


COUNTERSPY

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EDITORIAL

The response to our "alert and plea" for public support has given us the courage and strength to continue and affirmed the need for CounterSpy. The range of persons endorsing CounterSpy include: Bob Moore (National Secretary of the Mobilization for Survival *), Sister Mary O'Keefe (Chicago), Kathie Sarachild (New York City), Jose Buckland (farmer/Oklahoma), Rev. H. C. Mulholland (North Carolina), Allen Fisher (England), John Cavanagh (fellow/ Princeton University), Rev. Richard Preston (Michigan), and others listed below. We are, of course, grateful for the expression of grassroots support and urge others to do the same and, if possible, contribute financially to CounterSpy.

Since our last issue, we have presented papers at several conferences and completed special reports on the CIA in Nicaragua and US universities. CounterSpy presented a paper, "The CIA Goes To Work" at the VIII Conference of the International Peace Research Association in Koenigstein, West Germany; and editor, John Kelly, organized and chaired a panel on the CIA in academia for the 1979 Annual Convention of American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C. and presented a paper, "CIA and Academia". A catalogue of these papers and the special reports is available upon request.

Finally, we mentioned in our last issue, and the Pentagon has now confirmed that Iranian military personnel, who came here as members of the Shah's military forces, are still receiving military training from the Pentagon in the US. The Pentagon has also confirmed our revelation of an Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) depot at McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey which USAF Colonel, E. Arcene McSmith, Jr. has described as a "unique arrangement" between the US Air Force and the IIAF.

Unique, indeed. Obviously, this depot could serve as a secret staging area for the Shah loyalists led by the Shah's son who trained with these same officers in Texas and who is also in the US. The American and Iranian peoples have a right and a need-to-know why this dangerous situation continues.

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*for identification only

tions. CIA academician Ray Cline has admitted that covert operations are undertaken to "try to change the situation that you analyzed in R+A (research and analysis)". In short, CIA academicians, researchers, and analysts, like the SD predecessors, are part of the total CIA.

In the Middle East, the CIA has serviced and furthered the exploitation by U.S. corporations and repression of Zionism and dictatorial regimes such as that of King Hussein in Jordan. There is not a single instance where the CIA acted in the true interest of Middle East peoples. As always, the CIA's R+A provides the wherewithal for it to carry out its exploitation, oppression, and repression.

Given the history and on-going role of U.S. corporations and the CIA in the Middle East, it is with outrage that we report that during October 25-26, 1979, Princeton University (PU) hosted a conference "The Middle East and the Superpowers" which featured acknowledged member of the CIA and U.S. corporations. Corporate participants include: Abraham Almany (The Continental Group, Inc.); Bruce C. Anderson (Ebasco Services, Inc.); C. Andrew Brauer (New York Life Insurance Co.); Parker T. Hart (International Business Consultant); Richard H. Hittle (Conoco International); Richard A. Macken (Gulf Oil Corp.); and William A. Stoltzfus, Jr. (William Sword and Co., Inc.). The acknowledged CIA presence was Harry Gelman who spoke in place of Arnold Horelick. Harold Saunders, a well-known "former" CIA officer was scheduled to speak but was replaced by Michael S. Sterner from the U.S. State Department. Monroe Berger (PU), a former consultant for the CIA's Congress for Cultural Freedom (1958-61), chaired the panel.

The conference's rationale noted righteously that "... more than ever before the peoples of the region are seeking to control their destiny and to shape their political, economic, and social in-

PRINCETON-CIA — MIDDLE EAST

The SD was the elitist intelligence agency of academics that became a branch of the SS under the command of Reinhard Heydrich. According to a 1975 study by George C. Browder of the State University of New York, the SD's Nazi academicians considered themselves an "idealistic intelligence service" separate "from the unpleasant and distasteful activities of the Gestapo and from much of what the total SD implied". Indeed, the SD offered this separateness as its defense at the tribunals at Nuremberg. The tribunal rejected this defense for as Browder observed "try as they might, they were members of the total SS".

Publicly, the CIA also claims a separation between its "dirty tricks" and its research and analysis. CIA academic recruiter, John F. Devlin, told the American Historical Association CIA research "begins and ends with a piece of paper". In a secret meeting, CIA criminal Richard M. Bissell, Jr. came closer to the truth when he noted that the objective of CIA analysis is to provide "timely knowledge" of "tactical significance". Furthermore, "intelligence collection and covert action interact and overlap... to the point of being almost indistinguishable".

It is patently obvious that the so-called academic branch of the CIA provides the ammunition for covert opera-

and values". And, what does this call for ? "This emerging position of the Near East calls for examination. First, the view of the region from outside - from Washington, Moscow, and the financial world as exemplified by Wall Street - requires comment." The rationale concedes that internal views and interests "must be considered". But according to the question: "To what extent are they compatible with the goals and policies of the superpowers ?". (Despite the expressed concern for "Moscow's" view, there were no Soviet participants. Harry Gelman presented "Moscow's" view !)

We feel the aforementioned persons deserve the "light of day" particularly in the Middle East whose peoples deserve an explanation. We feel the same about the following scheduled speakers and panelists whose conscious participation provided a legitimate forum for the U.S. corporations and the CIA, the exploitative oppressors of the Middle East peoples. Nehama Rezler Bersohn, William G. Bowen, L. Dean Brown, Jerome Clinton, Martin Dickson, Norman Itzkowitz, Charles Issawi, Bernard Lewis, Robert Tignor, Richard Ullman, and John Waterburg (all from Princeton University); Oles Smolansky (Lehigh U.), Bayly Winder (NYU), Ernest Dawn (U. of Illinois/Urbana, William B. Quandt (Brookings Institute), J.C. Hurewitz (Columbia U.), Ann Lesch (Ford Foundation), Dankwart Rustow (City U., New York), and Ali Banuazizi (Boston College)

JOAN BAEZ, TOM DOOLEY OF THE 80'S?

On May 7, 1954, President Dwight Eisenhower wrote to Bao Dai after the defeat of the colonialists at Dien Bien Phu to express "admiration" on "behalf of the American people" to the Vietnamese who fought on the side to the French against their own fellow compatriots. Eisenhower concluded that: "We of the Free World are determined to remain faithful to the causes for which they have so nobly fought."

Shortly thereafter, Eisenhower dispatched CIA operative Colonel Edward Lansdale to Vietnam. Prior to his Vietnam assignment, Lansdale, along with CIA's Napoleon Valeriano, had directed the extermination of thousands of Huks in the Philippines under his so-called propaganda campaign of the Filipino Civil Affairs Office. Stanley Karnow described a typical psychological warfare operation: "When a Huk partol passed, the ambushers snatched the last man, punctured his neck vampire-fashion with two holes, hung his body until his blood drained out, and put the corpse back on the trail." Lansdale was sent to Vietnam to undertake a similar propaganda and psychological warfare campaign to save Vietnam from itself and the "communists" and coincidentally replace the French colonialism with U.S. neo-colonialism, such as was imposed in the Philippines.

An integral component of Lansdale's psychological warfare and

campaign to slip the U.S. into Vietnam was a worldwide propaganda campaign about the tremendous food and medical needs of the Vietnamese (the propaganda, of course, never mentioned the American role in producing these needs). Spearheading this campaign was CIA agent, Tom Dooley. Dooley propagandized from one end of the U.S. to the other about Vietnam; his image was based, in part, on - what even Holy Mother Church called - false CIA reports filed by Dooley. The ultimate hypocritical conclusion of all this was the Food-for-Peace program whose monies were used to buy weapons and ammunition with the permission of the U.S. government.

Now we have a latter-day Tom Dooley, Joan Baez, telling us Vietnam has to be rescued from itself again and hymning the CIA's line on Cambodia. It is like a re-run of the 1950's nightmare with Baez telling President Carter: "Either we bluff our way in there or pretend we didn't hear Phnom Penh's reaction to distributing food." And later at a "Georgetown house under the Waterfront chandeliers" telling the like of Edward Kennedy and Chip Carter that: "We just have to take our Red Cross and say, 'Here we come'. It's risky, but I don't think they want to shoot us." With Chip Carter responding: "We support her wholeheartedly. The President thinks her work will change world opinion and help us to proceed. We're going to go into Cambodia under the pretext that they will let us."

We don't know what's happening in Vietnam and Cambodia. But neither does Joan Baez, her ilk and even Ed Bradley of CBS News conceded that the CIA is propagandizing about Cambodia. We do know, however, that the U.S. government through the likes of Dooley and Baez has been lying to us about Indochina for over 25 years.

Thus, to Baez we say: "Hell No, We Won't Go" particularly in light of her saying she is now "comfortable"

with limousines and plush hotels - the haunts of exploiters and war criminals.

TRANSAFRICA???

The CIA is an ideological institution whose indoctrinated members seldom really leave. They do, however, engage in "sheep-dipping". This is a process whereby a CIA member ostensibly leaves the CIA to join another organization while maintaining loyalty to the CIA, sometimes with no contact with the CIA for years.

It has been documented that the CIA has specifically targeted blacks in the US for cooptation and barring that, "neutralization". Given these facts, CounterSpy feels compelled to call attention to a Washington Post article of May 21, 1978.

"There has for many years been an informal 'Africa Lobby' consisting of interested blacks from the State Department, the CIA, Capitol Hill and private organizations. Robinson said TransAfrica includes many of the same people...". (Randall Robinson is Executive Director of TransAfrica, a black lobby on Africa and the Caribbean.)

CounterSpy believes strongly in everyone's ability to change else we would not struggle as we do. It is not Counter-Spy but the CIA's nature that requires persons in TransAfrica to come forward and state whether they were in the CIA and what is their position on the CIA. This is particularly essential since TransAfrica owes it to itself and persons considering working with it to be up front about any relationships, even past, which its members may have had with the CIA.

September 6, 1979

Statement

We feel that we must respond to the latest in a series of attempts to suppress inquiry into the details and nature of Gloria Steinem's association with the Central Intelligence Agency. We are alarmed that the most visible commentary on these events has come from several well-known figures in the feminist movement who not only condone but endorse this suppression. Because feminism's appeal and impact spring from a fundamental intellectual honesty, it is particularly distressing that the suppression of dissent may be seen as some kind of official feminist position.

In 1975, after Redstockings researched Gloria Steinem's affiliations and raised questions about her political past, Steinem published a "Statement" in connection with her activities on behalf of the Independent Research Service, a CIA-funded group. Many feminists found this document neither entirely credible nor to the point, and they have persisted in seeking more enlightening answers.

Because of the consciously counterrevolutionary role the CIA has played at home and abroad over the years, it makes sense to expect a participant in the women's movement—especially one who has come to symbolize it—to fully discuss her past relationship to the CIA. We are still waiting to hear Steinem's opinion of the Agency; the last one she gave characterized the CIA as "liberal" and "farsighted" (*The New York Times*, February 21, 1967).

The events that prompted us to send out this letter include: 1) Gloria Steinem, Clay Felker (most recently publisher of *Esquire*), and Ford Foundation president Franklin Thomas were among those who threatened to sue for libel if Random House allowed the CIA chapters to be published in the Random edition of Redstockings' *Feminist Revolution*. At the same time, *Newsweek/Washington Post* publisher Katharine Graham and Warner Communications—a major *Ms.* stockholder—also complained. The offending chapters were deleted. Thus, Steinem and her powerful supporters successfully used the threat of litigation to exercise prior restraint over publication.

2) When Steinem learned that the *Village Voice* had assigned journalist Nancy Borman to prepare an article on the censorship of *Feminist Revolution*, her attorneys, Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, threatened suit against the *Voice* if any mention of Steinem's CIA association appeared in the article. After some delay to allow the *Voice*'s legal counsel to review the material, the *Voice* published the article (May 21, 1979), and in subsequent issues several letter-writers responded with attacks on Borman and the *Voice*.

3) In May 1979, when *Heights & Valley News*, a New York City neighborhood paper published by the Columbia Tenants Union, began a series on the material deleted from *Feminist Revolution*, Steinem's attorneys again threatened suit. But instead of threatening the Columbia Tenants Union corporation—as they had the Random House and *Village Voice* corpora-

tions—they sent a letter to each of CTU's 32 board members. Board members cannot be individually sued for a corporation's acts, except in a few instances not relevant here (many non-lawyers may not know this); but Steinem's attorneys stated in their letter to the board members that publication of the material "could subject [them] to individual liability." *Heights & Valley News* stood up to this attempt at intimidation and is continuing the series.

All this legal harassment was in response not to any actual instance of false, malicious defamation, but to the potential raising of embarrassing questions about some feminists' relations with the power elite.

We think that Steinem and her associates have not made a convincing case for cutting off discussion. At question is not just the right to debate one woman's past associations, although this is often important. There is an urgent need for wide-ranging debate in the feminist movement on such questions as:

- Do feminists think there are special topics on which it is defensible to stifle discussion? Why do we put up with bad-faith appeals to "sisterhood"?

- How far should feminists go in making compromises? Which kinds of compromises help us reach our goals? Which hurt?

- Is there a conflict-of-interest problem that our movement needs to solve—as other movements have tried to solve it—when movement representatives accept positions on the government or corporate side of the bargaining table?

- Are "right-wingers" the only reason for the growing number of setbacks for women? Or is the feminist movement failing to discuss its own serious mistakes?

- Does dependence on government and corporate funding and foundation grants increase or decrease the effectiveness of feminist groups? Does it distort their politics and activities?

- What is to be done about government and corporate spying and intervention in the feminist movement?

These questions are not personal but political. They are at the heart of our survival as a movement. We will not be silenced.

Note: Copies of the two articles reviewing Steinem's CIA associations, which were in the original edition of *Feminist Revolution*, are available for \$1 from Redstockings, P.O. Box 1284, New York, NY 10009; Redstockings' information packet on the censorship of the book's Random edition is \$1. Copies of the Sept. 6, 1975, *Majority Report*, containing Steinem's statement and annotations to it, are \$7.75 each from *Majority Report*, 49 Perry St., New York, NY 10014. Copies of the *Voice* article and letters of response are \$.50, cash or stamps, from the Statement Group, c/o Nancy S. Erickson, 619 Carroll Street, Brooklyn, NY 11215.

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Bob Feldman

U.S. INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN by Konrad Ege

"If Henry Kissinger were still around, there would be one hell of a temptation to get involved";¹ was the reaction of a U.S. "specialist" to recent events in Afghanistan. But Henry Kissinger is not "around", and State Department and CIA officials keep assuring us (as they did during the "secret" war in Laos and when covert aid was being given to the Kurds in Iraq) that the U.S. is "not interfering in any way"² in Afghanistan.

What is happening in Afghanistan that might provoke "one hell of a temptation to get involved"? Many factors and diverse U.S. interests are involved - all best illuminated in the light of recent Afghan history.

Afghanistan is a mountainous country about the size of Texas with a population approaching 18 million of many different nationalities, most of them peasants in the countryside. This landlocked country borders Iran, the Soviet Union (the border with the Soviet Union is some 2,000 miles), China, Pakistan, and India; and even though it has no access to the sea it has strategic significance. The United Nations rates Afghanistan as one of the world's poorest countries with an annual per capita income of \$ 160, an infant mortality rate of 50 per cent, and an illiteracy rate of some 90 per cent.³ Almost all Afghans are Muslims belonging to the more traditional of the two branches, the Sunnites.

Events have moved rapidly in Afghan-

istan over the last few years. In 1973, the forty year-old dictatorship of King Mohammad Zaher Shah and two of his uncles ended in a coup led by his cousin and brother-in-law, Mohammed Daoud, who had resigned as Zaher Shah's prime minister in 1963 and had seemingly retired from political life. (Zaher Shah was in Italy on vacation at the time of the coup, during a famine in his country, and was later offered asylum by Saudi Arabia.) There was virtually no one in Afghanistan prepared to fight for the Shah, who had led an extremely repressive and corrupt regime. The end of the monarchy was welcomed by most of the people. Daoud's coup was assisted by various sectors of the Afghan society, especially the leftist parties.

Soon after the coup, the U.S. became more "involved" in Afghanistan. (Adolph "Spike" Dubs, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from the summer of 1978 until he was killed on February 14, 1979, and who "had been trying to wean the Afghans away from Moscow"⁴ was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in 1975.) Iran, "encouraged by the United States, made a determined effort to draw Kabul [Afghanistan's capital] into a western-tilted, Teheran-centered, regional economic and security sphere embracing Pakistan, India, and the Persian gulf states"⁵ and to promote policies of anti-Communism in Afghanistan. The Shah of Iran began a massive \$ 2 billion aid program to Afghanistan under the condition that Daoud crack down further on the Khalq and Parcham parties who had been the "backbone of [Daoud's] 1973 coup"⁶ but were considered "Communist" by the Shah and the U.S. Government. Iran also pushed for the termination of Afghanistan's traditionally friendly relationship with the Soviet Union. The Shah began to exercise more and more power in Afghanistan, and SAVAK, his CIA-trained secret police, got heavily involved in Afghanistan's internal affairs. SAVAK went so far as to pinpoint "sus-

pected Communist sympathizers throughout the Afghan Government and military" ⁷ who were then to be purged by Daoud.

In the same years, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) stepped up its program of police aid to the Daoud government. Two million DM (\$ 1 million) were made available "in the form of equipment supplies and top-level guidance for the Afghani police by two German police officers in view of political developments".⁸ In addition, the West German magazine Der Spiegel reports that almost all high ranking Afghan police officers went to the FRG for training.⁹ Five Afghans were also trained in the U.S. by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) or through CIA programs in the International Police Academy (IPA) in Washington, DC and the "Bomb School" (Border Patrol Offices, BPO) in Los Fresnos, Texas: Abdul Samad Azher (DEA); Qader Abdul Azizi (IPA, BPO, DEA); Abdul Vaheed Najmi (IPA); Miam Rafiuddin (IPA); and Khawar Zaman (IPA).

With this improved police force, Daoud got rid of officers and civilians in his government, often using brutal tactics. He handed key positions to aristocrats and supporters of the big landowners and the deposed monarchy. The economic power stayed in the hands of a few landlords - five per cent of the population owned half of the arable land - and the corrupt bureaucracy of Zaher Shah was only slightly reformed.

The economic situation in Afghanistan deteriorated quickly in spite of the big foreign grants. Unemployment increased to almost one million, and from an anticipated development budget of \$ 400 million for 1976/77, only one third was actually expended by the Daoud government; and from the 1977/78 budget, only one sixth was spent.¹⁰ Daoud's highly proclaimed and badly needed land reform never took place, and the dissatisfaction of the Afghan people mounted. In response Daoud turned more and more to open repression. In February 1977, he adopted a one-party constitution, and issued laws providing severe penalties in-

cluding the death sentence for opposition political activities.

At the same time, the Shah of Iran's policy seemed to succeed: Daoud signed treaties with Iran and Pakistan and showed increasing hostility towards the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Shah himself planned to visit Kabul in June 1978, and Mohammed Daoud wanted to meet President Carter in the fall in Washington.

But Daoud's alliances with the U.S. Government, SAVAK, the feudal landlords and the Muslim clergy (often big landlords themselves), could not maintain his reign. On April 17, Daoud's newly appointed interior minister Abdul Quadir Nuristani arranged the assassination of Mir Akbar Khaiber, a popular leftist leader whom Daoud and Nuristani considered "Communist". Khaiber's funeral turned into a massive anti-government demonstration. Daoud, encouraged by the Shah, responded with an attempt to eliminate any and all opposition. On April 24, seven popular "Communist" leaders were arrested, and on April 26, hundreds of suspected Communist sympathizers were purged from their governmental posts.

The next day, Daoud was overthrown in what the U.S. press usually calls a "Soviet inspired, bloody military coup", but even Selig S. Harrison, a long time South Asia correspondent for the Washington Post, saw no Soviet masterminding behind the "bloody coup" and wrote that "it is misleading to depict the coup in the global strategic chess game".¹¹ The U.S. Government obviously did not expect a "coup" at this time in Kabul. Warnings from SAVAK about an unstable internal situation were not heeded, and in the subsequent criticism of the CIA's incompetence in Iran, the Afghanistan intelligence failure was invariably mentioned.

Mohammed Daoud and some of his closest advisors were killed on April 27, and a part of the army loyal to Daoud put up a short but fierce fight against the rebelling part of the army.

Hundreds of people were killed.

The "military coup" should probably be called a "decisive stage of the Afghan revolution" which had been advancing rapidly since the end of the monarchy in 1973. The "coup" grew out of a "tremendous and acute discontent" ¹² of the majority of the Afghan people which was especially visible during the widespread anti-government demonstrations in the days after the assassination of Khaiber. In addition, the military take-over was directed by civilians in the Khalq and Parcham parties, and not by military officers.¹³

Only a few days after the take-over, which began the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Noor Mohammed Taraki, a civilian, was elected Chairperson of the Revolutionary Council and then appointed Prime Minister. Taraki had a long history of opposition first to Zaher Shah and then to the Daoud regime. In fact, during the days of the take-over, Taraki was in prison. He was among the founders of the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) in 1965. The PDP, generally known as Khalq Party, was involved in numerous strikes and demonstrations in the 1970's, and it was also instrumental in the mass protest against the visit of Richard Nixon's Vice President Spiro Agnew in Kabul in 1970.

The Khalq government quickly enacted drastic land and water-rights reforms in favor of the country's peasants who make up most of the population and stepped up an immense literacy campaign for men and women. In addition, it abolished the death penalty for peasants and the system of usury by which moneylenders exploited peasants who by being forced to borrow against future crops were left in perpetual debt. Other programs included the promotion of equal rights for men and women, the separation of state and religion, improvement of health care, increased taxation of foreign corporations (some corporate officials were only allowed to

leave the country after they paid their tax debts), and the elimination of some foreign insurance and trade companies.

Not surprisingly, Taraki's foreign (he signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, and Afghan civilians and military officers began being trained by Soviet advisors) and internal programs ("We demand bread, food; we demand clothing; ... we demand participation of all sectors of society in social and political affairs; we demand our social rights; ..." ¹⁴) drew comments in the U.S. press such as "Afghanistan has lurched violently to the left", ¹⁵ "Now we have a whole set of leaders who clearly have a Communist backing", ¹⁶ and "Afghanistan takes a socialist road". ¹⁷

Taraki and other governmental officials were portrayed as not much more than Soviet puppets; the Khalq Party was labeled "Communist", and Afghanistan was put in the "Soviet satellite file". Soon, anti-Khalq news began to appear also in the FRG, England, Egypt, and other Muslim countries.

In February 1979, Afghanistan was again in the headlines in the U.S.: the U.S. Ambassador in Kabul, Adolph Dubs, had been kidnapped on February 14. On the way to work, Dubs' car stopped at a red traffic light, and a man dressed as a police sergeant approached it and asked to inspect the car. Dubs agreed and unlocked the doors. The "police sergeant" and three other men forced their way into the car, threatened the chauffeur with a revolver and ordered him to follow their directions. To this point, the State Department has never explained publicly, why Dubs rode to work without any bodyguards or under the protection of Afghan police officers who had been offered by Afghan authorities. Dubs was virtually unprotected.

Adolph Dubs was taken to one of the biggest hotels in Kabul. According to Newsweek, the kidnappers, who demanded the release of several Muslim leaders, belonged to "one of the fervent Islamic guerilla bands that

have been resisting, with minimal success, the Marxist regime of Prime Minister Noor Mohammed Taraki".¹⁸ In the hotel where Dubs was being held, one of the four kidnappers was arrested by Afghan police; and Afghan, U.S., and Soviet officials who were present debated the possibilities of freeing Dubs.

Reports on what happened after that differ widely. Afghan officials insisted that the Muslim leaders the kidnappers were demanding, were not at their disposal. Finally, some three hours after the kidnapping, U.S. Embassy officials were informed about a 1:00 P.M. deadline.¹⁹ At 12:40, according to the Washington Post, Afghan police officers asked Bruce Flatin, a political officer in the U.S. Embassy in Kabul who was present at the hotel, to shout to Dubs in German (a language both Dubs and Flatin understood) "to go to the bathroom or to drop to the floor in ten minutes"²⁰, but, the Post article goes on, "Flatin refused, recognizing that the Afghans were readying an assault".

Newsweek gives another "explanation" of why Flatin refused to give what could have been a life-saving message to Dubs: "Flatin refused, reasoning that the kidnappers may have understood German."²¹ Ten minutes later Afghan police attacked the room where Dubs was being held. "At exactly 12:50, very heavy gunfire broke out in the corridor, in the room and from across the street."²² When the police and U.S. officials entered the room, Ambassador Dubs and his kidnappers were dead.

The U.S. Government was quick to pin the blame for Dubs' death on Afghan officials and partly on the "Soviet advisors" at the scene, who, according to accounts in the Washington Post and Newsweek, had disregarded pleas of U.S. officials who were asking that an attack on the kidnappers be avoided in order to save Dubs' life. The fact that security measures on the part of

the U.S. Embassy were practically non-existent before the kidnapping, is not mentioned at all in State Department reports.

Newsweek correspondent Ron Moreau, who was in a Muslim rebel camp in Peshawar, Pakistan, at the time of the kidnapping came up with an explanation of why the kidnappers chose Dubs as their victim. "The theory making the rounds here among Pakistanis and Afghan exiles is that the kidnapping and killing of Dubs was a put-up job by the Kabul regime and the Soviets.

... The Kabul government feared that the U.S. might start supporting the rebels through a third country.... The affair may have been a conspiracy to insure that the U.S. would not heed the rebels' pleas for aid."²³ The Newsweek article goes on quoting unspecified "U.S. congressional sources" that "the Russians had wanted Dubs to die. The ambassador had been trying to wean the Afghans away from Moscow, and his death guaranteed that significant inroads would not be made for months - if ever."²⁴

In light of the situation in Afghanistan before and especially after the death of Adolph Dubs, theories like the ones offered by Newsweek and the Cold War warriors quoted as "U.S. congressional sources" are almost grotesque. According to the Washington Post, the assassination of Dubs convinced certain sectors of the Afghan society "that the counterrevolution had started"²⁵. For the Khalq government, the killing of Dubs presented one of the biggest difficulties in their relations with the U.S., and, in fact, "as a result of the incident, the U.S. considers Afghanistan as a communist country past recall"²⁶.

Cynics could say that the U.S. Government used the death of one of its ambassadors to make politics. One could even go so far as to suggest that the U.S. Government worked hand-in-glove with the kidnappers, in exactly the way they had planned. The

U.S. Government did take Dubs' death as a reason for changing relations with Afghanistan and for denouncing it as a "Communist regime", controlled by the Soviet Union. Washington named no replacement for Dubs, terminated almost all economic aid agreements and repeatedly charged the Afghan government with violations of human rights. Of course, the western press went along with the U.S. Government position, blaming the Afghan government and "Russian advisors" for Dubs' death. And, conveniently, most press accounts pointed to the existence of a Muslim rebel movement as a force fighting the government in the name of freedom. (It is highly interesting to compare the descriptions the U.S. press is giving the Muslim rebels in Afghanistan and the Muslim opposition movement to the deposed Shah of Iran - the Afghan Muslims tend to be described as freedom fighters while the Iranian Muslims are labeled often as terrorists, ultra conservative, and anti-democratic.)

Dubs' death provided the U.S. with a reason to begin to change relations with Afghanistan. The Muslim kidnappers achieved their goal: to draw attention to the situation in Afghanistan, to worsen U.S.-Afghan relations, and to bring the U.S. Government closer to aiding the rebels.

The activity of the Muslim rebels had started a few months after the Khalq Party took power. It was, and is, mainly inspired and supported by former landlords, conservative clergy (often they are identical), and foreign governments or organizations which began to run a small scale but constantly escalating war against the army, a war that has intensified to the point that the U.S. press is calling it "Moscow's Vietnam".

News about heavy fighting in Afghanistan between rebel forces and the Afghan military has been reported in the U.S. since fall, 1978. The fighting is por-

trayed as a struggle of the Afghan people against a pro-Moscow government. In December, 1978, the U.S. conservative mouthpiece U.S. News and World Report admitted that although "not directly involved", the U.S. has "big stakes in a struggle pitting Moslem conservatives against Moscow-backed rulers" because of "far reaching implications for the U.S. and the West".²⁷

Since then, the fighting which had been only sporadic over the summer (1978) months, has intensified. Attacks by the so-called rebels are mainly carried out from outside the country: In fact, thousands of Afghans opposed to the Khalq government have left Afghanistan mainly for neighboring Pakistan. At a press conference in February 1979, Pakistan's military ruler, Zia ul-Haq stated that there were over 20,000 Afghan refugees in the country.²⁸ Estimates now range as high as 100,000.

It is from Pakistan that most of the attacks are launched. A conference of rebel leaders was held in Lahore, Pakistan on January 18, 1979, and later meetings took place in other cities to which certain foreigners were invited to attend.

The fighting has affected almost all of Afghanistan's 28 provinces, and has been mainly in the countryside. However, Herat, Afghanistan's third largest city, which is only 70 miles from the Iranian border; Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad, and - in a limited way - Kabul have been affected. At one point, the rebels captured three towns in the province of Razmak. They established Islamic Courts and killed over 30 Khalq members within a few days.²⁹

According to the Washington Post, at least 5,000 people died in Herat in mid-March. Newsweek reported, quoting unspecified but "well placed American officials" (?) that "Soviet military advisors were among the casualties".³⁰ Washington Post writer Jonathan Randal went to great pains to describe in detail what he thinks happened in Herat. He writes that it

is a "favorite tactic of the Islamic tribesmen .. to torture victims by first cutting off their noses, ears, and genitals, then removing one slice of skin after another". Randal has a "diplomat" comment that this is "a slow, very painful death". According to him, it was the "Russians" living in Herat who were "hunted down" by "specially assigned assassination squads" that went "berserk" and indulged in "wholesale slaughter".³¹ Randal also points out that rebel groups are carrying out daily "terrorist" activities against members of the Khalq Party and soldiers. In retaliation, he says, the army actions against rebels have been "barbaric".

But what is really going on in Afghanistan ? Is this country a Soviet satellite ? Does the government of the Soviet Union see the ruling of the Khalq Party as part of a "gradually closing pincer movement aimed at Iran and the oil regions of the Middle East"³², as charged by Robert Neumann, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and now senior associate of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, an institution closely linked to the CIA ? And, is the "Islamic rebellion" an internal affair of conservative religious Muslims fighting a holy war ("Marx vs. the Mullahs"³³) against a communist, godless government ?

The first two questions have been partly answered: the Soviet Union was not instrumental in the events of April, 1978, which led to the ouster of Daoud and the beginning of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and although there are now several thousand Soviet advisors in Afghanistan, they are not determining what happens there. This became especially clear in the mid-September shake-up in the Afghan government when Noor Mohammed Taraki was replaced by Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin as President. Just a few days before he was replaced, Taraki was welcomed

in Moscow and assured continued support from Soviet leaders, who obviously could not predict the rapid change in Afghanistan following his visit. (As of now, it is still unclear whether Taraki resigned for health reasons, as reported in the Afghan News Agency, or whether he was seriously wounded and later died in a "violent palace revolt", as claimed in the U.S. media.)

Charges that the present fighting in Afghanistan is a "holy war" of rebel Muslims who are fearful that the "pro-Russian government" will curtail their religious freedom have never been substantiated. In fact, publications portraying the fighting as religiously-motivated seldom give any evidence for their presumptions and in September 1979, after one and a half years of the "godless" government, the pro-Western Economist reported that "no restrictions had been imposed on religious practice".³⁴

Obviously, reasons for the fighting and the terrorism lie elsewhere. In Afghanistan, Islam has always been tied closely to a social, political, and economic system of feudalism and semi-feudalism. Hence, the dissolution of the huge estates owned by the old aristocrats and feudal masters, and the partial destruction of the prior economic system by the Khalq Party has been interpreted as an attack on Islam. In addition, many of the rich landowners were in fact Muslim clergy.³⁵ and financial losses for the mullahs certainly motivated their propaganda about the "godless" communists.

Hence, it is not a religious war such as the western media is fond of creating to hide the truth. It is a struggle between the exploiters and the exploited. And, in this case, as in feudal Europe, religious leaders are largely in the exploiter's class which fact facilitates the creation of the religious war myth.

There have been cases of poor peasants who had been living almost as slaves on the estates of the landlords refusing to take land given to them or to go along with other reforms for fear of retaliation by the landlords. Having a long history of dependency on the mullahs and of being conditioned to listen to them as religious leaders, some of the peasants could well be convinced of the need of a "holy war" against the Khalq Party and the Soviets living and working in Afghanistan. Sometimes, however, Khalq officials gave the mullahs good openings for their propaganda by being insensitive to traditions and moving too fast with their reforms. Commented a conservative Afghan to CounterSpy: "They [the Khalq Party] could have done everything they wanted

if they had done it slower."

The third question raised above - is the fighting in Afghanistan an internal affair? - seems to be central. In March 1979, State Department spokesperson Hodding Carter III pointed out that the U.S. Government "would regard external involvement in Afghanistan's internal problems as a serious matter"³⁶. In his statement which was interpreted as "one more sign of sensitivity to the increased Soviet maneuvering in a wide area stretching from the Horn of Africa through Yemen to Afghanistan"³⁷ by the Washington Post, Carter directed his "warning" to the Soviet Union and pointed out that "the U.S. has not interfered in the internal situation of Afghanistan".³⁸ By calling the fighting an "internal affair" Carter is hiding the U.S.

A U.S. institution which has had close ties to the CIA in the past is still active in Afghanistan: the Asia Foundation. According to Joel W. Scarborough, Asia Foundation's representative in Afghanistan (box 257, Kabul), the Foundation "has closely collaborated with other American governmental agencies in Afghanistan, especially ICA, [International Communication Agency and] AID...". At the same time, Scarborough complains that "a favorable environment for accomplishing a great deal does not exist" (in a letter to the author on 6/18/79).

In the past, the Asia Foundation has arranged for numerous Afghans to visit and to be trained in the U.S. and has financed various projects in Afghanistan. One such project is the Afghan Women's Institute, headed by "the very capable Madame Kobra, president of the Institute and a former Minister of Public Health" (Asia Foundation News, Nov., Dec. 1977, p. 4).

Asia Foundation money was given to the institute to organize secretarial training courses for women and to strengthen its Cultural and Foreign Relations Department.

Contributions to the Asia Foundation come mainly from U.S. governmental grants and, to a lesser degree, from corporations. The Foundation, a "non-profit organization", works to create an infrastructure favorable to corporate investments in Asia, and to improve relations between corporate officials and Asian governments. For example, it gave a reception in the U.S. in the fall of 1977 for Sayad Waheed Abdullah, then Minister-in-charge for Afghan Foreign Affairs, which was well attended by corporate and State Department officials.

Whether the Asia Foundation still works with the CIA or not, it is performing the same functions as in the past: promoting corporate interests in Asia.

interests in intervention in Afghanistan and is ignoring massive, direct intervention by U.S. "friends". Further, given the long history of U.S. meddling in Afghan affairs, especially through the former Shah of Iran, Carter's statements are highly hypocritical.

After the defeat of U.S. economic, strategic, and political interests in Iran and the dissolution of CENTO (a military alliance of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan aided by the U.S.), the U.S. Government is very sensitive about the Middle East and South Asia region. Assistant Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, expressed that sensitivity during his trip to Turkey in spring 1979 where he negotiated for U.S. intelligence stations and explored the possibility of establishing a successor to CENTO. For an alliance like that, it would be "helpful" to have a government friendly to the U.S. in Afghanistan. Besides that, Afghanistan would be an excellent place for intelligence stations aimed at the Soviet Union.

Given what is at stake for U.S. long-term planning in the Middle East and South Asia region, it is certainly an illusion to believe that the U.S. is keeping its hands off Afghanistan. At this point, it is not clear how much the CIA is involved in Afghan affairs beyond the regular monitoring of activities of military and rebel movements. Although this is limited right now because "sophisticated electronic intelligence gathering is ... useless since there is little radio communication between rebel groups that can be intercepted and analysed".³⁹ Another U.S. intelligence agency which is highly active in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area is the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Comprised partly of "former" CIA officers, the DEA has rarely limited itself to "pure" prosecution of drug traffickers.

Evidence in the foreign press that the CIA is directly involved in the training of Afghan rebels in Pakistan camps and is in contact with them in

Afghanistan include statements in the Lebanese weekly, Al Kifah al Arabi,⁴⁰ and in various Eastern European publications.⁴¹ These statements have been denounced as "slanderous and baseless"⁴² by U.S. Government spokespersons.

Interestingly, two of the Afghan rebel leaders, Ziya Nezri and Zia Nassery, are in fact U.S. citizens, and the State Department is in touch with at least one of them. Ziya Nezri, a supporter of the deposed monarchy, visited the State Department in early March 1979, just before the attack on Herat, to ask for U.S. support. Nezri had lengthy discussions with Afghanistan Desk Officer Ronald Lorton and other State Department officials as well as with representatives of Senators Frank Church and Jacob Javits, who is known for his friendship with the former Shah of Iran. In an interview, Lorton refused to say whether he and Nezri had discussed arms shipments to the rebels because "Mr. Nezri is an American citizen". Church and Javits also declined to answer inquiries about their talks with Nezri.

The other U.S. citizen involved in the fighting in Afghanistan, Zia Nassery, is a member of the Afghan Islamic and Nationalistic Revolution Council based in Peshawar, Pakistan. (Peshawar is of strategic importance : it is the closest city to the Khyber Pass, the only road over the mountains from Afghanistan to Pakistan.) Nassery was interviewed in the New York Times in April 1979, where he claimed that his group has "150 000 fighting men in Afghanistan".⁴³

In a comment in the Washington Star, Charles Bartlett noted the obvious, viz., that "the impression is strong in informed circles [the Washington Star? the State Department ? the CIA ?] that the U.S. Government has given no arms or substantial [emphasis added] help to the insurgent Afghans..", but, "covert aid would of course be secret". Bartlett goes on to say that the U.S. will "pay a high price if we refuse

to be involved in situations like the one in Afghanistan".⁴⁴ A similar line is put forward by General Alexander Haig, the former Nixon aide and NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, who told the Belgian daily Le Soir that it is important to respond to "the emergence of Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Ethiopia as states to the Soviet Union".⁴⁵

Unlike Afghanistan, Pakistan has developed into a "paradise" for agents of foreign governments who want to intervene in Afghanistan, and the Pakistani government is eagerly supporting them. In a revealing article in the Swiss daily Neue Zuericher Zeitung in February 1979, it is documented that the Pakistani

military government is aiding the Afghan rebels seeking refuge and operational bases in Pakistan. Officially, Pakistan (like the U.S.) is "not interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs", as stated in the Pakistani paper Nawa-i-Waqt. The paper goes on, "if refugees crossing the border are given food and shelter, that is from purely humanitarian considerations".⁴⁶ However, the Neue Zuericher Zeitung Article documents that the Pakistani care for the "refugees" goes far beyond "humanitarian considerations". The Pakistani military rulers gave the refugees a sum of 20 million rupees, and never publicized this fact in the

While carefully exploring foreign intervention in Afghanistan, this article - due to the complexity of the issue and lack of space - does not analyze one important aspect determining Pakistan's support for the Afghan rebels: a long-lasting conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan caused by the arbitrary border division set up between these two countries at the end of British colonialism in the region.

Several times since 1947, when the British left the area, the Kabul government has challenged Pakistan by claiming that the Pashtuns, a substantial ethnic group whose members live in northwestern Pakistan as well as in northeastern Afghanistan have the right to decide their own future and that the Afghan-Pakistani border should not be internationally recognized. In the 1960's, this conflict escalated so far that the Afghan-Pakistani border was closed for almost three years. After the loss of Bangladesh, Pakistan's government has been very sensitive about any kind of independence movement such as that of the Pashtuns.

Another region that has been seeking independence from Pakistan is Baluchistan, the largest of Pakistan's four provinces. In 1972, the Baluchs launched a massive revolt against the regime of then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who answered by crushing the revolt with 70,000 Pakistani soldiers and helicopters and pilots supplied by Iran. (Time, 1/15/79, p. 32). Since then, Baluchistan has been virtually occupied by Pakistani soldiers from the eastern provinces.

Baluchs also live in Iran and Afghanistan, and the Khalq government has been sympathetic to their fight for independence and has been accused of aiding them militarily. Because the Marxist Baluchistan People's Liberation Front is part of this independence movement, "some Western analysts fear that future upheaval in Pakistan could lead to an extension of Soviet influence south to the Indian Ocean". (Time, 1/15/79, p. 32)

Pakistani press. At the same time, the Neue Zuericher Zeitung exposed a fact which is certainly not news to the Pakistani government, viz., that the "rebels use all their money to buy weapons".⁴⁷

U.S. papers and news agencies whose reporters have visited the rebel camps in Pakistan also repeatedly carried articles about rebels pleading for help: "Don't send us bread, send us arms and ammunition."⁴⁸ According to the Neue Zuericher Zeitung, another important fact about these camps needs to be understood: "It is very striking ... that practically all of the people who flee to Pakistan are male adults."⁴⁹

Beyond all doubt, it is in these camps in Pakistan that the real strongholds for the rebels are located, and they are aided by the Pakistani government in many ways: they receive money; they are allowed to cross the border to Afghanistan freely; they can receive training in the camps (see below); and Pakistan's ruler Zia ul-Haq also promotes their cause internationally. He told the Saudi Arabian paper Ukaz that "Afghanistan is an Islamic country presently ruled by Communists" and demanded a "common strategy of the Islamic nations to counter Communist activity in their countries".⁵⁰

Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran agrees and seems in this respect to be continuing the policies of the former Shah of Iran, who was always willing to help the reactionaries of Afghanistan. Khomeini's party has a close friendship with the Afghan Islamic Party which accused Taraki of being "an agent of the KGB".⁵¹ Also Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, "number two in the Shiite hierarchy, has appealed 'to all Muslims throughout the world to support the Afghan Muslims'".⁵² The Afghan Embassy in Teheran has been attacked by Afghans and Iranians protesting the Khalq government, which, in turn, has accused the Iranian mullahs of aiding the Afghan rebels even militarily. Also, other Islamic states

like Egypt, as well as the Muslim Brothers, an arch-conservative society of Muslims, are highly sympathetic to the Afghan Muslim rebels. Leaflets signed by the Islamic Brotherhood have been distributed in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area stating that "Iran has agreed to help the Islamic rebels fight against the Communists".⁵³

An article regarding foreign intervention in Afghanistan which appeared in the Canadian McLean's magazine reports that American drug enforcement agents discovered Chinese men in Pakistan near the Afghan border. First they suspected that these could be "Hong Kong Chinese heroin dealers ... planning to buy up the area's huge poppy crop". But later what they saw "emerged as one of Pakistan's most dangerous and best kept secrets: the presence on Pakistani soil of Chinese army officers and instructors. They were here to help train and equip right-wing Afghan Muslim guerillas for their 'holy war' against the Moscow-backed Kabul regime of Noor Mohammed Taraki.... The intriguing question now is this: Why is Pakistani strongman General Zia ul-Haq risking a fight with Afghanistan when he already faces violent rumblings among his own people ... ? Sources in neighboring India believe that it is all part of the tangled plan Zia has for building his own nuclear bomb which recently led to the cancellation of U.S. military aid. They suspect that China has now offered to help in return for Pakistani aid for the Afghan rebels."

McLean's goes on to report that the rebel's war is partly financed through the sale of illegal opium. "Feudal landlords whose holdings are threatened with confiscation by the Taraki government are bringing the produce from their poppy crops into Pakistan, and use the proceeds to buy rifles, explosives, and other weapons. Pakistani arms merchants report ... that their new customers come in daily and business is booming."⁵⁴

Another report by the Japanese

KYODO news agency indicates that "1,000 Chinese-trained Pakistani guerillas expert in ultrasubversive activities have been dispatched to carry out flash assaults on Afghan troops guarding the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and give protection to the Afghan rebel forces ". KYODO also states that, according to Indian intelligence sources, "the guerillas were sent from their training bases around Khasgar in Xingjiang Province [in China] to the sensitive areas bordering Afghanistan".⁵⁵

In the same news dipatch, KYODO reports that "Indian intelligence monitored "the movement of Lt. Gen. F.A. Christi, corps commander in charge of Pakistan's northern division ..., who recently visited the border area and said that he had a series of meetings with Chinese commanders of the area: 'Lt.Gen. Christi discussed issues like strategic posting of the guerillas, supply route of the already agreed Chinese military hardware, and exchanged ideas on a joint effort to keep ready a task force to subvert possible Soviet military help to Afghanistan ...'.⁵⁶ Another high-ranking Chinese military delegation headed by the Commander of the Air Force, Chang Ting Fa, visited Pakistan in spring 1979. This delegation also went to the Khyber Pass and a number of areas directly adjoining the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

"In view of America's obvious interest in the security and stability of the whole region, it would seem desirable that the U.S. Government consult and work with both Iran and Pakistan ever more closely. A quiet but visible demonstration of our sharing of their concerns would reassure them while serving as an implied warning if the new Afghan government tries to make trouble for its neighbors "⁵⁷ writes a senior associate of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies in July 1978. By now, it has become clear that

Afghanistan is not "making trouble" for its neighbors. On the contrary, it is the neighbors who interfere in Afghan affairs and support a conservative, religiously covered movement against the ruling Khalq Party.

As of now it is impossible to predict when and how the fighting in Afghanistan will end. The western media is eagerly painting a gloomy picture, and for a while they made it look like the Khalq government would fall within a few days. However, reports like "15 000 rebels have almost reached Kabul, and are hiding around the city. They are just waiting for the planned offense"⁵⁸, proved to be incorrect - wishful thinking of conservative and reactionary journalists.

On the contrary, by now it looks as if the Khalq government is strengthening its base among the people and also winning militarily over the rebels. But given the mountainous landscape, the on-going military and ideological support from Pakistan, China, and Iran for the rebels and the U.S. Government's "benevolence" towards them (and possibly more than that), the Afghan people are in for a long, costly struggle.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) Washington Post (WP), 5/10/79, p. A-43
- 2) The Afghanistan Desk officer in the State Department in a letter of 5/22/79
- 3) U.S. News and World Report, 12/11/78, p. 56
- 4) Newsweek, 2/26/79, p. 27
- 5) WP, 4/13/79, p. C-1
- 6) Current History, June 1979, p. 172
- 7) cf supra, # 5, p. C-5
- 8) Newsletter on Civil Liberties and Police Development (CILIP), West Berlin, Feb. 1979, p. 33
- 9) Der Spiegel, no. 12/79, p. 162
- 10) cf supra #.6, p. 173
- 11) cf supra #.5., p. C-5

- 12) Christian Science Monitor (CSM),
5/1/78, p. 6
- 13) Khyber Mail, 5/7/78, p. 1
- 14) Taraki in 1951 (!) in the paper Anqar:
as quoted in Political Affairs, Jan. 1979,
pp. 12, 13
- 15) cf supra, # 12
- 16) a "Carter administration official"
quoted in CSM, 5/9/78, p. 5
- 17) CSM, 11/14/78, p. 3
- 18) cf supra, # 4
- 19) WP, 2/22/79, p. A-13
- 20) ibid.
- 21) cf supra, # 4
- 22) cf supra, # 19
- 23) cf supra, # 4
- 24) ibid.
- 25) WP, 6/11/79, p. A-21
- 26) The Guardian Weekly, 4/29/79, p. 13
- 27) cf supra, # 3, p. 55
- 28) Neue Zuericher Zeitung, 2/7/79,
p. 4
- 29) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ),
8/21/79, p. 2
- 30) Newsweek, 4/2/79, p. 47
- 31) WP, 5/11/79, p. A-23
- 32) Washington Review of Strategic and
International Studies, July 1978, p. 117
- 33) Newsweek, 3/5/79, p. 66
- 34) The Economist, 9/11/79, p. 44
- 35) Newsweek, 4/16/79, p. 64
- 36) WP, 3/24/79, p. A-12
- 37) ibid.
- 38) ibid.
- 39) WP, 4/23/79, p. A-16
- 40) quoted as in Foreign Broadcast Infor-
mation Service (FBIS), Soviet Union,
4/23/79, p. D-1
- 41) Pravda even published names of CIA
agents and "masters of subversion", for
example, L. Robinson, R. Brock, and V.
David who are aiding the rebels (4/10/79,
p. 4)
- 42) WP, 4/3/79, p. A-12
- 43) New York Times (NYT), 4/16/79,
p. A-4
- 44) Washington Star (WS), 4/30/79,
p. A-11
- 45) quoted as in FBIS, Soviet Union,
4/23/79, p. D-1
- 46) Nawa-i-Waqt, quoted as in FBIS,
Soviet Union, 5/30/79, p. D-1
- 47) cf supra, # 28
- 48) NYT, 4/16/79, p. A-4
- 49) cf supra, # 28
- 50) quoted as in Dritte Welt Magazin,
4/79, p. 6
- 51) WP, 5/25/79, p. A-1
- 52) The Guardian Weekly, 5/6/79,
p. 12
- 53) quoted as in FBIS, Middle East
and North Africa, 4/18/79, p. 21
- 54) McLean's, 4/30/79, p. 24
- 55) cf supra, # 53
- 56) ibid.
- 57) cf supra, # 32
- 58) FAZ, 8/14/79, p. 2

CIA: PLOWSHARES INTO SWORDS?

They would never consider themselves to be "agents", yet the thousands of analysts, academicians, and researchers who do "intellectual" work for the CIA provide the Agency with all the necessary groundwork for its more notorious operations. They come from the private sector, the State Department, the Agency for International Development, corporations, "think tanks", and research centers of every description. The CIA depends on them, and they often become an integral part of the CIA machinery. Rand Corporation, for example, listed the CIA, the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the category of "Major Sponsors of Rand Research" in its 1977/78 report.

The document excerpted below is an example of a CIA solicitation for this kind of research. (A full-length copy of the original CIA paper is available from CounterSpy.)

Subject: Request for Proposal for a Study on Nutrition, Health and Food Science and Technology Capabilities of Key Countries (RFP-6-78N)

Gentlemen:

Your technical and cost proposal is solicited for a study in accordance with the Statement of Work set forth herein.

This letter and the matters addressed are unclassified, however, access to this material should be restricted to those judged to have a need-to-know.

Your proposal should be in accordance with the requirements of this Request for Proposal No. RFP-6-78N, which are contained in the following sections:

- Section I - Solicitation Instructions and Conditions
- Section II - Statement of Work (Under Separate Cover)
- Section III - Evaluation Criteria
- Section IV - Contractor's Certifications and Acknowledgements

Offers will be received until 5:00 PM, prevailing Washington, D.C. time 26 May 1978. Your attention is invited to the Late Offers and Modifications or Withdrawal Provisions set forth in the Solicitation Instructions and Conditions, Paragraph 7. The address for receipt of offers is:

William P. Yeatman
Post Office Box 2034
Main Post Office
Washington, D.C. 20013

The proposal must be submitted in the format described in this RFP. Offerors are requested to furnish four (4) copies of all proposals to facilitate the evaluation effort.

The type of information available to intelligence analysis will be described in detail by the Sponsor's Project Officer.

A final report presenting the results of this analysis will be required. A draft copy of the final report will be submitted to the sponsor for approval and comments prior to the submission of the final report.

It is anticipated that this effort will take approximately twelve (12) man-months of effort. Contractor may propose any type of contract for bidding purposes.

Requests for additional information or guidance concerning technical matters are to be addressed to the COTR, Dr. Julian Hoptman, who may be reached on (703) 351-6211, and administrative contractual questions are to be addressed to the Contract Negotiator, Mr. Brian MacDonald, who may be reached on (703) 351-6173.

Very truly yours,

(signed)

William P. Yeatman

SECTION II

STATEMENT OF WORK

Nutrition and Health, and Food Science and Technology
Capabilities of Key Countries

Studies will evaluate national nutrition and health problems and strengths and determine the potential limits for S&T, as they affect food availability and consumption requirements of key less developed countries and regions. Countries to be studied are Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, Nigeria, and the Philippines. Each country study will answer the following terms of reference:

1. What are the nutrition and disease factors related to food availability and utilization ? What is the impact of the biological/ecological/cultural environment on nutrition, health and disease ? What is the impact of illness related to dietary deficiency diseases ? What is the impact of national food needs and demands which result in parallel incidence of debilitation and crippling diseases in the labor force ? What is the nutritional status of the population as compared with its requirements ?
2. What conventional and unconventional food systems are available which apply to its problems ? Which alternative or substitute food could be developed and utilized ?
3. With scientific-technical input what would be the increment in food production, availability and utilization of current types of food ? What modern technologies are needed to upgrade present food resources or to achieve self-sufficiency in major foods ? What national or international research and development would be applicable to its food problems ? What are the food quality control and assurance requirements and the capabilities for processing, preservation and storage ?
4. On the basis of the preceding terms of reference, for each country make qualitative projections of the balance between future needs and capabilities in the light of government policies and prevailing issues. Estimate the extent to which problems are solvable on a national or regional scale. Estimate potential demands or competitive pressures on US or foreign S&T resources.
5. The contractor will deliver 5 final country reports, using the terms of reference outlined above, over a period not to exceed 12 calendar months. Progress reports will be submitted every two months and a final report will be submitted at the end of the contract period. The level of effort should total one (1) man-year. The data base for this contract will be unclassified and will be derived from public and professional sources.

When asked about the result of this solicitation for research, CIA officer Dr. Julian Hoptman, the man responsible for the technical aspects of the study, refused to answer any questions. A second officer, Brian MacDonald, admitted that the solicitation CounterSpy had obtained was initiated by the CIA's program office. However, MacDonald stated, "they never went ahead with the thing".

Whether this is true or not, the solicitation shows how far the analysts of the CIA's program office are willing to go in planning to control other countries. In the cases of Mexico and Nigeria, such a study could conceivably provide data for a strategy of withholding food aid and taking economic measures harmful to the national food system as a form of blackmail to procure oil resources. In Brazil and the Philippines the threat that popular movements pose to the present "favorable climates" for multinational exploitation would be a motivation for researching use of the food weapon. A study of Cuba would give information about the effects of the US blockade and suggest future options for continued US subversion of the Cuban revolution.

The solicitation takes on even more ominous implications when placed in the context of a previous CIA Report entitled "Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Production, and Climate" (discussed in CounterSpy, Winter 1976, pp. 8, 9). The report states that serious world food shortages could "give the US a measure of power it had never had before - possibly an economic and political dominance greater than that of the immediate post World War Two years". The report continues: "Washington could acquire virtual life and death power over the fate of multitudes of the needy. Without indulging in blackmail in any sense, the US would gain extraordinary political and economic influence...".

As incredible as it seems, there can be no doubt that people exist who are willing to contemplate such inhumanity as the use of food as a weapon. Already corporations import food from dozens of countries where the masses are malnourished without so much as a second thought about whether their actions are - at the very least - irresponsible. From such corporate practices to deliberate use of food as a weapon it is only a very small step.

THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
TEACHERS AND THE C.I.A.

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CIA IN INDONESIA 1965

by Peter Gribben

It may be that the true story of what happened in Indonesia on the night of September 30-October 1, 1965 (commonly referred to as "Gestapu") will never be told. The abortive coup by junior military officers was designed to prevent another perceived coup that the CIA-backed "Generals Council" was planning against the Sukarno government. In the early hours of October 1, six of the members of this council were abducted from their homes, taken to the rebels' headquarters outside Djakarta (Indonesia's capital), and then murdered later that morning. The mistakes these junior officers made: letting one General Nasution escape, and leaving another General Suharto off their list completely, proved their undoing. In the following months, Nasution, using the pretext of the aborted coup would direct the extermination of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and Suharto would take over control of the government from President Sukarno. The exact motives of these junior officers, their political allegiance and goals are unclear.

What is established fact, however, is that within twelve hours their coup had failed. The Army, led by Suharto, was able to regain control of those installations seized by the coup-makers, root out the dissident units who had participated, and apprehend their lead-

ers. What is also established fact is that, following the events of the Gestapu, the powers and ability of President Sukarno to govern were curbed (within six months he had ceded all control to General Suharto), a US-trained military-civilian elite took over the day-to-day affairs of the country, the PKI leadership was wiped out, and there began a mass murder of close to one million people.

CIA involvement in the events of the Gestapu has never been documented. Some of their machinations before and after October 1, 1965, however, are well known. CIA participation in the formulation of an American policy of "nation building" in Southeast Asia is extensive.¹ There is also evidence of the CIA's infiltration of right-wing student groups and anti-Communist trade union federations which laid the groundwork for the massacres before October 1965. In a way, then, the question of what role the CIA played in those 48 hours of the Gestapu is peripheral. For, whatever it may have been, it pales before their behavior during the coup's bloody aftermath.

To the vicious murder of one million innocent Indonesian workers, students and peasants, the CIA never objected. Instead, it concentrates its efforts (and US taxes) on analysis of the coup whose main aim is to implicate the PKI in the murder of the six generals and to justify the Army's purge of the Indonesian Left. To speak out against the atrocities of 1965-67 in Indonesia would put the CIA in a hypocritical and untenable position. For the beneficiaries of the new status quo in Indonesia are the very class interests which the CIA serves faithfully. It would be surprising to read a "dog bites man" story where the CIA and the corporate class in America are concerned.

Any discussion of CIA involvement in the September/October 1965 coup must begin by mentioning the CIA's own analysis of the events contained in its Indonesia-1965: The Coup That Back-

fired (1968). The book is important, not for its command of facts and events (in which respect it is a jumble of half-truths and contradictions), but for the circumstances which surround its publication: Indonesia-1965 is the only study of Indonesian politics ever released to the public on the Agency's own initiative. Further, it is the only study ever released by the CIA of a coup for which there was reason to doubt the CIA's own proclaimed innocence. The CIA never released of its own initiative a study of its involvement in the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile, for example. One has to ask the question, then, why the CIA went to the trouble to publish a history of the Gestapu affair, as it perceived it?

Related to the CIA's White Paper on the events surrounding Gestapu is its effort to quash the release of any study which questioned the CIA's conclusion. In January 1966, members of the Modern Indonesia Project at Cornell University (originally set up in 1954 with a grant from the Ford Foundation) circulated a confidential paper pointing out the inconsistencies of the version of events coming out of Indonesian trials of PKI leaders and other "official" sources in Djakarta. Caught by surprise, the CIA was able to hold up publication of the Cornell Paper for five years; time enough to concoct its own study and allow it to become accepted history.

NATION BUILDING VIA MILITARY ELITES

US plans for so called "nation-building" in Southeast Asia through the creation of Western-trained military elites grew out of a series of reports drawn up between 1958-60.² The Draper Report of 1959 (named after former Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr.) and its annexes written one year earlier; the Rockefeller Brothers Special Study Project of December 1959; and the Council on Foreign Relations'

(CFR) Study Group on Southeast Asia in US Policy all argued that the officer corps of under-developed countries, and Indonesia in particular, constituted a naturally selected and morally superior elite best suited to lead their country's process of economic development. Each of the reports urged the US government to make use of the supposed organizational strength and leadership capabilities of the military to achieve American economic objectives. From the beginning, these blueprints envisioned a scenario whose ultimate beneficiary would be US trade and investment.

CIA participation was evident throughout the gestation of this policy. One of the annexes to the Draper Report was written by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) of the University of Pennsylvania. The FPRI was advised in its report by Guy Pauker who, since joining the Rand Corporation in 1958 had worked closely with the CIA and the Indonesian civilian and military elite of which he spoke so highly. The FPRI, itself, was funded by the Catherwood Foundation of oil financier Cummins Catherwood. In 1967 it was revealed that the Catherwood Foundation served as a CIA conduit to pay the salary of the National Student Association's (NSA) International Vice President.³

A cursory glance at the participants of these study groups would turn up names such as retired (nominally, anyway) CIA-Colonel William Kintner, Admiral Felix B. Strump (board chairman of CIA's Air America), CIA's Edward Lansdale (responsible for the liquidation of the Huk people in the Philippines and the rigging of elections in favor of Diem in "South" Vietnam in the late 1950's), Kenneth Todd Young (a Stanvac oil company official who, in October 1960 would become an "advisor" to Diem and later the US Ambassador to Thailand), and many others with CIA/corporate credentials.

The culmination of the thoughts and recommendations put forth by these four reports took the form of a book written by Russell H. Fifield, Southeast Asia in United States Policy (New York, Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1963). The book was the final version of the CFR's study group on Southeast Asia. Reflecting the CFR's domination of foreign policy formulation, the study group "counseled" Washington "to provide assistance to President Sukarno but at the same time to build up non-Communist and anti-Communist forces".⁴

The ensuing five years in Indonesia caused great consternation for the self-anointed nation builders. The military's inability to stem the rising popularity of the PKI caused Pauker and others to publicly rescind their previous praise of the officers corps as "the best human material" to be found in Third World countries. By November 1964, Pauker's skepticism was full blown. He doubted whether Indonesia's anti-Communist forces (i.e., the military) could summon up "the ruthlessness that made it possible for the Nazis to suppress the Communist Party of Germany ... even though the enemies of the PKI ... are weaker than the Nazis, not only in numbers and in mass support, but also in unity, discipline, and leadership".⁵

ECONOMIC FRONT

As with Chile eight years later, while relations between Washington and Sukarno continued to deteriorate, US military aid to the Indonesian armed forces was increasing greatly. From 1949-61, \$29.5 million in military grants were extended. The four years 1962-65 saw \$38.5 million in military aid. And, while the number of Indonesian officers trained in the US before 1962 was around 700, by 1965 that figure had jumped to 4,000.⁶

US oil companies, meanwhile, were forging stronger links with the nomi-

nally independent, state-run Indonesian oil industry. Following the lead of smaller American oil companies, the majors, Stanvac (the Far East subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Mobil) and Caltex (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of California and Texaco) signed a 60-40 production-sharing formula with Permina, the Army-run Indonesian oil company. Given the attitude of Sukarno and the Indonesian people toward foreign investment during this period, these ventures were risky to say the least, and could only be consolidated by a total transformation of the Indonesian status quo.

In both these instances, the destination of US dollars, public and private, was not to Sukarno and the Indonesian government, but to forces allied against him which were thus able to strengthen their control over the key sectors of Indonesian society: the military and the economy.

Caltex officials had a particular revenge in seeking a turnaround in Indonesia. In 1958, it had financed, along with the CIA, the Outer Islands rebellion in which members of the pro-US Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and the modern Islamic Masjumi Party tried to get the islands of Sumatra and the Celebes to secede from Indonesia in response to the nationalizations of Dutch holdings by Sukarno. At the time, Caltex accounted for seventy per cent of Sumatran oil production, and future CIA Director John McCone owned \$1 million worth of stock in Caltex's parent company, Standard Oil of California. The '58 Sumatran fiasco had led to the exposure of the CIA when its pilot, Allen Pope was shot down and captured by the Indonesians. McCone, Caltex and the CIA had all suffered ignominious exposure and defeat in 1958.⁷ Any threat, now, to their new investment in Permina would be protected with a vengeance. Hence, when oil workers seized the refineries of Caltex, Stanvac, and two other companies in March 1965,

it marked the beginning of the end for Sukarno.

LABOR OPERATIONS

For US governmental labor policy in Indonesia, the '65 coup constituted a qualitative success over previous setbacks. During the late '50's and early '60's, AFL-CIO attempts to create one national, unified, pro-Western labor federation in Indonesia had repeatedly failed, in part, because the AFL-CIO lacked a regional Asian labor center of its own such as the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in Latin America. In one of the early attempts, the CIA-affiliated International Ladies' Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) set up a program to train Indonesian labor leaders from various trade unions. Funded by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, between 1956 -58 the ILGWU brought some 30 Indonesians to their US training institute. Five years later, close to twenty of these people were still active in the labor movement in Indonesia.⁸

In another campaign in October 1962, Dr. Kusna Purardiridja, chairperson of the PSI-affiliated labor federation, the All Indonesia Congress of Workers (KBSI), visited the US under a State Department Leadership Program. Because he was also head of the National Railway Workers Union, Dr. Kusna met with Lester Zosel, International Representative of the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks (BRAC). Joining the talks was Donald Beattie, executive secretary of the Railway Executives Association (REA). Kusna "hailed the feeling of responsibility" shown by the US labor movement for world developments. He especially praised the training of young Asian trade unionists in US union methods, saying that upon their return home they had "used this training seriously".⁹ Although Zosel, himself, has never been shown to have worked for the CIA, the BRAC was heavily involved in CIA

activities at the time. Through BRAC's International Trade Secretariats (ITS), the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), BRAC's Jack Otero worked as a "CIA agent for labor operations" in Latin America.¹⁰

The ITS of the Communication Workers of America (CWA), which was also collaborating with the CIA at the time, the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International (PTTI) helped to train members of the Indonesian telephone and telegraph workers union, the SSPTT. When Jack Sessions, who ran the ILGWU training institute in the 1950's, travelled to Indonesia in 1962, the stigma of having trained in the US was already being seen. "Communists, he recalled, denounced the SSPTT as an American socialist union."¹¹

The man most responsible for forging links between Indonesian and AFL-CIO trade unionism was Harry Goldberg. Recruited by Jay Lovestone, who had worked with the CIA throughout his career as head of the Education Department of the ILGWU and as Foreign Affairs Chief of the AFL-CIO, Goldberg helped establish the Asian Regional Organization of the ICFTU in 1951. Although he denies ever having worked for the CIA, Goldberg persistently tried to get the US government to support members of the PSI and Masjumi Party in their Outer Islands rebellion/fiasco. When leaders of these parties were exiled in 1959, Goldberg served as a courier between them and Indonesian trade unionists.

Following the 1965 coup, Goldberg was the first Western trade unionist to visit Indonesia. And although he had misgivings about the massacres, he urged student groups, trade unions and others to step up their purge of the PKI.¹² Upon his return to the US, Goldberg lobbied the Johnson Administration to increase aid to the new regime.

As contradictions in Indonesian society increased during the 1963's-65's, the role of US-trained trade unionists became more significant. Gathering the names of workers who were members or

even sympathizers of unions affiliated with the national labor federation SOBSI, these trade unionist spies laid the groundwork for the massacres of 1965-66 before the Gestapu ever occurred.¹³ Goldberg, himself, has admitted that the military-backed United Workers Action Front (KABI) was undoubtedly involved in any "excesses" committed against members of SOBSI.¹⁴

In the orchestrated hysteria which followed the Gestapu, massacres of the "left" ended up being directed against the majority of Indonesian workers, peasant "squatters" on estates, local PKI members and most active trade unionists. The presidential decree of May 1966 banning all mass organizations -- specifically the PKI, BAPERKI (an organization of Indonesians of Chinese descent which was accused of having ties to the Chinese communists), and SOBSI with its 62 trade union affiliates -- effected some ten million people. Any former members of these groups were also subject to arrest and indefinite detention at any time. No specific charges needed to be made against them and a trial was not guaranteed. Further, members and their families were ineligible for the "certificate of non-involvement" required for jobs and housing.¹⁵

The military's previous formation in 1962 of anti-SOBSI groupings of workers, students, and soldiers culminated in the creation of the national labor federation, SOKSI. With the help of the International Division of the AFL-CIO (a longtime CIA haunt) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the army formed SOKSI in order to undermine legitimate political groupings and ultimately cause a split in SOBSI.¹⁶ Its success in causing this break was due in large part to its ability to distribute government-subsidized commodities in short supply to its members.

The corporate ideology of SOKSI was directly opposed to the militant trade unionism in SOBSI. It stressed the mutual interest that both worker and management had in the production as op-

posed to their natural incompatibilities. From its inception, SOKSI was viewed by the PKI as an attempt to liquidate independent trade unions through the intimidation of workers. By making paramount Indonesia's "national aim" of development along capitalist lines with an emphasis on foreign investment, SOKSI tried to smash the trade union movement as part of an ongoing class struggle. The concept of karyawan, in attempting to cloud over the reality of the exploitation of workers by asserting the unity of interest between capital and labor, sowed the seeds of an Indonesian fascism.¹⁷

In all of this, SOKSI spread AFL-CIO's company unionism to the Indonesian masses. Trade unionism according to George Meany has always sought to de-politicize the demands of workers, to portray the production process as a joint harmonious endeavour. In Indonesia, this line of thinking indirectly justified the murder of hundreds of thousands of trade unionists; as in the US it has resulted in the repeated selling-out of rank and file by their union leadership, a fact not lost on American workers.

STUDENT AND CULTURAL OPERATIONS

Efforts by the CIA, the Ford Foundation and others to coopt Indonesian intellectuals and the student movement in particular took ten years and were not realized until the coup. The creation of an Indonesian elite which would one day steer the country's economy in a solidly pro-West direction began in the mid-1950's with the launching of field projects by American professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Cornell University.¹⁸ These efforts culminated in courses at the Army Staff and Command School, SESKOAD, in Bandung, Indonesia. These courses were taught by American-educated civilian economists. The students, by and large, were generals and senior officers who had been

trained in counterinsurgency at Fort Leavenworth and Fort Bragg in the US.

In 1954, the Ford Foundation funded a series of field projects at MIT and Cornell which "educated" a cadre of American scholars in Indonesian studies who have since dominated the field in this country. One of the first people to go through this program was the irrepressible Guy Pauker. Although Pauker denies having worked for the CIA before 1958, the Center for International Studies at MIT -- from where these field projects were run -- was a CIA think tank of Max Millikan and W. W. Rostow, literally created and financed by the CIA in the early 1950's.

After training this core team of American scholars, Ford began recruiting screened Indonesian intellectuals and sent them to the University of California to study under Pauker at the newly-created Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies at Berkeley, another recipient of CIA funds. Meanwhile, American professors were back in Djakarta transforming the Faculty of Economics into an "American-style school of economics, statistics and business administration". One team member, recalls that when Sukarno complained of there being too much emphasis on Schumpeter and Keynes, the staff "put 'socialism' into as many course titles as we could... but basically [we] tried to preserve the academic integrity of the place".¹⁹

The "integrity" of Indonesia's "best human material" (see above) was put on international display in 1958 during the CIA-backed Sumatra fiasco. One of the leaders of the rebellion, Sumitro Djojohadikusomo, had contacts with MIT and the CIA dating back to 1954 when he "participated in the [American] team's briefings before they left Cambridge"²⁰ for Indonesia. At the time of the 1958 rebellion, Sumitro was minister of finance in Sukarno's cabinet and dean of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Djakarta. During his exile to Singapore in 1959 (for his part in the Sumatran up-

rising), Sumitro kept in touch with his students through Harry Goldberg. During his six years in exile, he remained "chairman in absentia" of the school.²¹

Student organizations in Indonesia are closely tied to their sponsoring political parties which, in some cases, exert a paternalistic control over their students. Upon graduation from university, student leaders often go on to positions of power in their respective parties.²² The ability of the CIA to influence student politics is, thus, neatly accomplished through the infiltration and cooptation of the students' party-sponsors. The history of the Islamic Student Association (HMI) is a case in point.

The HMI was closely associated with the Masjumi Party, which was involved in the CIA's Outer Islands rebellion. Despite the banning of Masjumi in 1959, its contacts with HMI were never broken. Leaders of Masjumi, PSI (many of whose members had taken up faculty posts after their Berkeley training), and the orthodox Islamic Nahdatul Ulama (NU) party fed their students to a steady diet of anti-communism. Most of this propaganda was directed against members of the PKI-led CGMI, the most popular student federation with over 30,000 student-members by mid-1964.²³

Two weeks before the Gestapu, leaders of the CGMI were able to get the internationally recognized Federation of Indonesian Student Associations (PPMI) to issue a statement demanding the dissolution of HMI for its associations with the CIA.²⁴ But, as in the case of the oil workers' demands for nationalization of the oil industry, this move came too late.

Following Gestapu, these right-wing student groups burnt down the PKI headquarters and the home of Party chairperson D.N. Aidit; in the following days, they also burnt down the central offices of the Communist Movement of Indonesian Women (GERWANI) and the People's Youth (Permuda Rakyat), both of whom they accused of murdering the six generals on the night of October 1; and finally, they laid siege to the SOBSI headquarters.

On October 25, 1965, these right-wing student groups met at the home of the Minister of Higher Education and Science, Major General Sjarif Thajeb, to form a new student organization, the Action Command of Indonesian Students, KAMI.²⁵ (KAMI leaders had previously participated in American Field Service exchange programs and "Foreign Student Leadership Projects" sponsored by the CIA-financed National Student Association.²⁶) KAMI demonstrations accused the PKI of participation in the unsuccessful coup, and they provided the ideal method for circumventing government-controlled means of communication, which, at the time, had not implicated the PKI. KAMI's spread of anti-communist hysteria and accusations were given substantial support by the military. The Army frequently lent KAMI loudspeakers and transportation. And, students in KAMI could count on Army protection if they were attacked by hostile groups -- frequently members of the military itself.

The CIA's Congress for Cultural Freedom was also active in Indonesia, forging links with PSI and Masjumi Party members. In May 1964, the congress published a pamphlet entitled "Indonesia in Travail" which spoke of Indonesia's impending "crisis".²⁷ The pamphlet was written by 25 PSI and Masjumi anti-Sukarno intellectuals. One of the authors Mochtar Lubis, was Harry Goldberg's favorite Indonesian journalist. At one point, Goldberg even tried, unsuccessfully, to help Lubis import a printing press.

The purpose of the CIA's efforts in this regard was to counter a rising anti-Americanism on the part of the Indonesian people which was evidenced by the successive sackings and closings of three US Information Service (USIS) libraries in late 1964 and early 1965. These attacks on centers of US propaganda dissemination reflected the rising consciousness of Indonesians, workers in particular. The seizure of the USIS library in Surabaya in December 1964, was to pro-

test the US-Belgian joint "rescue operation" in Stanleyville which resulted in the killings of thousands of innocent Congolese citizens. In March of 1965, students occupied the US Embassy in Djakarta to protest the murder of Malcolm X in New York City. They read a petition which demanded the ouster of Ambassador Howard Jones, the closing of all remaining USIS libraries, and the departure of all Peace Corps volunteers from Indonesia.²⁸

It was the actions of Indonesian workers, however, which brought home to the CIA the need for some kind of immediate action in Indonesia. In March of 1965, unions cut off gas and electricity to the US embassy apartment building, the home of the American naval attache, Lt. Col. Victor A. Armstrong, and the offices of both the Indonesian-American Friendship Society and the Associated Press.²⁹ Although emergency generators soon restored power to the facilities, the afternoon and evening English classes for three thousand Indonesians had to be cancelled. The symbolic effect of isolating embassy personnel from their US contacts (the Friendship Society was a well-known meeting place for American intelligence officers and their Indonesian assets) angered the US and frustrated their efforts to win over a segment of Indonesian society.

During the same month, the Indonesian postal union imposed a mail and telegraph boycott on the US Embassy and refused to handle traffic for American news agencies.³⁰ This second action represented a greater danger to American plans. At a time of growing anti-Americanism and with the visit of presidential representative Ellsworth Bunker approaching, the prospect of not being able to present events in Indonesia in a "favorable" light threatened to derail a US scenario for intervention. News management requires more than the reporting of events. It demands the creation of a consumable commodity. In the case of Indonesia, packaging anti-American

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"hostility was a prerequisite for gaining the American people's countenance of covert actions by their government.

CONCLUSION

With the coming-to-power of Suharto and the US-trained military-civilian elite, the Indonesian "miracle" was achieved. The country was launched on a pro-Western course of development. The CIA, whether it chose to or not, could claim another "success" American unfettered access to Indonesia's vast mineral wealth was restored. The island-nation was once again an imperialist El Dorado.³¹

The hubris of American officials and their propagandists echoed the propitious turn of events. Scholar Richard Nixon (still a year out of office) used the Council on Foreign Relation's publication, Foreign Affairs, to speak to "the test prize in the Southeast Asian area" being rescued from "the Chinese orbit".³² Then-Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, testified to the Senate that, in retrospect, US military aid during the 1965-66 period had been "well justified" and had paid dividends.³³ US Ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green, repeatedly told audiences in Australia -- where he was the Ambassador from March 1973 to August 1975 -- that "we did what we had to do and you'd better be glad we did because if we hadn't Asia would be a different place today".³⁴

The reaction of the American press to the turnaround in Indonesia was equally self-serving. Making no mention of the bloodbath which followed, CIA mouthpiece, C.L. Sulzberger greeted the coup as a "positive achievement".³⁵ Another New York Times columnist, James Reston, made no mention of the mass murders, referring, instead, to the changes which occurred as "significant" and "hopeful".³⁶

Throughout the massacres -- and to

this day -- the CIA and its apologists have never deviated from their "official" portrayal of the carnage which followed the coup as a spontaneous, mystical act, a Holy War carried out against godless Communists.³⁷ But the on-going tragedy, the continued oppression of an entire people by a local elite sponsored, financed and made in the USA speaks to a different madness; one which is systematic, planned, and an automatic corollary of a "healthy" investment climate for US corporations.³⁸

The CIA and its clients have hidden behind their Indonesian "smokescreen" for too long. To the deterrence of future massacres, CounterSpy is publishing the names of those CIA agents, Public Safety Advisors and other involved persons who were in Indonesia at the time of the Gestapu, and who acquiesced the bloodbath and helped to consolidate its grizzly gains.

BREWSTER, Robert G.

(born: 10/24/26)

Brewster has been stationed in Indonesia from 6/65-5/67. He is a CIA officer. (other known assignments: Thailand, Malaysia)

DAYTON, John Winthrop

(born: 10/22/27)

Dayton is a CIA officer who served in Indonesia during the Gestapu. (Jordan, Somalia, Japan)

EMORY, Orville J.

(born: 2/27/33)

Emory was in Indonesia from 11/63-12/67. He is a CIA officer. (Philippines, Thailand)

ICHIKAWA, Grant H.

(born: 4/17/19)

Ichikawa is a CIA officer. He served in Indonesia from 1963-68.

LAZARSKY, Joseph E.

(born: 10/21/21)

Lazarsky, who is a CIA officer, was in Indonesia from 12/64-7/67. (Burma, India, South Korea)

LEVY, Frank A.

(born: 1/24/19)

Levy was assigned to Surabaya in 7/64. He is a CIA officer.

MASTERS, Edward Eugene

(born: 6/21/24)

Masters, head of the political section of the US Embassy at the time of the coup, has an extensive background of intelligence work, including that of intelligence research analyst and Deputy Chief of the Indonesia-Malaya Branch in the Office of Intelligence Research-Analysis in the State Department.

McAVOY, Clyde Richard

(born: 3/27/26)

McAvoy served in Indonesia from 7/61-4/66. He is a CIA officer. (Laos, Burma)

NICOL, Donald J.

(born: 7/17/31)

Nicol is a CIA officer who has worked in Indonesia (2/65-4/68) and South Korea.

SNYDER, Royce W., Jr.

(born: 4/25/32)

Snyder served twice in Indonesia: at the time of the coup and in the early 1970's. He is a CIA officer. (Malaysia, Vietnam)

STEIN, Arthur

(born: 11/2/26)

Stein has worked as police advisor in a university and as "public safety advisor" in Cambodia and Indonesia (1/64-8/65).

STRONG, Henry

(born: 10/6/23)

Strong is a CIA officer who was in Indonesia during the coup. (Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark)

TOVAR, Bernardo Hugh

(born: 12/27/22)

Tovar was CIA Chief of Station in Indonesia from 5/64-9/66. Peter Dale Scott calls him "a clearly activist Chief of Station...who has spent years in the Philippines with the CIA's Edward Lansdale in the early 1950's". (Ten Years Military Terror in Indonesia, Spokesman Books, London, 1975, p. 243). Subsequently, Tovar became Chief of Station in Laos (1970) and Thailand (1973).

WATERS, Hugh Richard

(born: 9/17/29)

Waters was assigned to Surabaya in 8/65. He is a CIA officer.

YU, David C.L.

(born: 6/29/24)

Yu is a CIA officer who was in Indonesia during the coup.

FOOTNOTES

1) See Peter Dale Scott, "The Vietnam War and the CIA-Financial Establishment" in Mark Selden (ed.), Remaking Asia: Essays on the American Uses of Power, Pantheon, New York, 1971.

2) Peter Dale Scott, "Exporting Military-Economic Development: America and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-67", in Malcolm Caldwell (ed.), Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia, Spokesman Books, London, 1975.

3) Ibid., p. 253

4) Russell H. Fifield, Southeast Asia in United States Policy, Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1963, p. 308

5) Guy J. Pauker, Communist Prospects in Indonesia, the RAND Corporation, RM-4135-PR, November 1964, p. 22

6) cf supra, # 2, p. 236

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U.S. INTELLIGENCE IN NORWAY

by Konrad Ege

Norway to Americans is an "iceberg of the mind"; a small, frozen country in northern Europe without any political, economic or military significance. However, for NATO and the CIA, Norway is the most important part of NATO's northern flank because of its 196 km. border with the Soviet Union and its potential as a new source of oil and natural gas.¹

Based on recent revelations, the following article examines this growing interest of the US Government in Norway. It documents cases of US intervention which violated Norwegian law and endangered the lives and security of the four million people living there.

Very little was known by the Norwegian public about operations of the CIA, the US Navy and the National Security Agency (NSA) in Norway until very recently - more precisely, the summer of 1977, which could be called today "a summer of leaks".² In that summer, governmental documents dealing with "secret" US installations in Norway were revealed and the true functions of some US military and intelligence stations were made known.

Revelations about these installations which serve primarily foreign (US) military and intelligence interests caused a public furor because according to Norwegian policy, foreign bases are not permitted to exist on Norwegian soil. This strict "no foreign bases" policy was established in February 1949, six months be-

fore the NATO Treaty went into effect. Two years later, it was qualified by the Norwegian Minister of Defense, Hauge. He stated that in spite of the "no foreign bases policy", Norway would open up bases for allied forces in case of an armed attack or threat of armed attack. Hauge also made clear that Norway would participate in NATO exercises, would allow allied forces brief visits, and that Norway would even construct "such military facilities which may be necessary to receive and support the allied forces which are necessary to assist the defense of the country".³

In the late 1950's, the Norwegian Government added another restriction to its military policies: no nuclear weapons could be stationed in Norway. (The main reason for the "no nuclear weapons" and the "no foreign bases" policies is simple: Norway wanted to avoid any provocation of the Soviet Union.) Despite the flexibility of Norway's policies, they still have been violated by the US military and intelligence, sometimes without the knowledge of the Storting (Norwegian parliament) and always without the knowledge of the Norwegian people. Nuclear weapons have been transported through Norway; US Navy vessels with nuclear delivery vehicles have surreptitiously visited the country. Nuclear powered submarines, like the "hunter-killer" USS Seahorse ("hunter-killers" are used for attacks on ships and other submarines) have also passed through, as in April, 1976, when a visit was made to a naval facility near Bergen.⁴ As for foreign bases, although none officially exist at this point, certain facilities have been used almost exclusively for US military and intelligence purposes and US intelligence operations continue to be run out of these bases.

The history of US intelligence in Norway begins as early as 1943 with the Office of Strategic Services' (OSS) support of the Norwegian resistance against the Nazi occupation. The early

contacts were problematic, and it took the OSS a long time until they were able to get involved in Norwegian operations because "the British had determined to keep the American amateurs from upsetting their own difficult relations with the Norwegian resistance".⁵

At the end of 1944, the OSS sent a mission to impede German railroad movements. The command of the operation was given to William Colby, a "short, wiry Minnesotan and pre-law graduate of Princeton who had distinguished himself as a Jedburgh in France".⁶ The operation was almost a complete failure with 10 people killed and two planes destroyed.

Unlike the Soviet Union, which took its troops out of Norway after the war, the US moved in and stayed. From that point on, Norway's dependence on the US increased tremendously, and it has been freely used as a base for intelligence and military operations.

As an important indication of this growth of US involvement, it is interesting to note the increase of personnel and budget of the Norwegian police force, its technical modernization, and the change in its structure from extreme decentralization to more and more centralization since World War II. The reasons for the development of the Norwegian police force are very complex, but a main reason certainly is the need to protect US interests in Norway and to suppress opposition against Norway's present pro-US and pro-NATO policies.

While Norwegian police expenditures in 1950/51 were 30,026 million Crowns per year (0.22 % of the GNP), they increased to 178,772 million in 1965 (0.32% of the GNP), and to 463,772 million in 1973 (0.42 % of the GNP).⁷ Since 1950, there has also been a remarkable shift of police concentration into the urban areas "which corresponded to actual population shifts only in exceptional cases".⁸ For example, in Oslo, the capital, the number of police increased by 47.6%

from 1950 to 1976, while the population increased only by 6.9% to 464,900.⁹ There has also been a tremendous increase in funding for "transportation and material" (including billy clubs, pistols, gas grenades, and machine guns). From 1975 to 1977 alone, the budget for "transportation and material" increased by 122 %.¹⁰

In addition, "Anti-Terror Squads" have now been established in Norway, in spite of the fact that no "terrorist incidents" have occurred in Norway besides the assassination of an alleged PLO member by Israelis in the so-called "Lillehammer Affair". These squads exist in every major city and number several hundred persons. The Norwegian Minister of Justice has issued directives that the Anti-Terror Squads may also be used against persons who are "dangerous to public safety" as well as to quell "domestic unrest".¹¹ The task of "quelling domestic unrest" may also be carried out by the Norwegian army. Norwegian military officers have been trained since 1969 in the Schule fuer Nachrichtenwesen der Bundeswehr (school for military intelligence) in Bad Ems, West Germany. In courses recommended by the Pentagon and the CIA, Norwegian officers have been trained in psychological warfare, mass psychology, fighting mass demonstrations, and internal surveillance.

Like every other NATO member, Norway has several intelligence agencies which keep files on more than 250,000 persons and constantly surveil some 7,500 persons.¹² Norwegian intelligence agencies illegally spy on legal activities of various political organizations and parties. Information about Norwegians is also passed on to the CIA. The former head of Norwegian intelligence, Vilhelm Evang, confirmed that there has always been a very close cooperation between the CIA and the Norwegian intelligence.¹³ Invariably, Norwegian military and intelligence operations have been targeted against Norwegians opposed to US and

NATO interference in Norway.

Other examples in Norwegian history reveal that the police and intelligence are not the only sectors of Norwegian society serving US governmental interests. There have been several cases where the University of Oslo collaborated with the US Air Force. In 1954, the University's Institute of Theoretical Astrophysics signed a contract with the USAF for solar research. It is clear that the interest of the USAF in this research was not academic but mainly military. Between 1959 and 1968, the University of Oslo also operated a Baker-Nunn Satellite Tracking Camera which is part of the Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS) of the USAF. SPADATS has several functions including "that of generating targeting data about non-US satellites for US satellite weapon systems" ¹⁴. It is also a principal source of "intelligence on Soviet space programs" and "is the only body of US compiled information about the total population of orbiting objects" ¹⁵. (When this program ended at the University of Oslo, a Baker-Nunn camera was installed on Mount John, New Zealand, and operated by the USAF under the auspices of the University of Canterbury. Unlike Norway, a public debate began in New Zealand, and the University of Canterbury had to renounce its contract - however, this did not prevent the USAF from continuing to operate the station at the same place.)

Another case where the US used Norwegian facilities for military and intelligence purposes was dramatically revealed in May, 1960, when CIA pilot Gary Powers was shot down during a spy flight over the Soviet Union: the CIA had used Bodø airport (near Narvik) for its spy flights over eastern Europe for years.

The CIA and the Pentagon have also shown their "concern" for the Norwegian Air Force. In 1967, then Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, promised Norwegian officials that the US Government would "provide them with some

new air defense equipment costing several million dollars" ¹⁶. Since the US was heavily "involved" in Viet Nam at the time, and the equipment was not available in the Pentagon inventory, McNamara ran into financial problems with his generous promise. It was decided that the Pentagon would ask the CIA for the money needed to purchase the equipment. The White House agreed, and the CIA transferred the funds secretly.

Amidst all these covert and overt operations of the CIA and the US military, there are two which are outstanding: the establishing of two Loran C and one Omega navigation stations in Norway.

Both Omega and Loran C are navigation systems for aircrafts, ships, and submarines. According to the Navigation Dictionary of the US Navy, Loran C (Loran = Long Range Navigation) is a "medium frequency radio navigation system by which hyperbolic lines of position are determined by measuring the difference in the times of reception and synchronized pulse signals from two fixed transmitters" ¹⁷. In the 1950's and early 1960's, Loran C was the most advanced navigation system.

On May 19, 1958, the US Government contacted the Norwegian Foreign Ministry to explore the possibility of establishing a Loran C installation on Norwegian soil. A few days later, Councillor Raynor from the US Embassy in Oslo made clear that this Loran C station would serve "special and for the time being purely American needs" ¹⁸. Later on, he added that the establishment of Loran C "must be treated strictly on a 'need to know' basis" and that "NATO [was] not to be informed about the plan". The real military nature of the Loran C station was to be kept secret from the public, as US Embassy official Fisher Howe (who is a former OSS officer and has maintained close contacts to the CIA) stated: "The US desires that any answers [to questions about Loran C] should avoid references to the military nature of the facility."

In 1959, the US Embassy in Norway

also raised the question of a second Loran C facility on Jan Mayen Island. In debating the need for this second station, the US Ambassador had to admit that the Jan Mayen Loran C station was to be built "with a view to deploying Polaris submarines [nuclear missile carrying submarines] from [the Norwegian Sea]". At the time, there was already a monitoring station for Loran C on Jan Mayen. It was quite difficult for the Norwegian Government to construct an additional Loran C station "serving purely American needs" on Jan Mayen without questions from the public, and on July 6, 1960, then Deputy Minister of Defense, Erik Himle, stated to the Foreign Ministry that "it would be difficult to hide the direct US involvement and interest in the construction of this station". However, eventually the Storting approved both Loran C stations and an additional monitoring station in Bjugn without any major public discussion about the military use of these installations. As the US Government had requested, "references to the military nature of the facility" were avoided.

The Norwegian Government had hardly given its approval to the two Loran C stations, when the US Navy asked them to agree to the installation of yet another navigation station - Omega, which is a "world wide radio navigation system providing moderate accuracy by phase comparison of very low frequency continuous wave radio signals"¹⁹; it transmits radio waves of 10 -14 kHz in 10 second intervals. The research on Omega was started in the middle 1940's under conditions of absolute secrecy. Several reports were not declassified until the late 1960's or early 1970's, one of the first reports being published in 1966.²⁰

A comparison of the abilities of Loran C and Omega indicates the advanced sophistication of Omega. The very low frequencies employed make "Omega usable by completely submerged submarines. It is the only radio navigation system of which this is true.

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Omega is therefore unique in a number of respects"²¹. In addition, only eight Omega stations, planned for Japan, Liberia, North Dakota, Argentina, the La Reunion Islands, Hawaii, Australia, and Norway are necessary for global coverage compared to 90 Loran C stations.²² By 1976, only about one seventh of the earth's surface could be covered by Loran C, which is also used for strategic nuclear submarines²³.

In all submarines, the basic navigation is performed by the Ship's Internal Navigation System (SINS), a "self-contained dead-reckoning device. A set of gyroscopes and accelerometers measures changes in the submarine's velocity and direction. This information is supplied to computers which continuously plot the course and the position of the vessel"²⁴. Since errors accumulate in SINS, on-land radio navigation aids like Loran or Omega are used as correctors.

The nature of Omega indicates clearly that it is of particular importance to submarines, especially since

Omega signals can be received up to 50 feet below the water surface, and "one of the primary motivating forces behind the development and the implementation of the Omega system is the requirement of a navigational system for the [nuclear missile-carrying] Polaris submarine"²⁵.

Precisely this fact - that Omega will be used by submarines carrying nuclear missiles like Polaris or the more advanced Poseidon submarine - was denied by the US Navy, because it makes every country hosting an Omega transmitter a very likely first-strike target in case of a nuclear war. Destroying the land-based Omega navigation station is the only way - if it can be done at all - to hamper the effectiveness of nuclear missile-carrying submarines, as Albert Langer states in an article in the Journal of Peace Research: "By striking the very low frequency navigation and communication facilities, an enemy would sub-

stantially increase the vulnerability of missile carrying submarines (from near zero to a small but finite vulnerability). ... Such a strike would be very likely for this purpose, since there is very little else that can be done to increase the vulnerability of these submarines²⁶. Otherwise, submarines like Polaris and Poseidon are virtually "invulnerable to detection and constitute one of the mainstays of America's nuclear 'deterrent' force"²⁷.

US officials have also tried to play down the military significance of Omega by stating that it could be used by civilian vessels and vessels of other countries as well. This might be true in peacetime, but there is nothing which technically prevents the transmission of end-to-end coded messages to selected vessels in case of a war.²⁸ And it is more than obvious that in a crisis situation the navigation stations would send out coded messages which could only be decoded by US vessels.

Until recently, there were two versions about how the Omega navigation stations were established - a public one, in which the real military purpose of Omega was not mentioned, and a secret one, which contained all the "interesting details". During "the summer of leaks" (1977), the secret version was finally made public.

However, a public debate about the Omega station in Norway had already begun earlier, when Anders Hellebust, a Norwegian military intelligence Captain, wrote his thesis on Omega and came to the conclusion that it was built "to provide American nuclear submarines with navigational data"²⁹. Hellebust also criticised the lack of openness in the defense policy decision-making of the Norwegian Government and the way that decisions about Norway's integration into NATO and into the US global military system were made. Hellebust's thesis prompted the Norwegian Chief of Defense Staff, General Zeiner H.F. Gunderson to write to the University of Oslo on April 17, 1975 demanding the

prevention of the thesis' distribution because it "could harm relations to foreign powers and provide foreign intelligence sources with useful information"³⁰. The University refused, and Hellebust replied that his thesis was based exclusively on public sources.

After several correspondences, Gunderson instituted a criminal investigation. Police interrogated Hellebust and a journalist involved in the case. They discovered that the publication of material from the thesis had been cleared by the Ministry for Defense and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Thus, they dropped the case, but not without advising the journalist not to write about the investigation. But the journalist did write, and also filed a complaint with the Norwegian Union of Journalists. The police action, coupled with publication of Gunderson's letters to the University, added to the credibility of the thesis. Hellebust's image of integrity was further improved by an attempt to transfer him to the Northern Finmark (Norway's "Siberia") which was prevented by a military Ombudsman.

News of the thesis also prompted the appointment on April 4, 1975 of a Royal Commission to begin an investigation of the establishment of Omega and Loran C stations in Norway. Supreme Court Judge Andreas Schei was appointed as its chairperson. (The commission is generally referred to as the "Schei Commission".) In December, 1975, its report was released. It turned out to be an almost complete whitewash, playing down the whole affair. Not released to the public was a classified version of the Royal Commission Report containing secret documents. This report was, however, reviewed and approved by members of the Storting in a secret session of June, 1976, even though it contradicts the public version.

Two members of the Storting, Berge Furre, a well-known historian at the University of Oslo, and Finn Gustavsen, both of the Socialist Left Party (SV) did not want to be a part of this "secret and silent" Storting, and released the secret report to the public. In the course of their action, they publicly defended the peoples' right to know. (After

releasing the secret documents, Furre and Gustavsen were threatened with impeachment, and only a few months ago, the Odelsting, a very large subcommittee of the Storting, voted not to start an impeachment trial. Interestingly, the SV members of the Odelsting voted in favor of the impeachment trial, in order to provide Furre and Gustavsen with a chance to defend themselves.)

Almost all major Norwegian newspapers and wireservices refused to publish classified parts of the report. The full report, however, has been printed by the Norwegian publishing house PAX, and some 15,000 copies were sold despite a ban on its distribution by many bookstores.

The classified parts of the Schei report make clear that some Norwegians, and, of course, US officials, were fully aware of Omega's function and withheld this information from the public. One of the classified parts of the report is, for example, a memo of Secretary Østern of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, dated October 8, 1964, which states that there is no specific interest for Norway in Omega: "As I understand it is intended that Omega will serve purely American needs, and NATO consequently will not enter into the picture". Østern also concluded that "another important aspect is that the Omega system is to be used by the Polaris submarines". In a memo dated October 14, 1969, from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, concern is expressed as to whether or not an Omega station would harm relations with the Soviet Union, pointing out that "any agreement to operate such a station [Omega] for the US Navy will place a considerable stress on our relations with the Soviet Union".

Already at this time the US was pushing to hide the use of Omega for Polaris submarines. This was done mainly through Colonel Rørholt, then head of the Norwegian Defense Communication Agency (NODECA). Rørholt himself had a history of personal involvement with Omega. From 1948 to 1949, he worked as a research assistant to J.A. Pierce, the inventor of Omega, at Harvard University. A high ranking officer from the

Norwegian Foreign Ministry reported in a memo on October 19, 1964, that Colonel Rørholt had told him explicitly that "Omega cannot be said to have any specific importance for the Polaris submarine".

The same lie was repeated later, on November 20, 1969 - after intensive discussions and the publication of articles proving the contrary - by First Secretary Sellin of the US Embassy in Oslo: "...the Omega Navigation System was not designed for and is not adequate for use by Polaris submarines. The US Navy does not have Omega receivers on any of these submarines, and does not intend to procure or put Omega receivers on them. ... This also applies for the Poseidon submarine."

In the following months, while Omega trial operations were going on in Norway, the Norwegian Foreign and Defense Ministry had extensive discussions about Omega and its actual use. Although it was agreed that Omega was of negligible application to Norwegian ships and aircraft, and that it could be used for submarines, many Norwegian officials believed the US Embassy and the US Navy that Omega was not to be used for Polaris or other nuclear submarines, disregarding the extensive literature proving the contrary. Finally, on November 2, 1971, Omega was approved by the Storting after more than five years of trial operations in Norway.

In the same year, the Norwegian Government allowed another US installation to begin to operate in Norway. This facility, called NORSAR (Norwegian Seismic Array) is a large seismic array which is designed to register underground nuclear explosions. NORSAR is financed by the US Department of Defense, and its operation is mainly undertaken for intelligence reasons. It is connected to the National Security Agency's (NSA) Seismic Data Analysis Center in Alexandria, Virginia. "Norwegian seismic data can thus only be analyzed together with other seismic

data (some derived from US military stations in secret locations)...³¹

Besides revelations about the US Navy stations, 1977 brought more carefully guarded secrets to the Norwegian public. These included a story about Norwegian training of Finnish agents "to penetrate the Soviet Union for intelligence and sabotage purposes in the early 1950's"³², material collected by a Norwegian investigative reporter about the Norwegian secret service and its connections to US intelligence stations, and detailed information about CIA personnel in Oslo.

Enraged about the Norwegian Government's denial of the fact that Norwegian intelligence had trained Finnish agents for operations in the Soviet Union in the 1950's, Major Svein Blindheim, then an intelligence officer and working in a secret mission to train the agents, revealed detailed information about his work which was part of a program controlled by the CIA and British intelligence, and masterminded by Nazi spy chief Reinhard Gehlen, who had joined with the CIA after World War II.

During this time, at least five bases in Norway were used for these penetration operations.³³ Blindheim's exposure, of what was one of the most unpleasant parts of Norway's history, led to criminal proceedings against him - rather than the involved Norwegian officials - , and finally, to a suspended prison sentence and a fine.

Publications of information on Norwegian intelligence and its collaboration with US intelligence also led to the arrest of several persons. Ivor Johansen, a publishing executive, had done a lot of research on intelligence in his spare time - using telephone directories, official public documents, and ingenious phone calls to military and intelligence officers; he also visited several listening sites in Norway. Finally, Johansen, with only public information, succeeded in piecing together a list of spy bases in Norway, mainly run by Norwegians but with US "liaison" officers. Johansen also obtained information on the little known Norwegian military intelligence FO/E.

Johansen's work led other resear-

When the New Zealand Christchurch Press reported on June 14, 1968, that the US Navy planned to build an Omega station in New Zealand, it created a storm. This news provoked the biggest demonstrations in New Zealand's recent history, and even though New Zealand was an ideal location for Omega, the US Navy was forced to abandon its hopes for such a navigation station in New Zealand.

Since New Zealand did not work out the US Navy decided to build its Omega station in the state of Victoria, Australia. In spite of massive protest there and statements like "anyone who believes that Omega is just a civilian navigation system does not understand what is happening... Victoria will be one of the major targets of the Soviets

in the event of a nuclear attack..." (US Rear Admiral LaRocque, as quoted in Stop Omega! Omega at Woodside), the Australian Government approved the Omega station.

The lies that were told to the Australian people almost outdo the ones told to the Norwegians: "Omega has no military functions" (US Ambassador Marshall Green on June 26, 1973 in Sydney), and "there is nothing secret or classified about Omega" (Australian Minister for Shipping and Transportation, Nixon, on July 25, 1977); Dr. Frank Barnaby of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute summarizes the process of Omega's installation in Australia: "... there is a prima facie case that the Australian public has been seriously misled".

chers to examine the nature of US facilities in Norway, for example, the undersea tracking of Soviet submarines sailing from Murmansk past the Norwegian coast, which tracking is now so good that "Western intelligence can consistently pinpoint the whereabouts of individual Soviet submarines in the northern seas.."³⁴.

Some of the stations Johansen found were in northern Norway, extremely close to the Soviet Union and not necessarily purely for Norwegian defense needs. All of these eavesdropping stations in northern Norway are supposed to be secret - even though they are certainly known to the government of the Soviet Union. Obviously, the reason for their secrecy is not related to security. Duncan Campbell of the New Statesman comments that "it is inconceivable that the secrecy serves only to avoid embarrassing officials and some politicians whose dishonesty is revealed by the lack of accord between secret procurements and secret activities".³⁵

Claims by the Norwegian Government that the intelligence and navigation stations in Norway serve mainly Norwegian defense purposes have been disproved. In a first draft of a study on the intelligence stations in Norway (which include facilities to intercept High Frequency and Very High Frequency communications), Owen Wilkes and Nils Petter Gleditsch came to the conclusion that "not a single intelligence installation [in Norway] to be described [in the study] can be judged clearly defensive on the basis of its technical capability alone".³⁶

The same Nils Petter Gleditsch of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) has been indicted by a Norwegian court for his revelation of the "secrets" of some of the intelligence stations in Norway. Like others before him, Gleditsch had obtained all his information from public sources. Gleditsch is not the only one in court over these matters. Ivar Johansen and two Nor-

wegian journalists, who had been sentenced for their "activities" in publishing information on intelligence stations in Norway are appealing their verdicts.

The "summer of leaks" (1977) was followed by a "fall of revelations" of the CIA in Norway. On November 24, 1977, the daily Ny Tid named five CIA agents who were in the country at the time: Quentin C. Johnson, David P. Hunt, Eugene S. Poteat, Charles L. Kindl, and Harry M. Zschack. On the same day, Ny Tid also published the "Key Intelligence Questions" (KIQ's), written under the auspices of Henry Kissinger and William Colby, and approved by the National Security Council. The KIQ's are a directive for CIA agents, and outline the type of intelligence agents are supposed to gather. The KIQ's documented the interest of the CIA in Norway, particularly in Norway's economic situation and its possibilities as an oil exporting country. (Norway has been exporting oil since May, 1975, and by 1980, "estimated oil and gas production is expected to be some 60 million tons of oil equivalent, or more than six times the domestic consumption of petroleum".³⁷) Ny Tid also reported that the CIA provided US and multinational corporations with information about Norway's economic situation, and that the CIA uses multinational corporations as covers.

The CIA has revealed its interest in Norway in other ways as well. In 1977/78 the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University in Washington, DC hosted several events dealing with Norway, since "Nordic security perspectives are troubled by rising levels of anxiety without corresponding latitude for adjustment".³⁸

As widely documented, CSIS has extremely strong CIA ties - it might even be called a CIA front.³⁹ CSIS printed a booklet on Norway's base policy; and in May, 1978, it published

a report entitled "Allied Interdependence Trade and Cooperation in Military Equipment": This report "grew out of a meeting of the CSIS Transatlantic Policy Panel in January, 1978" 40; Paul Thyness, a member of the Storting, was part of this "Transatlantic Policy Panel". Other Norwegian participants in CSIS activities are Deputy Minister of Defense Johan Holst, and Torsten Stoltenberg, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The question should be raised as to whether a CIA-linked institution, famous for its Cold War theories and propaganda, is an appropriate place for Norwegian Ministers and a member of the Storting.

In Norway, the people often are not informed about actions and decisions of governmental officials that supposedly represent the people. Furthermore, the examples of the installation of US intelligence and navigation stations in Norway shows that the Norwegian Government is often not serving its own people but the interests of the US.

According to the New Statesman, former CIA Director William Colby said in a recent interview that "the Norwegian Government was as much 'in the know' about the CIA as it wished to be". 41 Given the changeable nature of "truth according to Colby" this may or may not be the case. What's unquestionably certain is that until the Norwegian Government has knowledge of all CIA activities in Norway it cannot fulfill its grave responsibility to protect the very people it has been elected to represent. Ironically, rather than perform its duty, the Norwegian Government is repressing courageous Norwegians trying to expose harmful intelligence operations. Perhaps, the Norwegian people will re-examine its government in light of these facts.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) During his visit to Norway in April, 1979, US Vice President Walter Mondale asked the Norwegian Government whether it would be willing to ship oil to Israel on a regular basis - a request that was denied by the Norwegians.
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- 3) Sverre Lodgaard, Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Norway, the Not So Reluctant Ally", Cooperation and Conflict, vol. XII, 1977, p. 210
- 4) ibid., p. 213
- 5) R. Harris Smith, "OSS", University of California Press, 1972, p. 200
- 6) ibid., p. 201
- 7) Hakon Lorentzen, "Some Developments in the Development of the Norwegian Police", CILIP, Aug., Sept. 1978, p. 15
- 8) ibid., p. 14
- 9) ibid., p. 14
- 10) ibid., p. 16
- 11) ibid., p. 16
- 12) New Statesman, 6/15/79, p. 851
- 13) Ny Tid, 11/24/77
- 14) Owen Wilkes and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Optical Satellite Tracking: A Case of University Participation in Preparation for Space Warfare", Journal of Peace Research, no. 3, 1978, p. 204
- 15) ibid., p. 212
- 16) John Marks, Victor Marchetti, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence", pp. New York, 1974, pp. 63, 64
- 17) Navigation Dictionary, publ. by US Naval Oceanographic Office, Dept. of Navy, 1969
- 18) All the following quotes are, unless otherwise noted, as in: Nils Petter Gleditsch, "The Schei Report on Loran C and Omega", PRIO Publ., no. P-6/78
- 19) cf supra, # 17
- 20) NTIS Accession Number AD630900, May 1, 1966

- 21) "Navigation System, a Survey of Modern Electronic Aids", ed. by. G.F. Beck, Van Nostrum Reinhold Corp., Ltd., London, 1971, p. 118
- 22) ibid., p. 121
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- 24) ibid.
- 25) C.S. Samek and H.S. Price, "A Precise Electronic Navigation System Using Omega and a Synchronous Satellite Network", Navigator, vol. 13 no. 2
- 26) Albert Langer, "Accurate Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Strategy", Journal of Peace Research, no. 1, vol. XIV, 1977, p. 47
- 27) "Missile Submarines and National Security", Scientific American, June 72
- 28) cf supra, # 3, p. 115
- 29) Arbeiterbladet, 2/8/75
- 30) cf supra, # 18
- 31) cf supra, # 2, p. 3
- 32) ibid., p. 1
- 33) Steve Weissman, "Norwegian Spy War", Inquiry, 9/18/78, p. 12
- 34) ibid., p. 13
- 35) Duncan Campbell, "Sabotage, Submarines, and the Secret Norway Connection", New Statesman, 6/2/78, p. 730
- 36) Owen Wilkes and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Intelligence Installations in Norway: Their Number, Location, Function, and Legality", PRIO publ., S-4 79, First Draft
- 37) The Banker, May 1977, p. 91
- 38) CSIS: Annual Report 77/78, p. 91
- 39) Ray S. Cline, the Director of World Power Studies at CSIS, is a former Deputy Director of Intelligence for the CIA who has served for more than 25 years. CSIS's Director of African Studies is Chester A. Crocker, another former CIA employee; John Richardson, Jr. is CSIS Director for Public Diplomacy Studies. He ran Radio Free Europe when it was a CIA propaganda operation. Two consultants for CSIS are Henry Kissinger and Walter Laquer, who worked for the Information Bulletin, Ltd., a now-defunct CIA operation. In addition, CSIS is constantly featuring past and present CIA employees.
- 40) cf supra, # 38, p. 22
- 41) cf supra, # 35, p. 732

U.S. INTELLIGENCE: Guatemala

BLOCKER, V. Harwood

(born: 10/19/36)

First Secretary

Avenida La Reforma 7-01

Zona 10

Guatemala City

tel. 311541

Blocker is a CIA officer who served in the Dominican Republic at the time of the US military intervention, in Brazil (Recife and Rio de Janeiro), and Peru.

FISCHER, Forrest

(born: 1/2/25)

Fischer has participated in CIA connected propaganda operations in Mexico, Argentina, and during the US war in Vietnam (6/70-12/71).

CERRA, Ronald L.
(born: 3/6/43)
Second Secretary
Before he was assigned to France,
Cerra worked in Switzerland. He is a
CIA officer.

COPP, Jean Tremere
(born: 1/6/22)
Second Secretary
Copp has participated in CIA connected propaganda operations in Vietnam from 1972-75.

GIBSON, Barry R.
(born: 10/28/39)
Attache
Gibson is a CIA officer. He also served in Brazil.

JETON, Francis John
(born: 4/1/26)
Attache
Jeton is a CIA officer who has been stationed in Syria, Senegal, Zaire, Tunisia, and South Africa. In August 1957, Jeton was expelled from Syria because of his participation in anti-government work.

KELLY, John H.
(born: 7/20/39)
First Secretary
Kelly has an extensive background in military and intelligence related work. He has attended the Armed Forces Staff College.

MONCZEWSKI, Matthew E.
(born: 12/9/34)
Attache
Monczewski is a CIA officer. He has worked in the CIA's "secret war" in Laos, in the Central African Republic, and in Ethiopia.

Haiti

HARRISON, Lawrence E.
(born: 3/11/32)
Montagne Noire, Port-au-Prince
tel. 7-0665
Harrison worked in military intelligence before he joined AID in 1962.

HOLSEY, Leonard J.
(born: 6/25/21)
Pacot, Port-au-Prince
tel. 2-1983
Holsey is a CIA officer who served in Vietnam during the late 1960's.

MEADE, Frazier
(born: 7/17/28)
Counsellor
Débussy, Port-au-Prince
tel. 2-4541
Meade has served as an intelligence research specialist in the State Department and attended the Naval War College from 1971-72.

France

BURGSTALLER, Eugen F.
(born: 12/22/20)
Attache
Widely publicised, Burgstaller is the CIA Chief of Station in France. He has served in Austria and Lebanon.

Japan

CLARK, Robert D.
(born: 7/23/32)

Attache
19-5, Sändagi-cho, 5-chome,
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
tel. 821-5174

Clark has an extensive record of intelligence and intelligence related work in Italy and in the US.

COALE, George L., Jr.
(born: 3/14/26)

Attache
Grew Apt., 4427
1-1, Roppongi, 2-chome
Minato-ku, Tokyo
tel. 583-6951 ext. 427

Coale is a CIA officer who has served in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Tokyo (1969-72) and in Vietnam at the end of the war.

FLOYD, Walter I., Jr.
(born: 4/4/39)

Second Secretary
Grew Apt., 3421
tel. 583-6951 ext. 428

Floyd is a CIA officer who attended the Foreign Service Institute in Yokohama in 1971 and has been in Tokyo since then.

GRIMSLEY, William C., Jr.
(born: 4/20/27)

Attache
Connodor Apt. No. 610
13-28, Roppongi, 5-chome
Minato-ku, Tokyo
tel. 586-6417

Grimsley is a high ranking CIA officer who was Chief of Station in India. He has also served in Afghanistan and Nepal.

HERPY, David W., Jr.

(born: 3/10/38)

Second Secretary

14-7; Ebisu, 2-chome
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo
tel. 441-7247

Herpy's biography in the State Department's Biographic Registers (incomplete previous history, starting with R-6, political officer) indicates that he is a CIA officer. He served in Thailand before being transferred to Japan.

SELIGMANN, Albert L.

(born: 5/26/25)

Counsellor for Political Affairs
20-1 a, Hiroo, 2-chome
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo
tel. 400-3561

Seligmann, the highest ranking political officer in the US Embassy in Tokyo, has an extensive background of intelligence-related assignments.

SHERMAN, William Courtney

(born: 9/27/23)

Minister-Counsellor
1, Azabu, Nagasakacho,
Minato-ku, Tokyo
tel. 583-4648

Sherman has been an officer in the US military government in South Korea (1946-48), and has worked as an intelligence research specialist in the State Department and has attended the National War College.

SHIMA, Terry T.

(born: 1/20/23)

Attache

7-11, Minami Azabu, 4-chome,
Minato-ku, Tokyo
tel. 449-9565

Shima is a CIA officer, who has served in Singapore and the Philippines.

England

ANDERSON, Burnett F.

(born: 7/13/19)

Counsellor for Public Affairs

Hereford Lodge

139 Gloucester Road

London S.W. 7

tel. 01-373-9435

Anderson is a propaganda specialist who has served in the Mutual Security Agency, Iran, Sweden, Spain and France. He also attended the National War College in 1960.

ASCHER, James Martin

(born: 3/18/31)

First Secretary (Public Affairs)

20 Crooms Hill

London S.E. 10

tel. 01-858-1940

Ascher has served in CIA connected propaganda operations in Vietnam and India.

BLACKSHEAR, Thomas R.

(born: 8/11/29)

Assistant Political Attache

37 Circus Road

St. John's Wood

London N.W. 8

01-286-1684

Blackshear is a CIA officer who has been stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, Bulgaria and India.

EDDY, Condit N.

(born: 10/14/27)

First Secretary (Political Affairs)

Eddy has served in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey. He is a CIA officer.

ENGLE, Gerald Lloyd

(born: 12/10/35)

Assistant Political Attache

Engle is a CIA officer. He has been stationed in Switzerland, Bulgaria, and the USSR.

HANNON, John C.

(born: 3/2/38)

Second Secretary (Political Affairs)

Hannon, who is a CIA officer, has served in Kenya and Tanzania.

KEANE, Robert A.

Assistant Legal Attache

Keane is the FBI's liaison officer in London.

KIMBALL, John W.

(born: 9/23/33)

First Secretary (Political/Military Affairs)

8 Edwardes Square

London W.8

tel: 01-602-6543

Kimball is a CIA officer who has worked in India, Liberia, and the F.R. Germany.

McGHEE, William M.

(born: 7/8/22)

Political Attache

11 Chester Square

London S.W. 1

tel: 01-730-5641

McGhee has served in the Philippines, Ethiopia, Hong Kong and Singapore. He is a CIA officer.

NIBLO, Peter B.

(born: 3/20/25)

Narcotics Attache

30 Eaton Place

London S.W. 1

tel: 01-235-0453

Niblo served in Vietnam for over five years. He was a "public safety advisor", a "program officer" and a "special assistant" with AID. Niblo is responsible for US war crimes in Vietnam.

PERLMAN, Alvin

(born: 8/5/34)

First Secretary (Public Affairs)

89 Camberwell Grove

London S.E. 5

tel: 01-701-6939

Perlman has participated in CIA connected propaganda operations in India, Vietnam, and Indonesia.

PROCTOR, Edward William

(born: 12/30/20)

Political Attaché

Proctor is the CIA Chief of Station in England. He has been employed by the CIA since 1953, first as an economist, and from 1971-76 as Deputy Director for Intelligence.

STEVENSON, Rufus

(born: 11/26/39)

Stevenson is a CIA officer. He has worked in Madagascar and Mali.

ZASLOW, Milton S.

Political Attaché.

Flat 5, Bryanston Square

London W.1

tel: 01-262-9379

Zaslow is an intelligence officer, probably working for the National Security Agency.

sibility of pluralism". Moss also claims that General Pinochet saved Chile from "what may well have been an impending 'night of the long knives'". (Robert Moss, Chile's Marxist Experiment, David & Charles, Ltd., Newton Abbot, England, 1973, pp. ii, vi). Pinochet's military junta was delighted about the book: they bought the complete second printing for use in their propaganda.

Chile's Marxist Experiment is more than "just" a demagogic piece by a right-wing journalist. The idea to write the book was conceived by the CIA. They paid Moss an advance and "supervised the content and progress of the manuscript" (Inquiry, 9/30/79), p.9).

Perhaps the CIA also thought it necessary to "supervise" the content of Moss' manuscript for Thatcher's speech.

There is no sense in asking the British government to, at a minimum, control the activities of these US employees. In addition to having anti-labor and pro-corporate interests, Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has foreign policy views that fit right into the CIA's cold war program. In fact, a person who has a long history of participation in CIA propaganda operations has been - and perhaps still is - one of her speech-writers. A "British Conservative" commented to the New Leader: "Even those of us who agree with the Americans on most things don't like to feel the CIA considers us coolies. When Margaret made her tough foreign policy speech, I applauded. But when I learned that it had been drafted by that fellow Moss I sniffed a bit." (New Leader, 12/4/78, p. 13)

"That fellow Moss" who wrote Thatcher's speech is also the author of the CIA financed book Chile's Marxist Experiment, in which he comes to the conclusion that the 1973 military coup in Chile was necessary to preserve "the pos-

KELLY, JOHN

THE CIA IN AMERICA


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
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Time, 2/19/79

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