


# Understanding Open Ports in Android Applications: Discovery, Diagnosis, and Security Assessment

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# The First Step: Discovering Open Ports in Apps

Static Analysis

OPAnalyzer [EuroS&P'17]

## Issues:

dynamic code loading,  
complex implicit flows,  
and code obfuscation.

In-lab Dynamic  
Analysis

Cannot mimic real user  
inputs to driven apps

Difficult to recognize  
random port numbers



## Crowdsourcing Discovery

Leverage users' interaction  
with their smartphones to  
monitor open ports

# NetMon: On-device Open Port Monitoring

NetMon		:		
NETWORK SCAN		PORT MONITOR		
App Icon	App Name (# of port records)	TCP Ports	UDP Ports	Last Seen
	Nearby Service 2421 total records	8187	3942 1900	11:47 Jan 9
	Messenger 3401 total records	52610 etc.	N/A	11:42 Jan 9
	Pages Manager 201 total records	40672 etc.	N/A	11:42 Jan 9
	WhatsApp 67 total records	N/A	58560 etc.	11:02 Jan 9
	YouTube 2004 total records	57885 etc.	48639 etc.	10:32 Jan 9
	DU Cleaner 27 total records	52433	N/A	23:53 Jan 8
	WeChat 194 total records	N/A	47463 etc.	23:43 Jan 8
	App Backup & Restore 94 total records	7080	N/A	21:33 Jan 8


← Net Mon

YouTube's raw open-port records:			
Type	Port	IP address	Time
UDP4	2708	192.168.1.184	00:24 Jan 9
UDP4	44818	192.168.1.184	00:24 Jan 9
TCP6	43976	127.0.0.1	00:24 Jan 9
UDP4	2708	192.168.1.184	00:18 Jan 9
UDP4	44818	192.168.1.184	00:18 Jan 9
TCP6	43976	127.0.0.1	00:18 Jan 9
UDP4	2708	192.168.1.184	00:13 Jan 9
UDP4	44818	192.168.1.184	00:13 Jan 9
TCP6	43976	127.0.0.1	00:13 Jan 9

Available on Google Play since October 2016

<https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.netmon>

# Port Monitoring Mechanism




```
$ cat /proc/net/tcp6      (accessible also on the latest Android 8 and 9)
  sl local_address          remote_address          st tx_queue
  rx_queue tr tm->when retrnsmt  uid
  0: 0000000000000000 FFFF0000100007F:9AE0
  00000000000000000000000000000000:0000 0A 00000000:00000000
  00:00000000 00000000 10156
  1: 0000000000000000 FFFF0000100007F:EC22
  00000000000000000000000000000000:0000 0A 00000000:00000000
  00:00000000 00000000 10272
  2: 0000000000000000 FFFF00002600040A:E8EA
  0000000000000000FFFF00006B72662F:01BB 06 00000000:00000000
  03:00001279 00000000 0
  3: 0000000000000000 FFFF00002600040A:84B0
  0000000000000000FFFF00005FC2D9AC:01BB 08 00000000:00000001
  00:00000000 00000000 10015
```

Periodically analyze proc with minimal overhead

# Server-side Open-Port Analytic Engine

UID	App	Type	IP	Port	Time	App	Type	IP	Port
U1	Netflix	UDP4	0.0.0.0	1900	T1	Netflix	TCP4	0.0.0.0	9080
U1	Netflix	UDP4	0.0.0.0	39798	T1	Netflix	UDP4	0.0.0.0	1900
U2	Netflix	UDP4	0.0.0.0	1900	T2				
U2	Netflix	UDP4	0.0.0.0	32799	T2				
.....									
Ux	Netflix	TCP4	0.0.0.0	9080	Tx	App	Type	IP	Port
Uy	Netflix	TCP4	0.0.0.0	9080	Ty	Netflix	UDP4	0.0.0.0	Random




# Server-side Open-Port Analytic Engine

Raw port monitoring records from crowdsourcing  
(Using Netflix's TCP4/UDP4 ports as examples)

UID	App	Type	IP	Port	Time
U1	Netflix	UDP4	0.0.0.0	1900	T1
U1	Netflix	UDP4	0.0.0.0	39798	T1
U2	Netflix	UDP4	0.0.0.0	1900	T2
U2	Netflix	UDP4	0.0.0.0	32799	T2
.....					
Ux	Netflix	TCP4	0.0.0.0	9080	Tx
Uy	Netflix	TCP4	0.0.0.0	9080	Ty
.....					
Un	App N	UDP6	127.0.0.1	51663	Tn
Uo	Facebook	TCP6	127.0.0.1	46467	To
Up	WeChat	TCP4	192.x.x.x	9014	Tp
Uq	WeChat	TCP4	10.20.x.x	9014	Tq


Step 1: Aggregation



# Server-side Open-Port Analytic Engine

uring  
ples)

Time  
T1  
T1  
T2  
T2  
Tx  
Ty  
Tn  
To  
Tp  
Tq



# Server-side Open-Port Analytic Engine


Step 2: Clustering by occurrences

Netflix's T4 Subset	
Port	% User
9080	100%

.....  
(Other subsets)

Netflix's U4 Subset	
Port	% User
1900	100%
39798	3.6%
32799	2.4%

.....



Unsure ports

Random ports

Step 3: Clustering  
by three heuristics according to  
the port distribution

Heuristic I:

For ports *all* in the random range

Heuristic II:

For ports in *both* ranges

Heuristic III:

For ports *all* in the fixed range

Clustered per-app open ports  
for our analysis

App	Type	IP	Port
Netflix	TCP4	0.0.0.0	9080
Netflix	UDP4	0.0.0.0	1900

App	Type	IP	Port
Ports determined by heuristics			

App	Type	IP	Port
Netflix	UDP4	0.0.0.0	Random

# Crowdsourced Open Port Results

- The ten-month data:
  - 3,293 user phones from 136 different countries
  - 26% are from US, while diverse for others
- 40M port monitoring records:
  - 2,778 open-port apps
  - And their 4,954 open ports
- The effectiveness:
  - Discovered 2,284 apps with TCP open ports, vs. 1,632 apps detected in state-of-the-art research [EuroS&P'17].
  - In a controlled set of apps with TCP open ports, 25.1% of them use dynamic or obfuscated codes for open ports.
- The pervasiveness:
  - Correlated with top 3,216 apps from Google Play, 492 of them are with open ports.
  - Pervasiveness: 15.3%.

# Open Ports in 925 Popular Apps

Category	App Name	Type	IP <sup>†</sup>	Port	
Social	Facebook	TCP	L	Random	
	Instagram	TCP	L	Random	
	Google+	TCP	H	Random	
		TCP	L	Random	
	VK	TCP	H	48329	
		TCP	L	Random	
Communication	Messenger	TCP	L	Random	
	WeChat	TCP	H	9014	
	Skype	TCP	H	Random	
		TCP	L	Random	
	Chrome	TCP	L	5555	
	Firefox	TCP	H	8080	
		TCP	L	Random	
		UDP	H	1900	
Video Players or Music & Audio	YouTube	TCP	H	Random	
		TCP	L	Random	
	GPlay Music	TCP	L	Random	
		UDP	H	1900	
	Spotify	TCP	H	Random	
	Amazon Music	TCP	L	Random	
		TCP	H	Random	
	Tools	Google Play Services	UDP	H	2346
		UDP	H	5353	
		Google	TCP	H	20817
		Clean Master	TCP	L	Random
		360 Security	TCP	L	Random
Productivity	Avast	TCP	H	20817	
		TCP	L	Random	
	Google Drive	TCP	L	Random	
	Cloud Print	UDP	H	5353	
	ES File Explorer	TCP	H	42135	
Entertainment		TCP	H	59777	
		TCP	L	Random	
		UDP	H	5353	
GPlay Games	TCP	L	Random		
	Netflix	TCP	H	9080	
		UDP	H	1900	
		UDP	L	Random	
	Peer Smart Remote	TCP	L	Random	
		UDP	H	5353	
Games	Plants vs. Zombies 2	UDP	H	24024	
	Asphalt 8	TCP	H	7940	
	Solitaire	TCP	L	Random	
	Sonic Dash	TCP	L	Random	
	11				

# Open Ports in 755 Built-in Apps

Table 2: Top ten device vendors that include open-port apps.

Vendor	#	Top Five Open Port Numbers				
Samsung	186	UDP:	5060	68	1900	6100
		TCP:	5060	6100	6000	7080
LG	75	UDP:	68	1900	19529	5060
		TCP:	5060	59150	59152	8382
Sony	69	UDP:	68	1024	1900	1901
		TCP:	5000	5900	5001	9000
Qualcomm	42	UDP:	68	5060	1900	32012
		TCP:	5060	6100	4000	4500
MediaTek	26	UDP:	68	5060	50001	50002
		TCP:	5060	50001	-	-
Lenovo	25	UDP:	68	5060	50000	50001
		TCP:	2999	5060	50001	55283
Motorola	21	UDP:	68	32012	16800	-
		TCP:	2631	20817	-	-
Huawei	13	UDP:	68	1900	8108	-
		TCP:	-	-	-	-
ASUS	13	UDP:	68	5353	11572	11574
		TCP:	2222	5577	8258	8282
XiaoMi	11	UDP:	68	1900	5353	-
		TCP:	6000	8081	8682	-

More than half of these built-in apps contain UDP open port 68.

One quarter (175 apps, 23.2%) have TCP/UDP port 5060 open.

41 Samsung and 16 LG models modify some Android AOSP apps to introduce port 5060.

- TCP port 6000 in Xiaomi Browser
- UDP port 19529 in LG's 18 apps

While crowdsourcing is effective in discovering open ports, it does not reveal the code-level information for more in-depth understanding or diagnosis.

# Open Port Diagnosis via Static Analysis

SDK?



1

```
// API #1-#3  
ServerSocket(int port);  
ServerSocket(int port, int backlog);  
ServerSocket(int port, int backlog, InetAddress addr);  
  
// API #4-#6  
SSLServerSocket(int port);  
SSLServerSocket(int port, int backlog);  
SSLServerSocket(int port, int backlog, InetAddress addr);  
  
// API #7-#9  
//class ServerSocketFactory:  
createServerSocket(int port);  
createServerSocket(int port, int backlog);  
createServerSocket(int port, int backlog, InetAddress addr);  
  
// API #10-#11  
//ServerSocket socket = new ServerSocket();  
socket.bind(SocketAddress addr);  
socket.bind(SocketAddress addr, int backlog);
```

2

Insecure  
parameters?

**Listing 1: All ServerSocket constructor APIs.**


# Diagnosis I: Open-Port SDKs

- Out of the 1,520 open-port apps:
  - 61.8% are solely due to SDKs;  
Facebook SDK is the major contributor.
  - 13 open-port SDKs detected:

SDK	Pattern	#
Facebook Audience Network SDK [17]	Class='com.facebook.ads.%', Tag=ProxyCache, Ip=127.0.0.1, Port=0, Backlog=8	897
Yandex Metrica SDK [38]	Class='com.yandex.metrica.%', Port=29009 30102	28
CyberGarage UPnP SDK [14]	Class=org.cybergarage.http.HTTPServer, Ip=getHostAddress(), Port=8058 8059	19
MIT App Inventor SDK [25]	Class=com.google.appinventor.components.runtime.util.NanoHTTPD, Port=8001	19
Tencent XG Push SDK [36]	Class=com.tencent.android.tpush.service.XGWatchdog, Port=RANDOM+55000	13
Corona Game Engine SDK [13]	Class=com.ansca.corona.CoronaVideoView, Port=0, Backlog=8	11
Alibaba AMap SDK [4]	Class='com.amap.%', Port=43689	9
Millennial Ad SDK [24]	Class='com.millennialmedia.android.%', Tag=MillennialMediaAdSDK, Ip=null, Port=0	8
PhoneGap SDK [28]	Class=com.phonegap.CallbackServer, Port=0	6
Titanium SDK [37]	Class=org.appcelerator.kroll.common.TiFastDev, Tag=TiFastDev, Port=7999	6
Aol AdTech SDK [8]	Class=com.adtech.mobilesdk.publisher.cache.NanoHTTPD, Port=RANDOM+9000	6
Apache Cordova SDK [9]	Class=org.apache.cordova.CallbackServer, Port=0	4
Getui Push SDK [18]	Class='com.igexin.push.%', Port=48432 51688, Ip=0.0.0.0	3

# Diagnosis II: Insecure API Usages

Did not set the IP addr param or set it “null”.



**20.7% (120/581) open-port apps adopt convenient but insecure API usages.**

In the last phase of our pipeline,  
we perform three novel  
**security assessments of open ports.**


# Vulnerability Patterns Identified in Open Ports

ID	Vulnerability Patterns	Representative Apps Affected
P1	No/insufficient checks for information transmission	Terminate on-going sessions by sending two UDP packets Baidu ROM, Coolpad V1, iPhone
P2	No/insufficient checks for command execution	Crash Instagram by sending just a HTTP request Skype, Instagram
P3	Crash-of-Service (CoS)	
P4	Stealthy Data Inflation	Facebook SDK, Instagram
P5	Insecure Analytics Interface	Weibo, Alibaba & Baidu SDKs

Some open ports are used as an **analytics interface** for their companion websites.

Send a HTTP URL request pointing to a large file, to maliciously **inflate victim apps' cellular data usage** in the background.

# Denial-of-Service Attack Evaluation



# Inter-device Connectivity Measurement

Net Mon NetMon :


**NETWORK SCAN**      **PORT MONITOR**

Lan IP Type	Net Name	Host No.	Avg RTT	Scan Time
192.168.0.100	Just a Router	4	112.6ms	09:31 Nov 12
100.135.147.32	Singtel	35	428.8ms	22:32 Nov 8
10.4.8.137	ASUS	31	32.8ms	21:14 Nov 8
10.4.8.137	ASUS	32	58.9ms	21:13 Nov 8
100.135.147.32	Singtel	22	562.4ms	11:40 Nov 8
192.168.1.183	Zhou	1	797.0ms	23:28 Nov 7
100.135.147.32	Singtel	33	475.2ms	23:17 Nov 7
100.135.147.32	Singtel	26	401.6ms	22:50 Nov 7
10.169.1.54	WLAN-SMU	11	125.0ms	22:34 Nov 7
100.135.147.32	Singtel	21	500.0ms	20:55

Below are all scan records: (click for details)

**DISCOVER LAN HOSTS**

Remote open-port attacks require the victim device to be connected (**intra- or inter-network**).



Allow **intra-network** connectivity (in the same network)

23 cellular

10 WiFi

Allow **inter-network** connectivity due to using public IP

# Conclusion & Takeaway

- We proposed the first [open-port analysis pipeline](#).
- We found open ports in [many popular and built-in apps](#), and also in [SDKs](#).
- We performed [comprehensive security assessments](#):
  - Vulnerabilities in popular apps, DoS experiments, real connectivity measurement.

