The Right to Maim

Debility, Capacity, Disability

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"Will Not Let Die"

Debilitation and Inhuman Biopolitics in Palestine

> All this gnawing at the existence of the colonized tends
> to make of life something resembling an incomplete death.
>
> —FRANTZ FANON, *A Dying Colonialism*

A CATALOG OF SUFFERING

It is as yet unclear what the carnage in Gaza from the summer of 2014 will be known as, remembered as, or named. And it may remain unclear for quite some time.

The tally is in (though ever-evolving) after fifty-one days of Operation Protective Edge.

The United Nations reported that 2,131 Palestinians were killed during Israel's offensive, including 501 children; 70 percent were under the age of twelve. A total of 244 schools were shelled, and another was used as a military base by Israeli soldiers.[1]

The Ministry of Health in Gaza recorded 10,918 people injured, including 3,312 children and 2,120 women.[2]

The Palestinian human rights organization Al Mezan documented at least 10,589 houses damaged or destroyed, of which 2,715 were completely flattened.[3] (Later reports state 18,000 homes were destroyed, including high-rise apartment buildings.)[4] Eight hospitals (resulting in six being taken out of service), forty-six NGOs, fifty fishing boats, 161 mosques, and 244 vehicles were also hit. In September 2014, 80 percent of Gazan families had no means to feed themselves and were completely dependent on aid.[5] Amnesty International reported that at least thirteen health facilities and eighty-four schools were forced to close.[6]

Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières had difficulty reaching populations that needed assistance given the severity of the bombing, fuel shortages that grounded more than half of the ambulances, and depletion of supplies.[7] A number of hospitals were damaged, contravening the Geneva Convention, which considers civilian hospitals to be protected during wartime. Gaza City's el-Wafa Rehabilitation Center in Shijaiyah was targeted at least six times and has been severely damaged; its fifteen disabled and elderly patients finally managed to be evacuated.[8]

This is what is meant by the residents of Gaza being "under siege," a commonly used refrain that obscures much of this detail. I have resorted here to a somewhat polemical deployment of empirical information in part to counter this tendency to cloak the specifics of the occupation. Gaza is also claimed to be the most densely populated place on earth, and also the world's largest "open-air prison." Belying these tidy descriptions are what Allen Feldman calls the "new forms of imagery, discourse, war, security and state rights being carved out of the bent backs of Palestinian civilians."[9] Among the biopolitical aspects I have been tracking are the permeating relations between living and dying that complicate Michel Foucault's foundational mapping, in this case, the practice of deliberate maiming. I argue that the Israeli state manifests an *implicit* claim to the "right to maim" and debilitate Palestinian bodies and environments as a form of biopolitical control and as central to a scientifically authorized humanitarian economy. I further demonstrate the limitations of the idea of "collateral damage" that disarticulates the effects of warfare from the perpetration of violence. Finally, I note that the policy of maiming is a productive one, through the profitability of what I call a speculative rehabilitative economy.[10] This final chapter takes the biopolitics of debilitation to its furthest expanse, looking at how the population available for injury is capacitated for settler colonial

occupation through its explicit debilitation. It moves the argumentation about debilitation from the production of populations *available for injury* to the targeting of populations *to be injured.*

How is the practice of maiming manifested? Medical personnel in both Gaza and the West Bank report a notable "shoot to cripple" phenomenon. Dr. Rajai Abukhalil speaks of an increasing shift from "traditional means" such as tear gas and rubber-coated metal bullets used to "disperse" protests to "firing at protestors' knees, femurs, or aiming for their vital organs."[11] In Gaza, the Israeli Defense Forces used flechette shells. While these are not "expressly forbidden under international humanitarian law in all circumstances," nevertheless they are considered inappropriate for densely populated areas because they explode upon impact into thousands of tiny steel darts.[12] As a continuity and intensification of the practice of breaking the arms of stone throwers in the first intifada, shoot to cripple *attempts* to preemptively debilitate the resistant capacities of another intifada, the next intifada.

What is often claimed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as a "let live" praxis, understood in liberal terms as less violent than killing (and thus less sensational and more under the radar), shoot to cripple appears on the surface to be a humanitarian approach to warfare.[13] Another manifestation of this purported humanitarianism is the example of the "roof knock," a preliminary assault on structures to warn residents to evacuate, sometimes happening no less than sixty seconds before a full assault. Roof knocks were insufficient, however, when disabled Palestinians with mobility restrictions were unable to escape the bombardment of the Mubaret Philistine Care Home for Orphans and Handicapped in Gaza's Beit Lahiya district; three disabled residents died.[14] These were not mobile residents; the capacity of mobility circumscribes the utility of the roof knock, though the humanitarian intention of a sixty-second warning—a short, stingy temporal frame—is dubious.[15] Civilians in Gaza were also alerted to impending airstrikes through phone calls and texts, often misdirected to the wrongly targeted households. This purportedly humanitarian practice of warning Gazans of impending strikes with phone calls appears more like a "reminder of how powerless they are" given the control that Israel has over the telecommunication networks in the West Bank and Gaza.[16] As the research of Helga Tawil-Souri on "digital occupation" documents, telecommunication companies owned and operated by Palestinians are routed through servers in Israel.[17]

What happened in the summer of 2014 was preceded by much of the same during earlier periods. During the first intifada, the human rights organization Al-Haq produced a comprehensive report titled *Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations during the Palestinian Uprising: December 1987–December 1988*.[18] This document contains extensive evidence of both the intent and the effect of Israeli practices of injuring and maiming. Media accounts outline then defense minister Yitzhak Rabin's discussion of starting the use of plastic bullets "to increase the number of (wounded) among those who take part in violent activities but not to kill them."[19] "Violent activities" is the term most often used for political demonstrations or rock throwing. Statistics from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), reported by the *Jerusalem Post* on September 27, 1988, mark sharp increases in injuries after the introduction of plastic bullets.[20] Al-Haq's report includes affidavits from individuals describing incidents of arbitrary and unprovoked beatings unlinked to protest activity; cites the West Bank Database Project report of 1987 detailing the widening of the "opening of fire" from life-threatening situations to opening fire as part of deterrence, "shooting first at an 80-degree angle in the air, and then, with intent to injure, at the legs"; notes that the Israeli army radio confirms using "special bullets intended to injure while reducing the risk of killing"; follows debates in the *Jerusalem Post* about concern regarding the illegality of using certain bullets to increase injuries among Palestinian protesters; documents further reportage in the *Jerusalem Post* regarding the illegality of breaking someone's arm even if they had violated the law; notes the inappropriateness of high-velocity bullets and assault rifles with high muzzle velocity, which, as reported by *Haaretz*, causes the bullets to "spin around inside the victim's body, damaging the internal organs."[21] Al-Haq concludes: "The Israeli government's claims that its response to the uprising is a lawful one do not fit the facts. The assertion that the cases of illegality are mere exceptions to the rule cannot stand when seen against a wealth of documented examples showing savage behavior by the army on a regular basis."[22] As further evidence, Al-Haq cites the *Jerusalem Post* of November 30, 1988, which specifically reports that during the month of November, protests in the Gaza Strip were at their lowest while casualties were at their highest, thus contesting the claim that the IDF is merely responding to violent activity.[23]

During the second intifada, there were reports that the IDF were using "high-velocity" fragmenting bullets that created a "lead snowstorm" effect in the body—scattering the bullet throughout and creating multiple internal injuries—leading to high rates of crippling injuries.[24] Dumdum bullets, which are banned under international human rights law, are difficult to extract after they have entered and exploded outward within the body and usually guarantee those hit will "suffer for life."[25] Dr. Robert Kirschner of Physicians for Human Rights stated that "the Israeli soldiers appear to be shooting to inflict harm rather than solely in self-defense," their actions amounting to "a form of torture."[26] Dimo Qato, among other global health researchers and practitioners, argues that the "pattern of injuries cannot be claimed to be accidental."[27]

In 2002, Israeli linguist Tanya Reinhart analyzed "the policy of injuries" during the second intifada.[28] Reinhart claims that the "Israelis were not even trying to conceal their shooting policy." Citing interviews with IDF soldiers from the *Jerusalem Post*, she selects a representative example from Israeli sharpshooter Sergeant Raz of the Nashon Battalion, who proclaims: "I shot two people . . . in their knees. It's supposed to break their bones and neutralize them but not kill them."[29] Reinhart notes that the newspaper explicitly details the IDF strategy of keeping Palestinian casualties low to deflect attention, sympathy, and solidarity from the Palestinian struggle. She also turns, as many do, to human rights organizations that are close up enough to document the situation. A delegation of Physicians for Human Rights concluded "that Israeli soldiers appeared to be deliberately targeting the heads and legs of Palestinian protestors, even in non-life-threatening situations."[30]

Stating that the injured do not count in the "dry statistics of tragedy," Reinhart explicates: "The reason for this strategy is clear: Massive numbers of Palestinians killed everyday cannot go unnoticed by even the most cooperative Western media and governments. [Prime Minister Ehud] Barak was explicit about this. 'The prime minister said that were there not 140 Palestinian casualties at this point, but rather 400 or 1000, this . . . would perhaps damage Israel a great deal.'"[31] Reinhart concludes that the creation of disability is a tactical military move on the part of the IDF; injuring Palestinians has remained Israeli military policy: "Specially trained Israeli units, then, shoot in a calculated manner in order to cripple [sic], while keeping the statistics of Palestinians killed low."[32]

Reinhart's analysis of the policy of injuries originally appeared on November 14, 2000, in the Israeli paper *Yedioth Ahronoth*, to which she was a regular contributor. It is important to note that her assessment relies predominantly (and in some instances solely) on Israeli media sources in

لا للإنتقاص من حقوق اللاجئين ...

نعم للحماية الدولية الشاملة ...

66 YEARS عامًا على النكبة

FIG. 4.1. Haj Abdullah, *No to Undermining [Palestinian] Refugee Rights, Yes to Comprehensive International Protection*, 2014. The image shows a wheelchair with a United Nations flag in front of Palestinian people, marking sixty-six years of ineffective international aid. The poster received second place in BADIL's annual Al Awda Award Competition in the category of Best Poster of 2014. The theme for that year's competition was "No to undermining Palestinian refugee rights. Yes to comprehensive international protection." In BADIL's opinion, while the poster reflects the ongoing plight and displacement of Palestinian refugees, it demonstrates the international community's lack of fulfillment of its obligations toward Palestinian refugees, which includes the right to live in dignity through the provision of services until which time their refugee status is resolved through the exercise of their right of return. © BADIL, Artist Daoud Haj Abdullah.

Hebrew and English such as *Haaretz* (the English version of which, Reinhart claims, is more censored than the Hebrew version), the *Jerusalem Post*, and *Ma'ariv*.[33]

Also documented since the first intifada are various modes of obstruction of medical care. Al-Haq reports that the "obstruction of medical care, in all its various forms, is not new. However the scope of health-related human abuses has dramatically expanded during the current Palestinian uprising. . . . Violation of medical human rights have occurred with frightening regularity during the past year in all parts of the Occupied Territories."[34] The obstructions include blocking ambulances and cars transporting the sick and injured, raiding hospitals and clinics, denying medical teams access to areas under curfew, withholding medical treatment from prisoners, and deprioritizing the "right of the wounded to medical treatment."[35] During the second intifada, "Israeli forces attack[ed] Palestinian healthcare providers while on duty, and . . . [damaged] Palestinian medical facilities," demonstrating a blatant disregard for the principle of medical neutrality, which Israel is bound to by Articles 18 and 20 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.[36] The Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS), the main provider of emergency medical care in Palestine, reported 174 documented attacks on its ambulances during a period of approximately eighteen months from September 2000 to March 2002, damaging 78 out of 100 total available ambulances. Additionally, it reported 166 attacks on emergency medical technicians and heavy machine gun fire hitting the PRCS headquarters.[37] Another health-related section of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 17, prohibits obstructing the "passage of patients," in other words, delaying or preventing access to medical facilities, a quotidian occurrence even in nonbombardment times due to Israel's checkpoint regime.[38] The Israeli government's disregard for international human rights laws in Gaza and the West Bank, over time, has led to the "large-scale destruction of the developing health system, the inability of local and international healthcare providers to perform their duties, and a deterioration of the health conditions of Palestinians."[39]

INFRASTRUCTURAL WARFARE

Thus, not only bodies but also crucial infrastructures are being maimed in Gaza. In "Necropolitics," Achille Mbembe writes of the asymmetric war against infrastructure, or the "war on life support," as he calls it: the war on

life itself, on the state capacity to preserve and nourish life.[40] Two further examples from the summer of 2014 should suffice. Gaza's water system collapsed, and waste treatment services were rendered nonfunctional, leaving raw sewage spewing into streets. Several water authority technicians were killed, thus also compromising maintenance and repair work.[41] Even before the summer of 2014, the deterioration of water infrastructure, according to Ala Qandil, resulted in "households receiv[ing] running water for only six to eight hours at a time: 25 percent had access on a daily basis, 40 percent every other day, 20 percent once every three days, and the remaining 15 percent only one day out of four."[42] An apparently new tactic of infrastructural warfare was employed during Operation Protective Edge, namely, the destruction of what remained of Gaza's professional class: "The targeting of the professional class, a key pillar of Palestinian society generally considered unsympathetic to the political goals of Hamas, was a new front of economic and social warfare on Gaza."[43] Targeting the assets of the middle class by focusing on high-rises was a political message to those who remained; others had migrated since the early 2000s through Egypt when the border regime allowed.

Omar Jabary Salamanca extensively details the Israeli government's resignification of Gaza's main service buildings from infrastructural networks to "terrorist infrastructures," noting that the latter designation is used to justify Israel's policy of what he calls "infrastructural violence." This form of violence has increased, not decreased, after Israeli "disengagement" from the Gaza Strip in 2005.[44] The assault on infrastructure, Salamanca argues, is an essential, even central, component of the biopolitical regulation of a malleable humanitarian collapse, whereby "the supporting infrastructure of ordinary life became both target and weapon."[45] The disengagement from Gaza facilitates the appearance of the end of Israel's colonial presence while allowing it to retain forms of "remote" infrastructural control, a continuing yet covert colonial presence. Gaza as open-air prison is crafted through a "reassembled regime of spatial control," and works through manufacturing a "regulated humanitarian collapse."[46] Exemplifying what Sari Hanafi terms "spacio-cide," the terrain is dependent on the withdrawn colonizer's infrastructural support, which modulates calories, megawatts, water, telecommunication networks, and spectrum and bandwidth allocation to provide the bare minimum for survival. The one fiber-optic cable, for example, that connects the entirety of Gaza to the outside world passes

through and is controlled by Israel. "Spectrum allocation" thus becomes another tool of control, with Israel alternately withholding and releasing bandwidth. Salamanca calls this an "'asphyxatory' application of power."[47] This capacity to asphyxiate, however, is not just one of land enclosure via territorial containment. Nor is it digital enclosure that allows and regulates access to mobility via virtual worlds. Rather, as Helga Tawil-Souri argues, "Hi-tech enclosure is a multifaceted process. . . . This combination is what makes the Gazan case unique."[48] It is this interplay of territorial and virtual enclosure that complicates the Deleuzian (digital and digitizing) configuration of control societies, redescribed by Tawil-Souri as "a physical geography cancelled by networks." What she is pointing to as well is the coexistence and reinforcement of discipline and control. Topologies overlap, she argues, to the point where "it is increasingly difficult to distinguish one form of power from another in the Gazan landscape, for the Israeli space and practice of power has become one of in-distinction."[49] This interfacing of physical enclosure and virtual high-tech enclosure is what I take to be the epitome of an asphyxatory regime of power.

The target here is not just life itself, but resistance itself. Salamanca quotes Israeli politician Dov Wiesglass, who states that Israel's policy would be "like an appointment with a dietician. The Palestinians will get a lot thinner, but won't die."[50] Because of this asphyxatory control, Israel can create a crisis at will, having already set in place the bare minimum requisite for life that can be withheld at any moment, what he terms "an elastic humanitarian crisis."[51] There are continuities between these forms of elasticity, withholding, and suspension with the practices of "tactical government" that have historically ruled Gaza.[52] A provisional, tactical governmental structure is one devoid of vision and one that avoids legitimacy, capacity, and accountability through continual reactivity to crises.

Clearly, the capacity to asphyxiate is not a metaphor: while the West Bank is controlled largely through checkpoints, the Gaza Strip is suffocated through choke points. The intensification of policing and control thus happens through, and not despite, "disengagement" and disinvestment, not through checkpoints but through choke points. There is a temporal shift within this asphyxatory control society from a Virilian narrative of increasing speed to other forms of algorithmic, parallel, distributed, and networked time, working through suspension between states and slow attenuation, in direct contrast to the always-connected ideal. In fact, slow

death itself is literalized as the slowing down of Palestinian life. In the West Bank, immaculate freeways transport Israeli settlers through a landscape of dilapidated Palestinian back roads. Checkpoints ensure one is never guaranteed to reach work on time. The fear of not reaching work on time produces migration patterns that then clear the land for more settlements.[53] Time itself is held hostage; time is lived as fear. Distance is stretched and manipulated to create an entire population with mobility disabilities. And yet space is shrunken, as people are held in place, rarely able to move far. Unlike theorizations of space-time compression, the increased spatial dispersion is not remedied with temporal simultaneity. Rather, this simultaneity is withheld.[54] Hagar Kotef articulates the paradoxical relation of freedom to movement: move too much and one is unruly, too little and one is primitive.[55] The geopolitics of racial ontology is a frame that examines the regulation of affect as a racializing form of control. Accelerationist logics map speed, movement, and their withholding as an assemblage of racial ontologies. Disciplinary enclosure consorts with micromodulations of bodily becomings to ensure a population laden with affective reactivity. A politically regulated and controlled affective logic projected and interpreted as cultural and civilizational reactivity reinforces Orientalist projections of racial difference. Sensation racializes.

It is not just the capture and stripping of "life itself" that is at stake here but the attempt to capture "resistance itself."[56] How much resistance can be stripped without actually exterminating the population? Another question is, of course, what are the productive, resistant, indeed creative, effects of such attempts to squash Palestinian vitality, fortitude, and revolt?

THE BIOPOLITICS OF SETTLER COLONIALISM

These practices of bodily as well as infrastructural debilitation, loosely effaced in concerns about "disproportionate force," indicate the extension or perhaps the perversion of the "right to kill" claimed by states in warfare into what I am calling the "right to maim." "The right to maim" supplements if not replaces "the right to kill." Maiming as intentional practice expands biopolitics beyond simply the question of "right of death and power over life." Maiming becomes a primary vector through which biopolitical control is deployed in colonized space and hence not easily demarcated "necro" as it is mapped in Mbembe's reworking of biopolitics. Mbembe

discusses injury as a crucial element of enslavement: "The slave is kept alive but in a *state of injury* . . . slave life, in many ways, is a form of death-in-life."[57] Sticking with the binary of life and death with his formulation of "death-in-life," he does not pursue injury and debilitation as altering living and dying as primary poles within which populations oscillate. The four quadrants remain; death is reiterated as the ultimate loss (of life). While other scholars of biopolitics have noted the centrality of disability to the deployment of biopolitical population management, these efforts generally remain wedded to the poles of living and dying within which life is toggled. That is to say, while the distinctions between living and dying are often recognized through the "cuts" of race and the "folds" of overlapping population construction and management, maiming, debilitation, and stunting are relatively undertheorized components of these cuts and folds; centering these processes may potentially alter presumed relations to living and dying altogether. Maiming is a practice that escapes definition within both legal and biopolitical or necropolitical frameworks because it does not proceed through making live, making die, letting live, or letting die. My reframing adds a critical axis to the four quadrants, insisting that debilitation—indeed, deliberate maiming—is not merely another version of slow death or of death-in-life or of a modulation on the spectrum of life to death. Rather, it is a status unto itself, a status that triangulates the hierarchies of living and dying that are standardly deployed in theorizations of biopolitics.

Alongside examining how and why Foucault elided a theory of colonial occupation in his formulation of biopolitics, we might also ask, what is biopolitics in the twenty-first century, especially as informed by the ongoing structure of settler colonialism? Recent interventions by Alexander Weheliye and Mel Chen raise critical issues about the formulation of race in the theorization of biopolitics.[58] According to Weheliye, race only became important to Foucault when it entered the realms of European state management, not through the operations of colonialism. For this, Weheliye argues that the frame of biopolitics is foundationally flawed, for even as Foucault claims that the cut of race drives biopolitical distinctions, the severing of colonial occupation from a (belated) state racism relegates race to a derivative status. Weheliye's rather loose archival excavations of Foucault's work notwithstanding, what his and others' analyses lay bare is the dearth of theorization of the biopolitics of colonial regimes, especially

that of settler colonialism, of colonialism as a structure and not an event.[59] Further, Scott Morgensen rightly notes that settler colonialism remains undifferentiated within theorizations of the biopolitics of colonialism, continuing the propagation of colonialism as a bygone event or within a naturalized frame of periodization.[60]

Foucault's frame of biopolitics is intrinsically dedicated to variations of bodily health and vulnerability. In *Security, Territory, Population*, he details the different regimes of power associated with distinct illnesses. Leprosy is banished through the sovereign power to exclude; the plague is isolated through disciplinary power of quarantining; and smallpox becomes managed and regularized as epidemic through what Foucault calls "apparatuses of security."[61] In *"Society Must Be Defended,"* Foucault writes: "Biopolitics will derive its knowledge from, and define its power's field of intervention in terms of, the birth rate, the mortality rate, various biological disabilities, and the effects of the environment."[62] Here, disability is understood as a biologically produced rather than a socially induced condition. In some sense Foucault is inadvertently yet presciently mapping the liberal elision between disability as an exceptional accident or circumstance and disability as intrinsic to the function of colonial war machines. "Various biological disabilities" (and later, "anomalies") fulfills the function of misfortune but does not in this case address the imbrication of racialization and bodily capacity: "Biopolitics' other field of intervention will be a set of phenomena some of which are universal, and some of which are accidental but which can never be completely eradicated, even if they are accidental. They have similar effects in that they incapacitate individuals, put them out of the circuit or neutralize them. This is the problem . . . of old age, of individuals who, because of their age, fall out of the field of capacity, of activity . . . includ[ing] accidents, infirmities, and various anomalies."[63] In this, one finds germinating a theory of debility and capacity.

Foucault also points to the durational debilitations of chronicity. Illness shifts from epidemic to endemic; the endemic modulates "the form, nature, extension, duration, and intensity of the illnesses prevalent in a population . . . as permanent factors which . . . sapped the populations' strength, shortened the work week, wasted energy, and cost money, both because they led to a fall in production and because treating them was expensive."[64] Within the context of emergent forms of social welfare that Foucault speaks of, illness needs to be reduced, contained, isolated, and in some cases, abolished, because it compromises the thriving of the "make life" vector. In contemporary biopolitics, however, economic life can grow without the flourishing of much of human life, which means precisely that illness is no longer a hindrance to, but rather is implicated in, "make live."

Foucault writes, "The [old] right of sovereignty was the right to take life or let live. And then this new right is established: the right to make live and to let die."[65] Foucault notes that sovereignty's old right was not replaced but rather was complemented by this new right, "which . . . penetrate[s] it, permeate[s] it."[66] Given the interpenetrations of sovereign and biopolitical power, mapping what forms the sovereign right to take life or let live are machinating is critical. The sovereign right to maim implicates all of the other vectors at once—make die and make live (because in some cases debilitation can be harnessed into "compliant" disability rehabilitation), as well as let live and let die, a version of slow death, a gradual decay of bodies that are both overworked and underresourced.[67]

Maiming functions as slow but simultaneously intensive death-making, as targeting to maim is an accelerated assault on both bodily and infrastructural fronts. Different temporalities of living and dying labor here, a different modulation of time and a reworking of the temporalities of biopolitics. The stretching of the horizon of life (what can bare life bear?) and the finality of death into perverted versions of life seem and feel like neither life nor death, not even attenuated death. In this complication of the temporalities and processes, the speed of biopolitics turns not through distinctions between fast and slow, quick and languorous, but rather through the intensification and amplification of "life itself" and, in fact, "resistance itself" as a target of neglect, damage, and speculative rehabilitation.[68]

If slow death is conceptualized as primarily through the vector of "let die" or "make die," maiming functions as "will not let die" and, its supposed humanitarian complement, "will not make die." Maiming masquerades as "let live" when in fact it acts as "will not let die." For example, the IDF policy of shooting to maim, not to kill, is often misperceived as a preservation of life. In this version of attenuated life, neither living nor dying is the aim. Instead, "will not let die" and "will not make die" replace altogether the coordinate "make live" or "let die." It is not only the right to kill but also the right to maim that is being exercised as the domain of sovereignty. What kind of sovereignty is being articulated when the right to kill is enacted as the right to maim, to target both bodies and infrastructure for debilitation? This element of biopolitics entails targeting for death but not killing.

Israeli state practices of occupation and settler colonialism may well be rationalized through the conventional parameters of living and dying in Foucault's four quadrants of biopolitical management. The work of Eyal Weizman, Sherene Seikaly, and others has shown that the calories allowed into Gaza, the plotting of the number of deaths of Hamas members, the transit of fuel, materials, supplies, all of these parameters are mediated by expert language, algorithmic calculations, rational science, and framed in a discourse of humanitarian war.[69] Thus what I am explicitly arguing is that from the discursive and empirical evidence offered by Palestinians, this foundational biopolitical frame is a liberal fantasy that produces "let live" as an alibi for colonial rule and thus indeed facilitates the covert destruction of "will not let/make die." It is from the vantage of the occupied, I argue, and not from state power or from the privilege of the occupier, that we must apprehend and contend with revising—challenging, in fact—the theorization of the violent mechanisms of biopolitical population creation and maintenance. How is "will not let die" expressed? How is the distinction between death and debility mined? And how does the capitalization of this distinction occur while simultaneously obscuring the practices of deliberate maiming?

The debilitation of the Gazan infrastructure is elaborated in the following statement from Maher Najjar, the deputy general of Gaza's Coastal Municipalities Water Utilities:

> There is no water reaching any of the houses right now. We're facing a real catastrophe. Sewage pumps cannot work because the power plant has been destroyed, so we have sewage flooding the streets of Gaza. We can't assess the extent of the damage as we can't even go out without risking our lives right now. We had five staff members killed while doing repair work, another two were killed at home with their families. It will take more than US$20 million to rebuild the water and sewage networks, but there's no way they can be rebuilt under blockade. We have the total collapse of all essential services and there's nothing we can do about it. Believe me, it would be better if the Israelis just dropped the nuclear bomb on Gaza and get done with it. This is the worst ever assault on the Gaza Strip.[70]

In this missive, debilitation is rendered a fate worse than death. Treating Najjar's statement as political speech more so than the "truth" of death

as a form of mercy, the rhetorical strategy exposes the absolute farce of Israel's "let live" praxes. To suggest that the Gazan population is better off dead is surely to mock Israel's liberal democratic investment in humanitarian gestures of "let live." Najjar sharply contests this investment with a vision of humanitarianism that is startling. It is as if withholding death—will not let or make die—becomes an act of dehumanization: the Palestinians are not even human enough for death.

The implication in Najjar's statement that death is preferable to disability echoes with a general ethos of the nobility of dying for one's country. The preference of death over disability is also a stance that contravenes the human rights model of disability. Maiming is especially striking in this historical moment. In relation to the rise of disability as a recognized identity in need of state and global human rights protections, seeking to debilitate, or to further debilitate the disabled, contrasts heavily with the propagation of disability as a socially maligned condition that must be empowered to and through a liberal politics of recognition. Sanctioned maiming, capacitated in part through a deflection onto debates about the "collateral damage" of civilian deaths, bespeaks a profound failure in the global human rights framing of disability as a protected and supported social difference—protected and supported unless it is part of the war tactic of a settler colonial regime, one financially buttressed by the United States. Ironically but unsurprisingly, Israel is a signatory on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (as well as for the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child).[71] The distance between the cripple and the disabled is further exemplified by the fact that Gaza has a Paralympics team, one that is actually much more successful than the main Olympics team.[72]

COLLATERAL DAMAGE

Israel does not claim the actual "right" to maim in the way it claims a right to self-defense and a right to kill in warfare. Rather, I am arguing that by disobeying international protocol regarding medical neutrality (bombing hospitals and medical personnel, part of a larger tactic of infrastructural warfare), along with pacifying the injunction to minimize civilian deaths—otherwise known as collateral damage—Israel covertly enacts the right to maim through promoting itself as attempting to avoid civilian casualties. As the death toll of Palestinians soared during Operation Protective Edge

in comparison to Israeli deaths, much less spectacular and less commented upon, yet potentially more deleterious to the future of the Palestinian people, are the numbers of injured civilians.

The shoot to maim but not kill vector meshes, indeed colludes, with the principle of "collateral damage," which states that the unintentional killing of civilians, and the killing and injuring of children, if not deliberately targeted, are collateral damage. Since the Vietnam War, highly visible and inhumane techniques of maiming and destroying a population had become unacceptable, and these aims have been achieved through more subtle, low-intensity forms of warfare.[73] Maiming evades the optic of collateral damage. Jennifer Leaning, the director of Harvard University's FXB Center for Health and Human Rights, notes that "the number of dead and the number of wounded convey the false impression that the wounded are going to be okay."[74] Further, the discourse of targeting people with disabilities as an illegitimate, inhumane, and often shock-worthy tactic (as reflected in the response of horror when the IDF bombed the Mubaret Philistine Care Home for Orphans and Handicapped, killing three disabled residents) is then available as a foil to obfuscate the tactic of targeting to debilitate.

Numerous debates about collateral damage and intentional versus unintentional civilian deaths proliferated during the summer of 2014. Critics avowed that Israel was using "unguided, indirect fire with high-explosive shells," weaponry widely understood to be "inappropriate for a densely populated area." Nadia Abu El-Haj writes that Israel's allies proclaim that "the Israeli army wages war with moral integrity. It doesn't target civilians. It never intends to kill them. It even warns Gazans when an attack is coming so they can get out of harm's way."[75] Abu El-Haj dissects the discourse of "unintentionality," arguing that "most civilian deaths in urban counterinsurgency warfare may be 'unintentional,' but they are also predictable."[76] Laleh Khalili takes a more pointed view, arguing that civilians are not accidental casualties but "the very object of a settler-colonial counterinsurgency."[77] This discussion on intentionality leaves yet another possibility unspoken. The purposiveness behind civilian deaths may be indiscernible, debatable, or, as Khalili avers, absolutely transparently obvious. What the debate on civilian deaths may obscure is the intentional activity of maiming: the proliferation of injuries leading to permanent debilitation that remain uncalculated within the metrics of collateral damage. As a term that emerges in 1961, and signals the "debt" of war—that which should be

FIG. 4.2. Hafez Omar, *Le peuple déterminé*, Palestine, 2014. This red and black graphic symbolizes the resistance of the Palestinian people, lining the rooftops of homes while missiles point from the sky directly down at them. Reprinted with the artist's permission.

avoided and must be paid back—why does collateral damage disarticulate debilitation from death? Such a disarticulation effectively disconnects the act of violent perpetration from the effects of violence. Official terminology follows suit; for example, the designation "explosive remnants of war" suggests that the war is over and that the remnants, ranging from dumdum bullets to armament toxicity to land mines, are benign, manageable, or negligible.[78]

Maiming thus functions not as an incomplete death or an accidental assault on life, but as the end goal in the dual production of permanent disability via the infliction of harm and the attrition of the life support systems that might allow populations to heal from this harm. Maiming is required. Not merely a by-product of war, of war's collateral damage, it is used to achieve the tactical aims of settler colonialism. This functions

on two levels. The first is the maiming of humans within a context that is utterly and systematically resource-deprived, an infrastructural field that is unable to transform the cripple into the disabled. This point is crucial, for part of what gels the disabled body that is hailed by rights discourses is the availability of the process of cultural rehabilitation—that is, normalization practices that produce docile bodies.[79] The second is the maiming of infrastructure in order to stunt or decay the able-bodied into debilitation through the control of calories, water, electricity, health care supplies, and fuel.[80]

What does the sustained practice of maiming—in this case, sustained since the first intifada at least—accomplish for settler colonialism? What is the long-term value of will not let die, of withholding death? The understanding of maiming as a specific aim of biopolitics tests the framing of settler colonialism as a project of elimination of the indigenous through either genocide or assimilation. It asks us to reevaluate the frame of biopolitics in relation to the forms of maiming (and stunting, which I will discuss shortly) that have gone on for centuries in settler colonial occupations. The right to maim is therefore not an exceptional facet of any one form of sovereignty; it does not newly emanate from Israeli settler colonialism. Rather, the right to maim allows us to differently apprehend the wielding of Israeli state power while also challenging the current limits of biopolitical theorizing such that it may revise our thinking on other times and places. Accounting for Israeli settler colonialism and occupation is an encounter with the unspoken thresholds of biopolitical thought. Examining the role of maiming not only in Palestine but also in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States puts analytic pressure on the assumption that the goal of settler colonialism is necessarily elimination.[81]

Noting these different pressure points, Helga Tawil-Souri says of Gaza: "Israel is not seeking to assimilate the natives . . . nor enfold them (anymore) as a cheap labor force, but to treat them as refuse."[82] Here, settler colonialism is framed as a process of value extraction from populations that would otherwise be disposed of. The productivity of maiming—"will not let die"—is manifold. This third biopolitical vector, "will not let or make die," keeps the death toll numbers relatively low in comparison to injuries, while still thoroughly debilitating the population—depopulation through slow attrition, through maiming human forms. Because eventful killing is undesirable, the dying after the dying, perhaps years later, would not count as a war death alongside the quick administration of war deaths. Where

do the numbers of "collateral damage" end and the demarcation of "slow death" begin?

Further, debilitation is extremely profitable economically and ideologically for Israel's settler colonial regime. Many sectors take on the "rehabilitation" of Gaza in the aftermath of war: Israel, Egypt, the Arab Gulf states, NGO actors who are embedded in corporate economies of humanitarianism. Crumbs of the reconstruction will be fought over through local forms of control brokered by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. But these circuits of profit are uneven and perverse; who profits and how are extremely complex issues and not straightforward at an imperial scale.[83] However distinct some of these actors may appear, the overall assemblage works to feed back into the economic and ideological validation of Israel. The actors in play all calculate Palestinian life, death, and debilitation according to different economic, geopolitical, and domestic metrics. For the Arab Gulf States, this disjuncture between rhetoric and the outcome of financial exchanges points to certain political benefits, not simply profit in an economic sense but their favored status within an imperial order led by the United States.[84] Similarly, Egypt, under Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi, is rewarded for a disjuncture between policy and rhetoric, receiving military aid and support for its own domestic tyranny in return for shutting off the flow of vital goods to Gaza, all while condemning Israeli airstrikes publicly. As Max Blumenthal points out further, the team of consultants hired by the NGO complex to oversee Gaza's (privatized) rebuilding envisions a future of sweatshops producing zippers and buttons for Israeli fashion houses. The United States and other Western countries provide the majority of money for the UNRWA while providing the money and munitions that go into destroying UNRWA infrastructure like schools and hospitals.[85]

As a public health crisis, Gaza now represents a perversion of Foucault's management of health frame in that it feeds into models of disaster capitalism. Joseph Pugliese notes that Elbit, the company whose drones were tested during Israel's assault, recorded a 6 percent increase in profits during the first month of Operation Protective Edge.[86] Post-onslaught donor conferences raise billions of dollars for rebuilding infrastructure in Gaza— capitalist accumulation that ultimately feeds back into Israel's regime— despite the inevitability that Israel will destroy Gaza again.[87] This leads to "donor fatigue" due to the cycle of rebuilding infrastructure that will surely be razed yet again. It is most likely, however, that "donors will pay

up because it is far easier than addressing the underlying causes of and possible solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."[88] Israel's commitment to allow the five million tons of construction materials needed to rebuild the strip have resulted in naught; as of January 2015, only 3.9 percent of that had entered Gaza.[89] Materials to rebuild Gaza are subjected to massive administrative oversight by Israel and the UN because of fears that cement will be used to rebuild the tunnels.[90] Maintenance of the "separation policy" of Gaza from the West Bank is part of the economic withholding that gives license to other networks.[91]

These multifaceted circuits suggest that the targeting of Palestinian bodies as a source of extractive value goes beyond the plus-minus logic of accumulation toward a broader strategic goal of regenerating the structure of occupation, both locally in Gaza and globally through the many circuits of the imperial order. Given the economic profitability of the occupation to numerous actors who are ultimately beholden to the geopolitical and economic legitimation of Israel, it becomes even more urgent that resistant strategies such as BDS focus on disrupting the circuits of capitalist accumulation. Resistant strategies must also respond to Ilana Feldman's urgent call to break open the obscuring frame of humanitarianism and disrupt the cycle of destruction and rebuilding that ultimately regenerates the colonial situation.[92] Anne Le More concurs: "The international donor community has financed not only Israel's continued occupation but also its expansionist agenda—at the expense of international law, of the well-being of the Palestinian population, of their right to self-determination, and of the international community's own stated developmental and political objectives."[93] "Will not let die" is monetized to great effect and to the detriment of Gazans. "Existence is resistance" must necessarily refer to an existence outside this logic, beyond an inhuman biopolitics that takes the right to maim as its prerogative.

Thus one interpretation here is that the debilitation of Gazans is not only capitalized upon in a neoliberal economic order that thrives on the profitability of debility, as is the case elsewhere, but that Gazans must be debilitated in order to make (their) life (lives) productive. Perhaps differing from earlier colonial and occupation regimes where deprivation was distributed in order to maim yet keep labor alive, there is less need for Palestinian labor, for Palestinian production. Rather, profit is derived from the dismemberment of reproduction, a function of capitalism without labor (in part because a massive increase in migrant labor has been used to

offset the need for Palestinian labor). This inhuman biopolitics flourishes through and beside human populations—economic life growing without human life. In this regard we can say that along with the right to maim, Israel is also exercising a sovereign "right to repair," one that reaps profit through a speculative withholding and distribution of rehabilitation that is tactical, conditional, and controlled through Israel's security doctrine.

PREHENSIVE BIOPOLITICS

There are interesting disavowals of the Gazan civilian death toll that may expose the logic that undergirds the right to maim. Take, for instance, Benjamin Netanyahu's transposition of the make die vector from Israel onto Hamas, in this oft-quoted statement from the summer of 2014: "All civilian casualties are unintended by us but actually intended by Hamas. They want to pile up as many civilian dead as they can, because somebody said they use, I mean it's gruesome, they use telegenically dead Palestinians for their cause. They want the dead, the more the better."[94]

Here, there is a tentative answer to the question, why not just "make die"? The act of "make die" is transferred to Hamas as a wish to "let die." The anxiety generated by the term "collateral damage"—"the more dead the better"—is transformed into a favorable rather than damning equation. The statement, I suggest, serves as more than a ludicrous projection; rather, it might actually reveal an investment in "will not let die" that grounds the justification for the right to maim. These words hint at a speculative rehabilitative approach that modulates when to let die, when to maim, and when to "will not let die." Allen Feldman alludes to one reason why "make die" and even "let die" cannot usefully serve the mandate of the postgenocidal Israeli state: "The alleged manufacture of telegenic death by the Palestinians implies their subjugated knowledge of genocidal truth that both attracts and threatens Netanyahu—for in a Euro-American public sphere acculturated to the Holocaust, Palestinians become more attractive and rhetorically persuasive when dead than when alive, when televisually spiritualized rather than when protesting or resisting or simply enduring intractable prison-house materialities. Netanyahu attacks telegenic death because he fears the population bomb of Palestinian dead and wounded, wherein they become symbolic Jews."[95]

Given the prohibition and value of "dead Palestinians" that Feldman maps in his analysis, then, it is worth examining the repeated claim that

Gaza will be uninhabitable by the year 2020. The first question we might want to ask is, by what calculus is Gaza currently inhabitable? And then: With what metrics is this prognosis computed? Through which prehensive algorithms, via what naturalized logic does the agent of destruction that creates and sustains Gaza as uninhabitable drop from syntactical reference, as if the asphixatory control that Salamanca details reflects—but, in actuality, authorizes—the organic order of things?[96] How is this inevitability procured? The prehensive authorizes a set of predictive facts-on-the-ground sutured to the language of risk and probability that extends itself to a predicted "apocalypse"—in other words, the representation of Gaza as a "natural" disaster likely to happen. As an addition to reactive and preemptive forms of securitization, the prehensive is about making the present look exactly the way it needs to in order to guarantee a very specific and singular outcome in the future. A remark by Michael Oren, Israel's former ambassador to the United States, unwittingly unravels this grammatical elision by positing the inverse: "Life in Gaza is miserable now, but if Israel is permitted to prevail [i.e., destroy Hamas], circumstances can improve markedly."[97] That is to say, the apocalypse, the inevitable natural disaster, is a political outcome that can be avoided if a different scene of the present can be produced.

The year 2020 functions as a perverse apocalyptic timeline that is all too familiar to us now, largely through the predictive algorithms mapping for us the demise of the planet due to climate change. The prehensive is narratively produced as if this thing is happening to us, when indeed, we made it happen. (And, in fact, from Netanyahu's vantage: we wanted it to happen.) Through prehensive time, it is not only that the terms of futurity are already dictated in the present but also the terms of the present are dictated through the containment of the terms of the future, in an effort to keep the present in line with one version of the future that is desired. In seeding the fixed future into the present, data is fed forward in a retroactive manner that disallows us out of the present. That is to say, we cannot get out of the present because we are tethered to the desired future; past, present, and future feel somewhat futile as descriptors of temporal distinctions. These prehensive futurities are thoroughly resonant now: by such and such year, Caucasians will be the minority in California. X number of species will be extinct by year such and such. What this prehensive control over the present in order to create a certain future might suggest is that

the "solution" to the "Israeli-Arab conflict" may well be, for Israel, neither one-state nor two-state but rather the current status quo. In other words, a terrifying implication is that Israel already has its solution: the permanent debilitation of settler colonialism.

There is another twist to these temporalities: the multiplicity of competing prehensive narratives that challenge the hermeneutic seal. The year 2020 is also predicted to be when Palestinians will outnumber the Jewish Israeli population. Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied Territories will outnumber Jews by 7.2 million to 6.9 million.[98] Palestinians inside Israel's 1948 borders are reproducing 33 percent faster than Israeli Jews.[99] If indeed Israel needs Gaza's gas resources by 2017, if indeed by 2020 Gaza will be uninhabitable, these time frames reveal as much about the contractions and acceleration of pace demanded within the parameters of life span as they do about slow death.[100]

But is 2020 only a human timeline? If temporality itself is already suffused with the biopolitical, to claim unfettered access to futurity is already predicated upon the genocide or slow death of others. The invocation of 2020 marks the limit of thinking biopolitical time in human terms, gesturing toward temporalities that are operating in nonreproductive modalities, since "natural" human reproduction no longer singularly drives the engine of biopolitics. Gaza is living not only human time and "population time" but also versions of inhuman time. Mel Chen's work on toxicity alerts us to the question of the half-life of depleted uranium, approximately 4.5 million years, and other elements deposited through weaponry and infrastructural warfare.[101] Prehensive time thus also signals a weaponized epigenetics where the outcome is not so much about winning or losing, or about a solution. As Reza Nagarestani so magnificently shows us, the limits of the nonhuman/human frame are already apparent through their precise deployment within capitalism, revealing the necessity of theorizing an inhuman biopolitics; the nonhuman, posthuman, and inhuman are thoroughly amenable to the circuits of capitalism that inform biopolitical power.[102] Maiming is also necessary for exploiting the project of verticalization that Eyal Weizman details. For Weizman, verticalization happens through the production of expanded Israeli military space through three-dimensional renderings of air, ground, and underground entities, legitimizing Israeli rule through the colonization of space and time.[103] Verticalization is the manufacturing of depth. As Steven Salaita writes in *Israel's Dead Soul*,

interiority is accorded to the Jewish Israeli subject through the production of depth—of history, of archaeology, of presence.[104] Through debilitating practices of maiming and stunting, Palestinians are further literalized and lateralized as surface, as bodies without souls, as sheer biology, thus rendered nonhuman, part of creating surface economies of control, and captured in nonhuman temporal calculations.

FIG. 4.3. Carlos Latuff, *Gaza*, 2008, Brazil. Reprinted with the artist's permission.

NO FUTURE

Palestinian children in Gaza are on what the Israeli military leadership has called a starvation diet. You have almost 80 percent of Palestinian children living on less than $1 a day. They're at levels of what we would call poverty and extreme poverty, with extensive food insecurity. That's just another way of saying that most Palestinian children in Gaza go to bed hungry every day, so their caloric intake has been significantly reduced since the siege began within the last seven years. In addition to the reduced number of calories they take in, the kind of nutrients they're getting is also decreased, so what we see is this medical phenomenon called stunting, which results in lower birth weights for Palestinian children. Their average birth weight is going down. Their height and weight are below what you would consider basic international norm values for children that age. —DR. JESS GHANNAM, quoted in Said and Zahriyeh, "Gaza's Kids Affected Psychologically, Physically by Lifetime of Violence"

Finally, we turn to the question of generational time, characterized by the following statement: "Palestinian children in Gaza are exposed to more violence in their lifetime than any other people, any other children, anywhere in the world."[105] And yet, Palestinian trauma is classified into impossibility through "an assemblage of laws, policies, narratives, symbols, and practices that re-named trauma and suffering of the dispossessed with colonial terminology."[106] This terminology demeans Palestinians as "present-absentees," "security threats," and "demographic threats."[107] Numerous studies have documented the ongoing effects on Gazan children subject to arrests, assaults, home invasions, witnessing of deaths, and the loss of familial and community infrastructure.[108] The psychological impact on children has been deemed a form of "continuous PTSD" while the Israeli policy of the calorie regulation or the "starvation diet" has led to what medical practitioners call "stunting."[109] Exposure to white phosphorus in Operation Cast Lead and ground contamination from radioactive materials in Israeli bombs have led to increases in birth defects. Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian contends that "children are now one of the main targets of the

Israeli state," in large part because they are produced as "always already terrorists" and rendered nonhuman.[110] Efforts from human rights organizations to place the IDF on a United Nations list of serious violators of human rights because of the deaths of more than five hundred children and the injuries of at least thirty-three hundred during the siege of 2014 have been fraught and apparently stalled due to political pressure from the Israeli state.[111]

Once again, this is not a recent development. Research suggests that children became a prime target during the second year of the first intifada. Reports from UNRWA and the Jerusalem-based Palestine Human Rights Information Center (PHRIC) document that more than forty-one thousand

children aged sixteen or younger had been treated for gunshot wounds, injuries from beatings, and exposure to teargas between 1987 and 1992.[112] In 1992, the Gaza Community Mental Health Program (GCMHP) reported that "89% of a random sample of 1,564 children between the ages of eight and fifteen had experienced raids by Israeli soldiers into their homes; 45% were subjected to beatings."[113] During the middle of the first intifada, UNRWA reported a decline in the number of child fatalities due to Israeli gunfire and a sharp increase in the number of injuries.[114] Studies from the second intifada start recording the somatization of trauma and other mental health issues among the young.[115] Samir Qouta and Eyad El Sarraj have observed that "Palestinian children have become laboratories for the study of the relationship between trauma and violence, conflict, and children's well-being during war."[116]

Targeting youth not for death but for stunting, for physical, psychological, and cognitive injuries, is another aspect of this biopolitical tactic that seeks to render impotent any future resistance, future capacity to sustain Palestinian life on its own terms, thereby debilitating generational time. It is especially cognitive and psychological injuries that have long-range, traumatic effects that potentially debilitate any resistant capacities of future generations. It is worth stating an obvious but perhaps unremarked-upon qualification here: this is a biopolitical fantasy, that resistance can be located, stripped, and emptied. "Resistance itself" becomes an implicit target of computational metrics: How to measure, calculate, and capture resistance? But not only is biopolitical control a fundamentally productive assemblage; the ontological irreducibility of "resistance itself" is fundamentally elusive.

Samera Esmeir, writing of Israel's "experimental wars" in Gaza, claims that "Gaza has become the literal testing ground for Israel's various experiments. . . . as an occupying power, Israel transformed Gaza into such a laboratory by imposing on it different forms of confinements culminating in the siege imposed and maintained since 2006."[117] Military technologies are tested in "real-life situations, on the ground," and marketed as such.[118] In the quest for complete air, space, and ground control, a thoroughly saturated economy of spatial and temporal control, what are the terms of Gaza-as-laboratory?[119] Is Gaza an experimental lab for the production, maintenance, and profitability of biopolitical debilitation? Is Gaza an experiment in mining the infinite potentialities of the schisms between

death and debility—not a death camp but a debilitation camp—and the potentiating of nonhuman time?[120] And yet, labs and even many jails have better living conditions than those to which Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are subjected. Gaza emblematizes the profitability of a speculative rehabilitative economy where debilitated bodies are more valuable than dead ones because it keeps bodies in capital circulation, not as weakened, docile laborers, but as parts that are modulated with forms of life and their variegated temporalities. Maiming is a requirement for this economy, whereby settler colonialism is naturalized through a focus on the status and regulation of occupation.

I OFFER THIS analysis in the spirit of what Jord/ana Rosenberg has hailed an "anti-Zionist hermeneutic," one that insists on speaking the reality of debilitation as another form of biopolitical governmentality.[121] It is an anti-Zionist hermeneutic that seeks neither to exceptionalize Palestine nor to render it visible through containment in a comparative frame, but to understand intensifications of biopolitical modes of control that are continuous and resonant with historical modes and, indeed, across contemporary geopolitical spaces. Palestine in this sense provides an epistemological blueprint, one that opens up the connective tissue between regions, regimes of power, sites of knowledge production, historical excavations, and solidarity struggles for liberation. Rather than an exception, writes Michael Hardt, "we can see Palestine and the struggles of Palestinians as exemplary—a lesson and inspiration for those fighting back around the world."[122] Connecting Palestine to struggles elsewhere, Hardt argues that four rubrics of enclosure link different geopolitical sites: indebtedness, mediatization, securitization, and representation. This brief schema is perhaps one entrée into conceptualizations that neither exceptionalize Palestine nor minimize the role of the Israeli occupation in legitimating geopolitical technologies of securitization and sovereignty around the globe. An anti-Zionist hermeneutic recognizes the current shifting conditions in the U.S. academy—historically relatively foreclosed, as the writings of Edward Said remind us—for the possibility of genuine debate about what he called *The Question of Palestine*. The subject/object referred to in the phrase "the question of," explains Said, signals three things: a matter significant enough to be dealt with separately, an "intractable and insistent

problem," and something that is unstable or uncertain.[123] That Palestine is all three simply means that its lessons cannot be put aside or ignored. My goal, however, is not to affirm an instrumentalist use of such a blueprint or to mobilize Palestine in order to foreground a corrective to Eurocentric theorizations of biopolitics. The ultimate purpose of this analysis is to labor in the service of a Free Palestine.

POSTSCRIPT: TREATMENT WITHOUT CHECKPOINTS

I close with a short comment on preliminary fieldwork conducted in January 2016 in the West Bank and Occupied East Jerusalem. I was there with a film team, working on a documentary about Palestinian life called *On This Land*, directed by Nitasha Dhillon and Amin Husain.[1] The film explores forms of quotidian and popular resistance, especially within the context of the uprisings that began in October 2015. We visited four refugee camps—Dheisheh, Qalandiya, Al-Aoub, and Aida—meeting with numerous families to discuss their experiences of occupation. There were IDF shootings of Palestinians (always accused of wielding knives) nearly every day of our visit. We attended one wake and also a funeral for four martyrs from the same village, three of them cousins, killed on the same night in two separate incidents. The funeral drew thousands of people, simultaneously functioning as a protest rally, a gathering facilitating collective mourning, and an incredible celebration of fortitude and resistance. Everywhere we went, we heard stories of debilitation: injured Palestinians dying while being transported through twisty back roads to avoid Israeli checkpoints en route to the hospital; men with shattered knees and other multiple permanently debilitating injuries, marking each intifada; ordinary families who had lost one, two, sometimes three sons to clashes with the IDF; women who had also been injured or killed; frightened parents worried that children, both boys and girls, were being targeted on playgrounds and in the streets of the camps; speculations regarding policies of shooting to kill and shooting to maim and when and why the IDF might switch between them. There was never a day without terrible news, without some kind of antagonism with IDF soldiers (teargas, shootings, harassment, surveillance), without some confirmed or soon-to-be-confirmed report of shootings of Palestinians, what were often referred to as field assassinations.

128 Weizman, "The Politics of Verticality."

129 See also Adi Kuntsman's important work on Russian Israeli queers and ethnic difference within Israeli Jewish queer communities. Kuntsman, *Figurations of Violence.*

130 Solomon, "Viva La Diva Citizenship."

131 See Boyarin, *Unheroic Conduct;* also Gross, "Disabled Diaspora."

FOUR. "WILL NOT LET DIE"

1 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Occupied Palestinian Territory"; Kasrils, "Gaza and the 'Crime of Crimes.'"

2 Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, "Al Mezan Calls for Accountability for War Crimes and an End to Israel's Occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory."

3 Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, "IOF Declare Intentions to Commit Further Violations of International Law in Gaza under International Silence."

4 Avni, "Plans to Rebuild Gaza Keep Getting Undermined."

5 Kasrils, "Gaza and the 'Crime of Crimes.'"

6 Amnesty International, "Israel/Gaza"; Taylor, "In the Fight between Israel and Hamas, Gaza's Hospitals Are in the Middle."

7 Doctors Without Borders, "Gaza."

8 Amnesty International, "Israel/Gaza"; Alashi, interview with Goodman and González, "Israel Bombs Gaza's Only Rehab Hospital."

9 Feldman, "Genocidal Desistance in Gaza."

10 Epigenetics, part of this economy, refers to developing research on how external factors such as environment and social factors can affect how genes are expressed by switching them on or off, particularly during fetal development and early childhood. These gene de/activations may also be inherited by offspring. Racism and other structural inequalities have been shown to have strong epigenetic effects (Kuzawa and Sweet, "Epigenetics and the Embodiment of Race"). In a 2013 talk, "Abnormality, Race, and the New Epigenetic Biopolitics of Environmental Health," Becky Mansfield argued that the U.S. government has tried to manage the population effects of methyl mercury pollution, exposure to which produces epigenetic changes during fetal and childhood development, by placing responsibility on the individual to make proper choices about health and consumption. Without resources to "protect" themselves, vulnerable communities are made responsible for the effects of large-scale environmental pollution on their bodies and futures. See also Dupras and Ravitsky, "Epigenetics in the Neoliberal 'Regime of Truth,'" which argues that the new epigenetic turn is more likely to produce a push toward individual biomedicalized interventions rather than policy-level changes to address social and environmental sources of epigenetic changes.

11 Quoted in Blumenthal, "Evidence Emerges of Israeli 'Shoot to Cripple' Policy in the Occupied West Bank."

12 Sherwood, "Israel Using Flechette Shells in Gaza"; Withnall, "Israel-Gaza Conflict."

13 Neda Atanasoski has argued that contemporary U.S. military intervention is authorized through an appeal to humanitarian ethics, deploying rhetoric of doing battle against illiberal forms of intolerance. As such, positioning other locations as intolerant and illiberal "elicit[s] Euro-America's humanitarian gaze and calls for the military and juridical humanization of barbarous geographies," which are posed against the humanitarian West (*Humanitarian Violence,* 2). Religious and ideological difference becomes a mode of racialization, positioning the target as profoundly inhumane and in a state of permanent need for reform, thus justifying disciplinary intervention in the form of humanitarian militarism. See also Lopez, Bhungalia, and Newhouse, "Geographies of Humanitarian Violence," on "moral technologies" and humanitarianism as a means of perpetuating conditions of violence.

14 Henderson, "Israel Air Strike 'Hits Charitable Association for Disabled' in Gaza."

15 Beaumont, "Disabled Palestinians Unable to Escape Israeli Air Strike."

16 Taylor, "Israel Hopes Phone Calls to Palestinians Will Save Lives."

17 Tawil-Souri, interview by Dawes, "Digital Occupation"; Tawil-Souri, "Hacking Palestine." The Oslo Accords allowed Palestinians to build their own telecommunications network, but everything about its infrastructure would ultimately remain under Israeli control. There has been much enthusiasm about apps to monitor road conditions in the West Bank. One can use Ezma (which means "traffic jam" in Arabic) or Wasselni ("give me a ride" in Arabic), an Uber-like service recently launched in the Gaza Strip or else text "Q" on a Jawwal mobile phone to get access updates on "traffic conditions" at the Qalandia Checkpoint, the busiest checkpoint in the West Bank. One can follow discussions about these technological platforms on a Facebook group called Qalandia Conditions (https://www .facebook.com/groups/247012432000459/). Posted articles have cheery headlines that announce, for example, "Facebook Makes the Wait at the Qalandia Checkpoint Easier." The harnessing of "innovation," or "work-arounds," what Amit Rai describes as *jugaad* in the Indian context, entails lauding the creative and entrepreneurial spirit, the merging of the scales of the macropolitical and the experience of daily living, the diffusion and reappropriation of mobile technologies, and concomitantly an extension in and of the occupation. Tawil-Souri's work on digital occupation demonstrates West Bank technological fragmentation, rendering a digital map of the occupation that amends the geographic mapping. Zones A, B, and C—fragmented and separated from each other—are being morphed into quasi Gazas. Despite the hype, there is deep skepticism about "a text message service created by Palestine's largest telecommunications provider in order to profit from the need to pass through an Israeli military checkpoint inside the West Bank" (Tawil-Souri, "Occupation Apps"). Tawil-Souri continues, "There is nothing revolutionary about services that help you gauge traffic through a checkpoint . . . nor profits [that] are made on aspects of life dependent on and made desperate by the occupation."

18 Al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation.*

19 Al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation,* 16.

20 Al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation*, 16.

21 Al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation*, 21–26, 46, 47, 49, 53.

22 Al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation*, 43.

23 Al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation*, 44.

24 Andoni and Tolan, "Shoot to Maim."

25 Blumenthal, "Evidence Emerges of Israeli 'Shoot to Cripple' Policy in the Occupied West Bank." See also Giacaman, "A Population at Risk of Risks" Giacaman reports that from "28 September 2000 until March 28th [2002], on the eve of this invasion, not less than 1300 Palestinians had died and around 27,000 were injured by Israeli army violence, adding serious burdens on the existing medical and health care system."

26 Kirschner quoted in Qato, "The Politics of Deteriorating Health," 351.

27 Qato, "The Politics of Deteriorating Health," 351. See also Helweg-Larsen et al., "Systematic Medical Data Collection of Intentional Injuries during Armed Conflicts," 17–23.

28 Reinhart, *Israel/Palestine*, 112

29 Reinhart, *Israel/Palestine*, 113.

30 Ephron, *Boston Globe*, November 4, 2000, cited in Reinhart, *Israel/Palestine*, 113.

31 *Jerusalem Post*, October 30, 2000, cited in Reinhart, *Israel/Palestine*, 115.

32 Reinhart, *Israel/Palestine*, 114.

33 Reinhart, *Israel/Palestine*, 11

34 Al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation*, 70.

35 Al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation*, 69–75.

36 Jamjoum, "The Effects of Israeli Violations during the Second Uprising on Palestinian Health Conditions," 56.

37 Jamjoum, "The Effects of Israeli Violations during the Second Uprising on Palestinian Health Conditions," 56.

38 Beste, "The Reason Why Israel Killed So Many Pregnant Women in Gaza."

39 Jamjoum, "The Effects of Israeli Violations during the Second Uprising 'Intifada' on Palestinian Health Conditions," 72.

40 Mbembe, "Necropolitics."

41 Hass and Efrati, "Gaza's Water System Collapsing Due to IDF Strikes, Says Red Cross"; Chick, "Under Fire in Gaza and Not a Drop to Drink."

42 Qandil, "Gaza Faces Imminent Water Crisis."

43 Cohen, "In the Last Days of 'Operation Protective Edge' Israel Focused on Its Final Goal."

44 Salamanca, "Unplug and Play."

45 Salamanca, "Unplug and Play," 25

46 Salamanca, "Unplug and Play," 26.

47 Salamanca, "Unplug and Play," 30.

48 Tawil-Souri, "The Hi-Tech Enclosure of Gaza," 6.

49 Tawil-Souri, "The Hi-Tech Enclosure of Gaza," 12.

50 Salamanca, "Unplug and Play," 30.

51 Salamanca, "Unplug and Play," 32.

52 See Feldman, *Governing Gaza*, on the history of governmentality in Gaza and an elaboration of technologies of tactical government.

53 There is an interesting ongoing Palestinian settlement project in the West Bank. In Rawabi, just outside of Ramallah, a Palestinian millionaire named Bashar Masri is building the first ever Palestinian gated community, a completely new city built from scratch. Most aspects of this project are unprecedented: the scale of wealth being deployed as well as consolidated in the West Bank, the autonomy of the structure from anything that preceded it, the perverse circuits of capital that both enable and block the process of construction, the emblazoning of the post-Oslo consolidation of a class society in the West Bank. It will have upscale housing for twenty-five thousand residents, an amphitheater, a football stadium, cinemas, shops, and parks. The project is funded in part by the government of Qatar; in return, the Qatar Investment Authority expects a very large mosque to be built. Of course, all permission to build is controlled and cleared by Israel. Rawabi also, at this point in time, has no water. Challenged by solidarity activists with being complicit with the occupation, Masri responds by claiming that Rawabi is a "countersettlement" strategy that resists the occupation by mimicking the logic of land grab that sustains the occupation. But not only mimicking but also aggrandizing, exaggerating the scale and practice of illegal settlement—this is a huge volley of countersettlement. Part of "defying the occupation," claims Masri, is his desire to turn Ateret, an Israeli settlement, into a suburban satellite of Rawabi, so in a sense, an attempt not just to outshadow but to outrun the settlement by its copy. This is a parallel strategy of building on hilltops to create "facts on the ground," what Steven Salaita has called the "Israeli settlement as a form of geostrategic gentrification." This example functions as a kind of retort to Eyal's Weizman's project *Forensic Architecture*, where he situates architecture as a tactical tool, and, as he says "we just need to know how to decode it." There is no decoding at work here; rather, like meets like and attempts to override. The illegal settlements—perhaps we should call them colonies, says Kendall Thomas—are part of what Elias Khoury claims is the second Nakba already in progress, the displacement of Palestinians from the West Bank.

54 For more discussion, see the fantastic special issue of *Middle East Report* titled "Waiting: The Politics of Time in Palestine."

55 Kotef, *Movement and the Ordering of Freedom.*

56 Rose, *The Politics of Life Itself.*

57 Mbembe, "Necropolitics," 21.

58 Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus*; Chen, *Animacies.*

59 See especially Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology*; Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native."

60 Morgensen, "The Biopolitics of Settler Colonialism."

61 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 34, 37.

62 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended,"* 245.

63 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended,"* 244.

64 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended,"* 243–44.

65 Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended,"* 241.

66 Foucault continues in *"Society Must Be Defended"*: "What does the right of life and death actually mean? Obviously not that the sovereign can grant life in the same way that he can inflict death. The right of life and death is always exercised in an unbalanced way: the balance is always tipped in favor of death. Sovereign power's effect on life is exercised only when the sovereign can kill. The very essence of the right of life and death is actually the right to kill: it is the moment when the sovereign can kill that he exercises his right over life" (240–41).

67 Berlant, "Slow Death."

68 This analysis of the role of maiming of course also begs the visage of the opening passages of Foucault's *Discipline and Punish.* Foucault traces the "the disappearance of torture as a public spectacle": the transition of the spectacle of the punishment of torture, and specifically of severing limbs, from the purview of the public to the routinization of punishment in the prison. Torture thus remains a transgressive ritual but no longer a spectacle. In both the spectacle of maiming and its domestication in the prison, maiming is a disciplinary mode of punishment. But through its endemic and intrinsic incorporation into the "largest open-air prison" in the world (as Gaza is so often referred to), the banality of maiming becomes a form of torture that is crucial to how control functions. It is returned to the public sphere but still removed from its specularization, and thus normalized as a facet of life rather than an act of torture. In Gaza torture is not disappeared into the private, nor is there a return to the spectacle of torture. Rather more insidiously, torture is regularized as integral to settler colonialism (*Discipline and Punish*, 7).

69 In *The Least of All Possible Evils*, Eyal Weizman details Israel's tactic of calculating the minimum number of calories necessary for Palestinians living in Gaza to remain at just above the UN definition of hunger in order to determine the exact amount of food allowed inside Gaza. Israeli officials calculated 2,100 daily calories for men, 1,700 for women, and varying amounts for children; however, even these numbers were not met as Israel found reasons to more than halve the amount of food trucks going into Gaza necessary to meet even this basic caloric intake. Sherene Seikaly traces the racial and economic history of the calorie, expanding on Israel's policy of calorie counting, in "Counting Calories and Making Lemonade." Seikaly writes that in Israel we see the deployment of the calorie as a racialized tool of political containment in order to contain Gazans and incite anger against Hamas. For a history of the development of "nutritional economy" in Mandate Palestine, see Seikaly, *Men of Capital*, chap. 3.

70 Quotation provided by Karl Schembri in a Facebook post on July 30, 2014; partially quoted in Al-Helou and Waters, "Lack of Power Keeps Gazans in Dark during War."

71 Schulze, "Understanding the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities."

72 Al-Mughrabi, "Gaza Paralympians Confident of Success in London"; Degun, "Palestinian Paralympic Committee Headquarters Destroyed in Gaza Bombings."

73 Graff, "Crippling a People."

74 Quoted in Said and Zahriyeh, "Gaza's Kids Affected Psychologically, Physically by Lifetime of Violence."

75 Abu El-Haj, "Nothing Unintentional."

76 Abu El-Haj, "Nothing Unintentional."

77 Khalili, "A Habit of Destruction."

78 See Khatib and Kasozi, "Disability and Explosive Remnants of War in Gaza"; Mc-Fann, "Violent Waste."

79 Here I am following Mitchell and Snyder's definition of cultural rehabilitation described in *The Biopolitics of Disability*, 205.

80 Seikaly, "Counting Calories and Making Lemonade in Gaza"; Weizman, *The Least of All Possible Evils.*

81 See Stevenson, "The Psychic Life of Biopolitics."

82 Tawil-Souri, "The Digital Occupation of Gaza," 3.

83 Foreign countries and international organizations, especially on the part of the United States, have strong financial investments in the occupation. The United States signed a Free Trade Agreement with Israel in 1985, increasing exports to Israel by more than 500 percent and imports from Israel by more than 1200 percent. Since then, the occupation has shifted increasingly toward market-driven decisions. The privatization of the occupation that resulted from the Oslo peace process netted large sums of international aid money for Israel and has generated an industry for private military investments between the United States and Israel (see also Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*, chap. 21). The United States began offering "peace dividends" to countries that would enter into trade agreements with Israel (and, indirectly, the United States) and later created the Regional Business Council to establish trade relations between Israel and other Middle Eastern countries while explicitly excluding the West Bank and Gaza, implying a tacit approval of the occupation in favor of opened trade between Israel and countries such as Egypt and Jordan (Lubin, "Peace Dividends"). Grassroots organizations have called neoliberal financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank the "shadow government" in the West Bank, dictating the development program and expenditure of the Palestinian Authority. Under the guidance of the United States, the European Union, Israel, and these international financial institutions, the PA adopted a brutally economically stunting policy of reform and development in 2007, eliminating an enormous percentage of the jobs in the West Bank. This policy also called for the development of industrial zones in the West Bank where labor laws would not apply and relocating to these zones Turkish businesses that would produce cheap goods for the United States, the European Union, and the Gulf States. The wealthiest Palestinian business groups, foreign businesses (such as Coca-Cola and Marriott), and U.S. and European aid organizations (such as USAID) convened at a conference in 2008 to confirm the reform policies. The conference also highlighted a multinational plan to turn Palestinian farmers into day laborers and subcontractors for big agricultural industry in the Jordan Valley, producing exports to Israel and the Gulf States (Hanieh, "Palestine in the Middle East"). See also Lubin,

"The Disappearing Frontiers of US Homeland Security"; the Who Profits website, www.whoprofits.org.

84 Hamid, "Why Are the Arab Gulf Countries Silent on Gaza?"

85 Blumenthal, "International Community Promises to Rebuild Gaza."

86 Pugliese, "Forensic Ecologies of Occupied Zones and Geographies of Dispossession," 3.

87 Cohen, "In the Last Days of 'Operation Protective Edge' Israel Focused on Its Final Goal."

88 Dyke, "Analysis."

89 Gisha-Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, "The Gaza Cheat Sheet."

90 Beaumont, "Corruption Hampers Effort to Rebuild Gaza after Summer Conflict."

91 Gisha-Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, "A Costly Divide."

92 Feldman, "Gaza's Humanitarianism Problem," 33–34.

93 Le More, "Killing with Kindness," 983.

94 Netanyahu, interview with Blitzer, "Netanyahu."

95 Feldman, "Genocidal Desistance in Gaza."

96 Luciana Parisi draws on Whitehead's notion of the prehensive as a capacity to grasp and transform, suggesting that "the new function of algorithms within the programming of spatiotemporal forms and relations reveals how the degree of prehension proper to algorithms has come to characterize computational culture. Algorithms are no longer seen as tools to accomplish a task: they are the constructive material or abstract 'stuff' that enables the automated design of buildings, infrastructures, and objects. Algorithms are thus actualities, defined by an automated prehension of data in the computational processing of probabilities. From this standpoint, digital algorithms are not simply representations of data, but are occasions of experience insofar as they prehend information in their own way, which neither strictly coincides with the binary or fuzzy logic of computation nor with the agency of external physical inputs. Instead, as actual occasions, algorithms prehend the formal system into which they are scripted, and also the external data inputs that they retrieve" (Parisi, *Contagious Architecture*, xii).

97 Oren, "Israel Must Be Permitted to Crush Hamas."

98 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, "On the 65th Anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba"; Deutsche Presse-Agenteur, "Palestinians to Outnumber Jewish Population by 2020, Report Says."

99 Chamie, "By 2035, Jewish Population in Israel/Palestine Is Projected at 46 Percent."

100 Ahmed, "Armed Robbery in Gaza"; Ahmed, "IDF's Gaza Assault Is to Control Palestinian Gas, Avert Israeli Energy Crisis"; United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, "Gaza in 2020."

101 Chen, *Animacies*. A number of toxic materials have been detected at elevated levels in Gaza. Phosphorous, which is potentially destructive to the environment and to the health of local populations, has been detected at high levels in Gazan soil samples. While phosphorous is a common agricultural soil additive, these samples included urban and other nonagricultural areas that have specifically been hit by white phosphorous bombs (Hamada, Aish, and Shahwan, "Potential of Phospho-

rous Pollution in the Soil of the Northern Gaza Strip, Palestine," 295). A study of wound tissue from victims of Israel's 2007 and 2009 military operations in Gaza detected the presence of several toxic heavy metals and other known carcinogens, including mercury, arsenic, titanium, barium, and cesium (Skaik et al., "Metals Detected by ICP/MS in Wound Tissue of War Injuries without Fragments in Gaza"). An additional study on levels of toxic heavy metals in newborns with birth defects in Gaza examined children with birth defects born to parents directly exposed to military operations or their immediate aftermath during Operation Cast Lead. The study found that these newborns had significantly elevated levels of mercury, tin, and selenium compared with children born to parents not exposed directly to military operations during the same period (Manduca, Naim, and Signoriello, "Specific Association of Teratogen and Toxicant Metals in Hair of Newborns with Congenital Birth Defects or Developmentally Premature Birth in a Cohort of Couples with Documented Parental Exposure to Military Attacks"). See also Weir, "Conflict Rubble"; www.toxicremnantsofwar.info.

102 Negarestani, "Drafting the Inhuman."

103 Weizman, *The Least of All Possible Evils*.

104 Salaita, *Israel's Dead Soul*.

105 Ghannam quoted in Said and Zahriyeh, "Gaza's Kids Affected Psychologically, Physically by Lifetime of Violence." See also Thabet, Abed, and Vostanis, "Effect of Trauma on the Mental Health of Palestinian Children and Mothers in the Gaza Strip," 413–21.

106 Shalhoub-Kevorkian, "Criminality in Spaces of Death." For research on the relationship of trauma to the occupation, see Al-Krenawi, Graham, and Sehwail. "Mental Health and Violence/Trauma in Palestine," 185–209; Zaqout, "Psychological Support in Palestine," 94–106; Abu-Mourad et al., "Self-Reported Health Complaints in a Primary Care Population Living under Stressful Conditions in the Gaza Strip, Palestine," 68–79. On life expectancy, see Qlalweh, Duraidi, and Bronnum-Hansen, "Health Expectancy in the Occupied Palestinian Territory." On rising suicide rates in Gaza, see Abou Jalal, "Gaza Suicides Rise as Living Conditions Deteriorate"; Kamel, "Gaza's Youth Lose Hope"; Shakra, "No Exit but Suicide in Gaza."

107 Shalhoub-Kevorkian, "Criminality in Spaces of Death."

108 A further reference: "It would be safe to assume that most Palestinian children sixteen years or younger have either been hit by Israeli gunfire, beaten up by Israeli troops or colonists, or asphyxiated, burned, or nauseated by US-manufactured, highly concentrated CS or CN gases. The statistics and projections of child injuries from IDF gunfire and beating show that Palestinian children were massively targeted by the IDF, and that the scope of those assaults went far beyond what might have been required to contain demonstrations and cope with stone-throwing" (Graff, "Crippling a People," 53).

109 The current medical definition of stunting was introduced in 1973 as a deficit in height as a result of prolonged malnutrition that produces "a retardation in linear growth." Children are considered stunted when they are two standard

deviations below the determined average for their age and sex (Schmidt, "Beyond Malnutrition").

110 Shalhoub-Kevorkian, "Palestinian Children as Tools for 'Legalized' State Violence."

111 Sherwood, "UN Officials Accused of Bowing to Israeli Pressure over Children's Rights List."

112 Graff, "Crippling a People," 47.

113 Graff, "Crippling a People," 47–48.

114 Graff, "Crippling a People," 50.

115 Thabet and Vostanis, "Impact of Political Violence and Trauma in Gaza on Children's Mental Health and Types of Interventions"; Thabet and Vostanis, "Child Mental Health Problems in the Gaza Strip"; Thabet et al., "Comorbidity of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Attention Deficit with Hyperactivity, Conduct, and Oppositional Defiant Disorder in Palestinian Children Affected by War on Gaza."

116 Qouta and El Sarraj, "Prevalence of PTSD among Palestinian Children in Gaza Strip," 11.

117 Esmeir, "Colonial Experiments in Gaza."

118 Tawil-Souri, "The Digital Occupation of Gaza," 5. Tawil-Souri further states: "Gaza demonstrates what urban warfare looks like and how this model can be exported and/or emulated elsewhere . . . the drone wars over Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen; the forms of aerial and urban warfare being waged in Iraq and Syria; the electrified fences and remote-controlled sensors along various international borders; aerial surveillance over São Paolo" (5).

119 See an important collection, Tawil-Souri and Matar, *Gaza as Metaphor*, for a discussion of various descriptors used to delineate Gaza in ways that deny its historical and political specificity: Gaza as an open-air prison, Gaza as archive, Gaza as zoo, Gaza as a humanitarian crisis, Gaza as a torture chamber, Gaza as an object of humanitarian concern, Gaza as/is disaster capitalism.

120 Many thanks to Ittai Orr for this specific formulation and for his comments in response to an early version of this chapter presented at Yale University on February 4, 2015.

121 Rosenberg, lecture presented at the Reflection on Dispossession symposium.

122 See Hardt, preface to "Palestine: Cartography of an Occupation." See also MTL Collective, "The Slow, Sure Death of Palestine."

123 Said, *The Question of Palestine*, 4.

POSTSCRIPT: TREATMENT WITHOUT CHECKPOINTS

1 For more information on the film project, see MTL Collective, *On This Land*.

2 For more information about BASR's history and work, see Bethlehem Arab Society for Rehabilitation, *Annual Report 2010*.

3 For research on the growth and impact of CBRs in Palestine, see Eide, "Impact of Community-Based Rehabilitation Programmes," 199–210.

4 All interview material is from meetings that took place on January 5 and January 7, 2016. Simultaneous translation conducted on-site by Baraah Awad Owdeh. Written transcriptions and translations by Rasha Moumneh.

5 In the summer of 2016, reports released from BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights and *Haaretz* documented the targeting of Palestinian youth for injuries and kneecapping, particularly in the refugee camps in the West Bank. The majority of injured Palestinians (since the beginning of 2016) have been shot with live ammunition in the legs and knees. BADIL has collected testimonies regarding an Israeli commander in Area A known as Captain Nidal making statements such as "I will make all the youth of the camp disabled"; "I will have all of you walking with crutches and in wheelchairs"; "I will make half of you disabled, and let the other half push the wheelchairs"; and "I will make all of you stand in line at the ATM waiting for your disability subsides and assistance." BADIL, "Israeli Forces Targeting Palestinian Youth in the West Bank." See also Barrows-Friedman, "Israeli Captain." Israeli journalist Amira Hass provides testimony from numerous injured Palestinian young men; the accounts are published in *Haaretz*. She reports that Nidal "tells young people there will be no martyrs in the camp, but 'all of you will end up on crutches.'" In the village of Tekoa there is a "Captain Imad" who threatens to cripple anyone who confronts the IDF soldiers. Hass writes: "In many places there's a growing realization that the army is intensifying its use of live fire in confrontations with unarmed stone throwers, and that the wounds inflicted are deliberately more severe. There must be more than 100 people across the West Bank, including many minors, who have been crippled by the IDF over the last year. But there is still no exchange of information or collation of data to confirm the seeming trend" ("Is the IDF Conducting a Kneecapping Campaign in the West Bank?").