

TEACHER LAYOFFS, TEACHER QUALITY, AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM A DISCRETIONARY LAYOFF POLICY KRAFT (2015)

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INTRODUCTION: STUDY OBJECTIVE



OBJECTIVE

Estimate the grade-specific effects
of teacher layoffs on student
achievement in one school district
in North Carolina




FOCUS


Attention to the
differential effects of
layoffs based on
teacher seniority vs.
layoff policy based on
teacher effectiveness

INTRODUCTION: STUDY SPECIFICATIONS

Quasi-experimental study/
Approximation to natural
experiment




Compared students who entered
a grade in which a teacher was
laid off to the performance of
students who entered a grade
that did not experience a layoff.



LAYOFF CRITERIA

- Duplicative positions
- Enrollment trends
- Job performance
- Job qualifications
- Length of service

INTRODUCTION: DATA



Include covariates such as:

- Tenure
- Licensure status
- Licensure type (Math, science, special education, etc.)
- Seniority.

II. METHODS

Probability of being laid off

- Fit a series of logistic regressions that model the conditional probability of being laid off, (log odds) RIF, as a function of district RIF criteria for teacher j in year t .

$$Prob(RIF = 1 | RIF_CRITERIA_{jt}) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\gamma RIF_CRITERIA_{jt})}}$$

Differential effect of layoffs estimates across three measures:

Seniority

- Minimum of either the difference between the current academic year and teachers' district hire date or their level of salary experience credit.

Performance evaluation scores

- Constructed using principals' ratings of teachers on a statewide evaluation protocol (rolling average of evaluations).

Teacher's value-added scores

- Estimated by attempting to isolate a teacher's value added to her students' academic achievement on standardized tests for mathematics and English.

II. METHODS

- Fit a series of models where students' test scores (A_{it}) are a function of:

$$A_{it} = \alpha_g(f(A_{i,t-1})) + \phi LAYOFF_{gs,t-1} + \beta_c C_{gs,t-1} + \lambda X_{it} + \theta \bar{X}_{jt} \\ + \omega_{gt} + \varphi_{st} + \psi_{sg} + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

- $LAYOFF$, dichotomous indicator for whether any classroom teachers were laid off in each grade of a school in the previous year
- C , a given average characteristic of the laid-off teachers
- X_{it} , vectors of controls for observable student characteristics
- \bar{X}_{jt} , characteristics of a student's peers with the same teacher and grade-by-year fixed effects
- ω_{gt} , school-by-year fixed effects
- φ_{st} , schoolwide year-specific shocks to student achievement

III. RESULTS

- Averages of teacher characteristics across RIFed teachers and non-RIFed teachers for the following:
 - A: full sample,
 - B: excluding returning retired teachers,
 - C: tenured teachers
- These results show that the teachers selected for layoffs were likely to be non-tenured teachers, teachers hired after the start of the school year, teachers with a licensure deficiency, and low-performing teachers

	2009				2010			
	RIFed	Non-RIFed	Difference	N	RIFed	Non-RIFed	Difference	N
Panel A: All Teachers								
Experience	13.07	10.21	2.86***	8,918	5.60	11.03	-5.43***	8,491
Seniority	8.04	6.14	1.90***	8,918	1.87	6.98	-5.11***	8,491
Probationary teacher	0.842	0.421	0.421***	8,918	0.844	0.329	0.515***	8,491
Returning retired teacher	0.225	0.000	0.225***	8,918	0.003	0.001	0.002	8,491
Late hire	0.267	0.011	0.256***	8,918	0.419	0.009	0.410***	8,491
Licensure deficiency	0.162	0.038	0.124***	8,918	0.169	0.022	0.147***	8,491
Evaluation score: 1-year	-0.507	0.058	-0.565***	4,729	-1.211	0.055	-1.266***	8,038
Evaluation score	0.394	-0.016	-0.378***	7,837	-0.902	0.026	-0.928***	8,374
Math value-added score	-0.004	0.004	-0.008	1,847	-0.062	0.007	-0.069**	1,869
Reading value-added score	-0.005	0.004	-0.009	1,270	-0.014	0.001	-0.015 ⁺	1,897
Panel B: Excluding Returning Retired Teachers								
Evaluation score: 1-year	-0.864	0.058	-0.922***	4,600	-1.219	0.055	-1.274***	8,031
Evaluation score	-0.697	-0.016	-0.681***	7,703	-0.909	0.025	-0.934***	8,362
Math value-added score	-0.025	0.004	-0.029*	1,821	-0.061	0.007	-0.068**	1,864
Reading value-added score	-0.013	0.004	-0.017*	1,261	-0.014	0.001	-0.015 ⁺	1,894
Panel C: Tenured Teachers								
Evaluation score: 1-year	-1.415	0.317	-1.732***	877	-1.440	0.152	-1.592***	5,270
Evaluation score	-0.867	0.115	-0.982***	3,911	-0.875	0.136	-1.011***	5,463
Math value-added score	-0.051	0.008	-0.059*	1,127	-0.120	0.008	-0.128**	1,326
Reading value-added score	-0.014	0.008	-0.022	661	-0.046	0.002	-0.048*	1,333

III. RESULTS





Figure 1. Distribution of CMS Teachers by Seniority for RIFed and Non-RIFed Teachers in 2009 and 2010.


- The figure illustrates how layoffs were heavily concentrated among
 - 1. non-tenured teachers and
 - 2. teachers with 30+ years of seniority (for year 2009)
- Due to nonrenewal of returning retired teachers (constituted over 21% of all RIFed in 2009)
- Teachers collecting both salary and pension were first target for layoffs, despite the fact that they were more effective than average teachers
 - Average evaluation scores were $\frac{2}{3}$ of s.d. higher


III. RESULTS

- RIFed teachers had lower value-added scores in math and reading compared to non-RIFed teachers
 - RIFed teachers in 2010 had significantly lower value-added scores than non-RIFed teachers
 - 0.068 SD lower in math
 - 0.015 SD lower in reading
- When returning retired teachers are excluded from the estimates (Table I, panel B), or the sample is restricted to tenured teachers (panel C), the differences of value-added scores were even greater



(a)





- The figure suggests that evaluation scores were used to directly inform the layoff process
 - Only 4% of teachers with average rating or above were laid off;
 - while 58% of teachers below average rating were laid off
- So layoff selection did not operate based on value-added scores
- But it is not surprising given the weak-to-modest positive correlation between evaluation and value-added scores
 - Evaluation scores are correlated 0.27 and 0.19 with math and reading value-added scores

Table 3. The Relationship between Measures of RIF Criteria and the Probability of Being Laid Off

	Full Sample		Evaluation Score Sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0 years seniority	0.222*** (0.013)	0.087*** (0.011)	0.176*** (0.013)	0.112*** (0.010)	0.040*** (0.008)
1 year seniority	0.035*** (0.008)	0.038*** (0.007)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.009 (0.006)	0.016** (0.006)
2 years seniority	0.063*** (0.009)	0.065*** (0.008)	0.057*** (0.009)	0.040*** (0.007)	0.046*** (0.007)
3 years seniority	0.022* (0.009)	0.043*** (0.009)	0.017* (0.008)	0.010 (0.007)	0.032*** (0.008)
Retired teacher		0.890*** (0.018)			0.914*** (0.012)
Late hire		0.398*** (0.029)			0.327*** (0.030)
Licensure deficiency		0.065*** (0.010)			0.051*** (0.009)
Evaluation score				-0.039*** (0.003)	-0.040*** (0.003)
Licensure type fixed effects		Y			Y
Observations	17,409	17,409	16,211	16,211	16,211

Being a novice teacher was associated with 22 percentage point higher probability of being laid off compared to tenured teachers



But drops to 2.2 and 6.3 percentage points for teachers with between 1-3 years of seniority



Foreign language and arts teachers have the highest probabilities of being laid off

	Full Sample		Evaluation Score Sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Licensure Type					
Mathematics	0.035*** (0.008)	0.016** (0.006)	0.035*** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.007)	0.013* (0.005)
English language arts	0.014** (0.005)	0.007+ (0.004)	0.017** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.011* (0.005)
Science	0.017* (0.007)	0.005 (0.005)	0.016* (0.008)	0.010 (0.007)	0.002 (0.005)
Social studies	0.013* (0.006)	0.008+ (0.005)	0.012+ (0.007)	0.012+ (0.006)	0.009+ (0.005)
Foreign language	0.060*** (0.015)	0.026** (0.010)	0.061*** (0.015)	0.059*** (0.014)	0.026* (0.010)
Arts	0.024** (0.009)	0.024** (0.008)	0.028** (0.010)	0.034*** (0.010)	0.032*** (0.009)
Physical education	0.017+ (0.010)	0.016+ (0.009)	0.021* (0.011)	0.030** (0.011)	0.019+ (0.010)
English as a second language	-0.002 (0.009)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.002 (0.010)	0.008 (0.010)
Special education	-0.005 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.000 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)
Seniority (0–3 years)		Y			Y
Retired teacher		Y			Y
Late hire		Y			Y
Licensure deficiency		Y			Y
Evaluation score				Y	Y
Observations	17,409	17,409	16,211	16,211	16,211

III. DISCUSSIONS

- In addition to laying off untenured teachers, the school district focused on laying off returning-retired teachers, late-hired teachers, teachers with licensure deficiencies, and underperforming teachers.
- 58% of all teachers who received a “Below Standard” or “Unsatisfactory” rating on any of the eight evaluation rubrics were laid off
- District principals and admins appeared to have considered other factors such as teacher characteristics, or targeting highest-paid teachers
 - This questions the validity of objective and subjective measures of teacher effectiveness
- **When two models are compared simultaneously, measures of teacher effectiveness strictly dominate seniority as predictors of the effect of teacher layoffs on future achievement.**
- **Therefore, teacher experience matters. That is, experienced teachers, on average, make important contributions to education. However, performance measures are better indicators of likely effect of layoffs than seniority**


IV. DISCUSSIONS

Robustness tests and extensions

- One potential threat to identifying credible estimates is the possibility that students and their families responded strategically to layoffs by switching schools
- Student sorting on unobserved characteristics related to layoffs could bias results
- The author examines this potential threat by testing the sensitivity of the estimates to the inclusion of student fixed effects in place of prior achievement scores and student characteristics
- This, however, further restricts the estimates to within-student differences in achievement across time, greatly limiting the endogenous student selection process as a threat

Assumptions

- Estimating the correlation between principals' ability to mitigate the effect of layoffs and teachers' seniority or effectiveness is largely intractable (unobserved ability)



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