

Timeline




- 2014 Initial Ether sold on bitcoin
- 2016 DAO Attack: A Hacker expoited a smart contract bug, the community decided to undo attack, by discrading some blocks.
- 2020 Possible to stake ether and participate in PoS beakon chain, that votes on blocks created by PoW
- 2022 PoW depricated and Ethereum using PoS to create bocks

How does Ethereum enable Smart Contracts


Transactions and authenticaion



Transactions and authenticaion




Transactions and authenticaion



Transactions and authenticaion


Transactions are used to transfer ether, invoke functions, and deploy new contracts.




How does C1 know C2?

- C2 address supplied when deploying C1.
- C2 address supplied by transaction
- C2 address stored in contract state (can be updated)

Transactions and authenticaion



Transactions and authenticaion



State stored in Ethereum blockchain

Bitcoin Block structure

Header:

PrevBlockhash Nonce Timestamp

Transaction data

Merkle tree

Merkle tree allows to easily proof that a transaction is included in a block.

State of the blockchain (UTXO) is not in the block.

Ethereum Block structure


Header:

PrevBlockhash Nonce Timestamp

State root hash Receipts root hash

Transaction data

Merkle tree




Stores accounts:

```
Address:
[Value,
Nonce,
StorageRoot,
CodeHash]
```

Trie: Merkle tree that supports

update lookup proof




Root of state trie is in the block

Stores accounts:

```
Address:
[Value,
Nonce,
StorageRoot,
CodeHash]
```

Trie: Merkle tree that supports

update lookup proof



SC Variable changes


- -> SC storage root changes
- -> SC Account hash changes
- -> State trie root changes

Stores accounts:

```
Address:
[Value,
Nonce,
StorageRoot,
CodeHash]
```

Trie: Merkle tree that supports

update lookup proof



StorageRoot is the root of a different trie.


Stores accounts:


```
Address:
[Value,
Nonce,
StorageRoot,
CodeHash]
```

Trie: Merkle tree that supports

```
update
lookup
proof
```

StorageRoot is the root of a different trie.





Read contract state

- 1. ask trusted node
- 2. receive inclusion proof for

stateRoot: storageTrie account state: stateTrie


and block header

Ethereum Receipts trie

Stores transaction results:

```
From: address
To: address
Status: ... // aborted?
Logs: events
ContractAddress address
   // new contract address,
   // if created
```

Return transaction results, by emitting Events, which are added to the logs.



Fees and Gas

Fees

Bitcoin original: Fee based on transaction size (bytes)

Maximum 1Mb of transactions in the block

Update:

- More complex calculation, based on what requires compute and storage resources
- Large inputs cheaper than large outputs

Ethereum Gas

How to pay transaction fees in Ethereum?

- all bytecode instructions have a cost specified in Gas
- transaction has fixed cost in Gas
- especially: storing values is expensive

Transactions specify Gas price and Gas limit

- Gas price is ether given per gas
- Gas limit is how much the transaction may spend at most

Ethereum Gas

Why specific gas per instruction:

An infinite loop will cost infinitely much gas -> avoid denial of service

What happens if you hit the Gas limit?

- Exception is thrown and transaction reverted.
- Gas is still payed!

Which transactions are included?

- Miners will include transactions offering the highest gas price.
- Blocks have maximum amount of gas.

Gas - London upgrade 2021

Gas price is divided in Base price + Tip

- Base price is burned
- Tip is given to the validators

Blocks can be bigger than target size, but included transactions have to pay a larger base price

- Prevent exploits and attacks
- Attacks can:
 - Steal tokens
 - Leave contract disfunctional

Problem:

Code and smart contract state are public

If it is standing around in public, and it can be easily broken, someone will eventually break it.

Problem:

- Code and smart contract state are public
- Can try exploit before deploying it (in development environment)
- Can automatically scan for possible exploits

Problem:

- Smart contract cannot be upgraded
 - TDD, Formal verification, code audits, bug bounties
 - Language and platform support is constantly improving

Known vulnerabilities


Smart Contract Security Known vulnerabilities

- Integer overflow
- Force money to contract
- Re-entrancy

Smart Contract SecurityInteger overflow

Increment an integer above its max number

- Solidity has 256 bit uint
- Overflow: Incrementing to 2*256 gives 0



Integer overflow

TimeLock example

- Funds can be taken out only after 1 week
- How to exploit?

```
contract TimeLock {
   mapping(address => uint) public balances;
   mapping(address => uint) public lockTime;
    function deposit() public payable {
        balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
        lockTime[msg.sender] = now + 1 weeks;
    function increaseLockTime(uint _secondsToIncrease)
        public {
        lockTime[msg.sender] += _secondsToIncrease;
    function withdraw() public {
        require(balances[msg.sender] > 0);
        require(now > lockTime[msg.sender]);
        uint balance = balances[msg.sender];
        balances[msg.sender] = 0;
        msg.sender.transfer(balance);
```

Smart Contract Security Integer overflow

TimeLock example

- Funds can be taken out only after 1 week
- Use increaseLockTime to increase lock time to 0.

Fixed when using new Solidity version!

```
contract TimeLock {
   mapping(address => uint) public balances;
   mapping(address => uint) public lockTime;
    function deposit() public payable {
        balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
        lockTime[msg.sender] = now + 1 weeks;
    function increaseLockTime(uint _secondsToIncrease)
        public {
        lockTime[msg.sender] += _secondsToIncrease;
    function withdraw() public {
        require(balances[msg.sender] > 0);
        require(now > lockTime[msg.sender]);
        uint balance = balances[msg.sender];
        balances[msg.sender] = 0;
        msg.sender.transfer(balance);
```

Smart Contract SecurityInteger overflow

Token example

How to exploid this?

```
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
       pragma solidity 0.5.11;
       contract Token {
           mapping(address => uint256) balances;
           uint256 public totalSupply;
           constructor(uint256 _initialSupply) public {
              balances[msg.sender] = totalSupply = _initialSupply;
10
11
           function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public returns (bool) {
12
               require(balances[msg.sender] - _value >= 0);
13
              balances[msg.sender] -= _value;
              balances[_to] += _value;
               return true;
17
18
           function balanceOf(address _owner) public view returns (uint256 balance) {
19
               return balances[_owner];
20
21
22
```

Re-entrancy

Vulnerability when sending money to a different contract

Sending money can trigger a function

```
msg.sender.call.value(_weiToWithdraw)("");
if (success){
    balances[msg.sender] -= _weiToWithdraw;
}
```

This function can re-invoke the current function

```
// fallback function - where the magic happens
function () external payable {
    if (address(etherStore).balance >= 1 ether) {
        etherStore.withdrawFunds(1 ether);
    }
}
```

Smart Contract SecurityRe-entrancy

Vulnerability when sending money to a different contract

Mitigation

- Pattern: Reduce balance, then send money
- Use send or transfer not call

Method	address.send()	address.transfer()	address.call.value()()
Possibility to set gas limit	No	No	Yes
Gas limit	2300	2300	Settable
Return value when error	FALSE	Throws exception	FALSE

Smart Contract SecurityForcing Ether

- Ether can be send to an address without you wanting it.
- Using selfdestruct
- Sending money to address before contract is created

Mitigation

• Use a balance variable

Example

EtherGame

Smart Contract SecurityForcing Ether

- Ether can be send to an address without you wanting it.
- Using selfdestruct
- Sending money to address before contract is created

Mitigation

• Use a balance variable

Example

EtherGame

Other considerations

- Randomness is difficult to get Can be influenced by miners
- Timestamp can be influenced
- All values are public
- Execution order can be changed by miners that create a block by other clients by setting a high fee

- Set helper function private avoid being called directly
- Check library addresses

Smart Contract Security Example

How would you implement Rock-Paper-Scissors

Smart Contract Security Other attacks

- Today many attacks happen on trading and automatic pricing contracts.
- In essence, these attacks are market manipulation.