

Congressional Bargaining and the Distribution of Grants

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Abstract

In the United States, state and local governments receive over \$700 billion annually in federal grants, yet relatively little is known about how Congress designs these programs. I develop a theory of congressional bargaining over grants and test the theory using an original dataset of Senate amendments. The results suggest that congressional rules and political considerations shape, and at times distort, federal grant programs. For instance, I find that legislators design programs to procure additional funding for their states, and states represented by members of key congressional committees disproportionately benefit. Further, I show how coalitions are shaped by the status quo policy and the distribution of population, poverty, and other measures of need across states. Together, these results illustrate how institutional features, such as the committee system and majority rule, influence the policymaking process and how effectively the federal government distributes assistance to areas with the greatest need.

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1 Introduction

“The rich get richer and the poor get poorer under the politically devised formula for the distribution of this aid.”

— Representative Ashbrook (111 Cong. Rec. 4236)

In the United States, the federal government allocates over \$700 billion annually in grants to state and local governments. This type of federal funding, known as grants-in-aid, encompasses major programs such as Medicaid, the Title I-A education program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers, and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). Grants-in-aid account for 16.5% of all federal spending and over half of state government funding for health care and public assistance (Dilger and Cecire 2019). However, legislators have criticized these programs for allocating money based on political reasons as opposed to need.¹ And, in line with these criticisms, some programs are not responsive to changes in population (Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa 2013; Szymendera 2008) and provide more per capita funding to small states (Lee 2000) and to areas with lower economic need (Hall 2010).

How do political factors shape, and at times distort, the distribution of federal assistance? Existing research highlights the role that congressional rules and political considerations play in the distribution of federal funding (e.g., Balla et al. 2002; Cox and McCubbins 1986; Evans 1994; Fenno 1966; Ferejohn 1974; Mayhew 1974; Lee 2003; Weingast and Marshall 1988). But, while grants-in-aid account for the majority of federal assistance, most theories about the allocation of funds focus on earmarks or “pork barrel” spending.² Unlike earmarks, which allocate funding to specific places for one-off projects, grants-in-aid are primarily distributed based on statutory formulas that persist

¹See, for example, the debates surrounding Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act as summarized by Skinner and Rosenstiel (2017).

²Other types of federal assistance include Social Security and Medicare. While the vast majority of research on federal spending focuses on earmarks, notable exceptions are Curry and Donnelly (2020), Lee (2000), Levitt and Snyder (1995), and Martin (2018).

for many years. Thus, a theory that incorporates political considerations, congressional rules, and the structure of allocation formulas is needed to understand federal spending and how it relates to national policymaking more broadly.

To address this gap in the literature, I formalize a theory of congressional bargaining over allocation formulas for grants-in-aid, and provide empirical evidence consistent with the theory. I focus on the effects of two important institutional features: the congressional committee system and majority rule. Though this is not the first attempt to model bargaining over formulas (Martin 2018), this paper is the first to model and empirically test the role of congressional committees and the status quo policy. Specifically, I model congressional bargaining over formula grants as a divide-the-dollar game in which legislators attempt to adjust grant programs to bring as much funding as possible to their states. In the model, legislators bargain over how to allocate a fixed budget and proposals require the support of a majority of legislators to pass. The theory also incorporates three important characteristics of grants-in-aid: (1) legislators must allocate grants based on a set of observable attributes (e.g., population, poverty) as opposed to directly specifying the payoff for each state; (2) legislators can set a minimum grant amount that each state must receive; and (3) if Congress does not change the formula then grants will be allocated based on the status quo policy. Lastly, to incorporate the congressional committee system, I endow committee chairs with proposal power and consider an extension where proposals require the support of a majority of committee members to pass.

Examining these features together yields new predictions about how the congressional committee system and majority rule influence the policymaking process and who benefits from federal programs. For instance, because formulas allocate funding based on state characteristics, states with similar characteristics will fare similarly under the same program. And, as existing theories of congressional committees demonstrate, states represented by members of key congressional committees receive more federal funding due to committees' role in the policymaking process. However, the congressional committee system coupled with the structure of formulas results in programs that also benefit states with similar demographic characteristics to those represented by committee members.

Additionally, as in other models of bargaining under majority rule, legislators build coalitions that maximize their states' grant amounts and certain legislators may be "cheaper" than others to include in the coalition. For example, the smaller a state's grant under the status quo policy, the cheaper that state is to include in the coalition because there are many formulas that it would prefer to the status quo. However, considering majority rule, the status quo policy, and the structure of formulas together yields new predictions about the size of coalitions. Specifically, I present a sufficient condition for non-minimal-winning coalitions based on a combination of state demographic characteristics and the status quo policy.

Using an original dataset of Senate amendments, I find strong support for the theory. First, I use a within-state design to examine which states are included in the winning coalition. Consistent with theoretical predictions, I find that states receiving less funding under the status quo and that have similar demographic characteristics to the proposer's state are more likely to be included in the winning coalition when grant programs are amended. Second, to examine the role of committees, I use a matched differences-in-differences design to estimate the committee advantage when formula grant programs are reauthorized. In line with the assumption that committees have proposal power in Congress, I find evidence that states represented by committee members, and particularly committee chairs, receive more grant funding.

Together, these findings illustrate how the committee system combined with legislators' self interests may result in programs that effectively distribute funding to areas with higher need when that funding is allocated via formula. In particular, committee members representing constituencies with high need benefit from well targeted formulas. Thus, due to their proposal power, committees with high need typically improve formulas with poor targeting and protect formulas that target effectively. However, when need is concentrated in a few states, then the majority of legislators will prefer a less targeted formula. In that case, depending on the status quo policy, it may not be possible to improve the targeting of a formula. Further, if states doing worse under the status quo are more likely to be included in the winning coalition, then, when a well targeted formula is

changed, states with less need are more likely to be included in the winning coalition. As a result, a program that starts out effectively targeting need can easily become a program that does a poor job of targeting need.


The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. I begin by offering background on allocation formulas and briefly review the related literature. I then present a theory of congressional bargaining over the distribution of grants. Next, I empirically test the theory by examining winning coalitions. I then empirically test the role that committees play in the design of grant programs. The final section offers concluding remarks and discusses the implications of the theory for how effectively grant programs allocate funding to areas with the highest need.

2 Grant Allocation Formulas

Legislators have the ability to direct grant funding to certain states and districts because, in many cases, Congress writes the grant allocation formula. These formulas generally allocate funds based on a set of observable attributes or formula factors. For example, a formula might specify that grants be allocated in proportion to population. A program targeting poverty might include a count of people living below the poverty line in a state. It may also include a factor related to a state's tax base to capture a state's fiscal capacity. For example, consider the Title I-A program in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The purpose of the Title I-A program is to provide "financial assistance to local educational agencies (LEAs) and schools with high numbers or high percentages of children from low-income families" ("Title I, Part A Program" 2015). Grants under Title I-A are primarily allocated in proportion to the number of children in families living in poverty multiplied by state education expenditures. As a result, states with higher education spending receive more Title I-A funding. And, when reauthorizing the program, it is the relative weights on these factors that Congress bargains over. For example, while both factors have always been included in the Title I-A formula, legislators have reduced the weight placed on education expenditures over time (Skinner and Rosenstiel 2017).

Formulas often include minimum grant provisions to ensure that grantees have enough funding to run a program and to prevent large losses in grant amounts from year to year. Minimum grant provisions can ensure that each grantee receives a specific dollar amount or percentage of available appropriations. Additionally, some minimum grant provisions (commonly referred to as “hold harmless provisions”) stipulate that each grantee receive a percentage of their grant amount from a prior year. Other provisions, often referred to as “foundation grants” or “base guarantees,” allocate each grantee a set dollar amount and then distribute the remaining funds based on formula factors. The Title I-A program includes minimum grant provisions that guarantee each state a certain percentage of available appropriations and ensure no school district receives less than 85% of the funding it received in the prior year. One consequence of these minimum grant provisions is that smaller states receive more per capita funding than larger states. Figure 1 shows the Title I-A grant per child in poverty compared to the logged number of children in poverty in a given state under current law and if the formula contained no minimum grant provisions. Under current law, states with fewer children in poverty receive substantially more per child than states with higher numbers of children in poverty. When the minimum grant provisions are removed, this relationship goes away.

Figure 1: Title I-A Grant Amounts Per Child in Poverty (FY2016)



Source: Data from Skinner and Rosenstiel (2018)

3 Related Literature

Scholars have long been interested in how the federal government distributes funding, particularly the role of congressional committees. Distributive theories explain spending as the result of electorally motivated legislators (e.g., Evans 2011; Ferejohn 1974; Mayhew 1974; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988). That is, legislators can increase their chances of reelection by bringing funding back to their states or districts. And, this process is facilitated by the congressional committee system. Through the committee assignment process, legislators select onto committees with jurisdiction over policy areas for which their constituents have high demand. Then, these high demanders or preference outliers use their agenda-setting power (Knight 2005; Weingast and Marshall 1988) and veto power (Shepsle and Weingast 1987) within the chamber to procure a disproportionate share of benefits for their states and districts.

Distributive theories have received substantial empirical testing. There is evidence that members of key committees and subcommittees are able to procure more transportation funding for their districts (Evans 1994; Knight 2005; Lee 2003), research funding for universities in their states (Payne 2003), and military construction funding for military bases in their states and districts (Hammond and Rosenstiel 2020). Looking across multiple policy areas, Clemens, Crespín, and Finocchiaro (2015) find members of Appropriations subcommittees are able to procure more earmarks for their districts. Grimmer and Powell (2013) find that members on certain committees get an electoral subsidy from being on those committees. There is also evidence that it is committee status (e.g., being committee chair), not committee membership, that matters (Berry and Fowler 2018).³

Alternatives to distributive theory have also been proposed. In Krehbiel’s (1991) informational model, committees provide a division of labor and means for specialization as opposed to facilitating the distribution of funds. Thus, while committees are still an

³Berry and Fowler (2016) test distributive theory using formula grant outlays and find no relationship between committee membership and formula spending. However, this null result may be because the authors do not examine program reauthorizations.

important organizing force, their purpose is to encourage the development of expertise. Further, rather than being made up of high demanders, committees are representative of the chamber. Conversely, partisan theories emphasize the role of the majority party, rather than committees, in setting the agenda and organizing the chamber (Cox and McCubbins 1986, 1993, 2005). In this view, party leaders use their agenda-setting power to achieve party goals and legislators can increase their reelection chances by improving the party’s reputation or brand. In line with partisan theories, there is evidence that members of the majority party are able to procure more funding for their states and districts (Balla et al. 2002; Engstrom and Vanberg 2010; Levitt and Snyder 1995). Relatedly, partisan cohesion may make it easier for legislators from the same state to procure competitive grants for their constituents (Curry and Donnelly 2020).

This paper seeks to bring together insights from the literature on congressional committees with the additional constraints that bargaining over a formula impose. I join a large literature that builds on the divide-the-dollar game of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and its generalization by Banks and Duggan (2006). In the game, legislators bargain over how to allocate a fixed budget. Baron and Ferejohn show that the legislator with proposal power receives a disproportionate share of funds. Further, funds are only distributed to legislators that vote for the proposal (the winning coalition). And, when proposals are brought up under a closed rule, the size of the winning coalition is minimal (i.e., proposals pass by a bare majority). However, the Baron and Ferejohn model allows for any distribution of the dollar, which does not reflect how a substantial portion of the federal budget is allocated. With one notable exception (Martin 2018), theories have not considered how this zero-sum bargaining process is altered when legislators must distribute funding via a formula based on observable state characteristics.

In this paper, I formalize and test a distributive theory of bargaining over grants. The theory builds on the framework developed in Martin (2018). Martin extends the Baron and Ferejohn model to formally examine the constraint that bargaining over formula factors places on legislators. Martin shows that when bargaining over the weights placed on a small number of formula factors, legislators have relatively little latitude in

targeting funds to specific districts.⁴ Further, unlike the Baron and Ferejohn game, the theory predicts oversized winning coalitions, positive distributions outside of the winning coalition, and stable voting blocs. However, the theory misses an important component of grants-in-aid: the role of the status quo policy. Additionally, it does not consider how congressional committees—particularly committees made up of preference outliers or high demanders—may shape allocation formulas. Thus, the arguments and empirical findings about how the status quo policy and the congressional committee system affect grants-in-aid, and how these constraints interact with the structure of allocation formulas, are entirely new to this paper.

4 A Theory of Congressional Bargaining Over Grants

My model of congressional bargaining over grants-in-aid builds on the divide-the-dollar model by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and its extension to allocation formulas by Martin (2018). In the game, legislators bargain over the weights placed on formula factors. That is, given a formula based on population and poverty, legislators decide the share of funding allocated based on population and the share of funding allocated based on poverty. I conceptualize minimum grant provisions as an additional formula factor that provides an equal amount of funding for all states. In line with distributive theories, I endow committee chairs with proposal power. I also consider an extension in which a majority of committee members must support a proposal for it to pass.

I first consider a one-period game in which the committee chair proposes a formula and all legislators vote on the committee proposal. If the proposal is enacted, grants are allocated based on this new formula. If the proposal fails, grants are allocated based on the status quo policy. However, in practice, bargaining does not follow this take-it-or-leave-it structure. I therefore also consider an infinite horizon model where legislators

⁴Relatedly, Levitt and Snyder (1995) provide empirical evidence that political parties target formula funding to their constituents, but are unable to direct funding to specific congressional districts.

bargain until agreement is reached and a new proposer is drawn in each period.

What formula gets enacted depends on which legislator is chair, the status quo formula, and the distribution of formula factors across states. As the proposer, committee chairs are often able to modify formulas to bring additional funding to their states. However, due to the constraints imposed by bargaining over a formula, funding is distributed outside of the winning coalition. The model also yields predictions related to the status quo policy. First, there are cases in which the committee chair retains the status quo formula. And, in the repeated game, if the status quo is very favorable to the chair then there are cases when delay can occur in equilibrium yet ultimately a new policy is passed. Second, the winning coalition may be minimal sized or larger-than-minimal sized. The size of the winning coalition depends, in part, on the grants each legislator is receiving under the status quo. Third, states doing poorly under the status quo are “cheaper” to include in the winning coalition and thus benefit from formula changes. In addition, states with similar characteristics fare similarly because formulas allocate funding based on state characteristics. As a result, states are also cheaper to include in the winning coalition when they have similar characteristics to the proposer’s state.

4.1 Model Setup

Let $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$ be a set of n legislators bargaining over how to allocate a budget. One of the legislators, the committee chair, is endowed with proposal power. I denote the committee chair with c .

Formula grants, unlike earmarks, are based on formula factors as well as minimum grant provisions. To incorporate this into the model, I allow legislators to bargain over weights placed on formula factors and the minimum grant amount. Each legislator i has two quantifiable attributes or formula factors, $x_i > 0$ and $z_i > 0$. For simplicity, x_i and z_i are measured in share. A legislator’s allocation is a function of the weights placed on x and z , η and γ , as well as a fixed amount or minimum that each legislator receives, α :

$$y_i = \eta x_i + \gamma z_i + \alpha \frac{1}{n} \tag{1}$$

where $\eta, \gamma, \alpha \geq 0$.

For example, consider a formula based on population (x) and poverty (z) levels. If a state made up 10% of the total national population and had 25% of the national population living in poverty then $x_i = 0.1$ and $z_i = 0.25$. Further if $\eta = 0.5$, $\gamma = 0.5$, and $\alpha = 0$, then half of the funding would be based on population and the other half would be based on poverty. Under this formula, state i would receive 17.5% of the budget.⁵

What formula can be enacted is constrained by the funding level for the program. That is, legislators bargain over how to divide a budget among themselves but cannot increase the size of the budget. As in other zero-sum games, this budget constraint always binds in equilibrium. For simplicity, I fix the budget to 1. As a result, a legislator's grant amount y_i can be thought of as the share of available funding that her state receives. For an allocation $\mathbf{y} = (y_i)_{i=1}^n$ to be feasible, it must satisfy $\sum_{i=1}^n y_i \leq 1$. And because x_i and z_i are measured in share, then $\sum_{i=1}^n y_i \leq 1$ implies that $\eta + \gamma + \alpha \leq 1$. I denote all feasible combinations of (η, γ, α) with χ where

$$\chi = \{\eta, \gamma, \alpha \in [0, 1] \mid \eta + \gamma + \alpha \leq 1\} \quad (2)$$

In practice, a formula typically remains in effect until it is amended. To incorporate this into the model, I include an exogenously determined status quo policy $(\eta_q, \gamma_q, \alpha_q) \in \chi$. This status quo remains in effect if no formula change is passed. During a program's initial enactment, the status quo formula is $(0, 0, 0)$. I denote legislator i 's grant allocated under the status quo policy with q_i .

The sequence of play is as follows. At the start of the game, the committee chair makes a proposal $(\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in \chi$ and the chamber floor then takes an up-or-down on the committee proposal. If a decisive coalition $W \subseteq N$ vote for the proposal, grants are allocated based on the new formula. If the proposal fails, the status quo policy remains in effect. Utilities are then realized and the game ends. A coalition is decisive if it contains at least m legislators where $1 < m < n$. This structure includes both majority

⁵ $0.5 \times 0.10 + 0.5 \times 0.25 = 17.5\%$

and super-majority rules.

A player's utility is the allocation they receive from a formula. If a proposal (η, γ, α) is enacted, then the utility for legislator i is

$$u_i = \eta x_i + \gamma z_i + \alpha \frac{1}{n} \quad (3)$$

The largest grant amount a state can receive is equal to its largest formula factor. Let $f_i^1 > f_i^2 > f_i^3$ represent legislator i 's rank ordering of x_i , z_i , and $1/n$.⁶ When $f_i^1 = x_i$ (i.e., $x_i \geq z_i$ and $x_i \geq 1/n$) then the largest grant i can receive is x_i . And, this allocation occurs when $\eta = 1, \gamma = 0, \alpha = 0$. The intuition for this result is relatively straightforward: a legislator receives the largest grant when all of the weight is placed on her largest formula factor. I refer to legislators whose largest factor is x_i as legislators whose preferred weight is η . I refer to legislators whose largest factors are z_i and $1/n$ as legislators whose preferred weights are γ and α , respectively. Note that because x and z are measured as shares of the total, the mean of x is $1/n$ and the mean of z is $1/n$.⁷ Thus, when a formula is based on population (x) and poverty (z), a state with below average population and poverty levels prefers α . If a state has above average population and its population share is higher than its poverty share, the state prefers η . Otherwise, the state prefers γ .

4.2 Equilibrium Analysis

I focus on equilibria in which the chair proposes an acceptable allocation and no legislator uses a weakly dominated voting strategy. That is, the chair proposes an allocation that defeats the status quo and legislators vote yes if and only if their utility from the proposal not passing is less than their utility from the proposal. These restrictions rule out uninteresting equilibria in which proposals are best responses solely because they would not pass and voting decisions are best responses solely because a single vote does not

⁶For example, if $x_i > z_i > 1/n$ then $f_i^1 = x_i$, $f_i^2 = z_i$, and $f_i^3 = 1/n$.

⁷ $\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n x_i}{n} = \frac{1}{n}$ because, by definition, $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i = 1$.

change the outcome.

The question for the committee chair is which of the proposals that can pass the floor maximize her grant amount. A standard result of divide-the-dollar games is that the budget constraint always binds in equilibrium.⁸ Because of this, the chair's grant is equal to the following:

$$y_c = 1 - \sum_{i \in N-c} y_i \quad (4)$$

Therefore, for the chair to maximize her own grant she should minimize the grants to other legislators provided that a decisive coalition (at least $m - 1$ other legislators) would vote for the proposal. Let $A_i \subseteq \chi$ be the set of proposals that i would accept. As the alternative to a proposal is the status quo, all legislators accept any proposal that gives them at least their grant amount under the status quo. Thus the set of proposals acceptable to a given decisive coalition W is

$$A_W = \bigcap_{i \in W} A_i = \left\{ (\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in \chi \mid \eta x_i + \gamma z_i + \frac{\alpha}{n} \geq q_i \ \forall i \in W \right\} \quad (5)$$

and the social acceptance set is the following set of all proposals that could pass:

$$A = \bigcup_{W \in \mathcal{D}} A_W \quad (6)$$

where \mathcal{D} is the set of all decisive coalitions. Thus, the committee chair solves the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\eta, \gamma, \alpha} \quad & \sum_{j \in N-c} \eta x_j + \gamma z_j + \alpha \frac{1}{n} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & (\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in A \\ & \eta + \gamma + \alpha = 1 \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

Due to her proposal power, the chair always weakly benefits when Congress considers revising a formula.⁹ That is, if the chair were to ever lose funding from a formula change,

⁸I show this result for this model in Lemma 1 in the appendix.

⁹ $y_c \geq q_c$.

she would retain the status quo. And, in many cases the chair is able to increase her grant amount. In particular, whenever the status quo policy does not allocate the entire budget, the chair is always able to increase her grant amount. This is because, at the very least, the chair can increase her most preferred weight, which strictly increases the grant amounts for all legislators. However, when the budget constraint does bind under the status quo, then, to increase her own grant amount, the chair needs to decrease the grant amount for at least one other legislator. And, it is always possible for the chair to do this when the chair and $m - 1$ other legislators are receiving less under the status quo than they would if all of the funding were allocated based on either their second-most preferred weight or the chair's preferred weight. Proposition 1 summarizes this result.

Proposition 1. There exists a Nash equilibrium in which the chair makes an acceptable proposal. Further, let g_i be the grant legislator i receives when the committee chair sets her preferred weight to 1, G be the set of all legislators for whom $g_i \geq q_i$, and $|G|$ be the number of legislators in G . If (i) $\sum_{i \in N} q_i < 1$; (ii) $q_i < f_i^2$ for $m - 1$ legislators and the chair; or (iii) $|G| \geq m$ and $q_i < g_c$ then there exists a Nash equilibrium in which a formula is enacted that increases the chair's grant amount.

One implication of Proposition 1 is that when the status quo formula concentrates funding in just a few states, the chair will generally be able to alter the formula to increase her grant amount. However, if the majority of states are doing well under the status quo, then the chair may not be able to change the formula.

The underlying logic for this result is that when a legislator is not receiving her maximum grant amount then there is another formula in addition to the status quo formula that provides the legislator at least what she is receiving under the status quo. Thus, except in the case where the chair is receiving her maximum grant under the status quo or when requirements (i), (ii), and (iii) are violated, it is always possible for the chair to construct a formula that provides a $m - 1$ legislators at least what they were receiving under the status quo and increases her own grant.¹⁰

¹⁰If the chair is receiving her maximum grant under the status quo then she retains

If possible the chair sets her preferred weight to 1 as this provides her state its maximum grant amount. And, it is possible for the chair to enact this formula when it provides $m - 1$ other states at least what they are receiving under the status quo formula. As a result, when the chair sets her preferred weight to 1, there may be an oversized winning coalition. For example, if the chair prefers η and at least $m - 1$ other legislators are receiving grants under the status quo less than or equal to x_i then the size of the winning coalition is equal to the number of states for which $q_i \leq x_i$. However, if the chair is not able to set her preferred weight equal to 1 then any formula change has a winning coalition that is minimal sized. That is, under majority rule, the winning coalition is a bare majority. Corollary 1 states this result more formally.

Corollary 1. If $|G| \geq m$ then there exists a Nash equilibrium in which the winning coalition size is $|G|$. If $|G| < m$, then any formula change enacted in equilibrium has a minimal winning coalition.

Notice that if the committee chair prefers the same weight as $m - 1$ other legislators then, in equilibrium, the chair always sets her preferred weight to 1. Additionally, when the status quo formula is $(0, 0, 0)$, as would be the case when a program is initially enacted, then the chair sets her preferred weight to 1.

There are, however, cases where there exists an equilibrium in which the committee chair retains the status quo. For example, under majority rule, consider the case where a majority of legislators prefer α and the status quo policy is $(\eta_q, \gamma_q, \alpha_q) = (0, 0, 1)$. In this case all legislators are receiving grants equal to $1/n$, which is the maximum possible grant for the majority of legislators. Thus, any formula change would result in the majority of legislators losing funds. As a result, no matter which legislator is the committee chair, no formula change is enacted in equilibrium.

When proposing a formula, the chair forms the cheapest winning coalition. As equation 7 indicates, the cheapest members of the winning coalition are those whose inclusion results in the smallest amount of funding being distributed to legislators other than the


the status quo policy as this is already maximizing her utility.

committee chair. Specifically, legislators receiving smaller grants under the status quo policy and who share similar characteristics to the chair are cheaper to include in the winning coalition. The intuition for the former is that the lower a legislator's grant under the status quo, the lower their reservation value. The intuition for the latter is that, because funding is allocated via formula, a legislator with similar x and z values to the chair benefits from the same formulas as the chair. For example, if the chair and legislator i both have above average population but below average poverty, then they both benefit from a formula that puts all of the weight on population.

To illustrate what formula is enacted and which legislators are included in the winning coalition consider a case with three legislators c, i, j where $x_c > 1/3 > z_c$, $z_i > x_i > 1/3$, and $1/3 > x_j > z_j$. Thus, c prefers η , i prefer γ , and j prefers α . Further assume that $m = 2$ (i.e., majority rule). Thus, the committee chair just needs one other legislator to weakly prefer the committee proposal to the status quo for it to pass.

Figure 2 shows what c would propose to include either i or j in the winning coalition, depending on the status quo policy. Notice that the smaller a legislator's grant is under the status quo, the larger η is in chair's proposed formula. And because the chair prefers η , the smaller a legislator's grant is under the status quo, the larger the chair's grant is under the proposal.

Figure 2: Proposals By Status Quo Grant




When deciding whether to include i or j in the winning coalition, c chooses whichever formula gives her state the larger grant amount. The solution to this is shown in Figure 3 below. Because η is smaller the larger a state's grant is under the status quo, when a state

is receiving less under the status quo it is cheaper to include in the winning coalition.¹¹ Specifically, when $x_i \geq q_i$ then legislator i is included in the winning coalition. When $x_j \geq q_j$ then legislator j is included in the winning coalition. And, when both $q_i > x_i$ and $q_j > x_j$ then i is included in the winning coalition when the following is true:

$$\frac{z_i - x_i}{x_c - z_c}(q_j - x_j) \geq \frac{1/3 - x_j}{x_c - 1/3}(q_i - x_i) \quad (8)$$

When equation 8 does not hold and $q_i > x_i$ then j is included in the winning coalition. Thus, as q_i increases, legislator i becomes more expensive to include in the winning coalition. However, when both i and j have large grants under the status quo policy then j is included in the winning coalition. The reason for this is that j has more similar characteristics to the chair. That is, $1/3 > z_c$, so the chair prefers a formula where α is larger to a formula where γ is larger. And, because $1/3 > z_j$, then including j in the winning coalition means increasing α not γ . Thus, because both z_j and z_c are below average, j is cheaper to include in the winning coalition.

Figure 3: Legislator Included in the Winning Coalition



¹¹It is worth noting that evaluating how a state is doing under the status quo is relative. In this example, j 's grant under the status quo is always smaller than i 's grant. This is because $z_i > x_i > 1/3 > x_j > z_j$. However, there are times when the chair is better off including i in the winning coalition than j .

Notice that the formula enacted in equilibrium distributes funding outside of the winning coalition. Unlike the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model, any formula where at least one of the weights is non-zero provides some funding to every state. The reason for this is that $x_i > 0$ and $z_i > 0$. That is, for example, a formula that allocates funding based on population will provide some funding to every state as every state has a population greater than 0.

This example also illustrates how bargaining over a formula reduces the benefit for the proposer, which in this case is the committee chair. In the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) game, the funds distributed outside of the winning coalition would go to the proposer. Further, in the case where either $q_i < x_i$ or $q_j < x_i$ then the proposer's benefit is further reduced. This is because the chair sets $\eta = 1$, which increases the grant for i and/or j . However, in the Baron and Ferejohn game, the proposer would merely make i or j indifferent rather than increasing their grant amount. And, in equilibrium, the proposer would never include both i and j in the winning coalition.

4.3 Role of Committees

For a committee to report a bill to the floor, it must first be passed in committee. That is, a majority of committee members must vote for the proposal. To incorporate this feature of the bargaining process into the model, I consider a game where the winning coalition must include a majority of the committee members. Specifically, let $H = \{1, \dots, h\}$ be a set of h legislators who are members of the committee with jurisdiction over the formula such that $H \subseteq N$.¹² To avoid complications that may arise from ties, I assume that h is odd.

The sequence of play is as follows. At the start of the game, the committee chair $c \in H$ makes a proposal $(\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in \chi$ and legislators take an up-or-down on the proposal. If m legislators and $(h + 1)/2$ committee members vote for the proposal, grants are allocated based on the new formula. If the proposal fails, the status quo policy $(\eta_q, \gamma_q, \alpha_q) \in \chi$

¹²Notice that when $h = n$ and the voting rule is majority rule then this is the same as the base model.

remains in effect. Utilities are then realized and the game ends.

The effect of requiring the winning coalition to include a majority of committee members is that committee members disproportionately benefit from formula grants. However, it is not necessarily the case that a given committee member's grant increases compared to the base model. In fact, some committee members may do worse compared to the base model. Instead, the effect of this constraint is that more committee members will be included in the winning coalition. Proposition 2 summarizes this result.

Proposition 2. When the winning coalition must include a majority of committee members, the number of non-committee members included in the winning coalition weakly decreases and the number of committee members included in the winning coalition weakly increases compared to the baseline model.

It is worth noting that this additional constraint weakly decreases the committee chair's grant amount compared to the base model. That is, if the proposal that maximizes the chair's grant amount in base model has a winning coalition that includes a majority of committee members, then the chair would make the same proposal. However, if the winning coalition does not include a majority of committee members then the chair must enact a formula that provides her less funding.

4.4 Effect of Multiple Proposers

In practice, bargaining does not typically follow this take-it-or-leave-it structure. If the committee proposal is not accepted, other legislators can offer alternate proposals. To investigate the effect of this bargaining, I consider an infinite horizon game where a new proposer is randomly selected and payoffs are realized in each period. Specifically, the bargaining protocol is as follows. In the first period, the committee chair makes a proposal $(\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in \chi$ and the chamber floor then takes an up-or-down on the committee proposal. If m legislators vote for the proposal, then utilities based on the committee proposal are realized in the current period and in every subsequent period. Otherwise grants are allocated based on the status quo policy $(\eta_q, \gamma_q, \alpha_q) \in \chi$ for the current period, a new

proposer is selected, and the game repeats. Legislator i is selected as the proposer with probability ρ_i . Legislators discount future payoffs with a common discount rate $\delta \in [0, 1)$. Note that when $\delta = 0$ this is the same as the one-period game.

Following Banks and Duggan (2006), I focus on no-delay stationary equilibria.¹³ More formally, I require that legislators' proposals satisfy sequential rationality and that their acceptance sets satisfy weak dominance. In such equilibria, legislators have a continuation value

$$v_i = \sum_{j=1}^n \rho_j \int_{\chi} \frac{y_i(p)}{1-\delta} \pi_j dp \quad (9)$$

where $y_i(p)$ is legislator i 's grant from proposal p and π_j puts probability one on socially acceptable proposals that maximize j 's utility and zero otherwise.

As in the one-period model, the question for the committee chair is which of the proposals that can pass the floor maximize her grant amount. From equation 4 it follows that for the chair to maximize her own grant she should minimize the grants to other legislators provided that legislators in the winning coalition W receive a grant at least equal to what they would if they rejected the proposal. If proposal $p = (\eta, \gamma, \alpha)$ is accepted, each player i receives a payoff in the current period equal to $y_i = \eta x_i + \gamma z_i + \alpha \frac{1}{n}$ and a dynamic payoff equal to $\frac{y_i}{1-\delta}$. Therefore, player i supports any proposal that provides her a grant y_i weakly greater than $(1-\delta)q_i + \delta v_i$ and the set of proposals acceptable to a given winning coalition is

$$A_W = \left\{ (\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in \chi \left| \eta x_i + \gamma z_i + \frac{\alpha}{n} \geq (1-\delta)q_i + \delta v_i \quad \forall i \in W \right. \right\} \quad (10)$$

The cheapest members of the winning coalition again are the legislators with the lowest grants under the status quo and that have similar characteristics to the chair. However, in addition, a legislator's cheapness is also a function of her continuation value and thus the probability that she becomes the proposer in the future.

As with most divide-the-dollar games, this model can be formulated as a special case

¹³No delay implies that a proposal p is in A .

of Banks and Duggan (2006). From Theorem 1 of Banks and Duggan I get the following existence result:

Proposition 3. There exists a stationary equilibrium with immediate agreement.

And this result holds even though the status quo policy may be favorable to some legislators. However, for certain values of q_c and distributions of x and z there also exist stationary equilibria with delay. I provide an example of one such scenario in the Appendix.

5 Winning Coalitions

In this section, I test the theory empirically by examining which legislators are included in the winning coalition. The theory predicts that a state is cheaper to include in the winning coalition when it is receiving a smaller grant under the status quo policy and has more similar characteristics to the proposer. To test these predictions, I first examine the relationship between a state's grant amount under the status quo formula and whether that state is included in the winning coalition. Second, I look at the relationship between winning coalition membership and how similar a state's population is to that of the proposer's state. Consistent with these predictions, I find that both groups of states are more likely to be included in the winning coalition when allocation formulas are changed.

5.1 Data

To test the theory, I use an original dataset of Senate amendments to formula grant programs. Specifically, when allocation formulas are amended, legislators have estimates produced of how each state will do under the proposal.¹⁴ For each proposal, I collected estimates of state grants under the proposal and the status quo policy from the Congressional Record. I also recorded which member proposed the amendment and I match

¹⁴Grant estimates are generally produced by the government agency that administers the program or by the Congressional Research Service.

these data to roll call votes from Lewis et al.'s (2017) Voteview database.¹⁵ The dataset spans the 80th Congress to the 114th Congress (1947–2016).

For each proposal, I consider the status quo policy to be the formula that would be in effect if the proposal did not pass. The status quo is usually the formula in current law, under the bill as reported by committee, or under changes passed by the House. Figure 4 shows what the data generally look like in the Congressional Record. In this example, grants under Senator Bellmon's amendment were compared to grants under H.R. 3434.

Figure 4: 125 Cong. Rec. (1979) 29936

	Fiscal year 1980					Fiscal year 1980			
	Fiscal year 1978	H.R. 3434	Bellmon amendment	Change		Fiscal year 1978	H.R. 3434	Bellmon amendment	Change
U.S. total.....	211.95	278.14	279.84	+1.70	Missouri.....	1.50	2.20	2.68	+1.43
Alabama.....	1.30	1.80	2.21	+0.41	Montana.....	.50	.60	.57	-.01
Alaska.....	.70	.84	.80	-.04	Nebraska.....	.60	.72	.72	(*)
Arizona.....	(*)	1.10	1.57	+1.47	Nevada.....	.30	.36	.34	-.02
Arkansas.....	.40	1.00	1.27	+1.27	New Hampshire.....	.50	.60	.57	-.03
California.....	29.30	35.16	35.16	(*)	New Jersey.....	.30	3.30	4.65	+1.35
Colorado.....	1.20	1.44	1.44	(*)	New Mexico.....	.08	.60	.85	+1.25
Connecticut.....	1.60	1.92	1.92	(*)	New York.....	109.20	131.04	125.09	-5.95
Delaware.....	.40	.48	.49	+1.01	North Carolina.....	.70	2.60	3.01	+1.41
District of Columbia.....	.48	.48	.58	+1.10	North Dakota.....	.40	.48	.46	-.02
Florida.....	1.10	3.50	4.15	+1.65	Ohio.....	2.50	5.00	6.22	+1.22
Georgia.....	2.20	2.64	2.99	+1.35	Oklahoma.....	.60	1.30	1.58	+1.28
Hawaii.....	(*)	.40	.62	+1.22	Oregon.....	3.70	4.44	4.24	-.20
Idaho.....	.30	.40	.40	(*)	Pennsylvania.....	6.80	8.16	8.16	(*)
Illinois.....	3.20	5.30	5.37	+1.07	Rhode Island.....	.30	.36	.41	+1.01
Indiana.....	1.20	2.60	3.31	+1.71	South Carolina.....	.50	1.40	1.79	+1.39
Iowa.....	1.10	1.32	1.32	(*)	South Dakota.....	.30	.36	.41	+1.05
Kansas.....	2.40	2.88	2.75	-.13	Tennessee.....	2.10	2.52	2.80	+1.28
Kentucky.....	1.90	2.28	2.42	+1.14	Texas.....	1.00	6.30	6.30	(*)
Louisiana.....	2.60	3.12	3.12	(*)	Utah.....	.40	.70	.73	+1.03
Maine.....	1.70	2.04	1.95	-.09	Vermont.....	.50	.60	.57	-.03
Maryland.....	3.00	3.60	3.60	(*)	Virginia.....	2.60	3.12	2.98	-.14
Massachusetts.....	.60	2.50	2.50	(*)	Washington.....	2.10	2.52	2.52	(*)
Michigan.....	10.20	12.24	12.24	(*)	West Virginia.....	.80	.96	1.04	+1.08
Minnesota.....	3.20	3.84	3.76	-.08	Wisconsin.....	2.90	3.48	3.48	(*)
Mississippi.....	.80	1.30	1.50	+1.20	Wyoming.....	.07	.20	.20	(*)

* Less than \$0.05 million.

* No change.

As these data are at the state level, I focus my analysis on the Senate. While there is nothing particular to the theory that applies to the Senate but not the House, there is reason to suspect that Senators are more likely to try and alter grant programs to bring more funding to their states than House members. Specifically, because formulas do not allocate grants to congressional districts it is difficult for House members to claim credit for formula changes and know how a formula change will affect funding for their district (Lee 2003, 2004). However, because most formula grants allocate funding to states or entities that are nested within states, these same issues do not affect Senators.

The advantage of these data is that they allow me to isolate formula changes. That is,

¹⁵Forty percent of the floor amendments in my dataset received a roll call vote. In the analysis of roll call votes only this subset is included. In the other analysis, all amendments are included. Both analyses include amendments that pass and those that do not.

by looking at individual amendments rather than entire bills, I can examine how legislators voted when the only issue being considered is the allocation formula. Further, these data allow me to identify the proposer and easily quantify both the status quo policy and the proposal policy. However, it is worth noting that these data do not reflect the universe of all proposed amendments to formula grant programs. For example, during consideration of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) in 2016, 17 amendments to allocation formulas were proposed on the Senate floor. Of those amendments, 3 are included in the data I collected from the Congressional Record. The amendments included are those that make larger and more contentious formula changes. That is, these amendments resulted in more debate on the Senate floor. To account for this sample selection issue, I reestimate the status quo analysis using a dataset that encompasses the universe of enacted changes to formulas administered by the U.S. Department of Education and find similar results. Additionally, I reestimate the state characteristics analysis using a dataset of all amendments to allocation formulas considered during the three most recent reauthorizations of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Again, I find similar results. These analyses are included in the Appendix.

5.2 Methodology

To examine the relationship between status quo grants, state characteristics, and winning coalition membership, I compare whether a state was included in the winning coalition under amendments proposed in the same congress. This design takes advantage of the fact that multiple amendments with different proposers and status quo policies are considered within the same congress. Thus, I can, for example, compare whether a state was included in the winning coalition when it was doing poorly under the status quo to when it was doing well under the status quo within a two-year span.

I use two measures for whether a state is included in the winning coalition: (1) a binary indicator for whether the state's grant share increased and (2) whether the state's Senators voted for the proposal. To measure a state's similarity to the proposer's state,

I use the Euclidean distance between their populations.¹⁶ To measure whether a state is doing poorly under the status quo, I use the a state’s grant share under the status quo.¹⁷ Specifically, I estimate the probability of being included in the winning coalition (WC) with the following linear model:¹⁸

$$Pr(WC_{ipt}|q_{ipt}, \omega_{it}, x_{it}, x_{pt}^*) = \beta_1 q_{ipt} + \beta_2 |x_{it} - x_{pt}^*| + \omega_{it} + \epsilon_{ipt} \quad (11)$$

where q_{ip} is state i ’s grant share under the status quo for the program amended by proposal p ; x_{it} is state i ’s population at time t ; x_{pt}^* is the population of the state represented by the proposer of proposal p ; ω_{it} is a state-congress fixed effect; and ϵ_{ipt} is an error term. As linear probability models suffer from heteroskedasticity, I use robust standard errors.¹⁹

As grant amounts vary by state, the analysis using grant amounts as the dependent variable is done at the state level. Similarly, as roll call votes are measured at the Senator level, the analysis using roll call votes as the dependent variable is done at the legislator level.²⁰ However, because the independent variables of interest vary at the state level, not the legislator level, the standard errors for the roll call analysis are clustered by state-amendment.

¹⁶State population data are from the U.S. Census (Manson et al. 2020).

¹⁷The results are similar when state poverty is used instead of state population, log dollars are used instead of grant share, and a covariate for copartisanship is included. I include these analyses in the Appendix.

¹⁸I fit a linear probability model rather than a logistic regression due to the inclusion of fixed effects. In the Appendix, I fit a conditional logistic regression and get similar results.

¹⁹I calculate White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors using the `sandwich` package in R (Zeileis 2004).

²⁰This analysis excludes the majority party leader due to votes to recommit.

5.3 Results

Table 1 examines which states and legislators are included in the winning coalition when an allocation formula is amended. In line with theoretical predictions, when a state is doing worse under the status quo it is more likely to be included in the winning coalition.²¹ Specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in a state’s grant under the status quo reduces the probability that their Senator votes for an amendment by 1.9 percentage points. Additionally, states that have a similar population level to the chair are also more likely to be included in the winning coalition. And, these results hold when measuring winning coalition membership using roll call votes as well as a binary indicator for whether a state’s grant share increased.

Table 1: Winning Coalition Membership

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Vote for Amendment	Grant Share Increase
Status Quo Grant Share	−0.019* (0.008)	−0.041*** (0.008)
Difference from Proposer	−3.585*** (0.408)	−2.117*** (0.313)
State-Congress Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Count of Amendments	47	117
Observations	4,144	5,604
Adjusted R ²	0.356	0.095

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state-amendment for analysis of roll call votes. The analyses in the first column is at the legislator level. The analysis in the second column is at the state level. Grant share is measured on a scale of 0 to 100. Difference from the proposer is measured using the Euclidean distance in state population. Models using log dollars instead of share, poverty instead of population, and including a covariate for copartisanship are presented in Appendix.

²¹It could be the case that states receiving less funding under the status quo see an increase in their grant amounts due to mean reversion. To test this, I simulate how much states would receive if grant shares were determined randomly. I find that the effect size is significantly smaller than what I observe in the data, suggesting that the results are not just do to mean reversion. I include this analysis in the Appendix.

These results suggest that legislators are trying to alter allocation formulas to increase their states' grant amounts and that bargaining over a formula imposes additional constraints on legislators. If legislators are attempting to allocate funding based solely on need, then a state's grant under the status quo and its similarity to the proposer should have no relationship to whether it is included in the winning coalition. Thus, these results are more consistent with legislators trying to maximize grants for their states by forming the cheapest winning coalitions. Further, state characteristics only influence how cheap a legislator is when grants are allocated based on state characteristics (i.e., via formula). Thus, these findings suggest that not only are legislators trying to procure more funding for their states, but that they are constrained by the structure of formulas. However, this is not to say that other political and institutional factors do not play a role in the distribution of grants. Rather, these results should be taken to mean that at least some of the patterns in grant allocations can be explained by legislators trying to increase their grant amounts and the structure of formulas.


6 Role of Congressional Committees

In this section, I examine the role that committees play in the design of allocation formulas. If legislators want to procure additional funding and committees have proposal power then the states represented by committee members should benefit more from formula changes. I test this using data on education grant programs. Specifically, I use a matched difference-in-differences design to estimate how much formula funding committee members and chairs are able to procure for their states. Consistent with the theory, I find evidence that both committee members and committee chairs are able to procure additional formula funding for their states when programs under their jurisdiction are reauthorized.

6.1 Data

To test examine the role of committees, I examine the distribution of grants to states for education. I compile a data set of grant amounts for each state in each year going back to FY1980 for all formula grant programs administered by the Department of Education.²² For each program in each year, I hand code when the program was last reauthorized. I then match each reauthorization to Stewart and Woon’s (2017) and Nelson’s (1993) congressional databases to determine authorizing committee membership. As all of the programs in the data set are education programs, they all fall under the jurisdiction of the Health Education Labor and Pensions (HELP) Committee.²³ Figure 5 summarizes which programs are funded in each year in this dataset. As in the previous analyses, these data are at the state level. As a result, I focus my analysis on the Senate.

Figure 5: Formula Grants Administered by ED, FY1980 to FY2017



²²Data on state grant amounts are available on the Department of Education’s website. I exclude the Impact Aid program from this analysis because it has been reauthorized by bills reported out of the Health Education Labor and Pensions Committee and the Armed Services Committee. Thus, it is sometimes unclear what bill last reauthorized the program and who the committee members are.

²³During this time period the HELP Committee was also called the Human Resources Committee and the Labor and Human Resources Committee.

6.2 Methodology

To estimate the committee and committee chair effects, I use a difference-in-differences design that compares state grant amounts within the same year under education programs that have and have not been reauthorized. Specifically, I exploit the fact that programs do not come up for reauthorization at the same time. That is, at the beginning of a legislator's tenure as chair there will be some programs that she has reauthorized (and thus had the ability to change the formulas) and others she has not. Therefore, I can compare how a state does under a program that the current chair has reauthorized to a similar program that has yet to come up for reauthorization. Put differently, each treated observation has its own control set made up of grant amounts in the same year for the same state under similar programs. For example, Senator Ted Kennedy (MA) became chair of the HELP committee in 2007. In 2008, Congress reauthorized the Higher Education Act (HEA), which is under the jurisdiction of the HELP committee. However, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), which is also under HELP's jurisdiction, had yet to be reauthorized while Senator Kennedy was chair. To estimate the additional formula funding Senator Kennedy was able to bring to Massachusetts, I compare the change in Massachusetts's HEA grant amounts between 2008 and 2009 to the change in Massachusetts's WIA grant amounts over the same time period.

The assumption required for identification is that, absent program reauthorization, both treated and control units would have continued along the same pre-treatment trajectories. Provided this assumption is satisfied, I can compare differences in the means of state grant amounts before and after reauthorization among treated and control units, and this estimate represents the effect solely attributable to committee membership.²⁴

²⁴To test this assumption, I examine the pre-reauthorization trends in state grant amounts and find the reauthorized and not reauthorized grants are similar. This analysis also assumes that chairs do not strategically select which programs to reauthorize. This assumption seems reasonable as a single statute contains multiple formula grant programs as well as other policies. Thus, whether a program gets reauthorized depends on more than just its allocation formula. To test this assumption, I compare chairs' grants under

As formula changes are often phased in over time, I estimate the effect of joining the committee and becoming chair immediately following a formula change and for each of the three subsequent years.²⁵ Let $D_{ipt} \in \{0, 1\}$ represent the treatment status of state i for program p at time t . Thus, the vector \mathbf{D} for the treatment (T) and control (C) groups is the following:

	$t - 3$	$t - 2$	$t - 1$	t	$t + 1$	$t + 2$	$t + 3$
D_T	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
D_C	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

To estimate the treatment effect j years after reauthorization, I compare the change in each treated observation's logged grant amount between $t - 1$ and $t + j$ to that of its matched control set. To account for the fact that the same observation may be used in the control group for multiple observations in the treatment group (matching with replacement), I estimate standard errors using a weighted bootstrap (Otsu and Rai 2017). I discuss the estimation of effect sizes and standard errors further in the appendix.

This differences-in-differences design overcomes two potential issues for estimation. First, as the model illustrates, a state's grant amount depends on its formula factors or observable attributes. Comparing the same state in the same year holds state attributes, such as population and poverty, constant. Second, as others have noted, a challenge in measuring the committee advantage is constructing the counterfactual as certain legislators may be more likely than others to select onto a committee (e.g., Grimmer and Powell 2013; Berry and Fowler 2016). Thus I cannot compare a committee member's state to all other states. This design sidesteps this issue by exploiting the plausibly exogenous variation in program reauthorizations, as opposed to which state is represented by the chair, to make within-state comparisons.

the status quo under programs reauthorized and not reauthorized in a given year and find no significant difference. I include these analyses in the appendix.

²⁵Thus, I only include observations in the treatment group in year t where the treatment status does not change prior to year $t + 4$. I also only include observations that remained untreated for at least three years prior to reauthorization.

6.3 Results

Table 2 presents estimates of the committee advantage and the committee chair advantage. Consistent with the theory, the analysis suggests that states represented by committee members receive more formula grant funding and this benefit is not just due to committee members being high demanders.²⁶ Further, there is an additional benefit of becoming the committee chair on top of committee membership.²⁷ In the first year following a reauthorization, committee members' states receive about 24% more education funding and committee chairs' states receive an additional 5.5%.²⁸

Table 2: Effect of Committee Position on Formula Grants, Diff-in-Diff Estimates

	<i>DV: Grant Amount (Log)</i>			
	<i>t</i>	<i>t</i> + 1	<i>t</i> + 2	<i>t</i> + 3
Committee Chair	0.055* (0.023)	0.198* (0.077)	0.106* (0.044)	0.117 (0.061)
Committee Member	0.215* (0.1)	0.1** (0.037)	0.227*** (0.053)	0.396** (0.121)
Observations				
Committee Chair	138	138	138	138
Committee Member	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Standard errors computed based on 1,000 weighted bootstrap samples in parentheses. Count of observations refers to unique number of state-program reauthorization dyads in each analysis.

²⁶It could be the case that committee members' grants increase because all states' grants increase following reauthorization. In the Appendix, I present a placebo test where I examine the grants of non-committee members and find no significant increase.

²⁷The control group includes programs that have yet to be reauthorized since a legislator became chair. Because committee chairs were on committee prior to being chair, the committee chair effect is primarily comparing how a state does when it was represented by a committee member to when it is represented by the committee chair.

²⁸As grants are measured in log dollars, $100 \times (\epsilon^\beta - 1)$ reflects the percentage change in funding in a legislator's state when that legislator is on committee or is the chair.

7 Concluding Discussion

In this paper I show how federal grants-in-aid are shaped by majority and super-majority rule, congressional committees, legislators attempting to maximize the funding their states receive, the status quo policy, and the structure of allocation formulas. Consistent with a distributive theory of grants, committee members, and particularly the committee chair, are more successful in procuring additional funding because of the role they play in the policymaking process. However, the structure of a formula imposes additional constraints. The advantage to the chair is reduced because funding is distributed outside of the winning coalition, winning coalitions may be oversized, and members of the winning coalition may receive a larger share of funding than is required to make them support a proposal. Further, states doing worse under the status quo and that are similar to proposers benefit more from formulas because they are cheaper to include in the winning coalition. And, consistent with these predictions, I find that states receiving smaller grants under the status quo policy and that have similar population levels to the proposer are more likely to be included in the winning coalition.

Taken together, these results illustrate how institutional features, such as the committee system and majority rule, influence how effectively the federal government distributes assistance to areas with the greatest need. What formula gets enacted, and thus which states benefit, depends on the distribution of formula factors across states, the committee chair, and the status quo policy. Because funding is allocated based on state characteristics, committee chairs representing a constituency with high need must allocate funding to other places with high need in order for their own states to benefit. Thus, due to their proposal power, committee chairs with high need typically improve formulas with poor targeting and protect formulas that target effectively. However, for a committee chair to improve the targeting of a formula, she needs to find a majority, or super-majority, of legislators who support her proposal. Thus, if the majority of legislators have relatively low need then, depending on the status quo, it may not be possible for the chair to enact a formula that improves targeting. Further, when amending a formula that is already well targeted, states with low need are more likely to be included in the winning coalition

as they are doing poorly under the status quo. As a result, for the committee chair to maximize her grant under a program that is well targeted, she may need to make the program less targeted.

One implication of this theory is that the congressional committee system may actually improve how effectively formulas target need. Weingast and Marshall (1988) show how the committee system in Congress facilitates decision making because it allows for the enforcement of legislative bargains. This is due to both committees' agenda setting power and the fact that committees are made up of high demanders. By a similar argument committee chairs can enact and protect formulas that most benefit their states through their agenda setting power. And, if committee chairs have high need for a program (i.e., they are high demanders) then the formulas they enact and protect are likely to be formulas that target funding toward areas with the greatest need.

The theory also has implications for the distribution of funding to smaller states. As the Title I-A example illustrated, smaller states tend to receive more per capita grant funding than larger states (Lee 2000). This result is consistent with the theory as the distribution of population across states is right skewed. In other words, there are a few states with very high populations (e.g., New York, California, Texas) but the majority of states have population levels below the national average. Thus, if a formula were to include population or factors correlated with population (e.g., poverty) then a large number of states would want to have high minimum grants. Because a large number of formulas do include some measure of population, many formulas should end up with higher minimum grant amounts. And, since minimum grants distribute an equal amount of funding to each state, these provisions provide smaller states more per capita funding.

To my knowledge, this paper is the first to develop and test a theory that incorporates congressional committees, majority rule, the status quo policy, and structure of allocation formulas. However, noticeably absent from the theory are political parties and their role in designing grants-in-aid. Legislators may be trying to do more than increase funding for their own states and districts. Future research should explore how legislators' distributive motivations interact with partisan ones. For example, it may be the case that legislators

support proposals that target funding to constituents represented by electorally vulnerable copartisans. Alternatively, legislators may factor in party brand when evaluating proposals. And, these partisan motivations may have consequences for who benefits from federal assistance and thus how effectively federal assistance is distributed to the areas with the greatest need.

Appendix

A Theory

Maximum Grant Amounts

It is first useful to consider the maximum possible amount each state could receive under a formula. In a typical divide-the-dollar game (e.g., Baron and Ferejohn 1989), the maximum possible allocation for a legislator is 1 (i.e., they take the entire dollar). However, when allocations are constrained by a formula, each type of legislator has a different maximum allocation, which is less than 1 and determined by x_i and z_i . A legislator's "type" is pair $\{x_i, z_i\}$. Thus, legislators with the same values for x_i and z_i are of the same type. Based on these types, legislators fall into the following three categories, which describe their maximum possible allocation and the formula factor from which they most benefit:

1. When $x_i \geq z_i$ and $x_i \geq 1/n$ then $y_i^{\max} = x_i$ and this allocation occurs when $\eta = 1, \gamma = 0, \alpha = 0$. I refer to these legislators as legislators whose preferred weight is η .
2. When $z_i \geq x_i$ and $z_i \geq 1/n$ then $y_i^{\max} = z_i$ and this allocation occurs when $\gamma = 1, \eta = 0, \alpha = 0$. I refer to these legislators as legislators whose preferred weight is γ .
3. When $x_i \leq 1/n$ and $z_i \leq 1/n$ then $y_i^{\max} = 1/n$ and this allocation occurs when $\alpha = 1, \eta = 0, \gamma = 0$. I refer to these legislators as legislators whose preferred weight is α .²⁹

The intuition for this result is relatively straightforward: a legislator receives the largest grant when all of the weight is placed on their largest formula factor. More formally,

²⁹If $x_i = z_i = 1/n$ then that legislator receive their maximum allocation ($1/n$) under any combination of weights so long as $\eta + \gamma + \alpha = 1$.

$$\max_{\eta, \gamma, \alpha} \eta x_i + \gamma z_i + \alpha \frac{1}{n} \quad (12)$$

when $\eta, \gamma, \alpha \geq 0$ and the budget constraint is $\eta + \gamma + \alpha \leq 1$.

In the case where $z_i = x_i = 1/n$, any combination of η, γ, α provides i her maximum grant of $1/n$ so long as $\eta + \gamma + \alpha = 1$. In this case, η, γ , and α are essentially perfect substitutes. However, in all other cases we must consider corner solutions. When $(1, 0, 0)$ is the formula, i receives a grant of x_i . When $(0, 1, 0)$ is the formula, i receives a grant of z_i . When $(0, 0, 1)$ is the formula, i receives a grant of $1/n$. Thus, $(1, 0, 0)$ provides i her maximum grant (equal to x_i) when $x_i > z_i$ and $x_i > 1/n$. That is, when i prefers η . Similarly, $(0, 1, 0)$ and $(0, 0, 1)$ provides i her maximum grant when she prefers γ and α , respectively.

Proof of Proposition 1

Proposition 1. There exists a Nash equilibrium in which the chair makes an acceptable proposal. Further, let g_i be the grant legislator i receives when the committee chair sets her preferred weight to 1, G be the set of all legislators for whom $g_i \geq q_i$, and $|G|$ be the number of legislators in G . If either (i) $\sum_{i \in N} q_i < 1$; (ii) $q_i < f_i^2$ for $m - 1$ legislators and the chair; or (iii) $|G| \geq m$ and $q_i < g_c$ then there exists a Nash equilibrium in which the chair enacts a formula that increases her grant amount.

Proof. By construction, the voting strategy $A_i = \{(\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in \chi | \eta x_i + \gamma z_i + \alpha/n\}$ satisfies weak dominance. Notice that legislator i 's acceptance set A_i contains the status quo formula for all $i \in N$. Thus, A is always nonempty as it will contain the status quo formula. As a result, the chair can always make an acceptable proposal. And, because a non-acceptable proposal results in grants based on the status quo formula, there is always an acceptable proposal that the chair weakly prefers to a non-acceptable proposal. As a result, selecting the proposal in A that maximizes her grant amount, is a best response for the chair. Thus, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which the chair makes an acceptable proposal. \square

Define w_i^1, w_i^2, w_i^3 as the value of legislator i 's most, second-most, and least preferred weights, respectively, under the status quo.³⁰

- (i) When $\sum_{i \in N} q_i < 1$ this implies $\eta_q + \gamma_q + \alpha_q < 1$. Thus, the proposer can always strictly increase her grant amount and the grant amount for all other legislators by increasing her preferred weight by $1 - \alpha_q - \gamma_q - \eta_q$. \square
- (ii) Note that when $\eta + \gamma + \alpha = 1$ but legislator i 's least preferred weight is 0 then it must be the case that $y_i \geq f_i^2$. Thus, when $q_c < f_c^2$ this implies that $w_c^1 + w_c^2 < 1$. Further, when $q_i < f_i^2$ for $m - 1$ legislators then $w_i^1 + w_i^2 < 1$ for $m - 1$ legislators. Thus the grant for the chair and $m - 1$ legislators can be increased by decreasing w_c^3 . \square
- (iii) When $|G| \geq m$ then the formula that sets the chair's preferred weight to 1 is socially acceptable. This is because it provides every legislator with $y_i = g_i$, which weakly increases grants for m legislators. Further, this provides the chair her maximum grant amount ($y_i = y_i^{\max}$), which strictly increases the chair's grant amount provided the chair is not already receiving her maximum. \square

Proof of Corollary 1

Let g_i be the grant legislator i receives when the committee chair sets her preferred weight to 1, G be the set of all legislators for whom $g_i > q_i$, and $|G|$ be the number of legislators in G . Further, let A_W^* be the formula in A_W that maximizes the chair's grant amount and $y_i(A_W^*)$ be legislator i 's grant amount from this formula.

It is first useful to consider some lemmas to prove the main result. Lemma 1 shows that in equilibrium the budget constraint always binds.

Lemma 1. $\sum_{i \in N} y_i = 1$

Proof. Suppose not and $\sum_{i \in N} y_i < 1$. Note that because $\sum_{i \in N} x_i = 1$ and $\sum_{i \in N} z_i = 1$, then Lemma 1 implies $\eta + \gamma + \alpha = 1$. If it were not to bind then the proposer could always strictly increase her grant amount by increasing her preferred weight by $1 - \alpha - \gamma - \eta$. \square

³⁰For example, if $f_i^2 = x_i$ then $w_i^2 = \eta_q$

Lemma 2 shows that if the formula proposed in equilibrium does not provide the chair her maximum grant amount then at least one legislator in the winning coalition is indifferent between the proposal and the status quo.

Lemma 2. If $y_c(A_W^*) < y_c^{\max}$ then there exists $i \in W$ such that $y_i(A_W^*) = q_i$.

Proof. From weak dominance,

$$A_i = \left\{ (\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in \chi \mid \eta x_i + \gamma z_i + \frac{\alpha}{n} \geq q_i \right\} \quad (13)$$

If possible, the chair would set her preferred weight to one as it provides her y_c^{\max} . Thus, when $y_c(A_W^*) < y_c^{\max}$, it must be the case that $q_i > g_i$ for $m - 1$ legislators. This implies that $m - 1$ legislators do not prefer the same weight as the chair and some of these legislators need to be included in the winning coalition. Further, from Lemma 1, it immediately follows that if the chair cannot set her preferred weight to 1 the formula proposed in equilibrium will put weight on at least one other factor. If $y_i(A_W^*) > q_i$ for all $i \in W$ such that $g_i > q_i$ then the chair can increase her preferred weight and decrease the other weight in the formula, which decreases the grants for these legislators. Further, the chair will continue to do this until $y_i(A_W^*) = q_i$ for at least one legislator. \square

Lemma 3 shows that in equilibrium the sum of grants distributed to legislators other than the chair weakly decreases if members are removed from the winning coalition. Further, if the formula proposed in equilibrium does not provide the chair her maximum grant amount then this inequality is strict.

Lemma 3. When $W' \in \mathcal{D}$ and $W' \subset W$ then

1. $\sum_{i \in N-c} y_i(A_{W'}^*) \leq \sum_{i \in N-c} y_i(A_W^*)$
2. If $y_c(A_W^*) < y_c^{\max}$ then $\sum_{i \in N-c} y_i(A_{W'}^*) < \sum_{i \in N-c} y_i(A_W^*)$

Proof. Because the budget constraint binds in equilibrium, the chair's grant is equal to the following:

$$y_c = 1 - \sum_{i \in N-c} y_i \quad (14)$$

Thus for the chair to maximize her grant, she must minimize grants to all other legislators.

As a result,

$$\sum_{i \in N-c} y_i(A_{W'}^*) = \min_{(\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in A_{W'}} \sum_{i \in N-c} \eta x_i + \gamma z_i + \alpha/n \quad (15)$$

$$\sum_{i \in N-c} y_i(A_W^*) = \min_{(\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in A_W} \sum_{i \in N-c} \eta x_i + \gamma z_i + \alpha/n \quad (16)$$

Because $W' \subset W$, it immediately follows that $A_W \subseteq A_{W'}$. As a result, $\sum_{i \in N-c} y_i(A_{W'}^*) \leq \sum_{i \in N-c} y_i(A_W^*)$. As for part 2, note that, from Lemma 2, there exists $j \in W$ such that $y_j(A_W^*) = q_j$. If legislator j is removed from the winning coalition then c can increase her preferred weight and decrease at least one of the other weights. This strictly increases the chair's grant amount, therefore strictly decreasing the sum of grants distributed to other legislators. \square

With this, I can now prove the main result.

Corollary 1. If $|G| \geq (n+1)/2$ then the winning coalition size is $|G|$. If $|G| < (n+1)/2$, then any formula change enacted in equilibrium has a minimal winning coalition.

Proof. If possible the chair sets her preferred weight to 1 as this results in her maximum grant amount. It is possible for the chair to enact this formula when $m-1$ other states receive at least what they are receiving under the status quo formula. Thus, the winning coalition size is $|G|$. In all other cases, the winning coalition is minimal sized. Suppose not and c proposes $(\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in A$ where $y_i > q_i$ for $\hat{n} > m$ legislators. Because, $|G| < m$ the chair cannot set her preferred weight to 1. From Lemma 1 it follows that if the chair cannot set her preferred weight to 1 then in equilibrium at least two weights are non-zero. From Lemma 3, the chair strictly prefers increasing her preferred weight and decreasing at least one of the other weights such that fewer legislators are included in the winning coalition. This results in a minimal winning coalition because if it did not and the other weights could not be decreased any further then this would imply that the chair's preferred weight is 1, which is not possible.³¹ And, the chair strictly prefers

³¹There are some knives edge conditions in which two legislators are equally "cheap" to include in the winning coalition and thus, in equilibrium, the chair could have an

this formula to (η, γ, α) because it increases the weight on her most preferred factor and weakly decreases the weight on the other two factors. \square

Proof of Proposition 2

Proposition 2. When the winning coalition must include a majority of committee members, (i) the number of non-committee members included in the winning coalition weakly decreases and (ii) the number of committee members included in the winning coalition weakly increases.

First, I show that the size of the winning coalition in this extension is weakly smaller than in the base model. Let A^h be the set of proposals that weakly increase grant amounts for m legislators and a majority of committee members. And, let $|W|$ be the size of the winning coalition in the base model and $|W^h|$ be the size of the winning coalition when it must include a majority of committee members.

Lemma 4. $|W| \geq |W^h|$

Proof. It follows from Corollary 1 that the winning coalition is only oversized when the chair puts all of the weight on her most preferred factor. If this proposal is in A^h then the chair will propose it in both this extension and the base model as it provides the chair her maximum possible grant amount. If this proposal is in A but not A^h then $|W| > |W^h|$. If this proposal is in neither acceptance set then $|W| = |W^h|$ \square

With Lemma 4, I now prove the main result.

Proof.

- (i) As I show below, the number of committee members included in the winning coalition, weakly increases. Further, Lemma 4 shows that the overall size of the winning coalition weakly decreases. It must therefore be the case that the number of non-committee members included in the winning coalition weakly decreases. \square

oversized coalition.

- (ii) If the proposal that maximizes the chair's grant amount in the base model is in A^h then the chair proposes that as $A^h \subset A$. If not then it must be the case that the proposal in the base model would not include a majority of committee members. Thus, the number of committee members in the winning coalition weakly increases. \square

Proof of Proposition 3

To apply Theorem 1 of Banks and Duggan (2006) I must verify six technical conditions:

1. Impose the requirement that $\delta \in [0, 1)$ and $\delta_i = \delta \forall i$.
2. The set of possible formulas χ is nonempty, compact, and convex where $\chi = \{\eta, \gamma, \alpha \in [0, 1] \mid \sum_{i \in N} \eta x_i + \gamma z_i + \alpha 1/n \leq 1\}$. $(0, 0, 0) \in \chi$ so χ is nonempty. Convexity and compactness follow immediately from the linear budget constraint and the non-negativity constraints used to define χ .
3. The status quo policy $(\eta_q, \gamma_q, \alpha_q) \in \chi$. This is true by assumption.
4. Impose the requirement that the recognition probabilities ρ_1, \dots, ρ_n are fixed throughout the game. Note that fixing the chair as the proposer in the first period does not conflict with this requirement as we can consider the chair to be the legislator who is chosen as the proposer in the first period.
5. Each legislator's utility u_i is continuous and concave. This is ensured by the linearity of the utility function.
6. Each legislator's utility u_i is strictly quasi-concave and strictly monotonic in the consumption of i 's district. Strict quasi-concavity and strict monotonicity follow from the fact that i 's utility is strictly increasing in her own district's grant amount.³²

³²This condition is needed to ensure that Banks and Duggan's requirement of limited shared weak preferences (LSWP) holds. LSWP is similar to, but weaker than, single-peakedness.

Example of Delay

Proposition 2 shows that there always exists a stationary equilibrium without delay. However, for certain values of q_c and distributions of x and z there also exist stationary equilibria with delay.³³ In such an equilibrium, legislators have the following continuation value:

$$v_i = \frac{\sum_{j \in N} \rho_j \left(\int_A \frac{y_i(p)}{1-\delta} \pi_j dp + (1-\delta) q_i \pi_j (\chi - A) \right)}{1 - \delta \sum_{j \in N} \rho_j \pi_j (\chi - A)} \quad (17)$$

where $\pi_j(\chi - A)$ is the probability that legislator j makes a proposal that is not accepted.

Consider a case where $1/3 > x_c > z_c$, $x_i > z_i > 1/3$, $x_j > z_j > 1/3$, and $(\eta_q, \gamma_q, \alpha_q) = (0, 0, 1)$. That is, legislator c prefers α , legislators i and j both prefer η , and the status quo formula places all of the weight on α , providing each legislator with a status quo grant of $1/3$. Further assume $m = 2$ (i.e., majority rule). I look for stationary equilibria of the following form: $p_c = (0, 0, 1)$, $A_c = \{(\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in \chi | y_c \geq (1-\delta)1/3 + \delta v_c\}$, $p_i = p_j = (1, 0, 0)$, $A_i = \{(\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in \chi | y_i \geq (1-\delta)1/3 + \delta v_i\}$, and $A_j = \{(\eta, \gamma, \alpha) \in \chi | y_j \geq (1-\delta)1/3 + \delta v_j\}$. In such equilibria,

$$\begin{aligned} v_c &= \frac{(\rho_i + \rho_j) \frac{x_c}{1-\delta} + \rho_c \frac{1}{3} (1-\delta)}{1 - \delta \rho_c} \\ v_i &= \frac{(\rho_i + \rho_j) \frac{x_i}{1-\delta} + \rho_c \frac{1}{3} (1-\delta)}{1 - \delta \rho_c} \\ v_j &= \frac{(\rho_i + \rho_j) \frac{x_j}{1-\delta} + \rho_c \frac{1}{3} (1-\delta)}{1 - \delta \rho_c} \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

Therefore c accepts a proposal when

$$y_c \geq \frac{1}{3} + \frac{\delta(1 - \rho_c) \left(\frac{x_c}{1-\delta} - 1/3 \right)}{1 - \delta \rho_c} \quad (19)$$

³³Model 6 of Banks and Duggan (2006) provides a similar example of a stationary equilibrium with delay.

i accepts a proposal when

$$y_i \geq \frac{1}{3} + \frac{\delta(1 - \rho_c)(\frac{x_i}{1-\delta} - 1/3)}{1 - \delta\rho_c} \quad (20)$$

and j accepts a proposal when

$$y_j \geq \frac{1}{3} + \frac{\delta(1 - \rho_c)(\frac{x_j}{1-\delta} - 1/3)}{1 - \delta\rho_c} \quad (21)$$

In this case, i and j always vote to reject c 's proposal. And, by construction, all three legislators' acceptance sets satisfy weak dominance. Further, the chair weakly prefers proposing $(0, 0, 1)$ to any other proposal that would get rejected and weakly prefers proposing $(0, 0, 1)$ to making a proposal that either i or j would accept immediately. Thus, c 's proposal strategy satisfies sequential rationality. Additionally, as i and j 's proposals would both pass and provide them their maximum grant amounts, these strategies also satisfy sequential rationality. Therefore, there exists a stationary equilibrium where delay occurs with probability 1 but after a finite number of periods a proposal other than the status quo is enacted.³⁴

B Senate Floor Amendments

Figure A1 shows the number of amendments in the dataset in each congress by amendment status.

³⁴If the chair were not fixed as the proposer in the first period then delay would occur with probability $\rho_c > 0$.

Figure A1: Amendments to Formula Grant Programs Over Time




Table A1 provides some descriptive statistics on Senate amendments to formula grant programs. Winning coalition size is measured as the number of states whose grant amount would increase under the proposal.

Table A1: Summary of Formula Grants Amendment Data

	All Amendments	Passed Amendments
Grant Under Proposal		
Mean	\$116,373,836	\$56,887,163
St. Dev.	\$560,444,629	\$185,588,104
Status Quo Grant		
Mean	\$103,861,793	\$55,393,051
St. Dev.	\$497,156,091	\$193,021,005
Change in Grant Amt.		
Mean	\$12,512,042	\$1,494,113
St. Dev.	\$102,585,375	\$50,567,361
Proposal Funding Level		
Mean	\$5,741,109,230	\$2,831,355,390
St. Dev.	\$20,118,608,406	\$5,566,692,195
Status Quo Funding Level		
Mean	\$5,123,848,472	\$2,756,991,257
St. Dev.	\$17,856,464,769	\$5,563,743,261
Winning Coalition Size		
Mean	35.35	37.83
St. Dev.	13.85	11.62

C Estimating the Committee Advantage

To estimate the committee advantage I use a difference-in-differences design where each treated observation is matched with control observations from the same state in the same time period. Let $D_{ipt} \in \{0, 1\}$ represent the treatment status (committee member/committee chair) of state i for program p at time t . I estimate the committee advantage j years after a reauthorization for $j \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ using

$$\hat{\tau}_j = \frac{\sum_{i \in S} \sum_{t \in T} \sum_{p \in P} W_{ipt} (Y_{ipt+j} - Y_{ipt-1})}{\sum_{i \in S} \sum_{t \in T} \sum_{p \in P} D_{ipt} \times W_{ipt}} \quad (22)$$


where Y_{ipt+j} is state i 's grant amount under program p at time $t + j$; and

$$W_{ipt} = \begin{cases} \frac{-\sum_{p' \in P} \prod_{j'=1}^3 (1 - D_{ip't-j'}) \prod_{j'=0}^3 D_{ip't+j'}}{\sum_{p' \in P} \prod_{j'=-3}^3 (1 - D_{ip't+j'})} & \text{if } D_{ipt+j'} = D_{ipt-j'} = 0 \ \forall j' \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\} \\ 1 & \text{if } \prod_{j'=0}^3 D_{ipt+j'} = \prod_{j'=1}^3 (1 - D_{ipt-j'}) = 1; \\ & \text{and } \sum_{p' \in P} \prod_{j'=-3}^3 (1 - D_{ip't+j'}) > 0 \\ 0 & \text{Otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Note that τ is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The denominator reflects the number of treated observations that have at least one control observation in their matched sets. The numerator is equivalent to taking the change in a state's grant amount for treated observations that have a matched set and subtracting it from the average change in that state's grant amounts over the same time period for programs that have yet to be reauthorized. To achieve this, treated observations with a matched control set receive a weight (W_{ipt}) of 1 and control observations receive a weight based on the number of treated observations they are matched to and the number of other control observations in the matched set. To estimate standard errors, I use the weighted bootstrap procedure proposed by Otsu and Rai (2017). Specifically, I treat the weights as covariates and do not re-estimate them within each bootstrap iteration. Following Imai, Kim, and Wang (2020), I use a block bootstrap procedure to sample state-program units to accommodate the panel nature of my data.

This analysis relies on two assumptions. First, chairs are not strategically selecting programs to reauthorize based on which formulas they want to change. Second, observations in the treatment and control groups follow common trends. Figure A2 shows the difference in means between the chair’s grant under the status quo for the treatment and control groups.³⁵ I measure the chair’s status quo grant using both share and log dollars.³⁶ There does not appear to be any relationship between the status quo grants and whether programs were reauthorized. This suggests that chairs are not selecting bills to reauthorize based on how much grant funding their states are receiving under programs included in each bill. Figure A3 shows the average grant for committee members’ states under programs that were reauthorized (treatment group) and not reauthorized (control group). The pre-reauthorization trends for the treatment and control units are similar, which supports the common trends assumption required for identification.


Figure A2: Chair’s Status Quo Grant Balance Between Treatment and Control



³⁵The differences in means were weighted using the absolute value of the weights W_{ipt} described above.

³⁶In order to make the figure easier to read, I multiply share by 100. Thus a share of 15 means that a state is receiving 15% of the funding.

Figure A3: Committee Members' Grants by Reauthorization Status



D Robustness Checks

Winning Coalition Membership

Table A2 reexamines winning coalition membership, but also includes a covariate for co-partisanship. Specifically, I include an indicator for whether an amendment was proposed by a copartisan.³⁷ I find that, even when accounting for partisanship, legislators are more likely to be included in the winning coalition when their state is doing worse under the status quo or has similar characteristics to the proposer's state.

³⁷When performing analyses at the state level, I consider an amendment to be proposed by a copartisan if the proposer is a copartisan of either of a state's Senators.

Table A2: Winning Coalition Membership

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Vote for Amendment	Grant Share Increase
Status Quo Grant Share	−0.019* (0.008)	−0.041*** (0.008)
Difference from Proposer	−3.179*** (0.392)	−2.130*** (0.314)
Proposer Is a Copartisan	0.247*** (0.019)	−0.028 (0.025)
State-Congress Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Count of Amendments	47	117
Observations	4,144	5,604
Adjusted R ²	0.405	0.095

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state-amendment for analysis of roll call votes. The analyses in the first column is at the legislator level. The analyses in the second column is at the state level. Grant share is measured on a scale of 0 to 100.

Table A3 reexamines which states are included in the winning coalition using a state's grant amount (measured in log dollars) as opposed to its grant share to measure its grant under the status quo. I also include a covariate for the funding level of the program to account for the fact that a state may have a lower grant under the status quo because that program is smaller. Similar to using grant share, I find that states doing worse under the status quo are more likely to be included in the winning coalition.

Table A3: Winning Coalition Membership

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Vote for Amendment	Grant Share Increase
Status Quo Grant (Log)	−0.040*** (0.012)	−0.046*** (0.003)
Difference from Proposer	−3.108*** (0.412)	−1.719*** (0.322)
Program Funding Level (Log)	0.007 (0.014)	0.043*** (0.005)
State-Congress Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Count of Amendments	47	117
Observations	4,144	5,604
Adjusted R ²	0.363	0.106

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state-amendment for analysis of roll call votes

The analysis of winning coalition membership uses a dataset that includes only a subset of amendments to grant programs. Tables A4 and A3 reestimate the analysis using datasets that do not suffer from these selection issues. Table A4 reexamines whether states more similar to the proposer are more likely to be included in the winning coalition. Specifically, I regress whether a state’s Senators voted for an amendment on the distance between a state’s population and the proposer’s population. In this analysis I examine all amendments to allocation formulas introduced on the Senate floor during consideration of the three most recent reauthorizations of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA): the Every Student Succeeds Act, No Child Left Behind Act, and Improving America’s Schools Act.³⁸ Table A5 reexamines the relationship between status quo grants and winning coalition membership using the education grants dataset used in the committee analysis. Winning coalition membership is measured as a state’s grant

³⁸Data on the amendments to these bills comes from Congress.gov. I classified each amendment as amending a formula or not using the available text of the amendment. As a result, only amendments for which the text was available were included.

share increasing. As with the committee analysis, I estimate the probability of being in the winning coalition for each of the first four years following a reauthorization. The results from these analyses are similar to the analysis included in the main body of the paper.

Table A4: Winning Coalition Membership, ESEA Reauthorizations

	<i>DV: Vote for Amendment</i>	
	All Amendments	Passed Amendments
Difference from Proposer	−0.251 (0.348)	−1.295*** (0.343)
State-Congress Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Count of Amendments	55	28
Observations	5,573	2,734
Adjusted R ²	0.023	0.093

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by state-amendment

Table A5: Winning Coalition Membership, Education Grants

	<i>DV: Winning Coalition Member</i>			
	<i>t</i>	<i>t + 1</i>	<i>t + 2</i>	<i>t + 3</i>
Status Quo Grant Share	−0.655 (0.561)	−0.815 (0.650)	−1.47* (0.709)	−1.946* (0.770)
State-Congress Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000
Adjusted R ²	0.059	0.071	0.078	0.094

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table A6 reestimates the winning coalition analysis using state poverty instead of state population to estimate the similarity to the proposer's state. Again, I find that states with similar characteristics to the proposer are more likely to be included in the winning coalition.³⁹

³⁹The state poverty data only go back to 1970. As a result, this analysis includes fewer observations than the analysis using population data.

Table A6: Winning Coalition Membership

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Vote for Amendment	Grant Share Increase
Status Quo Grant Share	−0.025* (0.011)	−0.043*** (0.013)
Difference from Proposer (Poverty)	−3.280*** (0.639)	−2.079*** (0.446)
State-Congress Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Count of Amendments	23	58
Observations	2,113	2,813
Adjusted R ²	0.258	0.072

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state-amendment for analysis of roll call votes. Grant share is measured on a scale of 0 to 100.

Table A7 reestimates the winning coalition analysis using a conditional logistic regression.⁴⁰ As with the other analyses, I find that states doing worse under the status quo and that are more similar to the proposer are more likely to be included in the winning coalition.

Table A7: Winning Coalition Membership (Conditional Logit)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Vote for Amendment	Grant Share Increase
Status Quo Grant Share	−0.142** (0.045)	−0.436*** (0.040)
Difference from Proposer	−18.573*** (1.932)	−9.251*** (1.273)
State-Congress Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Count of Amendments	47	117
Observations	4,144	5,604
Log Likelihood	−1,001.034	−1,993.629

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

The analysis of winning coalition membership shows that legislators receiving smaller


⁴⁰Note, table reflects raw logit coefficients.

grants under the status quo policy are more likely to be included in the winning coalition. However, this could be do to reversion to the mean. That is, if legislators were randomly choosing proposals (and thus who is included in the coalition) then states doing worse under the status quo may be more likely to benefit from the proposal due to mean reversion. To test this, I simulate how much a state would receive under a proposal if grants were determined randomly. Specifically, I run 1,000 simulations where I draw a state's grant share for each amendment from a beta distribution. I estimate the parameters for the beta distribution from the observed data using the method of moments. For each simulation I estimate the following:

$$\Pr(GrantFromSim_{ip} > StatusQuoGrant_{ip}) = \beta_1 StatusQuoGrant_{ip} + \delta_{ic} + \epsilon_{ip}$$

where δ_{ic} is a state-congress fixed effect. Figure A4 compares the coefficients (β_1) from the simulation to the coefficient from the observed data calculated using the same specification. The effect sizes from the simulation are all smaller than the observed effect size (-4.053). This suggests that the probability of observing an effect as extreme as -4.053 if grants are randomly determined using the data generating process described above is zero. That is, the observed effect is not solely due to mean reversion.

Figure A4: Simulated Reversion to the Mean



Committee Advantage

It is possible that states represented by committee members and the committee chair see an increase in their grant amounts because all states see an increase in their grant amounts following a reauthorization. To account for this, I rerun the analysis for non-committee members and present the results in Table A8. Consistent with the theory, I do not find a significant increase in these states' grant amounts following program reauthorizations.

Table A8: Effect of Committee Position on Formula Grants Placebo Test

	<i>DV: Grant Amount (Log)</i>			
	<i>t</i>	<i>t + 1</i>	<i>t + 2</i>	<i>t + 3</i>
Not On Committee	0.004 (0.035)	0.008 (0.037)	0.037 (0.041)	0.06 (0.046)
Observations	653	653	653	653

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; standard errors computed based on 1,000 weighted bootstrap samples in parentheses

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