



1-1-Taste-Backoff-2

2020年6月5日 星期五 上午2:00



1-1-Taste-Backoff-2



Game Theory Intro


Game Theory Course:
Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Strategic interactions - self-interested people
↳ structured → good outcomes

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Game Theory Intro

TCP Backoff Game



pop-up

X-trusted - install virus

help

communication - diff. parts

send message - wait - get

X receives - send again

sequence - pass message

your

PC - Do it speed - congestion

overwhelm with message

threw away - X-per

handle again behavior


hesitant PC

Send back message - receive

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Game Theory Intro

TCP Backoff Game




Should you send your packets using correctly-implemented TCP (which has a “backoff” mechanism) or using a defective implementation (which doesn’t)?

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Game Theory Intro

TCP Backoff Game



Should you send your packets using correctly-implemented TCP (which has a “backoff” mechanism) or using a defective implementation (which doesn’t)?

- This problem is an example of what we call a **two-player game**:
 - both use a correct implementation**: both get 1 ms delay
 - one correct, one defective**: 4 ms for correct, 0 ms for defective
 - both defective**: both get a 3 ms delay.

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Game Theory Intro

TCP Backoff Game

- This problem is an example of what we call a **two-player game**:
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- Play this game: in your head; with a friend; on our online system.
- Some questions to discuss after playing:
 - What **action** should a player of the game take?
 - Would all users behave **the same** in this scenario?
 - What global **behavior patterns** should a system designer expect?
 - For what **changes to the numbers** would behavior be the same?
 - What effect would **communication** have?
 - Repetitions?** (finite? infinite?)
 - Does it matter if I believe that my opponent is **rational**?

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