

ROB311 Quiz 2

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Probabilistic Inference Problems

1 Bayesian Networks

Definition: Vertices represent random variables and edges represent dependencies between variables.

1.1 Junction

Definition: A **junction** \mathcal{J} consists of three vertices, X_1 , X_2 , and X_3 , connected by two edges, e_1 and e_2 :



Figure 1

- X_1 and X_2 are not independent, X_2 and X_3 are not independent, but when is X_1 and X_3 independent?

1.1.1 Causal Chain

Definition: A causal chain is a junction \mathcal{J} s.t.



Figure 2

- X_1 and X_3 are not independent (unconditionally), but are independent given X_2 .

Notes:

- **Analogy:** Given X_2 , X_1 and X_3 are independent. Why? X_2 's door closes when you know X_2 , so X_1 and X_3 are independent.
- **Distinction b/w Causal and Dependence:** X_1 and X_2 are dependent. However, from a causal perspective, X_1 is influencing X_2 (i.e. $X_1 \rightarrow X_2$).

Warning: X_1 is influencing X_2 and X_2 is influencing X_3 .

1.1.2 Common Cause

Definition: A common cause is a junction \mathcal{J} s.t.



Figure 3

- X_1 and X_3 are not independent (unconditionally), but are independent given X_2 .

Notes:

- **Analogy:** Given X_2 , X_1 and X_3 are independent. Why? Consider the following example:
 - Let X_2 represent whether a person smokes or not, X_1 represent whether they have yellow teeth, X_3 represent whether they have lung cancer.
- Without knowing X_2 , observing X_1 provides information about X_3 because yellow teeth are associated with smoking, which in turn increases the likelihood of lung cancer.
- If X_2 is known, then knowing whether a person has yellow teeth provides no additional information about whether they have lung cancer beyond what is already known from smoking status.

1.1.3 Common Effect

Definition: A common effect is a junction \mathcal{J} s.t.



Figure 4

- X_1 and X_3 are independent (unconditionally), but are not independent given X_2 or any of X_2 's descendants.

Notes:

- **Analogy:** Consider the following example:
 - Let X_2 represent whether the grass is wet, X_1 represent whether it rained, X_3 represent whether the sprinkler was on.
- Without knowing whether the grass is wet (X_2), the occurrence of rain (X_1) and the sprinkler being on (X_3) are independent events. The rain may occur regardless of the sprinkler, and vice versa.
- However, once we observe that the grass is wet (X_2), the two events become dependent:
 - If we learn that the sprinkler was not on, then the wet grass must have been caused by rain.
 - If we learn that it did not rain, then the wet grass must have been caused by the sprinkler.

1.2 Dependence Separation

1.2.1 Blocked

Definition: $\mathcal{J} = (\{X_1, X_2, X_3\}, \{e_1, e_2\})$ is **blocked** given $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ if X_1 and X_3 are independent given \mathcal{K} .

1.2.2 Blocked Undirected Path

Definition: An undirected path,

$$p = \langle (X_1, e_1, X_2), \dots, (X_{|p|-1}, e_{|p|-1, |p|}, X_{|p|}) \rangle,$$

is **blocked** given $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ if any of its junctions,

$$\mathcal{J}^{(n)} = \{(X_{n-1}, X_n, X_{n+1}), (e_{n-1}, e_n)\},$$

is blocked given \mathcal{K} .

1.2.3 Independence

Theorem: Any two variables, X_1 and X_2 , in a Bayesian network, $\mathcal{B} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, are independent given $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ if every undirected path is blocked.

1.2.4 Consequence of Dependence Separation

Theorem: For any variable, $X \in \mathcal{V}$, it can be shown that X is independent of X 's non-descendants, $\mathcal{V} \setminus \text{des}(X)$, given X 's parents, $\text{pts}(X)$.

Notes:




Figure 5

- Given X 's parent, apply junction rules to determine that X is independent of its non-descendants.
- $\mathcal{J} = \{(Z_1, \text{pt}(X), X), (e_1, e)\}$ shows that Z_1 and X are independent given $\text{pt}(X)$ (causal chain).
- $\mathcal{J} = \{(Z_2, \text{pt}(X), X), (e_2, e)\}$ shows that Z_2 and X are independent given $\text{pt}(X)$ (common cause).
- Given $\text{ch}(X)$'s parent, apply junction rules to determine that $\text{ch}(X)$ is independent of its non-descendants.
- $\mathcal{J} = \{\text{pt}(X), X, \text{ch}(X)\}, (e, e')\}$ shows that $\text{pt}(X)$ and $\text{ch}(X)$ are independent given X (causal chain).
- Given Z_4 's parent, apply junction rules to determine that Z_4 is independent of its non-descendants.
- $\mathcal{J} = \{X, \text{ch}(X), Z_4\}, (e', e_4)\}$ shows that X and Z_4 are independent given $\text{ch}(X)$ (causal chain).
- CHECK THIS OVER AGAIN WITH CHANDRA

2 Probabilistic Inference

2.1 Problem Setup

Definition: Given a Bayesian network, $\mathcal{B} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, where $\mathcal{V} = \{X_1, \dots, X_{|\mathcal{V}|}\}$, we want to find the value of:

$$\text{pr}(\mathbf{Q} \mid \mathbf{E}) := \text{pr}(Q_1, \dots, Q_{|\mathbf{Q}|} \mid E_1, \dots, E_{|\mathbf{E}|}) = \frac{\sum_{\mathcal{V} \setminus (\mathbf{Q} \cup \mathbf{E})} p(X_1, \dots, X_{|\mathcal{V}|})}{\sum_{\mathcal{V} \setminus \mathbf{E}} p(X_1, \dots, X_{|\mathcal{V}|})}$$

$$\text{pr}(\mathbf{Q} \mid \mathbf{E}) \propto \sum_{\mathcal{V} \setminus (\mathbf{Q} \cup \mathbf{E})} \left(p(X_1) \prod_{i \neq 1} p(X_i \mid \text{pts}(X_i)) \right)$$

- $\mathbf{Q} = \{Q_1, \dots, Q_{|\mathbf{Q}|}\}$: Query variables
- $\mathbf{E} = \{E_1, \dots, E_{|\mathbf{E}|}\} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$: Evidence variables
- $\mathbf{Q} \cap \mathbf{E} = \emptyset$.

2.2 Method 1: Bayesian Network Inference

2.2.1 Markov Blanket

Definition: The **Markov blanket** of a variable X , denoted $\text{mbk}(X)$, consists of the following variables:

- X 's children
- X 's parents
- The other parents of X 's children, excluding X itself.

which is when a variable, X , is "eliminated", the resulting factor's scope is the Markov blanket of X .

2.2.2 Graphical Interpretation

Definition: Pictorially, eliminating X is equivalent to replacing all hyper-edges that include X with their union minus X , and then removing X .

2.2.3 Elimination Ordering

Definition: The order that the variables are eliminated.

2.2.4 Elimination Width

Definition: The **elimination width** of a sequence of hyper-graphs is the # of variables in the hyper-edge within the sequence with the most variables.

2.2.5 Heuristics for Elimination Ordering

Definition: Choose the elimination ordering to minimize the elimination width using the following heuristics:

1. Eliminate variable with the fewest parents.
2. Eliminate variable with the smallest domain for its parents, where

$$|\text{dom}(\text{pts}(X))| = \prod_{Z \in \text{pnt}(X)} |\text{dom}(Z)|.$$

3. Eliminate variable with the smallest Markov blanket.
4. Eliminate variable with the smallest domain for its Markov blanket, where

$$|\text{dom}(\text{mbk}(X))| = \prod_{Z \in \text{embk}(X)} |\text{dom}(Z)|.$$

2.3 Method 2: Inference via Sampling

Definition: Generate a large # of samples and then approximate as:

$$p(\mathbf{Q} \mid \mathbf{E}) \approx \frac{\# \text{ of samples w/ } \mathbf{Q} \text{ and } \mathbf{E}}{\# \text{ of samples w/ } \mathbf{E}}.$$

- As # of samples $\rightarrow \infty$, the approximation becomes exact.

2.3.1 Inference via Sampling with Likelihood Weighting

Motivation: Most of the samples are wasted since they are not consistent with the evidence.

Definition: Generate a large # of samples and then approximate as:

$$p(\mathbf{Q} \mid \mathbf{E}) \approx \frac{\text{weight of samples w/ } \mathbf{Q} \text{ and } \mathbf{E}}{\text{weight of samples w/ } \mathbf{E}}.$$

- Weight for each sample: Probability of forcing the evidence, i.e. probability of the evidence given the sample.

2.4 Canonical Problems:

Example:

1. **Given:** Caveman is deciding whether to go hunt for meat. He must take into account several factors:
 - Weather
 - Possibility of over-exertion
 - Possibility encountering lion

These factors can result in Cavemen's death. His decision will ultimately depend on the **chances** of his death.

2. **Binary Variables:**

- $W = \{\text{Sun, Rainy}\}$: Weather
- H : Whether the Cavemen goes hunting or not.
- L : Whether the Cavemen encounters a lion or not.
- T : Whether the Cavement is tired or not.
- D : Whether the Cavemen dies or not

3. **Problem:** Cavemen must decide whether to go hunting or not.

- He must consider the conditional probabilities (i.e. dependence) of each event.

Warning: Have to be discrete.

2.4.1 Undirected Path Blocked?

Process:

1. **Given:** Undirected path p and \mathcal{K}
2. Check if any of the junctions on the undirected path are blocked given \mathcal{K} .
 - i.e. Check if X_1 and X_3 of the junction are independent given \mathcal{K} .

2.4.2 Independence

Process:

1. Given a Bayesian network w/ 2 variables to find independence.
2. Find all undirected paths between the 2 variables in the Bayesian network.
3. Identify a set of variables, \mathcal{K} , that blocks all undirected paths.
4. If all undirected paths are blocked, then the 2 variables are independent given \mathcal{K} .

Example:

1. **Given:** Bayesian network.




Figure 6

2. **Problem:** A and E are
 - independent if $\mathcal{K} =$
 - not necessarily independent for $\mathcal{K} =$
3. **Soln:**
 - (a) **Undirected Paths:**
 - $A \rightarrow G \rightarrow H \rightarrow B \rightarrow E$
 - $A \rightarrow G \rightarrow D \rightarrow B \rightarrow E$
 - $A \rightarrow C \rightarrow F \rightarrow B \rightarrow E$
 - $A \rightarrow C \rightarrow D \rightarrow B \rightarrow E$

Example: Independent:

\mathcal{K}
$\{G, C\}$
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • $A \iff G \iff H \iff B \iff E$ is blocked given \mathcal{K} since $\mathcal{J} = \{(A, G, H), (e_1, e_2)\}$ is blocked given G since A, H independent given G (causal chain) • $A \iff G \iff D \iff B \iff E$ is blocked given \mathcal{K} since $\mathcal{J} = \{(A, G, D), (e_1, e_2)\}$ is blocked given G since A, D independent given G (causal chain) • $A \iff C \iff F \iff B \iff E$ is blocked given \mathcal{K} since $\mathcal{J} = \{(A, C, F), (e_1, e_2)\}$ is blocked given C since A, F independent given C (causal chain) • $A \iff C \iff D \iff B \iff E$ is blocked given \mathcal{K} since $\mathcal{J} = \{(A, C, D), (e_1, e_2)\}$ is blocked given C since A, D independent given C (causal chain)
$\{D, F\}$
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • $A \iff G \iff H \iff B \iff E$ is blocked given \mathcal{K} since $\mathcal{J} = \{(G, H, B), (e_1, e_2)\}$ is blocked NOT given H since G, B independent NOT given H (common effect) • $A \iff G \iff D \iff B \iff E$ is blocked given \mathcal{K} since $\mathcal{J} = \{(G, D, B), (e_1, e_2)\}$ is blocked given D since G, B independent given D (causal chain) • $A \iff C \iff F \iff B \iff E$ is blocked given \mathcal{K} since $\mathcal{J} = \{(C, F, B), (e_1, e_2)\}$ is blocked given F since C, B independent given F (causal chain) • $A \iff C \iff D \iff B \iff E$ is blocked given \mathcal{K} since $\mathcal{J} = \{(C, D, B), (e_1, e_2)\}$ is blocked given D since C, B independent given D (causal chain)

Not Necessarily Independent:

\mathcal{K}
$\{H, D, F\}$
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • $A \iff G \iff H \iff B \iff E$ is unblocked given \mathcal{K} since $\mathcal{J} = \{(G, H, B), (e_1, e_2)\}$ is unblocked given H since G, B not independent given H (common effect) • $A \iff G \iff D \iff B \iff E$ is blocked given \mathcal{K} since $\mathcal{J} = \{(G, D, B), (e_1, e_2)\}$ is blocked given D (causal chain) since G, B independent given D (causal chain) • $A \iff C \iff F \iff B \iff E$ is blocked given \mathcal{K} since $\mathcal{J} = \{(C, F, B), (e_1, e_2)\}$ is blocked given F since C, B independent given F (causal chain) • $A \iff C \iff D \iff B \iff E$ is blocked given \mathcal{K} since $\mathcal{J} = \{(C, D, B), (e_1, e_2)\}$ is blocked given D since C, B independent given D (causal chain)

2.4.3 Hypergraph

Process:

1.

2.4.4 Bayesian Inference

Process:

1.

Example:

1. Given:




Figure 7

2. Problem:

2.4.5 Inference via Sampling

Process:

- 1.

Example:

1. **Given:**
2. **Problem:**

3 Markov

3.1 General

3.1.1 Random Process

Definition: Time-varying random variables S_0, S_1, S_2, \dots

3.1.2 Markov Process

Definition: Random process + depends on previous time step only (memoryless)

- w.l.o.g. states can contain history of previous states.

3.2 Markov Chains (MCs)

Summary: In a **Markov Chain**, we assume that:

- there are no agents
- state transitions occur automatically
- S_t is the state *after* transition t
- the state transition process is stochastic and memoryless:

$$S_t \perp S_0, \dots, S_{t-2} \mid S_{t-1}$$

- S_t is independent of all previous states given S_{t-1}

Name	Function:
initial state distribution	$p_0(s) := \mathbb{P}[S_0 = s]$
transition distribution	$p(s' s) := \mathbb{P}[S_{t+1} = s' S_t = s]$
Prob. that state of the env. after T transitions is s	$p_T(s) := \mathbb{P}[S_T = s]$ $= \sum_{s'} p_{T-1}(s') p(s s')$
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • $p_{T-1}(s')$: Prob. s' at $T-1$ (given) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – $p_0(s)$: Base case • $p(s s')$: Prob. s given s' (from graph) 	

3.2.1 Bayesian Network

Notes: S_0, S_1, S_2, \dots form a **Bayesian Network**:




Figure 8

3.3 Markov Reward Processes (MRPs)

Summary: In a **Markov Reward Process**, we assume that:

- there is one agent
- state transitions occur automatically (i.e. agent has no control over actions)
- S_t is the state *after* transition t
- the state transition process is stochastic and memoryless:

$$S_t \perp S_0, \dots, S_{t-2} \mid S_{t-1}$$

- S_t is independent of all previous states given S_{t-1}
- R_t is the reward for transition t , i.e., $(S_{t-1}, \emptyset, S_t)$

Name	Function:
Initial state distribution	$p_0(s) := \mathbb{P}[S_0 = s]$
Transition distribution	$p(s' s) := \mathbb{P}[S_{t+1} = s' S_t = s]$
Reward function	$r(s, s') := \text{reward for transition } (s, \emptyset, s')$
Discount factor	$\gamma \in [0, 1]$
Return after T transitions	$U_T = \sum_{t=1}^T \gamma^{t-1} R_t$ $= U_{T-1} + \gamma^{T-1} R_T$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • i.e. The (possibly discounted) sum of the rewards after T transitions (sequence of rewards) • Why? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Future rewards are less valuable than immediate rewards. – Won't converge if sum goes to ∞ if $\gamma = 1$.
Expected return after T transitions	$\mathbb{E}[U_T] = \mathbb{E}[U_{T-1}] + \gamma^{T-1} \mathbb{E}[R_T]$ $= \mathbb{E}[U_{T-1}] + \gamma^{T-1} \sum_{s, s'} p_{T-1}(s) p(s' s) r(s, s')$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • $p_{T-1}(s)p(s' s)$: Prob. $s \rightarrow s'$ • $r(s, s')$: rwd $s \rightarrow s'$ • $\mathbb{E}[U_0] := 0$: Base case

3.3.1 Bayesian Network

Notes: $S_0, R_1, S_1, R_2, S_2, \dots$ form a **Bayesian Network**:




Figure 9

3.4 Markov Decision Processes (MDPs)

3.4.1 Setup

Summary: In a **Markov Decision Process (MDP)**, we assume that:

- there is one agent
- state transitions occur manually (after each action)
- S_t is the state *after* transition t
- A_t is the action inducing transition t
- the state transition process is stochastic and memoryless:

$$S_t \perp S_0, A_1, \dots, S_{t-2}, A_{t-1} \mid S_{t-1}, A_t$$

- S_t is independent of all previous states and actions given S_{t-1} and A_t
- R_t is the reward for transition t , i.e., (S_{t-1}, A_t, S_t)

Summary:

Name	Function:
initial state distribution	$p_0(s) := \mathbb{P}[S_0 = s]$
transition distribution	$p(s' s, a) := \mathbb{P}[S_t = s' A_t = a, S_{t-1} = s]$
reward function	$r(s, a, s') := \text{reward for transition } (s, a, s')$
a time-invariant policy for choosing actions	$\pi(a s) := \mathbb{P}[A_t = a S_t = s]$
Maximum number of transitions	T_{\max}
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A Markov Decision Process can be either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finite: T_{\max} is finite Infinite: T_{\max} is infinite * For infinite MDPs, we must have $\gamma < 1$. 	
Prob. that state of the env. after T transitions is s	$p_T(s) = \sum_{a, s'} p_{T-1}(s) \pi(a s') p(s s', a)$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> $p_{T-1}(s)$: Prob. s' at $T-1$ $\pi(a s')$: Action a from s' $p(s s', a)$: Prob. s given s', a
Expected return after T transitions	$\mathbb{E}_\pi[U_T] = \mathbb{E}_\pi[U_{T-1}] + \gamma^{T-1} \mathbb{E}_\pi[R_T]$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> $\mathbb{E}_\pi[R_t] = \sum_{s, a, s'} p_{T-1}(s) \pi(a s) p(s' s, a) r(s, a, s')$ $\mathbb{E}_\pi[U_0] = 0$: Base case.
Future return after τ transitions	$G_\tau = \sum_{t=\tau+1}^T \gamma^{t-(\tau+1)} R_t$ $= R_{\tau+1} + \gamma G_{\tau+1}$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Starting at $\tau + 1$ for the future return.
Expected future return after τ transitions given $S_\tau = s$	$\mathbb{E}_\pi[G_\tau S_\tau = s] = \mathbb{E}_\pi[R_{\tau+1} S_\tau = s] + \gamma \mathbb{E}_\pi[G_{\tau+1} S_\tau = s]$ $= \sum_{a, s'} \pi(a s) p(s' s, a) (r(s, a, s') + \gamma \mathbb{E}_\pi[G_{\tau+1} S_{\tau+1} = s'])$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> $\mathbb{E}_\pi[G_{T_{\max}} S_{T_{\max}} = s] = 0$: Base case.

Summary:

Name	Function:
Value function	$v_\pi(s, T) := \mathbb{E}_\pi[G_{T_{\max}-T} \mid S_{T_{\max}-T} = s]$ $= \sum_{a, s'} \pi(a \mid s) p(s' \mid s, a) (r(s, a, s') + \gamma v_\pi(s', T-1))$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Value of state s under the policy π with T transitions remaining. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i.e. How good the state is at time T (e.g. If $v(s, T) = 5$, then the expected future return at T is 5). $v(s, 0) = 0$ for all s: Base case
Optimal action	$a^*(s, T) = \arg \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}(s)} \sum_{s'} p(s' \mid s, a) (r(s, a, s') + \gamma v_{\pi^*}(s', T-1))$ $= \arg \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}(s)} q^*(s, a, T)$
Optimal policy	$\pi^*(a \mid s, T) = \arg \max_{\pi(a \mid s, T)} \mathbb{E}_\pi[G_\tau \mid S_\tau = s] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a = a^*(s, T) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Choose $\pi(\cdot \mid s)$ to maximize the expected future return after T transitions given $S_\tau = s$. Note: Policy always depends on transitions remaining so may omit.
Optimal value function	$v^*(s, T) = \max_a \sum_{s'} p(s' \mid a, s) (r(s, a, s') + \gamma v^*(s', \tau+1))$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assume we use an optimal policy π^*. $v^*(s, 0) = 0$ for all s: Base case.
Q function (quality)	$q_\pi(s, a, T) := \mathbb{E}_\pi[G_{T_{\max}-T} \mid S_{T_{\max}-T} = s, A_{T_{\max}-(T-1)} = a]$ $= \sum_{s'} p(s' \mid s, a) \left(r(s, a, s') + \gamma \sum_{a'} \pi(a' \mid s') q_\pi(s', a', T-1) \right)$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quality of move (s, a) under policy π with T transitions remaining. $q_\pi(s, a, 0) = 0$ for all s, a: Base case.
Optimal Q function	$q^*(s, a, T) = \sum_{s'} p(s' \mid s, a) \left(r(s, a, s') + \gamma \max_{a'} q^*(s', a', T-1) \right)$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> $q^*(s, a, 0) = 0$ for all s, a: Base case.
IDK Expected Return	$\mathbb{E}_\pi[U_{T_{\max}}] = \sum_s \mathbb{E}_\pi[G_0 \mid S_0 = s] p_0(s)$ $= \sum_s v_\pi(s, 0) p_0(s)$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> $G_0 = U_{T_{\max}}$
IDK Optimal Expected Return	$\max_\pi \mathbb{E}[U_{T_{\max}}] = \sum_s v^*(s, 0) p_0(s)$

3.4.2 Bayesian Network

Notes: $S_0, A_1, R_1, S_1, A_2, R_2, S_2, \dots$ form a **Bayesian Network**:




Figure 10

3.4.3 Intuition on Formulae

Notes:

$$\mathbb{E}_\pi[R_{\tau+1} \mid S_\tau = s] = \sum_{a, s'} \pi(a \mid s) p(s' \mid a, s) r(s, a, s')$$

- $\pi(a \mid s) p(s' \mid a, s)$: Prob. of getting to s' from s w/ action a
- $r(s, a, s')$: Reward of getting to s' from s w/ action a

$$\mathbb{E}_\pi[G_{\tau+1} \mid S_\tau = s] = \sum_{a, s'} \pi(a \mid s) p(s' \mid a, s) \mathbb{E}_\pi[G_{\tau+1} \mid S_{\tau+1} = s']$$

- $\pi(a \mid s) p(s' \mid a, s)$: Prob. of getting to s' from s w/ action a
- $\mathbb{E}_\pi[G_{\tau+1} \mid S_{\tau+1} = s']$: Expected future return at $\tau + 1$ from s' at $\tau + 1$.
- $\sum_{a, s'}$: Sum over all possible future states and current actions to get expected future return at $\tau + 1$ from s at τ .

3.5 Canonical Examples

3.5.1 Markov Chains

Example:

1. **Given:** Caveman needs to predict the weather, W , which is either sunny or rainy. Suppose the weather tomorrow depends on the weather today:




Figure 11

2. **Problem:** Caveman wants to predict the weather on a given day.

3.5.2 Markov Reward Processes

Example:

1. **Given:** Caveman needs to predict the weather, W , which is either sunny or rainy. Suppose the weather tomorrow depends on the weather today:




Figure 12

- Depending on the transition, caveman may feel happier/sadder. This is quantified w/ the rewards.
2. **Problem:** Caveman wants to predict the weather on a given day that maximizes his happiness.

3.5.3 Markov Decision Processes

Example:

1. **Given:**




Figure 13

- Solid straight line: Outcome of action a from state s .
- Dotted straight line: Choice of action (policy) from state s .
 - If policy known, then reduced to MRP.
- Squiggly line: Reward for action a from state s to state s' .
- Assume uniform probability.
 - Since $\sum p = 1$, therefore count # of arrows going out of s and divide by 1 to get p .
- Same states have the same connections (i.e. all can use them just to hard to draw)

2. **Problem:** Find the optimal policy for $\gamma = 1$ and $T_{\max} = 5$.

3. **Soln:**

Example:

T	s	a	$q^*(s, a, T) = \sum_{s'} p(s' s, a) \left(r(s, a, s') + \gamma \max_{a'} q^*(s', a', T - 1) \right)$
0	-	-	0
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Best Action: $a^*(s, 0) = \text{NA}$ 			
1	seed	wait	$q^*(\text{seed}, \text{wait}, 1) = \underbrace{0.5(-2 + 0)}_{s'=\text{seed}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{ga}} = -1$
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Best Action: $a^*(\text{seed}, 1) = \text{wait}$ 			
1	ga	wait	$q^*(\text{ga}, \text{wait}, 1) = \underbrace{0.25(-2 + 0)}_{s'=\text{ga}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{rea}} + \underbrace{0.25(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{roa}} = -0.5$
1	ga	eat	$q^*(\text{ga}, \text{eat}, 1) = \underbrace{0.1(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.9(6 + 0)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 5.4$
1	ga	hunt	$q^*(\text{ga}, \text{hunt}, 1) = \underbrace{0.5(24 + 0)}_{s'=\text{seed}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} = 12$
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Best Action: $a^*(\text{ga}, 1) = \text{hunt}$ 			
1	rea	eat	$q^*(\text{rea}, \text{eat}, 1) = \underbrace{1(12 + 0)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 12$
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Best Action: $a^*(\text{rea}, 1) = \text{eat}$ 			
1	roa	eat	$q^*(\text{roa}, \text{eat}, 1) = \underbrace{0.25(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.75(2 + 0)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 1.5$
1	roa	hunt	$q^*(\text{roa}, \text{hunt}, 1) = \underbrace{0.5(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.5(18 + 0)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 9$
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Best Action: $a^*(\text{roa}, 1) = \text{hunt}$ 			
1	dead	-	$q^*(\text{dead}, -, 1) = \underbrace{1(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{end}} = 0$
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Best Action: $a^*(s, 1) = -$ 			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Optimal Policy w/ 1 Transition Remaining: $\pi^*(a s, 1) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a = a^*(s, 1) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$ 			

Example:

T	s	a	$q^*(s, a, T) = \sum_{s'} p(s' s, a) \left(r(s, a, s') + \gamma \max_{a'} q^*(s', a', T - 1) \right)$
2	seed	wait	$q^*(\text{seed}, \text{wait}, 2) = \underbrace{0.5(-2 - 1)}_{s'=\text{seed}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 12)}_{s'=\text{ga}} = 4.5$
• Best Action: $a^*(\text{seed}, 2) = \text{wait}$			
2	ga	wait	$q^*(\text{ga}, \text{wait}, 2) = \underbrace{0.25(-2 + 12)}_{s'=\text{ga}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 12)}_{s'=\text{rea}} + \underbrace{0.25(0 + 9)}_{s'=\text{roa}} = 10.75$
2	ga	eat	$q^*(\text{ga}, \text{eat}, 2) = \underbrace{0.1(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.9(6 - 1)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 4.5$
2	ga	hunt	$q^*(\text{ga}, \text{hunt}, 2) = \underbrace{0.5(24 - 1)}_{s'=\text{seed}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} = 11.5$
• Best Action: $a^*(\text{ga}, 2) = \text{hunt}$			
2	rea	eat	$q^*(\text{rea}, \text{eat}, 2) = \underbrace{1(12 - 1)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 11$
• Best Action: $a^*(\text{rea}, 2) = \text{eat}$			
2	roa	eat	$q^*(\text{roa}, \text{eat}, 2) = \underbrace{0.25(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.75(2 - 1)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 0.5$
2	roa	hunt	$q^*(\text{roa}, \text{hunt}, 2) = \underbrace{0.5(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.5(18 - 1)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 8.5$
• Best Action: $a^*(\text{roa}, 2) = \text{hunt}$			
2	dead	-	$q^*(\text{dead}, -, 2) = \underbrace{1(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{end}} = 0$
• Best Action: $a^*(s, 2) = -$			
• Optimal Policy w/ 2 Transitions Remaining: $\pi^*(a s, 2) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a = a^*(s, 2) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$			

Example:

T	s	a	$q^*(s, a, T) = \sum_{s'} p(s' s, a) \left(r(s, a, s') + \gamma \max_{a'} q^*(s', a', T - 1) \right)$
3	seed	wait	$q^*(\text{seed}, \text{wait}, 3) = \underbrace{0.5(-2 + 4.5)}_{s'=\text{seed}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 11.5)}_{s'=\text{ga}} = 7$
• Best Action: $a^*(\text{seed}, 3) = \text{wait}$			
3	ga	wait	$q^*(\text{ga}, \text{wait}, 3) = \underbrace{0.25(-2 + 11.5)}_{s'=\text{ga}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 11)}_{s'=\text{rea}} + \underbrace{0.25(0 + 8.5)}_{s'=\text{roa}} = 10$
3	ga	eat	$q^*(\text{ga}, \text{eat}, 3) = \underbrace{0.1(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.9(6 + 4.5)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 9.45$
3	ga	hunt	$q^*(\text{ga}, \text{hunt}, 3) = \underbrace{0.5(24 + 4.5)}_{s'=\text{seed}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} = 14.25$
• Best Action: $a^*(\text{ga}, 3) = \text{hunt}$			
3	rea	eat	$q^*(\text{rea}, \text{eat}, 3) = \underbrace{1(12 + 4.5)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 16.5$
• Best Action: $a^*(\text{rea}, 3) = \text{eat}$			
3	roa	eat	$q^*(\text{roa}, \text{eat}, 3) = \underbrace{0.25(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.75(2 + 4.5)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 4.875$
3	roa	hunt	$q^*(\text{roa}, \text{hunt}, 3) = \underbrace{0.5(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.5(18 + 4.5)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 11.25$
• Best Action: $a^*(\text{roa}, 3) = \text{hunt}$			
3	dead	-	$q^*(\text{dead}, -, 3) = \underbrace{1(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{end}} = 0$
• Best Action: $a^*(s, 3) = -$			
• Optimal Policy w/ 3 Transitions Remaining: $\pi^*(a s, 3) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a = a^*(s, 3) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$			

Example:

T	s	a	$q^*(s, a, T) = \sum_{s'} p(s' s, a) \left(r(s, a, s') + \gamma \max_{a'} q^*(s', a', T - 1) \right)$
4	seed	wait	$q^*(\text{seed}, \text{wait}, 4) = \underbrace{0.5(-2 + 7)}_{s'=\text{seed}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 14.25)}_{s'=\text{ga}} = 9.625$
• Best Action: $a^*(\text{seed}, 4) = \text{wait}$			
4	ga	wait	$q^*(\text{ga}, \text{wait}, 4) = \underbrace{0.25(-2 + 14.25)}_{s'=\text{ga}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 16.5)}_{s'=\text{rea}} + \underbrace{0.25(0 + 11.25)}_{s'=\text{roa}} = 14.125$
4	ga	eat	$q^*(\text{ga}, \text{eat}, 4) = \underbrace{0.1(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.9(6 + 7)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 11.7$
4	ga	hunt	$q^*(\text{ga}, \text{hunt}, 4) = \underbrace{0.5(24 + 7)}_{s'=\text{seed}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} = 15.5$
• Best Action: $a^*(\text{ga}, 4) = \text{hunt}$			
4	rea	eat	$q^*(\text{rea}, \text{eat}, 4) = \underbrace{1(12 + 7)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 19$
• Best Action: $a^*(\text{rea}, 4) = \text{eat}$			
4	roa	eat	$q^*(\text{roa}, \text{eat}, 4) = \underbrace{0.25(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.75(2 + 7)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 6.75$
4	roa	hunt	$q^*(\text{roa}, \text{hunt}, 4) = \underbrace{0.5(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.5(18 + 7)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 12.5$
• Best Action: $a^*(\text{roa}, 4) = \text{hunt}$			
4	dead	-	$q^*(\text{dead}, -, 4) = \underbrace{1(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{end}} = 0$
• Best Action: $a^*(s, 4) = -$			
• Optimal Policy w/ 4 Transitions Remaining: $\pi^*(a s, 4) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a = a^*(s, 4) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$			

Example:

$$T \quad s \quad a \quad q^*(s, a, T) = \sum_{s'} p(s' | s, a) \left(r(s, a, s') + \gamma \max_{a'} q^*(s', a', T-1) \right)$$

$$5 \quad \text{seed} \quad \text{wait} \quad q^*(\text{seed}, \text{wait}, 5) = \underbrace{0.5(-2 + 9.625)}_{s'=\text{seed}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 15.5)}_{s'=\text{ga}} = 11.5625$$

- Best Action: $a^*(\text{seed}, 5) = \text{wait}$

$$5 \quad \text{ga} \quad \text{wait} \quad q^*(\text{ga}, \text{wait}, 5) = \underbrace{0.25(-2 + 15.5)}_{s'=\text{ga}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 19)}_{s'=\text{rea}} + \underbrace{0.25(0 + 12.5)}_{s'=\text{roa}} = 16$$

$$5 \quad \text{ga} \quad \text{eat} \quad q^*(\text{ga}, \text{eat}, 5) = \underbrace{0.1(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.9(6 + 9.625)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 14.0625$$

$$5 \quad \text{ga} \quad \text{hunt} \quad q^*(\text{ga}, \text{hunt}, 5) = \underbrace{0.5(24 + 9.625)}_{s'=\text{seed}} + \underbrace{0.5(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} = 16.8125$$

- Best Action: $a^*(\text{ga}, 5) = \text{hunt}$

$$5 \quad \text{rea} \quad \text{eat} \quad q^*(\text{rea}, \text{eat}, 5) = \underbrace{1(12 + 9.625)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 21.625$$

- Best Action: $a^*(\text{rea}, 5) = \text{eat}$

$$5 \quad \text{roa} \quad \text{eat} \quad q^*(\text{roa}, \text{eat}, 5) = \underbrace{0.25(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.75(2 + 9.625)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 8.71875$$

$$5 \quad \text{roa} \quad \text{hunt} \quad q^*(\text{roa}, \text{hunt}, 5) = \underbrace{0.5(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{dead}} + \underbrace{0.5(18 + 9.625)}_{s'=\text{seed}} = 13.8125$$

- Best Action: $a^*(\text{roa}, 5) = \text{hunt}$

$$5 \quad \text{dead} \quad - \quad q^*(\text{dead}, -, 5) = \underbrace{1(0 + 0)}_{s'=\text{end}} = 0$$

- Best Action: $a^*(s, 5) = -$

- Optimal Policy w/ 5 Transitions Remaining: $\pi^*(a | s, 5) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a = a^*(s, 5) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$