

Title of the Paper

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Abstract Write your abstract here.

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Acknowledgements

Abstract

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Mini TOC

Chapter 2

Preliminaries

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Chapter 3

Finding good Factorization Trees

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Distributed Query Processing in FDB

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Experimental Evaluation

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In this section we will present experimental evaluation for the main contributions of this project, namely the *COST* function for finding good f-trees (see Chapter), the serialization techniques explained in **Chapter XX** and D-FDB, the distributed query engine as presented in **Chapter X**.

6.1 Datasets and evaluation setup

6.2 COST function – Finding good f-trees

6.3 Serialization of Data Factorizations

Chapter 7

Conclusions and Future Work

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A player faces a dynamic optimization problem of 5 periods. Let \mathbf{a}_t denotes the player's action in period t ,

$$\mathbf{a}_t \in \{P, N\} \tag{1}$$

We denote the vector of action choices by $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, a_2, a_3)$. Playing in a period yields an immediately consumption level of x at a certain future cost, to be paid at period 4, while not playing yields no consumption and incurs no cost, so

$$x_t = \begin{cases} x & \text{if } a_t = P \\ 0 & \text{if } a_t = N \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

The player observe x in period 1 before she pick her action.

Let C_s denotes total cost for playing s games and S_t the number of games played up till and including time t .

This paper.¹ Theoretically, ...

The issue of ...

This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents ... Then, Section 3 discusses

¹ Ashraf et. al [1] uses a ...

the ... Section 4 analyzes the ... Concluding remarks are offered in Section 5.

References

Ashraf, Nava, Dean Karlan and Wesley Yin. “Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 121, No. 2, pp. 635-672. May 2006.