# Monetary Policy & Anchored Expectations An Endogenous Gain Learning Model

Laura Gáti

Boston College

Western Economic Association International (WEAI)

March 17, 2021

### Anchoring

"Essential to anchor inflation expectations at some low level."

"We don't see a de-anchoring."



"Failure of the Fed to stably achieve its 2 percent target could de-anchor inflation expectations."

"Long-run inflation expectations [...] are not perfectly anchored in real economies; moreover, the extent to which they are anchored can change."

### This paper

- 1. A model of expectations:
  - $\hookrightarrow$  unanchored expectations: sensitivity of long-run expectations to short-run fluctuations

- 2. Estimate how unanchoring takes place in data
  - $\hookrightarrow$  quantify novel anchoring channel

- 3. Analyze monetary policy
  - $\hookrightarrow$  analytically and numerically using novel model disciplined by data
- 4. Key takeaway
  - → monetary policy anchors expectations to inflation target by responding aggressively to movements in long-run expectations

#### Related literature

 Optimal monetary policy in the New Keynesian model Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003)

#### Adaptive learning

Evans & Honkapohja (2001, 2006), Sargent (1999), Adam (2005), Primiceri (2006), Lubik & Matthes (2018), Bullard & Mitra (2002), Preston (2005, 2008), Ferrero (2007), Molnár & Santoro (2014), Mele et al (2019), Eusepi & Preston (2011), Milani (2007, 2014), Marcet & Nicolini (2003), Eusepi, Giannoni & Preston (2018), Slobodyan & Wouters (2011)

#### • Anchoring and the Phillips curve

Goodfriend (1993), Svensson (2015), Afrouzi & Yang (2020), Reis (2020), Hebden et al 2020, Hazell et al (2021), Gobbi et al (2019), Carvalho et al (2019)

#### Model overview

• New Keynesian core: standard IS and Phillips curves

▶ Microfoundations

$$x_{t} = -\sigma i_{t} + \hat{\mathbb{E}}_{t} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} \left( (1-\beta) x_{T+1} - \sigma(\beta i_{T+1} - \pi_{T+1}) + \sigma r_{T}^{n} \right)$$
 (1)

$$\pi_t = \kappa x_t + \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} (\alpha \beta)^{T-t} \left( \kappa \alpha \beta x_{T+1} + (1-\alpha) \beta \pi_{T+1} + u_T \right)$$
 (2)

Observables:  $(\pi, x, i)$  inflation, output gap, interest rate Exogenous states:  $(r^n, u)$  natural rate and cost-push shock

#### Model overview

• New Keynesian core: standard IS and Phillips curves

▶ Microfoundations

$$x_{t} = -\sigma i_{t} + \hat{\mathbb{E}}_{t} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} \left( (1-\beta) x_{T+1} - \sigma(\beta i_{T+1} - \pi_{T+1}) + \sigma r_{T}^{n} \right)$$
 (1)

$$\pi_t = \kappa x_t + \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} (\alpha \beta)^{T-t} \left( \kappa \alpha \beta x_{T+1} + (1-\alpha) \beta \pi_{T+1} + u_T \right)$$
 (2)

Observables:  $(\pi, x, i)$  inflation, output gap, interest rate Exogenous states:  $(r^n, u)$  natural rate and cost-push shock

• Novelty of the paper: inflation expectations process

$$\hat{\mathbb{E}}_t \pi_{t+1} = \bar{\pi}_t + \mathbb{E}_t \, \pi_{t+1} \tag{3}$$

 $\mathbb{E}$ : rational (model-consistent) expectations

 $\hat{\mathbb{E}}$ : nonrational expectations  $\rightarrow$  long-run inflation expectations  $\bar{\pi}_{t-1}$ 

### Evolution of long-run inflation expectations

One-period ahead inflation forecast:

$$\hat{\mathbb{E}}_{t-1}\pi_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \mathbb{E}_{t-1}\pi_t \tag{4}$$

### Evolution of long-run inflation expectations

One-period ahead inflation forecast:

$$\hat{\mathbb{E}}_{t-1}\pi_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \mathbb{E}_{t-1}\pi_t \tag{4}$$

One-period ahead inflation forecast error:

$$f_{t|t-1} = \pi_t - \hat{\mathbb{E}}_{t-1}\pi_t \tag{5}$$

### Evolution of long-run inflation expectations

One-period ahead inflation forecast:

$$\hat{\mathbb{E}}_{t-1}\pi_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \mathbb{E}_{t-1}\pi_t \tag{4}$$

One-period ahead inflation forecast error:

$$f_{t|t-1} = \pi_t - \hat{\mathbb{E}}_{t-1}\pi_t \tag{5}$$

→ Update for long-run inflation expectations:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + k_t f_{t|t-1} \tag{6}$$

 $k_t \in (0,1)$  learning gain

1. Decreasing gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} f_{t|t-1} \tag{7}$$

2. Constant gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + k f_{t|t-1} \tag{8}$$

1. Decreasing gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} f_{t|t-1} \tag{7}$$

2. Constant gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + k f_{t|t-1} \tag{8}$$

3. Endogenous gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \mathbf{g}(f_{t|t-1}) f_{t|t-1}$$
 (9)

► Assumptions on g(·)

1. Decreasing gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} f_{t|t-1} \tag{7}$$

Optimal monetary policy: Mele et al (2019)

2. Constant gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + k f_{t|t-1} \tag{8}$$

Optimal monetary policy: Molnár & Santoro (2014)

3. Endogenous gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \mathbf{g}(f_{t|t-1}) f_{t|t-1}$$
 (9)



1. Decreasing gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} f_{t|t-1}$$
 (7)

Optimal monetary policy: Mele et al (2019)

2. Constant gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + k f_{t|t-1} \tag{8}$$

Optimal monetary policy: Molnár & Santoro (2014)

3. Endogenous gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \mathbf{g}(f_{t|t-1}) f_{t|t-1}$$
 (9)

Marcet & Nicolini (2003), Carvalho et al (2019)



1. Decreasing gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} f_{t|t-1} \tag{7}$$

Optimal monetary policy: Mele et al (2019)

2. Constant gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + k f_{t|t-1} \tag{8}$$

Optimal monetary policy: Molnár & Santoro (2014)


3. Endogenous gain:

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \mathbf{g}(f_{t|t-1}) f_{t|t-1}$$
 (9)

Marcet & Nicolini (2003), Carvalho et al (2019) Optimal monetary policy: -




### Optimal policy - responding to unanchoring



5 bp movement in  $\bar{\pi} \rightarrow$  250 bp movement in i

# Optimal policy - responding to unanchoring



5 bp movement in  $\bar{\pi} \rightarrow 250$  bp movement in *i* 

Mode: 0.3 bp movement in  $\bar{\pi}$ 

### Unanchoring causes volatility




Figure: Impulse responses after a cost-push shock when policy follows a Taylor rule



#### Conclusion

First theory of monetary policy for potentially unanchored expectations

#### Estimation of novel unanchoring channel

• Expectations process nonlinear

#### Monetary policy

- · Optimal policy aggressive when unanchored, accommodates otherwise
- Taylor rule less aggressive than under rational expectations

#### Future work

- $\hookrightarrow$  How to anchor at zero-lower bound?
- $\hookrightarrow$  Other applications: currency crises



# Long-run expectations: responsive to short-run conditions?

Individual-level Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF): for 1991-Q4 onward, estimate rolling regression

$$\Delta \bar{\pi}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1^w f_{t|t-1} + \epsilon_t \tag{10}$$

 $\bar{\pi}_t$  10-year ahead inflation expectation

 $f_{t|t-1} \equiv \pi_t - \mathbb{E}_{t-1} \, \pi_t$  individual one-year-ahead forecast error w indexes windows of 20 quarters

### Time-varying responsiveness

$$\Delta \bar{\pi}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1^w f_{t|t-1} + \epsilon_t \tag{1}$$




Figure: Time series of  $\hat{\beta}_1^w$ 

#### Breakeven inflation



Figure: Market-based inflation expectations, various horizons, %



### Correcting the TIPS from liquidity risk




Figure: Market-based inflation expectations, 10 year, %



#### Robustness checks

$$\Delta \bar{\pi}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1^w \pi_t + \epsilon_t \tag{1}$$




Figure: Time series of  $\hat{\beta}_1^w$ 

#### Robustness checks - PCE core

$$\Delta \bar{\pi}_t = \beta_0^w + \beta_1^w f_{t|t-1} + \epsilon_t \tag{1}$$




Figure: Time series of  $\hat{\beta}_1^w$ 



### Robustness checks - controlling for inflation levels

$$\Delta \bar{\pi}_t = \beta_0^w + \beta_1^w f_{t|t-1} + \beta_2^w \pi_t + \epsilon_t \tag{1}$$




Figure: Time series of  $\hat{\beta}_1^w$ 



### Further evidence: disagreement

Figure: Livingston Survey of Firms: Interquartile range of 10-year ahead inflation expectations








Figure: New York Fed Survey of Consumers: Percent of respondents indicating 3-year ahead inflation will be in a particular range





### Further evidence: introspection

Figure: PCE core inflation against the Fed's target





# Households: standard up to $\hat{\mathbb{E}}$

Maximize lifetime expected utility

$$\hat{\mathbb{E}}_{t}^{i} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} \left[ U(C_{T}^{i}) - \int_{0}^{1} v(h_{T}^{i}(j)) dj \right]$$

$$\tag{11}$$

**Budget** constraint

$$B_t^i \le (1 + i_{t-1})B_{t-1}^i + \int_0^1 w_t(j)h_t^i(j)dj + \Pi_t^i(j)dj - T_t - P_tC_t^i$$
 (12)



# Firms: standard up to $\hat{\mathbb{E}}$

Maximize present value of profits

$$\hat{\mathbb{E}}_{t}^{j} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \alpha^{T-t} Q_{t,T} \left[ \Pi_{t}^{j}(p_{t}(j)) \right]$$
(13)

subject to demand

$$y_t(j) = Y_t \left(\frac{p_t(j)}{P_t}\right)^{-\theta} \tag{14}$$



# Oscillatory dynamics in adaptive learning

Consider a stylized adaptive learning model in two equations:

$$\pi_t = \beta f_t + u_t \tag{15}$$

$$f_t = f_{t-1} + k(\pi_t - f_{t-1}) \tag{16}$$

Solve for the time series of expectations  $f_t$ 

$$f_t = \underbrace{\frac{1 - k^{-1}}{1 - k^{-1}\beta}}_{\approx 1} f_{t-1} + \frac{k^{-1}}{1 - k^{-1}\beta} u_t \tag{17}$$

Solve for forecast error  $f_t \equiv \pi_t - f_{t-1}$ :

$$f_{t} = \underbrace{-\frac{1-\beta}{1-k\beta}}_{\text{lim}_{t\to 1}=-1} f_{t-1} + \frac{1}{1-k\beta} u_{t}$$
 (18)

### Functional forms for g in the literature

• Smooth anchoring function (Gobbi et al, 2019)

$$p = h(y_{t-1}) = A + \frac{BCe^{-Dy_{t-1}}}{(Ce^{-Dy_{t-1}} + 1)^2}$$
(19)

 $p \equiv Prob(\text{liquidity trap regime})$  $y_{t-1}$  output gap

• Kinked anchoring function (Carvalho et al, 2019)

$$k_t = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{t} & \text{when } \theta_t < \bar{\theta} \\ k & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
 (20)

 $\theta_t$  criterion,  $\bar{\theta}$  threshold value



### Choices for criterion $\theta_t$

• Carvalho et al. (2019)'s criterion

$$\theta_t^{CEMP} = \max |\Sigma^{-1}(\phi_{t-1} - T(\phi_{t-1}))|$$
 (21)

 $\Sigma$  variance-covariance matrix of shocks  $T(\phi)$  mapping from PLM to ALM

CUSUM-criterion

$$\omega_t = \omega_{t-1} + \kappa k_{t-1} (f_{t|t-1} f'_{t|t-1} - \omega_{t-1})$$
(22)

$$\theta_t^{CUSUM} = \theta_{t-1} + \kappa k_{t-1} (f'_{t|t-1} \omega_t^{-1} f_{t|t-1} - \theta_{t-1})$$
 (23)

 $\omega_t$  estimated forecast-error variance



# General updating algorithm

$$\phi_t = \left(\phi'_{t-1} + k_t R_t^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ s_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} \left( y_t - \phi_{t-1} \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ s_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} \right)' \right)' \tag{24}$$

$$R_t = R_{t-1} + k_t \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ s_{t-1} \end{pmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & s_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} - R_{t-1}$$

$$(25)$$



Assumptions on  $\mathbf{g}(\cdot)$ 

$$\mathbf{g}_{ff}\geq 0$$

(26)

 $\mathbf{g}(\cdot)$  convex in forecast errors.



## Estimating form of gain function

- Calibrate parameters of New Keynesian core to literature
- Estimate flexible form of expectations process via simulated method of moments
   (Duffie & Singleton 1990, Lee & Ingram 1991, Smith 1993)

$$\bar{\pi}_t = \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \mathbf{g}(f_{t|t-1}) f_{t|t-1}$$
 (18)

• Moments: autocovariances of inflation, output gap, federal funds rate and 1-year ahead Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) inflation expectations at lags  $0,\ldots,4$ 

## Estimated expectations process

$$\bar{\pi}_t - \bar{\pi}_{t-1} = \mathbf{g}(f_{t|t-1}) f_{t|t-1}$$
 (18)




Figure: Changes in long-run inflation expectations as a function of forecast errors



## Details on households and firms

Consumption:

$$C_t^i = \left[ \int_0^1 c_t^i(j)^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}} dj \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\theta - 1}} \tag{27}$$

 $\theta > 1$ : elasticity of substitution between varieties

Aggregate price level:

$$P_t = \left[ \int_0^1 p_t(j)^{1-\theta} dj \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}$$
 (28)

Profits:

$$\Pi_t^j = p_t(j)y_t(j) - w_t(j)f^{-1}(y_t(j)/A_t)$$
(29)

Stochastic discount factor

$$Q_{t,T} = \beta^{T-t} \frac{P_t U_c(C_T)}{P_T U_c(C_t)}$$
(30)



## **Derivations**

Household FOCs

$$\hat{C}_t^i = \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t^i \hat{C}_{t+1}^i - \sigma(\hat{i}_t - \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t^i \hat{\pi}_{t+1})$$
(31)

$$\hat{\mathbb{E}}_t^i \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s \hat{C}_t^i = \omega_t^i + \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t^i \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s \hat{Y}_t^i$$
(32)

where 'hats' denote log-linear approximation and  $\omega_t^i \equiv \frac{(1+i_{t-1})B_{t-1}^i}{P_tY^*}$ .

- 1. Solve (31) backward to some date *t*, take expectations at *t*
- 2. Sub in (32)
- 3. Aggregate over households *i*
- $\rightarrow$  Obtain (1)



## Actual laws of motion

$$y_{t} = A_{1}f_{a,t} + A_{2}f_{b,t} + A_{3}s_{t}$$

$$s_{t} = hs_{t-1} + \epsilon_{t}$$
(33)

where

$$y_t \equiv \begin{pmatrix} \pi_t \\ x_t \\ i_t \end{pmatrix} \qquad s_t \equiv \begin{pmatrix} r_t^n \\ u_t \end{pmatrix} \tag{35}$$

and

$$f_{a,t} \equiv \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t \sum_{T-t}^{\infty} (\alpha \beta)^{T-t} y_{T+1} \qquad f_{b,t} \equiv \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t \sum_{T-t}^{\infty} (\beta)^{T-t} y_{T+1}$$
 (36)

◀ Return

# Piecewise linear approximation to gain function

$$\mathbf{g}(f_{t|t-1}) = \sum_{i} \gamma_i b_i (f_{t|t-1})$$
(37)

- $b_i(f_{t|t-1})$  = piecewise linear basis
- $\gamma_i$  = approximating coefficient at node i
- $\hookrightarrow$  Estimate  $\hat{\gamma}$  via simulated method of moments



## The expectation process over time



Figure: Time series of forecast errors, changes in long-run expectations and gain

## Target criterion

## Proposition

Let  $\mathbf{g}_{z,t} \equiv \frac{\partial \mathbf{g}}{\partial z}$  at t. Then monetary policy optimally brings about the following target relationship between inflation and the output gap

$$\pi_t = -\frac{\lambda_x}{\kappa} x_t$$

RE (discretion): move  $\pi_t$  and  $x_t$  to offset cost-push shocks



## Target criterion

## Proposition

Let  $\mathbf{g}_{z,t} \equiv \frac{\partial \mathbf{g}}{\partial z}$  at t. Then monetary policy optimally brings about the following target relationship between inflation and the output gap

$$\pi_t - \Gamma(k) \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} x_{t+i} = -\frac{\lambda_x}{\kappa} x_t$$

Adaptive learning: can move  $\mathbb{E}_t x_{t+i}$  too if k > 0





## Target criterion

## Proposition

Let  $\mathbf{g}_{z,t} \equiv \frac{\partial \mathbf{g}}{\partial z}$  at t. Then monetary policy optimally brings about the following target relationship between inflation and the output gap

$$\pi_t - \Omega\left(k_t + f_{t|t-1}\mathbf{g}_{\pi,t}\right) \left(\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} x_{t+i} \prod_{j=0}^{i-1} (1 - k_{t+1+j} - f_{t+1+j|t+j}\mathbf{g}_{\bar{\pi},t+j})\right) = -\frac{\lambda_x}{\kappa} x_t$$

Endogenous gain: ability to move  $\mathbb{E}_t x_{t+i}$  depends on present and future degree of unanchoring







#### Lemma

The discretion and commitment solutions of the Ramsey problem coincide.



## Corollary

 $Optimal\ policy\ under\ adaptive\ learning\ is\ time-consistent.$ 

## No commitment - no lagged multipliers

Simplified version of the model: planner chooses  $\{\pi_t, x_t, f_t, k_t\}_{t=t_0}^{\infty}$  to minimize

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{E}_{t_0} \sum_{t=t_0}^{\infty} \beta^{t-t_0} \left\{ \pi_t^2 + \lambda x_t^2 + \varphi_{1,t} (\pi_t - \kappa x_t - \beta f_t + u_t) + \varphi_{2,t} (f_t - f_{t-1} - k_t (\pi_t - f_{t-1})) + \varphi_{3,t} (k_t - \mathbf{g}(\pi_t - f_{t-1})) \right\}$$

$$2\pi_t + 2\frac{\lambda}{\kappa}x_t - \varphi_{2,t}(k_t + \mathbf{g}_{\pi}(\pi_t - f_{t-1})) = 0$$
 (38)

$$-2\beta \frac{\lambda}{\kappa} x_t + \varphi_{2,t} - \varphi_{2,t+1} (1 - k_{t+1} - \mathbf{g_f}(\pi_{t+1} - f_t)) = 0$$
 (39)



# Target criterion system for anchoring function as changes of the gain

$$\varphi_{6,t} = -cf_{t|t-1}x_{t+1} + \left(1 + \frac{f_{t|t-1}}{f_{t+1|t}}(1 - k_{t+1}) - f_{t|t-1}\mathbf{g}_{\bar{\pi},t}\right)\varphi_{6,t+1} - \frac{f_{t|t-1}}{f_{t+1|t}}(1 - k_{t+1})\varphi_{6,t+2}$$

$$(40)$$

$$0 = 2\pi_t + 2\frac{\lambda_x}{\kappa}x_t - \left(\frac{k_t}{f_{t|t-1}} + \mathbf{g}_{\pi,t}\right)\varphi_{6,t} + \frac{k_t}{f_{t|t-1}}\varphi_{6,t+1}$$

$$\tag{41}$$

 $\varphi_{6,t}$  Lagrange multiplier on anchoring function

The solution to (41) is given by:

$$\varphi_{6,t} = -2 \, \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (\pi_{t+i} + \frac{\lambda_x}{\kappa} x_{t+i}) \prod_{j=0}^{i-1} \frac{\frac{k_{t+j}}{f_{t+j|t+j-1}}}{\frac{k_{t+j}}{f_{t+j|t+j-1}} + \mathbf{g}_{\pi,t+j}}$$
(42)




# Optimal Taylor-coefficient on inflation

$$i_t = \psi_\pi \pi_t + \psi_x x_t \tag{43}$$

## Optimal Taylor-coefficient on inflation




Figure: Central bank loss as a function of  $\psi_{\pi}$ 



## Optimal Taylor-coefficient on inflation

$$i_t = \psi_\pi \pi_t + \psi_x x_t \tag{43}$$

Figure: Central bank loss as a function of  $\psi_{\pi}$ 



Anchoring-optimal coefficient:  $\psi_{\pi}^{A}=1.1$  RE-optimal coefficient:  $\psi_{\pi}^{RE}=2.2$ 

# Why less aggressive? Future interest rate expectations

IS curve:

$$x_t = -\sigma i_t + \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} \left( (1-\beta) x_{T+1} - \sigma(\beta i_{T+1} - \pi_{T+1}) + \sigma r_T^n \right)$$

• Current interest rate  $i_t$ : one channel of policy

# Why less aggressive? Future interest rate expectations

IS curve:

$$x_{t} = -\sigma i_{t} + \hat{\mathbb{E}}_{t} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} ((1-\beta)x_{T+1} - \sigma(\beta i_{T+1} - \pi_{T+1}) + \sigma r_{T}^{n})$$

- Current interest rate *i*<sub>t</sub>: one channel of policy
- Taylor rule implies interest rate expectation

$$\hat{\mathbb{E}}_t i_{t+k} = \psi_\pi \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t \pi_{t+k} + \psi_x \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t x_{t+k}$$
(44)

## Why less aggressive? Future interest rate expectations

IS curve:

$$x_{t} = -\sigma i_{t} + \hat{\mathbb{E}}_{t} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} \left( (1-\beta) x_{T+1} - \sigma(\beta i_{T+1} - \pi_{T+1}) + \sigma r_{T}^{n} \right)$$

- Current interest rate i<sub>t</sub>: one channel of policy
- Taylor rule implies interest rate expectation

$$\hat{\mathbb{E}}_t i_{t+k} = \psi_\pi \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t \pi_{t+k} + \psi_x \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t x_{t+k}$$
(44)

 If private sector understands and believes Taylor rule, expected future interest rates additional channel of policy (Eusepi, Giannoni & Preston 2018)

## Respond but not too much




Figure: Impulse responses for unanchored expectations for various values of  $\psi_\pi$ 

