

# “The role of the minimum wage in reducing inequality (2018-2024): Counterfactual evaluation of wage distribution in Mexico”

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## Research Relevance

- This research aims to investigate the effect of minimum wage increases on income inequality in Mexico.
- Recent administrations have implemented significant wage hikes to redistribute income and reduce inequality, especially for low-income households.
- The actual impact is uncertain: minimum wage increases could reduce inequality, have no effect, or even worsen it through job losses or higher informality.
- Empirical evaluation is key to understanding the effectiveness of these policies and informing future strategies.

## Literature Review – Main Insights

- The minimum wage is a key policy for reducing wage inequality, especially at the bottom of the distribution.
- Studies in the U.S. (e.g., Lee 1999; Autor et al. 2016) find that declining real minimum wages contributed to rising inequality.
- Evidence of **spillover effects** suggests that minimum wage increases may benefit workers slightly above the threshold.
- Context matters: the effectiveness depends on enforcement, labor market structure, and level of the minimum wage.

# Data and Sample Characteristics

- Source: ENOE (INEGI), nationally representative labor force survey.
- Analysed period: 2018 and 2024 (during this years the minimum wage rose from \$88.15 to \$191.18).
- Population: salaried workers aged 18–65 (both formal and informal).
- Cleaning: Top and bottom 1% of hourly wages trimmed.
- Subgroup analysis: By gender and formality status.

# Income Imputation

- Surveys, such as ENOE, have been facing a problem of no income declaration.
- The percentage has been increasing in the last years.
- This wouldn't be a problem if people deciding not to declare were randomly distributed.








Figure: Percentage of workers who do not declare income.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Source: Campos-Vázquez (2013)

# Who decides no to declare?



# Predictive Mean Matching

Semi-parametric imputation method.

- Step 1: Estimate a regression model for the variable with missing values.
- Step 2: Compute predicted values for missing cases.
- Step 3: Identify observed cases with the closest predicted values (donors).
- Step 4: Randomly select one donor and assign its observed value.

Advantages:

- Preserves the original data distribution.
- Avoids implausible or out-of-range values.
- Useful for continuous variables with skewness or outliers.

# Descriptive Statistics by Year

| Indicator                            | 2018    |       | 2024    |       |
|--------------------------------------|---------|-------|---------|-------|
|                                      | Count   | %     | Count   | %     |
| <b>Population below minimum wage</b> | 7,373   | 1.7%  | 32,339  | 6.4%  |
| <b>By Gender</b>                     |         |       |         |       |
| Men                                  | 256,132 | 59.0% | 285,964 | 56.8% |
| Women                                | 178,379 | 41.0% | 217,060 | 43.2% |
| <b>By Social Security Access</b>     |         |       |         |       |
| With access                          | 274,341 | 63.2% | 324,319 | 64.5% |
| Without access                       | 158,002 | 36.4% | 175,277 | 34.8% |
| Not specified                        | 2,168   | 0.5%  | 3,428   | 0.7%  |
| <b>Total</b>                         | 434,511 |       | 503,024 |       |



# Workers Earning Less Than the Minimum Wage

| Characteristic                   | 2018   | 2024   |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Population below minimum wage    | 1.7%   | 6.42%  |
| <b>By Gender</b>                 |        |        |
| Men                              | 52.03% | 53.25% |
| Women                            | 47.97% | 46.75% |
| <b>By Business Type</b>          |        |        |
| Independent or family business   | 69.25% | 69.02% |
| Private company                  | 30.75% | 30.95% |
| Other                            | –      | 0.02%  |
| <b>By Educational Level</b>      |        |        |
| No education                     | 4.92%  | 3.35%  |
| Basic education                  | 57.94% | 50.04% |
| Middle education                 | 22.46% | 28.00% |
| Higher education                 | 14.68% | 18.61% |
| <b>By Social Security Access</b> |        |        |
| With access                      | 22.43% | 24.90% |
| Without access                   | 77.38% | 74.12% |
| Not specified                    | 0.19%  | 0.98%  |

# Objective and Methodology

- This study analyzes the impact of recent minimum wage increases on wage inequality in Mexico.
- Method: DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (DFL, 1996) decomposition.
- We want to answer:  
*What would the 2024 wage distribution look like if policy conditions had remained as those in 2018?*
- It combines:
  - **The wage structure of 2018** (before policy change),
  - With the **worker characteristics of 2024** (e.g., age, education, formality, sector).
- Technically: we reweight 2018 data to match the distribution of observable characteristics in 2024.

# DFL – Method Overview

## 1 Estimate the reweighting function:

- Logit model where the dependent variable is the year (1 if 2024, 0 if 2018).
- Covariates: age, gender, schooling, state, urban/rural, sector, marital status, formality, employer type.
- Estimate  $\phi(x) = \Pr(T = 1 | x)$  and compute weights:

$$\omega(x) = \frac{\phi(x)}{1 - \phi(x)}$$

## 2 Construct the counterfactual distribution:


- The counterfactual density is:

$$f_{2024}^{CF}(w) = \int f_{2018}(w | x) \cdot \frac{P(T = 1 | x)}{P(T = 0 | x)} \cdot f_{2018}(x) dx$$

- It simulates wages in 2024 had policy conditions remained at 2018 levels.

# Results

## Impact of the Minimum Wage



# Inequality Measures – Total Population

Table: Summary of Inequality Indicators

| Indicator   | Real (2024) | Counterfactual (2018 MW) | Change (%) |
|-------------|-------------|--------------------------|------------|
| Gini Index  | 0.2813      | 0.2878                   | -2.25%     |
| Palma Ratio | 1.0127      | 1.0410                   | -2.72%     |
| P90/P10     | 3.5769      | 3.7894                   | -5.61%     |
| P50/P10     | 1.9476      | 2.0066                   | -2.94%     |

# Results – Men vs. Women



Men




Women

# Inequality Measures by Gender


Table: Inequality Measures – Men vs. Women

| Measure     | Men      |                |        | Women    |                |        |
|-------------|----------|----------------|--------|----------|----------------|--------|
|             | Observed | Counterfactual | Change | Observed | Counterfactual | Change |
| Gini Index  | 0.2773   | 0.2821         | -1.70% | 0.2866   | 0.2985         | -3.99% |
| Palma Ratio | 0.9970   | 1.0040         | -0.70% | 1.0557   | 1.0906         | -3.20% |
| P90/P10     | 3.5082   | 3.6897         | -4.92% | 3.7300   | 3.9151         | -4.72% |
| P50/P10     | 1.9377   | 2.0011         | -3.17% | 1.9450   | 2.0025         | -2.87% |

# Results – Formal vs. Informal Workers



Formal Workers



Informal Workers



# Inequality Measures by Sector Type

Table: Inequality Measures – Formal vs. Informal


| Measure     | Formal   |                |         | Informal |                |        |
|-------------|----------|----------------|---------|----------|----------------|--------|
|             | Observed | Counterfactual | Change  | Observed | Counterfactual | Change |
| Gini Index  | 0.2667   | 0.2832         | -5.82%  | 0.2603   | 0.2578         | +0.97% |
| Palma Ratio | 0.9368   | 1.0059         | -6.87%  | 0.9449   | 0.9002         | +4.97% |
| P90/P10     | 3.3099   | 3.7386         | -11.46% | 3.0868   | 3.2360         | -4.61% |
| P50/P10     | 1.8433   | 1.9742         | -6.63%  | 1.7902   | 1.9135         | -6.45% |

# Conclusions

- The DFL decomposition was used to simulate a 2024 wage distribution under 2018 policy conditions.
- Results show a consistent reduction in inequality indicators—especially for lower-income groups.
- Stronger effects are observed for:
  - **Women** – systematic improvement across all measures.
  - **Formal workers** – clear reductions in inequality.
- Mixed results for informal workers: some improvements in relative measures, but higher dispersion in the tails.
- Overall, 2024 policies (such as minimum wage increases) appear to have helped compress the wage distribution between 2018 and 2024.

**Thanks! Questions?**

## Results (2014-2016)



# Inequality Measures – Total Population (2016 vs. 2014 Policy)

Table: Summary of Inequality Indicators

| Indicator   | Real (2016) | Counterfactual (2014 MW) | Change (%) |
|-------------|-------------|--------------------------|------------|
| Gini Index  | 0.3285      | 0.2904                   | +13.13%    |
| Palma Ratio | 1.3155      | 1.0880                   | +20.93%    |
| P90/P10     | 4.1870      | 3.5366                   | +18.40%    |
| P50/P10     | 2.0561      | 1.9482                   | +5.54%     |

# Objective of the Analysis

**Objective:** Assess the impact of the minimum wage increase on income distribution in Mexico, replicating the analysis done by Bouchot Viveros (2018).

- Analyze how the minimum wage increase affects different percentiles of the wage distribution.
- Compare the effects between zones A and B using the Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach.

# Identification Strategy

**Identification Strategy:** We use the Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach to identify the causal impact of the minimum wage increase.

- In 2015, the Mexican government implemented a national minimum wage unification policy.
- The wage increase in October 2015 only affected the zone B, creating an exogenous variation.
- Zone A did not experience any change and serves as the control group.

**Assumption:** Parallel trends assumption between both zones before the treatment.

## Why 2015?

- Prior to 2015, there were two minimum wage zones, with zone A having a higher wage due to higher economic development.
- On October 1, 2015, the government unified the minimum wage across the country, raising zone B's minimum wage to the same level as zone A (from \$68.28 to \$70.10).
- This creates an exogenous variation to isolate the causal effect of the minimum wage on income distribution.
- We consider zone A as the control and zone B as the treated group.



# Empirical Strategy

DiD Model using Recentered Influence Function (RIF) for each percentile of the income distribution:

$$RIF_{it}(q) = \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot Post_t + \beta_2 \cdot Treated_i + \beta_3 \cdot (Post_t \times Treated_i) + \theta_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

- $Post_t$ : Indicator variable, 1 for Q4 2015, 0 for Q3 2015.
- $Treated_i$ : Indicator variable, 1 for zone B and 0 for zone A.
- $\theta_i$ : Individual-level fixed effects.

**Why RIF?** The Recentered Influence Function (RIF) allows us to study the distributional effects of the minimum wage increase at different percentiles of the income distribution.

# Preliminary Results

