





# Memory Isolation

- Memory isolation is particularly challenging as it must protect:
  - Off-chip memory
  - On-chip microarchitectural structures (caches)
  - Translation structures (page tables)
  - Translation look-aside buffers (TLBs)
- Unlike CPU isolation where all TEEs use the same approach, memory isolation strategies are diverse.
  - Many TEEs use different strategies based on the type of attacker being considered.


# Memory Isolation



(a) Enclave memory isolation against  $A_{app}$ ,  $A_{tee}$ , and  $A_{ssw}$ .



(b) TCB memory isolation against  $A_{app}$ ,  $A_{tee}$ , and  $A_{ssw}$ .



(c) Memory isolation strategy against  $A_{bus}$ .

# Memory Protection Mechanisms

## Memory Protection Unit (MPU)

- Checks physical address and access type against access control information
- Supports limited number of memory regions
- Suitable for coarse-grained protection
- Used in many academic TEEs




## Memory Management Unit (MMU)

- Converts virtual addresses to physical addresses using page tables
- Stores permissions alongside mappings
- Offers fine-grained protection
- Used in many commercial TEEs

The access control information used by MPUs and MMUs must itself be protected against unauthorized access, typically through spatial partitioning.

# Cache Isolation

Against software adversaries ( $A_{app}$ ,  $A_{tee}$ , and  $A_{ssw}$ ).



# Translation Look-aside Buffers (TLBs)

TLBs hold recent virtual-to-physical address translations and must be protected to prevent leakage:

## Spatial Partitioning

Dedicated TLBs per logical processor provide inherent spatial partitioning

## Temporal Partitioning

TLBs are flushed on context switches to prevent reuse of stale translations

## Optimization

Modern processors support partial TLB flushes using context identifiers

Cryptographic isolation is not used for TLBs due to performance overheads.