RACE AND AMERICAN CULTURE

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RACE & RESISTANCE

LITERATURE & POLITICS IN ASIAN AMERICA

For Takeo

Resist!

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CONCLUSION

Model Minorities and Bad Subjects

The concept of a dictatorial regime and its relationship to Asian Americans can be found not only in the context of American imperialism and its support for overseas authoritarian regimes. As Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue, the United States and its domestic policies toward people of color can be conceived of as a "racial dictatorship" for a period that extends from 1790 to 1964, or the overwhelming majority of the nation's history (66). In 1790, the franchise was restricted to free white males, and the last provisions of legislated discrimination were not removed from the nation's laws until the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Frank Chin argues that for Asian Americans the result of living under racial oppression was the internalization of dominant society's perceptions of Asian Americans as generally docile and submissive, especially in comparison to the seemingly more recalcitrant African American and Latino populations. Asian Americans then became the objects of "racist love," versus "racist hate,"

because they had, by the 1960s and 1970s, accepted their place as a model minority subservient to whites. Unlike the stereotype of the yellow peril, which is resolutely negative and therefore easily rejected by those who are labeled with it, the sterotype of the model minority is regarded by Asian American intellectuals as insidious precisely because of its ability to be internalized by Asian Americans. Even more than the stereotype of the yellow peril, then, this specter of the model minority haunts contemporary Asian American intellectuals, who prefer to see themselves and the objects of their critical inquiry as bad subjects.

Model minorities are good subjects, those who, according to Louis Althusser, "'work by themselves' in the vast majority of cases," or adhere to the dominant ideology of their society without being aware of their adherence (181). The bad subjects reject dominant ideology (although that does not mean they are free from ideology itself) and "on occasion provoke the intervention of one of the detachments of the (repressive) State apparatus," such as the police (181). The bad subject, as the dominant form of the Asian American body politic in the imagination of Asian American intellectuals, becomes the organizing sign that Asian American intellectuals use to guide their excavation of the past and interpretation of the present. I will not argue for whether or not a bad subject truly exists; I will demonstrate instead how the bad subject as sign motivates a discourse that is fundamental to Asian American intellectuals. For Asian American intellectuals, the various forms taken by the body politic that this book has explored can in the end be interpreted as collectively reinforcing the discourse of a bad subject created by both enforced condition and voluntary choice. This retrospective collectivization of Asian American experience is at least partially a function of the fact that Asian American intellectuals inhabit what Pierre Bourdieu calls the economic world reversed, where value is determined not by financial capital but, in this case, by a symbolic capital that derives its worth from the idea of political resistance and social change.

I argue that Asian American intellectuals have created a discourse of the bad subject that not only rejects what David Palumbo-Liu calls model minority discourse but also disavows the model minority status of many Asian American intellectuals themselves (395–416). If, in Palumbo-Liu's characterization, model minority discourse's primary role is to suture the racialized individual back into dominant American culture as healed and whole consumer and producer, the discourse of the bad subject's primary role is to prevent that suture, demonstrating the fractures and ruptures of American culture in regard to racial and other inequities. If model minority discourse tends to idealize the model minority, the discourse of the bad subject responds by tending to idealize the bad subject, ignoring the contradictions and excesses that make the bad subject amenable to discipline by dominant society. Thus Asian American intellectuals often implicitly posit model minority discourse and the discourse of the bad subject as a binary, although in what follows I hope to demonstrate their mutual interdependency. Asian Americans can frequently occupy both situations simultaneously or, at the very least, alternate between them, as realized perhaps

most graphically in the role of the panethnic entrepreneur. In this chapter, I turn to two different ways in which the discourse of the bad subject forms, first in Cynthia Kadohata's *In the Heart of the Valley of Love* and then in the relationship between Theresa Hak Kyung Cha's *Dictee* and the critical anthology *Writing Self, Writing Nation*. I conclude with a reading of Lois-Ann Yamanaka's trilogy of novels set in Hawai'i. The trilogy not only troubles the image of Asian Americans as a bad subject in a variety of ways, in particular complicating the distinction between the bad subject and the model minority, but also brings into question the very definition of Asian American identity. In all three cases, we continue to see the persistence of bodily representations in expressing the relationship of the Asian American body politic to the larger American body politic.

Ultimately, I wish to demonstrate how the discourse of the bad subject both enables and disables, through the process of idealization, the very type of political activity that it seeks to encourage and uncover. In other words, an idealistic construction of the Asian American body politic, even if it is ultimately inaccurate through its denial of the ideological heterogeneity of Asian America and even if it does fundamentally alter the vision of Asian American intellectuals by predisposing them to examine the past and the present for signs of resistance, does allow for political mobilization, unification, and action to take place, in the short term. In the long term, however, the inaccuracy that is inherent in the discourse of the bad subject prevents Asian American intellectuals from recognizing the ability of late capitalism to transform Asian American racial identity into a commodity and Asian America into a niche market for that commodity. Given that Asian American intellectuals are generally predisposed to be critical of capitalism because of its exploitation of racial minorities, the working class, and the poor, this inability to recognize how capitalism can transform the very basis of Asian American intellectual work—founded upon race as a resistant identity—constitutes a fundamental problem for both intellectual inquiry and political leadership. This problem of idealization and misrecognition constitutes the most important limit of Asian American intellectual work; by the end of this chapter, I will demonstrate how idealization and misrecognition result in a disavowed essentialism of racial identity and an unintentional repetition of ideological domination, where Asian American intellectuals seek to interpellate others even as we resist dominant society's attempts to interpellate us. If these are the intellectual limits of our contemporary mode of practice, which become expressed in a particular representation of Asian America, they are inextricably related with the limits of Asian America itself, our object of study and our place of work. These limits stem from the implicit pluralism found in contemporary constructions of Asian American identity, the commodification of that racial identity, the ideological heterogeneity of a diverse Asian American population, and the willingness of a considerable portion of that population to participate in and perpetuate such commodification and the social and economic practices that lead to it. Ultimately, Asian American intellectuals have to consider the possi-

bility that we need to look beyond Asian America in order to address the goals of social and economic justice that were so important to our predecessors and, presumably, remain important to ourselves.[1]

THE MODEL MINORITY THESIS

To characterize the entire history of dominant representations of Asian Americans through the category of the model minority is, to a certain extent, ahistorical, given that the category itself did not come into existence under that name until 1966 and the publication of an article in *U.S. News & World Report*, which praised the accomplishments of Japanese and Chinese Americans, especially considering the racism that they had endured, and explicitly compared them favorably to African Americans.[2] For *U.S. News & World Report*, "the model minority" is a positive label to describe a well-adjusted minority population. While the category of the model minority has a particular historical specificity relevant to the post–civil rights era, the idea of Asian Americans functioning as a de facto model minority has deep historical roots, traceable at least to the nineteenth-century deployment of Chinese laborers as strikebreakers used against unruly white laborers in the North and recalcitrant black laborers in the South.[3] The emergence of Asian Americans as a de facto model minority in the nineteenth century constitutes a minor aspect of Asian American existence during the period of racial dictatorship; the major aspect was certainly one of being the objects of racist hate, versus racist love. Nevertheless, the historical functions of Asian Americans as a model minority in the past and present are similar and important to stress. Asian American intellectuals have generally come to a consensus regarding this historical function and its ideological import, what I will call here the *model minority thesis*, to distinguish such a position from the one held by others who simply accept the Asian American as a model minority at face value.

In the model minority thesis, the model minority works as a buffer between whites and blacks, who are separated by not only racial difference but a related class antagonism as well. Assuming that blacks are in general economically underprivileged as a whole and also economically disadvantaged as a racially differentiated segment when they are in the same class with whites, the thesis argues that the racial and class antagonism of blacks toward the structure of domination that favors whites is deflected at crucial moments toward Asian Americans through the model minority. The structure of domination that favors whites and is controlled by them positions Asian Americans as a minority that can succeed without government or social assistance, through sheer hard work and perseverance based upon a system of social values that prioritizes family, education, and sacrifice. These social values that all Asian Americans reputedly share, often referred to as Confucian, accurately or otherwise, also prioritize obedience and hierarchy, which means that Asian Americans are reluctant to blame others for any lack in their social position and are willing to accept their social position with gratitude. Asian Americans are therefore a model minority because they demonstrate to other minorities what can be achieved through self-reliance rather than government assistance, self-sacrifice rather than self-interest, and quiet restraint rather than vocal complaint in the face of perceived or actual injustice.[4]

Ideologically, the model minority becomes a scapegoat, drawing the ire of other minorities for the systemic inequities that they experience. The exploitation of Korean American small-business owners by politicians, police, and the media during the Los Angeles riots to absorb African American and Latino rage and characterize that rage as the jealousy of the have-nots is an enduring example of the ideological process that the model minority thesis critiques.[5] This ideological analysis of the function of Asian Americans in the race-class schema of American life differs, of course, from the subjective perspective of many Asian Americans who may indeed see themselves as a model minority from the perspective of the dominant class—in other words, accepting the positive attributes of the model minority while rejecting the ideological critique. These Asian Americans, who for want of a better term may be called neoconservatives, do not see themselves as existing in a state of false consciousness, as a class that is not aware of itself as a class, which is arguably the way proponents of the model minority thesis might see them. Asian American neoconservatives are, as Glenn Omatsu aptly labels them, "strange and new political animals" with whom mainstream Asian American intellectuals have difficulty reconciling themselves (42). To complicate matters further, even as Asian American neoconservatives disagree with much of mainstream Asian American intellectual leadership on political and economic issues, they do not necessarily accept the label thrust upon them as being insensitive to the racial and class dynamics of American society and the problems of economic and social inequity that hinder the attainment of a harmonious American pluralism.[6]

There is ambivalence and conflict, therefore, at the heart of the model minority's representation, disagreements over how to interpret the success Asian Americans have seemed to attain in the years since the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act. This ambivalence and conflict over the success of Asian Americans permeates the literature of Asian Americans, especially the literature that is most visible on the general landscape of American culture. While few Asian American writers demonstrate the enthusiasm for the conception of Asian Americans as a model minority that is found in its most naked terms in publications such as the *U.S. News & World Report* article, many writers take some of the model minority's aspects for granted as the formal foundation of their literature. "Success," for example, is one of the basic building blocks of mainstream Asian American literature, "mainstream" being defined as that which is most likely to be read by non-

Asian American readers and critics. The idea that first-generation Asian Americans sacrifice for their children and that these children are more assimilated and economically better off than their parents is almost universal in this type of literature—not necessarily as part of an argument the authors wish to explicitly advance but as a part of the cultural background and assumption against which the primary action takes place. The most notable type of primary action that is produced from this background is that of generational conflict and cultural difference, which, as Lisa Lowe argues, have become key signifiers of Asian American literature (*Immigrant Acts* 60–83). "Success" is certainly the most visible evidence of the conjuncture between the model minority and the American Dream, and just as the American Dream has generated a wide degree of ambivalence in American cultural productions, so has the model minority generated ambivalence in Asian American cultural productions. The key themes of the model minority—self-reliance versus government assistance, self-sacrifice versus self-interest, and quiet restraint versus vocal complaint in the face of perceived or actual injustice—can all be found in the mainstream literature as moments of conflict for the central characters.

David Palumbo-Liu cites *The Woman Warrior* and *The Joy Luck Club* as two texts that embody what he calls model minority discourse. This discourse is "an ideological construct not coextensive with the texts themselves, but rather a mode of apprehending, decoding, recoding, and producing Asian American narratives" (Palumbo-Liu 396).[7] Even if model minority discourse is not coextensive with the texts themselves, Palumbo-Liu goes on to show that as a matter of fact model minority discourse can be read from the texts and not simply from the popular and academic critical discourse that is wedded to the texts, given that the authors presumably are a part of "apprehending, decoding, recoding and producing" not only Asian American narratives but also the model minority narrative itself. Palumbo-Liu's conception of model minority discourse expands upon the ideological critique found in the model minority thesis. For Palumbo-Liu, this discourse is a mode of healing, and the injury in question is the damage done to minorities by the nation through racism and cultural (in)difference. These injuries are manifest in the dilemmas of racial and cultural identity that the protagonists find themselves enmeshed in, and the healing or resolution undertaken is inevitably individual and psychological: "The logic of model minority discourse argues that an inward adjustment is necessary for the suture of the ethnic subject into an optimal position within the dominant culture" (397). Therefore, "the pedagogical function of model minority discourse is its most significant aspect" (408). Pedagogically, model minority discourse serves to instruct readers that the individual is the appropriate resource to draw upon for resolving the disjuncture the individual may feel between his or her personal identity and the identity of the nation. The conception of individualism that is so important to standard narratives of the American nation is thus reaffirmed through model minority discourse, which absolves the nation of its responsibility for the individual's fate.

The fact that the discourse is a mode of interpretation on the part of both authors and readers is critical to stress, for by doing so we can see the assumptions that underlie the discourse. Possibly the most basic assumption is the one that Palumbo-Liu identifies as the reified identity crisis (413), or the assumption that all Asian Americans actually do suffer from a cultural damage that needs to be healed. This crisis ironically stems from the excess of success mentioned earlier, a success that seems to sever or damage human relations, resulting in the fetishization of material objects as compensation (this is *reification*); identity itself, however, can also become one such object, as can a crisis of identity. Many works of Asian American literature center upon this identity crisis, and within the literary market the identity crisis in one of the major features with which Asian American literature is identified and then marketed. The identity crisis is resolved and one is healed not only for an optimal cultural position but also for an optimal economic position within American society. Both of these positions are based upon the primary role of the individual over the communal or familial or at best in negotiation with the communal or familial. Thus Palumbo-Liu argues that in *The Woman Warrior* problems for the narrator that are caused by sexism and racism (inflicted upon the body) are ultimately resolved not through politics but through an "interpersonal" resolution between mother and daughter at the book's conclusion (404).[8]

The case of Asian American literature as a whole demonstrates that model minority discourse, while producing the type of docile and privatized narrative of Americanization described by Palumbo-Liu, also produces a benefit in the canonization or inclusion of Asian American literature in the American culture pantheon. Ultimately, the model minority in literature shares a similar function to the model minority in American society generally: it serves as a model of panethnic entrepreneurship, selling American society on the value of Asian Americans. I do not mean that these valued texts are not critical of American society, but they are not critical to the extent that they question the ultimate validity of American pluralism and inclusion; indeed, their very criticism of American society is taken positively by non-Asian American critics, as a necessary corrective. Hence, the combination of criticism and consensus to pluralism constitutes the flexible strategy of these particular authors. While canonization itself may be a problematic term or event, entailing, possibly, a submission on the part of artists and critics toward a dominant set of literary and cultural values, it also may entail a contestation of those literary and cultural values through the inclusion of heretofore excluded participants. The standard critique of canonization in this regard is to point to multiculturalism as an example of how the inclusion of culturally representative texts or authors does not necessarily change the social and economic conditions of those they represent or are chosen to represent by cultural arbiters.[9] Nevertheless, canonization and contestation are dialectically related forces, operating perhaps unevenly but nevertheless in tandem, as the discourse of the bad subject also demonstrates.

THE DISCOURSE OF THE BAD SUBJECT

The discourse of the bad subject, like model minority discourse, is a method of creating political meaning that concerns the place of Asian Americans in American society; the creation of such meaning is both enabling and disabling, as it is for model minority discourse. While model minority discourse allows for the inclusion of Asian Americans in American society at the cost of concessions to the legitimacy of American pluralism, the discourse of the bad subject allows for opposition to the hegemony of pluralism and capitalism at the cost of an inability to meaningfully recognize ideologically contradictory Asian Americans. The result of such a refusal is the failure of Asian American intellectuals to confront the inevitable idealization of Asian American identity in late capitalism, the gradual slide from a politically necessary strategic essentialism to a co-opted and commodified essentialism as the dominant, if not sole, form of Asian American identity, which in the end limits the degree of opposition to pluralism and capitalism that the discourse of the bad subject wishes to promote. In addition, the discourse of the bad subject has yet another ironic consequence, namely, the fact that it is also an ideological discourse that practices interpellation, not only hailing those it identifies as Asian Americans—who may think of themselves otherwise—but also hailing them to behave in particular ways as Asian Americans. Thus Asian American intellectuals who see themselves as bad subjects that resist dominant society's interpellation into a race- and class-stratified society may also seek to interpellate others.

Cynthia Kadohata's *In the Heart of the Valley of Love* offers an unambiguous example of the discourse of the bad subject. Set in Los Angeles in the year 2050, *In the Heart of the Valley of Love* presents a dystopian vision of the United States that is more of an exaggeration of contemporary affairs rather than a complete departure. In this new world, the United States is 64 percent nonwhite or poor white, a population who only make 20 percent of the legal purchases (Kadohata 33). The United States is also a police state in which being a petty criminal is almost a necessity, given that while the shortage of resources has driven most people to the black market, that market is illegal. Resources are so scarce that water is rationed, while the police state is so pervasive that extensive prisons have been built in the California desert and "disappearances" have become common. In Los Angeles, there is not only racial division between whites and nonwhites but also class division between the "richtown" of Beverly Hills/Brentwood and everyone else. Political apathy among voters is extremely high, while class riots are commonplace, and violence is endemic. The narrator, a community-college student named Francie, is Japanese, Chinese, and black, embodying the novel's conception of nonwhite identity as being a mélange of different ethnic and racial backgrounds. The fact that being nonwhite is also essentially being symbolically "black" or oppressed in terms of race and class and potentially a member of those politically opposed to the richtowns and whites is represented in the novel through the "black pearls" that have become a widespread skin disease. Francie compares the "lovely, black, shining pearls" (Kadohata 10) that grow underneath one's skin to acne, essentially harmless but "profoundly disturbing" (12). The black pearls are a marker of poverty and exclusion, of the inability to fight off the contamination of the earth and the destruction of its resources; they mark the bodies of the nonwhite as political, as different, as poor and marginalized. At the same time, the fact that there is nevertheless something lovely and valuable about the pearls demonstrates their contradictory meaning for Francie and the other outcasts, that the pearls can be reclaimed or resignified with resistant political meaning, in the same way that black skin was reclaimed and resignified during the 1960s.

Francie's recognition that being nonwhite and poor (synonymous in the text) is a political condition—that there is, in fact, a body politic composed of the excluded, who are physically marked through the black pearls—is demonstrated when she and her fellow college journalists meet with richtown journalists:

> They would tell us about what would happen if we ever made it in the real world. But what made one world real and another not? We didn't always want to be us, but we never wanted to be them. That's what they didn't understand. It was starting to become clear to us, if it was not to them, that someday it would be our children and not theirs who would be inheriting the country, if there was a country left to inherit. (Kadohata 82)

In this passage, *In the Heart of the Valley of Love,* like *The Cry and the Dedication,* couches its critique of capitalism's distortion of human relations in the language of reality. Capitalism distorts the reality of human relationships through reification, although capitalism in the guise of the richtown journalists presents itself as the "real world" to the disenfranchised, those without property. *In the Heart of the Valley of Love* also shares a common theme with other dystopian visions, such as *Blade Runner,* in which class and race warfare intersects with the depredations of capitalism on the environment and on human bodies, but it is noticeably different in its adoption of the "other" perspective, namely, of those black and blackened. Although blackness is often associated with criminality in the American imagination (see chapter 3), this novel recasts the terms of legality and illegality by arguing that the police state creates criminality through a wide-ranging net of laws. "They like to have something on you," is how one character puts it (201). The political and racial climate that is the concern of the novel is clearly sketched and particular to the United States, providing a concrete environment for the novel's political concerns, but *In the Heart of the Valley of Love* tends to idealize those politics. This is most evident in the novel's division between a white richtown and a nonwhite/poor white remainder. While poor whites can be included in the disenfranchised mix, the privileged are depicted as purely white. The ambiguities of racial and class alignment are erased. Asian Americans, for example, are not mentioned as such (the category is never used) and instead cast as nonwhite and non-

rich, while contemporary experience would seem to point toward a future in which some Asian Americans will be included in categories of wealth and (possibly) whiteness.

Kadohata's novel demonstrates the basic irony found in the discourse of the bad subject, namely, that even as the discourse of the bad subject rejects the interpellative "hail" of dominant ideology that demands the subject conform to a particular identity, it also engages in a hailing or naming of its own. Kadohata's novel attempts to construct or name the Asian American as a particular kind of bad, resistant subject, allied with other people of color against a white, wealthy class that is synonymous with the state, and this gesture is clearly meant for the present, not for the future, even given the novel's fictionalized setting. The naming of the subject does not require the subject to even know that s/he is being named, as Judith Butler argues in her modification of Althusser's notion of interpellation (*Excitable Speech* 28–35).[10] According to Butler, the subject being named does not have to turn around and respond to the naming, agreeing with that name as his/her appropriate title. Indeed, "one may well imagine oneself in ways that are quite to the contrary of how one is socially constituted; one may, as it were, meet that socially constituted self by surprise, with alarm or pleasure, even with shock" (31). Asian American culture is replete with stories that detail the surprise, alarm, or shock that is experienced when we are hailed by dominant society as the Oriental or the outsider, and the discourse of the bad subject is designed to deal precisely with this type of naming. Asian American culture, however, finds it difficult to address those same emotions when it is the name of the Asian American that inspires them.[11] While those emotions can lead to an eventual acceptance of the name, they also may not, or they may result in ambivalence about such a name. More important, these emotions arise from a recognition that the one who names has a certain kind of power over the one being named. While Asian Americans may not think of themselves as possessing power, the discourse of the bad subject does enable the use of power, although not always in the direction of resistance that is intended. Butler goes on to argue that "if we concede that the one who speaks powerfully, who makes happen what she or he says, is enabled in his/her speech by first having been addressed and, hence, initiated into linguistic competence through the address, then it follows that the power of the speaking subject will always, to some degree, be derivative, that it will not have its source in the speaking subject" (32–33). The origins of the discourse of the bad subject in Asian American culture are complicated, but part of the discourse's derivation comes from its legitimation by the state. The unease one may experience upon first hearing oneself named as an Asian American does, then, have meaningful roots: that unease stems from both an implicit recognition of the history of racial formation and one's place in it and the implicit recognition that one is being subjected to another form of ideological hailing.

Theresa Cha's *Dictee* provides another example of the bad subject, at least in the case made for it by its companion volume of critical essays, *Writing Self, Writing Nation*, edited by Elaine Kim and Norma Alarcón. The relationship between these two texts constitutes an additional instance of the discourse of the bad subject in operation, although in ways more complicated than what we witness with *In the Heart of the Valley of Love*. In *Writing Self, Writing Nation*, *Dictee* is presented as a key text that expresses many of the fundamental ideological concerns of Asian American intellectuals through complex and challenging formal experimentation with narrative, poetry, and visual bricolage. For some, perhaps many, readers, *Dictee* is a confusing text, and unlike most of the texts considered in this book, *Dictee* does not seem to exhibit either a flexible strategy or panethnic entrepreneurship but instead seems singularly willful and inflexible in its refusal to accommodate its audience; not surprisingly, *Dictee*'s adherence to principle and its refusal of the literary market attract critics and readers with similarly rigorous standards of politics and aesthetics who find in the text an embodiment of the strategies and values that might form the basis of an ideal countercanon, seemingly untainted by the demands of the literary market and the corollary commodification of racial identity. Even as *Dictee* renounces flexibility and panethnic entrepreneurship, however, it demonstrates a great reluctance, unlike *In the Heart of the Valley of Love*, to become the object of another's hail, including the hail of the critics and the hail of the discourse of the bad subject, a refusal that may ironically, in its perversity or its writerliness, further incite the act of hailing.

To the extent that *Dictee* can be said to be "about" anything, it is about the personal and historical experiences that have shaped Koreans and Korean Americans since the period of Japanese colonization that commenced in the early twentieth century and continued through colonization's aftermath in the Cold War. Japanese colonialism was of course interested in making good subjects of Koreans, through various kinds of coercion, including the forcible education of Koreans in the Japanese language and the bestowal of Japanese names; this erasure of the Korean language, and hence Korean culture and identity, went hand in hand with the violent suppression of Korean resistance to Japanese colonization. Cha summarizes the violence that can be enacted through language through the phrase "broken tongue" (75), "crystallizing, in the ambiguous meaning of 'tongue' as both organ and language, the relationship between linguistic colonialism and the material violences of which language can be only a painfully descriptive index" (Lisa Lowe, "Unfaithful to the Original" 47). While Cha in one context is referring to the domination of Koreans by Japanese, she also takes a more radical step in her critique of domination in general through her experimentation with the reader's response to her text. For Cha, the learning of language and the process of reading a narrative (textual or visual) can be a form of ideological indoctrination. In *Dictee*, therefore, Cha disrupts the way the reader may accept language as simply an instrument or tool that provides access to some type of knowledge; in actuality, the language and the way that it is used shape our understanding of knowledge as well. Thus considerable parts of the text are used to force the

reader to reflect upon why language and narrative are being deployed in particular ways. In one passage, for example, the reader sees both a French paragraph and its translation into English; the translation is imperfect, however, since the grammatical directions given in French are translated literally, rather than rendered as punctuation marks (for example, "comma" versus ","). What is being criticized here is the submission a student of language makes to the process of dictation; the student is literally taking down words but is also submitting to a form of dictatorship manifested through the use of language as a tool.

The student who has taken down this dictation by writing "comma" versus "," is doing it literally, as Lisa Lowe points out, rather than figuratively (following the letter versus the spirit of translation), and in so doing is actually rebelling against the dictation, by not doing as she is supposed to, in one sense, but doing exactly as she is told to, in another sense ("Unfaithful to the Original" 38–42). Thus she is a bad subject, mimicking a good student but being subversive in actuality. *Dictee* is replete with examples of bad subjects, from the translation student, to Korean female martyrs, to Joan of Arc—bad subjects who are variously defined by dominant power but who exceed their definition. In a number of ways, then, *Dictee* foregrounds how the good subject is formed through ideology and how the bad subject rebels through a refusal to follow those types of ideological orders that are taken for granted by most. Good subjects internalize the nation, literally, as *Dictee* makes clear when it discusses the return of a Korean refugee to South Korea: "You leave you come back to the shell left empty all this time. To claim to reclaim, the space. Into the mouth the wound the entry is reverse and back each organ artery gland pace element, implanted, housed skin upon skin, membrane, vessel, waters, dams, ducts, canals, bridges" (57). The infrastructure of the nation as an allegory for the individual's body itself means that the individual and the nation are joined through a concept of the body politic, with the body-as-political, and with the political defined as a possession of the body. *Dictee* rejects this domination of the individual through national discourse and the discourses of religion, race, and patriarchy that it sees as related, and it enacts that rejection in its own relationship to the reader, challenging conventional modes of literary consumption.

Lowe argues that in resisting various forms of domination that seek to define identity in a singular fashion *Dictee* is engaged in a politics of difference, even as its commitment to exposing the history of Japanese colonization is dependent upon a politics of identity; "this dialectic between the politics of identity and the politics of difference is . . . of utmost importance, for it . . . engages with rather than suppresses heterogeneities of gender, class, sexuality, race and nation, yet [it is] also able to maintain end extend the forms of unity which make common struggle possible" ("Unfaithful to the Original" 63–64). The politics of difference, however, poses potential problems for the relationship between *Dictee* and *Writing Self, Writing Nation,* especially when it comes to the issue of difference as surplus or excess. As Shelley Wong puts it,

> In the colonial calculus that identifies Korean with Japanese, the "Korean" is surplus; in the racial calculus that identifies American as white, the "Korean" is surplus; in the patriarchal calculus that identifies Korean as male, the "Korean female" is surplus; and in the formal calculus that identifies a literary work with a discrete genre, *Dictee* is surplus. In *Dictee's* economy of translation, the Korean American feminine is invariably rendered as surplus, as that which goes unaccounted for. (122)

Likewise, the fluidity of identity that Elaine Kim and L. Hyun Yi Kang note as being one of the hallmark features of the text that attracts them to it is, in the end, a surplus that the critical and political calculus of *Writing Self, Writing Nation* finds difficult to account for.[12]

We see this problem of the surplus in the concluding chapters of *Dictee,* where the text follows through on its critique of how various ideologies and discourses attempt to dominate the individual by reverting to a highly personal, highly lyrical account of subjectivity and perception, rooted in the experiences of the reader and the viewer. The account involves explicit rejection of conventional narrative, summarized in this passage that speaks of an unnamed person: "She says to herself if she were able to write she could continue to live. Says to herself if she would write without ceasing. To herself if by writing she could abolish real time. She would live. If she could display it before her and become its voyeur" (Cha 141). "Real time" finds its analogue in narrative movement, and *Dictee* seeks to abolish both that time and movement through its narrative of pastiche and juxtaposition that forestalls progress. In another passage, a moviegoer watches a movie and "follows no progression in particular of the narrative but submits only to the timelessness created in her body"—a physical sensation that, presumably, the reader of the text also may experience as s/he is immersed in *Dictee's* lack of progression (Cha 149). From these two examples, we can see that one goal of *Dictee,* besides its ideological critique, seems to be the establishment of an almost utopian space where the reader/viewer can find pleasure in escaping from the conventional demands of narrative and from the constraints of ideology and discourse. This utopian space is associated with childhood, which can be seen in *Dictee's* last two narrative fragments, both focusing on young girls, as if the book is moving backward in a person's life, toward innocence. These fragments conclude with a child's view of the world. In the second-to-last passage, the child looks "through the paper screen door" and sees that "dusk had entered and a small candle was flickering" (170). The child's view of light and shadows through a paper screen bears a resemblance to a spectator's view of a film screen, a view focused on intensely through-out *Dictee.* For a text deeply concerned with the cinematic image, *Dictee's* decision to nearly conclude with this return to the child's relationship with the basic building blocks of film—light and movement—suggests that it may only be here, in this lost time, that the viewer can have an uncomplicated relationship with sight. This lack of complication is an illusion, however, as we see in the last passage when a child asks

her mother to hold her up to a window, where "there is no one inside the pane and the glass between" (179); at the same time as there is "no one" to obstruct her view of the world outside, that view is nevertheless being filtered by the glass, no matter how clear. As Kang puts it, "We perceive through layers" (95), although for the most part *Dictee* is concerned with opaque rather than transparent layers that throw one's own reflection back upon oneself, as Kim points out ("Poised on the In-between," 12).

The gesture toward a child's view of the world, whether conducted in sincerity or parody, and the general focus of the final third of *Dictee* on personal experience pose some challenges for the interpretation presented of *Dictee* in *Writing Self, Writing Nation* as a radical political text. While *Dictee* does offer a negative critique of ideology—in that sense offering a vision through the eyes of a bad subject—its own solution of a return to an innocent vision of the world does not correspond with the materialist, neo-Marxist approach favored in *Writing Self, Writing Nation*'s construction of the bad subject. The resistance to closure around issues of narrative and identity that the critics of *Writing Self, Writing Nation* note as a feature of *Dictee* also returns as a critical problem in the final, unnumbered page of *Dictee*. The page consists of two notes and acknowledgments for biographical material and calligraphy used in the text. The two notes are hardly adequate reference material for the wealth of allusions in the text and seem to be ultimately a mockery of the critical apparatus that they allude to. Providing us with marginal information that only partially explicates the text—and even then doing so only imprecisely, omitting publication dates for the citations and exact references to their relevance to *Dictee*'s own pages—the notes comically gesture at the critical desire for wholeness, for intellectual history and foundation.[13] *Dictee* in the end seems to distrust critics and their tools of exegesis, even as it obviously deploys some of those academic tools itself in order to excavate the history of Korean experiences. This distrust is symptomatic of the text's resistance to the various discourses it exposes and to ideological interpellation in general; the distrust is also a sign of how *Dictee* refuses to be part of the "textual coalition" between texts and critics that Sauling C. Wong argues is a feature of Asian American literature (*Reading Asian American Literature* 9). What does it mean, then, for critics to represent *Dictee* as enacting a particular political agenda that resonates with their own? Is the subversiveness of *Dictee* really a "theoretical construct," as Jinqi Ling claims (*Narrating Nationalisms* 9)? Instead of arguing for the (in)correctness of *Writing Self, Writing Nation*, I shall point instead to the resistance that *Dictee* poses to even sympathetic critics as an emblem for the relationship between Asian America and Asian American intellectuals. *Dictee* is premised upon a tension between its demonstration of a fluid subject and its own aesthetic inflexibility, its unwillingness to concede to the critic or to the market, to interpretation or consumption. This tension between fluidity and inflexibility is the emblem of the bad subject as it is constructed by Asian American intellectuals, yet it is that very same fluidity that constitutes an excess, and it is that very same inflexibility that resists interpretation and interpellation. Therefore, the relationship between *Dictee* and *Writing Self, Writing Nation* is an example of the discourse of the bad subject, built around signs of bad behavior that are at once the basis of the discourse and the limits of it. The subject who refuses to be hailed by dominant ideology can also refuse to be hailed by resistant ideology. It is that refusal that signals the limits of the discourse of the bad subject and the limits of Asian America.

THE LIMITS OF ASIAN AMERICA

I now turn to the novels of Lois-Ann Yamanaka and the controversies that surround them. The reception and location of production for Yamanaka's novels all pose challenges to Asian American cultural self-representation, and because the controversies around her work exceed the realm of literature and literary criticism, intruding into the entirety of Asian American studies and achieving national attention, an examination of her texts will be a fitting conclusion for this book and its concerns with the limits of Asian America. Yamanaka's novels, set in Hawai'i, seem to make as their implicit claim the validation of a culture that is relatively invisible to continental Americans, including Asian Americans.[14] Many Asian American intellectuals have considered Yamanaka's work to be part of Asian American literature, since the Association for Asian American Studies has recognized her work with its annual book awards, but many critics and writers of Hawaii's "local" literature insist that Hawaii's local culture, from which Yamanaka's work originates, is quite distinct form Asian American culture, due to the particular historical conditions that have shaped cultural formation.[15] It is arguable, therefore, that Yamanaka's works do not constitute Asian American literature at all. I read Yamanaka's works not so much as examples of Asian American literature but as examples of something that Asian American literary criticism has claimed as its own. Reading her work, then, helps illuminate Asian American studies' preoccupations and assumptions and the limits of a theoretical framework based on Asian America. By claiming the local literature of Hawai'i as Asian American literature, Asian American studies reveals the geographical, political, and cultural investments Asian America has made in a continental America with an imperialist history that continues to shape the present. Through these investments, Asian American studies feels safe to claim Yamanaka's novels and the culture they represent as Asian American, despite the fact that it may in doing so "operate unexpectedly in the service of American imperialism" (Fujikane, "Between Nationalisms" 24), reiterating American nationalism and the related historical amnesia that concerns imperialism and its effects. Within this context of Asian America's claim on local literature as Asian American, what we also witness is how Yamanaka's novels oppose the discourse of the bad subject in ways that are different from *Dictee*'s resistance. Yamanaka's novels willingly explore and perhaps embody the messiness of diversity

and heterogeneity, represented in this case through Hawaii's local culture, where panethnicity can break down into interethnic strife.

The history of local culture in Hawai'i demonstrates some of the similarities and differences with continental Asian America, as we shall see later. The development of local culture in Hawai'i is a direct result of U.S. colonization, which first manifested itself through the arrival of U.S. businessmen and missionaries in Hawai'i in the early 1800s. U.S. businessmen who were looking for economic opportunities in building sugar plantations gradually assumed more and more power in Hawai'i throughout the course of the nineteenth century, even as the power of the Hawaiian monarchy waned. Factors in the U.S. rise and the Hawaiian decline included the devastation of the Hawaiian population due to the introduction of Western diseases and the usurpation of Hawaiian land by U.S. businessmen through the introduction of Western concepts of land tenure. The clash of interests between U.S. businessmen and the Hawaiian monarchy culminated in an 1893 coup led by U.S. businessmen and supported by the U.S. military, which successfully overthrew the Hawaiian queen. Although President Cleveland refused to annex Hawai'i, his successor, President McKinley, did so in 1898. The Hawai'i of subsequent generations bore the mark of the coup, as a white oligarchy retained economic and political power in the territory, controlling a population composed of Native Hawaiians and emigrants who primarily came from East Asia and the Philippines as contract labor for the plantations.[16]

Starting in the early nineteenth century, sugar plantations in Hawai'i depended on the labor of Hawaiians, but the planters subsequently turned to imported labor from Asia, the Pacific, and even Europe. Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and Korean immigrants all came during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in successive ethnic waves. On the plantation, they found themselves facing both ethnic segregation among the labor force, whereby different Asian ethnic groups were separated from one another in order to prevent the cohesion of a potentially resistant workforce, and racial domination, whereby Americans and ethnic European immigrant laborers were able to rise to positions of influence on the plantation but not Asians (Takaki, *Pau Hana* 13–81). Eventually, however, the barriers of ethnic segregation broke down, partially through the development of panethnic labor strikes and partially through the development of common cultural connections such as Hawai'i Creole English, or pidgin, a hybrid language that incorporated both English and various other immigrant languages.[17] It is this population of people, primarily Asian, that forms a substantial portion of the population defined by residents of Hawai'i as "local," in relationship to haoles (whites) and Native Hawaiians (who may or may not also identify as local). Brenda Lee Kwon defines "local" as a label that "can be used to refer to anyone of Asian, Hawaiian, or other Pacific Islander descent, and usually designates those who have been in Hawai'i for more than one generation, although more politicized definitions call for a lineage that can be traced back to the plantation labor experience" (9). As Kwon implies, the category of

the local is not without its controversies over definition, with some questions as to whether haoles can ever become locals and whether "local" simply describes a state of residence or also a state of lineage and cultural consciousness; that is, locals are sometimes seen as being direct descendants of the primarily nonwhite class of plantation workers, a heritage that also implies some type of working-class consciousness.[18]

Local culture, in any event, finds its origins in the plantation system and U.S. colonization, which led to the importation of different populations who, despite the efforts of plantation owners, developed a unique and hybrid working-class culture that Jonathan Y. Okamura claims is the result of struggle ("Aloha Kanaka"). A refusal to recognize the historical struggle over the making of culture and the allocation of resources, Okamura argues, leads to the fact that Hawai'i "while loudly and proudly embracing its ethnic/racial diversity . . . has yet to confront its perverse social inequities" (204).[19] The idea that local culture is the result of struggle is a different conception from the popular one attached to Hawai'i on the continent, namely, that local culture is a multicultural mélange that can be celebrated as a further, innocent extension of the melting pot, as evidenced by the mixing of populations, the high proportion of nonwhites among the population, and the rise to power of local Asians in the political structure.[20] This image of Hawai'i is also perpetuated by some scholars and locals, particularly those of the middle-class local Asian elite dominated by local Japanese. Other residents and scholars of Hawai'i object to such an image. These critical scholars point to the fact that the multiculturalism of Hawai'i is no less problematic than the multiculturalism of the continent, whereby cultural diversity is not necessarily a signifier of economic and social equality.[21]

Continental perceptions of Hawai'i as a multicultural paradise, with the history of U.S. colonization and the continuing U.S. military presence in Hawai'i erased, have aided in the creation of a tourist economy that is central to Hawai'i.[22] Tourism, as the economic mainstay of Hawai'i since statehood in 1959, occupies a critical place in the culture and economy. Native Hawaiians and locals regard tourism with emotions that include acceptance, ambivalence, and outright rejection. On the one hand, many residents of Hawai'i are convinced that tourism is an inextricable part of the economy; on the other hand, many residents also recognize that tourism is responsible for damaging the environment, driving real estate values to astronomical heights, creating a service-oriented economy that limits job opportunities for residents, and perpetuating an idealistic image of Hawai'i that is at odds with the complexities of Hawaii's cultures. The commodification of Native Hawaiian and local culture through tourism is also a bone of contention for residents. The touristic, multicultural image of Hawai'i also obscures the fact that there is significant tension between locals and Native Hawaiians over the question of sovereignty and the history of colonial domination, with Native Hawaiian leaders arguing that locals, despite any past history of being dominated by the plantation system, are now themselves settlers who are complicit with colonialism (Trask, "Settlers of

Color"). Rejecting the legacy of colonialism, the controversial Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement seeks to reclaim land ceded by the United States to Native Hawaiians but still being used by the military, corporations, and federal and state governments (Trask, *From a Native Daughter*). Meanwhile, the rise to power of local Japanese in Hawai'i does not reflect the fact that some ethnic populations, notably Filipinos, Native Hawaiians, Samoans, and other recent immigrants to Hawai'i, have not had the same economic and political benefits.[23]

Asian Americans' claiming of local literature as a part of Asian American literature can therefore be a fraught act that reiterates unacknowledged assumptions about the relationship of the continental United States to Hawai'i, which include a disavowal of the colonization of Hawai'i and its perpetuation through tourism and the military as well as an unwitting reiteration of stereotypes that concern the idealized multiculturalism of Hawai'i. The relationship between the continental United States and Hawai'i is also characterized by continental cultural domination of Hawai'i, a recognition of which by local writers led to the development of local literature, catalyzed by the 1978 "Talk Story" conference. This local literature opposed itself to the representation of Hawai'i on the continent and in the dominant, white literary establishment in Hawai'i at the time. James Michener's *Hawaii*, released in 1959, the same year as Hawaii's statehood, came to symbolize both the literary establishment and the continental representation of Hawai'i. For many local writers, a self-consciously defined local literature was an act of cultural validation in the face of continental marginalization or dismissal of local culture, imposed continental standards of cultural worthiness, and reiterated stereotypes of Hawai'i as paradise. Since Asian Americans on the continent are not immune from perpetuating these continental representations of Hawai'i and its inhabitants, local literature in its emergence not only had to contest the image of Hawai'i as tourist paradise and the image of Hawai'i as provincial and inconsequential culturally but also had to face the potential problems of being misread or appropriated by Asian Americans.[24]

There are, then, significant political, economic, and cultural tensions in Hawai'i that are tied to the historically created differences among ethnic populations, due to the legacy of U.S. colonization, the plantation system, and the development of the tourist economy; these tensions coexist with the undeniable ethnic diversity of Hawai'i. Yamanaka's work shows both the reality of this diversity and its related tensions that fueled the controversy that concerned the representation of local Filipinos as sexual monsters and deviants in *Blu's Hanging*, as Filipinos and their supporters argued that Yamanaka was drawing from a historical well of anti-Filipino prejudice. These tensions contradicted the implicit panethnic multiculturalism that is a part of Hawaii's popular image and a part of some Asian American intellectuals' image of Asian America. Asian American intellectuals, who otherwise are inclined to critique the multiculturalism of American society, generally (although with notable exceptions) accept

the notion that Asian America is a multicultural alliance of different ethnic groups. This version of multiculturalism, like the national version, simultaneously recognizes and disavows the differences of power that may exist between different ethnic groups; in Asian America's case, these issues of power, manifesting themselves in discrimination and oppression between groups, are displaced onto dominant society's relationships with Asian Americans as a whole or onto Old World intranational Asian rivalries that are supposedly irrelevant to second-generation-and-beyond Asian Americans. Asian America is generally assumed by Asian American intellectuals to be oppressed *first* by dominant society, which is then a historical cause for any potential and seemingly misguided intraethnic Asian American discrimination. The local culture that Yamanaka depicts does not follow this model of oppression. Yamanaka represents the local community, in many of the most important events, as responsible for both the alienation and inclusion of its members. Thus while Yamanaka's works retain a historical memory of colonization and haole racism and recognize their consequences in such things as exploitative tourism and the destruction of self-esteem among locals, these works also demand a recognition of the community's ability to turn against itself. The community—and here I mean the local community as an allegory for the continental Asian American community—may not be amenable to the discourse of the bad subject, premised on an opposition to racism, discrimination, and exploitation, because it may practice these forms of oppression itself, contra the dictates of a political leadership that calls for unity and allegiance based on race. This is a lesson that Asian American intellectuals are still dealing with in the aftermath of the controversy around Yamanaka's work.

While the case of Uncle Paulo in *Blu's Hanging* will serve as my concluding point for investigating these claims, I will begin with more general assertions that concern Yamanaka's work as a whole. The issues of colonialism, tourism, cultural commodification, and the complexity and validity of local culture are all prominent in Yamanaka's trilogy of novels that deals with the lives of local Japanese families, in particular the lives of the young girls in these families. Viewed as a whole, the trilogy actually tells one story, given that the protagonists and their families are very similar, as are the difficulties concerning alienation and inclusion the protagonists endure. The trilogy is about narrators who do not fit into any environment easily—their families, their schools, their immediate neighborhoods, and continental American culture. By the trilogy's conclusion, these forms of alienation will be overcome; what is redeemed by the conclusion is not only the protagonist but also her local culture, which is both her home and her source of adolescent angst and perceived cultural inferiority. Thus even though the narrator of the last book, *Heads by Harry*, becomes a "good subject," that identification is defined in relationship to a unified local community, not to continental American culture. The ruptures and the fractures, the exploitation and the eventual redemption, are all ultimately centered on the bodies of children and animals, who are the most help-

less members of the local community and whose fates are ultimately a commentary upon the potential of unifying the body politic of that community.

In the first novel of the trilogy, *Wild Meat and the Billy Burgers*, the pubescent narrator Lovey Nariyoshi suffers from an inferiority complex that is partly racial (she "used to wish [she] looked just like" Shirley Temple (*Wild Meat* 3)), partly cultural (she is ashamed of speaking pidgin), and partly economic (she is ashamed of her family's poverty), all of which converge to form her personal alienation from the other children her age. The fact that Lovey is a poor local Japanese is significant, because as a whole, Japanese in Hawai'i are the predominant nonwhite ethnic group, economically and politically. Lovey's sense of alienation is due to a desire not only to be like haoles but also to be like other local Japanese, who all seem wealthier, prettier, and more stylish than herself. Yet Lovey's perspective on the world around her is clearly meant to be ironic, for if she believes that all her haole and Japanese friends and acquaintances are significantly better off than she, the narrative demonstrates otherwise. Some haole girls are shown to come from poor families and to be less popular than the local Japanese girls, although for Lovey it is a flat statement of truth that it is "just better to be haole" (28). Meanwhile, one of Lovey's Japanese nemeses, who belongs to the popular Japanese girls' club at school that Lovey characterizes as being "all so rich" (186), is poignantly described as coming from a working-class background (191, 195). Lovey can notice the details of the girl's life but does not understand their significance. This girl victimizes Lovey, but the reader is able to see that this victimization is an outcome of the girl's own sense of inferiority, displaced onto Lovey, who herself has previously repeated the cycle of adolescent cruelty by picking on a Filipina in order to displace the attention of other children onto the Filipina (14–15). Lovey's world of adolescent cruelty is mirrored in the world of animals, including pets, whose experiences become lessons in the cruelty of nature for Lovey—and by extension lessons in the cruelty of human nature. In one of the more disturbing scenes in the novel, Lovey's father takes away her pet female goat and gives her to the zoo, where Lovey sees male goats forcing sex upon her goat in an act that Lovey implicitly understands to be rape (163). For Lovey, the strange act of sex is one that involves violence and domination and one that is replete with horrible consequences, which is a belief reinforced when she spies on a teenage girl she idolizes having sex; later, the girl, pregnant, commits suicide.

This threatening world of sexual violation, which finds its corollary in the abuse of animals by humans and other animals, is continued in its representation with even greater ferocity in *Blu's Hanging*. As in *Wild Meat*, *Blu's Hanging* features an adolescent boy, in this case Blu, the narrator Ivah's younger brother, who is struggling with his (homo)sexuality. Blu in particular becomes the object of attention for various men of different ethnicities in the neighborhood who seek to expose themselves to him and molest him. Blu is complicit in his own molestation in many cases, if "complicit" can be used to describe someone who is clearly longing for ways to compensate for his own sense of individual inadequacy that arises from his sexuality and his family's poverty; his complicity in one act of molestation is bought by an old man, for example, with money and candy—a $100,000" bar (Yamanaka, *Blu's Hanging* 20). The environment of molestation and sexual danger is embodied most graphically in the twenty-year-old Uncle Paulo, who is part Japanese and part Filipino, and his nieces, who are also half-Japanese and whom Ivah describes as "human rats" (34) because of their sadistic behavior: they torture and kill the neighborhood cats and threaten Ivah's own pet cat. Uncle Paulo has sex with at least one of the older nieces, who in turn perform oral sex on Blu; ultimately, Uncle Paulo kidnaps Blu and rapes him, but Blu himself is ambivalent about the entire event, finding at least some pleasure in the sexual act (253). Yamanaka has defended herself from charges of racism in the portrayal of Uncle Paulo by arguing that her critics cannot distinguish her perspective from her characters'. Certainly the world as seen through Ivah's eyes, as it is through Lovey's, is a horrifying and threatening one, populated by monsters in human form. Uncle Paulo is not the only sexual villain in the novel, and the novel also makes it clear that his nieces are not innately evil, as Ivah understands, but corrupted by Uncle Paulo. The two younger nieces, for example, do not participate in the same cruel activities as their elders and are terrified of Uncle Paulo and the initiations that he seems to promise (149–150).

Yamanaka's argument that her novels are told through the adolescent perspective, which readers have to understand ironically, finds support in the third novel of her trilogy, *Heads by Harry*, published in 1999 after the controversies about alleged anti-Filipino racism arose but presumably written before the controversies reached their height in 1998.[25] In *Heads by Harry*, the narrator Toni is a teenager who goes on to college and hence has a different understanding of the world and sexuality than the previous narrators, who can be seen as younger incarnations of herself. In *Heads by Harry*, the world is not as threatening as it once was, particularly in terms of sex, poverty, and ethnic difference. While Mindy Pennybacker reads this as a retreat on Yamanaka's part from confronting difficult issues, it can also be read as a maturation of an adolescent perspective that is no longer as prone to see the world in drastic terms. Again sexuality and animals are tied together in a thematic sequence of events that demonstrate the nature of Toni's perspective on the world. Unlike Lovey and Ivah, Toni does not see sex as threatening, insomuch as she sees it as something pleasurable, if still confusing. In notable contrast to *Blu's Hanging*, Toni's significant sexual encounters are with Filipino brothers. In addition, her most memorable, and secret, encounter involves both brothers simultaneously. The novel implies that sex is not an experience whose unruliness must be disciplined by bourgeois constrictions but one that should be embraced or at least accepted; what bourgeois society or small children like Ivah and Lovey may consider monstrous is at the most disruptive and kinky in the local neighborhood, once the secret is revealed. The ethnic differences and tensions between Filipinos and Japanese, magnified in *Blu's Hanging* and certainly a reality in the

local society, is ameliorated by the relationship between Toni and the Filipino brothers and the deep friendship between Toni's father and the brothers' father. Meanwhile, animals, whose natural behavior and whose exploitation by human beings became symbolic of the Darwinist nature of the world for Ivah and Lovey, become symbolic of creation and art in *Heads by Harry* through the profession of Toni's father, Harry, who is a taxidermist (hence the title of the novel). As Pennybacker argues, the novel explicitly compares the taxidermist's re-creation of animal life to the artist's re-creation of life in her work. Thus the world of animals—especially hurt animals—that is so threatening in the first two novels is redeemed in the end though the artistic process in *Heads by Harry*. The last image in *Heads by Harry* is of the return of Toni to her local community, the place where she finally feels at home. While *Wild Meat and the Billy Burgers* and *Blu's Hanging* also offer closure for the narrators as they come to some sense of reconciliation with their identity and place in society, *Heads by Harry* is the only novel of the trilogy to also paint a more positive portrait of the environment, the local culture in which the narrator lives. At the same time, then, as the narrator is brought home, the novel affirms local culture.

The issue of local culture in particular, and the concept of community in general, is fundamental to Yamanaka's works, and the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion that drives the thematics of her novels is pinned upon the representation of bodies. The affirmation of a local identity is ultimately accomplished through a reconciliation of the narrator's own bodily concerns with her ability to represent the bodies of others. This nexus of bodily identification and representation is also at the heart of the controversial reception of *Blu's Hanging* and the obvious case of Uncle Paulo and Blu. In looking more closely at Uncle Paulo and his relationship to the community around him, especially Ivah's family, we can trace a chain of events *routed through the body* that implicate the community in what eventually happens to Blu. The original sin of the community, in the history of the novel, is the exile of Ivah's parents during their childhood, an act occasioned by their contraction of leprosy. Their diseased bodies are excised from the healthy bodies of their family and their community, and they are never welcomed back. Ivah's mother is so stricken by her abandonment that she swears she will never leave her own children and subsequently, fearing that her leprosy may return and again force her own removal, consumes over the course of her lifetime a dangerous amount of a drug designed to stave off leprosy. It is this drug that eventually and ironically kills her. The death of Ivah's mother leads to the emotional and physical withdrawal of Ivah's father from his children, leaving them essentially defenseless in the face of Uncle Paulo's assault. Ivah's sense of alienation from her community is thus not simply in her imagination or produced from the cruelties of adolescence but also a direct function of the community's exclusion of her parents. While Uncle Paulo's monstrousness remains inexplicable, the opportunity for him to molest and rape is provided by a breakdown in the community's body politic—the social relations

that bind all members together. This breakdown commences with the exile of Ivah's parents due to their leprosy and continues in the neglect of Ivah and her siblings by their peers, their father, and their neighbors. The social relations of the body politic are ruptured by the fear of otherness and contamination symbolized in the disease of leprosy and reenacted continuously through various cruelties, major and minor, that the local children commit upon one another.

Yamanaka's work and its reception demonstrate the complex and contradictory ways that power works, blurring the lines between "good" and "bad," the insider and the outsider, the model minority and the bad subject. Even as Yamanaka's novels affirms local culture, for example, they repeat the colonization of Native Hawaiians by erasing their presence, as Pennybacker points out:

> Though Hawaiian myths, artifacts, place names and ghosts fill the threatened landscape, there aren't any living Native Hawaiians among Yamanaka's main characters. But the Big Island and Molokai, where her novels are set, have relatively large populations of Kanaka Maoli. Instead, their culture is appropriated as a sentimental, beautiful backdrop, like the forest itself, indigenous but nearly extinct.

Pennybacker's comment points to an ongoing dilemma for local residents of Hawai'i, constituted by the history of colonization, the theft of land from Native Hawaiians, and the accusations by Native Hawaiian leaders that locals, even if they are not white and have a history of being oppressed themselves, are nevertheless settlers (Trask, *From a Native Daughter* 79). Thus locals, who may imagine themselves as participating in some kind of "oppositional regionalism," as Rob Wilson calls it, or at least may imagine themselves as being descendants of and proponents for the disenfranchised and the marginalized, find that they are being targeted as participants in oppression (129).[26] Addressing the same problem, Jeff Chang argues that "local knowledges are split, sometimes mimicking and other times resisting colonial narratives" (3), a phenomenon clearly visible in Yamanaka's work.

The ruptures and fractures in the local community and the greater society of Hawai'i and the methods of resolving those ruptures and fractures serve as analogous examples for continental Asian Americans as they consider their own practice of community. The fact that Hawaii's local community derives largely from Asian populations helps to advance this analogy, although there are clear and significant historical differences in the formation and practices of the local and the Asian American communities. The most useful analogy to be drawn from Yamanaka's work, detailing the limits of Asian America, would concern the panethnic possibilities and limits of an Asian American community, especially as it has arisen to a position of demographic prominence and all that this possibly entails in terms of economic, cultural, and political power. Yamanaka's novels send a mixed message about the possibilities of a pan-Asian population, because even as they suggest that individuals and communities can "grow up" or evolve beyond prejudices, the world of terror is nev-

ertheless reproduced anew for every generation.[27] It is this adolescent world of children misbehaving and terrorizing one another, of people who do not subscribe to the doctrines of ethnic equality and respect, that presents critical problems for Asian America and its hopes of panethnic unity. Asian American intellectuals, who have prided themselves on their alignment with America's bad subjects, must contend with those who are not "hailed" by the discourse of Asian America as the bad subject, who do not respond to the call that they are Asian American, or at least do not respond in the way desired. As Asian America grows larger and more complex in every way imaginable, as they become a significant minority in a society of minorities in the twenty-first century, it will become increasingly more difficult for a "mature" Asian American political and cultural leadership to maintain a cohesive ideology about what constitutes Asian American subjectivity.

It may, indeed, be impossible to even entertain the idea of an Asian American subject that has any significant political meaning in a postmulticultural society, that is to say, a society in which the importance of multiculturalism is no longer a political issue but simply a fact of American life. To the extent that an Asian American political subject exists today, it is premised upon the idea of Asian Americans as a "race" who must struggle against oppression, which is clearly a contemporary social construction born out of a posture of political self-defense on the part of people of Asian descent in the United States. If multiculturalism eliminates the power of racial identity as a political bond in this sense, given that multiculturalism ostensibly creates a racially equal society, then an Asian American racial identity itself will have no clear ideological orientation, since the struggle for racial and cultural *validation*—versus a more complicated notion of socioeconomic equality—will no longer exist. Certainly race will continue to matter, since it is embedded in relations of class and economic difference, privilege, and exploitation that will remain into a multicultural future, but it will be increasingly difficult to convince Asian Americans *as a whole* that their common political interests involve anything more than their own immediate racial self-interest. The specter of Pres. George W. Bush nominating the ideologically conservative Elaine Chao for a cabinet position and having that nomination endorsed by progressive groups such as the Organization of Chinese Americans is indicative of the future of Asian America where for many race itself, rather than certain kinds of goals or practices, becomes politics. In that scenario, the picture that Yamanaka paints of intra-Asian rivalries—rivalries that are resolutely domestic and not a function of the Old World—may very well characterize a contradictory set of Asian American intrarelations. Once Asian Americans take their common racial identity for granted and evacuate it of any substantive political meaning, that is to say, any ideological orientation except the orientation toward race as identity, Asian American populations will be free to fracture around more concrete political and economic interests.

BEYOND ASIAN AMERICA

Given that Asian America has claimed Hawaii's literary products for itself through the rhetoric of racial formation that extends continental assumptions to Hawai'i because it is a part of the nation, I have taken the opportunity to read Yamanaka's works because of their significance within Asian American culture. At the same time, I read her works not as Asian American literature but as a counterexample, an analogy, and a parallel, in order to demonstrate how Asian America is divided, often against itself. The lesson we can draw from Yamanaka's work about local culture is that the practice of Asian American communities and their politics can run counter to idealized visions of Asian American consensus, which demands a recognition that an Asian American political identity may be most clearly articulated in defensive postures against racism, where being an Asian American has its most concrete meaning. Anti-Asian violence and discrimination creates Asian American consensus as nothing else will. This is illustrated vividly in Steven Okazaki's pseudo-documentary film *American Sons*, which has four Asian American actors reenacting interviews done with Asian American men about their experiences with racism. The film concludes with the actors reading from newspaper articles that document anti-Asian hate crimes. Preceding the litany of hate crimes, which in itself constitutes a particularly important trope of Asian American cultural production, the actor Kelvin Han Yee, in the voice of his character, states:

> [Some] Asian Americans have forgotten about being Asian American. They've forgotten the sacrifices that their parents and grandparents made. They don't give back to the communities they came from. They've got their cars and their houses and their good jobs and they think they can create a comfort zone where racism doesn't affect them. They're living in denial! They read these newspaper stories and they think, well, that doesn't affect us. They read about some Southeast Asian kid who gets his head bashed in with a baseball bat, and they think, well, we're not Vietnamese. . . . You see, these Asian Americans who think they're safe, who think that all this Asian bashing and hatred and violence has nothing to do with them, they're not Asian Americans. They're something else. You see, to me, saying that you're an Asian American, that means something to me. It means you carry a sense of pride and solidarity when you say it. Don't give that up.

In this monologue, which echoes Mari Matsuda's argument that being Asian American is a conditional, political identity from which certain people can be excluded (177), many of the foundational elements of Asian American intellectual work and the discourse about Asian American identity are evident, including the call to historical memory, community commitment, coalitional alliances,

political resistance, and ideological homogeneity. The call, or the interpellation, is dependent upon the specter of anti-Asian violence, the seemingly inarguable mark that is used to distinguish the Asian American body politic from the rest of the American body politic. This reminder of violence works in more subtle ways as well, circulating through the everyday ways that I, for example, and possibly many others structure a course syllabus on Asian American studies: punctuated by the history of anti-Asian violence and discrimination and shaped by a "sense of pride and solidarity" in the formation of Asian American communities and identities, the syllabus and the teaching is implicitly, if not always explicitly, an exercise in interpellation, in the education and making of future Asian Americans.

If classrooms and universities are some of the spaces where the underlying theories of Asian American intellectuals are exercised in practice, they are also spaces where we may see these theories falter as they run up against those types of recalcitrant Asian Americans—or non-Asian Americans, as the case may be—of whom Kelvin Han Yee's character and Mari Matsuda speak. Yen Le Espiritu argues that even though Asian America was born from a protective reaction against racism, as ethnic groups cohered for political survival, Asian America "may outlive the circumstances and interests that produced it/creating conditions that sustain and revivify it" (*Asian American Panethnicity* 164). Perhaps it is these recalcitrant Asian Americans who do not take Asian American studies classes, for example, who will constitute the new other and the mirror to our contemporary Asian American self and who will help to create different conditions for demographically defined, rather than self-identified, Asian American communities to grow and change in unpredictable ways. It has been my argument that these new conditions of sustenance and what they produce may very well run counter to the ideological beliefs of many Asian American intellectuals, who are deeply invested in the analysis of the original circumstances and interests of their own production, which are essentially the dialectic between the racist, capitalist exploitation of Asian Americans and the resistance they have posed against such exploitation. In these new conditions, many Asian Americans may see themselves as equal participants and beneficiaries in a global capitalism that many Asian American intellectuals view with despair. What may be worse for Asian American intellectuals than fractures within Asian America, however, is the ironic prospect that there can still be a relatively unified Asian America that will operate under a different set of signs from antiracism and anticapitalism. Thus when Espiritu warns in 1992 that "without shared worldviews, collective modes of interpretation, and common class interests, the prospects of a viable pan-Asian ethnicity appear bleak" (*Asian American Panethnicity* 173), she may not be taking into account that global capitalism may very well provide that shared worldview, collective mode of interpretation, and common class interest for many—perhaps a majority of—Asian Americans. Whether this group constitutes a viable pan-Asian ethnicity or is the only voice for Asian Americans, they may nevertheless contest the leadership of

Asian America and the definition of Asian Americans as a political, cultural, and economic interest group in the eyes of other Americans.

Asian American intellectuals are beginning to worry about these future directions of Asian America. Patricia Chu, for example, asks: "When will Asian Americans write as assimilated subjects, and when we do, what will it mean to write as Asian Americans?" (189). My speculation is that once (some) Asian Americans write as assimilated subjects, their literature and their subjectivity will enter the realm of ethnicity rather than race; in this scenario, (some) Asian Americans may become white or become aligned with whiteness, in effect assuming a position as the "new Jews" who are "ethnic" rather than "racial," as Eric Liu argues in *The Accidental Asian* (145–174). These two options of becoming white or becoming aligned with whiteness are not exactly identical. In both options, Asian Americans become ethnic rather than racial, but in the first option whiteness is not redefined; it retains its identity as the powerful, dominant ethnic/racial identification and category in the United States into which other groups must assimilate. In the second option, whiteness is forced to change, losing some of its dominance and allying itself with other, competing ethnic groups with whom it must share power. The possibility that, in either option, (some) Asian Americans may become an ethnic group that either assimilates into whiteness or transforms whiteness by becoming its ally is objectionable to mainstream Asian American intellectuals, whose discourse of the bad subject is predicated upon the insistence of a fundamental racial difference from whites. While this racial difference is (of course) articulated by Asian American intellectuals as a social and historical construction, it is also nevertheless quite often construed, implicitly, as an essential—and not a strategically essential—difference.

One example that illustrates my claim about an implied reliance upon essentialism is Ronald Takaki's argument with the neoconservative intellectual Nathan Glazer that concerned the possibilities of minority assimilation. Glazer, in an article originally published in 1975, compares the situation of blacks, Chinese, and Irish from the nineteenth century until the present and argues that if the Irish, once characterized by American society as "white negroes," can overcome hurdles of discrimination and become a part of the white mainstream and if the Chinese by the 1970s have almost done the same, then so can blacks, if they learn to rely on themselves rather than on government assistance, which was never proffered to the Irish or the Chinese (1994). Takaki claims that Glazer's argument blurs the line between race and ethnicity, implicitly positing that Chinese, Irish, and blacks are equivalent ethnic groups ("Reflections on Racial Patterns"). In reality, Takaki argues, an overarching racial difference separates the Irish, as white, from the Chinese and blacks, as nonwhite; the eventual success of the Irish is partially predicated upon their whiteness and the opportunities this affords. Takaki's argument about the subordinate nature of ethnicity under race is fundamental for Asian American intellectuals, but it is based upon a tautology: the Irish can become white because they look white,

and the Chinese cannot become white because they do not look white. Yet historical evidence demonstrates that in the nineteenth century the Irish *did not look white*, at least to other European Americans who had already claimed the mantle of whiteness.[28] If the Irish can become white, when they were seen by others as black, or at least nonwhite, then what is to prevent any other nonwhite group from doing the same? The situation of the Irish demonstrates that race is not inherently visible through physical characteristics such as skin color, hair texture, and eye and nose shape, but that race is instead something that we learn to see. Robyn Wiegman's question about the visibility of race is worth quoting here: does the "fact of blackness" (or any other color) "lie in the body and its epidermis or in the cultural training that quite literally teaches the eye not only how but what to see?" (22).

Against Wiegman's question, the discourse of the bad subject implicitly assumes that Asian Americans simply do not look white, cannot look white, and therefore can never be white, a set of assumptions produced from a history of cultural training in regard to how we see race. My point in demonstrating this assumed (and denied) essentialism on the part of many Asian American intellectuals is not, in the end, to argue that my speculations about (some) Asian Americans becoming white or becoming aligned with whiteness will come true. Rather, it is to argue that the meanings and perceptions of race are dynamic and unpredictable and that the discourse of the bad subject is, in many ways, not prepared to address the possibility of changes in racial identity and perception that are antithetical to its own assumptions. Of course, one of the basic assumptions of the discourse of the bad subject is that the establishment and maintenance of an Asian American subjectivity as a resistant identity is a good thing, yet as David Li argues, there is a paradox in such efforts: a "definitive Asian American culture would be premature at this point. If there were, there would also have been a complete resolution of the American democratic contradiction, and accordingly, the expiration of 'Asian America(n)'s categorical and historical functions" (16). Li suggests that a *definitive* Asian American culture can exist only—and ironically—when the *need* for such a culture has expired. Hence, a definitive Asian American culture implies the transformation of Asian Americans from a racial group predicated upon the need for political defensiveness to an ethnic group predicated upon a successfully completed assimilation into American pluralism—a complete transformation, in other words, of the very nature of the Asian American body politic.

At the present moment, such a formulation of Asian Americans—as an ethnic group—would be inaccurate and is indeed anathema to most Asian American intellectuals who are convinced that Asian Americans are racially different from whites (and rightfully so, in the contemporary context). The work of Asian American intellectuals is dependent, to some extent, upon the continuing validity of such a characterization and the endurance of the conditions that mark Asian Americans as being racially different. Practitioners of Asian American culture and politics, as they strive to create a space for Asian Americans in the American nation, must then ask themselves to what end that space—Asian America—is created. Disagreements over the meaning of that space among academics, artists, activists, and panethnic entrepreneurs, split over the priority of multiculturalism as the definition for that space or conflicting notions of social and economic justice, will serve to dilute the usefulness of Asian America in the future. Ironically, this dilution comes about even as it seems inevitable that Asian Americans will become more influential in the nation's economy and, we hope, in its culture and politics as well. In these circumstances, when prosperity and inclusiveness for *some* Asian Americans blunt the power of Asian American leadership to maintain a political cohesiveness, Asian America itself as a category will be thrown into crisis, if it is not already in one. We can only hope that crisis will force Asian American intellectuals to determine new strategies that are not completely or finally dependent upon racial identity as a vehicle of long-term social change. As Deepika Bahri argues, the "performance of categorical identity for strategic political purposes may indeed be unavoidable but cannot be the goal for the long term. Even as we use these categories to combat the problems of the moment, we cannot ignore the reification that is inherent in their deployment" (41).[29] The space of racial identity itself will no longer serve as a place for consensus, which has significant ramifications for Asian American intellectuals who have proceeded on the tacit assumption that, regardless of ethnic and other diversities, Asian America at least had ideological common ground. While Asian America will undoubtedly have political uses in the future, it will have to serve an ideologically diverse constituency, and Asian America as a result will continue to see a polarization between those Asian Americans who perceive themselves and are perceived as the model minority, the inheritors of the American Dream, and those who perceive themselves and are perceived as bad subjects. It is doubtful that Asian America as a category, a space, or an identity will be adequate in addressing the needs and desires of those "bad subjects" in a future after multiculturalism.

by unlikely coincidences that are central to determining that the plot ends up where it should (as in the case of *All That Heaven Allows*, where Ron's timely accident brings Carey to his side).

24. For the relevance of melodrama to an examination of bourgeois family life under capitalism, see Kleinhans.

25. See Schirmer and Shalom for accounts of American racism and atrocities in the Philippines and for statistics on casualty figures. See Kaplan and Pease, especially their respective introductions, for excellent arguments on integrating an anti-imperialist awareness into literary and historical approaches to U.S. culture.

26. For a negative account of pluralism in American studies, see Rogin (272–300). For pluralistic approaches to American literature and history, see Bercovitch and Sollors.

27. This model of the exile comes under attack in San Juan ("In Search of Filipino Writing" 224–225), for what he considers to be its homogenization of diverse diasporic populations with radically different economic possibilities and its romanticization of the privileged aesthetic exile. While San Juan's warnings about homogenization and romanticization are well heeded, Campomanes's model may still very well apply for my purposes in considering writers like Hagedorn and Rosca, who are clearly part of a privileged exilic elite.

Conclusion

1. As I have sought to make clear in the introduction, this book is primarily concerned with the mainstream of the Asian American intellectual class, hence my addressing here a body of readers who are generally predisposed to these goals of social and economic justice. This concern does not overlook the fact that there is *some* ideological diversity in the intellectual class; rather, it recognizes that a *self-identified* Asian American intellectual class—distinct from a population of intellectuals *who happen to be Asian American but who may not recognize or value such an identification*—does, at the present moment, overwhelmingly share a basic consensus concerning the meaning of race and the value of certain kinds of political and intellectual work, which can be articulated around very broadly defined ideas of social and economic justice.

2. The article is reprinted in Amy Tachiki et al., eds., *Roots: An Asian American Reader* (1971).

3. Takaki discusses this use of Chinese laborers (*Strangers* 94–99).

4. Numerous Asian American scholars have written upon the model minority issue. These include Robert S. Chang (53–58), Neil Gotanda, Ruth Y. Hsu, Li (10), Robert G. Lee (180–204), Okihiro (*Margins and Mainstreams* 118–147), Glenn Omatsu, Keith Osajima, Palumbo-Liu (395–418), Natsu Taylor Saito, and Dooboo Shim.

5. The essays by Elaine Kim and Sumi Cho in the anthology *Reading Rodney King, Reading Urban Uprising* illustrate this analysis of the role played by Korean American merchants.

6. Anthony S. Wang is one of the few to have written positively on the topic of Asian American neoconservatism, besides the more well known pundit Arthur Hu, who came to prominence for helping to argue against affirmative action because of its supposed discrimination against Asian American students. Glenn Omatsu sketches a political portrait of Asian American neoconservatives (42–50) and argues that "the emergence of neo-conservatism in our community is a fascinating phenomenon, one we should analyze and appreciate" (42). Karen Su addresses the role of neoconservatism in relationship to Asian American literature.

7. In his articles "Model Minority Discourse" and "*China Man* Autoeroticism," Tomo Hattori also raises the notion of a model minority discourse that supplements Palumbo-Liu's claims about how the discourse is deployed to interpret and use cultural texts. Hattori argues that model minority discourse "constructs a shadow or parallel majority discourse so that a minor people can enjoy an ethnonationalism of their own" ("*China Man* Autoeroticism" 232); this discourse, which enables assimilation, is "shrewdly and mostly unconsciously camouflaged [by Asian American writers and critics] as opposition to and resistance against dominant culture" ("Model Minority Discourse" 233).

8. The sexism of Chinese patriarchy and the racism of American society are of course inflicted upon the bodies of Chinese men and women, illustrated most vividly in the back-tattooing episode from *The Woman Warrior* (discussed in chapter 3).

9. See Lisa Lowe (*Immigrant Acts*) and Chow.

10. I thank Rachel Lee for referring me to this work.

11. Eric Liu's aptly titled *The Accidental Asian* is probably the best account of how Asian American discourse can hail someone and transform him into an Asian American, almost against his will or intention.

12. Kim notes that "by focusing on the fluidity of the boundaries between inside and outside, sender and receiver, viewer and viewed, Cha insists upon a self that both extends and is contained, like the liquid that is referred to throughout the text" ("Poised on the In-between" 18). Kang describes *Dictee*'s project as a "sincere attempt to inscribe a very fluid and heterogeneous Korean feminist subjectivity" (98), a description that aptly encapsulates the political project of *Writing Self, Writing Nation* as it balances a recognition of heterogeneity with the practical demand of strategic essentialism.

13. The first note refers to F. A. McKenzie's *The Tragedy of Korea*, originally published in 1908 and reprinted in 1969. The book documents the Japanese occupation of Korea and is the source for several quotations in the chapter "History" in *Dictee*. The second note refers to *Story of a Soul: The Autobiography of St. Thérèse of Lisieux*, which provides the source of quotations in the chapter "Love Poetry." The autobiography also is the source of the black-and-white photograph at the beginning of "Love Poetry," which is an image of Saint Thérèse herself playing the role of Joan of Arc. The end of "Love Poetry" has another image of Joan of Arc, from Carl Dreyer's film *The Passion of Joan of Arc* (1928).

14. Following the convention of scholars on Hawai'i such as Brenda Lee Kwon, I use the term "continental" to describe what has habitually been called the mainland because, as they argue, the term "mainland" implies a marginalized stature for Hawai'i in relationship to the rest of the United States. Throughout this book, when I use the word "Hawai'i," I also use the 'okina, which "represents glottal stops in pronunciation" (Kwon 1); as Kwon also notes, the 'okina is not used in Anglicized words like "Hawaiian" and "Hawaii's."

15. For more on this argument, see Fujikane ("Between Nationalisms"), Kwon, Morales, and Sumida ("Sense of Place"). Rodney Morales claims that most writers affiliated with Bamboo Ridge Press, the predominant publisher of local literature, identify themselves as locals; he includes Yamanaka in this count of writers.

16. This brief summary of American colonization in Hawai'i is drawn from Haas ("A Brief History"), Takaki (*Pau Hana*), and Trask.

17. For more on the development and use of Hawai'i Creole English, see Bickerton, Jeff Chang, Fujikane ("Between Nationalisms"), and Sumida ("Postcolonialism").

18. Jonathan Y. Okamura ("Aloha Kanaka") and Stephen Sumida (*And the View from the Shore*) are other scholars who offer definitions and brief histories of local identity and formation.

19. Ironically, local identity, while serving historically to unify an ethnically diverse population against class and racial oppression, can also in the contemporary moment work to perpetuate the political and economic domination of locals over Native Hawaiians. See Fujikane ("Sweeping Racism") and Rosa for further elaborations on this point.

20. Michael Haas (introduction to *Multicultural History*) argues that despite ongoing socioeconomic problems, Hawai'i is characterized by a "harmonious multiculturalism" (xi), and F. James Davis cites extensive racial intermixing as evidence of racial and ethnic tolerance. For a survey of this multicultural approach to Hawai'i, see Jeff Chang.

21. Scholars who express this argument include Ibrahim G. Aoudé, Morales, and Okamura ("Social Stratification" and "Aloha Kanaka").

22. Haunani-Kay Trask (*From a Native Daughter*) and Rob Wilson both offer rigorous attacks upon these stereotypical representations and the actual damaging effects of tourism and the U.S. military presence.

23. The same scholars in note 21 demonstrate these political and economic inequities. Haas also alludes to these problems ("A Brief History").

24. The summary of the development of local literature and its mission is drawn from Fujikane ("Between Nationalisms"), Kwon, and Sumida (*And the View from the Shore*).

25. For an account of the controversies that surround Yamanaka's texts, see Candice Fujikane ("Sweeping Racism"), who also repudiates the validity of the argument that concerns Yamanaka's texts as ironic in their depiction of anti-Filipino racism.

26. Fujikane, Kwon, Morales, and Okamura are other scholars who also express concern over the internal fractures within local culture and the compromised place of locals in relationship to Native Hawaiians and the legacy of colonization.

27. As John P. Rosa points out, however, Yamanaka and other authors in Hawai'i are more concerned with panethnic relations among the wider diversity of populations in Hawai'i than they are with pan-Asian relations. The pan-Asian emphasis in this paragraph is due, of course, to the role in which Yamanaka's work is here cast as an analogy for continental Asian American intrarelations. Personal communication, February 15, 2001.

28. See Ignatiev and Roediger for accounts of the Irish transformation into whiteness.

29. Urvashi Vaid expresses similar sentiments when she argues that "ideology-based movements are more valuable than identity-based ones" (10). Vaid's excellent article concisely identifies the problems and limits of an Asian American coalition implicated with capitalism and identity politics. If Asian Americans think of themselves as part of a progressive coalition or movement, they must confront the fact that because of "the way [they] are structured—issue by issue, or identity by identity—social justice movements cannot boast the kind of ideological or political unity that is found on the conservative right" (13). Hence, the need to organize beyond identity if what we seek is more than visibility and empowerment.

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