Wardrop Equilibrium

V. Leclère (ENPC)

May 5th, 2021

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- Recalls on optimization and convexity
 - Recalls on convexity
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- Modelling a traffic assignement problem
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Convex set

• A set $C \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ is convex iff

$$\forall x, y \in C$$
, $\forall t \in [0,1]$, $tx + (1-t)y \in C$.

- Intersection of convex sets is convex.
- A closed convex set *C* is equal to the intersection of all half-spaces containing it.

Convex function

• The *epigraph* of a function $f: \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}$ is

$$\operatorname{epi}(f) := \{(x, t) \in \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R} \mid t \ge f(x)\}.$$

• The domain of a function f is

$$dom(f) := \left\{ x \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid f(x) < +\infty \right\}$$

 The function f is said to be convex iff its epigraph is convex, in other words iff

$$\forall t \in [0,1], \qquad f(tx + (1-t)y) \le tf(x) + (1-t)f(y).$$

• The function f is said to be strictly convex iff

$$\forall t \in (0,1), \qquad f(tx + (1-t)y) < tf(x) + (1-t)f(y).$$

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Convexity and differentiable

We assume sufficient regularity for the written object to exist.

- If $f: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$.
 - f is convex iff f' non-decreasing.
 - If f' > 0 then f is strictly convex.
 - f is convex iff $f'' \ge 0$.
 - If f'' > 0 then f is strictly convex.
- If $f: \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}$
 - f is convex iff ∇f non-decreasing (i.e. $(\nabla f(y) \nabla f(x)) \cdot (y x) \ge 0$).
 - f is convex iff $\nabla^2 f(x) \succ 0$ for all x.
 - If $\nabla^2 f(x) > 0$ for all x then f is strictly convex.

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Video explanation

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qF0aDJfEa4Y

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Convex differentiable optimization problem

Consider the following optimization problem.

$$\min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} f(x) \tag{P}$$
s.t. $g_i(x) = 0$ $\forall i \in [n_E]$

$$h_j(x) \le 0 \qquad \forall j \in [n_I]$$

with

$$X := \left\{ x \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid \forall i \in [n_E], \quad g_i(x) = 0, \quad \forall j \in [n_I], \quad h_j(x) \le 0 \right\}.$$

- \bullet (P) is a convex optimization problem if f and X are convex.
- (P) is a convex differentiable optimization problem if f, and h_j (for $j \in [n_I]$) are convex differentiable and g_i (for $i \in [n_E]$) are affine

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KKT conditions

Theorem (KKT)

Let x^{\sharp} be an optimal solution to a differentiable optimization problem (P). If the constraints are qualified at x^{\sharp} then there exists optimal multipliers $\lambda^{\sharp} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_{E}}$ and $\mu^{\sharp} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_{l}}$ satisfying

$$\begin{cases} \nabla f(x^{\sharp}) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \lambda_{i}^{\sharp} \nabla g_{i}(x^{\sharp}) + \sum_{j=1}^{n_{l}} \mu_{i}^{\sharp} \nabla h_{j}(x^{\sharp}) = 0 & \textit{first order condition} \\ g(x^{\sharp}) = 0 & \textit{primal admissibility} \\ h(x^{\sharp}) \leq 0 & \textit{dual admissibility} \\ \mu \geq 0 & \textit{dual admissibility} \\ \mu_{i} g_{i}(x^{\sharp}) = 0, \quad \forall i \in \llbracket 1, n_{l} \rrbracket & \textit{complementarity} \end{cases}$$

The three last conditions are sometimes compactly written

$$0 \leq g(x^{\sharp}) \perp \mu \geq 0.$$

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Video explanation

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Intro to constrained optimization
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vwUV2IDLP8Q
Explaining tangeancy of multipliers
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yuqB-d5MjZA
Marginal interpretation of multipliers
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-G3K2GPmEQ
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Slater condition

A convex optimization problem (P) satisfies the *Slater* condition if there exists a strictly admissible $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}^n$ that is

$$\forall i \in [n_E], \quad g_i(x_0) = 0, \quad \forall j \in [n_I], \quad h_j(x_0) < 0.$$

If the Slater condition is satisfied, then the constraints are qualified at any $x \in X$.

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Another optimality condition (convex case)

Theorem

If (P) is a convex differentiable optimization problem, then $x^{\sharp} \in X$ is an optimal solution iff

$$\forall y \in X$$
, $\nabla f(x) \cdot (y - x) \ge 0$.

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 - System optimum
 - Wardrop equilibrium
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The set-up

- G = (V, E) is a directed graph
- x_e for $e \in E$ represent the flux (number of people per hour) taking edge e
- $ullet \ell_e: \mathbb{R} o \mathbb{R}^+$ the cost incurred by a given user to take edge e
- We consider K origin-destination vertex pair $\{o^k, d^k\}_{k \in [1,K]}$, such that there exists at least one path from o^k to d^k .
- r_k is the rate of people going from o^k to d^k
- $m{\mathcal{P}}_k$ the set of all simple (i.e. without cycle) path form o^k to d^k
- We denote f_p the flux of people taking path $p \in \mathcal{P}_k$

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Some physical relations

People going from o^k to d^k have to choose a path

$$r^k = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}^k} f_p.$$

People going through an edge are on a simple path taking this edge

$$x_e = \sum_{p \ni e} f_p.$$

The flux are non-negative

$$\forall p \in \mathcal{P}, \quad f_p \geq 0, \quad \text{and} \quad , \forall e \in E, \quad x_e \geq 0$$

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System optimum problem

The system optimum consists in minimizing the sum of all costs over the admissible flux $x = (x_e)_{e \in E}$

- Given x, the cost of taking edge e for one person is $\ell_e(x_e)$.
- The cost for the system for edge e is thus $x_e \ell_e(x_e)$.
- Thus minimizing the system costs consists in solving

$$\min_{x,f} \quad \sum_{e \in E} x_e \ell_e(x_e) \tag{SO}$$

$$s.t. \quad r_k = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_k} f_p \qquad k \in [1, K]$$

$$x_e = \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \qquad e \in E$$

$$f_p > 0 \qquad p \in \mathcal{P}$$

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- We can reformulate the (SO) problem only using path-intensity $f = (f_p)_{p \in \mathcal{P}}$.
- Define $x_e(f) := \sum_{p \ni e} f_p$, and $x = (x_e)_{e \in E}$.
- Define the loss along a path $\ell_p(f) = \sum_{e \in p} \ell_e (\sum_{\substack{p' \ni e \\ \mathsf{x}_e(f)}} f_{p'})$
- The total cost is thus

$$C(f) = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} f_p \ell_p(f) = \sum_{e \in E} x_e \ell_e(x_e(f)) = C(x(f)).$$

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Path intensity problem

$$\min_{f} \quad \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} f_{p} \ell_{p}(f) \tag{SO}$$

$$s.t. \quad r_{k} = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_{k}} f_{p} \qquad k \in [1, K]$$

$$f_{p} \ge 0 \qquad p \in \mathcal{P}$$

Equilibrium definition

John Wardrop defined a traffic equilibrium as follows. "Under equilibrium conditions traffic arranges itself in congested networks such that all used routes between an O-D pair have equal and minimum costs, while all unused routes have greater or equal costs."

A mathematical definition reads as follows

Definition

A user flow f is a User Equilibrium if

$$\forall k \in [1, K], \quad \forall (p, p') \in \mathcal{P}_k^2, \qquad f_p > 0 \quad \Longrightarrow \quad \ell_p(f) \leq \ell_{p'}(f)$$

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A new cost function

We are going to show that a user-equilibrium f is defined as a vector satisfying the KKT conditions of a certain optimization problem.

Let define a new edge-loss function by

$$L_e(x_e) := \int_0^{x_e} \ell_e(u) du.$$

The Wardrop potential is defined (for edge intensity) as

$$W(f) = W(x(f)) = \sum_{e \in E} L_e(x_e(f))$$

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$$W(f) = W(x(f)) = \sum_{e \in E} L_e(x_e(f)).$$

User optimum problem

Theorem

A flow f is a user equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the first order KKT conditions of the following optimization problem

$$egin{array}{ll} \min_{x,f} & W(x) \ s.t. & r_k = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_k} f_p & k \in \llbracket 1, K
rbracket \ & x_e = \sum_{p \ni e} f_p & e \in E \ & f_p \ge 0 & p \in \mathcal{P} \end{array}$$

Proof

In path intensity formulation

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{f}{\text{min}} & & \sum_{e \in E} L_e \Big(\sum_{p \ni e} f_p \Big) \\ & s.t. & & r_k = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_k} f_p \\ & & & f_p \ge 0 \end{aligned} \qquad \qquad k \in \llbracket 1, K \rrbracket$$

with Lagrangian

$$L(f,\lambda,\mu) := W(f) + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \lambda_k \left(r_k - \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_k} f_p \right) + \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} \mu_p f_p$$

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Proof

In path intensity formulation

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{f}{\text{min}} & & \sum_{e \in E} L_e \Big(\sum_{p \ni e} f_p \Big) \\ & s.t. & & r_k = \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_k} f_p \\ & & & f_p \ge 0 \end{aligned} \qquad \qquad k \in \llbracket 1, K \rrbracket$$

with Lagrangian

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Now note that we have

$$\frac{\partial W}{\partial f_{p}}(f) = \frac{\partial}{\partial f_{p}} \left(\sum_{e \in E} L_{e}(\sum_{p' \ni e} f_{p'}) \right)$$
$$= \sum_{e \in p} \frac{\partial}{\partial x_{e}} L_{e}(x_{e}(f))$$
$$= \sum_{e \in p} \ell_{e}(x_{e}(f)) = \ell_{p}(f),$$

Recall that
$$L_e(x_e) := \int_0^{x_e} \ell_e(u) du$$
.

The constraints of (UE) are qualified. Consequently its first-order KKT conditions reads

$$\begin{cases} \frac{\partial L(f,\lambda,\mu)}{\partial f_p} = \ell_p(f) - \lambda_k + \mu_p = 0 & \forall p \in \mathcal{P}_k, \forall k \in [1,K] \\ \frac{\partial L(f,\lambda,\mu)}{\partial \lambda_k} = r_k - \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}_k} f_p = 0 & \forall k \in [1,K] \\ \mu_p = 0 \text{ or } f_p = 0 & \forall p \in \mathcal{P} \\ \mu_p \le 0, f_p \ge 0 & \forall p \in \mathcal{P} \end{cases}$$

f satisfies the KKT conditions iff for all origin-destination pair $k \in \llbracket 1, K
rbracket$, and all path $p \in \mathcal{P}_k$ we have

$$\begin{cases} \ell_p(f) = \lambda_k & \text{if } f_p > 0 \\ \ell_p(f) \ge \lambda_k & \text{if } f_p = 0 \end{cases}$$

In other words, if the path $p \in \mathcal{P}_k$ is used, then its cost is λ_k , and all other path $p' \in \mathcal{P}_i$ have a greater or equal cost, which is the definition of

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V. Leclère

Convex case: equivalence

If the loss functions (in edge-intensity) are non-decreasing then the Wardrop potential ${\it W}$ is convex.

Theorem

Assume that the loss function ℓ_e are non-decreasing for all $e \in E$. Then there exists at least one user equilibrium, and a flow f is a user equilibrium if and only if it solves (UE)

Proof: the cost is convex as composition of convex and affine functions, thus KKT is a necessary and sufficient condition for optimality.

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Convex case: characterization

define the system cost of a flow f for a given flow f', as

$$C^f(f) := \sum_{e \in E} x_e(f) \ell_e \big(x_e(f') \big).$$

heorem

Assume that the cost functions ℓ_e are continuous and non-decreasing. Then, f^{UE} is a user equilibrium iff

$$\forall f \in F^{ad}, \qquad C^{f^{UE}}(f^{UE}) \leq C^{f^{UE}}(f),$$

where F^{ad} is the set of admissible flows.

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where F^{ad} is the set of admissible flows.

Proof

By convexity (f^{UE}) is an optimal solution to (UE) iff

$$\nabla W(f^{UE}) \cdot (f - f^{UE}) \ge 0, \qquad \forall f \in F^{ad}$$

which is equivalent to

$$\sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} \underbrace{\frac{\partial W}{\partial f_p}(f^{UE})}_{\ell_p(f^{UE})} f_p \quad \geq \quad \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} \underbrace{\frac{\partial W}{\partial f_p}(f^{UE})}_{\ell_p(f^{UE})} f_p^{UE}, \qquad \forall f \in F^{ad}$$

which can be written

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Definition

Definition

Consider increasing loss functions ℓ_e . Let f^{UE} be a user equilibrium, and f^{SO} be a system optimum. Then the price of anarchy of our network is given by

$$PoA := \frac{C(f^{UE})}{C(f^{SO})} \ge 1.$$

Theorem

Let ℓ_e be the affine function $x_e \mapsto b_e x_e + c_e$, with $b_e, c_e \ge 0$. Then the price of anarchy is lower than 4/3, and the bound is tight.

Proof

Let f be a feasible flow, and f^{UE} be the user equilibrium. For ease of notation we fix $x^{UE} = x(f^{UE})$, and x = x(f).

By Theorem we have

$$C(f^{UE}) \le C^{f^{UE}}(f)$$

$$= \sum_{e \in E} \left(b_e x_e^{UE} + c_e \right) x_e$$

$$\le \sum_{e \in E} \left[\left(b_e x_e + c_e \right) x_e + \frac{1}{4} b_e \left(x_e^{UE} \right)^2 \right] \quad \text{as } (x_e - x_e^{UE}/2)^2 \ge 0$$

$$\le C(f) + \frac{1}{4} \sum_{e \in E} \left(b_e x_e^{UE} + c_e \right) x_e^{UE} \quad \text{as } c_e x_e^{UE} \ge 0$$

$$= C(f) + \frac{1}{4} C^{f^{UE}}(f^{UE})$$

Proof

Let f be a feasible flow, and f^{UE} be the user equilibrium. For ease of notation we fix $x^{UE} = x(f^{UE})$, and x = x(f). By Theorem we have

$$C(f^{UE}) \le C^{f^{UE}}(f)$$

$$= \sum_{e \in E} (b_e x_e^{UE} + c_e) x_e$$

$$\le \sum_{e \in E} \left[(b_e x_e + c_e) x_e + \frac{1}{4} b_e (x_e^{UE})^2 \right] \quad \text{as } (x_e - x_e^{UE}/2)^2 \ge 0$$

$$\le C(f) + \frac{1}{4} \sum_{e \in E} (b_e x_e^{UE} + c_e) x_e^{UE} \quad \text{as } c_e x_e^{UE} \ge 0$$

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Hence we have $3/4C(f^{UE}) \le C(f)$.

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Pigou's Example




Figure: Pigou example

On a graph with two nodes: one origin, one destination, a total flow of 1, a fixed cost of 1 on one edge, and a cost of x^N on the other, where $N \in \mathbb{N}$ and x is the intensity of the flow using this edge (see Figure 1).

- lacktriangle Compute the system optimum for a given N.
- **3** Compute the price of anarchy on this network when $N \to \infty$.

Exercise for next week (3.2)

Consider a (finite) directed, strongly connected, graph G = (V, E). We consider K origin-destination vertex pair $\{o^k, d^k\}_{k \in [\![1,K]\!]}$, such that there exists at least one path from o^k to d^k .

We want to find bounds on the price of anarchy, assuming that, for each arc e, $\ell_e: \mathbb{R}^+ \to \mathbb{R}^+$ is non-decreasing, and that we have

$$x\ell_e(x) \le \gamma L_e(x), \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^+$$

- **1** Recall which optimization problems solves the social optimum x^{SO} and the user equilibrium x^{UE} .
- 2 Let x be a feasable vector of arc-intensity. Show that $W(x) \le C(x) \le \gamma W(x)$.
- **3** Show that the price of anarchy $C(x^{UE})/C(x^{SO})$ is lower than γ .
- 4 If the cost per arc ℓ_e are polynomial of order at most p with non-negative coefficient, find a bound on the price of anarchy. Is this bound sharp?

Further video content

This is a research seminar by one of the expert in the domain. The first half is very interesting to get a better intuition of the concepts. The second half is more dedicated to the proof of the result presented in the talk.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e30_tMsN2t8