
Nash equilibrium in Infinite extensive-form games

Stéphane Le Roux (TU Darmstadt)

HIGHLIGHTS 2013


September 17, 2013

NE are traditionally obtained by **backward induction**:



Nash equilibrium in finite extensive-form games


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Double lines represent strategical choices.


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Let C be a non-empty set.

Player **a**
$$p_0 \in C$$
 $p_2 \in C$... Player **b** $p_1 \in C$ $p_3 \in C$...

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
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Example with $C = \{left, right\}$




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
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
Leaf-free infinite extensive-form games: no backward induction!!!

Discrete topology on C and product topology on C^{ω} .



clopen balls =
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


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Borel sets include the open sets of C^{ω} and are close under:

- complementation;
- 2. countable union;

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


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Quasi-Borel sets include the open sets of C^{ω} and are close under:

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Theorem (Martin 1975, 1990)


If W is (quasi)-Borel, one player has a winning strategy.



Messy Gale-Stewart games

Gale-Stewart games, players play alternately:

Messy Gale-Stewart games, arbitrary order:



Lemma

Let W be the winning set of a messy Gale-Stewart game. If W is quasi-Borel, one player has a winning strategy.

Proof.

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



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
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If winning set W is quasi-Borel,




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
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



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
Win. strat. after dummy insertion translate back to win. strat.









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


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


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Theorem

The game has an NE, if the \prec_a^{-1} are strictly well-founded, $v^{-1}(o)$ is quasi-Borel for all o in countable O.



Both players get the same payoffs.



▶ At the root, *a* seeks the best guaranteed payoff.

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$$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{a} \Rightarrow \textbf{a} \rightarrow \textbf{a} \rightarrow \textbf{a} \rightarrow \textbf{a} \rightarrow \textbf{0} \\ \downarrow \qquad \qquad \downarrow \qquad \downarrow \qquad \downarrow \\ 1 \qquad 1 \qquad 1 \qquad 1 \end{array}$$

$$a \Rightarrow a \Rightarrow a \Rightarrow a \longrightarrow 0$$
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
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


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


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
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


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$$y \ge_a x$$
 a b subgame g


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Questions:

- Several proofs in logic invoke Borel determinacy, can the results be extended by invoking existence of NE?
- ▶ Is anyone familiar with the proof of Borel determinacy?