

Pre-registration: Ideology & Decision Speed: Results

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This document describes the results from the data collected based on the Pre-registration from 10.12.2013.

Replicating the Ideological Conflict Hypothesis. Liking for the groups was regressed on perceived ideology of the groups, ideology of the participant, and the cross-level interaction between these two variables. The ideological conflict hypothesis predicts a significant interaction, such that liberals show more liking of liberal groups and conservatives show more liking of conservative groups. Results indicated a main effect of political ideology ($b = .019$, $SE = .009$, $p = .03$) such that conservatives had relatively higher levels of liking other groups compared to liberals. There was also a main effect of perceived group ideology ($b = .037$, $SE = .016$, $p = .02$), such that groups who were perceived as more conservative were liked more than groups who were perceived as more liberal. Importantly, there was a significant interaction between participants ideology and the perceived ideology of the groups ($b = .13$, $SE = .006$, $p < .001$). This interaction was probed at plus and minus one standard deviation of the perceived ideology midpoint. For groups perceived to have a liberal political ideology, political ideology of the participant was negatively associated with liking ($b = -.140$, $SE = .012$, $p < .001$), indicating that as participants rated themselves more conservatively they liked the groups they rated liberally less. For groups perceived to have a conservative political ideology, political ideology of the participant was positively associated with liking ($b = .178$, $SE = .011$, $p < .001$), indicating that as participants rated themselves more liberally they liked the groups they rated conservatively less.

Testing Decision Speed. Decision-speed for the liking items was regressed on perceived ideology of the groups, ideology of the participant, and the cross-level interaction between these two variables. There were no significant main effects of political ideology ($b = -.02$, $SE = .10$, $p = .82$), perceived ideology of the groups ($b = .10$, $SE = .17$, $p = .56$), or the interaction between these two variables ($b = -.02$, $SE = .07$, $p = .80$). This failed to confirm the original predictions.

Decision-speed for the perceived group ideology items was regressed on perceived ideology of the groups, ideology of the participant, and the cross-level interaction between these two variables. There were no significant main effects of political ideology ($b = .02$, $SE = .10$, $p = .88$) or perceived ideology of the groups ($b = .002$, $SE = .09$, $p = .98$). There was a significant interaction between political ideology and the perceived ideology of the group ($b = .08$, $SE = .04$, $p = .02$). This interaction was probed at plus and minus one standard deviation of the perceived ideology midpoint. For groups perceived to have a liberal political ideology, political ideology of the participant was negatively non-significantly associated with group ideology reaction time ($b = -.09$, $SE = .09$, $p = .35$). For groups perceived to have a conservative political ideology, political ideology of the participant was positively associated with group ideology reaction times ($b = .12$, $SE = .13$, $p = .36$). Because the preregistration probes of ± 1 SD of the group ideology midpoint did not reveal significant effects, this interaction was explored at ± 1 SD of the

political ideology midpoint. For liberal participants, groups perceived to be more conservative were classified as such faster ($b = -.18$, $SE = .08$, $p = .03$). For conservative participants, there was no association between perceived ideology and decision speed ($b = .18$, $SE = .16$, $p = .24$). These results failed to confirm the original predictions.

Exploratory Analyses: Decision Speed as Outcome

The reaction times were not normally distributed and so to further explore the data I log transformed the reaction time data. There was no significant main effect of political ideology ($b = .0001$, $SE = .008$, $p = .99$) or perceived group ideology ($b = -.003$, $SE = .004$, $p = .41$). There was a significant interaction between political ideology and perceived group ideology ($b = -.008$, $SE = .001$, $p < .001$). This interaction was probed at plus and minus one standard deviation of the perceived ideology midpoint. For groups perceived to have a liberal political ideology, political ideology of the participant was positively non-significantly associated with liking reaction time ($b = .01$, $SE = .008$, $p = .21$). For groups perceived to have a conservative political ideology, political ideology of the participant was negatively and non-significantly associated with liking reaction times ($b = -.009$, $SE = .008$, $p = .26$). Because the preregistration probes of ± 1 SD of the group ideology midpoint did not reveal significant effects, this interaction was explored at ± 1 SD of the political ideology midpoint. For liberal participants, liking responses were faster for groups perceived to be more liberal ($b = .014$, $SE = .004$, $p < .001$). For conservative participants, liking responses were faster for groups perceived to be more conservative ($b = -.02$, $SE = .006$, $p = .001$). These results failed to confirm the original predictions and instead suggest that both liberals and conservatives are likely to more quickly report their level of liking of ideological ingroups than ideological outgroups. This might be due to a confound, whereby the “liking” end of the scale is close to the page submit button.

When conducting the same analyses on the logged perceived ideology reaction times, there was no significant main effect of political ideology ($b = .006$, $SE = .008$, $p = .48$) and no significant interaction between political ideology and perceived ideology ($b = .003$, $SE = .002$, $p = .12$). There was a significant main effect of perceived group ideology, such that groups perceived as liberal were rated as such slower than groups perceived to be conservative ($b = -.02$, $SE = .005$, $p < .001$).

Exploratory Analyses: Decision Speed as Predictor and Moderator

It is also possible that decision speed differentially predicts liking judgments for liberals and conservatives. That is, people with different political ideologies may be more likely to rely on different types of judgments when reporting their liking (or disliking) for a particular group. To test this, liking was regressed on political ideology, perceived ideology of the groups, logged liking RT, logged group ideology RT, and all possible interactions. The full results are in Table 1.

The main effect of political ideology, the main effect of group ideology, and their interaction replicated the previous analyses that did not include reaction times. There was a main effect of liking RT indicating that faster decisions were associated with more liking. There were no other main effects, but there were several other significant interactions.

The two-way interaction between group ideology and liking RT was superseded by a three-way interaction with political ideology. This interaction indicated that for conservatives the two-way interaction between group ideology and liking RT was negative and significant ($b = -.13$, $SE = .05$, $p = .007$). This means that for conservatives rating groups they perceive to be conservative the association between the liking RT and liking was $b = -.61$, $SE = .09$, $p < .001$. When rating groups they perceived to be liberal the association between liking RT and liking was $b = -.32$, $SE = .09$, $p < .001$. For liberals, the two-way interaction between group ideology and liking RT was not significant ($b = -.003$, $SE = .03$, $p = .91$) indicating that decision speed did not play a role in liking for liberals. The effect of the liking RT on liking for liberal participants was $b = -.52$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$.

There was also a three-way interaction between political ideology, group ideology, and group ideology RT. This interaction was probed similarly to the previous three-way interaction. For conservatives there was an interaction between group ideology and group ideology RT ($b = -.08$, $SE = .04$, $p = .03$). This interaction indicated that for conservatives rating groups they perceived to be conservative, there was a negative association between group ideology RT and liking $b = -.12$, $SE = .06$, $p = .03$. For conservatives rating groups they perceived to be liberal, there was a non-significant association between group ideology RT and liking $b = .08$, $SE = .07$, $p = .25$. For liberals there was a significant positive interaction between group ideology and group RT ($b = .14$, $SE = .03$, $p < .001$). This interaction indicated that for liberals rating groups they perceived to be conservative, there was a positive association between group ideology RT and liking $b = .15$, $SE = .04$, $p = .001$. For liberals rating groups they perceived to be liberal, there was a negative association between group ideology RT and liking $b = -.20$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$.

Table 1

Full results of the exploratory model including reaction times predicting liking.

	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>p-value</i>
Intercept	3.18	.02	<.001
Political Ideology	.02	.009	.08
Group Ideology	.04	.02	.009
Group Ideology RT (logged)	-.02	.03	.37
Liking RT (logged)	-.49	.04	<.001
Political Ideology * Group Ideology	.12	.006	<.001
Political Ideology * Group Ideology RT	.001	.01	.93
Political Ideology * Liking RT	.01	.02	.47
Group Ideology * Group Ideology RT	.03	.03	.27
Group Ideology * Liking Ideology RT	-.06	.03	.03
Group Ideology RT * Liking RT	-.20	.06	.001
Political Ideology * Group Ideology * Group Ideology RT	-.05	.01	<.001
Political Ideology * Group Ideology * Liking RT	-.02	.01	.02
Political Ideology * Group Ideology RT * Liking RT	-.02	.02	.35
Group Ideology * Group Ideology RT * Liking RT	-.05	.06	.40
Political Ideology * Group Ideology * Group Ideology RT * Liking RT	-.02	.02	.39