

# Day13 容器进阶之Kubernetes 安全原理分析








# 大纲

- 安全全景图
- 认证和鉴权
- Admissions与安全的持久化保存 键值(etcd)
- Pod SecurityContext (安全上下文)
- Network Policy



### 安全全景图




- · 部署态的安全控制
  - 。 认证
  - 鉴权
  - Admission (准入控制)
  - Pod SecurityContext
- 运行态的安全控制
  - Network policy





# 认证(Authentication)和鉴权(Authorization)





```
// Info describes a user that has been authenticated to the system.
type Info interface {
 // GetName returns the name that uniquely identifies this user among
  // other active users.
 GetName() string
 // GetUID returns a unique value for a particular user that will char
 // if the user is removed from the system and another user is added
with
  // the same name.
 GetUID() string
 // GetGroups returns the names of the groups the user is a member of
 GetGroups() []string
 // GetExtra can contain any additional information that the
authenticator
 // thought was interesting. One example would be scopes on a token.
 // Keys in this map should be namespaced to the authenticator or
 // authenticator/authorizer pair making use of them.
 // For instance: "example.org/foo" instead of "foo"
 // This is a map[string][]string because it needs to be serializeable
into
 // a SubjectAccessReviewSpec.authorization.k8s.io for proper
authorization
 // delegation flows
 // In order to faithfully round-trip through an impersonation flow,
these kevs
 // MUST be lowercase.
 GetExtra() map[string][]string
```

- 认证支持多种方式,其中一种认证方式认证通过即通过,输出userinfo
- 基于认证输出的userinfo进行鉴权,鉴权也支持多种方式,常用方式为RBAC








# 认证(Authentication)



认证方式有: X509、service account、Authenticating Proxy、WebHook、username/password... 常用认证方式介绍:

#### X509:

- Kube-apiserver的启动参数'—client-ca-file=ca.crt'指定X509根证书,请求中需带有由该根证书签名的证书,才能认证通过
- 客户端签署的证书里包含user、group信息,具体为证书的subject.CommonName(user name)以及subject.Organization(group)






# 认证(Authentication)



#### Service Account (为k8s必选认证方式):

- Kube-apiserver的启动参数'—service-account-key-file=key.pem'指定pem文件,用以生成 bearer token; '—service-account-lookup=true/false'表示在删除service account后其token是 否被吊销
- Serviceaccount Admission默认给Pod打上service account,当然用户也可以自行指定所需要 的service account



```
spec:
      serviceAccountName: default
      containers:
      - image: nginx:latest
        imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
        name: container-0
        volumeMounts:
        - mountPath:
/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
          name: default-token-rm7xw
          readOnly: true
      volumes:
       name: default-token-rm7xw
        secret:
          defaultMode: 420
          secretName: default-token-rm7xw
```







# 鉴权(Authorization)

鉴权分为以下几种:RBAC、ABAC、Node以及Webhook 常用RBAC介绍:

```
NamespaceScoped
Role
W须相同namespace
RoleBinding
的namespace
ClusterRole
整个集群
ClusterRoleBind
ing
```

```
kind: Role
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
  namespace: default
  name: pod-reader
rules:
- apiGroups: [""] # "" indicates the core API group
  resources: ["pods"]
  verbs: ["get", "watch", "list"]
kind: ClusterRole
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
  name: secret-reader
rules:
- apiGroups: [""] # "" indicates the core API group
  resources: ["secrets"]
  verbs: ["get", "watch", "list"]
kind: RoleBinding
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
  namespace: default
  name: read-pods
subjects:
- kind: User
  name: wangbo
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
roleRef:
  kind: Role #this can be Role or ClusterRole
  name: pod-reader
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
  name: read-secrets-global
subjects:
- kind: Group
  name: manager
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
```









# Admission(PodSecurityPolicy)

- Kube-apiserver的启动参数'—admissioncontrol=PodSecurityPolicy'新增PodSecurityPolicy admission
- Admin用户创建PodSecurityPolicy策略,决定 能创建什么样的Pod
- 创建Pod的用户也必须赋予它能使用 PodSecurityPolicy策略的权限

```
apiVersion: policy/vlbetal
kind: PodSecurityPolicy
metadata:
  name: restricted
  annotations:
    seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/allowedProfileNames: 'docker/default'
    apparmor.security.beta.kubernetes.io/allowedProfileNames: 'runtime/default'
    seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/defaultProfileName:
                                                               'docker/default'
    apparmor.security.beta.kubernetes.io/defaultProfileName: 'runtime/default'
spec:
  privileged: false
  # Required to prevent escalations to root.
  allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
  # This is redundant with non-root + disallow privilege escalation,
  # but we can provide it for defense in depth.
  requiredDropCapabilities:
    - ALL
  # Allow core volume types.
  volumes:
    - 'configMap'
    - 'emptyDir'
    - 'projected'
    - 'secret'
    - 'downwardAPI'
    # Assume that persistentVolumes set up by the cluster admin are safe to use.
    - 'persistentVolumeClaim'
  hostNetwork: false
  hostIPC: false
  hostPID: false
  runAsUser:
    # Require the container to run without root privileges.
    rule: 'MustRunAsNonRoot'
  seLinux:
    # This policy assumes the nodes are using AppArmor rather than SELinux.
    rule: 'RunAsAny'
  supplementalGroups:
    rule: 'MustRunAs'
    ranges:
      # Forbid adding the root group.
      - min: 1
        max: 65535
  fsGroup:
    rule: 'MustRunAs'
    ranges:
      # Forbid adding the root group.
      - min: 1
        max: 65535
  readOnlyRootFilesystem: fals
```








# 安全的持久化保存键值(etcd)



- etcd支持备份恢复机制,防止数据被误删导致数据丢失
- 用户的敏感信息建议存放在secret类型的资源中,该类型资源是加密 存储在etcd中
- etcd支持https, kube-apiserver访问etcd使用https协议

#### 具体配置方式:



#### Client->Server:

- --auto-tls 是否系统自动生成证书

#### Server->Server:

- --peer-cert-file=<path>







# 安全上下文(Pod SecurityContext)



- 分为Pod级别和容器级别,容器级别的会覆盖Pod级 别的相同设置。
- 在有PodSecurityPolicy策略的情况下,两者需要配合 使用

是否使用特权容器

指定容器启动UID

指定Pod中容器文 件所属组GID

容器的文件系统是否是只读

容器系统调用能力配置

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: wanqbo
spec:
  securityContext:
   -privileged: false
    runAsUser: 1000
   -fsGroup: 2000
  volumes:
  - name: test
    emptyDir: {}
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: gcr.io/google-samples/node-hello:1.0
    volumeMounts:
    - name: test
      mountPath: /data/test
    securityContext:
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
      runAsUser: 1001
      privileged: false
      capabilities:
        add: ["NET ADMIN", "SYS TIME"]
        drop: ["SYS BOOT"]
```







# **Network Policy**

分为Ingress和Egress策略控制,都为白名单

- Ingress为入口请求控制
- Egress为出口请求控制

规则匹配器,选择匹配的Pod

远端(访问端)IP白名单开放

远端(访问端)namespace 🕶 白名单开放

远端(访问端)pod白名单开 放

本端(被访问端)允许被访 问的端口和协议

```
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: test-network-policy
  namespace: default
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      role: db
  policyTypes:
  - Ingress
  - Egress
  ingress:
  - from:
    - ipBlock:
        cidr: 172.17.0.0/16
        except:
        - 172.17.1.0/24
    - namespaceSelector:
        matchLabels:
          project: myproject
      podSelector:
        matchLabels:
          role: frontend
    ports:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 6379
  egress:
  - to:
    - ipBlock:
        cidr: 10.0.0.0/24
    ports:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 5978
```



# **Network Policy**

#### 禁止所有入口请求

```
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
   name: default-deny
spec:
   podSelector: {}
   policyTypes:
   - Ingress
```

#### 禁止所有出口请求

```
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
   name: default-deny
spec:
   podSelector: {}
   policyTypes:
   - Egress
```

#### 允许所有入口请求

```
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
   name: allow-all
spec:
   podSelector: {}
   policyTypes:
   - Ingress
   ingress:
   - {}
```

#### 允许所有出口请求

```
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
   name: default-deny
spec:
   podSelector: {}
   policyTypes:
   - Egress
   egress:
   - {}
```





# Thank You



