

51.505 – Foundations of Cybersecurity

Week 5 - Symmetric Encryption

Created by **Pawel Szalachowski (2017)**

Modified by **Jianying Zhou (2018)**

Last updated: 23 Sept 2018

Review of Exercises

- Mid-term exam (Week 6): Fri 19 Oct, 7:30 PM (covering Part I Foundations: Week 1 – Week 4)
- Let's review some exercises from Week 1 to Week 4.

Cryptography


- Cryptography: art and science of encryption (ciphers)
- More than encryption (other primitives)
 - ✓ hash functions, MACs, (P)RNG, RSA, DH
- Higher-level constructions
 - ✓ secure channel, key server, PKI
- Real-world systems ?

Cryptography

- Threat model
 - ✓ Understand what and against whom you are trying to protect
- Cryptography is very difficult.
 - ✓ Proofs but with many assumptions, implementation issues, side-channel attacks, security vs. performance
- Cryptography is the easy part.
 - ✓ Systems are very complex, while a cryptographic component has fairly well-defined boundaries and requirements.
- Cryptography only solves some security problems.


How it happens?

- Secure communication
 - ✓ Client-Server via HTTPS



Symmetric Encryption


- Encryption scheme
 - ✓ Encryption and decryption algorithms: $E()$ and $D()$
- Alice, Bob, and Eve
 - ✓ Alice and Bob share a secret (symmetric) key: K
 - ✓ Eve sees all (encrypted) communication.



- Kerckhoffs' Principle
 - ✓ *The security of the encryption scheme must depend only on the secrecy of the key, and not on the secrecy of the algorithm.*

Caesar Cipher

- A substitution cipher, where each letter in the plaintext is replaced by a letter some fixed number of positions down the alphabet.
 - ✓ This fixed number of positions is the secret key.
 - ✓ What's the key in the following example?




Other Substitution Ciphers

- Monoalphabetic

Alphabet: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ


Key: PDKIFMRBHSNCGXUTJWEYLQAZV

- Trivial to break with letter frequency



One-Time Pad

- Key is *random*, as long as plaintext (at least), and is used only once.



- This scheme **cannot** be *broken*.
 - ✓ No matter how strong an adversary is, she cannot learn anything about plaintext.
- Disadvantages?

Attacks

Goal: to discover the key.

- Ciphertext-Only Attack (COA)
 - ✓ Eve knows only ciphertexts (without the corresponding plaintexts).
- Known-Plaintext Attack (KPA)
 - ✓ Eve knows some (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs.
- Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA)
 - ✓ Eve can select plaintexts and obtain the corresponding ciphertexts.
- Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA)
 - ✓ Eve can select plaintexts and/or ciphertexts and obtain the corresponding ciphertexts and/or plaintexts.



**More
powerful
attacks**

Security Level

- Exhaustive search (brute-force) attack: an adversary tries all possible values for some target object (like the key).
- If an attack requires 2^n steps of work, then it is corresponding to an exhaustive search for a n-bit value. Example via keylength.com:

Date	Symmetric	Factoring Modulus	Discrete Logarithm Key	Discrete Logarithm Group	Elliptic Curve	Hash	
2017 - 2022	128	2000	250	2000	250	SHA-256 SHA-512/256 SHA-384 SHA-512	SHA3-256 SHA3-384 SHA3-512
> 2022	128	3000	250	3000	250	SHA-256 SHA-512/256 SHA-384 SHA-512	SHA3-256 SHA3-384 SHA3-512


- The level of security is usually a function of the access of the adversary (e.g. how many encrypted messages she sees).

Modern Ciphers

- **Block ciphers**
 - ✓ Operate on data blocks
 - ✓ AES, DES, Serpent, ...
- Stream ciphers
 - ✓ Operate on data streams
 - ✓ RC4, Salsa20, ...

Block Cipher

- An encryption/decryption function for **fixed-size blocks** of data.
 - ✓ Encryption function (E_K) for a secret key and a plaintext block returns the ciphertext (one block).
 - ✓ Decryption function (D_K) for the secret key and the ciphertext block *reverts* the plaintext block.
 - ✓ Currently, 128 bits is the most common **block size** and key lengths are usually between 128 - 512 bits.



AES (Rijndael)

- The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
 - ✓ Standardized (2001) and the most popular
 - ✓ Hardware support in recent CPUs
 - ✓ Blocks are 128-bit long
 - ✓ Keys can be 128-, 192-, or 256-bit long

AES Internals

```
AddRoundKey(0)
```

```
for round in range(1, Nr):  
    SubBytes()  
    ShiftRows()  
    MixColumns()  
    AddRoundKey(round)
```

```
SubBytes()  
ShiftRows()  
AddRoundKey(Nr)
```

- Substitution-permutation network.
- Number of rounds (N_r) depends on key length.
 - ✓ $N_r = 10$ for 128-bit keys
 - ✓ $N_r = 12$ for 192-bit keys
 - ✓ $N_r = 14$ for 256-bit keys
- Before execution the key expansion procedure is called to derive N_{r+1} subkeys.
- A set of reverse rounds is applied to transform a ciphertext back into the plaintext.

AES Internals

AddRoundKey (0)

```
for round in range(1, Nr):
```

```
    SubBytes()
```

```
    ShiftRows()
```


```
    MixColumns()
```

```
    AddRoundKey (round)
```

```
SubBytes()
```

```
ShiftRows()
```

```
AddRoundKey (Nr)
```



- Each byte of the state is combined (**XORed**) with a byte of the round subkey.

AES Internals

```
AddRoundKey(0)
```

```
for round in range(1, Nr):
```

```
    SubBytes()
```

```
    ShiftRows()
```


```
    MixColumns()
```

```
    AddRoundKey(round)
```

```
SubBytes()
```

```
    ShiftRows()
```

```
    AddRoundKey(Nr)
```



- Each byte in the state is replaced with its entry in a fixed 8-bit lookup table S .
- The goal is to provide the *non-linearity* in the cipher.

AES Internals

```
AddRoundKey(0)
```

```
for round in range(1, Nr):
```

```
    SubBytes()
```

```
    ShiftRows()
```

```
    MixColumns()
```


```
    AddRoundKey(round)
```

- Bytes in each row of the state are shifted cyclically to the left.
- The goal is to avoid the columns being encrypted independently, in which case AES degenerates into four independent block ciphers.

```
SubBytes()
```

```
ShiftRows()
```

```
AddRoundKey(Nr)
```



AES Internals

```
AddRoundKey(0)
```

```
for round in range(1, Nr):
```

```
    SubBytes()
```

```
    ShiftRows()
```


```
    MixColumns()
```

```
    AddRoundKey(round)
```

```
SubBytes()
```



```
ShiftRows()
```

```
AddRoundKey(Nr)
```



- Each column of the state is multiplied with a fixed polynomial $c(x)$.
- The goal is to provide *diffusion* in the cipher.

AES Crib Sheet (Handy for memorizing)



General Math

11B = AES Polynomial = $m(x)$


Fast Multiply

$x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$

$x \cdot a(x) = (a < 1) \oplus (a_7 = 1) ? 1B : 00$

$\log(x \cdot y) = \log(x) + \log(y)$

Use $(x+1) = 03$ for log base



Intermediate Rounds

#	Key
9	128
11	192
13	256



Ciphertext

?	?	?	?
?	?	?	?
?	?	?	?
?	?	?	?

S-Box (SRD)

$SRD[a] = f(g(a))$

$g(a) = a^{-1} \text{ mod } m(x)$

Think $5^3 \oplus 6^3$

5 is and 3's $[0110 \ 0011]^T$

11	11	000
01	11	100
00	11	110
00	01	111
10	00	111
10	00	111
11	00	011
11	00	011
11	00	011
11	00	011

a_7
 a_6
 a_5
 a_4
 a_3
 a_2
 a_1

Key Expansion:

Round Constants

01	02	04	08
----	----	----	----

First Column:

K	B3
E	6E
Y	CB
	B7

Round Key 0

Other Columns:

T	E1	C1
2	21	10
8	86	B4
	F2	CA

Prev Col \oplus Col from Previous round key

Round Constants

First Column:

01	B2
00	6E
00	CB
00	B7

S	B2	E1
O	6E	21
M	CB	86
E	B7	F2

Mix Columns:

2	1	1	3
2	1	1	3
3	2	1	1
1	3	2	1
1	1	3	2

a_3
 a_2
 a_1
 a_0

Inverse Mix

E	B	D	9
9	E	B	D
D	9	E	B
B	D	9	E


a_3
 a_2
 a_1
 a_0

Block Cipher Modes

- How to encrypt variable-length messages with a block cipher?
- Naive approach:
 - ✓ Divide a message into blocks and encrypt each block.
- Padding: Encoding is up to the upper layer but must be reversible, e.g.
 - ✓ Add a single fixed byte (0x80) and pad the rest with 0x00, or
 - ✓ Determine number of padding bytes n , and pad with n bytes, each with value n .


Electronic Codebook (ECB)

- $C_i = E_K(P_i)$



Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption

- $P_i = D_K(C_i)$



Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode decryption

ECB Properties

- Simple !
- Encryption/Decryption can be done in parallel.
- Padding is needed.
- Identical plaintext blocks are encrypted into identical ciphertext block.
✓ if $P_i = P_j$ then $C_i = C_j$


Plaintext



ECB's ciphertext




Expected




Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

- $C_i = E_K(P_i \oplus C_{i-1})$
 $C_0 = IV$



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption

- $P_i = D_K(C_i) \oplus C_{i-1}$
 $C_0 = IV$





Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

CBC Properties


- Eliminates the problems of ECB.
 - ✓ Involves initialization vector (IV) to randomize inputs.
 - ✓ IV's length is the block size.
- Sequential encryption, **but decryption can be parallelized.**
- A receiver needs to know IV.
- If $C_i = C_j$ then $P_i \oplus P_j = C_{i-1} \oplus C_{j-1}$

Initialization Vector (IV)

- Fixed IV
 - ✓ CBC with a fixed IV has similar properties as ECB.
- Counter IV
 - ✓ $IV_{i+1} = IV_i$
 - ✓ Can reveal information about the plaintext (e.g., when the first plaintext blocks have small differences).
- **Random IV**
 - ✓ A random IV is generated for every message and sent with the ciphertext.
 - ✓ Increases communication overhead.
- **Nonce-generated IV**
 - ✓ Nonce (number used **once**) is used to generate an IV, e.g. $IV = E_K(\text{nonce})$.
 - ✓ Nonce could be a message number (or any other unique number).
 - ✓ It can help to minimize the communication overhead of random IV.


Output Feedback (OFB)

- $C_i = P_i \oplus T_i$
 $T_i = E_K(T_{i-1})$
 $T_0 = IV$



Output Feedback (OFB) mode encryption

- $P_i = C_i \oplus T_i$
 $T_i = E_K(T_{i-1})$
 $T_0 = IV$




Output Feedback (OFB) mode decryption

OFB Properties

- Eliminates the problems of ECB by producing a **key stream**.
 - ✓ Involves IV to randomize key stream.
- Sequential encryption/decryption (cannot be parallelized).
- Only encryption operation is used (no decryption operation).
- **No padding is needed.**
- A receiver needs to know IV (as in CBC).
- Reused IV is very dangerous.
 - ✓ If $IV = IV'$, then $T_i = T_i'$, $C_i \oplus C_i' = (P_i \oplus T_i) \oplus (P_i' \oplus T_i) = P_i \oplus P_i'$
 - ✓ If C_i, C_i', P_i are known, it is trivial to find P_i' .
- Cycles in key streams are possible (although, not very likely).
 - ✓ Suppose block size is 128 bits.
 - ✓ After how many blocks of encryption, such a collusion may happen?


Counter (CTR)

- $C_i = E_K(\text{Nonce} \parallel i) \oplus P_i$



Counter (CTR) mode encryption

- $P_i = E_K(\text{Nonce} \parallel i) \oplus C_i$



Counter (CTR) mode decryption

CTR Properties

- Eliminates the problems of ECB by producing a **key stream**.
 - ✓ Involves Nonce and counter to randomize key stream.
 - ✓ Typical setting for 128-bit block: 64-bit *Nonce* + 64-bit counter *i*.
- Encryption/decryption can be parallelized (as in ECB).
- Only encryption operation is used (as in OFB).
- No padding is needed (as in OFB).
- A receiver needs to know Nonce.
- Reused (Nonce, counter) pair is very dangerous.

Other Issues

- Usually CBC or CTR mode is used.
 - ✓ ECB is not secure.
 - ✓ CTR is better than OFB.
- CBC, CTR, and OFB provide CPA security, is it enough?
 - ✓ It guarantees that Eve will not learn anything about plaintexts (except their lengths).
 - ✓ What else can go wrong?
 - Let's assume that Eve can manipulate communication... → authentication.
 - ✓ All the modes presented are **not** CCA-secure.
- Limit the amount of data to be encrypted by one key.

Key Points

- Kerckhoffs' principle
- Types of attacks to symmetric ciphers
- Security level of a cipher
- Block cipher & AES
- Padding in block cipher
- Block cipher modes (ECB, CBC, OFB, CTR)

Exercises & Reading

- Classwork (Exercise Sheet 5): due on Fri Oct 12, 10:00 PM
- Homework (Exercise Sheet 5): due on Fri [Oct 26](#), 6:59 PM
- Reading: FSK [Ch2, Ch3, Ch4]
- [Mid-term exam \(Week 6\): Fri 19 Oct, 7:30 PM](#) (covering Part I Foundations: Week 1 – Week 4)

End of Slides for Week 5