Web appendix for "Territorial revision and state repression."*

The purpose of this appendix is to display the results of many of the robustness checks conducted for this project. While most of these results are presented without comment, because I believe they are fairly straightforward, such as those with different, but commonly used standards of democracy or with a slightly different control set. There are a few, described below, which I believe warrant some commentary. All of the tables are presented below my comments. The replication files which accompany this appendix contain the STATA code necessary to create these tables as well.

I have conducted analyses, employing similar models to what are presented in the paper, replacing the variable for revisionists with one for status quo states during territorial conflict, and I include that model below in Table 9 of this appendix. I coded the status-quo states as non-revisionists participating in the same MID number as the revisionists, and required that they be originators (involved on day 1), so they are the participants most likely to be defending territory. Joiners may have no interest in the territory itself and may be motivated by completely different factors for getting involved (alliance constraints for instance) and they are therefore not included.

The results in the above table overall do not show much of a relationship between MIDs fought on behalf of the territorial status quo and repression, either in the lower order terms or interacted with fatalities. Autocracies do not appear to change their behavior at all, either in non-fatal territorial MID years or as those years become more deadly. Democracies do show the opposite effect of revisionism as those territorial MID years become more deadly, by displaying a negative relationship. I attribute this to the idea that a rallying effect may politically strengthen democracies when targeted in territorial MIDs, such that repression may become less desirable. This finding might be compared to the findings of Gibler, Hutchison and Miller (2012) who find that individuals in states targeted by territorial MIDs are more likely to identify with their country as a whole, rather than their ethnic group, which they are more likely to identify with when their state is a territorial revisionist.

Another way of coding territorial conflict participation is to take dyadic dispute data, generated by the *EUGene* software (Bennett and Stam, 2000) or the Maoz (2005) dyadic dispute data, and then impute that dyadic data by each country in the dispute. I tried

*Wright, Thorin M. 2014. "Territorial Revision and State Repression." *Journal of Peace Research*. 2014. 51 (3): 375-387

this approach as well, in the interest of rigor. In the full sample analysis using a three term interaction (of democracy X territorial revisionist X fatalities), the results using the Maoz data were somewhat similar those those I present in the paper, and the results using the EUGene output were similar in the finding for democracies, albeit only in a one-tailed test. These results are displayed in Table 10 of this appendix. Neither the Maoz or EUGene option produced especially strong results in the split sample analysis of democracies or autocracies. Using the EUGene data yielded more observations of territorial revisionism. As for why this is the case, I am not sure, other than there could be some inconsistencies between the MID participant and dyadic MID data, or it is due to how EUGene compiles dyadic MID information. The Maoz data yielded roughly the same number of territorial revisionists, but there were discrepancies in the fatalities data. Using either of these other conflict data options thus showcases some sensitivity in my results. I prefer using the MID participant data, however, because it is monadic to begin with, so making it ready to merge into a country-year data set is simpler. The full sample interaction model results of using the three datasets for conflict are displayed in this memo (Table 2). In the interest of noting as many robustness checks as possible, I do note these findings in a footnote in the research design section.

During the review process, one of the concerns raised was that there was a potential fifth column effect, being driven by the presence of transborder minorities, and that was really driving the observed effects of territorial revision. I conducted robustness checks using data from Minorities at Risk (Davenport, 2003). They have a variable that indicates whether there is group presence in adjoining countries (the "numsegx" variable). I generated a dummy variable based on their number of groups with transnational ties variable to account for whether there was a transnational minority in any neighboring country. Because MAR data is only available annually from 1985 on, but includes data for every five years before that, I chose to use the 1975 values for 1977-1979, and the 1980 values from 1981-1984. Every observation not coded a 1 got coded as a zero. I then included the dummy variable in the models presented in Table 1 of the paper, and no results changed in any significant way, although, as one might expect, the dummy for transborder minorities is significant and positively related to repression.

I then interacted the transborder dummy with whether a state was a territorial revisionist. Doing so does not alter the major results of Table 1 in the revised paper (see Table 11 of the appendix). Only the significance for the non-fatal territorial revision variable drops out of conventional significance in the autocratic sample, but it is still significant in a one-tailed test at the 0.10 level.

My general take on this attempt at incorporating transborder minorities, both additively and multiplicatively, is that there are clear some fifth column mechanics at work, which is a part of my theoretical story. That being said, transborder minorities are not enough to push repressive action into place. The data themselves do not change much, year to year, for transborder minorities. Such groups present, like contiguity in interstate conflict research, an opportunity variable, in that they are potential targets for repression, but it requires some political action on the part of governments, in my story seeking to revise territory through militarized conflict, in order to them to be willing to make them targets of repression. Beyond perhaps a simple control for the presence of a transborder minority group, I am therefore hesitant to include the transborder minority variables in

my analysis, because I think this full investigation of their impact underscores the importance of conflict as the prime mover. That being said, because the presence of transborder minorities are so common, it would be interesting in future research to see if interstate conflict (not just territorial) is related to increased repression of 5th column groups (or generally) specifically when there are transborder minorities present in a conflict.

I also conducted robustness checks employing the CIRI dataset (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010). The results just aren't as strong with the CIRI data. I've included in the robustness check section of this memo the CIRI models that show results that are somewhat consistent with my argument. Again, fatalities do not impact repression, just the interaction between territorial revision and democracy. See Table 12 of this appendix for some of the CIRI models.

References

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Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	Full Sample	Democracies	Autocracies
PTS mean	2.573	1.983	2.938
PTS mode	2	1	3
PTS mean during Territorial Revision	3.288	2.802	3.522
PTS mode during Territorial Revision	3	2	3
Territorial Revisionist Observations	264	86	178
Fatality Mean	0.245	0.149	0.304
% Terr. Revisionist MID-years with Fatalities	42%	34%	46%
GDP (ln, t-1)	7.999	8.718	7.553
Population (ln, t-1)	9.080	9.223	8.989
Civil Conflict Observations	691	174	517
Non-Fatal MID most severe that year observations	999	426	573
Total Observations	3,538	1,353	2,185

Table 2: Democracies that increase repression during revisionist territorial MIDs

Country	Year	Country	Year
Colombia	1982	Pakistan	1994
Turkey	1985	Pakistan	1995
Venezuela	1986	Ecuador	1998
India	1987	Turkey	1998
Pakistan	1990	Pakistan	1998
Nicaragua	1991	Pakistan	1999
Armenia	1994	Philippines	1999
Turkey	1994	Cyprus	2001
Japan	1994		

These are the countries that increase repression by at least one category of the PTS, relative to the prior year during years of territorial MIDs.

Table 3: Democracies that increase repression during revisionist territorial MIDs with fatalities

Country	Year	Country	Year
Pakistan	1990	Pakistan	1994
Armenia	1994	Pakistan	1995
Turkey	1998	Pakistan	1998
Pakistan	1999	Cyprus	2001

These are the countries that increase repression by at least one category of the PTS, relative to the prior year during years of territorial MIDs.

Table 4: Autocracies that decrease repression during revisionist territorial MIDs with fatalities

Country	Year	Country	Year
China	1978	Thailand	1987
Uganda	1979	Yugoslavia	1992
USSR	1980	Croatia	1993
Vietnam	1980	China	1993
Argentina	1982	Azerbaijan	1995
Pakistan	1983	Sudan	1995
Pakistan	1984	Nigeria	1996
Mali	1985	Eritrea	1999
Iraq	1986	China	2001

These are the countries that increase repression by at least one category of the PTS, relative to the prior year during years of territorial MIDs.

Table 5: Effects of territorial revision on repression, 1977-2001. Employing "Any MID" control variable

	(1) Full Sample	(2) Full Sample	(3) Democracies	(4) Democracies	(5) Autocracies	(6) Autocracies
Territorial Revisionist	0.297*	0.366*	0.064	-0.125	0.296∧	0.484*
	(0.161)	(0.167)	(0.219)	(0.246)	(0.217)	(0.243)
MID Fatalities (max/year)	-0.014	0.016	-0.033	-0.174*	-0.018	0.048
	(0.047)	(0.060)	(0.082)	(0.097)	(0.058)	(0.071)
Terr. Rev. X Fatalities		-0.074		0.322*		-0.163∧
		(0.091)		(0.130)		(0.111)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.139**	0.138**	0.162**	0.166**	0.168**	0.163**
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.208**	-0.208**	-0.392**	-0.387**	-0.110*	-0.108*
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Civil Conflict	1.435**	1.433**	1.505**	1.583**	1.412**	1.425**
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.354)	(0.374)	(0.151)	(0.152)
Any MID	0.087	0.074	-0.077	-0.049	0.277**	0.240*
	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.165)	(0.161)	(0.106)	(0.110)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.617**	-0.618**				
	(0.113)	(0.114)				
Observations	3,538	3,538	1,353	1,353	2,185	2,185

Standard errors clustered on the country. One-tailed significance: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ∧ p<0.1

Table 6: Effects of territorial revision on repression, 1977-2001: State Department PTS scores

	Full Sample	Democracies	Autocracies
Territorial Revisionist in MID	0.220†	0.049	0.135
	(0.133)	(0.262)	(0.175)
Fatalities (max/year)	0.093	-0.057	0.156†
	(0.066)	(0.083)	(0.080)
Terr. Rev. X Fatalities	-0.064	0.174∧	-0.130
	(0.090)	(0.108)	(0.105)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.136**	0.113†	0.186**
	(0.033)	(0.064)	(0.040)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.208**	-0.367**	-0.115†
	(0.047)	(0.092)	(0.062)
Civil Conflict	1.442**	1.474**	1.456**
	(0.147)	(0.280)	(0.153)
Non Fatal MID	0.083	-0.058	0.258*
	(0.089)	(0.152)	(0.107)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.722**		
	(0.121)		
Observations	3,538	1,353	2,185

Robust standard errors clustered on the country. Significance: ** p| < |0.01, * p| < |0.05, †p| < |0.1, ∧p<0.1

Table 7: Effects of territorial revision on repression, 1977-2001: Cheibub & Gandhi democracy scores

	Full Sample	Democracies	Autocracies
Territorial Revisionist in MID	0.328*	-0.120	0.454†
	(0.162)	(0.244)	(0.237)
Fatalities (max/year)	0.043	-0.170*	0.135*
	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.065)
Terr. Rev. X Fatalities	-0.072	0.254†	-0.170∧
	(0.090)	(0.136)	(0.109)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.155**	0.181**	0.188**
	(0.033)	(0.061)	(0.040)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.221**	-0.464**	-0.093∧
	(0.046)	(0.096)	(0.059)
Civil Conflict	1.457**	1.712**	1.346**
	(0.156)	(0.346)	(0.160)
Non Fatal MID	0.135∧	0.116	0.234*
	(0.085)	(0.145)	(0.109)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.588**		
	(0.107)		
Observations	3,768	1,556	2,212

Standard errors clustered on the country. Significance: **p| < |0.01, * p| < |0.05, † p| < |0.1, ∧p<0.1

Table 8: Effects of territorial revision on repression, 1977-2001: democracy set at polity 7

	Full Sample	Democracies	Autocracies
Territorial Revisionist in MID	0.376*	-0.236	0.539*
	(0.163)	(0.265)	(0.223)
Fatalities (max/year)	0.047	-0.167∧	0.110∧
	(0.060)	(0.104)	(0.067)
Terr. Rev. X Fatalities	-0.081	0.323*	-0.181†
	(0.089)	(0.134)	(0.107)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.141**	0.175*	0.165**
	(0.033)	(0.069)	(0.038)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.192**	-0.380**	-0.111*
	(0.046)	(0.107)	(0.058)
Civil Conflict	1.451**	1.530**	1.458**
	(0.158)	(0.363)	(0.151)
Non Fatal MID	0.118∧	-0.085	0.283**
	(0.084)	(0.165)	(0.104)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.710**		
	(0.128)		
Observations	3,538	1,200	2,338

Standard errors clustered on the country. Significance: ** p| < |0.01, * p| < |0.05, † p| < |0.1 ∧ p<0.1

Table 9: Effects of territorial status quo on repression, 1977-2001

	Full Sample	Democracies	Autocracies
Status Quo State in Terr. MID	-0.224	-0.350	-0.182
	(0.192)	(0.399)	(0.252)
MID Fatalities (max/year)	0.035	0.062	0.057
	(0.054)	(0.081)	(0.061)
Terr. Status Quo X Fatalities	0.072	-0.258*	0.136
	(0.108)	(0.129)	(0.124)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.143**	0.172**	0.177**
	(0.033)	(0.060)	(0.038)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.212**	-0.413**	-0.113†
	(0.046)	(0.085)	(0.061)
Civil Conflict	1.417**	1.525**	1.372**
	(0.159)	(0.342)	(0.152)
Non-Fatal MID	0.190*	0.024	0.364**
	(0.087)	(0.150)	(0.108)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.609**		
	(0.114)		
Observations	3,538	1,353	2,185

Standard errors clustered on the country. Two-tailed significance: ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, † $p<0.1$

Table 10: Effects of territorial revision on repression, 1977-2001: using various data for MIDs

	Full Sample MID 3.10B	Full Sample Maoz	Full Sample EUGene
Democracy (t-1)	-0.581**	-0.593**	-0.597**
	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.120)
Territorial Revisionist	0.545*	0.566*	0.285
	(0.229)	(0.225)	(0.212)
Democracy X Terr. Rev.	-0.544†	-0.448	-0.193
	(0.303)	(0.304)	(0.277)
MID Fatalities (max/year)	0.067	0.220*	0.062
	(0.069)	(0.106)	(0.075)
Dem. X Fatalities	-0.132	-0.139	-0.127
	(0.096)	(0.135)	(0.150)
Terr. Rev. X Fatalities	-0.178∧	-0.359*	-0.113
	(0.112)	(0.167)	(0.103)
Dem. X Terr. Rev. X Fatalities	0.456*	0.710*	0.265∧
	(0.177)	(0.357)	(0.193)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.135**	0.140**	0.136**
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.206**	-0.199**	-0.209**
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Civil Conflict	1.466**	1.430**	1.437**
	(0.162)	(0.158)	(0.160)
Non-Fatal MID	0.124	-0.003	0.132
	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.087)
Observations	3,538	3,538	3,538

Standard errors clustered on the country. Significance: ** p| $<$ |0.01, * p| $<$ |0.05, † p| $<$ |0.1, ∧p$<$0.1

Table 11: Effects of Territorial Revision on Repression, 1977-2001: Including MAR variables

	Full Sample	Democracies	Autocracies
Territorial Revisionist in MID	0.754†	0.707	0.647
	(0.430)	(0.735)	(0.548)
Fatalities (max/year)	0.032	-0.236*	0.112†
	(0.061)	(0.100)	(0.067)
Terr. Rev. X Fatalities	-0.071	0.345*	-0.176∧
	(0.091)	(0.144)	(0.109)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.113**	0.122†	0.153**
	(0.035)	(0.065)	(0.040)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.217**	-0.420**	-0.114†
	(0.046)	(0.090)	(0.060)
Civil Conflict	1.398**	1.503**	1.406**
	(0.157)	(0.400)	(0.150)
Non Fatal MID	0.111	-0.097	0.283**
	(0.083)	(0.146)	(0.103)
Transborder Minority Group	0.372**	0.876**	0.147
	(0.119)	(0.238)	(0.130)
Terr. Rev. X Transborder Minority	-0.486	-0.950	-0.180
	(0.454)	(0.760)	(0.582)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.643**		
	(0.113)		
Observations	3,538	1,353	2,185

Standard errors clustered on the country. Significance: ** p| $<$ |0.01, * p| $<$ |0.05, † p| $<$ |0.1, ∧p$<$0.1

Table 12: Effects of territorial revision on repression, 1982-2001: Using CIRI data

	Full Sample	Full Sample	Autocracies	Democracies
Territorial Revisionist in MID	-0.022	0.049	-0.175	0.124
	(0.226)	(0.134)	(0.195)	(0.173)
Fatalities (max/year)		0.061	0.075	0.020
		(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.130)
Terr. Rev. X Fatalities		0.034	0.028	0.131
		(0.083)	(0.097)	(0.124)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.175**	0.168**	0.202**	0.198**
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.048)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.275**	-0.277**	-0.132*	-0.530**
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.081)
Civil Conflict	1.336**	1.326**	1.210**	1.712**
	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.157)	(0.376)
Non Fatal MID	0.219**	0.262**	0.371**	0.219
	(0.080)	(0.088)	(0.115)	(0.135)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.656**	-0.612**		
	(0.108)	(0.106)		
Dem. X Terr. Rev.	0.433†			
	(0.242)			
Observations	2,726	2,726	1,577	1,149

Standard errors clustered on the country. Significance: ** p| $<$ |0.01, * p| $<$ |0.05, † p| $<$ |0.1

Table 13: Effects of revision over any issue and non-territorial Revision on repression, 1977-2001

	Democracies	Democracies	Autocracies	Autocracies
Revisionist in Any MID	-0.315†		0.310*	
	(0.188)		(0.151)	
MID Fatalities (max/year)	-0.256*	-0.043	0.039	0.039
	(0.108)	(0.094)	(0.077)	(0.059)
Revisionist X Fatalities	0.407**		-0.005	
	(0.126)		(0.100)	
Population (ln, t-1)	0.173**	0.159*	0.165**	0.176**
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Economic Development (ln, t-1)	-0.400**	-0.394**	-0.113†	-0.113†
	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Civil Conflict	1.530**	1.484**	1.374**	1.373**
	(0.359)	(0.375)	(0.152)	(0.151)
Non-Fatal MID	0.112	0.076	0.230*	0.343**
	(0.153)	(0.161)	(0.116)	(0.121)
Revisionist in Non-Terr. MID		-0.286		0.036
		(0.195)		(0.176)
Non-Terr Rev. X Fatalities		0.130		0.154*
		(0.198)		(0.089)
Observations	1,353	1,353	2,185	2,185

Standard errors clustered on the country. Significance: ** p| $<$ |0.01, * p| $<$ |0.05, † p| $<$ |0.1