**Reviewer 2**

Thank you for your kind comments. We appreciate your feedback and the time and care you spent with regards to reading our manuscript. We have tried to address all of your comments and take action on as many as we could. We are hopeful you find our responses/edits to your concerns (expressed below) sufficient. Please, notice that our responses are provided in bold after your comments/suggestions.

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| The article is methodologically OK and well written. However, in general, we see many articles like this in the area of social and environmental reporting. Also, the application of agency theory is so common that reading it over and again in the new studies also makes the readers bored these days. Now it is important that the new researchers try to take the research on this area to a new and interesting level. However, I accept this article only for the moderating variable the authors have tested. |
| **Authors:**  **Thank you very much for your words. In our modest opinion, the originality of the paper is the analysis of the moderating role played by the proportion of independent directors on boards of directors with the relationship between the constitution of remuneration committees and CSR disclosure.**  **-We have not found previous research focused on this topic using independent directors as moderator variable. We have improved the introduction by adding a paragraph that better motivates the work. Furthermore, we have included these other references to improve the introduction of the work:**   * **Code, U. G. G. (2006). Unified Good Governance Code of Listed Companies. Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores. Spain.** * **Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I. (1998). Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation. *Academy of management journal*, 41(2), 146-157.** * Good Governance Code of Listed Companies (2020). Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores. Spain. * **Fama, E.F., & Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 24, 301–325.** * **Harrison, J. R. (1987). The strategic use of corporate board committees. *California Management Review*, 30(1), 109-125.** * **Khan, A., Muttakin, M. B., & Siddiqui, J. (2013). Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility disclosures: Evidence from an emerging economy. *Journal of business ethics*, *114*(2), 207-223.** * **Tao, N. B., & Hutchinson, M. (2013). Corporate governance and risk management: The role of risk management and compensation committees. *Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics*, 9(1), 83-99.** * **Williamson, O. E. (1983). Credible commitments: Using hostages to support exchange. *The American Economic Review, 73*(4), 519–540.** * **Zaid, M. A., Abuhijleh, S. T., & Pucheta‐Martínez, M. C. (2020). Ownership structure, stakeholder engagement, and corporate social responsibility policies: The moderating effect of board independence. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*, *27*(3), 1344-1360.**   **-We have justified the need to extend the literature focused on the compensation committees and the disclosure of CSR information due to the scarce existence of previous literature in recent years.** |

Having addressed all your proposals for change and improvement, we await your decision in the best interests of Sustainability.

Best regards,

The authors