

TABLE 2 Development, Democracy, and Leader Change

	(A) 1960–2000, All Countries					(B) 1820–2008, Polity2 <sub>t-1</sub> < 6					(C) 1875–2004, Polity2 <sub>t-1</sub> < 6					
	1-yr. (1)	5-yr. (2)	10-yr. (3)	15-yr. (4)	20-yr. (5)	1-yr. (6)	5-yr. (7)	10-yr. (8)	15-yr. (9)	20-yr. (10)	1-yr. (11)	5-yr. (12)	10-yr. (13)	15-yr. (14)	20-yr. (15)	10-yr. (16)
Polity2 <sub>t-1</sub>	.88*** (.01)	.47*** (.05)	.15* (.09)	-.03 (.10)	-.17* (.09)	.92*** (.01)	.62*** (.06)	.29*** (.09)	.27*** (.12)	.10 (.10)	.91*** (.01)	.53*** (.07)	.16* (.10)	.12 (.14)	-.01 (.11)	.28** (.11)
Ln GDP per capita <sub>t-1</sub>	-.005 (.007)	.001 (.029)	.012 (.052)	.005 (.075)	-.019 (.115)	.002 (.004)	.03 (.02)	.13*** (.04)	.15*** (.05)	.22** (.09)	-.001 (.005)	.02 (.03)	.04 (.05)	-.03 (.06)	.09 (.11)	
Leader exited <sub>t-1</sub> <sup>a</sup>											-.08** (.04)	-.27** (.12)	-.64** (.25)	-1.06*** (.36)	-.84 (.58)	.05 (.05)
Ln GDP per capita <sub>t-1</sub> × Leader exited <sub>t-1</sub>											.012** (.005)	.04** (.02)	.10*** (.03)	.16*** (.05)	.13* (.08)	.02 (.03)
Average years schooling (age 15 and over) <sub>t-1</sub>																.03** (.02)
Average years schooling <sub>t-1</sub> × Leader exited <sub>t-1</sub>																
Cumulative effect of income	-.04	.00	.01	.01	-.02	.03	.09	.18***	.20***	.25**	.12	.12**	.17***	.16**	.22**	
If leader exited											-.01	.03	.05	-.03	.09	
If leader stayed																
Cumulative effect of schooling																.07*
If leader exited																.02
If leader stayed																
Fisher p level	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]	[.95]	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]	[.06]	[.00]
Observations	5,358	1,099	560	329	277	8,216	1,573	730	474	340	6,425	1,233	601	396	291	416
Countries	158	158	136	135	131	140	137	123	123	116	134	132	119	120	113	65
R-squared	.9492	.8274	.7780	.8038	.8135	.8836	.6422	.5852	.6261	.6925	.8703	.6237	.6037	.6745	.7343	.5569

Note: Dependent variable: Polity2, rescaled to range between 0 and 1; t-1: previous panel period. OLS with country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. Fisher p level: probability level at which one can reject H0: residuals are I(1), from Fisher test of residuals.

<sup>a</sup>Columns 12–16: To avoid attributing liberalization to leader changes caused by it, exit is coded 0 if period contains both a net increase in Polity2 and leader exit, but no net increase in Polity2 comes *after* a leader exited.

\* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Sources: See Table A18 in the supporting information.