

# Operation Research and Transport

## Braess's Paradox

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# What will this course be about ?

- Understanding how people choose their way through a transportation network.
- having an idea on how to compute efficiently :
  - the shortest path on a network
  - the equilibrium on a network
- A practical work to compute this equilibrium on a computer
- Snapshots of other problems

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- 1 Urban Transportation Network Analysis
- 2 Showcasing an example of Braess Paradox

# Transportation Planning Process

- ① Organization and definition
- ② Base year inventory
- ③ Model analysis
  - ① trip generation
  - ② trip distribution
  - ③ modal split
  - ④ traffic assignement
- ④ Travel forecast
- ⑤ Network evaluation

# Urban Transportation Network Analysis

Input of the analysis:

- transportation infrastructure and services (street, intersections...)
- transportation system and control policies
- demand for travel.

Two stage analysis:

- First stage: determining the congestion, i.e. calculating the flow through each component of the network.
- Second stage : computing measure of interests according to the flow.
  - travel time and costs,
  - revenue and profit of ancilliary services,
  - welfare measures (accessibility, equity),
  - flow by-products (pollution, change in land-value)...

# Why do we need a system approach ?

- Some decision could be taken according to local measure. For example traffic light can be timed according to data on current usual traffic at the intersection.
- However most decision will impact the travel time / confort. Hence, some people will adapt their usual transit route.
- Consequently, the congestion on the network will change, changing time / confort of other part of the system and inducing other people to adapt their path...
- After some time these ripple effect will lessen, and the system will reach a new equilibrium.

# Equilibrium in Markets

- For a given product, in a perfectly competitive market we have:
  - a production function giving the number of product companies are ready to make for a given price;
  - a demand function giving the number of product consumer are ready to buy for a given price.
- In some cases, especially in transportation, the price is not the only determinant factor. Regularity, fiability, ease of use, comfort are other determinant factor.
- In the remaining of the course we will be speaking of cost of each path, the cost factoring in all of this factors.

# Nash Equilibrium : Prisoner's Dilemma

Two guys got caught while dealing chocolate. As he is missing hard evidence the judge offer them a deal.

- If both deny their implication they will get 2 month each.
- If one speak, and the other deny, the first will get 1 month while the other will get 5 months.
- If both speak they get 4 month each.

Question : what is the equilibrium ?



# Nash Equilibrium

- In game theory we consider multiple agents  $a \in \mathcal{A}$ , each having a set of possible action  $u_a \in \mathcal{U}_a$ .
- Each agent earn a reward  $r_a(u)$  depending on his action, as well as the other actions.
- A (pure) Nash equilibrium is a set of actions  $\{u_a\}_{a \in \mathcal{A}}$ , such that no player can increase his reward by changing his action if the other keep these actions :

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A}, \quad \forall u'_a \in \mathcal{U}_a, \quad r_a(u'_a, u_{-a}) \leq r_a(u_a, u_{-a}).$$

- A recommendation can be followed only if it is a Nash Equilibrium.

# Game Theory : a few classes

- Number of player
  - 2 (most results)
  - $n > 2$  (hard, even with 3)
  - an infinity.
- Objective
  - zero-sum game (e.g. chess)
  - cooperative : everybody share the same objective (e.g. pandemia)
  - generic (e.g. Prisonner dilemna)

# Game theory : a few definitions

## Definition

A **Nash equilibrium** is a set of action such that no player can unilaterally improve its pay-off by changing his action.

## Definition

A **Pareto efficient solution** is a set of action such that no other set of actions can strictly improve at least one player pay-off without decreasing at least another.

## Definition

A **social optimum** is a set of action minimizing the pay-off average.

Exercises :

- what about Prisoner's Dilemma ?
- what about Zero Sum games ?

# Exercise: A beautiful mind

A beautiful mind : <https://youtu.be/a9k4UJrCdKg>

- Is the solution proposed by Nash a Nash equilibrium ?
- Is the solution proposed by Nash a Pareto Optimum ?
- Is the solution proposed by “Smith” a Nash equilibrium ?
- Is the solution proposed by “Smith” a Pareto Optimum ?
- Any other suggestion ?

# Contents


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# Game theory in road network

- People choose their means of transport (e.g. car versus public transport), their time of departure, their itinerary.
- Each user choose in its own interest (mainly the shortest time / lowest cost).
- The time depends on the congestion, which means on the choice of other users.
- Hence, we are in a game framework : users interact with conflicting interest.


# A very simple framework

- Consider a large group of who person want to go from the same origin  $o$  to the destination  $d$ , at the same time, with the same car.
- We look at a very simple graph with two roads, each composed of two edges.
- The time on each edges of the road is given as a function of the number of person taking the given edge.



# A very simple framework


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
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Total time : 1.5


# Adding a road

- Now someone decide to construct a new, very efficient road with cost 0.
- What is the new equilibrium ?




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# Adding a road

- Now someone decide to construct a new, very efficient road with cost 0.
- What is the new equilibrium ?
- Notice that the time for every user as increased ! This is the **price of anarchy**.



Total time : 2

## Another explanation

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZiauQXIKs3U> (7')

And a physical demonstration :

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nMrYlspifuo>

# Definitions snapshot

On this example we can compare :

- User Equilibrium (UE), with global cost 2
- System Optimum (SO), with global cost 1.5
- price of anarchy :  $4/3$ .

## Definition

A Wardrop (User) Equilibrium, is a repartition of flow such that no single user can improve its cost (travel time) by unilaterally changing routes.

## Real case examples

- 42d Street of New York. ([New York Times, 25/12/1990](#)).
- Stuttgart 1969 (a newly built road was closed again), [Seoul 2003](#) (6 lanes highway was turned into a park).
- New York 2009 (closed some places with success)
- In 2008, researcher found road in Boston and NYC that should be closed to diminish traffic.
- Steinberg and Zangwill showed that Braess paradox is more or less as likely to occur as not.
- [Rapoport's experiment \(2009\)](#):
  - A group of 18 students is presented with the problem of repetively (40 times) choosing its road on the graph, earning money for the experiment : fastest meaning more money.
  - Then the graph is modified (either by adding the 0 cost road, or retiring it).
  - Conclusion : after a few iteration the observed repartition is close to the theoretical one with some oscillations.
  - Then tested on a bigger network.

# Exercise

- Two nodes :  $a$  and  $b$
- Two edges : (from  $a$  to  $b$ ): 1 and 2
- Total number of trips : 1000
- Costs :  $c_1(x_1) = 5 + 2x_1$ ,  $c_2(x_2) = 10 + x_2$ .
- Question : what is the repartition of the trips along the two edges ?
- Same question with  $c_1(x_1) = 15(1 + 0.15(\frac{x_1}{1000})^4)$ ,  
 $c_2(x_2) = 20(1 + 0.15(\frac{x_2}{3000})^4)$  ?



## Another Nash Equilibrium: Split or Steal

The prisoner's Dilemma has been used as the final part of TV game show called "split or steal".

The rules :

- The two remaining contestants have a certain amount of money  $M$ .
- They each have to choose "split" or "steal"
- If both "split" they each get half:  $M/2$ .
- If one "steal" while the other "split", the stealing one get  $M$  and the other  $0$ .
- If they both "steal" they get nothing.

Here is an example :

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yM38mRHY150&list=PLq4\\_sHebc4IWI2VQnqaKXf0YXEj88jcK0&index=5](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yM38mRHY150&list=PLq4_sHebc4IWI2VQnqaKXf0YXEj88jcK0&index=5)

Here is a very nice example of why reality is more complex than math : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0qjK3TWZE8>