.153)
Sex ratio, 1964 (std.)	-0.176	-0.055	-0.121
	(0.623)	(0.958)	(0.188)
%Juren, 1971-1904 (log)	1.981	2.249	-0.268
	(0.724)	(1.092)	(0.216)
Primary and secondary schools, 1900 (log)	3.932	4.423	-0.491
	(1.639)	(1.393)	(0.350)
Colleges, 1947 (log)	2.168	3.128	-0.961*
	(1.785)	(1.948)	(0.433)
Population density, 1953 (log)	2.777	3.419	-0.642**
	(1.013)	(0.855)	(0.216)
Agricultural suitability	2.938	3.138	-0.200
	(0.650)	(0.716)	(0.158)
Urban population, 1920 (log)	-4.539	-4.143	-0.396
	(1.472)	(1.156)	(0.304)
Colony in late Qing (std.)	-0.210	0.172	-0.382
	(0.000)	(1.340)	(0.223)
Longitude	112.322	114.760	-2.438*
	(5.579)	(4.429)	(1.159)
Latitude	31.325	31.540	-0.215
	(6.196)	(3.937)	(1.189)
Mass revolts in Qing (std.)	-0.273	0.209	-0.481*
	(0.513)	(0.978)	(0.183)
Social organizations, 1935 (log)	3.359	3.449	-0.090
	(0.331)	(0.374)	(0.082)
Clan density in Ming-Qing (log)	0.054	0.121	-0.068
	(0.471)	(1.619)	(0.280)
Obs.	110	125	

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

CR Correlates



Figure: Correlations of R with Historical Variables

Add CR Correlates



Figure: Estimate After Including CR Correlates

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Selection on Migration

Table: Robustness Check: Selective Migration

	(1) All 2000	(2) Stayers 2000
$R \times D^f$	-3.979**	-2.996***
	(1.604)	(1.056)
D.V. mean	7.082	4.828
R mean	0.039	0.038
Prefecture FE	Y	Y
Province $\times$ cohort FE	Y	Y
Parent cohort FE	Y	Y
Covariates	Y	Y
Obs.	325491	241805
R^2	0.088	0.060

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

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Selection on Coresidence

Table: Robustness Check: Selective Co-Residence

	D.V.: 100 × Child Co-residence Dummy	
	(1)	(2)
$R \times D$	1.102	
	(4.649)	
$R \times D^f$		-4.315
		(4.769)
$R \times D^m$		7.137
		(4.924)
D.V. mean	19.878	19.878
Prefecture FE	Y	Y
Province × cohort FE	Y	Y
Parent cohort FE	Y	Y
Covariates	Y	Y
Obs.	2956028	2956028
R^2	0.183	0.183

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

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Timing Placebo

- Falsify violence time from 1966–1971 to 1956–1960 or 1960–1965

Table: Robustness Check: CR Time Placebo

	(1) Falsified to 1954–1959	(2) Falsified to 1960–1965
$R \times D^f$	3.217	-2.167
	(2.299)	(2.266)
D.V. mean	7.314	7.314
Prefecture FE	Y	Y
Province × cohort FE	Y	Y
Parent cohort FE	Y	Y
Covariates	Y	Y
Obs.	127520	127520
R^2	0.048	0.048

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

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Spatial Placebo



Figure: Robustness Check: CR Intensity Placebo Test

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Alternative Definition of R

Table: Robustness Check: Alternative Measurement of CR Intensity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	$\tilde{R}$ = ln(1+%CR deaths)	$\tilde{R}$ = %CR victims	$\tilde{R}$ = ln(1+%CR victims)	$\tilde{R}$ = Toll Deaths (std.)	$\tilde{R}$ = Toll Victims (std.)
$\tilde{R} \times D^r$	-8.962**	-0.303	-1.534**	-1.523***	-1.886***
	(4.358)	(0.190)	(0.671)	(0.516)	(0.459)
D.V. mean	7.425	7.425	7.425	7.422	7.422
$\tilde{R}$ mean	0.038	1.970	0.896	0.000	0.000
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Province $\times$ cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Parent cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	379109	379109	379109	379294	379294
R^2	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.066

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

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Alternative Definition of D

Table: Robustness Check: Alternative Measurement of CR Exposure

	(1) Cont. Exposure, 1966–71	(2) Binary Exposure, 1966–76	(3) Cont. Exposure, 1966–76
$R \times \tilde{D}^f$	-7.145*	-6.990*	-10.066*
	(4.245)	(3.634)	(5.228)
D.V. mean	7.425	7.425	7.425
Prefecture FE	Y	Y	Y
Province × cohort FE	Y	Y	Y
Parent cohort FE	Y	Y	Y
Covariates	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	379109	379109	379109
R^2	0.065	0.065	0.065

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

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Heterogeneity-Robust Estimates



Figure: Heterogeneity-Robust Estimates

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