



The Energy Required to Produce Materials: Constraints on Energy Intensity Improvements, Parameters of Demand

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The Energy Required to Produce Materials: Constraints on Energy

Intensity Improvements, Parameters of Demand

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Abstract

In this paper we review the energy requirements to make materials on a global scale by focusing on the five materials which dominate energy used in materials production: steel, cement, paper, plastics and aluminum. We then estimate the possibility of reducing absolute materials production energy by half, while doubling production from 2000 to 2050. The goal therefore is a 75% reduction in energy intensity. Four technology based strategies are investigated without regard to cost: 1) widespread application of best available technology (BAT), 2) BAT to cutting edge technologies, 3) aggressive recycling, and finally, 4) significant improvements in recycling technologies. Taken together these aggressive strategies could produce impressive gains, on the order of a 56% reduction in energy intensity, but this is still short of our goal of a 75% reduction. Ultimately the constraints on improvement in energy intensity are fundamental in nature, prescribed by the laws of thermodynamics. But other options for the reduction in total energy do exist, such as material substitutions, and reductions in demand. A strategy for meeting our target by providing materials services more efficiently and thereby reducing demand is suggested, called “material efficiency”.

1 1. Introduction

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10 Humanity's use of materials is immense, growing, and quite unequal between the rich
11 and the poor. For example, Graedel and Cao point out that there is a reasonably strong
12 correlation between rates of metals usage and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($R^2 =$
13 0.79), with per capita metal use in the more developed countries from 10 to 100 times
14 larger than the use in the less developed countries [1]. Our collective anthropogenic
15 material flows are now a geological force, equaling in magnitude other natural geological
16 phenomena [2], and often dominating or perturbing natural material budgets and cycles
17 for many of the elements [3],[4]. The power required to make these materials and their
18 associated products, and the carbon emissions associated with this production are also
19 huge, requiring on the order of a third of the total worldwide primary energy use per year
20 (~ 160 EJ), and contributing a similarly large proportion of total anthropogenic carbon
21 emissions (~ 10 GtCO₂) [5],[6],[7].

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In this paper, we examine the determinants of these large energy requirements, and look to potential future reductions, and in particular, potential constraints on these reductions. We approach this problem by focusing on the largest energy users among the many materials, and then on the most energy intensive operations of their production processes. We frame the problem by using a simple mathematical identity which states that the energy use for a particular material E is equal to the quantity of material produced Q times the average energy intensity for that material e .

$$E_i = Q_i \cdot e_i \quad (1)$$

where

E_i = energy use per year for material "i" (Joules)

Q_i = materials production per year (mass)

e_i = energy intensity (MJ/kg)

Our total energy use then is just the sum $E_T = \Sigma E_i$.

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5 First we look at the energy intensity of materials production, e and review the
6 reasons for the high values and the steps that can be taken to reduce these values.
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8 Secondly, we look at the determinants of demand Q , and identify mechanisms that could
9 be used to reduce demand.
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14 As a point of reference we are looking to reduce our energy use in the materials
15 sector even while we allow demand to grow. For example, sustainability guidelines for
16 energy and carbon emissions suggest that we need to halve our energy use from 2000 to
17 2050. At the same time, to allow developing countries to “catch up” to the developed
18 world, we would need to allow for a doubling of demand [[8], [9], [5]]. Taken together,
19 this would require that the energy intensity of materials production in 2050 be only one
20 quarter of that in 2000. In other words, we are looking into the possibility of obtaining a
21 75% reduction in the average energy intensity of materials production. We set aside
22 potential complications such as price effects and rebound and proceed as if we are
23 operating in a world where the incentives exist to encourage this goal.
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33 If one looks at the hundreds of materials that humanity produces, the associated energy
34 requirements are dominated by just a few material categories. This is quite fortunate from
35 an analysis point of view. Here we look at the materials used to make physical goods.
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37 Figure 1 shows a Pareto type plot rank ordering the energy requirements for these
38 materials. The figure shows that just a few materials dominate materials production, and
39 if we track just the “top five” (steel, cement, paper, aluminum and aggregated plastics)
40 these alone dominate the entire world industrial sector both in terms of energy used, and
41 CO₂ emitted [[10], [5], SI].
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


Figure 1. Total energy used for the production of 31 materials worldwide, cumulative scale on the right. [11].

2. Energy Intensity “e”

The energy intensity, or embodied energy, is the energy required to produce a material from its raw form, per unit mass of material produced. The energy is usually measured in terms of the lower heating value (LHV) of the primary fuels used plus any other primary energy contributions. These energy requirements are dominated by two main steps. The first step involves the mining, crushing, washing and separation of the ore from the surrounding material (call gangue), and the second step is a chemical reduction process that produces the refined material from its ore, (called smelting in metals processing). Many of the important metal ores are either oxides or compounds with sulfur which in turn are often converted to oxides during processing. The reduction step for these oxides uses a reducing agent, usually carbon, which yields a final output including refined metal and carbon dioxide gas. Hence the reduction process can produce a certain amount of carbon dioxide (on the order of one mol of CO₂ per mol of metal) in

addition to the carbon dioxide associated with the energy requirements (which depends critically on the nature of the energy source). The ratio of carbon dioxide emitted by the carbon reduction reaction, to that from energy use varies by material and technology but is generally in the range of 1:1 (some cement operations) to 1:10 (some aluminum operations). In general, however, the carbon dioxide intensity of materials production is dominated by the energy intensity of production and the implied fuel usage with a very strong correlation between the two as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: The carbon emission in kg CO₂ per kg of material produced versus the embodied energy. Data from [11].

Early materials production processes were relatively simple requiring only harvesting, as for stone and timber, and mixing and heating as for bricks and concrete. These materials are still in use today, and generally produced much more efficiently than in early days, with energy intensities on the order of 1-5 MJ/kg. Newer materials, extracted

from dilute ores, and involving a reduction step, are much more energy intensive. For example, the energy intensities for a variety of metals are plotted in Figure 3 versus the dilution (reciprocal of the ore grade or mass concentration “c” of the metal at the mine).




Figure 3: Embodied energy of 16 metals [11] plotted against the dilution, or inverse of concentration, of the common ores used to produce the metals [12]. See SI for more discussion of this plot.

While there is a considerable scatter in the plot, it does show that these materials are quite energy intensive compared to earlier materials, and that above a certain dilution, energy intensity e increases with dilution ($1/c$). The shape of this curve can be explained by the change in the dominating energy step. In the lower dilution range, particularly for materials such as iron and aluminum, the energy requirement for production is dominated by the chemical reduction step. At the other end of the figure, for those metals that are

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3 highly dilute (and generally less reactive), such as gold and platinum, the energy
4 requirements are dominated by the mining and separation steps, and generally increase
5 with increasing dilution of the ore. The scatter in the low dilution area can be explained
6 in part by the differences in the thermodynamic requirements for the chemical reduction
7 process. This can be estimated by looking at the magnitude of the standard Gibb's free
8 energy of formation for the common ores used to make these metals. For example,
9 looking in the low dilution area of the figure, the Gibb's free energy for the ores for
10 titanium (TiO_2), and aluminum (Al_2O_3), are relatively large (17.8 and 27.1 MJ/kg
11 respectively) compared to the Gibb's free energy for the ores used to produce iron
12 (Fe_2O_3) and manganese (MnO_2), (6.6 and 8.9 MJ/kg respectively). Other major
13 differences, which affect the embodied energies are the quality and availability of the ore,
14 the ore matrix, the complexity of the smelting and production processes, the age of the
15 technology employed, and the degree of purity required in the final output. Because
16 these factors can vary considerably around the world, each data point in Figure 3 could
17 actually be represented by a cluster of points around a mean value that could easily vary
18 by $\pm 20\%$ or more. See [[13],[11], SI]. Note that unlike the engineering properties of a
19 material, such as strength or stiffness, which can be obtained under well specified
20 conditions, the embodied energy is a function not only of the material itself, but also of a
21 larger system that surrounds the material and is often not well-defined. Hence this level
22 of uncertainty is somewhat inherent to the type of large boundary analysis we are
23 performing.
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Historical data shows that industry has made significant reductions in the energy intensity of materials, particularly for those produced in high volumes. Figure 4 gives time series data for average worldwide production of pig iron and aluminum. These data are plotted in terms of e (for the chemical reduction step only, which dominates for these two cases) versus Q , with a few dates marked to indicate the progression of time. The energy intensity data for pig iron corresponds to the coke used in blast furnaces, while the energy intensity value for aluminum corresponds to the electricity used in the smelting of aluminum (the so called Hall – Héroult process). The pig iron data shows an almost one order of magnitude reduction in the energy intensity over a time period of about 200

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3 years. The aluminum data shows an equally impressive reduction over about a century.
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5 The average annual improvements for the energy intensity for these technologies have
6 been in the range of 1.0 to 1.5%. The plots also show the theoretical minima for these
7 operations. These minima are approximated by the standard Gibbs Free Energy of
8 formation for the ores (Fe_2O_3 and Al_2O_3). It is readily apparent that while there is still
9 room for improvement, new improvement will be constrained by thermodynamics.
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11 Generally as one approaches a thermodynamic limit, progress slows down and the
12 performance levels off near to, but never obtaining the limit. Figure 5 shows a
13 breakdown of the energy intensity for aluminum smelting by major regions of the world
14 over the time period 1980 to 2005. The data show the variation in the world data as well
15 as the world average marked by the dashed line in the middle. Taken together Figures 4
16 and 5 suggest two important strategies to further reduce the world average energy
17 intensity of materials production. The first would be to move the world average down to
18 the best available technology (BAT) and the second would be to move further toward the
19 theoretical minimum.
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32 The constraints on the first strategy are primarily financial. Materials production
33 facilities represent large capital investment. Once these costs are sunk there is a large
34 incentive to continue operation for decades. In fact, looking closely at Figure 5 reveals
35 that some of the least energy efficient facilities are actually operated in the developed
36 world where the installations are older, while the newer more energy efficient facilities
37 are in the developing world. This pattern is repeated for other materials as well, see
38 results for world cement production [7]. At the same time, it is to be noted that because
39 materials production is so energy intensive, and materials are available on local and
40 global markets, no one can remain competitive and be energy inefficient for long.
41 Therefore, while there may be outliers, the bulk of production for globally competitive,
42 energy intensive materials can not stray too far from the best available technology. After
43 reviewing the data for our so-called top five materials we estimate that a worldwide move
44 from today's average to best available technologies¹ would result in an overall energy
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¹ Best available technologies or BATs can contain those that are available but not necessarily economically viable. BAT in many cases can be the same as Best practice technology (BPT) that

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3 reduction of about 20%. This agrees with detailed estimates made by us and others,
4 including the International Energy Agency IEA [[6],[7],[5]]. Some of the technologies
5 involved in these improvements would include worldwide implementation of by-product
6 gas recovery from steel production and thin slab casting, retrofitting of aluminum
7 smelters and point feeders, continuous digesters and dry sheet forming for paper
8 production, wet to dry kilns for cement, as well as fuel and clinker substitution and
9 improvements in cracking and distillation for plastics. In addition widespread
10 implementation of combined heat and power and more efficient electric motors is
11 assumed. Data used our calculations are provided in the supporting information
12 document.
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23 Additional energy reductions can be made with research breakthroughs and by
24 implementing cutting edge technologies. Each of the top five materials already have
25 technology roadmaps with key energy challenges identified, and funded research and
26 scale up on going [10]. At the same time, the major energy intensive steps for the top
27 five materials are already in the vicinity of 60% efficient (relative to their thermodynamic
28 limits). If we make the fairly aggressive assumption that these can be further improved to
29 within half the remaining distance to the theoretical limit (~80% efficient) we estimate an
30 additional overall reduction in total energy requirements for materials production of
31 about 17%, for a total of 37% when combining both strategies. Some of the
32 breakthrough technologies considered here include, alternative reduction technologies
33 with fuel and feedstock substitution, black liquor gasification for paper and inert anodes
34 for aluminum and other cutting edge technologies some of which may not have been
35 discovered yet. Again additional details can be found in our work and that of others, as
36 well as in our supporting information [15], [16], [17], [18], [5], [6], [10],[7]. The
37 magnitude of this improvement may seem smaller than expected to some. The reason is
38 that this improvement applies only to primary production, not secondary (recycled)
39 production, which in some cases already represents a significant fraction of supply. We
40 discuss recycling next.
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57 is best available and economical, but can be different when a new technology has emerged.
58 Saygin and co-workers in their work distinguish the two for several industries [14].
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


Figure 4: Historic trends in global average energy requirements for production of pig iron from ore, and for aluminum smelting, versus the respective global production volumes. The corresponding years are labeled above the chart. Also included are the theoretical minimum values for the two processes. For aluminum the primary energy is shown on the right vertical axis using global average electricity factor of 9.3 MJ/kWh. Data for iron energy intensity is obtained from [19] and that for aluminum from [20]. Production data is obtained from [21]. Pie chart data is taken from [18], [20], [22].




Figure 5: Historical Regional data for the energy intensity of aluminum smelting [7].

Another way to reduce the energy requirements for materials production would be to look to a new material source with a lower energy intensity e . This could be to harvest the already processed materials in end-of-life products. That is, since recycling generally avoids many of the energy intensive steps in primary production (e.g. chemical reduction, mining and separation etc.) it is well known for having a lower energy requirement as compared to primary production. For example, the production of secondary aluminum may require only on the order of 10% of the energy intensity of primary aluminum. And for steel it may be only 50% of primary energy intensity [11]. The problem here is that while we know that we can generally make the energy intensity of secondary production small compared to primary production, there are serious constraints on the quantity of secondary materials that can be captured and processed. This problem is particularly apparent for emerging countries while they are building their infrastructure which adds materials to stocks rather than making them available for recycle [23].

To explore this effect, we use a relatively simple model that focuses on post consumer discards, an area with the most potential for improvement. Consider the total demand Q_T subdivided into Q_p (primary production) produced with energy intensity e_p , and Q_s (secondary production) produced with energy intensity e_s . The total energy E_T for a given material then is,

$$E_T = Q_p e_p + Q_s e_s \quad (2)$$

$$E_T = Q_T[(1-r)e_p + r e_s] = Q_T \bar{e} = Q_T e_p (1-m) \quad (3)$$

$$m = r(1 - \frac{e_s}{e_p}) \quad r = \frac{Q_s}{Q_T} \quad (4a \text{ and } b)$$

where \bar{e} is the average energy intensity, r is the fraction of secondary material in the supply and m controls our potential energy savings. Since the general situation is $r \leq 1$ and $e_s < e_p$, with $0 < m < 1$, our goal then is to make m as close to one as possible.

We state the constraints on Q_s as follows

$$Q_s < Q_{discards} < Q_T \quad (5)$$

That is, our secondary supplies must be less than the end of life discards due to difficulties in collection, separation and losses. Let us say

$$Q_s = f Q_{discards} \quad (6)$$

where $0 \leq f \leq 1$ is the fraction of discards that become available to satisfy demand.

Secondly, the discards must be less than demand, because in general, the discards have come out of the system after "n" years of product life time, while demand has continued to grow at rate "i". Putting this together gives us an expression for r, as

$$\frac{Q_s}{Q_T} = r = f(1+i)^{-n} \quad (7)$$

In other words, r is constrained by the efficiency of the recycling system as well as by the parameters of growth. Furthermore, as we move forward to improve our recycling in an effort to reduce energy use and carbon emissions from materials production, we will run into the realization that some materials such as steel, paper and aluminum are already recycled at fairly high levels. At the same time there is no known route to efficiently recycle concrete, and the recycling of plastics is difficult. The challenges plastics present to recycling, are the flip side of the advantages they provide for product design – they are almost infinitely changeable. That is we can alter their color, properties and performance by a vast array of pigments, additives and fillers, only to greatly complicate the problem of material identification and separation at the end of life. At the same time, some improvements in technology and labeling in Europe do seem to be helpful in improving the recyclability of plastics.

Table 1 Recycling parameters for top five materials. ('Cur' = current average; 'CE' = cutting edge). Details are provided in the Supporting Information document.

Material	n [years]	i	f_{cur}	f_{new}	$[1-e_{s,Cur}/e_{p,Cur}]$	$[1-e_{s,Cur}/e_{p,CE}]$	$[1-e_{s,CE}/e_{p,CE}]$
Steel	19	1.4%	56%	90%	49%	1%	50%
Aluminum	15	2.2%	49%	90%	90%	82%	91%
Cement	50	0.8%	0%	0%	-	-	-
Paper	1	1.4%	46%	81%	47%	37%	69%
Plastic	5	1.5%	6%	30%	74%	64%	82%

If we now assume a fairly aggressive effort to increase the fraction f and apply estimates for relevant recycling parameters given in columns 1 through 5 in Table 1, we estimate an additional reduction in the world energy required to produce materials at about only 6% of current usage. Note that this percentage depends on the order of implementation of our proposed energy saving strategies (current to BAT to cutting edge). If recycling were implemented before any of the other improvements (using column 6 instead of column 7) the percentage change would have been 18%. Never the less the total combined savings would remain the same, at about 44%, regardless of the order. Finally, we implement yet a further recycling improvement by assuming an

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3 additional reduction in the energy intensity of secondary materials production, e_s . Here
4 we somewhat arbitrarily assume the current value of this energy intensity is reduced by
5 half for all sectors. This provides still more improvement, raising our total potential
6 savings to 56%. Note that this improvement step appears quite large because we have
7 already implemented aggressive increases in recycling rates in the previous improvement.
8 This is just about as far as we can go with energy efficiency, even using very optimistic
9 assumptions, and yet we are still substantially short of our goal of 75%.

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17 One more method to further reduce the energy requirements for materials production
18 might be considered; to substitute materials with low energy intensity for materials with
19 high energy intensity. This would be done at the product design stage with proper
20 consideration of the performance requirements for the materials. For example, it would
21 appear that timber with an energy intensity in the vicinity of 1 - 3MJ/kg, could be
22 substituted for steel with an energy intensity around 20MJ/kg, in some building
23 applications. As a general observation however, it can be seen that the energy intensity of
24 materials correlates very closely with their price. This is shown in Figure 6. The close
25 correlation is due in part, to the fact that energy shows up as a relatively large percentage
26 of the cost to produce a material – something like 30% for concrete and aluminum and
27 60% for plastics [10]. As a result we can assume that materials substitution driven by
28 price has already had some effect on reducing the energy intensity of the materials we
29 use. For example, in Figure 7 the energy intensity, e , Vs world production, Q , for many
30 materials of construction are plotted. The figure reveals that in general many of the high
31 production volume materials are already the low energy intensity materials. Of the top
32 five; steel, paper and concrete are near the bottom of the energy intensity scale. Though it
33 is possible that some opportunities for the substitution of concrete, brick and wood for
34 steel do likely still exist. For any particular case, however, one would need to do a life
35 cycle assessment for the product to ensure that the overall energy requirements are
36 reduced. This approach would be especially important when considering aluminum and
37 plastics which have generally been substituted for lower energy materials, such as steel.
38 For example, if the application is to vehicles such as automobiles and aircraft, the energy
39 savings during the use phase brought about by employing lighter weight materials such as
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3 aluminum and plastic matrix composites may be (and often is) larger than the marginal
4 increase in materials energy. In fact, it is quite likely, that when the problem of total
5 energy reduction is approached from a product life cycle perspective that this will lead to
6 the deployment of some materials that are actually higher in energy intensity rather than
7 less.
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14 In summary, we have looked at the possibility of reducing the energy intensity of
15 materials production by 75% over the next four decades and found that this appears very
16 unlikely. An analysis that includes significant new breakthroughs in production
17 technology and recycling systems as well as deployment worldwide falls considerably
18 short of this mark, providing only about a 56% reduction. The essence of this problem is
19 that materials production energy is dominated by a small group of materials that has been
20 in production for some time, and has already become quite efficient. Iron and steel,
21 cement, concrete, paper and aluminum have all been in production for at least a century.
22 Plastics, which are newer, will be reaching a century in production just a decade or two
23 from now. Hence, while future gains in energy efficiency for these materials are still
24 quite likely, major improvements are restricted in part by the laws of thermodynamics.
25 We next turn our attention to the potentially more painful option of reducing material
26 demand. This is explored in the next session.
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


Figure 6: Price of various materials plotted against the embodied energy of the materials. The data for embodied energy comes from [11], for material prices for metals from [21], plastics from [24] and brick, wood, and glass from [11]. Plastic prices are for year 2011, and all others are for 2009.




Figure 7: Energy intensity e versus world production Q for various materials of construction [11].

3. The Determinants of Material Demand “ Q ”

To explore the growth in materials demand, we will decompose Q into four components using a mathematical identity similar to the so called IPAT equation, or the Kaya Identity [25].

$$Q = P \cdot \frac{GDP}{P} \cdot \frac{V_{mat'l's}}{GDP} \cdot \frac{Q}{V_{mat'l's}} \quad (\text{eq. 8})$$

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or

$$Q = P \cdot A \cdot M \cdot \frac{1}{p} \quad (\text{eq. 9})$$

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12 differentiation leads to
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$$\frac{\Delta Q}{Q} = \frac{\Delta P}{P} + \frac{\Delta A}{A} + \frac{\Delta M}{M} + \frac{\Delta(1/p)}{1/p} \quad (\text{eq. 10})$$

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22 where,
23

- 24 Q = quantity of the material consumed² (usually mass)
 25 P = population
 26 A = affluence (GDP/P)
 27 GDP = Gross domestic product (or a similar measure) of the total value
 28 of the goods and services produced in the region considered.
 29 M = total market value of the material considered ($V_{mat'}$) as a fraction
 30 of the GDP . To some extent this is how society chooses to spend
 31 its money. This component is called “choice” by Waggoner and
 32 Ausable [28]
 33 p = price, economic value of the material per unit of quantity Q .

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43 We breakdown the quantity of materials demanded Q in terms of population P ,
 44 Affluence A , relative material value M and the reciprocal of price ($1/p$). By using time
 45 series data one can show how the growth or decline in Q (i.e. $\Delta Q/Q$ given in percent per
 46 year) is related to the growth or decline in the terms on the right hand side of equation 9,
 47 as shown in equation 10. This is a process of simple addition provided that the annual
 48 changes are small (i.e. on the order of a few percent). Note that writing identity
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 55 ² Apparent consumption used for this calculation is as defined and provided by USGS.
 56 This doesn't include material consumed as part of imported products or that lost as
 57 exported products. [26], [27].
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equations does not imply that the terms on the right hand side are independent, nor that the relationship demonstrates cause and effect. But it does show correlations and allows us to identify major historical trends in society, thus provides a framework for speculating about how things might change.


Broadly speaking, world trends for the terms in equation 10 over the last 9 decades, show that both population and affluence have been steadily increasing, the first at a rate of a little more than 1% a year, and the second at a rate a little below 2%. At the same time, material prices while subject to variation, have generally been decreasing. For example, the industrial index for materials has fallen by a little under 2% a year over this same time period [11]. In other words, three out of the four terms on the right hand side of equation 10 have mostly been going up at a combined rate of a little under 5%. The fourth term M, which represents the value of materials produced for society relative to the total value of all goods and services produced by society, has been generally decreasing but varies considerably between the rich and the poor. Generally, M increases with a high value as a country grows and builds its infrastructure, and then slows down and can become negative as growth in GDP outpaces materials use. This transition is sometimes called “relative dematerialization” and includes economic structural effects as GDP shifts from manufacturing to services. Worldwide, M has been dominated by the behavior of the developed countries leading to a decline on the order of 2% per year. Putting this together, indicates a historical trend of growing materials demand on the order of almost 3% per year. Note that 3% a year for 50 years will give an increase of more than 4 times.

To consider the different patterns of demand, consider the data for the USA and China given in Figure 8. The time periods reflect times of rising materials prices (1950 – 1980) and times of falling materials prices (1980 to 2001 or 2005). The data for three metals shows several interesting features. First of all, we see that the USA has essentially saturated in per capita demand for these metals. That is the growth in Q keeps in pace with the growth in population, in particular for the 1980 to 2001 data. This moderation in demand appears to be linked with the increasingly negative value for the change in M.

For China, on the other hand, strong demand for materials, on the order of 8 to 10% per year, has been evident for at least the last five decades, but the drivers of this demand have changed dramatically as China has changed. Currently, growth in materials demand in China is driven primarily by significant increases in affluence. But earlier data showed a pattern more like developing countries, with large values of the parameter M. In between these two time periods, the sign for M has flipped from large positive to slightly negative.

Figure 8: Historical time series data for the terms in equation 10. Quantity data for USA is obtained from [21], for China from [29], GDP and Population data from [30], price data from [21].

Region (Time)	Material	Q	P	A	M	1/p
USA (1950-1980)	Steel	0.9%	1.4%	2.2%	-1.1%	-1.5%
	Aluminum	6.0%	1.4%	2.2%	2.6%	-0.2%
	Copper	1.3%	1.4%	2.2%	-1.8%	-0.5%
USA (1980-2001)	Steel	1.0%	1.1%	2.1%	-4.5%	2.7%
	Aluminum	1.3%	1.1%	2.1%	-4.9%	3.2%
	Copper	1.1%	1.1%	2.1%	-5.4%	3.8%
China (1950-1980)	Steel	8.2%	1.8%	2.3%	5.5%	-1.5%
	Aluminum	8.5%	1.8%	2.3%	4.5%	-0.2%
	Copper	10.4%	1.8%	2.3%	6.5%	-0.5%
China (1980-2005)	Steel	8.3%	1.2%	8.6%	-2.6%	1.2%
	Aluminum	9.7%	1.2%	8.6%	-1.8%	1.7%
	Copper	8.6%	1.2%	8.6%	-1.1%	0.0%



How these patterns play out into the future is open to speculation, but several possibilities are outlined here to demonstrate the range of parameters. Perhaps the most conservative would be to extrapolate at the apparent rate of growth for the developed countries at about 1%. This gives a multiplier of 1.65 after 50 years. Alternatively we could use the estimated recent world rate of 3% and this would give a multiplier of 4.4 after 50 years. Compared to these we could posit two altruistic scenarios. In the first, we assume saturation in the developed world with no additional growth, but additional growth for the developing world up to the same per capita materials levels as the developed world. Using data from Graedel and Cao, for metals usage, one can estimate the required growth to be a little over a doubling in total demand [1]. This is similar to the estimate we used in our opening goal statement. If on the other hand, we were to attempt to meet our energy target by maintaining materials demand at the current level, but to do it equitably, the developed world would have to cut their demand by more than half, while the developing world could increase by a factor between 3 and 4.

Factors that could moderate materials demand (see equation 8) of particular importance include higher materials prices, and a weakened economy. Higher materials prices could come about by shortages in supply and/or increases in costs including energy

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3 costs and carbon taxes. Because most of our construction materials are generally quite
4 abundant on earth, including the feed stocks for our top five, there should be no long term
5 concerns about their availability. At the same time, as we expand our palate of materials
6 to include nearly all of the 92 naturally occurring elements often in specialized
7 applications, it is quite probable that some short and moderate term supply shortages
8 could very well occur while new sources are brought into production and substitutes are
9 developed. Several recent reports and papers identify the supply of some of the rare earth
10 metals and other energy materials as potentially vulnerable until alternative supplies are
11 developed around the world [31], [32]. Similarly some materials may become more
12 difficult to access and/or may become more dilute as the best resources are depleted.
13 These materials including copper and uranium, could then have corresponding price
14 increases.

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26 Figure 3 suggests how energy requirements could go up if dilution were to increase
27 dramatically. At the same time it is to be noted that mining and separation processes are
28 still quite far from theoretical limits and potential gains in this area are quite possible. In
29 fact over recent history surface mining of dilute ores has actually been more energy
30 efficient than the subsurface mining of more concentrated ores for the same metal [33].
31 Overall however, the problem of difficult access and dilution for materials production of
32 our top five materials is generally not foreseen as serious, with the possible exception of
33 plastics. The more serious problem has to do with the consequences of energy resources
34 used and their effect on our ecosystems.

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44 **4. The Next Step**

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46 It is not our intention here to predict the future, but only to point out what we see as very
47 likely constraints on our ability to have it both ways. It does not seem likely that material
48 production (and more generally the industrial sector) can meet the dual goals we set out
49 earlier in this paper of doubling production, while halving energy use. In fact, this
50 analysis suggests that we may only be able to halve energy with no increase in demand.
51 Furthermore, for the strategies discussed in this paper to be implemented, significant
52 technical breakthroughs and financial incentives are required. Currently the prices for
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energy and materials are too low to significantly alter the prevailing game plan, which is to substitute energy and material for labor.

Table 2: The magnitude of effect relative to price of increasing energy price or imposing a CO₂ tax. Prices same as in Figure 6. Energy fraction of cost taken from [10], and CO₂ intensities from [11].

Material	Price (USD/ton)	Energy Frac of Operating cost	CO₂ (kg/kg)	magnitude of effect relative to price		
				energy price inc. by 50%	CO₂ is taxed at \$20/ton	CO₂ is taxed at \$100/ton
Steel	\$ 700	15%	2.5	8%	7%	37%
Aluminum	\$ 2,400	30%	9.5	15%	8%	42%
Paper	\$ 800	12%	1.4	6%	4%	18%
Cement	\$ 100	30%	0.7	15%	15%	74%
Plastics	\$ 1,985	60%	2.5	30%	3%	13%

At the same time we recognize the potential vulnerability of the top five materials to price increases, particularly those brought about by higher energy prices and potential carbon taxes. To illustrate this, we have constructed Table 2 that shows potential cost effects relative to price for our top five materials. Whether an energy cost increase would necessarily translate into a material price increase (and further to a product price increase) depends on several factors. For one, large energy intensive material producers work hard to establish long term, low cost energy sources to insulate themselves from energy price increases and fluctuation. For example, about one half of all aluminum smelted uses hydropower, with long term agreements. Never the less, these potential cost effects do indicate a certain level of pressure on these producers and the potential for price increases. These price increases on the other hand, could weaken demand and increase the effort to increase efficiency and find substitutes.

In summary then, our analysis using extremely optimistic estimates for future energy efficiency cannot deliver sufficient savings to meet our 2050 targets as outlined at the beginning of this paper. There are, however, additional strategies, which could be employed to provide material services to consumers by using materials more efficiently and thereby reducing demand. We term this collection of strategies “material efficiency”

and discuss them in recent publications [34], [35]. They include the ideas of providing equivalent materials services but with reduced materials requirements. Materials efficiency includes such ideas as extending the life of products, using materials more effectively in design, reusing materials and remanufacturing. The savings from this approach could be quite large and could allow us to meet our targets for energy and carbon. For example, conceptually at least, if we were to double the life of all current products, this could result in a maximum reduction in our demand by half³. Of course this would not be an attractive solution from the viewpoint of those who produce our input materials, but on the other hand, material efficiency does offer a way to provide material services for humanity while still meeting energy and carbon targets. It is clear that current price incentives are unlikely to motivate these kinds of improvements either in terms of energy efficiency as outlined in this paper, or material efficiency as just mentioned. Therefore it is necessary that we explore how we can wrap these improvements up in other benefits, and promote these improvements, as necessary, by changes in policy.


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
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
³ If we explore this idea using equation 9, we are saying a halving of M could result in a halving of Q. Of course such a dramatic intervention would require some significant changes from today, and would have some influence on all of the other parameters in equation 9 as well. Further, extending product life would also affect our results from recycling per equation 7.

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
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






Pig Iron





Aluminum Smelting

1890 1904

1922

1947

1970 2009

Energy Intensity (Wh/g)

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10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000

Production, 1000's tonnes


Thermodynamic Limit


$$y = 175.59x^{-0.139}$$
$$R^2 = 0.98567$$

Energy Intensity (MJ/kg)


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
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IEA





Region (Time)	Material	Q	P	A	M	1/p
USA (1950-1980)	Steel	0.9%	1.4%	2.2%	-1.1%	-1.5%
	Aluminum	6.0%	1.4%	2.2%	2.6%	-0.2%
	Copper	1.3%	1.4%	2.2%	-1.8%	-0.5%
USA (1980-2001)	Steel	1.0%	1.1%	2.1%	-4.5%	2.7%
	Aluminum	1.3%	1.1%	2.1%	-4.9%	3.2%
	Copper	1.1%	1.1%	2.1%	-5.4%	3.8%
China (1950-1980)	Steel	8.2%	1.8%	2.3%	5.5%	-1.5%
	Aluminum	8.5%	1.8%	2.3%	4.5%	-0.2%
	Copper	10.4%	1.8%	2.3%	6.5%	-0.5%
China (1980-2005)	Steel	8.3%	1.2%	8.6%	-2.6%	1.2%
	Aluminum	9.7%	1.2%	8.6%	-1.8%	1.7%
	Copper	8.6%	1.2%	8.6%	-1.1%	0.0%

