



**Bridge-Finding Game**

In the Bit-Fixing GGMM

1

5











preprocessing phase



online phrases



**Fix**

$$(t_1, \tau(t_1), \dots, (t_P, \tau(t_P)))$$



[illegible]





$$\tau(y) \equiv \vec{a} \cdot \vec{x} + b$$


$$(x_1, x_2, x_3)$$






$$\tau(1), \tau(x_1), \tau(x_2), \tau(x_3)$$



$$\text{Mult}(\tau(x_1), \tau(x_2))$$


$$\tau(x_1 + x_2)$$




$$\text{Inv}(\tau(x_1 + x_2))$$





$$\tau(-x_1-x_2)$$



$$\text{Mult}(\tau(x_1), \tau(1))$$


$$\tau(x_1 + 1)$$



$$\text{Mult}(\tau(x_2), \eta)$$


$$\tau(x_2 + 7)$$



$\tau(y)$







$\pi(t_1)$

$$\tau(t_P)$$

$(0, 0, 0)$

$(0, 0, 0)$



CP

P









$$\tau(1) \quad (0,0,0) \quad 1$$

$$\tau(x_1)$$

$$\tau(x_2)$$

$$\tau(x_3)$$

$(1, 0, 0)$

$(0, 1, 0)$

$(0, 0, 1)$









$$\tau(x_1+x_2)(1,1,0)0$$


$$\tau(-x_1-x_2)(-1,-1,0)-0$$

$$\tau(x_1+1)(1,0,0)1$$

$$\tau(x_2+7)(0,1,0)7$$

$$n \quad (0,0,0) \quad 7$$





**Restricted  
Discrete-Log  
Oracle**







01101101

01101101



Bridge event since  $\tau(t_P) = \tau(-x_1 - x_2) = 01101101$

but  $((0, 0, 0), t_P) \neq ((-1, -1, 0), 0)$



Then we learned

$$x_1 + x_2 + t_p = 0$$



**Theorem (informal).**  $\Pr[\text{BRIDGE}] \leq \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{q^2 + q(N + P)}{p}\right).$



In the **Auxiliary-Input Model**, we have

**Theorem (informal).**

$$\Pr[\text{BRIDGE}] \leq \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{q2^k S}{p}\right).$$

  
*k*-bit security:  $p \approx 2^{2k} S$

# Bridge-Finding Game

## In the Bit-Fixing GGM

$$(x_1, x_2, x_3)$$

$$\tau(y) = \vec{a} \cdot \vec{x} + b$$

$\mathcal{L}$

$\tau(y)$	$\vec{a}$	$b$
$\tau(t_1)$	$(0, 0, 0)$	$t_1$
$\dots$	$\dots$	$\dots$
01101101	$(0, 0, 0)$	$t_P$
$\tau(1)$	$(0, 0, 0)$	1
$\tau(x_1)$	$(1, 0, 0)$	0
$\tau(x_2)$	$(0, 1, 0)$	0
$\tau(x_3)$	$(0, 0, 1)$	0

Fix  $(t_1, \tau(t_1)), \dots, (t_P, \tau(t_P))$

preprocessing phase  
online phase

$$\tau(1), \tau(x_1), \tau(x_2), \tau(x_3)$$

$$\text{Mult}(\tau(x_1), \tau(x_2))$$

$$\tau(x_1 + x_2)$$

Bridge event since  $\tau(t_P) = \tau(-x_1 - x_2) = 01101101$   
but  $((0, 0, 0), t_P) \neq ((-1, -1, 0), 0)$

Then we learned

$$x_1 + x_2 + t_P = 0$$

**Theorem (informal).**  $\Pr[\text{BRIDGE}] \leq \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{q^2 + q(N + P)}{p}\right)$ .

In the **Auxiliary-Input Model**, we have

**Theorem (informal).**

$$\Pr[\text{BRIDGE}] \leq \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{q2^k S}{p}\right).$$

$k$ -bit security:  $p \approx 2^{2k} S$

# Multi-User Security Bound and Signature Length

## “Short” Schnorr Signatures

		Security Bound	For k-bit Security	Signature Length
Without Preprocessing		$\varepsilon \leq \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{q^2 + qN}{p} + \frac{q}{2^k}\right)$	$p \approx 2^{2k}$	$k + \log p \approx 3k$
	Key-Prefixed	$\varepsilon \leq \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{q^2 S \log p}{p} + \frac{q}{2^k}\right)$	$p \approx 2^{2k} S \log p$	If $S = 2^{k/2}$ $\Rightarrow k + \log p \approx 3.5k$
With Preprocessing	Standardized	$\varepsilon \leq \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{q2^k S}{p} + \frac{q}{2^k}\right)$	$p \approx 2^{2k} S$	If $S = 2^{k/2}$ $\Rightarrow k + \log p \approx 3.5k$