



2-5-Exercise

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Example: Mixed Strategy Nash

Game Theory Course:
Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham


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Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- Mixed strategies in sports and competitive games


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Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- Mixed strategies in sports and competitive games
- Be unpredictable


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Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- Mixed strategies in sports and competitive games
- Be unpredictable
- How do equilibrium strategies adjust to skills?
kicks - goalie (game)
quasi-simultaneous move game


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Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- Mixed strategies in sports and competitive games
- Be unpredictable
- How do equilibrium strategies adjust to skills?
- Should a kicker (who kicks penalty kicks) worse to the right than left kick more often to the left than right?
more often: R > L
 worse: L > R

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Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

	Goalie	
	Left	Right
Kicker/Goalie		
Left	0, 1	0, 0
Right	1, 0	0, 1

kicker's 1/2
Goalie 1/2

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Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks


q + 0.75(1-q) = 1-q
q = 3/7

	Goalie	
	Left	Right
Kicker/Goalie		
Left	0, 1	1, 0
Right	1, 0	0, 1

4/7 *3/7*
1-q *1-p*
0.75p = 1-p
0.75p = 1
p = 1/0.75 = 4/3

kicks often to weaker side
kicker payoff okay - Goalie payoff adjust
Goalie mixed adjustment - equilibrium adjust


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Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- In a mixed equilibrium, the goalie's strategy must have the kicker indifferent


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Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- In a mixed equilibrium, the goalie's strategy must have the kicker indifferent
- p probability goalie goes left; Kicker indifferent: $(1 - p)1 = p.75$
or $p = 1/1.75 = 4/7$


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Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- In a mixed equilibrium, the goalie's strategy must have the kicker indifferent
- p probability goalie goes left; Kicker indifferent: $(1 - p)1 = p.75$
or $p = 1/1.75 = 4/7$
- Goalie goes Left more often than Right (4/7 to 3/7), kicker still goes Left and Right with equal probability $1/2$


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Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- In a mixed equilibrium, the goalie's strategy must have the kicker indifferent
- p probability goalie goes left; Kicker indifferent: $(1 - p)1 = p.75$
or $p = 1/1.75 = 4/7$
- Goalie goes Left more often than Right (4/7 to 3/7), kicker still goes Left and Right with equal probability
- Goalie's strategy adjusts, and the kicker actually adjusts to kick more to their (weak) side!


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Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- The Goalie has a slight advantage now, and wins 4/7 of the time


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Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- The Goalie has a slight advantage now, and wins 4/7 of the time
- If the goalie still played equal probability, then the kicker could always go left and win 1/2 the time instead of 3/7


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Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- The Goalie has a slight advantage now, and wins 4/7 of the time
- If the goalie still played equal probability, then the kicker could always go left and win 1/2 the time instead of 3/7
- By adjusting the strategy to keep the kicker indifferent, the Goalie takes advantage of the kicker's weak right kick and wins more often!

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Summary - Mixed Strategies - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- A player must be indifferent between the actions he or she randomizes over
- Interesting comparative statics
- Do players really do this?!

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