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Wireshark: A Guide to Color My Packets

When was the last time you faced a packet trace file, and hoped to remember all the different filters used to detect anomalous network activities? Were you typing in the filters as you progress, and hoping for an alternate solution? This paper discusses some basic features in Wireshark, and the advanced techniques for creating simple to complex Display filters for Coloring rules, using it to identify network reconnaissance, attacks and recovering evidence from within the packet trace files.

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Wireshark: A Guide to Color My Packets

Detecting Network Reconnaissance to Host Exploitation

GIAC GCIA Gold Certification

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Abstract

When was the last time you faced a packet trace file, and hoped to remember all the different filters used to detect anomalous network activities? Were you typing in the filters as you progress, and hoping for an alternate solution? This paper discusses some basic features in Wireshark, and the advanced techniques for creating simple to complex Display filters for Coloring rules, using it to identify network reconnaissance, attacks and recovering evidence from within the packet trace files.

1. Introduction

Incident Responders investigating technology-facilitated crime in an unfamiliar or even non-homogenous network environment can be given access to raw packet trace files. These files can provide a plethora of information to determine the source of compromised, and related nefarious activities. However, in the field environment with access to limited tools, the challenge is to analyze the packet trace files, identify any anomalous network activities, and provide an informed assessment in a time-critical environment.

Wireshark is an open source network protocol analyzer (Combs, n.d.). It can be customized to create Display filters and Coloring rules to highlight the obvious packets when reviewing complex network interaction; establishing the general flow of network activities, or identify anomalous traffic that relates to a network attack.

It is evident, the use and application of Wireshark Coloring rules can provide a faster analysis of result. By using colors to attract attention to the packet details, it can be a useful presentation tool to demonstrate the flow of complex data to non-technical staff, or jury in a court of law. Incident Responders can also harness the flexibility and portability of Wireshark Coloring rules by sharing customized rules that are helpful and assist in getting results that would otherwise be difficult or missed entirely.

This paper will guide the readers through examples, exploring Wireshark features used in creating Display filters and Coloring rules to detect network reconnaissance, attacks, and recovering data from packet trace files. With due diligence, experience and research, an Incident Responder should build a collection of Wireshark Coloring rules and adopt them for network forensics or incident response efforts.

2. Wireshark

The Wireshark project (*formerly known as Ethereal*) is created by Gerald Combs (Orebaugh, et al., 2007), it comes with an extensive library of supported network protocols and runs on many platforms, including Windows, Linux and OS-X. By default, the Wireshark installation package installs the feature-rich Wireshark Graphical User

Interface (GUI)¹. It also provides the option to install various Wireshark command line utilities, including a command line version of Wireshark called Tshark. This section introduces the Wireshark GUI using the labels depicted in Figure 1, which sets out some of the references used in this paper.

2.1. Wireshark Graphical User Interface

To view a packet trace file, launch Wireshark, and open a packet trace file via the File Menu. The Wireshark GUI view of an opened packet trace file is illustrated in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1: The various components of the Wireshark GUI

2.2. Wireshark: Profile

It is possible to create custom Wireshark Profiles for specific tasks relating to network protocol or packet analysis and troubleshooting (i.e. network scanning detection, unauthorized or anomalous network traffic identification).

To create or manage a new or existing Wireshark Profile, the user can navigate to the Configuration Profiles via the Edit Menu Toolbar. This option is also available via right-click on the Profile column in the Status Bar. A Bluetooth² and Classic³ profile is

¹ For the purpose of this paper, Wireshark version: 1.10.6 (Windows 64-bit) was installed on a Microsoft Windows 7 (64-bit) workstation. Wireshark GUI for Linux and OSX Operating Systems utilized similar Wireshark GUI layout.

² The Wireshark Bluetooth profile contains additional Bluetooth related Coloring rules.

³ The Wireshark Classic profile uses the default rules but displays the Packet List using a brighter color palette.

available as part of the default Wireshark installation and can be used as a template for creating a new profile.

When creating a new Profile, a folder with the given profile name is saved in the *profiles* folder within the Personal configuration directory. It is used for storing profile settings, such as user preferences, and files containing custom filters, i.e. Capture filters (cfilters), Display filters (dfilters) or Color filters (colorfilters).

The ‘About Wireshark’ dialog box via the Help Menu (in Figure 2) provides the essential Wireshark folders location (i.e. the Global and Personal configuration directories) installed on the system.




Figure 2: About Wireshark, "Folders" tab: the location of essential Wireshark folders

2.3. Wireshark: Display Filter

The Wireshark Display filter is temporarily applied to locate and display specific packets based on defined protocol field name(s). We will walk through some of the options to determine the protocol field names, using it to create simple or compound Display filters.

Option 1: Filter Toolbar – use Wireshark Filter Input Box

In Wireshark, network protocols and its fields used for Display filters are defined in lowercase (i.e. arp, ip, icmp, tcp, udp, dns, bootp, http). To create a Display filter to show all TCP packets, enter tcp within the Wireshark Display Filter Input Box as shown in Figure 3:




Figure 3: By itself, tcp is a valid Display filter to show all TCP packets
(auto-filter checking: Green color background indicates a valid display filter
Red color background indicates an invalid display filter)

Wireshark Display Filter Input Box also comes with an auto-lookup feature. It lists the available protocol fields as you type in the Filter Input Box toolbar. Enter tcp. (followed by a period), as shown below in Figure 4:



Figure 4: Wireshark auto-lookup feature, listing valid protocol field names.

Option 2: Filter Toolbar – use Wireshark Filter Expression

Apply the following steps shown in Figure 5 to create Display Filter via the ‘Expression...’ button⁴ or to view a list of supported protocols and related field names:




Figure 5: Creating Display Filter via the Expression...button

Option 3: Packet Detail Pane and Status Bar

To determine the correct Display filter protocol field name, select the required field in the Packet Details pane and lookup the status bar for the corresponding protocol field name (as shown by the yellow arrow in Figure 6).

⁴ Invoking the Expression button, displays a list of all Wireshark supported protocols and its associated field names.




Figure 6: The selected protocol field name displayed in the Status Bar

Wireshark Display filter can be created by entering the appropriate network protocol field name in the Display Filter Input Box. Alternatively, right-click on a selected packet in the Packet List, or protocol field name in the Packet Details to bring up the list of available options, as shown in Figure 7 below:




Figure 7: A myriad of options are available by right-clicking on a selected packet/protocol field name

The 'Apply as' or 'Prepare a Filter' option is particularly useful. It can be used to apply a simple Display filter, or create compound Display filter using comparison and logical operators. A common list of comparison and logical operators applicable to Wireshark is provided in the Table 1, with the exception of the 'contains' and 'matches' operator; either the short-form expression or the symbol can be used.

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
eq	==
ne	!=
gt	>
lt	<
ge	>=
le	<=
contains	case-sensitive string comparison or byte sequences matching
matches	search string fields and byte sequences using Perl Compatible Regular Expression (PCRE)
and	&&
or	
not	!

Table 1: A list of comparison and logical operators for comparing values or combining Wireshark Display filters

In the example shown in Figure 6, the packet trace file shows an attempt to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, where specially crafted packets were sent using the same source IP address and port number as the listening host's destination IP address and port number; this is known as the LAND attack (Imperva, n.d.). A vulnerable host will crash or freeze from processing such packets.

Using the options described in this section, the following Wireshark compound Display filter created below identifies TCP or UDP based land attack attempts:

```
(ip.src == ip.dst) && (tcp.srcport == tcp.dstport ||
udp.srcport == udp.dstport)
```

To save this Display filter to the current active Wireshark Profile for future analysis, select the Display filter icon  located on the Icon Toolbar, or click on the 'Filter' button (shown by the blue arrow in Figure 6) on the Filter Toolbar to bring up the Display Filter Manager dialog box shown in Figure 8. Select New, enter a filter name (e.g. Land Attack), the Display filter string, and click Apply to save the Display filter.





Figure 8: Wireshark Display Filter Manager Dialog Box

Newly created Display filters are saved to the “dfilters” file in the Personal configuration directory or within its *profiles* folder, it can be edited using a text editor or via the Display Filter Manager. Each Display filter in the “dfilter” file uses the following syntax that ends with a newline: “*Display filter name*” *Display filter string*.



```

1 "Ethernet address 00:08:15:00:08:15" eth.addr == 00:08:15:00:08:15
2 "Ethernet type 0x0806 (ARP)" eth.type == 0x0806
3 "Ethernet broadcast" eth.addr == ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
4 "No ARP" not arp
5 "IP only" ip
6 "IP address 192.168.0.1" ip.addr == 192.168.0.1
7 "IP address isn't 192.168.0.1, don't use != for this!" !(ip.addr == 192.168.0.1)
8 "IPX only" ipx
9 "TCP only" tcp
10 "UDP only" udp
11 "Non-DNS" !(udp.port == 53 || tcp.port == 53)
12 "TCP or UDP port is 80 (HTTP)" tcp.port == 80 || udp.port == 80
13 "HTTP" http
14 "No ARP and no DNS" not arp and !(udp.port == 53)
15 "Non-HTTP and non-SNTP to/from 192.168.0.1" not (tcp.port == 80) and not (tcp.port == 25) and ip.addr == 192.168.0.1
16


```

Figure 9: Wireshark *dfilter* file of an active profile, showing the described syntax ending with a newline

To remove the display filter shown in the Filter Input Box, select the ‘Clear’ button on the Filter Toolbar. To manage or apply previously stored Display filters, click on the Display filter icon or ‘Filter’ button and select the required Display filter listed in the Display Filter Manager dialog box

2.4. Wireshark: Coloring Rules

One of the features of Wireshark is the ability to apply custom Coloring rules to highlight the packets of interest. A Coloring rule is created using the Display filter syntax, and saving it to the “colorfilters” file using the Wireshark Color Filter rule editor. The Coloring rules are applied automatically to the packets in the background, integrating seamlessly with the packet display.

To create and manage a new or existing Coloring rule, navigate to the Wireshark Coloring rules manager (in Figure 10) via the Coloring Rules icon  located on the Icon Toolbar, or via the sub-menu item: ‘Coloring Rules...’ under the View Menu.




Figure 10: Wireshark: Coloring rules manager, (The title bar indicates the applicable coloring rules for the current active Profile and the “Checksum Error” rule is shown as being disabled)

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To create a new Wireshark Coloring rule:

1. Click on the New button to launch the Wireshark Color Filter rule editor (shown in Figure 10 below).
2. Provide a Coloring rule name
3. Enter the Display Filter (if required, use the Expression option to assist)

e.g. using the example shown in Figure 1, we will create a simple filter to identify Windows ICMP Echo Request (ICMP type 8, code 0) packets, containing about 32 bytes of data resembling a string of English alphabets in lowercase.

4. Click on the “Foreground Color” button to select a foreground color
5. Click on the “Background Color” button to select a background color
6. Check to ensure that the Coloring rule is valid via the displayed color shown in the String Display Filter Input Box (in Figure 11 below):




Figure 11: Wireshark Color Rule Editor with a valid Color Filter
(String Input box: a Green color background indicates a valid Display filter;
a Red color background indicates an invalid Display filter)

7. Click the “OK” button to create the Coloring rule.

By default, the new Coloring rule is placed at the top of the list in the Coloring rules manager, the rules are processed and the result is illustrated below:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
3	0.000334	192.168.2.94	192.168.2.1	DNS	70	Standard query 0x5569 A google.com
4	0.418107	192.168.2.1	192.168.2.94	DNS	326	Standard query response 0x5569 A 203.42.0.182 A 203.42.0.177 A 203.42.0.157
5	0.422497	192.168.2.94	203.42.0.182	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=13/3328, ttl=128 (reply in 6)
6	0.762974	203.42.0.182	192.168.2.94	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) reply id=0x0001, seq=13/3328, ttl=57 (request in 5)
7	1.432834	192.168.2.94	203.42.0.182	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=14/3584, ttl=128 (reply in 8)
8	1.843066	203.42.0.182	192.168.2.94	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) reply id=0x0001, seq=14/3584, ttl=57 (request in 7)
9	2.431206	192.168.2.94	203.42.0.182	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=15/3840, ttl=128 (reply in 10)
10	2.722880	203.42.0.182	192.168.2.94	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) reply id=0x0001, seq=15/3840, ttl=57 (request in 9)
11	3.429619	192.168.2.94	203.42.0.182	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=16/4096, ttl=128 (reply in 12)
12	3.733045	203.42.0.182	192.168.2.94	ICMP	74	Echo (ping) reply id=0x0001, seq=16/4096, ttl=57 (request in 11)

Figure 12: The “Windows ICMP Echo Request” Coloring Rule was successfully applied, highlighting the ICMP Echo Request (Ping) packets: 5, 7, 9, and 11 using the configured color scheme

To identify the Coloring rule that was applied to a specific packet, select one of the packets (i.e. ICMP Echo Request) from the Packet List, and expand the frame section in the Packet Details pane to reveal the details of the applied Coloring Rule (as shown in

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Figure 13). It is also possible to display a list of packets with the same applied rule; right-click on the Coloring rule in the Packet Details pane, and select the option to apply it as a simple Display filter.




Figure 13: Identifying the triggered Coloring Rule from the Frame section in the Packet Details pane

To manage an existing Coloring rule listed in the Coloring rules manager, select the required Coloring rule and click on the appropriate option button. A temporary disabled Coloring rule is shown with its Coloring rule name and filter string being strikethrough in the Coloring rules manager. The example in Figure 10 shows the disabled ‘Checksum Error’ Coloring rule.

To share a copy of the Coloring rules used in the current Wireshark Profile, use the Export option within the Coloring rules manager to save it to a file. The Import option takes in a file containing the imported Coloring rules, and appends it to the end of any existing Coloring rules. This may include duplicated Coloring rules that can be removed using the Delete option.

2.4.1. Wireshark: colorfilters file

Wireshark saves pre-defined (default), imported or custom created Coloring rules of an active profile to a file named: “colorfilters”. It is located within the Personal configuration directory or *profiles* folder, and can be edited or reviewed using a text editor. The syntax used by Wireshark “colorfilters” file is explained below:

- # : denotes a single line comment, not processed as a coloring rule
- @ : denotes a delimiter used to identify and separate the required fields used to describe the Coloring Rule:

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e.g. @Coloring Rule Name@Display Filter String@[Background Color] [Foreground Color]

note: the Background and Foreground color co-ordinates are each separated by a comma

! : denotes a disabled Coloring Rule

```

1 # DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE! It was created by Wireshark
2 @Windows ICMP Echo Request@icmp.type == 8 && icmp.code == 0 and (data.len == 32)@51693,62630,15267@0,0,0
3 @Bad TCP@tcp.analysis.flags && !tcp.analysis.window_update@4718,10030,11796@63479,34695,34695
4 @HSRP State Change@hsrp.state != 8 && hsrp.state != 16@4718,10030,11796@65535,64764,40092
5 @Spanning Tree Topology Change@stp.type == 0x80@4718,10030,11796@65535,64764,40092
6 @OSPF State Change@ospf.msg != 1@4718,10030,11796@65535,64764,40092
7 @ICMP errors@icmp.type eq 3 || icmp.type eq 4 || icmp.type eq 5 || icmp.type eq 11 || icmpv6.type eq 1 || icmpv6.type eq 2 || icmpv6.type eq 3 || icmpv6.type eq 4
8 @ARP@arp@4250,61680,55255@4718,10030,11796
9 @ICMPv6@icmp || icmpv6@64764,57569,65535@4718,10030,11796
10 @TCP RST@tcp.flags.reset eq 1@42148,0,0@65535,64764,40092
11 @SCTP Abort@sctp.chunk_type eq ABORT@42148,0,0@65535,64764,40092
12 @TTL low or unexpected@(! ip.dst == 224.0.0.0/4 && ip.ttl < 5 && !pim) || (ip.dst == 224.0.0.0/24 && ip.ttl != 1)@42148,0,0@60652,61680,60395
13 @Checksum Errors@cdp.chksum_bad==1 || ip.chksum_bad==1 || tcp.chksum_bad==1 || udp.chksum_bad==1 || sctp.chksum_bad==1 || mstp.chksum_bad==1 ||
    cdp.chksum_bad==1 || gdp.chksum_bad==1 || wlan.fcs_bad==1@4718,10030,11796@63479,34695,34695
14 @SMB@smb || nbss || nbns || nbix || ipxsap || netbios@65278,65535,53456@4718,10030,11796
15 @HTTP@http || tcp.port == 80@58596,65535,51143@4718,10030,11796
16 @IPX@ipx || spx@65534,58325,58808@4718,10030,11796
17 @DCE/RPC@dcerpc@51199,38706,65533@4718,10030,11796
18 @Routing@barp || rarp || ospf || bgp || cdp || vrrp || gvrp || ismp@65534,62325,54808@4718,10030,11796
19 @TCP SYN/FIN@tcp.flags & 0x02 || tcp.flags.fin == 1@41026,41026,41026@4718,10030,11796
20 @TCP@tcp@59345,58980,65535@4718,10030,11796
21 @UDP@udp@56026,61166,65535@4718,10030,11796
22 @Broadcast@eth[0] & 1@65535,65535,65535@47802,48573,46774
  
```

Figure 14: The Wireshark `colorfilters` file showing the syntax used for Wireshark pre-defined and custom Coloring rules

2.4.2. Wireshark: colorfilters file

To determine or verify the processing order of the Wireshark Coloring rules, we will re-order the “Windows ICMP Echo Request” Coloring rule created earlier, and moving it below the Wireshark pre-defined “ICMP” Coloring rule as shown in the figure below:




Figure 15: The re-ordering (up/down move buttons) of the Windows ICMP Echo Request Coloring Rule

The results illustrated in Figure 16, shows that Wireshark processed the Coloring rules sequentially from top to bottom in the order they are listed, until a match is found for each packet. If there is no match, the Wireshark default Coloring rule is applied. Essentially, a more specific rule should be placed before a general rule to ensure that the Coloring rule is triggered during processing.




Figure 16: The re-ordering of the Coloring ruleset, invoked the Wireshark pre-defined ICMP Coloring Rule and removing the colors from the ICMP Echo Request (Ping) packets: 5, 7, 9, and 11

3. Network Reconnaissance

Network reconnaissance is one of the most important stages of any attack. It aims to identify active hosts listening on the targeted network. It is during this information gathering and preparatory phase that the attacker(s) maps the network topology, identify network devices, host IP addresses, open ports, network services and operating system information that can be associated to known or potential vulnerabilities; exploiting it to gain unauthorized access and control its targets. The more complete is the information gathered about the targeted network and its hosts, the higher chance of a successful attack.

3.1. DNS Reconnaissance

Domain Name Server (DNS) is used to translate a domain name to an IP address. An organization's public accessible domain name server generally stores its own DNS records and can provide a variety of information, including its function described in RFC1035 (Mocakapetris, 1987).

DNS information is publicly available and can be queried using built-in operating system command line tools such as nslookup, host, or dig. This information is extremely useful to an attacker, since DNS reconnaissance can easily obtain a list of known host IP addresses from the targeted network.

Unlike normal DNS query and response that occurs over UDP Port 53, DNS zone transfer requests and responses occur over TCP Port 53. DNS zone transfer is the replication process to provide a copy of the DNS zone file resource records from a primary DNS server to a set of secondary DNS server(s). DNS zone transfer request/response should be restricted to known secondary DNS server(s); otherwise, an entire copy of the DNS zone file can be requested.

The following Wireshark compound Display filters retrieve any DNS Zone Transfer requests and responses from within a packet trace file:

```
DNS Zone Transfer request:
(tcp.dstport == 53) && (dns.flags.response == 0) && (dns.qry.type == 0x00fc)

DNS Zone Transfer response:
(tcp.srcport == 53) && (dns.flags.response == 1) && (dns.qry.type == 0x00fc)
```

3.1.1. DNS Information

To retrieve a list of DNS queries and responses from within a packet trace file, use the following Wireshark Display filters:

```
DNS queries and responses : dns
DNS queries                : dns.flags.response == 0
DNS response               : dns.flags.response == 1
```

To display a list of DNS queries or responses containing a specific record type, e.g. DNS A record; a common list of DNS record types is also provided in Table 2:

```
DNS query      : (dns.flags.response == 0) and (dns.qry.type == 0x0001)
DNS response   : (dns.flags.response == 1) && (dns.resp.type == 0x0001)
```

A	IPv4 host address	0x0001
AAAA	IPv6 host address	0x001c
NS	authoritative name server	0x0002
CNAME	alias canonical name	0x0005
SOA	start of zone authority	0x0006
PTR	Domain name pointer	0x000c
HINFO	host info	0x000d
MINFO	mailbox/mail list info	0x000e
MX	mail exchange	0x000f
AXFR	zone transfer	0x00fc

Table 2: A list of common DNS records types

Alternatively, Wireshark can display a list of all name resolution from within a packet trace file via “Show Address Resolution” option found under the Statistics Menu:




Figure 17: A list of DNS name resolution obtained from within a trace file

3.2. Network Mapping

Network mapping attempts to elicit response from active hosts, mapping its topology, identifying its IP address, listening ports and services provided over the network.

3.2.1. NMAP Host Discovery & Port Scanning

Network Mapper or commonly known as NMAP was released by Gordon “Fyodor” Lyon as an open source utility in 1997 for network exploration and security auditing, and runs on Linux, OS-X, and Windows (Lyon, 2008). While an exhaustive explanation of every NMAP option and scan technique is not possible, the focus is on identifying the type of network scans. It is essential to mention that packet-crafting tools, such as Hping⁵ or Scapy⁶ can create similar packets to elicit response. The following are some of the observation made regarding NMAP⁷ host discovery and port scanning options:

- **NMAP Host Discovery: Ping Scan**

NMAP Ping scan is used only for host discovery, it does not conduct a port scan if it identifies an active host. This is the default scan uses by NMAP before starting its port or service scanning and remote OS fingerprinting (Lyon, 2014), and can be disabled.

⁵ Hping, an open source software available via <http://www.hping.org/download.html>

⁶ Scapy, an open source software available via <http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy>

⁷ NMAP version 6.01 was used in this paper and can be found as part of Backtrack 5-R3 Linux Penetration Testing distribution which has been discontinued, but available via: <http://ftp.uio.no/pub/security/backtrack/>

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According to the NMAP man page, running NMAP Ping scan in privilege mode sends the following four packets to identify an active host (shown with the corresponding Wireshark Display filters to identify NMAP Ping scan):

1. NMAP sends an ICMP Echo Request with no data

```
(ip.flags == 0x00) && (icmp.type == 8 && icmp.code == 0) &&
(icmp.seq == 0) && (not data)
```

2. NMAP sends a TCP SYN to port 443

```
(ip.flags == 0x00) && (tcp.flags == 0x0002) &&
(tcp.dstport == 443)
```

3. NMAP sends a TCP ACK to port 80

```
(ip.flags == 0x00) && (tcp.flags == 0x0010) &&
(tcp.dstport == 80)
```

4. NMAP sends an ICMP timestamp request without originate time

```
(ip.flags == 0x00) && (icmp.type == 13 && icmp.code == 0) &&
(icmp.seq == 0) && (icmp[8:4] == 00:00:00:00) && (not data)
```

Before adding the above Wireshark Display Filters to the Coloring rules, it is pertinent to remember the order of precedence. By re-ordering the fourth ICMP rule before the first ICMP rule ensures the Coloring rule is correctly triggered. The figure below illustrates the successful application of the Coloring rules to identify NMAP Ping scan packets:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.2.10	192.168.2.1	DNS	75	Standard query 0x5f15 A scanme.nmap.org
2	1.597149	192.168.2.1	192.168.2.10	DNS	91	Standard query response 0x5f15 A 74.207.244.221
3	1.606320	192.168.2.10	74.207.244.221	ICMP	42	Echo (ping) request id=0xe4f1, seq=0/0, ttl=38
4	1.606758	192.168.2.10	74.207.244.221	TCP	58	62070 > https [SYN] Seq=0 win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
5	1.606927	192.168.2.10	74.207.244.221	TCP	54	62070 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=1024 Len=0
6	1.607092	192.168.2.10	74.207.244.221	ICMP	54	Timestamp request id=0x7e71, seq=0/0, ttl=46
7	2.495778	74.207.244.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	60	https > 62070 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=0 Len=0

Figure 18: The Coloring Rules detect NMAP Ping scan successfully in packets: 3-6; illustrating the characteristics documented in the man page for NMAP Ping scan

3.2.2. NMAP Port Scanning

▪ TCP SYN Stealth scan:

The NMAP Stealth scan is a half-open TCP SYN scan. It does not complete the TCP 3-way handshake. NMAP sends a SYN packet to elicit a SYN/ACK packet response from a listening port. If it receives a response, NMAP sends a RST packet to tear down the connection. The following Wireshark Display filter identifies the TCP SYN packet:

```
(ip.flags == 0x00) && (tcp.flags == 0x0002) &&
(tcp.option_kind == 2) && not (tcp.option_kind == 3 ||
tcp.option_kind == 4)
```

■ TCP Connect scan:

The NMAP TCP Connect scan completes the TCP 3-way handshake with the target listening port(s), and tears down the connection with a RST/ACK packet.

The following Wireshark Display filter identifies the TCP SYN packet:

```
(ip.flags == 0x02) && (tcp.flags == 0x0002) &&
(tcp.option_kind == 2 && tcp.option_kind == 3 &&
tcp.option_kind == 4 && tcp.option_kind == 8)
```

While both NMAP TCP SYN Stealth and TCP Connect scans initiate destination port connection using TCP SYN packet, a notable difference in the IP header was observed:

- NMAP SYN Stealth scan sends SYN packet with IP Don't Fragment flag set to 0 and a single TCP Option: Maximum Segment Size (MSS).
- NMAP Connect scan sends SYN packet with IP Don't Fragment flag set to 1 with multiple TCP Options.

The Display filters described above were added to the Wireshark Coloring rules, with the results in Figure 19 illustrating the differences:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	ICMP	42	Echo (ping) request id=0x9f7a, seq=0/0, ttl=51
2	0.000445	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	58	38959 > 443 [SYN] Seq=1517360426 win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
3	0.000644	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	54	38959 > 80 [ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1517360426 win=1024 Len=0
4	0.000809	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	ICMP	54	Timestamp request id=0x43eb, seq=0/0, ttl=56
5	0.525845	74.207.224.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	60	443 > 38959 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1517360427 win=0 Len=0
6	0.529472	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	58	38959 > 1720 [SYN] Seq=3356789139 win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
7	0.529669	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	58	38959 > 993 [SYN] Seq=3356789139 win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
8	0.529828	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	58	38959 > 22 [SYN] Seq=3356789139 win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
9	0.530002	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	58	38959 > 995 [SYN] Seq=3356789139 win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
10	0.530177	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	58	38959 > 143 [SYN] Seq=3356789139 win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
11	0.530333	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	58	38959 > 139 [SYN] Seq=3356789139 win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
12	0.530553	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	58	38959 > 23 [SYN] Seq=3356789139 win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
13	0.530700	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	58	38959 > 110 [SYN] Seq=3356789139 win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
14	0.530867	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	58	38959 > 113 [SYN] Seq=3356789139 win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
15	0.531033	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	58	38959 > 113 [SYN] Seq=3356789139 win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
16	0.828738	74.207.224.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	60	993 > 38959 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=3356789140 win=0 Len=0
17	0.829015	74.207.224.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	60	995 > 38959 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=3356789140 win=0 Len=0
18	0.829183	74.207.224.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	60	143 > 38959 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=3356789140 win=0 Len=0
19	0.829301	74.207.224.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	60	110 > 38959 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=3356789140 win=0 Len=0
20	0.829510	74.207.224.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	60	1720 > 38959 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=3356789140 win=0 Len=0
21	0.829828	74.207.224.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	60	139 > 38959 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=3356789140 win=0 Len=0
22	0.829926	74.207.224.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	60	22 > 38959 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1031594524 Ack=3356789140 win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1400
23	0.829944	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	54	38959 > 22 [RST] Seq=3356789140 win=0 Len=0
24	0.830075	74.207.224.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	60	23 > 38959 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=3356789140 win=0 Len=0
25	0.830356	74.207.224.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	60	113 > 38959 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=3356789140 win=0 Len=0
26	2.842943	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	ICMP	42	Echo (ping) request id=0xc301, seq=0/0, ttl=57
27	2.843342	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	58	50771 > 443 [SYN] Seq=1422017016 win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
28	2.843563	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	54	50771 > 80 [ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1422017016 win=1024 Len=0
29	2.843736	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	ICMP	54	Timestamp request id=0x03ec, seq=0/0, ttl=45
30	2.843876	74.207.224.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	60	412 > 50771 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1422017016 win=0 Len=0
31	3.285032	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	74	44172 > 256 [SYN] Seq=2736238283 win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=59385740 TSecr=0 WS=16
32	3.285231	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	74	42829 > 8888 [SYN] Seq=3028681354 win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=59385740 TSecr=0 WS=16
33	3.285407	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	74	40665 > 199 [SYN] Seq=1800058087 win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=59385740 TSecr=0 WS=16
34	3.285544	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	74	46930 > 3389 [SYN] Seq=3787517964 win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=59385740 TSecr=0 WS=16
35	3.285693	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	74	55063 > 23 [SYN] Seq=2448684915 win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=59385740 TSecr=0 WS=16
36	3.285827	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	74	57897 > 53 [SYN] Seq=869975494 win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=59385740 TSecr=0 WS=16
37	3.285961	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	74	33370 > 5900 [SYN] Seq=2664138045 win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=59385740 TSecr=0 WS=16
38	3.286087	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	74	42146 > 113 [SYN] Seq=391903878 win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=59385740 TSecr=0 WS=16
39	3.286219	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	74	54472 > 1723 [SYN] Seq=3326394039 win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=59385740 TSecr=0 WS=16
40	3.286315	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	74	40869 > 21 [SYN] Seq=458458218 win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=59385740 TSecr=0 WS=16
41	3.290863	74.207.224.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	74	53 > 57897 [SYN, ACK] Seq=2621061212 Ack=869975494 win=5792 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=124042779 TSecr=124042779
42	3.290991	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	66	57897 > 53 [ACK] Seq=869975494 Ack=2621061212 win=14608 Len=0 TSval=59385740 TSecr=124042779
43	3.291120	192.168.2.10	74.207.224.221	TCP	66	57897 > 53 [RST, ACK] Seq=869975494 Ack=2621061212 win=14608 Len=0 TSval=59385740 TSecr=124042779
44	3.593654	74.207.224.221	192.168.2.10	TCP	60	3389 > 46930 [RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=3787517965 win=0 Len=0

Figure 19: Coloring rules applied to identify packets relating to NMAP Stealth Scan and TCP Connect Scan

4. Detecting Web Server Scanning

Apart from mapping the topology of a private network or port scanning for listening hosts connected to Internet, attackers are also looking for vulnerable web servers; seemingly looking for any opportunity to compromise the integrity of the web server via a vulnerability, and gaining access to its data store.

Nikto is a web server scanner, an open-source project that is publicly available (Sullo & Lodge, 2012). It can be used by a diligent system administrator with explicit given permission or by an attacker to discover well-known vulnerabilities, mis-configurations, and unpatched software installed on the web server(s). Nikto performs a number of tests on web servers, including directory traversal attempts to access restricted directories on the web server, trying to gain access to the underlying operating system or known data files, and attempts to execute commands outside of the web server root directory.

A simple Wireshark Display filter, using the “contains” comparison operator can be used to match a sequence of hexadecimal byte values (shown in ASCII as ../) to return a list of directory traversal attempts:

`http.request.uri contains 2e:2e:2f:`




Figure 20: Identifying Nikto scan via its user-agent string


In the figure above, the user-agent string captured within the HTTP request shows that the web traffic was generated by Nikto scan. By extending the above filter, a compound Display filter is created to identify Nikto and its related directory traversal attempts:

`http.user_agent contains "Nikto" and http.request.uri contains 2e:2e:2f:`

To display a list of directory traversals with its corresponding response, update the Wireshark Display filter to search the packet frame:

`frame contains 2e:2e:2f:`

As shown in Figure 21, a manual review identifies a successful attack amongst the scanning activities:



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.107	HTTP	544	GET /mybank/download.php?file=../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
2	4.518798	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.107	HTTP	547	GET /mybank/download.php?file=../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
3	8.686576	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.107	HTTP	550	GET /mybank/download.php?file=../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
4	8.689037	192.168.126.107	192.168.126.111	HTTP	1387	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
5	34.807862	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.107	HTTP	550	GET /mybank/download.php?file=../../../../etc/shadow HTTP/1.1
6	26448.23415	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	HTTP	209	GET /phpmyadmin/db_details_importdocsql.php?submit_show=true&do=import&docpath=... HTTP/1.0
7	26448.24239	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	HTTP	298	GET /db_details_importdocsql.php?submit_show=true&do=import&docpath=... HTTP/1.0
8	26448.34806	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	HTTP	301	GET /netget?userid=300&file=../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.0
9	26448.35591	192.168.126.103	192.168.126.111	HTTP	790	HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found (text/html)
10	26448.36734	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	HTTP	268	GET /cobalet/sysManager/?admin=1&access HTTP/1.0
11	26448.37038	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	HTTP	303	GET /atom/cboard/index.php?location=../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.0
12	26448.37152	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	HTTP	316	GET /current/modules.php?mod=fr&file=../../../../etc/passwd&bn=fm.di HTTP/1.0
13	26448.37251	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	HTTP	307	GET /current/index.php?site=demos&bn=../../../../etc/passwd&bn HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n
 Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2014 03:26:44 GMT\r\n
 Server: Apache/2.2.12 (Ubuntu) mod_mono/2.4.2 PHP/5.2.10-Zubuntu6.5 with Suhosin-Patch mod_ssl/2.2.12 OpenSSL/0.9.8g\r\n
 X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.10-Zubuntu6.5\r\n
 Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\r\n
 Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n
 Pragma: no-cache\r\n
 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=../../../../etc/passwd\r\n
 Vary: Accept-Encoding\r\n
 Content-Encoding: gzip\r\n
 Content-Length: 813\r\n
 Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=98\r\n
 Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n
 Content-Type: text/html\r\n
 \r\n
 [HTTP response 3/3]

Content-Encoded entity body (gzip): 813 bytes -> 1939 bytes

Line-based text data: text/html


```

root:x0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
sync:x4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
man:x6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh
lp:x7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh
  
```

Figure 21: Detecting a successful directory traversal attack, retrieving the /etc/password file

While it is trivial to modify the user-agent⁸ string, the following Wireshark compound Display filter is created to retrieve any HTTP request(s) containing uncommon user-agent strings, with its result shown in Figure 22:

```
http.request && (not http.user_agent matches "(?i)
(Chrome|Mozilla|Gecko|MSIE|Safari|AppleWebKit|Android|Blackberry|Opera) ")
```



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Flags	Info
8	0.988377	192.168.2.11	203.42.8.227	HTTP	0x0018	[TCP Retransmission] GET / HTTP/1.1

Frame 8: 216 bytes on wire (1728 bits), 216 bytes captured (1728 bits)

Ethernet II, Src: c0:ff:ee:41:77:e2 (c0:ff:ee:41:77:e2), Dst: 00:60:64:9d:c5:dd (00:60:64:9d:c5:dd)

Internet Protocol version 4, Src: 192.168.2.11 (192.168.2.11), Dst: 203.42.8.227 (203.42.8.227)

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 33907 (33907), Dst Port: 80 (80), Seq: 1300366467, Ack: 3592908116, Len: 162

[2 Reassembled TCP Segments (163 bytes): #5(4), #8(162)]

Hypertext Transfer Protocol

GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
 [Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
 Request Method: GET
 Request URI:
 Request version: / HTTP/1.1
 Host: www.google.com\r\n
 Accept: */*\r\n
 Accept-Encoding: identity, deflate, compress, gzip\r\n
 User-Agent: python-requests/0.13.6 CPython/2.6.5 Linux/3.2.6\r\n
 \r\n
 [Full request URI: http://www.google.com]
 [HTTP request 1/1]
 [Response in frame: 11]

Figure 22: Identifying a non-browser based web request

⁸ A comprehensive list of user-agent string can be found via <http://www.useragentstring.com/pages/useragentstring.php>

5. Detecting Host Exploitation

While it is not possible to discuss every attack and exploitation technique used in the wild, researching common attack vectors can help Incident Responders recognize the type of attacks used by the attacker(s). As an example, we will briefly discuss using Wireshark Coloring rules to detect an FTP brute force attack.

5.1. FTP Account/Password Guessing & Brute Force Attack

File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server can be easily setup for sharing of files across the Internet. It is described in RFC959, and utilizes a client/server model. The client connects to the FTP server on TCP Port 21 (control channel for FTP command) to initiate a service request, but utilizes a separate port for data exchange (Postel & Reynolds, 1985). In relation to data exchange, an FTP server can operate in either Active or Passive mode:

- In Active FTP mode: client issues the "PORT" command and provides the listening data port. The FTP server then uses TCP Port 20 to connect to the client specified port for data exchange.
- In Passive FTP mode: server provides the listening data port in response to client "PASV" command request. The client then connects to server specified port for data exchange.

According to RFC959, the data port is communicated using the convention: h1,h2,h3,h4,p1,p2, where h1-h4 is the host address and the listening port for data exchange is computed using the value of p1 and p2, such that the port is: $p1*256+p2$.

Some of the common client service commands found in RFC959 are listed below:

USER	submit username for login to FTP Server
PASS	submit password for login to FTP Server
LIST	request for a list of files in the current directory
STOR	upload data onto FTP server
RETR	download data from the server

The following Wireshark Display filter displays the list of FTP related commands issued by the FTP client in a packet trace file: `ftp.request.command`

It is also important to know that FTP transactions are in cleartext, thus susceptible to sniffing attacks. Depending on its configuration, it can also be prone to user

account/password brute force attacks. Unbeknownst to the owner, their FTP server can be attacked for nefarious use, such as hosting malicious malware, and insidious use of sharing offensive images over the Internet.

In Wireshark, the protocol name: “ftp” displays related packets that communicate on FTP command channel, TCP port 21. FTP data channel can be located using the field name: “ftp-data”. Nonetheless, it is essential to review the packets to identify and verify the host IP address and data port number via a simple Wireshark Display filter:

```
(ftp.request.command == PORT) or (ftp.response.code == 227)
```

To identify brute force attack on an FTP server, create the following Display filters and add them as two separate Coloring rules:

To display a list of credential used in FTP server login attempts:

```
(ftp.request.command == "USER") or (ftp.request.command == "PASS")
```

To confirm a successful login to the FTP server:

```
(ftp.response.code == 200)
```

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Flags	Info
520	77.627246	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	FTP	0x0018	Request: USER bob
521	77.627434	192.168.126.103	192.168.126.111	FTP	0x0018	Response: 331 user name okay, need password.
526	77.629863	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	FTP	0x0018	Request: USER bob
527	77.629837	192.168.126.103	192.168.126.111	FTP	0x0018	Response: 331 user name okay, need password.
528	77.630097	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	FTP	0x0018	Request: USER bob
529	77.630287	192.168.126.103	192.168.126.111	FTP	0x0018	Response: 331 user name okay, need password.
530	77.630631	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	FTP	0x0018	Request: USER bob
531	77.630741	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	FTP	0x0018	Request: PASS iloveu
532	77.630818	192.168.126.103	192.168.126.111	FTP	0x0018	Response: 331 user name okay, need password.
533	77.631102	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	FTP	0x0018	Request: USER bob
534	77.631228	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	FTP	0x0018	Request: PASS brandy
535	77.631608	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	FTP	0x0018	Request: USER bob
536	77.631939	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	FTP	0x0018	Request: USER bob
537	77.632196	192.168.126.103	192.168.126.111	FTP	0x0018	Response: 230-
538	77.632307	192.168.126.103	192.168.126.111	FTP	0x0018	Response: 331 user name okay, need password.
539	77.632421	192.168.126.103	192.168.126.111	FTP	0x0018	Response: 331 user name okay, need password.
540	77.632426	192.168.126.103	192.168.126.111	FTP	0x0018	Response: 331 user name okay, need password.
541	77.632546	192.168.126.103	192.168.126.111	FTP	0x0018	Response: 530 Password not accepted.

Figure 23: Wireshark Coloring rules successfully detects FTP brute Force login attack

As illustrated in the figure above, the Incident Responder can quickly identify the automated attack using the request time sequence, and reliably determine any successful login. To investigate subsequent actions, right-click on the packet: “FTP Response: 230-” in the Packet List, and select the Wireshark option to “Follow TCP stream”. It brings up a dialog box showing the entire conversation stream, including any request that occurs after the successful login.

6. Data Recovery

Apart from compromising a system, attacker(s) will attempt to take a foothold of its victim's infrastructure. They will commonly upload toolkits, insert backdoors, and extract data from compromised machines. These may include password hash files for offline password cracking, intellectual property data, email and business financial or transaction records, etc. In this section, we will take advantage of Wireshark auto-packet reassemble feature, and use it like a forensic tool to recover data file from raw packet trace files.

6.1. Identification of common data files in packet trace file:

Prior to any data extraction or recovery, Wireshark Display filter or Coloring rules can be used for searching common data files contained within the packet trace file. The following described some of the options:

1. Search by common file extension (e.g *.doc, *.pdf, *.exe, *.zip, *.gz., *.tar):

It is possible to search an entire packet using “frame” or search for packets relating to specified protocol, defined in lowercase (e.g. ip, tcp, icmp, udp, tftp, ftp, http, smtp, dns, bootp):

Option A: Use Wireshark comparison operator “contains” for case sensitive string matching of a single specific file extension:

```
frame contains ".exe"
```

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.126.103	192.168.126.111	TFTP	60	Read Request, File: nc.exe, Transfer type: octet
246	40.432351	192.168.126.103	192.168.126.111	TFTP	65	Read Request, File: tcpdump451.exe, Transfer type: octet

Options B: Use Wireshark PCRE comparison operator “matches” to search for a set of strings (keywords are separate by pipe |, group by brackets and enclosed by inverted commas, where \. denotes a dot and (?i) for case-insensitive search):

```
ftp matches "\.(?i)(exe|zip|7z|gz|tar|pdf|doc|xls)"
```

Filter: [ftp matches "(?i)(exe zip 7z gz tar pdf doc xls)"]				Expression...	Clear	Save
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info	
615	69.142097	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.107	FTP	Request: STOR /file.7z	
659	74.658843	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.107	FTP	Request: STOR /uploads/file.7z	
668	74.661062	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.107	FTP	Request: SITE CHMOD 644 /uploads/file.7z	
670	74.661320	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.107	FTP	Request: SITE UTIME 20140419151614 /uploads/file.7z	
707	128.213028192.168.126.111		192.168.126.107	FTP	Request: RETR /uploads/users.zip	
708	128.213877192.168.126.107		192.168.126.111	FTP	Response: 150 opening BINARY mode data connection for /uploads/Users.zip (1439829 bytes)	

It is also possible to search via specific fields name within a protocol, e.g. HTTP web request, with the result shown below:

```
http.request.uri matches "\.(?i)(exe|zip|7z)"
```


Filter:	http.request.uri matches "[a-z0-9]*" Expression... Clear Apply Save				
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
33	11.938996	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.107	HTTP	GET /ftp/tcpdump451.exe HTTP/1.1
44	19.491197	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.107	HTTP	GET /ftp/file.7z HTTP/1.1
49	22.762919	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.107	HTTP	GET /ftp/users-Accounts.zip HTTP/1.1
1276	29.963979	192.168.126.111	192.168.126.107	HTTP	GET /ftp/nc.exe HTTP/1.1

2. Search by known content or case insensitive string matching:

Wireshark comparison operator: “matches” enables PCRE string matching. As an example, the following Display filter identifies the data stored in the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files:

```
frame and (data.data matches "[a-zA-Z0-9]+" || data-text-lines matches "[a-zA-Z0-9]+")
```

Filter:	frame 88 (data.data.matches "[a-zA-Z0-9]+" data.text-lines.matches "[a-zA-Z0-9]+")		Expression...	Clear	Apply	Save
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.126.117	192.168.126.111	UDP	1010	Source port: 39321 Destination port: 1337
4	32.327918	192.168.126.117	192.168.126.111	UDP	1389	Source port: 37869 Destination port: 1337
18	124.285521	192.168.126.117	192.168.126.111	TCP	1413	58629 > 31337 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=14608 Len=1347 TSval=73589504 TSecr=53639567
26	152.374118	192.168.126.117	192.168.126.111	TCP	1034	58630 > 31337 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=14608 Len=968 TSval=73596616 TSecr=53647994
143	217.144683	192.168.126.107	192.168.126.111	HTTP	938	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/plain)
148	225.854453	192.168.126.107	192.168.126.111	HTTP	353	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/plain)

1

Frame 1: 1010 bytes on wire (8080 bits), 1010 bytes captured (8080 bits)

Ethernet II, Src: Co:ff:ee:41:77:e2 (Co:ff:ee:41:77:e2), Dst: Co:ff:33:41:77:ee (Co:ff:33:41:77:ee)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.126.117 (192.168.126.117), Dst: 192.168.126.111 (192.168.126.111)

User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 39321 (39321), Dst Port: 1337 (1337)

Data (968 bytes)

Data: 726f6f743a2436244b5a54a616b3858246f675634483347...

[Length: 968]

0020

7e 6f 99 99 05 39 03 d0 eb df f2 6f 74 3a 24

~o...9...oot:~

0030

86 24 4b 5a 55 4a 61 6b 38 58 24 6f 67 56 34 48

6KZUJAK 8x\$ogv4h

0040

83 47 6f 56 45 67 4c 4f 74 56 62 2f 70 67 30 44

8GvEgLo xJ8/p908

0050

41 58 65 4d 76 6b 61 4f 58 47 78 35 47 57 31 42

AXeMVKao xG\$5Gw18

0060

37 2e 31 71 61 33 78 5a 62 64 36 31 4a 55 5a 69

7.1q3xZ b6d1JUZ

0070

67 76 75 4a 57 56 70 52 49 64 65 30 3a 38 77 45

WwUdVp8 d6028w2

0080

62 33 73 66 6e 73 59 58 44 65 74 39 64 59 70 43

b38fnsYx det9dypc

0090

30 3a 31 36 31 30 33 3a 30 3a 39 39 39 39 3a 39

0:16103: 0:99999

00a0

37 3a 3a 64 65 65 6d 6f 6e 6a 78 3a 31 38

7::: dse monx:16

00b0

31 30 33 3a 30 3a 39 39 39 39 3a 37 3a 3a 3a

103:0:99 9997:::

00c0

0a 62 69 6e 78 3a 31 36 31 30 33 3a 30 3a 39

0:bin:x:1 6103:0:9

00d0

39 39 39 39 3a 37 3a 3a 3a 0a 73 79 73 3a 78 3a

999997:: x:99184

00e0

31 36 31 30 33 3a 30 3a 39 39 39 39 3a 37 3a

16103:0: 99999:7:

00f0

3a 3a 0a 73 79 6e 63 3a 78 3a 31 36 31 30 33 3a

1::sync: x:161034

0100

30 3a 39 39 39 39 3a 37 3a 3a 3a 0a 67 61 6e

0:99999: 7::: gam

0110

65 73 3a 78 3a 31 36 31 30 33 3a 30 3a 39 39 39

as:x:161 03:0:999

3. Search by file header signature (aka magic number):

Wireshark can also search for specific file types, using known file header signature. As an example, the Windows binary executable file contains the file header value: “MZ” (hex value: 0x4d5a), accompanied by a string of values: “This Program must be run under Win32” or “This program cannot be run in DOS”.

The following Wireshark Display filters search for Windows executable file header values (Bruneau, n.d.), and case insensitive text string matching for “This program”:

```
frame matches "(\x4d\x5a\x90|\x4d\x5a\x50)"
&& frame matches "(?i)this program"
```

Filter: matches "(\x4d\x5a\x90 \x4d\x5a\x50,)" && frame matches "(?)this program" Expression... Clear Apply Save						
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
6	1.234375	117.121.253.112	192.168.2.66	HTTP	1454	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/octet-stream)
28697	1224972.19192.168.126.111	192.168.126.103	UDP	558	Source port: 44655	destination port: 1219

To recover the data file, select the packet in display (from either Packet List or the Data field in the Packet Details pane). Right-click for the option to follow the protocol⁹ stream, then filter the conversation stream (uni-direction) to show the data content/binary file, and export the file as a raw file using the “Save-As” option.

⁹ For TCP Data Recovery, ensures that the TCP protocol preference is set to “Allow subsector to reassemble TCP streams”. In some instances, the combination use of hex editor and file carving using known file header signature may be required after exporting the data as a raw file.

6.2. Manual Data Recovery of SMTP Data Attachments


The SMTP email standard is described in RFC822 (Postel, 1982) and its attachments are encoded using Base64 multipurpose content transfer encoding described in RFC2045 (Freed & Borenstein, 1996). Emails can be used as a transport mechanism, sending malicious content via a spear-phishing attack directed at targeted employee(s), or it can be used as a means to exfiltrate data.

Manual recovery of SMTP data attachment requires the following steps:

1. Use the following Wireshark filter to locate SMTP packets with attachment(s):

```
smtp matches "(?i)(Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64|attachment)"
```

2. Select the packet in the Packet List pane, and right-click to select the Wireshark option: "Follow TCP stream". In the Wireshark Stream Content window, select the appropriate data stream containing the file attachment (shown in figure below; in Wireshark, Red color text denotes data sent by client, and Blue colortext denotes data sent by the server):



3. The MIME delimiter tag delimits each attachment. It starts after the line "Content-Disposition: ..." and terminates near the end of the MIME delimiter tag (as shown in the figure below):

```
b290IDEGMCB5IC9jbmZvIDpMcB5C19jRCBpPERE0ET3Q0JFM0U2RE04QkExMTk4RTAgRjQ1RkI4NDhCPjxERDhCN0NCRTNFKR0EjBMTES0EU0RKY0NUZCQDQ4Qj5dCj4+Cnn0YX00HJ1ZgpxMjM5Mw01JUVPRgc=
```

Highlight (left-click and drag) to select the data containing the attachment, then right-click to copy the data. Insert the data into a plaintext file and save the file.

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4. It is possible to decode the Base64 encoded data attachment using the base64 utility¹⁰ installed in a Linux workstation (example shown using Backtrack 5-R3¹¹) using the command shown in the diagram below:

```

root@bt5r3: ~/Desktop
File Edit View Terminal Help
root@bt5r3:~/Desktop# base64 -di rawfile > secret-recipe.pdf
root@bt5r3:~/Desktop# file secret-recipe.pdf
secret-recipe.pdf: PDF document, version 1.4

```

6.3. Data Recovery using Wireshark

For HTTP and SMB related file recovery, use the “Export Object” feature in Wireshark:

1. Use Wireshark Display filter, http to display web related packets:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
6	4.444117	192.168.2.3	8.30.239.206	HTTP	650	GET /extracting-objects-from-http-streams.html HTTP/1.1
10	6.400441	192.168.2.3	8.30.239.206	HTTP	355	GET /swfobject.js HTTP/1.1
11	6.400441	192.168.2.3	8.30.239.206	HTTP	355	GET /swfobject.js HTTP/1.1
16	6.759459	8.30.239.206	192.168.2.3	HTTP	355	HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found (text/html)
18	6.783334	192.168.2.3	8.30.239.206	HTTP	646	GET /wp-content/uploads/2009/07/extracting-objects-from-http-streams.swf HTTP/1.1
1490	39.999192	8.30.239.206	192.168.2.3	HTTP	319	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x-shockwave-flash)

2. Right-click on one of the TCP packets (in the Packet List or Packet Details pane) and ensure the TCP “Protocol Preferences” option to “Allow subdissector to reassemble TCP streams” is enabled (as shown in the diagram below):

The image shows the Wireshark interface with the 'Transmission Control Protocol' details pane selected. A context menu is open over the details pane, and the 'Protocol Preferences' option is selected. In the 'Transmission Control Protocol Preferences' dialog box, the 'Allow subdissector to reassemble TCP streams' checkbox is checked, indicated by a red arrow.

3. Click on the File Menu, and select “HTTP” within the “Export Objects”. Depending on the size of the packet trace file, it may take a while to reassemble the packets and load the HTTP object list shown below. Once it is loaded, select the file and use the save-as option to export the file.

Packet num	Hostname	Content Type	Size	Filename
10	evilrouters.net	text/html	1998 bytes	extracting-objects-from-http-streams.html
16	evilrouters.net	text/html	13 KB	swfobject.js
1490	evilrouters.net	application/x-shockwave-flash	1349 KB	extracting-objects-from-http-streams.swf

¹⁰ Linux Base64 utility is part of GNU core utilities available via <http://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/coreutils/> or

standalone Base64 utility for windows available via <http://www.fourmilab.ch/webtools/base64/base64.zip>


¹¹ Backtrack 5-R3 Linux Pentesting distribution has been discontinued, but available via: <http://ftp.uio.no/pub/security/backtrack/>

7. Detecting Covert Channels

In an environment that has implemented tight security controls, users may be looking at creative means to access the Internet for their favorite websites. In general, protocol tunneling carries non-legitimate traffic inside allowed protocol traffic to bypass restrictions or network security monitoring. Similarly, attacker(s) can be using tunneling techniques as a backdoor to maintain access to the network, or as a pivot to compromise other systems; allowing them to move within the environment without raising too much attention via such covert channel, and exfiltrate the data that are important to the organization.

7.1. Ping Tunnel (ptunnel): tunneling using ICMP packets

ptunnel is a free and open source software that can be used for tunneling TCP packets over ICMP Echo Request and Reply packets, and can be executed on a Windows or Linux based machines (Stodle, 2011).



As illustrated in the above diagram, the proxy is the bridge between the client and the destination host; communication between the client machine and the proxy host is conducted using ICMP Echo Request/Reply, the proxy host will forward the packets via TCP to the destination host. The ptunnel client software can be executed from the victim or the attacker's machine. However, ptunnel requires the attacker to have control of a machine that is used as a proxy host.

7.2. Wireshark: Detecting SSH over ICMP

The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is described in RFC777 and is used to communicate transient error condition (Postel, 1981). To determine if a host is online, an ICMP Echo Request (Type 8) is sent to elicit an ICMP Echo Reply (Type 0). These packets are commonly allowed to traverse within and across network perimeter.




Figure 24: ICMP Echo Request/Reply packet format

To provide an understanding of the fields contained within an ICMP Echo Request/Reply packet, the packet layout is shown in Figure 24. Normally, an ICMP Echo Request sent by a Windows operating system (in Figure 1), and Linux operating system (in Figure 25) contains 32 bytes and 48 bytes of data respectively. Excessive ICMP data size is abnormal and should be checked. As a defense against network mapping, external facing network devices should not be configured to respond to external ICMP request.




Figure 25: Linux ICMP Echo Request/Reply

Secure Shell (SSH) encrypts data packets in transit and its identification ensures that any unauthorized outbound encrypted traffic running from internal host(s) can be investigated, and prevented from leaving the network. To detect SSH encrypted session over ICMP packet in Wireshark, create a Display filter to list all ICMP packets matching case insensitive string “SSH-“:

```
icmp && data.data matches "(?i)SSH-"
```

One of the ICMP Echo Request packets, identified by the above Wireshark Display filter shows a ptunnel packet within its ICMP data section. A ptunnel packet can be identified by its magic hex-value: 0xD5200880 (highlighted in red box), and contained the corresponding ICMP header session identifier number (highlighted by the yellow boxes), shown in Figure 26 below:




Figure 26: Wireshark Display filter successfully displaying packets related to SSH tunneling over ICMP packets

A review of the packet that initiates the SSH session over ICMP (in Figure 27 below), shows the ptunnel packet within the ICMP data section (magic hex value: 0xD5200880), its final SSH destination host IP, and listening port in hexadecimal value.




Figure 27: The packet captured via the proxy shows the host that initiated the SSH session in packet 1 (the red box highlights the ptunnel magic value, the yellow box highlights the SSH destination host IP and the green box highlights the SSH destination host port)

Finally as a short-term containment measure, use Wireshark to create an Access Control List (ACL) rule for CISCO network device or supported firewalls to drop incoming or outgoing packets from a specific host by selecting the offending packet from the Packet List pane, and use the 'Firewall ACL rules' option located under the Tools Menu (as shown in Figure 28).




Figure 28: A list of supported firewalls shown in the Wireshark Firewall ACL rules option

8. Conclusion

When it comes to the number of options available for a packet and protocol analyzer, few come close to the number of options for the price offered by Wireshark. While it is not possible to describe every Wireshark option or create filters for every known or unknown attack, we can always seize the opportunity to think outside the box, and re-purpose the features that exist in Wireshark and apply it to our own situation. This paper described the basic features of Wireshark for packet analysis, and the advanced techniques using Coloring rules to deal with simple to complex network interaction and network attacks.

The Wireshark Coloring rules present another option in our detection and defense efforts, limited only by an Incident Responder's knowledge and creativity in developing meaningful Display filters and Coloring rules. It is portable, and can be used systematically to identify unauthorized activities, showing cause in the event of an attack to detect network reconnaissance and vulnerability scans, establishing source and type of attack, identify covert channels used for circumventing controls, and aid in the discovery and recovery of evidence from raw packet trace files. The flexibility of Wireshark Coloring rules is a useful tool to have in the Incident Responder's toolkit for packet analysis, and network forensics.

9. References

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10. Appendix

Here are some additional Wireshark Display filters that can be added as Coloring Rules:

- Identify IP routing options in use:

```
loose source    : 0x83
strict source   : 0x89
record route    : 0x07
timestamp       : 0x44
```

```
(ip.hdr_len > 20) && (ip.opt.type == 0x83 || ip.opt.type == 0x89 ||
ip.opt.type == 0x07 || ip.opt.type == 0x44)
```

- SMB – Identify upload of executable file(s):

```
(smb.create.action == 2) and (smb.file matches "\.(?i)exe")
```

SMB – Identify executable file(s) being opened:

```
(smb.create.action == 1) and (smb.file matches "\.(?i)exe")
```

SMB – Identify host operating system information:

```
smb.native_os && smb.native_lanman
```

- Identify data payload sent within a SYN packet, as permitted in section 3.4 of RFC793, (University of Southern California, 1981):

```
(tcp.flags == 0x0002) && (tcp.hdr_len >= 20) && (tcp.segment_data > 0)
```

- Possible fast flux DNS responses, consisting multiple IP addresses with low TTL:

```
(dns.flags.response == 1) && (dns.count.answers >= 5) &&
(dns.resp.ttl < 3600 || dns.resp.ttl < 86400 || dns.resp.ttl <
259200)
```

The “dns.count.answers” should be set to an arbitrary value of choice or made optional, as the filters also checks for low TTL value that is less than 1hr, 24hrs or 72hrs (Bambenek, 2008).

- A list of some useful HTTP Wireshark Display filters:

```
HTTP requests           : http.request
HTTP responses           : http.response
Successful HTTP response : http.response.code == 200
HTTP client(4xx) or server(5xx)errors : http.response code > 399
```

HTTP options via the Statistics menu returns related HTTP information:

- HTTP >> Packet counter: returns a list of HTTP request methods and status code responses
- HTTP >> Requests: returns a list of request to each Web server
- HTTP >> Load distribution: returns the number of requests & responses for each web server

- NMAP remote active OS Fingerprinting:

NMAP sends at least 16 probes to conduct remote active OS fingerprinting. The unique probes documented in the NMAP Network Scanning book (Lyon, 2008) were used to create the corresponding Display filters for the Coloring rules:

- **TCP Options, Sequence Generation Probes: O1-O6**

NMAP TCP Option and Sequence Generation probes send 6 TCP SYN packets to an open port, each containing different TCP options. The options for each probe are described below, followed by the corresponding Wireshark compound Display filters:

O1: window scale (10), NOP, MSS (1460), timestamp (TSval: 0xFFFFFFFF; TSecr: 0), SACK permitted. The window field is 1.

```
O1:
tcp.flags == 0x0002) && (frame[54:3] == 03:03:0a) &&
(tcp.options.mss_val == 1460) &&
(tcp.options.sack_perm == 1) &&
(tcp.options.timestamp.tsval == 4294967295) &&
(tcp.options.timestamp.tsecr == 0) &&
(tcp.window_size_value == 1)

alternatively O1:
(tcp.flags == 0x0002) && (tcp.window_size_value == 1) &&
(tcp.options ==
03:03:0a:01:02:04:05:b4:08:0a:ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00:00:00:04:02)
```

O2: MSS (1400), window scale (0), SACK permitted, Timestamp (TSval: 0xFFFFFFFF; TSecr: 0), EOL. The window field is 63.

```
O2:
(tcp.flags == 0x0002) && (frame[58:3] == 03:03:00) &&
(tcp.options.mss_val == 1400) &&
(tcp.options.sack_perm == 1) &&
(tcp.options.timestamp.tsval == 4294967295) &&
(tcp.options.timestamp.tsecr == 0) && (frame[73:1] == 00)
&& (tcp.window_size_value == 63)

Alternatively O2:
(tcp.flags == 0x0002) && (tcp.window_size_value == 63) &&
(tcp.options ==
02:04:05:78:03:03:00:04:02:08:0a:ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00:00:00:00:00)
```

O3: Timestamp (TSval: 0xFFFFFFFF; TSecr: 0), NOP, NOP, window scale (5), NOP, MSS (640). The window field is 4.

```
O3:
(tcp.flags == 0x0002) && (tcp.window_size_value == 4) &&
(tcp.options ==
08:0a:ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00:00:00:01:01:03:03:05:01:02:04:02:80)
```

O4: SACK permitted, Timestamp (TSval: 0xFFFFFFFF; TSecr: 0), window scale (10), EOL. The window field is 4.

```
O4:
(tcp.flags == 0x0002) && (tcp.window_size_value == 4) &&
(tcp.options ==
04:02:08:0a:ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00:00:00:03:03:0a:00)
```

O5: MSS (536), SACK permitted, Timestamp (TSval: 0xFFFFFFFF; TSecr: 0), window scale (10), EOL. The window field is 16.

```
05:
(tcp.flags == 0x0002) && (tcp.window_size_value == 16) &&
(tcp.options ==
02:04:02:18:04:02:08:0a:ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00:00:00:03:03:0a:00)
```

O6: MSS (265), SACK permitted, Timestamp (TSval: 0xFFFFFFFF; TSecr: 0). The window field is 512.

```
O6:
(tcp.flags == 0x0002) && (tcp.window_size_value == 512) &&
(tcp.options ==
02:04:01:09:04:02:08:0a:ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00:00:00)
```

- **ICMP Probe: IE1 and IE2**

The ICMP probes are sent immediately after the previous TCP Sequence Generation probes. NMAP sends the first ICMP echo request packet with the IP Don't Fragment flag set, a Type-of-Service (TOS) of value 0, ICMP type 8, Code 9 (instead of 0), random IP identifier, ICMP sequence number: 295, and a data payload containing 120 bytes of 0x00. The first Wireshark filter has the data payload value hard coded 120 times. An alternative filter is provided below using the Wireshark PCRE “matches” comparison operator, nonetheless both filters provide similar result:

[illegible]

NMAP sends the second ICMP echo request packet with IP Don't Fragment flag set 0, a Type-of-Service (TOS) of value 4, ICMP type 8 Code 0, IP ID was incremented by 1 from previous value used by IE1, ICMP sequence number: 296, and a data payload of 150 bytes of 0x00. The following Wireshark filter was updated to reflect the changes:

```
IE2:
(ip.flags == 0x00) && (ip.dsfield == 4) && (icmp.type == 8)
&& (icmp.code == 0) && (icmp.seq == 296) && (data.data
matches "\x00+") && (data.len == 150)
```

○ UDP Probe: U1

NMAP attempts to elicit an ICMP port unreachable packet from a closed UDP port, with a UDP packet consisting of IP identification value of 0x1042, and a data payload containing 300 'C' (0x43) characters.

```
U1:
(udp && not icmp) && (ip.id == 0x1042) && (data.len == 300)
&& (data.data matches "\x43{300}")
```

○ TCP Explicit Congestion Notification Probe: ECN

NMAP sends a SYN packet to an open TCP port with the Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN), Congestion Window Reduced (CWR) and Explicit Congestion Notification Echo (ECE) control flag set. An urgent pointer value of 0xF7F5, urgent flag not set, windows size of 3, and TCP options consisting: windows scale (10), No Operation (NOP), Maximum Segment Size, MSS (1460), Selective ACKnowledgement (SACK) permitted, NOP, NOP.

```
ECN:
(tcp.flags == 0x08c2) && (tcp.window_size_value == 3) &&
(tcp.urgent_pointer == 0xf7f5) &&
(tcp.options == 03:03:0a:01:02:04:05:b4:04:02:01:01)
```

○ TCP Probes: T2-T7

NMAP sends 6 TCP probes: T2-T6 containing the TCP options: 03:03:0a:01:02:04:01:09:08:0a:ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00:00:00:04:02, each of the 6 packets are describe below, with the corresponding Wireshark Display filter:

T2: IP Don't Fragment set, TCP null packet and a window field of 128 to an open port.

```
T2:
(ip.flags == 0x02) && (tcp.flags == 0x0000) &&
(tcp.window_size_value == 128) && (tcp.options ==
03:03:0a:01:02:04:01:09:08:0a:ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00:00:00:04:02)
```

T3: IP Don't Fragment is not set, TCP packet with SYN, FIN, URG, and PSH flags set and a window field of 256 to an open port.

```
T3:
(ip.flags == 0x00) && (tcp.flags == 0x002b) &&
(tcp.window_size_value == 256) && (tcp.options ==
03:03:0a:01:02:04:01:09:08:0a:ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00:00:00:04:02)
```

T4: IP Don't Fragment set, TCP ACK packet and a window field of 1024 to an open port.

```
T4:
(ip.flags == 0x02) && (tcp.flags == 0x0010) &&
(tcp.window_size_value == 1024) && (tcp.options ==
03:03:0a:01:02:04:01:09:08:0a:ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00:00:00:04:02)
```

T5: IP Don't Fragment is not set, TCP SYN packet and a window field of 31337 to a closed port.

```
T5:
(ip.flags == 0x00) && (tcp.flags == 0x0002) &&
(tcp.window_size_value == 31337) && (tcp.options ==
03:03:0a:01:02:04:01:09:08:0a:ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00:00:00:04:02)
```

T6: IP Don't Fragment set, TCP ACK packet and a window field of 32768 to a closed port.

```
T6:
(ip.flags == 0x02) && (tcp.flags == 0x0010) &&
(tcp.window_size_value == 32768) && (tcp.options ==
03:03:0a:01:02:04:01:09:08:0a:ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00:00:00:04:02)
```

T7: IP Don't Fragment is not set, TCP packet with FIN, PSH, and URG flags set and a window field of 65535 to a closed port.

```
T7:
(ip.flags == 0x00) && (tcp.flags == 0x0029) &&
(tcp.window_size_value == 65535) && (tcp.options ==
03:03:0f:01:02:04:01:09:08:0a:ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00:00:00:04:02)
```

- Xprobe2 is a remote active OS fingerprinting tool developed by Sys-Security Group (Sys-Security Group, n.d.). A series of Wireshark Display filters were created from observation to identify some of the packets related to Xprobe2 version 2.1 (installed as part of the Linux Backtrack 5-R3 Penetrating Testing distribution):

```

▪ (ip.flags == 0x00) && (icmp.type == 8 ) && (icmp.code == 0) &&
  (data.len == 48)

▪ (ip.flags == 0x02) && (icmp.type == 8 ) && not (icmp.code == 0) &&
  (data.len == 48)

▪ (ip.flags == 0x00) && (icmp.type == 13 && icmp.code == 0) &&
  (icmp.seq == 0) && not (icmp[8:4] == 00:00:00:00)

▪ (ip.flags == 0x00) && (icmp.type == 15 && icmp.code == 0) &&
  (icmp.seq == 0) && (not data)

▪ (ip.flags == 0x00) && (icmp.type == 17 && icmp.code == 0) &&
  (icmp.seq == 0) && (icmp[8:4] == 00:00:00:00)

▪ (udp && not icmp) && (ip.ttl == 255) && (dns.flags.response == 1)
  && (dns.qry.name == "www.securityfocus.com")

▪ (udp && not icmp) && (ip.flags == 0x02) && (udp.dstport == 161) &&
  (snmp.name == 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0)

▪ (udp && not icmp) && (ip.flags == 0x00) && (udp.srcport == 5555) &&
  (udp.dstport == 161)

▪ (ip.flags == 0x02) && (ip.ttl == 1) && (tcp.flags == 0x0002) &&
  (tcp.dstport == 65535) && (tcp.window_size_value == 0)

▪ (ip.flags == 0x02) && (tcp.flags == 0x0002) && (tcp.dstport ==
  65535)

```




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