LEONIE BAUMANN

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CURRENT POSITION

Assistant Professor (tenure-track), Department of Economics, McGill University, since 2019

GRADUATE STUDIES

Ph.D. in Economics (summa cum laude), University of Hamburg, Germany, 2012-17

Thesis title: Essays on Social Interactions in Microeconomic Theory
Committee: Anke Gerber (primary advisor), Andreas Lange (secondary advisor),
Gerd Mühlheusser, Lydia Mechtenberg

Summer School of the Econometric Society: Frontiers in Microeconomic Theory, 08/2014

M.Sc. in Economics, University of Hamburg, 2009-12

UNDERGRADUATE STUDIES

B.A. in Economics (with distinction), University of Siegen, Germany, 2005-09

B.A. in Literary, Cultural and Media Studies, University of Siegen, 2004-09

ERASMUS Exchange, Department of Economics, University of Orléans, France, 01-06/2008

RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS

Economic Theory, Networks, Mechanism Design, Game Theory

Additional teaching interests:
Economics of Information, Environmental Economics, Industrial Organization

RESEARCH AND WORK EXPERIENCE

Postdoctoral Research Associate, Cambridge-INET Institute, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, 2016-19

Postdoctoral Associate, Christ's College, Cambridge, 2017-18

Bye-Fellow, Christ's College, Cambridge, 2016-17

Research and Teaching Assistant for Anke Gerber (Microeconomic Theory and Experiments), University of Hamburg, 2012-16

Visiting Student Researcher with Matthew Jackson, Stanford University, 02-04/2014

Research Assistant for Jann Lay (Project "Large Scale Land Acquisitions and Sustainable Development"), German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany, 2010-11

Student Assistant for Rüdiger Pethig (Environmental Economics), University of Siegen, 01-09/2009

WORKING PAPERS

Self-Ratings and Peer Review (2018)
    The previous version of this paper is *Identifying the Best Agent in a Network* (2016). First version: 2016.

A Model of Weighted Network Formation (2019)
    2nd round R&R at *Theoretical Economics.*
    The previous version of this paper is *Time Allocation in Friendship Networks* (2015). First version: 2014.

Demand Cycles and Heterogeneous Conformity Preferences (2019)
    R&R at *Journal of Economic Theory.* First version: 2017.

PRESENTATIONS

2020   scheduled: Universite Laval, University of East Anglia

2019   ITAM; McGill University; University of Vienna; Queen's University; Birkbeck, University of London; Aix-Marseille School of Economics; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; Canadian Economic Theory Conference; University of East Anglia Theory Workshop; Universite de Montreal (scheduled)

2018   Paris School of Economics; Northwestern (Kellogg Strategy); HU Berlin; BiNoMa Workshop; Barcelona GSE Summer Forum: Networks Workshop; Oxford

2017   Third Annual Conference on Network Science and Economics; Coalition Theory Network Annual Workshop; BiNoMa Workshop; University of Kent; Econometric

Society European Meeting; VfS Annual Conference; Warsaw University; Networks Reading Group Cambridge

2016   Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn; University of Essex; Cambridge-INET Institute (2); University of Bonn; Second Annual Conference on Network Science and Economics, Stanford University; Málaga University; III MOMA Meeting

2015   Annual Congress of the European Economic Association; World Congress of the Econometric Society; Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement for Economic Theory; Coalition Theory Network Annual Workshop; Workshop on Networks, Queen Mary University

2014   PhD Seminar, University of Hamburg; Networks Discussion Group, Stanford University

SHORT VISITS

2018   Paris School of Economics (1 week); Northwestern; Stanford (each 2 weeks)

2017   University of Bonn; Warsaw University (each 1 week)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Game Theory, Welfare, and Applications & Economics of Uncertainty and Information
Supervisions for 2nd year undergraduates in Economics, Christ's College, Cambridge, 2016-18

Microeconomics
Tutorial for 1st year undergraduates in Economics (in German), University of Hamburg, summer 2012, 2015

Microeconomics II
Tutorial for 2nd year undergraduates in Economics (in German), University of Hamburg, winter 2013-14

Economics of Information
Tutorial for 3rd year undergraduates in Economics (in German and English), University of Hamburg, winter 2012-14

Microeconomics for Business Administration students
Tutorial for 1st year undergraduates (in German), University of Hamburg, summer 2013

SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS

Econometric Society World Congress Travel Grant, 2015
Hamburglobal, 2014
Travel subsidy out of the corporate capital of the University of Hamburg, 2014, 2015
ERASMUS foreign exchange scholarship, 2008

REFEREE SERVICE

Czech Economic Review, Economics Letters, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Theoretical Economics

ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE

Organization of Networks Reading Group at Cambridge-INET, 2016-19

Organization of Workshop on Networks at Cambridge-INET, 04/2017

Member of the Faculty Council of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, University of Hamburg, 2013-15

Member of the hiring committee for two Assistant Professors in Economics at the Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, 04-06/2011

LANGUAGES

German (native), English (fluent), French (good), Spanish (good)

CITIZENSHIP

German

REFERENCES

Sanjeev Goyal (Postdoc advisor), University of Cambridge, sg472@cam.ac.uk

Anke Gerber (PhD advisor), University of Hamburg, anke.gerber@uni-hamburg.de

Matthew Elliott, University of Cambridge, mle30@cam.ac.uk

Matthew Jackson, Stanford University, jacksonm@stanford.edu

Francis Bloch, Paris School of Economics, francis.bloch@univ-paris1.fr

Self-Ratings and Peer Review

Job Market Paper

Previous versions of this paper were titled *Identifying the Best Agent in a Network* (first version: 2016).

The paper designs direct mechanisms without transfers for a principal to always allocate a prize to the best agent when agents' knowledge about each other is determined by a network. Agents send statements about themselves (applications) and about their network neighbors (references) to the principal. Lying is only possible to a certain extent. In this setup, Maskin-/Bayesian-monotonicity and the revelation principle fail. We design a mechanism which implements the choice of the best agent via untruthful equilibria. The mechanism selects an agent for the prize as a function of best applications and worst references. If the network is complete, the mechanism fully implements selecting the best agent. For a larger class of networks, an extended version of the mechanism fully implements the principal's objective, if agents only lie when lying increases their chances of winning. The model relates to employee performance evaluation and peer-review processes in academia.

A Model of Weighted Network Formation

2nd round R&R at *Theoretical Economics.* Previous versions of this paper were titled *Time Allocation in Friendship Networks* (first version: 2014).

The paper proposes a game of weighted network formation in which each agent has a limited resource to form links of possibly different intensities with other agents and to use for private purposes. We show that every equilibrium is either "reciprocal" or "non-reciprocal". In a reciprocal equilibrium, any two agents invest equally in the link between them. In a non-reciprocal equilibrium, agents are partitioned into "concentrated" and "diversified" agents and a concentrated agent is only linked to diversified agents and vice versa. For every link, the concentrated agent invests more in the link than the diversified agent. The unweighted relationship graph of an equilibrium, in which two agents are linked if they both invest positively in each other, uniquely predicts the equilibrium values of each agent's network investment and utility level, as well as the ratio of any two agents' investments in each other. We show that equilibria are not pairwise stable and not efficient due to the positive externalities of investing in a link.

Demand Cycles and Heterogeneous Conformity Preferences

R&R at *Journal of Economic Theory*.

The paper analyzes the dynamics of demand for three options when agents differ in their preferences for conformity. Each agent seeks to imitate others who are more individualistic and to distinguish herself from others who are more conformist, relative to herself. In each period, every agent chooses her utility-maximizing option given each agent's demand in the previous period. It is shown that for a large class of initial demand distributions, demand dynamics resemble fashion cycles: Total demand for each option over time is wave-like, and, when positively demanded, an option trickles through the entire population, from individualistic towards conformist agents.