

Power and States in Politics: Week 8 / Identity: Race, Ethnicity and Kinship

Based on your readings of the articles, try to fill in this table to your best ability. Please work on your own / we will discuss in class.

	Alesina et al	Lieberman	Kasara	Wang	Wimmer	Darden / Mylonas	McMurry
Explanatory variable	Ethnic fragmentation	definitions of National Political Community (NPC), varying in terms of how racial and regional cleavages were addressed in critical constitutions	Co-ethnicity: if the president or the coalition shares the same ethnicity as the agricultural area.	Geography of kinship network; Local concentration of kin.	State capacity in the past	External threats	Recognition of collective self-governance rights
Outcome variable	Public good provision	Taxation ability on income tax: portion of tax income tax on GDP	TaxN, TaxR. In general, the real taxation rate.	Support for reform of state capacity build-up	Contemporary ethnic heterogeneity and public goods provision	Linguistic commonality	National identity

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Is the state a causal or outcome variable?	Outcome variable	Both: the states define NPC at some points and they are influenced by the definition at the end.	A causal variable.	Outcome variable	Causal variable	Causal variable: adoption of national language policy; Outcome: territorial integrity.	Outcome: state weakness
Key actors	Members of jurisdiction: they decide how to allocate resources; Voters: characterized by features, such as ethnicity and preference. Their need ought to be satisfied.	States: demanding income tax; Upper-income groups: subjects to be taxed	1. African leaders 2. Farmers	Political elites; actors in the kinship network	States	States	States: recognize collective self-governance rights; Citizen: recognize the state

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Key argument relating cause to effect / “mechanism”	<p>Polarization makes the equilibrium point of public good provision lower that maximizes the overall utility function.</p> <p>Voters choose lower public goods when a significant fraction of tax revenues collected on one ethnic groups are used to provide public goods shared with other ethnic groups.</p>	<p>The definition of political community creates a sense of “us” and others so that give the low-income whites the ability to demand upper-income classes. Cohesion being created, the state is able to extract income-tax.</p>	<p>Conventional wisdom: leaders would favor farmers of the same ethnicity.</p> <p>It is easier for the political leader to exert influence and enact policy upon groups of the same ethnicity.</p> <p>They have no alternative and no bargain ability.</p> <p>The less bargaining ability, the higher the taxation rate will be imposed.</p>	<p>The type of kinship-based institutions matters for state building: kinship networks, when geographically dispersed, crosscut local cleavages and align the incentives of self-interested elites in favor of building a strong state.</p> <p>With a strong state, geographically dispersed kinship network could gain protection and exert influence with a lower cost, while locally concentrated network could gain resources and protection with a lower cost.</p>	<p>Diversity and the state’s capacity to public goods may both result from a previous history of state formation.</p>	<p>When facing external threats, states are more incentivized to promote mass schooling in pursuit of national cohesion, a consequence of which is a higher linguistic commonality.</p>	<p>Recognizing the local governance can increase state control by making indigenous communities more “legible” and redefining indigenous authority structures on terms controlled by the state.</p>

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Key evidence / and cases to demonstrate the claim	<p>Ethnicity affect fiscal aggregate, expenditure share and transfer from higher level government.</p> <p>More ethnically diverse jurisdictions in the United States have higher spending and higher deficits/ debt per capita, and yet devote lower shares of spending to core public goods like education and roads. The higher spending in more ethnically diverse jurisdictions is financed in part by higher intergovernmental</p>	<p>Brazil and South Africa are similar in many aspects. However, South Africa shows a stronger ability in extracting income tax, which is reflected in the proportion of income tax over GDP.</p>	<p>1. The co-ethnicity of president is associated with a higher taxation rate; 2. Contest in the election brings down the originally positive association;</p>	<p>Politicians embedded in a geographically dispersed network are more likely to support the reform of building up state capacity.</p>		<p>Indonesia, faced with substantial external threats soon after its independence, chose to promote national mass schooling to create a dominance of the official language; Congo, on the contrary, having a comparable level of linguistic diversity but no substantial external threats, did not choose to promote a single lan</p>	<p>Using DiD, this study finds that after titling, the national identity increases. In the language of the original results, with higher proportion of titled groups, there comes with higher indigenous identification.</p>

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Way in which identity-based variables are conceptualized / measured? Are they exogenous?	ethnic fractionalization index. Probability of two randomly selected units being of the same race.	Inception of NPC. It's not exogenous.	An indicator variable if the president is of the same ethnicity as a specific region; An indicator variable if the coalition comes from the the region.	Key variable: type of kinship network. Measurement: the sum weighted geographic distance between kins. Not exogenous.			1. Subnational identification; 2. Compliance with the state: birth registration.
How identity variables affect preferences / behaviors? (if at all)		In Brazil, NPC equalizes all ethnic groups legally. In South Africa, NPC maintains the white supremacy. Thus, the Whites in South Africa have the handle to create cohesion.	Identity-based variables reduce the bargaining power of farmers, because they have few alternatives.	Sense of belonging to a large network which is more geographically dispersed makes political elites in favor of a more universal form of institutions and rules.			

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Future research? Concerns?		State weakness creates such a difference at the very beginning?	The types of co-ethnicity matter. Only when the interests of the political leaders are embedded in the network, will co-ethnicity matter and bring benefits.	Following the same logic, if the network where elites embed in is globally dispersed, would they go beyond states and in favor of policies that may hamper state building?			The validity of measurement of outcomes: is birth registration a valid measure of identity?
Scope conditions or universe of cases	1. United States; 2. Democratic states with racial diversity.	1. Brazil v.s. South Africa; 2. States with racial diversity.	African states. The reasoning is arguably applicable to states other than African states.	In theory, all the states. However, some regions may not have states with characteristics as described in this paper, i.e. as China.	All the states	Modern states with high linguistic diversity. Or, in short, modern states.	Subnational units

Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions

Alberto Alesina

We present a model that links heterogeneity of preferences across ethnic groups in a city to the amount and type of public goods the city supplies.

We test the implications of the model with three related data sets: U.S. cities, U.S. metropolitan areas, and U.S. urban counties. Results

show that the shares of spending on productive public goods—education, roads, sewers, and trash pickup—in U.S. cities (metro areas/urban counties) are inversely related to the city's (metro area's/county's) ethnic fragmentation, even after controlling for other socioeconomic and demographic determinants.

We conclude that ethnic conflict is an important determinant of local public finances.

National Political Community and the Politics of Income Taxation in Brazil and South Africa in the Twentieth Century

Evan S. Lieberman

Why was the South African state so much more successful than the Brazilian state in its attempts to collect income taxes during the twentieth century?

Nationally distinctive tax policies and patterns of administration can be explained by examining the impact of contrasting definitions of *national political community*, specified in critical constitutions written around the turn of the century.

The ways in which racial and spatial cleavages were addressed in the 1891 Brazilian Constitution and the 1909 South Africa Act influenced the development of interclass and intraclass relations, which in turn affected the willingness of upper-income groups to accept state demands for income tax payments.

Varied patterns of state development were largely predicated on contested notions of “us” and “them.”

Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa

Kimuli Kasara

It is typically assumed that African leaders enact policies benefiting their ethnoregional groups through patronage.

Crop production and political power are geographically concentrated in many African countries, and this paper exploits this overlap to challenge that conventional wisdom.

Using data on 50 country–crop combinations, it shows that cash crop farmers who are ethnically identified with the head of state face higher taxes. Furthermore, democratic regimes impose lower taxes.

Farmers with few alternatives face higher taxes, as leaders use local intermediaries to exert control over the countryside and prevent support for alternative candidates.

As leaders can better select and monitor intermediaries in their home areas, they can extract more from the majority “at home” than “abroad,” using taxes on regionally—but not individually—targetable cash crops.

Blood Is Thicker Than Water: Elite Kinship Networks and State Building in Imperial China

Yuhua Wang

A long tradition in social science scholarship holds that kinship-based institutions undermine state building.

I argue that kinship networks, when geographically dispersed, crosscut local cleavages and align the incentives of self-interested elites in favor of building a strong state, which generates scale economies in providing protection and justice throughout a large territory.

I evaluate this argument by examining elite preferences related to a state-building reform in eleventh-century China.

I map politicians’ kinship networks using their tomb epitaphs and collect data on their political allegiances from archival materials.

A statistical analysis demonstrates that a politician’s support for state building increases with the geographic size of his kinship network, controlling for individual, family, and regional characteristics.

These findings highlight the importance of elite social structure in facilitating state development and provide a useful counterpoint to Eurocentric state-building theories.

Is Diversity Detrimental? Ethnic Fractionalization, Public Goods Provision, and the Historical Legacies of Stateness

Andreas Wimmer

Existing research has shown that highly diverse countries tend to provide fewer public goods.

This article argues, by contrast, that the relationship is spurious: both contemporary ethnic heterogeneity and low public goods provision reflect legacies of weakly developed state capacity inherited from the past.

Classical theories of state formation are then tested to show that favorable topography and climate, high population densities, and a history of warfare are conducive to state formation.

Using an instrumental variable approach, I show that previous ethnic diversity is not consistently an impediment to the formation of indigenous states and thus to contemporary public goods provision.

Empirically, this article uses three different measures of public goods provision and data on precolonial levels of state formation in Asia and Africa to test these hypotheses.

Threats to Territorial Integrity, National Mass Schooling, and Linguistic Commonality

Keith Darden

Why are some countries more linguistically homogeneous than others?

We posit that the international environment in which a state develops partially determines the extent of its linguistic commonality and national cohesion.

Specifically, the presence of an external threat of territorial conquest or externally supported secession leads governing elites to have stronger incentives to pursue nation-building strategies—often through the cultivation of a common national language via mass schooling.

Comparing cases with similar levels of initial linguistic heterogeneity, state capacity, and development but different international environments, we find that states without external threats were more likely to outsource education and identity construction to missionaries or private groups, or not to invest in assimilation at all—leading to higher ethnic heterogeneity.

By contrast, states facing high external threats invested in nation-building strategies to homogenize their populations.

From Recognition to Integration: Indigenous Autonomy, State Authority, and National Identity in the Philippines

Nina McMurtry

How does the recognition of collective self-governance rights for indigenous communities affect national unity and state consolidation?

In recent decades, many states have recognized such rights, devolving de jure control over land and local governance to indigenous institutions.

Prominent perspectives in the state-building literature suggest that these policies threaten state consolidation by strengthening nonstate authorities at the expense of state authority and subnational identities at the expense of national identity.

Yet few studies have tested these claims.

Leveraging spatial and temporal variation in the granting of communal land titles to indigenous communities in the Philippines, I use difference-in-differences and panel designs to show that titling increases both indigenous self-identification and compliance with the state.

Results from an original survey experiment suggest that recognizing collective self-governance rights can strengthen, rather than weaken, identification with the nation.