

# Lautaro Chittaro

## CONTACT INFORMATION

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## EDUCATION

**Ph.D. in Economics**, Stanford University  
**M.A. in Economics**, University of San Andrés  
**B.A. in Economics**, University of Buenos Aires

## REFERENCES

**Monika Piazzesi** (co-primary advisor)  
Dept. of Economics, Stanford University  
[piazzesi@stanford.edu](mailto:piazzesi@stanford.edu)

**Martin Schneider** (co-primary advisor)  
Dept. of Economics, Stanford University  
[schneidr@stanford.edu](mailto:schneidr@stanford.edu)

**Shoshana Vasserman**  
Grad. Sc. of Business, Stanford University  
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## FIELDS

Financial Economics, Macroeconomics, Industrial Organization

## JOB MARKET PAPER

**Selection in crisis lending**  
with Cristián Sánchez

Government-guaranteed loans (GGL) have arisen as a popular policy tool to provide liquidity to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) during recent economic crises. We examine their short- and long-run effects on firm default using Chile's FOGAPE program as a case study. Firms that received GGLs have a default rate 1.9 pp. lower than similar firms that did not receive GGLs in the same year of the program, but 3 years after takers default 2.1 pp. more. Selection on unobservables partially explains the long-term positive default gap: when conditioning on applicants, it roughly halves to 0.9 pp. Motivated by this evidence, we develop a dynamic equilibrium model of investment, borrowing, and default choices where firms can apply to a GGL, and banks can choose to approve or reject the application. We show how firms with different current and long-run productivities are sorted into GGLs. Using a calibrated model to match the observed gaps, we propose to evaluate alternative designs for GGL programs.

## WORKING PAPERS

**Asset returns as carbon taxes**  
with Monika Piazzesi, Martin Schneider and Marcelo Sena

In frictionless financial markets, a carbon tax on energy users provides the same incentives as a *replicating return schedule* that depends on firms' emission intensities, defined as scope 1 emissions relative to enterprise value. We use this result to interpret pollution premia measured by recent empirical studies and conclude that markets currently provide only modest incentives. Replicating a serious carbon tax requires high returns in the right tail of the emission intensity distribution. With heterogeneous investors, such returns are not sustainable unless essentially everyone perceives large nonpecuniary costs from holding dirty capital. Substantial emission reductions can be achieved, however, when even a small share of investors perceive nonpecuniary *benefits* from owning clean electricity capital.

**Pricing and Financial Incentives in Sovereign Green Debt: Evidence from Chile**

with Marcelo Sena

We study the pricing of sovereign green bonds using Chile's pioneering green bond program and its cross-design issuance. Employing a panel of Chilean U.S.-dollar bonds, we estimate no-arbitrage pricing kernels for green and conventional bonds. The results reveal a declining greenium across maturities, driven by the higher interest-rate risk exposure of green bonds. We find no evidence of investor segmentation or liquidity differences between green and conventional bonds. Instead, we explain the observed pricing patterns through a representative-agent asset-pricing model in which investors derive nonpecuniary benefits from the real value of their green bond holdings. During high-inflation periods, as observed in our sample, the real value of green bond portfolios deteriorates, making the convenience service they provide scarcer and more valuable. This positive correlation between green convenience yields and inflation generates a risk premium that compresses the greenium especially at longer maturities, producing a downward-sloping greenium term structure.

WORK IN PROGRESS	<p><b>The Cost of Port Disruptions: evidence from U.S. Containerized Trade</b>  with Stephen Redding, Janet Stefanov, and Shoshana Vasserman  We match containership GPS data with import bill of lading to estimate port substitution and the cost of port disruptions.</p>	
ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS	<p><b>From bad to worse: the economic impact of COVID-19 in developing countries. Evidence from Venezuela</b>  with Germán Caruso, María Emilia Cucagna, Luis Pedro Espana  <i>Latin American Economic Review</i>, 2021</p> <p>Policy responses to COVID-19 affected the dynamic of economic growth and labor markets worldwide, hitting economically harder on developing countries. These policies involved economic lockdowns that included the shutdown of the main statistical exercises, making it almost impossible to assess the breadth and variety of their effects. Using a phone survey, this paper examines the impact of the quarantine implemented in Venezuela on labor market outcomes. The identification strategy exploits the exogenous variation in the severity of the lockdown in different regions of the country. The main result indicates a 16.5 percentage points reduction in employment, while in regions with severe lockdowns the reduction has been 13.8 p.p. larger. In particular, the self-employed and informally employed were hard hit by the lockdown. To cope with this effect, households sold their productive assets, reduced their savings, sought for alternative income sources and looked for help from relatives. This paper does not find a differential effect on the number of COVID-19 cases in more severe lockdown settings. Results are robust to endogenous migration and alternative specifications.</p>	
RELEVANT POSITIONS	<p><b>Department of Economics, Stanford University</b> 2022-2025  Research Assistant for Martin Schneider and Monika Piazzesi</p> <p><b>Graduate School of Business, Stanford University</b> 2022-2025  Research Assistant for Shoshana Vasserman</p> <p><b>World Bank, Washington DC</b> 2020  Short-term Consultant</p> <p><b>Ministry of Production, Argentina</b> 2017-2020  Senior Trade Policy Advisor</p>	
TEACHING	<p>Macroeconomics II (Ph.D.) Stanford University  Economic Forecasting (Undergrad) Stanford University  Macroeconomics I, II (Undergrad) University of Buenos Aires  Industrial Organization (Undergrad) University of Buenos Aires  National Accounts (Undergrad) University of Buenos Aires</p>	
AWARDS & FELLOWSHIPS	<p>Gale and Steve Kohlhaugen Fellowship, Stanford University 2024  The Alejandro and Lida Zaffaroni Fellowship, Stanford University 2020-2022</p>	
INTERNSHIPS & WORKSHOPS	<p><b>Central Bank of Chile</b> 2024  Visiting Program</p> <p><b>Central Bank of Mexico</b> 2024  Summer Internship Program</p> <p><b>Princeton University</b> 2022  Macro, Money and Finance (Continuous Time Methods Workshop)</p>	
OTHER PUBLICATIONS	<p><b>International Integration and Productive Development: New Policy Guidelines</b> 2018  with Juan Carlos Hallak - <i>Boletín Techint (Spanish Only)</i></p>	
LANGUAGE	<p>English, Spanish (Native)</p>	