

On the Instability of Fractional Reserve Banking*

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Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model to study the (in)stability of the fractional reserve banking system. The model shows that the fractional reserve banking system can endanger stability in that equilibrium is more prone to exhibit endogenous cyclic, chaotic, and stochastic dynamics under lower reserve requirements, although it can increase welfare in the steady-state. Introducing endogenous unsecured credit to the baseline model does not change the main results. This paper also provides empirical evidence that is consistent with the prediction of the model.

JEL Classification Codes: E42, E51, G21

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Motivated partly by a desire to avoid such [excessive] price-level fluctuations and possible Wicksellian price-level indeterminacy, quantity theorists have advocated legal restrictions on private intermediation. ... Thus, for example, Friedman (1959, p. 21) ... has advocated 100 percent reserves against bank liabilities called demand deposit. **Sargent and Wallace (1982)**

1 Introduction

There have been claims that fractional reserve banking is an important cause of boom-bust cycles, based on the notion that banks create excess credit under fractional reserve banking. (e.g., [Fisher, 1935](#); [Von Mises, 1953](#); [Minsky, 1957](#); [Minsky, 1970](#)). For instance, [Fisher \(1935\)](#) views fractional reserve banking as one of several important factors in explaining economic fluctuations. Others believe that this is a primary cause of boom-bust cycles. According to [Von Mises \(1953\)](#), the overexpansion of bank credit as a result of fractional reserve banking is the root cause of business cycles. [Minsky \(1970\)](#) claims that economic booms and structural characteristics of the financial system, such as fractional reserve banking, can result in an economic collapse even when fundamentals remain unchanged.

This idea leads to policy debates on fractional reserve banking. Earlier examples include Peel's Banking Act of 1844 and the Chicago plan of banking reform with a 100% reserve requirement proposed by Irving Fisher, Paul Douglas, and others in 1939. Later, [Friedman \(1959\)](#) supported this banking reform, whereas [Becker \(1956\)](#) took the opposite position of supporting free banking with 0% reserve requirement.¹ Recently in 2018, Switzerland had a referendum of 100% reserve banking, which was rejected by 75.72% of the voters. The referendum was aiming for making money safe from crisis by constructing full-reserve banking.² Whereas the debate on whether a fractional reserve banking system is inherently unstable has been an important policy discussion from a long time ago, the debate has never stopped.

This paper examines the instability of fractional banking by answering the following

¹[Sargent \(2011\)](#) provides a novel review of the historical debates between narrow banking and free banking as tensions between stability versus efficiency.

²The official title of the referendum was *the Swiss federal popular initiative "for crisis-safe money: money creation by the National Bank only! (Sovereign Money Initiative)"* and also titled as *"debt-free money."*

questions: (i) Can fractional reserve banking be inherently volatile even if we shut down the stochastic component of the economy? (ii) If so, under what condition can fractional reserve banking generate endogenous cycles without the presence of exogenous shocks and changes in fundamentals? To assess the claim that fractional reserve banking causes business cycles, this paper constructs a model of money and banking that captures the role of fractional reserve banking.

In the model, each agent faces an idiosyncratic liquidity shock. Banks accept deposits and extend loans to provide risk-sharing among the depositors whereas the bank's lending is constrained by the reserve requirement. The real balance of money is determined by two factors: storage value and liquidity premium. Today's storage value is increasing in the future value of money. However, the liquidity premium, the marginal value of its liquidity function, is decreasing if the money becomes more abundant. When the liquidity premium dominates the storage value, the economy can exhibit endogenous fluctuations. Fractional reserve banking amplifies the liquidity premium because it allows the bank to create inside money through lending. Due to this amplified liquidity premium, the fractional reserve banking system is more prone to endogenous cycles.

In the baseline model, lowering the reserve requirement increases welfare in the steady state. However, lowering the reserve requirements can induce two-period cycles as well as three-period cycles, which implies the existence of periodic cycles of all order and chaotic dynamics. This also implies it can induce sunspot cycles. This result holds in the extended model with unsecured credit. The model also can deliver a self-fulfilling bubble burst. It is worth noting that the full reserve requirement does not necessarily exclude the possibility of endogenous cycles. However, the economy will be more susceptible to cycles with lower reserve requirement.³

This paper departs from previous works in two ways. First, in contrast to the previous works on banking instability, which mostly focus on bank runs following the seminal model by [Diamond and Dybvig \(1983\)](#), this work focuses on the volatility of real balances of inside money. It is another important focal point of banking instability because recurring boom-bust cycles associated with banking may be more prevalent than bank runs. Second, the approach here differs from a traditional approach to economic fluctuations with financial frictions. To understand economic fluctuations, there are two major points of view. The first one is that economic fluctuations are

³[Gu, Monnet, Nosal and Wright \(2019\)](#) show that introducing banks to the economy could induce instability in various settings which is in line with this result.

driven by exogenous shocks disturbing the dynamic system, and the effects of exogenous shocks shrink over time as the system goes back to its balanced path or steady-state. The second one is that they instead reflect an endogenous mechanism that produces boom-bust cycles. While there has been a lot of work on the role of financial friction in the business cycles including [Kiyotaki and Moore \(1997\)](#), [Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist \(1999\)](#), and [Gertler and Karadi \(2011\)](#), most of them focused on the first approach, in which all economic fluctuations are caused by exogenous shocks and the financial sectors only serve as an amplifier. This paper, however, takes the second approach and focuses on whether the endogenous cycles arise in the absence of the stochastic component of the economy.

To evaluate the main prediction from the theory that fractional reserve banking induces excess volatility, I test the association between the required reserves ratio and real inside money volatility using cointegrating regression. A significant negative relationship between the two variables are found, and the results are robust to different measures of inflation and different frequency of time series. Both theoretical and empirical evidence indicate a link between the reserve requirement and the (in)stability.

Related Literature This paper builds on [Berentsen, Camera and Waller \(2007\)](#), who introduce financial intermediaries with enforcement technology to the [Lagos and Wright \(2005\)](#) framework. The approach to introduce unsecured credit to the monetary economy is related to [Lotz and Zhang \(2016\)](#) and [Gu, Mattesini and Wright \(2016\)](#) which are based on the earlier work by [Kehoe and Levine \(1993\)](#).

This paper is related to the large literature on fractional reserve banking. [Freeman and Huffman \(1991\)](#) and [Freeman and Kydland \(2000\)](#) develop general equilibrium models that explicitly capture the role of fractional reserve banking. Using those models, they explain the observed relationships between key macroeconomic variables over business cycles. [Chari and Phelan \(2014\)](#) study the condition under which fractional reserve banking can be socially useful by preventing bank runs in the cash-in-advance framework. For the recent study, [Andolfatto, Berentsen and Martin \(2020\)](#) integrate [Diamond \(1997\)](#) into [Lagos and Wright \(2005\)](#) and provide a model in which fractional reserve banking emerges endogenously and a central bank can prevent bank panic as a lender of last resort. Whereas many previous works on instability focus on bank runs, this paper studies a different type of instability in the sense that fractional reserve banking induces endogenous monetary cycles.

This paper is also related to the large literature on endogenous fluctuations, chaotic dynamics, and indeterminacy that have been surveyed by [Brock \(1988\)](#), [Baumol and Benhabib \(1989\)](#), [Boldrin and Woodford \(1990\)](#), [Scheinkman and Woodford \(1994\)](#) and [Benhabib and Farmer \(1999\)](#). For a model of bilateral trade, [Gu, Mattesini, Monnet and Wright \(2013\)](#) show that credit markets can be susceptible to endogenous fluctuations due to limited commitment. [Gu et al. \(2019\)](#) show that introducing financial intermediaries to an economy can engender instability in four distinct setups that capture various functions of banking. The model in this paper is closely related to [Gu et al. \(2019\)](#), whereas the model here is extended to incorporate fractional reserve banking.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the baseline search-theoretic monetary model. Section 3 provides main results. Section 4 introduces unsecured credit. Section 5 discusses the empirical evaluation of the model. Section 6 concludes.

2 Model

The model is based on [Lagos and Wright \(2005\)](#) with a financial intermediary as in [Berentsen et al. \(2007\)](#). Time is discrete and infinite. In each period, three markets convene sequentially. First, a centralized financial market (FM), followed by a decentralized goods market (DM), and finally a centralized goods market (CM). The FM and CM are frictionless. The DM is subject to search frictions, anonymity, and limited commitment. Therefore, a medium of exchange is needed to execute trades.

There is a continuum of agents who produce and consume perishable goods. At the beginning of the FM, a preference shock is realized: With probability σ , an agent will be a buyer in the following DM and with probability $1 - \sigma$, she will be a seller. Agents discount their utility each period by β . Within-period utility is represented by

$$\mathcal{U} = U(X) - H + u(q) - c(q),$$

where X is the CM consumption, H is the CM disutility from production, and q is the DM consumption. As standard $U', u', c' > 0$, $U'', u'' < 0$, $c'' \geq 0$, and $u(0) = c(0) = 0$. One unit of H produces one unit of X in the CM. The efficient consumption in CM and DM is X^* and q^* that solve $U'(X^*) = 1$ and $u'(q^*) = c'(q^*)$, respectively.

A representative bank accepts deposits and lends loans. The banking market is perfectly competitive. The bank can enforce the repayment of loans at no cost. Last,

there is a central bank that controls the money supply M_t . Let γ be the growth rate of the money stock. Changes in money supply are accomplished by lump-sum transfer if $\gamma > 0$ and by lump-sum tax if $\gamma < 0$.

2.1 Agent's Problem

Let W_t , G_t , and V_t denote the agent's value function in the CM, FM, and DM, respectively, in period t . There are two payment instruments for the DM transaction: fiat money (outside money) and loans from the bank (inside money). I will allow the agents to use unsecured credit as a means of payment in the next section. An agent entering the CM with nominal balance m_t , deposit d_t , and loan ℓ_t , solves the following problem:

$$\begin{aligned} W_t(m_t, d_t, \ell_t) &= \max_{X_t, H_t, \hat{m}_{t+1}} U(X_t) - H_t + \beta G_{t+1}(\hat{m}_{t+1}) \\ \text{s.t. } \phi_t \hat{m}_{t+1} + X_t &= H_t + T_t + \phi_t m_t + (1 + i_{d,t}) \phi_t d_t - (1 + i_{l,t}) \phi_t \ell_t, \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where T_t is the lump-sum transfer (or tax if it is negative), $i_{d,t}$ is the deposit interest rate, $i_{l,t}$ is the loan interest rate, ϕ is the price of money in units of the CM goods, and \hat{m}_{t+1} is the money balance carried to the FM where a bank takes deposits and makes loans. The first-order conditions (FOCs) are $U'(X_t) = 1$ and

$$\phi_t = \beta G'_{t+1}(\hat{m}_{t+1}), \quad (2)$$

where $G'_{t+1}(\hat{m}_{t+1})$ is the marginal value of an additional unit of money taken into the FM of period $t + 1$. The envelope conditions are

$$\frac{\partial W_t}{\partial m_t} = \phi_t, \quad \frac{\partial W_t}{\partial d_t} = \phi_t(1 + i_{d,t}), \quad \frac{\partial W_t}{\partial \ell_t} = -\phi_t(1 + i_{l,t}),$$

implying W_t is linear in m_t , d_t , and ℓ_t .

The value function of an agent at the beginning of FM is

$$G_t(m) = \sigma G_{b,t}(m) + (1 - \sigma) G_{s,t}(m), \quad (3)$$

where $G_{j \in \{b,s\},t}$ is the value function of type j agent in the FM. Agents choose their deposit balance d_j and loan ℓ_j based on the realization of their types in the following

DM. The value function $G_{j,t}$ can be written as

$$G_{j,t}(m) = \max_{d_{j,t}, \ell_{j,t}} V_{j,t}(m - d_{j,t} + \ell_{j,t}, d_{j,t}, \ell_{j,t}) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad d_{j,t} \leq m, \quad (4)$$

where $V_{j,t}$ is value function of type j agent in the DM. The FOCs are

$$\frac{\partial V_{j,t}}{\partial \ell_{j,t}} \leq 0 \quad (5)$$

$$\frac{\partial V_{j,t}}{\partial d_{j,t}} - \lambda_d \leq 0 \quad (6)$$

where λ_d is the Lagrange multiplier for $d_{j,t} \leq m$.

The terms of trade in the DM are determined by an abstract mechanism that is studied in [Gu and Wright \(2016\)](#). The buyer must pay $p = v(q)$ to the seller to get q . As shown in [Gu and Wright \(2016\)](#), the bilateral trade satisfies the following

$$p = \begin{cases} z & \text{if } z < p^* \\ p^* & \text{if } z \geq p^* \end{cases} \quad q = \begin{cases} v^{-1}(z) & \text{if } z < p^* \\ q^* & \text{if } z \geq p^* \end{cases}, \quad (7)$$

where $v(q)$ is some payment function satisfying $v'(q) > 0$ and $v(0) = 0$, p^* is the payment required to get efficient consumption q^* , and z is the total liquidity, $\phi(m - d + \ell)$, held by the buyer. Many standard mechanisms, such as Kalai and generalized Nash bargaining, are consistent with this specification.

With probability α , a buyer meets a seller in the DM while a seller meets a buyer with probability α_s . Since the CM value function is linear, the DM value function for the buyer can be written as

$$V_{b,t}(m_t - d_{b,t} + \ell_{b,t}, d_{b,t}, \ell_{b,t}) = \alpha[u(q_t) - p_t] + W(m_t - d_{b,t} + \ell_{b,t}, d_{b,t}, \ell_{b,t}),$$

where $p_t \leq \phi_t(m_t - d_{b,t} + \ell_{b,t})$. Assuming interior solution, differentiating $V_{b,t}$ yields

$$\frac{\partial V_{b,t}}{\partial m} = \phi_t[\alpha\lambda(q_t) + 1], \quad \frac{\partial V_{b,t}}{\partial d} = \phi_t[-\alpha\lambda(q_t) + i_{d,t}], \quad \frac{\partial V_{b,t}}{\partial \ell} = \phi_t[\alpha\lambda(q_t) - i_{\ell,t}],$$

where $\lambda(q) = u'(q)/v'(q) - 1$ if $p^* > z$ and $\lambda(q) = 0$ if $z \geq p^*$. Combining the buyer's FOCs in the FM and the derivatives of V_b yields

$$\partial G_b / \partial d_b = \phi i_d - \phi \alpha \lambda(q) - \lambda_d \leq 0, = 0 \text{ iff } d_b > 0 \quad (8)$$

$$\partial G_b / \partial \ell_b = -\phi i_l + \phi \alpha \lambda(q) \leq 0, = 0 \text{ iff } \ell_b > 0. \quad (9)$$

A seller's DM value function is

$$V_{s,t}(m_t - d_{s,t} + \ell_{s,t}, d_{s,t}, \ell_{s,t}) = \alpha_s[p_t - c(q_t)] + W_t(m_t - d_{s,t} + \ell_{s,t}, d_{s,t}, \ell_{s,t}).$$

Differentiating $V_{s,t}$ yields

$$\frac{\partial V_{s,t}}{\partial m_t} = \phi_t, \quad \frac{\partial V_{s,t}}{\partial d_t} = \phi_t i_{d,t}, \quad \frac{\partial V_{s,t}}{\partial \ell_t} = -\phi_t i_{l,t}.$$

Similar to the buyer's case, combining the seller's FOCs in the FM and the first-order derivatives of V_s yields

$$\partial G_s / \partial d_s = \phi_t i_d - \lambda_d \leq 0, = 0 \text{ iff } d_s > 0 \quad (10)$$

$$\partial G_s / \partial \ell_s = -\phi_t i_l \leq 0, = 0 \text{ iff } \ell_s > 0. \quad (11)$$

2.2 Bank's Problem

A representative bank accepts deposits d and makes loans ℓ . The depositors are paid with a nominal interest rate i_d by the bank, and the borrowers need to repay their borrowing with a nominal interest rate i_l . The central bank sets reserve requirement χ . The representative bank solves the following profit maximization problem.

$$\max_{d, \ell} (i_l \ell - i_d d) \quad s.t. \quad \chi \ell \leq d \quad (12)$$

The FOCs for the bank's problem are

$$0 = i_l - \lambda_L \quad (13)$$

$$0 = -i_d + \lambda_L / \chi, \quad (14)$$

where λ_L is the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the bank's lending constraint. For $\lambda_L > 0$, we have

$$i_l = \chi i_d \quad (15)$$

while $\lambda_L = 0$ implies $i_d = i_l = 0$. Given the bank's problem and the agent's problem, we can define an equilibrium as follows:

Definition 1. Given (γ, χ) , an equilibrium consists of sequences of prices $\{\phi_t, i_{l,t}, i_{d,t}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, real balances $\{m_t, \ell_{b,t}, \ell_{s,t}, d_{b,t}, d_{s,t}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, and allocations $\{q_t, X_t, \ell_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ satisfying the following:

- Agents solve CM and FM problems: (1) and (4)
- A representative bank solves its profit maximization problem: (12)
- Markets clear in every period:
 1. Deposit Market: $\sigma d_{b,t} + (1 - \sigma) d_{s,t} = d_t$
 2. Loan Market: $\sigma \ell_{b,t} + (1 - \sigma) \ell_{s,t} = \ell_t$
 3. Money Market: $m_t = M_t$

The next step is to characterize the equilibrium. In the equilibrium, buyers do not deposit and sellers always deposit. Buyers always borrow loan from the bank but sellers do not. For $m > 0$ and $\lambda_d > 0$, we have $\partial G_b / \partial d_b < \partial G_s / \partial d_s = 0$ and $\partial G_s / \partial \ell_s < \partial G_b / \partial \ell_b = 0$ because

$$0 = \overbrace{i_d - \lambda_d / \phi}^{\frac{\partial G_s}{\partial d_s}} > \overbrace{i_d - \lambda_d / \phi - \alpha \lambda(q)}^{\frac{\partial G_b}{\partial d_b}} \quad (16)$$

$$0 = \underbrace{-\phi i_l + \phi \alpha \lambda(q)}_{\frac{\partial G_b}{\partial \ell_b}} > \underbrace{-\phi i_l}_{\frac{\partial G_s}{\partial \ell_s}} \quad (17)$$

implying $i_l = \alpha \lambda(q)$, $d_s = m$, $d_b = 0$, and $\ell_s = 0$. With binding bank's lending constraint, the equilibrium lending satisfies $\ell = (1 - \sigma)m / \chi$ and $\ell_b = (1 - \sigma)m / (\sigma \chi)$.

Using above results, We can rewrite value functions in the FM as follows:

$$G_b(m) = \alpha[u(q) - p] + W(m + \ell_b, 0, \ell_b) \quad (18)$$

$$G_s(m) = \alpha_s[p - c(q)] + W(m - d_s, d_s, 0) \quad (19)$$

where $q = v^{-1}(p)$ and $p = \min\{p^*, \phi(m + \ell_b)\}$. Take derivative of $G_{j,t}(m)$ with respect to m to get

$$G'_{b,t}(m) = \phi_t - \phi_t i_{l,t} \frac{1 - \sigma}{\sigma \chi} + \phi_t \frac{1 - \sigma + \sigma \chi}{\sigma \chi} \alpha \lambda(q_t) \quad (20)$$

$$G'_{s,t}(m) = \phi_t + \phi_t i_{d,t} \quad (21)$$

for $j \in \{b, s\}$. Since $G'_t(m_t) = \sigma G'_{b,t}(m_t) + (1 - \sigma)G'_{s,t}(m_t)$, we have the following expression:

$$G'_t(m_t) = \phi_t \frac{1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi}{\chi} \alpha \lambda(q_t) + \phi_t + \phi_t(1 - \sigma) \left(i_{d,t} - \frac{i_{l,t}}{\chi} \right).$$

Using (15) and the FOCs of buyers' and sellers' decision yields

$$G'_t(m_t) = \phi_t \left[\frac{1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi}{\chi} \alpha \lambda(q_t) + 1 \right]. \quad (22)$$

Combine equations (2) and (22), and use equilibrium condition $m_{t+1} = M_{t+1}$ to get

$$\phi_t = \begin{cases} \phi_{t+1} \beta \left[\frac{1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi}{\chi} \alpha \lambda \circ v^{-1}(z_{t+1}) + 1 \right] & \text{if } z_{t+1} < p^* \\ \phi_{t+1} \beta & \text{if } z_{t+1} \geq p^*, \end{cases} \quad (23)$$

where $z_{t+1} = \phi_{t+1} M_{t+1} (1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi) / \sigma\chi$. Here, z_{t+1} is buyer's available liquidity for the DM trade which is a sum of the buyer's money holding and the loan from the bank. Then multiplying both sides of (23) by $M_t (1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi) / \sigma\chi$ allows us to reduce the equilibrium condition to one difference equation of real balances z :

$$z_t = f(z_{t+1}) \equiv \frac{z_{t+1}}{1+i} \left[\frac{1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi}{\chi} \alpha L(z_{t+1}) + 1 \right], \quad (24)$$

where $(1+i) \equiv \gamma/\beta$ and $L(z) \equiv \lambda \circ v^{-1}(z)$ is the liquidity premium.⁴

3 Results

This section establishes key results on the instability of banking. Consider a stationary equilibrium, which is a fixed point that satisfies $z = f(z)$. There always exists a non-monetary equilibrium with $z = 0$. Given $i \in [0, \bar{i})$ and $\chi \in (0, 1]$, where $\bar{i} = \alpha(1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi)L(0)/\chi$,⁵ an unique stationary monetary equilibrium exists and satisfies

$$\chi i = (1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi) \alpha L(z_s).$$

⁴In the stationary equilibrium, $i = \gamma/\beta - 1$ is the nominal interest rate.

⁵Nash and Kalai bargaining provides simple examples for \bar{i} . Under the Inada condition $u'(0) = \infty$, with Kalai, $\bar{i} = \theta \alpha (1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi) / \chi (1 - \theta)$; whereas with Nash bargaining, $\bar{i} = \infty$.




Figure 1: A Two-period Cycle under Fractional Reserve Banking

Since $L'(z) < 0$ (see [Gu and Wright, 2016](#)), the following result holds:

Proposition 1. *In the stationary equilibrium, lowering the nominal interest rate or lowering reserve requirement increases DM consumption.*

The dynamics of monetary equilibrium is characterized by equation (24). We can derive the condition that equation (24) exhibits a two-period cycle that satisfy $z_1 < z_s \leq p^* < z_2$.

Proposition 2 (Two-period Monetary Cycle). *There exists a two-period cycle with $z_1 < z_s \leq p^* < z_2$ if $\chi \in (0, \bar{\chi}_m)$, where*

$$\bar{\chi}_m \equiv \frac{(1 - \sigma)\alpha L\left(\frac{p^*}{1+i}\right)}{(1+i)^2 - 1 - \sigma\alpha L\left(\frac{p^*}{1+i}\right)}.$$

Proposition 2 shows that lowering the reserve requirement can induce a two-period endogenous cycle under the general trading mechanism. However, in general, a two period cycle with $z_1 < z_s < z_2$, could be either $z_2 > p^*$ or $z_2 < p^*$. Following the standard textbook method (see [Azariadis, 1993](#)), we can show that if $f'(z_s) < -1$, there exists a two-period cycle with $z_1 < z_s < z_2$. Consider a special case where $-qu''(q)/u'(q) = \eta$, $c(q) = q$ and the buyer makes take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) offer. The following proposition says that there exists a two-period cycle if χ is low.

Proposition 3. *Assume $-qu''(q)/u'(q) = \eta$ and $c(q) = q$. If $\chi \in (0, \chi_m)$, where*

$$\chi_m \equiv \frac{\alpha\eta(1 - \sigma)}{\eta(1 - \alpha\sigma) + (2 - \eta)(1 + i)}, \quad (25)$$




Figure 2: A Three-period Cycle under Fractional Reserve Banking

then $f'(z_s) < -1$.

Proof. See Appendix A. ■

Whereas condition (25) is written in terms of χ , this condition can be written in terms of i , as follows:

$$0 < i < \frac{\eta[\alpha(1 - \sigma) - \chi(1 - \alpha\sigma)]}{\chi(2 - \eta)} \quad (26)$$

which implies that if $\eta < 2$, lowering either χ or i can induce a cycle. The role of i on cycles depends on η . If $\eta \geq 2/(\alpha\sigma)$, χ_m is negative for all i , implying the cycle does not exist. If $2/(\alpha\sigma) > \eta > 2$, χ_m is negative when $i > \frac{\eta\alpha\sigma-2}{2-\eta}$ and positive when $i < \frac{\eta\alpha\sigma-2}{2-\eta}$. In this case, setting i higher than $\frac{\eta\alpha\sigma-2}{2-\eta}$ eliminates cyclic equilibria. When $\eta = 2$, χ_m is constant, implying that the i has no effect on the cycle in this case.

To interpret the results, recall $f(z_{t+1})$ from equation (24). The first term, $z_{t+1}/(1+i)$ on the right-hand side, reflects the store of value, which is monotonically increasing in z_{t+1} . The second term $(1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi)\alpha L(z_{t+1})/\chi + 1$, reflecting the liquidity premium, is decreasing in z_{t+1} . Because $f'(z_{t+1})$ depends on both terms, $f(z_{t+1})$ is nonmonotone in general. If the liquidity premium dominates the storage value, we can have $f'(\cdot) < -1$, which is a standard condition for the existence of cyclic equilibria. Lowering the reserve requirement amplifies the liquidity premium because it allows the bank to create more liquidity through lending. This amplification of liquidity generates endogenous cycles.

In addition to the condition for two-period cycles, the next result provides the condition for three-period cycles under the general trading mechanism. The existence of three period-cycles implies cycles of all orders as well as chaotic dynamics (see Sharkovskii, 1964 and Li and Yorke, 1975).

Proposition 4 (Three-period Monetary Cycle and Chaos). *A three-period cycle with $z_1 < z_2 < p^* < z_3$ does not exist. There exists a three-period cycle with $z_1 < p^* < z_2 < z_3$ if $\chi \in (0, \hat{\chi}_m)$, where*

$$\hat{\chi}_m \equiv \frac{(1 - \sigma)\alpha L \left(\frac{p^*}{1+i} \right)}{(1+i)^3 - 1 - \sigma\alpha L \left(\frac{p^*}{1+i} \right)}.$$

Proof. See Appendix A. ■

In any periodic cycle, the liquidity constraint binds, $z_t < p^*$, at some point over the cycle.

Corollary 1 (Binding Liquidity Constraint). *In any n -period cycle, the liquidity constraint binds, $z_t < p^*$, at least one periodic point over the cycle.*

Proof. See Appendix A. ■

The model can also generate sunspot cycles. Consider a Markov sunspot variable $S_t \in \{1, 2\}$. This sunspot variable is not related to fundamentals but may affect equilibrium. Let $\Pr(S_{t+1} = 1|S_t = 1) = \zeta_1$ and $\Pr(S_{t+1} = 2|S_t = 2) = \zeta_2$. The sunspot is realized in the FM. Let W_t^S be the CM value function in state S in period t , then

$$\begin{aligned} W_t^S(m_t, d_t, \ell_t) &= \max_{X_t, H_t, \hat{m}_{t+1}} U(X_t) - H_t + \beta [\zeta_s G_{t+1}^S(\hat{m}_{t+1}) + (1 - \zeta_s) G_{t+1}^{-S}(\hat{m}_{t+1})] \\ \text{s.t. } \phi_t^S \hat{m}_{t+1} + X_t &= H_t + T_t + \phi_t^S m_t + (1 + i_{d,t}) \phi_t^S d_t - (1 + i_{l,t}) \phi_t^S \ell_t. \end{aligned}$$

The FOC can be written as

$$-\phi_t^S + \beta \zeta_s G_{t+1}'^S(\hat{m}_{t+1}) + \beta(1 - \zeta_s) G_{t+1}'^{-S}(\hat{m}_{t+1}) = 0. \quad (27)$$

Solving the FM problem results in

$$G_{t+1}'^S(m_{t+1}^S) = \phi_{t+1}^S \left[\frac{1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi}{\chi} \alpha L(z_{t+1}^S) + 1 \right]. \quad (28)$$

We substitute (28) into (27) and multiply the both sides by $(1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi)M_{t+1}/(\sigma\chi)$ to




Figure 3: Self-Fulfilling Bubble and Burst Equilibria

get

$$\begin{aligned}
 z_t^S &= \frac{\zeta_s z_{t+1}^S}{1+i} \left[\frac{1-\sigma+\sigma\chi}{\chi} \alpha L(z_{t+1}^S) + 1 \right] + \frac{(1-\zeta_s) z_{t+1}^{-S}}{1+i} \left[\frac{1-\sigma+\sigma\chi}{\chi} \alpha L(z_{t+1}^{-S}) + 1 \right] \\
 &= \zeta_s f(z_{t+1}^S) + (1-\zeta_s) f(z_{t+1}^{-S})
 \end{aligned} \tag{29}$$

where $z_t^S = (1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)\phi_t^S m_t/(\sigma\chi)$. We define a sunspot equilibrium as follows:

Definition 2 (Proper Sunspot Equilibrium). *A proper sunspot equilibrium consists of the sequences of real balances $\{z_t^S\}_{t=0, S=1,2}^\infty$ and probabilities (ζ_1, ζ_2) , solving (29) for all t .*

Consider stationary sunspot equilibria with $z^1 < z^2$ that only depend on the state, not the time. The liquidity constraint is binding in state $S = 1$. By the standard approach (see again [Azariadis, 1993](#) for the textbook treatment), the condition for two-period cycles is also sufficient and necessary condition for two-state sunspot equilibrium. If $f'(z_s) < -1$, there exists $(\zeta_1, \zeta_2) \in (0, 1)^2$, $\zeta_1 + \zeta_2 < 1$, such that the economy has a proper sunspot equilibrium in the neighborhood of z_s .

In addition to deterministic and stochastic cycles, the model also features the equilibria where real balance increases above the steady-state until certain time, T , and crashes to zero. Consider a sequence of real balance $\{z_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ with $z_T \equiv \max\{z_t\}_{t=0}^\infty > z_s$ (bubble) that crashes to 0 (burst) as $t \rightarrow \infty$, where $T \geq 1$ and $z_T > z_0$. We refer to this equilibrium as a self-fulfilling bubble and burst equilibria:

Definition 3 (Self-Fulfilling Bubble and Burst Equilibria). *For initial real bal-*

ance $z_0 > 0$, a self-fulfilling bubble and burst is a sequence of $\{z_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ satisfying (24) and $0 < z_s < z_T$, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} z_t = 0$, and $z_T = \max\{z_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ with $T \geq 1$.

The next step is to check under which condition this type of equilibria can occur. When $z_s > \bar{z}$, where \bar{z} solves $f'(\bar{z}) = 0$, there exist multiple equilibria. Then, if $f(\bar{z}) \geq q^*$, the self-fulfilling bubble and burst equilibria exist. Proposition 5 uses some specific functions and a buyer's TIOLI offer and shows lowering the reserve requirement can induce this type of equilibria.

Proposition 5 (Existence of Self-Fulfilling Bubble and Burst Equilibria).

Assume $-qu''(q)/u'(q) = \eta$ and $c(q) = q$. There exist self-fulfilling bubble and burst equilibria, if

$$0 < \chi < \min \left\{ \frac{(1-\sigma)\alpha\eta(1+i)}{(1-\eta)^2q^* + (1+i)[(1-\eta)(3+i-\eta) - \alpha\sigma\eta]}, \frac{\alpha\eta(1-\sigma)}{1+i-\eta(i+\alpha\sigma)} \right\}$$

Proof. See Appendix A. ■

4 Money and Unsecured Credit

Consider an alternative payment instrument in the DM - unsecured credit. The buyer can pay for DM goods using unsecured credit that will be redeemed to the seller in the following CM and she can borrow up to her debt limit, \bar{b}_t . For simplicity, I assume that the buyer makes a TIOLI offer to the seller in the DM, which means the buyer maximizes her surplus subject to the seller's participation constraint. The DM cost function is $c(q) = q$. Suppose the buyer has issued b_t units of unsecured debt in the previous DM. The CM value function is

$$\begin{aligned} W_t(m_t, d_t, \ell_t, -b_t) &= \max_{X_t, H_t, \hat{m}_{t+1}} U(X_t) - H_t + \beta G_{t+1}(\hat{m}_{t+1}) \\ \text{s.t. } \phi_t \hat{m}_{t+1} + X_t &= H_t + T_t + \phi_t m_t + (1 + i_{d,t})\phi_t d_t - (1 + i_{l,t})\phi_t \ell_t - b_t, \end{aligned} \tag{30}$$

which is the same as before except that the agent needs to pay or collect the debt. The agent's FM problem is identical to the previous section. Then, $1 - \sigma$ fraction of agents will deposit \hat{m}_{t+1} , and σ fraction of agents will borrow loan from the bank. The DM value function is

$$V_t^b(m_t + \ell_t, 0, \ell_t) = \alpha[u(q_t) - q_t] + W_t(m_t + \ell_t, 0, \ell_t, 0),$$

where $q_t = \min\{q^*, \bar{b}_t + \phi_t(m_t + \ell_t)\}$. Given \bar{b}_t , solving equilibrium yields

$$z_t = \begin{cases} \frac{z_{t+1}}{1+i} \left\{ \frac{1-\sigma+\sigma\chi}{\chi} \alpha [u'(z_{t+1} + \bar{b}_{t+1}) - 1] + 1 \right\} & \text{if } z_{t+1} + \bar{b}_{t+1} < q^* \\ \frac{z_{t+1}}{1+i} & \text{if } z_{t+1} + \bar{b}_{t+1} \geq q^*, \end{cases} \quad (31)$$

where $z_{t+1} = (1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi)\phi_{t+1}M_{t+1}/(\sigma\chi)$.

Next, I am going to endogenize the debt limit. The buyer cannot commit to pay back the debt. If the buyer reneges she is captured with probability μ . The punishment for a defaulter is permanent exclusion from the DM trade but she can still produce for herself in the CM. The value of autarky is $\underline{W}(0, 0, 0, 0) = \{U(X^*) - X^* + T\}/(1 - \beta)$. The incentive condition for voluntary repayment is

$$\underbrace{-b_t + W_t(m_t, d_t, \ell_t, 0)}_{\text{value of honoring debts}} \geq \underbrace{(1 - \mu)W_t(m_t, d_t, \ell_t, 0) + \mu\underline{W}(m_t, d_t, \ell_t, 0)}_{\text{value of not honoring debts}}.$$

One can write the debt limit \bar{b}_t as $b_t \leq \bar{b}_t \equiv \mu W_t(0, 0, 0, 0) - \mu\underline{W}(0, 0, 0, 0)$. Recall the CM value function. Using the solution of FM, we can rewrite the buyer's CM value function as

$$\begin{aligned} W_t(0, 0, 0, 0) &= U(X^*) - X^* + T_t + \beta W_{t+1}(0, 0, 0, 0) \\ &\quad + \max_{\hat{m}_{t+1}} \{-\phi_t \hat{m}_{t+1} + \beta \alpha \sigma [u(q_{t+1}) - q_{t+1}] + \beta \phi_{t+1} \hat{m}_{t+1}\}, \end{aligned}$$

where $q_{t+1} = \min\{q^*, z_{t+1} + \bar{b}_{t+1}\}$. In the equilibrium, substituting $W_t(0, 0, 0, 0) = \bar{b}_t/\mu + \underline{W}(0, 0, 0, 0)$ yields

$$\frac{\bar{b}_t}{\mu} = -\phi_t M_{t+1} + \beta \alpha \sigma [u(z_{t+1} + \bar{b}_{t+1}) - z_{t+1} - \bar{b}_{t+1}] + \frac{\beta \bar{b}_{t+1}}{\mu} + \beta \phi_{t+1} M_{t+1},$$

where M_{t+1} and z_{t+1} solve (31). Rearranging terms yields

$$\bar{b}_t = \begin{cases} \beta \bar{b}_{t+1} + \frac{\chi \mu \sigma [-\gamma z_t + \beta z_{t+1}]}{1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi} + \beta \alpha \mu \sigma S(z_{t+1} + \bar{b}_{t+1}) & \text{if } z_{t+1} + \bar{b}_{t+1} < q^* \\ \beta \bar{b}_{t+1} + \frac{\chi \mu \sigma [-\gamma z_t + \beta z_{t+1}]}{1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi} + \beta \alpha \mu \sigma S(q^*) & \text{if } z_{t+1} + \bar{b}_{t+1} \geq q^*, \end{cases} \quad (32)$$

where $S(z_{t+1} + \bar{b}_{t+1}) \equiv [u(z_{t+1} + \bar{b}_{t+1}) - z_{t+1} - \bar{b}_{t+1}]$ is the buyer's trade surplus. The equilibrium can be collapsed into a dynamic system satisfying (31)-(32).

In the stationary equilibrium, (31) becomes

$$-\frac{i\chi}{\alpha(1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)} + u'(q) \leq 0, = \text{ if } z > 0 \quad (33)$$

and (32) becomes

$$(1-\beta)\bar{b} = \begin{cases} \frac{\chi\mu\sigma[\beta-\gamma]z}{1-\sigma+\sigma\chi} + \beta\alpha\mu\sigma[u(z+\bar{b}) - z - \bar{b}] & \text{if } z + \bar{b} < q^* \\ \frac{\chi\mu\sigma[\beta-\gamma]z}{1-\sigma+\sigma\chi} + \beta\alpha\mu\sigma[u(q^*) - q^*] & \text{if } z + \bar{b} \geq q^*, \end{cases} \quad (34)$$

where $q = \min\{z + \bar{b}, q^*\}$. The stationary equilibrium solves above two conditions, and it falls into one of the three cases: the pure money equilibrium, the pure credit equilibrium, and the money-credit equilibrium. First, if no one can capture the buyer after she reneges, $\mu = 0$, the unsecured credit is not feasible, $\bar{b} = 0$. In this case, the equilibrium will be the pure money equilibrium. Second, when \bar{b} solving (34) satisfies $u'(\bar{b}) < i\chi/[\alpha(1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)]$ then money is not valued, $z = 0$. We have the pure credit equilibrium in this case. Third, if solutions of (33)-(34), (z, \bar{b}) are strictly positive then we have the money-credit equilibrium.

The debt limit at the stationary equilibrium, \bar{b} , is a fixed point satisfying $\bar{b} = \Omega(\bar{b})$ where

$$\Omega(\bar{b}) = \begin{cases} \frac{\mu\sigma\alpha}{r}[u(\tilde{q}) - \tilde{q}] - \frac{i\mu\sigma\chi}{r(1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)}[\tilde{q} - \bar{b}] & \text{if } \tilde{q} > \bar{b} \geq 0 \\ \frac{\mu\sigma\alpha}{r}[u(\bar{b}) - \bar{b}] & \text{if } q^* > \bar{b} \geq \tilde{q} \\ \frac{\mu\sigma\alpha}{r}[u(q^*) - q^*] & \text{if } \bar{b} \geq q^* \end{cases} \quad (35)$$

where \tilde{q} solves $u'(\tilde{q}) = 1 + i\chi/[\alpha(1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)]$ and $r \equiv 1/\beta - 1$. The DM consumption q_s is determined by $q_s = \min\{q^*, \max\{\tilde{q}, \bar{b}\}\}$. Money and credit coexist if and only if $0 < \bar{b} < \tilde{q}$, which holds when $0 < \mu < \min\{1, \tilde{\mu}\}$, where

$$\tilde{\mu} \equiv \frac{r(1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)}{\alpha\sigma[u(\tilde{q})/\tilde{q} - 1](1-\sigma+\sigma\chi) - 2i\sigma\chi}.$$

The DM consumption is decreasing in i in the stationary monetary equilibrium.

Consider the dynamics of equilibria where money and credit coexist. I claim the main results from Section 3 - lowering the reserve requirement can induce endogenous




Figure 4: Scatter Plot for Inside Money Volatility and Required Reserve Ratio

cycles - still hold even after unsecured credit is introduced. For compact notation, let $\iota \equiv \max\{i, r\}$ and $w_j \equiv z_j + \bar{b}_j$. The following proposition establishes the conditions for two-period cycles, three-period cycles, and chaotic dynamics.

Proposition 6 (Monetary Cycles with Unsecured Credit). *There exists a two-period cycle of money and credit with $w_1 < q^* < w_2$ if $\chi \in (0, \chi_c)$, where*

$$\chi_c \equiv \frac{(1 - \sigma)\alpha \left[u' \left(\frac{q^*}{1 + \iota} \right) - 1 \right]}{(1 + i)^2 - 1 - \sigma\alpha \left[u' \left(\frac{q^*}{1 + \iota} \right) - 1 \right]}.$$

There exists a three-period cycle of money and credit with $w_1 < q^ < w_2 < w_3$, if $\chi \in (0, \hat{\chi}_c)$, where*

$$\hat{\chi}_c \equiv \frac{(1 - \sigma)\alpha \left[u' \left(\frac{q^*}{1 + \iota} \right) - 1 \right]}{(1 + i)^3 - 1 - \sigma\alpha \left[u' \left(\frac{q^*}{1 + \iota} \right) - 1 \right]}.$$

Proof. See Appendix A. ■

5 Empirical Evaluation: Inside Money Volatility

In the previous sections, the theoretical results show that lowering the required reserve ratio can induce instability. To evaluate the model prediction, I examine whether the required reserve ratio is associated with the cyclical volatility of the real balance of the inside money.

Following [Jaimovich and Siu \(2009\)](#) and [Carvalho and Gabaix \(2013\)](#), I measure the cyclical volatility in quarter t as the standard deviation of a filtered log real total

checkable deposit during a 41-quarter (10-year) window centered around quarter t . Total checkable deposits are from the H.6 Money Stock Measures published by the Federal Reserve Board and converted to real value using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Seasonally adjusted series are used to smooth the seasonal fluctuation. I adopt the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a 1600 smoothing parameter as standard. To construct an annual series, quarterly observations are averaged for each year. The sample period is from 1960:I to 2018:IV so that there are annual series from 1965 to 2013. To check whether the results are sensitive to different measures of the price level, I also use the core CPI, the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE), and the core PCE to transform the total checkable deposit into real value.

The legal reserve requirement for the demand deposits has been 10% since April 2, 1992. However, the Federal Reserve imposes different reserve requirements depending on the size of a bank's liability. These criteria have changed over time. For example, during 1992:Q1-2019:Q4, this changed 27 times. To consider these changes, I divide the required reserves by total checkable deposits to compute the required reserve ratio.

Figure 4 presents a scatter plot of the cyclical volatility of the real inside money balance and the required reserve ratio. Column (1) of Table 1 reports its regression estimates with Newey-West standard errors. The plot and estimates show a negative relationship between the cyclical volatility of the real inside money balance and the required reserve ratio with statistically significant regression coefficients. However, this result can be driven by a spurious regression. Table 2 provides unit root test results for the federal funds rate, the required reserve ratio, and the cyclical volatility of inside money. Both augmented Dickey-Fuller tests and Phillips-Perron tests fail to reject the null hypotheses of unit roots for these series, whereas they reject the null hypotheses of unit roots at their first differences. In addition to that, the Johansen cointegration test in Column (1), suggests that there is no cointegration relationship between two variables. So it is hard to rule out that Column (1)'s results are driven by a spurious regression.

To overcome this issue, I adopt the cointegrating regression with an additional variable, the federal funds rate. Column (2) of Table 1 provides Johansen cointegration test results for the federal funds rate, the required reserves, and the cyclical volatility of inside money. The trace test suggests a cointegration relationship among these three variables, which is consistent with the theoretical result: The instability depends on the reserve requirement and the interest rate. With the cointegration relationship, we

Table 1: Effect of Required Reserve Ratio

Price level	CPI		Core CPI		PCE		Core PCE	
Dependent variable: σ_t^{Roll}	OLS (1)	CCR (2)	OLS (3)	CCR (4)	OLS (5)	CCR (6)	OLS (7)	CCR (8)
χ	-0.283*** (0.027)	-0.245*** (0.002)	-0.267*** (0.027)	-0.221*** (0.003)	-0.306*** (0.029)	-0.227*** (0.004)	-0.307*** (0.027)	-0.220*** (0.005)
ffr		-0.109*** (0.002)		-0.125*** (0.003)		-0.187*** (0.004)		-0.207*** (0.004)
Constant	0.074*** (0.003)	0.074*** (0.000)	0.070*** (0.004)	0.071*** (0.000)	0.074*** (0.004)	0.075*** (0.000)	0.073*** (0.004)	0.073*** (0.000)
Obs.	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
$adj R^2$	0.700	0.621	0.728	0.648	0.740	0.650	0.764	0.665
$\lambda_{trace}(r=0)$	9.807	35.688	9.120	35.145	9.109	35.367	8.593	35.028
5% CV	15.41	29.68	15.41	29.68	15.41	29.68	15.41	29.68
$\lambda_{trace}(r=1)$	3.324	10.682	2.839	10.065	2.723	9.894	2.417	9.345
5% CV	3.76	15.41	3.76	15.41	3.76	15.41	3.76	15.41

Note: For (1), (3), (5) and (7), OLS estimates are reported, and Newey-West standard errors with lag 1 are reported in parentheses. For (2), (4), (6), and (8), first-stage long-run variance estimations for CCR are based on the quadratic spectral kernel and Bayesian information criterion. The bandwidth selection is based on Newey-West fixed lag, $4 \times (T/100)^{2/9}$; χ denotes the required reserve ratio, **ffr** denotes federal funds rates and σ_t^{Roll} denotes the cyclical volatility of real inside money balances. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 2: Unit Root Tests

		Phillips-Perron test		ADF test
		$Z(\rho)$	$Z(t)$	$Z(t)$ w/ lag 1
ffr		-6.766	-1.704	-2.362
χ		-1.492	-1.173	-1.341
σ_t^{Roll}	(CPI)	-4.708	-2.191	-2.090
σ_t^{Roll}	(Core CPI)	-4.681	-2.189	-1.978
σ_t^{Roll}	(PCE)	-4.329	-2.038	-2.047
σ_t^{Roll}	(Core PCE)	-4.076	-1.954	-1.930
$\Delta \mathbf{ffr}$		-28.373***	-5.061***	-6.357***
$\Delta \chi$		-31.818***	-4.802***	-3.693***
$\Delta \sigma_t^{Roll}$	(CPI)	-24.905***	-3.416**	-2.942**
$\Delta \sigma_t^{Roll}$	(Core CPI)	-24.758***	-3.509**	-2.942**
$\Delta \sigma_t^{Roll}$	(PCE)	-23.691***	-3.330**	-2.842*
$\Delta \sigma_t^{Roll}$	(Core PCE)	-22.826***	-3.296**	-2.768*

Note: **ffr** denotes federal funds rates, χ denotes required reserve ratio, and σ_t^{Roll} denotes cyclical volatility of real inside money balances. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

may not have to worry about a spurious relationship. Columns (2) of Table 1 report the estimates for the cointegrating relationship. Because of the potential bias from long-run variance, I estimate a canonical cointegrating regression (CCR) for Column (2) of Table 1. The estimates are statistically significant with a sizeable level and consistent with the prediction from the model.

To check the sensitivity of the results, I redo all the analyses using the core CPI, the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE), and the core PCE to transform the total checkable deposit into real value. Columns (3), (5), and (7) of Table 1 regress required reserve ratio on the inside money volatility and report its Newey-West standard errors. They also report the trace test statistics of Johansen cointegration test between these two variables. The results are consistent with the benchmark case in Column (1). Columns (4), (6), and (8) of Table 1 report CCR estimates regressing the required reserve ratio and federal funds rate on the inside money volatility and the trace test statistics of Johansen cointegration test between these three variables. All the results are consistent with the benchmark case in Column (2).

Appendix B includes more sensitivity analyses: (1) Using quarterly series instead of annual series; (2) Using time series before 2008. All the results are not sensitive with respect to different frequency and time period.

6 Conclusion

The goal of this paper is to examine the (in)stability of fractional reserve banking. To that end, this paper builds a simple monetary model of fractional reserve banking that can capture the conditions for (in)stability under different specifications. Lowering the reserve requirement increases the welfare at the steady state. However, it can induce instability. The baseline model and its extension establish the conditions for endogenous cycles and chaotic dynamics. The model also features stochastic cycles and self-fulfilling boom and burst under explicit conditions. The model shows that fractional reserve banking can endanger stability in the sense that equilibrium is more prone to exhibit cyclic, chaotic, and stochastic dynamics under lower reserve requirements. This is due to the amplified liquidity premium. This result holds in the extended model with unsecured credit.

This paper also provides some empirical evidence that is consistent with the prediction of the model. I test the association between the required reserves ratio and the

real inside money volatility using cointegrating regression. I find a significant negative relationship between the two variables. Both theoretical and empirical evidence find a link between the reserve requirement policy and (in)stability.

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Appendix

Appendix A Proofs

Proof of Proposition 2. Let there exists a three-period cycle satisfying $z_1 < z_s < p^* < z_2$. Since $z_2 > p^*$, we have $z_2 = (1+i)z_1$. Using (24) with $z_1 < p^*$ gives

$$\chi = \frac{(1-\sigma)\alpha L(z_1)}{(1+i)^2 - 1 - \sigma\alpha L(z_1)} \quad (36)$$

This two-period cycle should satisfy $z_1 < z_s < p^*$ and $z_2 = (1+i)z_1 > p^*$. First one can be easily shown using

$$0 = L(p^*) < L(z_s) = \frac{i}{\alpha(1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)}\chi < \frac{(1+i)^2 - 1}{\alpha(1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)}\chi = L(z_1)$$

since we have $L'(\cdot) < 0$. Because $dz_1/d\chi < 0$, the latter one, $z_1 > p^*/(1+i)$, is held when

$$0 < \chi < \frac{(1-\sigma)\alpha L\left(\frac{p^*}{1+i}\right)}{(1+i)^2 - 1 - \sigma\alpha L\left(\frac{p^*}{1+i}\right)}.$$

■

Proof of the Existence of a Two-period Monetary Cycle where $f'(z) < -1$. Let $f^2(z) = f \circ f(z)$. With given the unique steady state, $f(z) > z$ for $z < z_s$ and $f(z) < z$ for $z > z_s$. Because $f(z)$ is linear increasing function for $z > p^*$, there exist a $\tilde{z} > p^*$ s.t $f(\tilde{z}) > p^*$. Since $\tilde{z} > p^*$ and $f(\tilde{z}) < \tilde{z}$, \tilde{z} satisfies $f^2(\tilde{z}) < f(\tilde{z}) < \tilde{z}$. We can write slope of $f^2(z)$ as follows.

$$\frac{\partial f^2(z)}{\partial z} = f'[f(z)]f'(z) = f'(z)f'(z) = [f'(z)]^2$$

which implies $\partial f^2(z)/\partial z > 1$ when $f(z) < -1$. And it is easy to show $\partial f^2(0)/\partial z > 0$. With given $i > 0$ and $\chi > 0$, there exist a (z_1, z_2) , satisfying $0 < z_1 < z_s < z_2$ which are fix points for $f^2(z)$ ■

Proof of Proposition 3. When DM trade is based on take-it-or-leave-it offer from

buyer to seller with $c(q) = q$ and $-qu''(q)/u' = \eta$, f' can be written as

$$f'(q) = \frac{1}{1+i} \left\{ \frac{1-\sigma+\sigma\chi}{\chi} \alpha [u''(q)q + u'(q) - 1] + 1 \right\} < -1$$

Using $u''(q)q = -\eta u'(q)$ gives

$$\frac{1-\sigma+\sigma\chi}{\chi} \alpha [u'(q)(1-\eta) - 1] + 1 < -(1+i)$$

where $u'(q) = 1 + \frac{i\chi}{\alpha(1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)}$. Substituting $u'(q)$ and rearranging terms give

$$0 < \chi < \frac{\alpha\eta(1-\sigma)}{\eta(1-\alpha\sigma) + (2-\eta)(1+i)}$$

■

Proof of Proposition 4. I divide three period cycles into two cases.

Case 1: Let there exists a three-period cycle satisfying $z_1 < z_s < p^* < z_2 < z_3$. Since $z_2, z_3 > p^*$, we have $z_2 = (1+i)z_1$, $z_3 = (1+i)z_2 = (1+i)^2 z_1$. Using (24) with $z_1 < p^*$ gives

$$\chi = \frac{(1-\sigma)\alpha L(z_1)}{(1+i)^3 - 1 - \sigma\alpha L(z_1)} \quad (37)$$

This three-period cycle should satisfy $z_1 < z_s < p^*$ and $z_2 = (1+i)z_1 > p^*$. First one can be easily shown using

$$0 = L(p^*) < L(z_s) = \frac{i}{\alpha(1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)} \chi < \frac{(1+i)^3 - 1}{\alpha(1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)} \chi = L(z_1)$$

since we have $L'(\cdot) < 0$. Because $dz_1/d\chi < 0$, the latter one, $z_1 > p^*/(1+i)$, is held when

$$0 < \chi < \frac{(1-\sigma)\alpha L\left(\frac{p^*}{1+i}\right)}{(1+i)^3 - 1 - \sigma\alpha L\left(\frac{p^*}{1+i}\right)}.$$

Case 2: Let there exists a three-period cycle satisfying $z_1 < z_2 < p^* \leq z_3$. Since $z_3 > p^*$, we have $z_3 = z_2(1+i)$ and (z_2, z_1) solves (38)-(39).

$$z_1 = f(z_2) = \left[\frac{1-\sigma+\sigma\chi}{\chi} \alpha L(z_2) + 1 \right] \frac{z_2}{1+i} \quad (38)$$

$$z_2 \equiv \tilde{f}(z_1) = \left[\frac{1-\sigma+\sigma\chi}{\chi} \alpha L(z_1) + 1 \right] \frac{z_1}{(1+i)^2}. \quad (39)$$




Figure 5: Intersection of $\tilde{f}(z)$ and $f(z)$

These functions satisfies $f(x) > x$ for $x < z_s$, $f(x) < x$ for $x > z_s$, $\tilde{f}(x) > x$ for $x < \tilde{z}$ and $\tilde{f}(x) < x$ for $x > \tilde{z}$ where \tilde{z} solves $\tilde{z} = \tilde{f}(\tilde{z})$. One can easily show $\tilde{z} < z_s$. Therefore any intersection between $z_1 = f(z_2)$ and $z_2 = \tilde{f}(z_1)$ satisfies $z_1 > z_2$ which contradicts to our initial conjecture $z_1 < z_2$. This implies there is no three-period cycles satisfying $z_1 < z_2 < p^* \leq z_3$. Therefore we can conclude that a three-period cycle exist when

$$0 < \chi < \frac{(1 - \sigma)\alpha L \left(\frac{p^*}{1+i} \right)}{(1 + i)^3 - 1 - \sigma\alpha L \left(\frac{p^*}{1+i} \right)}.$$

The existence of a three-cycle implies the existence of cycles of all orders and chaotic dynamics by the Sarkovskii theorem (Sharkovskii, 1964) and the Li-Yorke theorem (Li and Yorke, 1975). ■

Proof of Corollary 1: Let $z_1 < z_2 < \dots z_n$ be the periodic points of a n -cycle. Suppose $z_j > z_s$ for all $j = 1, 2, \dots, n$. By the definition of a n -period cycle, $z_1 = f(z_n) < z_n$ since $f(z) < z$ for $z > z_s$.

$$z_n = f(z_{n-1}) < z_{n-1} = f(z_{n-2}) < z_{n-2} \dots < z_1.$$

which shows the contradiction implying at least one periodic point satisfies $z_t < z_s < p^*$. ■

Proof of Proposition 5. Consider $z_t = f(z_{t+1})$. If $z_s > \bar{z}$ where \bar{z} solves $f'(\bar{z}) = 0$. In this case, there exist multiple equilibria. If $q^* \leq f(\bar{z})$, then there exist equilibria $\{z_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ with $z_T \equiv \max\{z_t\}_{t=0}^\infty > q^*$ (bubble) which crashes to 0 (burst) as $t \rightarrow \infty$,

where $T \geq 1$ and $z_T > z_0$. Then there exist equilibria with bubble-burst as a self-fulfilling crisis. Conditions for this case are shown as below. Similar to Corollary 3, consider take-it-leave-it offer with $-qu''/u' = \eta$ and $c(q) = q$. Then we have following difference equation:

$$z_t = f(z_{t+1}) \begin{cases} \frac{z_{t+1}}{1+i} \left\{ \frac{1-\sigma+\sigma\chi}{\chi} \alpha [u'(z_{t+1}) - 1] + 1 \right\} & \text{if } z_{t+1} < q^* \\ \frac{z_{t+1}}{1+i} & \text{if } z_{t+1} \geq q^* \end{cases} \quad (40)$$

Step 1: [Multiplicity i.e., $z_s > \bar{z}$ where \bar{z} solves $f'(\bar{z}) = 0$] Consider the following condition.

$$f'(\bar{z}) = \frac{1}{1+i} \left\{ \frac{\alpha(1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)}{\chi} [u'(\bar{z})(1-\eta) - 1] + 1 \right\} = 0$$

Since $z_s > \bar{z} \rightarrow u'(z_s) < u'(\bar{z})$, we have

$$u'(z_s) = 1 + \frac{i\chi}{\alpha(1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)} < \frac{1}{1-\eta} \left\{ 1 - \frac{\chi}{\alpha(1-\sigma+\sigma\chi)} \right\} = u'(\bar{z}).$$

This can be reduced as

$$\chi < \frac{\alpha\eta(1-\sigma)}{1+i-\eta(i+\alpha\sigma)}$$

Step 2: [Show $q^* \leq f(\bar{z})$] It is straightforward to show that $q^* < f(\bar{z})$ holds when

$$\chi < \frac{(1-\sigma)\alpha\eta(1+i)}{(1-\eta)^2 q^* + (1+i)[(1-\eta)(3+i-\eta) - \alpha\sigma\eta]}$$

Therefore, when

$$0 < \chi < \min \left\{ \frac{(1-\sigma)\alpha\eta(1+i)}{(1-\eta)^2 q^* + (1+i)[(1-\eta)(3+i-\eta) - \alpha\sigma\eta]}, \frac{\alpha\eta(1-\sigma)}{1+i-\eta(i+\alpha\sigma)} \right\}$$

there exist $\{z_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ satisfying $z_T \equiv \max\{z_t\}_{t=0}^\infty > q^*$ and $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} z_t = 0$, where $T \geq 1$ and $z_T > z_0 > q^*/(1+i)$. ■

Proof of Proposition 6. A two period cycle result is presented and three-period case will follow. Let there exists a two-period cycle satisfying $w_1 < q^* < w_2$ where $w_j = z_j + \bar{b}_j$. Since $w_2 > q^*$, we have $z_2 = (1+i)z_1$ and $\bar{b}_2 = (1+r)\bar{b}_1$ where q_1 , \bar{b}_1 , and z_1

solve

$$u'(q_1) = 1 + \chi \frac{(1+i)^2 - 1}{\alpha(1-\sigma + \sigma\chi)}$$

$$\bar{b}_1 = [(1+r)^2 - 1]^{-1} \left\{ \frac{i\mu\sigma\chi}{1-\sigma + \sigma\chi} \left[1 - \frac{(1+i)^2}{\beta} \right] z_1 + \mu\alpha\sigma[u(q_1) - q_1] \right\}$$

and $z_1 = q_1 - \bar{b}_1$. This two-period cycle should satisfy $q_1 < q^*$ and $w_2 = (1+i)z_1 + (1+r)\bar{b}_1 > q^*$. For given $i > 0$ and $\chi > 0$, first one can be easily shown using

$$1 = u'(q^*) < u'(q_s) = 1 + \frac{i}{\alpha(1-\sigma + \sigma\chi)}\chi < 1 + \frac{(1+i)^2 - 1}{\alpha(1-\sigma + \sigma\chi)}\chi = u'(q_1)$$

since we have $u''(\cdot) < 0$. Now we also can check the latter using the below conditions

$$(1+r)q_1 > (1+i)z_1 + (1+r)\bar{b}_1 = w_2 > q^* > q_1 = z_1 + \bar{b}_1 \quad \text{if } r > i$$

$$(1+i)q_1 > (1+i)z_1 + (1+r)\bar{b}_1 = w_2 > q^* > q_1 = z_1 + \bar{b}_1 \quad \text{if } i > r.$$

The sufficient conditions to have $w_2 > q^*$ is $q_1 > q^*/(1+r)$ for $r > i$ and $q_1 > q^*/(1+i)$ for $i > r$. Since we have $dq_1/d\chi < 0$, there exist a three period cycle $q_1 = w_1 < q_s < q^* < w_2 < w_3$ when

$$0 < \chi < \frac{(1-\sigma)\alpha[u'(\frac{q^*}{1+\iota}) - 1]}{(1+i)^2 - 1 - \sigma\alpha[u'(\frac{q^*}{1+\iota}) - 1]}$$

where $\iota = \max\{i, r\}$. Now, let there exists a three-period cycle satisfying $q_1 = w_1 < q_s < q^* < w_2 < w_3$ where $w_j = z_j + \bar{b}_j$. Since $w_3, w_2 > q^*$, we have $z_2 = (1+i)z_1$, $z_3 = (1+i)^2 z_1$, $\bar{b}_2 = (1+r)\bar{b}_1$ and $\bar{b}_3 = (1+r)^2 \bar{b}_1$ where q_1, \bar{b}_1 , and z_1 solve

$$u'(q_1) = 1 + \chi \frac{(1+i)^3 - 1}{\alpha(1-\sigma + \sigma\chi)}$$

$$\bar{b}_1 = [(1+r)^3 - 1]^{-1} \left\{ \frac{i\mu\sigma\chi}{1-\sigma + \sigma\chi} \left[1 - \frac{(1+i)^2}{\beta} \right] z_1 + \mu\alpha\sigma[u(q_1) - q_1] \right\}$$

and $z_1 = q_1 - \bar{b}_1$. This three-period cycle should satisfy $q_1 < q_s < q^*$ and $w_2 = (1+i)z_1 + (1+r)\bar{b}_1 > q^*$. For given $i > 0$ and $\chi > 0$, first one can be easily shown

using

$$1 = u'(q^*) < u'(q_s) = 1 + \frac{i}{\alpha(1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi)}\chi < 1 + \frac{(1+i)^3 - 1}{\alpha(1 - \sigma + \sigma\chi)}\chi = u'(q_1)$$

since we have $u''(\cdot) < 0$. Now we also can check the latter using below conditions

$$\begin{aligned} (1+r)q_1 &> (1+i)z_1 + (1+r)\bar{b}_1 = w_2 > q^* > q_1 = z_1 + \bar{b}_1 & \text{if } r > i \\ (1+i)q_1 &> (1+i)z_1 + (1+r)\bar{b}_1 = w_2 > q^* > q_1 = z_1 + \bar{b}_1 & \text{if } i > r. \end{aligned}$$

The sufficient conditions to have $w_2 > q^*$ is $q_1 > q^*/(1+r)$ for $r > i$ and $q_1 > q^*/(1+i)$ for $i > r$. Since we have $dq_1/d\chi < 0$, there exist a three period cycle $q_1 = w_1 < q_s < q^* < w_2 < w_3$ when

$$0 < \chi < \frac{(1-\sigma)\alpha[u'(\frac{q^*}{1+\iota}) - 1]}{(1+i)^3 - 1 - \sigma\alpha[u'(\frac{q^*}{1+\iota}) - 1]}$$

where $\iota = \max\{i, r\}$. Again, the existence of a three-cycle implies the existence of cycles of all orders and chaotic dynamics by the Sarkovskii theorem and the Li-Yorke theorem. ■

Appendix B Empirical Appendix

This section provides robustness checks for empirical results. To check the sensitivity of the results, the following results repeat all the empirical analysis using quarterly series instead of annual data. This section also provides robustness checks using time-series before 2008.

Table 3: Effect of Required Reserve Ratio:Robustness Check (Quarterly)

Price level	CPI		Core CPI		PCE		Core PCE	
Dependent variable: σ_t^{Roll}	OLS (1)	CCR (2)	OLS (3)	CCR (4)	OLS (5)	CCR (6)	OLS (7)	CCR (8)
χ	-0.282*** (0.016)	-0.452*** (0.001)	-0.266*** (0.014)	-0.400*** (0.003)	-0.305*** (0.015)	-0.485*** (0.000)	-0.306*** (0.014)	-0.476*** (0.006)
ffr		-0.050*** (0.000)		-0.058*** (0.002)		-0.015*** (0.000)		-0.047*** (0.005)
Constant	0.074*** (0.002)	0.085*** (0.000)	0.070*** (0.002)	0.079*** (0.000)	0.074*** (0.002)	0.089*** (0.000)	0.073*** (0.002)	0.086*** (0.001)
Obs.	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	196
$adjR^2$	0.696	0.240	0.725	0.263	0.737	0.222	0.761	0.268
$\lambda_{trace}(r=0)$	9.496	31.950	11.045	33.808	10.930	34.481	12.103	35.951
5% CV	15.41	29.68	15.41	29.68	15.41	29.68	15.41	29.68
$\lambda_{trace}(r=1)$	1.677	11.162	1.959	12.266	1.938	12.094	1.887	12.485
5% CV	3.76	15.41	3.76	15.41	3.76	15.41	3.76	15.41

Note: For (1), OLS estimates are reported, and Newey-West standard errors with lag 1 are reported in parentheses. For (2) and (3), first-stage long-run variance estimations for CCR are based on the quadratic spectral kernel and Bayesian information criterion. The bandwidth selection is based on Newey-West fixed lag, $4 \times (T/100)^{2/9}$; **ffr** denotes federal funds rates and σ_t^{Roll} denotes cyclical volatility of real inside money balances. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 4: Unit Root Tests:Robustness Check (Quarterly)

		Phillips-Perron test		ADF test
		$Z(\rho)$	$Z(t)$	$Z(t)$ w/ lag 1
ffr		-8.611	-1.956	-2.183
χ		-1.335	-1.145	-1.199
σ_t^{Roll}	(CPI)	-4.320	-2.062	-1.554
σ_t^{Roll}	(Core CPI)	-4.388	-2.201	-1.924
σ_t^{Roll}	(PCE)	-3.822	-1.946	-1.868
σ_t^{Roll}	(Core PCE)	-3.565	-1.928	-2.023
$\Delta \mathbf{ffr}$		-139.701***	-10.792***	-10.288***
$\Delta \chi$		-163.796***	-12.272***	-9.909***
$\Delta \sigma_t^{Roll}$	(CPI)	-23.132***	-2.604*	-3.576***
$\Delta \sigma_t^{Roll}$	(Core CPI)	-30.423***	-3.544***	-4.894***
$\Delta \sigma_t^{Roll}$	(PCE)	-24.507***	-2.874*	-4.362***
$\Delta \sigma_t^{Roll}$	(Core PCE)	-28.054***	-3.373**	-5.138***

Note: **ffr** denotes federal funds rates, χ denotes required reserve ratio, and σ_t^{Roll} denotes cyclical volatility of real inside money balances. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 5: Effect of Required Reserve Ratio:Robustness Check (pre-2008)

Price level	CPI		Core CPI		PCE		Core PCE	
Dependent variable: σ_t^{Roll}	OLS (1)	CCR (2)	OLS (3)	CCR (4)	OLS (5)	CCR (6)	OLS (7)	CCR (8)
χ	-0.266*** (0.030)	-0.297*** (0.001)	-0.266*** (0.030)	-0.268*** (0.001)	-0.307*** (0.032)	-0.288*** (0.002)	-0.305*** (0.029)	-0.277*** (0.002)
ffr		-0.107*** (0.001)		-0.124*** (0.001)		-0.189*** (0.002)		-0.210*** (0.002)
Constant	0.070*** (0.004)	0.080*** (0.000)	0.070*** (0.004)	0.076*** (0.000)	0.074*** (0.004)	0.082*** (0.000)	0.072*** (0.004)	0.080*** (0.002)
Obs.	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43
$adjR^2$	0.727	0.659	0.727	0.710	0.739	0.708	0.759	0.734
$\lambda_{trace}(r=0)$	8.373	32.228	7.438	31.299	7.661	31.867	6.897	31.250
5% CV	15.41	29.68	15.41	29.68	15.41	29.68	15.41	29.68
$\lambda_{trace}(r=1)$	1.504	9.554	1.125	8.428	1.146	8.603	0.938	7.693
5% CV	3.76	15.41	3.76	15.41	3.76	15.41	3.76	15.41

Note: For (1), OLS estimates are reported, and Newey-West standard errors with lag 1 are reported in parentheses. For (2) and (3), first-stage long-run variance estimations for CCR are based on the quadratic spectral kernel and Bayesian information criterion. The bandwidth selection is based on Newey-West fixed lag, $4 \times (T/100)^{2/9}$; **ffr** denotes federal funds rates and σ_t^{Roll} denotes cyclical volatility of real inside money balances. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 6: Unit Root Tests:Robustness Check (pre-2008)

		Phillips-Perron test		ADF test
		$Z(\rho)$	$Z(t)$	$Z(t)$ w/ lag 1
ffr		-9.476	-2.258	-2.868**
χ		-0.768	-0.660	-0.877
σ_t^{Roll}	(CPI)	-2.966	-1.738	-1.770
σ_t^{Roll}	(Core CPI)	-2.860	-1.641	-1.495
σ_t^{Roll}	(PCE)	-2.662	-1.515	-1.627
σ_t^{Roll}	(Core PCE)	-2.412	-1.371	-1.400
Δ ffr		-25.378***	-4.773***	-5.833***
$\Delta\chi$		-28.208***	-4.594***	-3.658***
$\Delta\sigma_t^{Roll}$	(CPI)	-25.627***	-4.281***	-3.813***
$\Delta\sigma_t^{Roll}$	(Core CPI)	-25.836***	-4.329***	-3.764***
$\Delta\sigma_t^{Roll}$	(PCE)	-24.420***	-4.101***	-3.594**
$\Delta\sigma_t^{Roll}$	(Core PCE)	-23.848***	-4.034***	-3.464**

Note: **ffr** denotes federal funds rates, χ denotes required reserve ratio, and σ_t^{Roll} denotes cyclical volatility of real inside money balances. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.