Title of the Paper

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Abstract Write your abstract here.
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1 Introduction

This paper.[1] Theoretically, ...
The issue of ...
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents ... Then, Section 3 discusses the ... Section 4 analyzes the ... Concluding remarks are offered in Section 5.

2 Model

2.1 Setup

2.2 Model

A player faces a dynamic optimization problem of 5 periods. Let a_t denotes the player's action in period t,

$$a_t \in \{P, N\} \tag{1}$$

We denote the vector of action choices by $\boldsymbol{a} = (a_1, a_2, a_3)$. Playing in a period yields an immediately consumption level of x at a certain future cost, to be paid at period 4, while not playing yields no consumption and incurs no cost, so

$$x_t = \begin{cases} x & if\ a_t = P \\ 0 & if\ a_t = N \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

The player observe x in period 1 before she pick her action.
Let C_s denotes total cost for playing s games and S_t the number of games played up till and including time t.

2.3 Implications

[1] Ashraf et. al [1] uses a ...

References

Ashraf, Nava, Dean Karlan and Wesley Yin. "Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines." Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 121, No. 2, pp. 635-672. May 2006.