

# ROB311 Quiz 3

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# One-Shot Multi-Agent Decision Problems

## 1 Multi-Agent Problems

**Summary:** In a **Multi-Agent problem**, we assume that:

- Set of states for environment is  $\mathcal{S}$
- $P$  agents within environment.
- For each state  $s \in \mathcal{S}$ :
  - possible actions for agent  $i$  is  $\mathcal{A}_i(s)$
  - set of action profiles is  $\mathcal{A}(s) = \prod_{i=1}^P \mathcal{A}_i(s)$
- possible state-action pairs are  $\mathcal{T} = \{(s, a) \text{ s.t. } s \in \mathcal{S}, a \in \mathcal{A}(s)\}$
- environment in some origin state,  $s_0$
- environment destroyed after  $N$  transitions
- agent  $j$  wants to find policy  $\pi_j(a_j | s)$  so that  $\mathbb{E}[r_j(p)]$  is maximized
- agents act independently given the environment's state:  $\pi(a | s) = \prod_{j \in [P]} \pi_j(a_j | s)$

Name	Function:
State transition given state-action pair defined by $\text{tr} : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$	$\text{tr}(s, a)$ = state transition from $s$ under $a$
Reward to each agent, $i$ defined by $r_i : \mathcal{Q} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$	$r_i(s, a, \text{tr}(s, a))$ = rwd to agent $i$ for $(s, a, \text{tr}(s, a))$
State evolution of environment after $N$ transitions	$p = \langle (s_0, a^{(1)}, s_1), \dots, (s_{N-1}, a^{(N)}, s_N) \rangle$
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Given sequence of actions: <math>p.a = \langle a^{(1)}, \dots, a^{(n)} \rangle</math></li> <li>• <math>s_N = \tau(s_{n-1}, a^{(n)})</math></li> </ul>	
reward to agent $i$	$r_i(p) = \sum_{n=1}^N r_i(s_{n-1}, a^{(n)}, s_n)$
expected-reward (value) of playing $a$ from $s$ for agent $j$	$q_j(s, a) = r_j(s, a, \tau(s, a)) + \sum_{a' \in \mathcal{A}(\tau(s, a))} \pi(a'   \tau(s, a)) q_j(\tau(s, a), a')$
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <math>\mathcal{A}(s) = \emptyset</math> if <math>s \in \mathcal{G}</math></li> </ul>	

### 1.1 Action Equilibria

#### 1.1.1 Finding Action Equilibria

### 1.2 Strategy Equilibria

#### 1.2.1 Finding Strategy Equilibria

#### 1.2.2 Existence of Strategy Equilibria

#### 1.2.3 Convergence of Strategy Equilibria

### 1.3 Examples

#### 1.3.1 Finding Action Equilibria

#### 1.3.2 Optimal Action Profiles