

HOW DO STOCK MARKET EXPERIENCES SHAPE WEALTH INEQUALITY?

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ABSTRACT. This paper develops a continuous-time overlapping generations model with rare disasters and agents who learn from their own experiences. Disasters such as the Great Depression make investors distrustful of the market. Generations that experience disasters save in the form of safer portfolios, even if similar disasters are not likely to occur again during their lifetimes. “Fearing to attempt” therefore inhibits wealth accumulation by these “depression babies” relative to other generations. This effect is amplified in general equilibrium, since the equity premium is relatively high following a disaster. When calibrated to US data, the model can explain between 12 – 21% of recent trends in generational inequality. The model is also consistent with observations on life cycle portfolio choice, top wealth shares, and changes in asset returns following disasters.

Keywords: rare disasters, heterogeneous beliefs, portfolio choice, inequality, learning

JEL Classification Numbers: D63, D81, G11, G51

“Our doubts are traitors and make us lose the good we oft might win, by fearing to attempt.”

—Measure for Measure (1623, Shakespeare)

1. INTRODUCTION

Tensions between generations have existed since the last Ice Age. Perhaps Orwell (1945) said it best - “*Each generation imagines itself to be more intelligent than the one that went before it, and wiser than the one that comes after it.*” Recently, however, this tension has

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risen above its normal level. We’ve all heard the meme-setting “ok boomer” retort, and are well aware of the resentment that inspired its utterance. The source of this resentment is clear. For the first time in recorded history, most of the younger generation are in danger of being poorer than their parents (Chetty, Grusky, Hell, Hendren, Manduca, and Narang (2017)).




FIGURE 1. Median Net Worth Ratio of 65 and over vs. 35 and under (Survey of Consumer Finances)

Figure 1 plots Survey of Consumer Finances data on the ratio of median net worth for those over 65 years of age to those under 35.¹ Unsurprisingly, the old have always been wealthier than the young. In 1989 their net worth was 9.0 times greater on average. However, over the course of the next 27 years this ratio more than doubled, to over 20.²

¹The SCF definition of net worth includes total financial and non-financial assets, less the value of debt.

²SCF data are at the household level. There have been changes over time in demographics and household composition that potentially cloud the interpretation of Figure 1. First, household size has been decreasing. Data from the Current Population Survey shows that average family size decreased from 3.16 in 1989 to 3.14 in 2016. This suggests that the increase at the individual level might be even greater. Second, CPS data show that the marriage rate has also decreased, from 58% in 1995 to 53% in 2018. However, this has been offset by an equal increase in cohabitation during the same period, from 3% to 7%. Third, life expectancy has increased, which could potentially explain part of the increase in Figure 1. However, life expectancy in the US has increased relatively mildly as compared to other countries. According to OECD data, it rose from 75.1 in 1989 to 78.6 in 2016.

Most of the inequality literature focuses on the recent increase in *overall* inequality. This increase reflects a combination of within- and between-cohort inequality. Evidence suggests that more than half of the increase in overall inequality is driven by between-cohort inequality. For example, using PSID data, I find that the between-cohort wealth Gini was 57.2% of the overall wealth Gini in 1984, and was 61.9% in 2017. Of course, one might argue that within-cohort inequality is more important than between-cohort inequality, since between-cohort redistributions can be offset by inter-generational transfers. Evidence suggests, however, that intergenerational redistributions are not fully offset by transfers (e.g., Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1997)). Moreover, while parental wealth undoubtedly plays a valuable insurance role for young adults (Kaplan (2012)), prolonged financial dependence on parents can also produce adverse psychological and sociological consequences (Mortimer, Kim, Staff, and Vuolo (2016), Caputo (2020), Hill, van der Geest, and Blokland (2017)).

Standard inequality models cannot explain the data in Figure 1 because they generate *stationary* age/wealth distributions. Of course, one could always inject an exogenous shock, and then attribute the trend in Figure 1 to transition dynamics. However, this is a rather unappealing strategy, since the trend in Figure 1 is the mirror image of a declining trend that took place during the 40 years following the Great Depression. Although direct evidence on historical generational inequality is lacking, we do know that generational inequality is highly correlated with top wealth shares, simply because the wealthy have always been relatively old. According to the Saez and Zucman (2016) data, the Top 1% wealth share in 1930 was 43.6%. It then steadily decreased to 22.3% by 1980. This suggests that baby boomers are better off than both their parents and their kids. It also suggests, however, that you would need to introduce *two* exogenous shocks to explain the observed trends in generational inequality.

What then explains this reversal? Undoubtedly, many factors are responsible. This paper focuses on just one of them, namely, generational belief differences. I study an economy that combines two key ingredients. First, individuals weight their own personal experiences more heavily when forming their beliefs, as in Malmendier and Nagel (2011). Second, the economy is subject to rare disasters, as in Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006). When the model is calibrated to US data, it can not only account for a significant share of the recent increase in the relative wealth of the old generation, it can also explain why this ratio decreased following the Great Depression. The model also illustrates how general equilibrium feedbacks operating in financial markets contribute to these changes.

Although introducing rare disasters may seem similar to introducing exogenous shocks, there is a crucial difference. Although rare, disaster shocks in my model are *recurrent*, and the anticipation of this recurrence influences behavior, both before and after the shock. In fact, this anticipation explains why the rare disasters literature has been successful at resolving the Equity Premium Puzzle. However, the asset-pricing rare disasters literature relies on a representative agent. My primary contribution is to show that when rare disasters are combined with overlapping generations and experiential learning, a powerful force for heterogeneity and inequality is ignited.

Specifically, I argue that different generations have different beliefs about market returns due to their own limited experiences. This influences their risk-taking behavior which, in turn, influences the growth rate of their wealth. For instance, a 65 year old in 1989 would have been born in 1924. At an early age she experienced the Great Depression. By contrast, a 65 year old in 2016 would have been a lucky baby boomer, who skipped the Great Depression and had more positive experiences in the stock market. Due to the rare nature of disasters, it was not likely that the depression babies would experience another Great Depression. But its salience within their own experience caused it to cast a long shadow throughout the remainder of their lives. In other words, they were “scarred”. Therefore, it is natural that investors in different cohorts “agree to disagree” about the likelihood of disasters.

Of course, this paper is not the first to propose an “experiential learning” channel in return expectations and portfolio choice. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) provides strong empirical support that macroeconomic experience in the stock market has a prolonged impact on how much households invest in risky assets later in their lives. They find that the “depression babies” were much less likely to participate in the stock market later in their lives. And, if they did, they tended to invest a lower fraction of wealth into risky assets compared with other generations. Using SCF data, they find that an increase in experienced return from the 10th to the 90th percentile implies a 10.2% increase in the likelihood of participation in the stock market. Conditional on participation, there exists a 7.9% increase in the fraction of wealth allocated to stocks.³ There has also been independent empirical evidence which shows that older people nowadays are more optimistic relative to young people. For example, Heimer, Myrseth, and Schoenle (2019) find that as households age, they grow more optimistic about longevity. Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2020) uses survey data on the more recent Covid-19 crisis, and shows that

³The potentially important distinction between lifetime experiences and financial market experiences is not present in my model, since I assume everyone participates in the financial markets.

the current older generation worries less about the health risk induced by the pandemic, despite the fact that evidence suggests they are the most vulnerable. This could be due to their own experience with previous pandemics.

While I do not aim to dismiss other potential mechanisms that drive between-cohort inequality, the experiential-learning approach does offer several advantages. First, it micro-founds “scale dependence”, i.e., a positive correlation between growth and wealth consistent with the data (See Gabaix, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2016)). Modern life cycle portfolio choice theory *a la* Campbell, Viceira, Viceira, et al. (2002) suggests that the optimal share of risky investment should decrease with age. This is because younger households hold future labor income as a non-tradable asset, so they adjust tradeable asset holdings to compensate for the implicit holding of human wealth. However, micro evidence shows the opposite (e.g., Ameriks and Zeldes (2004), Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and Fagereng, Gottlieb, and Guiso (2017)). At least before retirement, the old are more likely to participate in the stock market compared with the young, and conditional on participation, they invest a higher share of their wealth in risky assets. From the perspective of experiential learning, this is not so surprising. As households age, they witness more data, and become more confident of their own estimates, which encourages them to invest a higher fraction of their wealth in risky assets. This is true during normal times, but especially so during disasters. For example, Gale, Gelfond, Fichtner, and Harris (2020) shows that the recent financial crisis has disproportionately depleted the wealth of millennials relative to older generations. From the experiential-learning angle, millennials have had less experience with normal times. As such, they “over-react” to the crisis becoming relatively pessimistic about future stock market returns compared to their more experienced elders.

Second, while most of the literature focuses on why inequality has increased since the 1980s, the experiential learning approach provides a unified explanation of the long-run evolution of wealth inequality, tracing all the way back to 1930s. In particular, it can explain the U-shaped pattern that we see in the data. At the beginning of the Great Depression, the old to young wealth ratio at first decreased because the old were more invested in risky assets. However, as just noted, young people over-extrapolate from the disaster more than the old, since they have less experience. As these young households age, they tend to take few risks in the financial market, while the future generations are not subject to such scarring. This implies a gradual decrease of the old to young wealth ratio as time goes by. This tranquil decrease was interrupted in the 1980s, as the GenXers (born in 1965-1980) and millennial’s (born in 1981-1996) experienced more recent disasters (e.g., the 1987 crash, the dotcom bubble burst, the financial crisis, and especially the

more recent global pandemic). Since baby boomers are much less affected by these events, the old to young wealth ratio has increased. A U-shaped pattern of inequality of the last century naturally emerges.

Third, experiential learning in an overlapping generation environment can generate realistic features of asset prices. Gomez et al. (2016) studies the interaction between asset prices and the wealth distribution with recursive preferences. Nakov and Nuño (2015) shows that when individuals learn from their own experience (i.e., decreasing gain learning), the aggregate implications for asset prices look similar to a representative agent economy with constant gain learning, which has been shown to provide a good rationale for stock market volatility, and can explain the observed negative correlation between experienced payout growth and future excess returns (Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2016), Adam, Marcet, and Beutel (2017), Nagel and Xu (2019)).

Last but not least, the experiential-learning mechanism is consistent with survey data on stock return expectations. Using UBS/Gallup survey, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find that a 1% decrease in experienced return is associated with 0.6 – 0.7% decrease in expected returns to their own portfolio. Recent evidence that combines return expectations and portfolio choice data also shows that belief changes are indeed reflected in household portfolio choices; see Giglio, Maggiori, Stroebel, and Utkus (2019). ⁴

An important advantage of developing an explicit model is that it allows us to examine how these partial equilibrium effects become amplified in a general equilibrium where prices are endogenously determined. With heterogeneous beliefs and finite lives, prices reflect the wealth-weighted average beliefs of market participants. As a consequence, market pessimism induces a high equity premium following a disaster shock. Cogley and Sargent (2008) attributes the existence of the postwar equity premium to pessimism induced by the Great Depression. This effect is endogenously generated here with overlapping generations. Right after the Great Depression, increased pessimism produced a rise in equity premium. However, over time, as the “depression babies” died out, the market became dominated by the baby boomers. Since the boomers did not experience the Great Depression, they invested aggressively in risky assets and bid up asset prices, which then led to a declining equity premium. These trends in the (ex ante) equity premium are

⁴This belief channel does not rule out the possibility that households’ risk attitude could change in response to disasters. In fact, Cohn, Engelmann, Fehr, and Maréchal (2015) provides experimental evidence of counter-cyclical risk aversion. Dillenberger and Rozen (2015) develop a model of history dependent risk attitudes. However, given the direct evidence from survey expectations on experienced and expected returns, we know that the belief channel also exists.

consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Blanchard, Shiller, and Siegel (1993) and Jagannathan, McGrattan, and Scherbina (2001). While both partial and general equilibrium effects might appear intuitive and simple, it is not straightforward to quantify them within a structural model. This is because prices depend on the wealth distribution, which is an infinite-dimensional object, whose evolution is difficult to characterize in discrete time. My model attempts to disentangle the partial and general equilibrium effects of experiential learning by solving a continuous time overlapping generation model with heterogeneous agents, and providing closed form solutions for policy functions, prices, and wealth dynamics.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and solves for equilibrium prices. Section 3 uses a perturbation approximation of the Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck (KFP) equation to characterize the dynamics of the generational wealth distribution. Section 4 provides simulation evidence. Section 5 calibrates the model to US data, and shows that the model can explain the observed U-shaped pattern in postwar generational inequality. Section 6 provides further evidence on the connection between beliefs and stock market crashes. Section 7 discusses several alternative explanations of the rise in old/young wealth inequality, e.g., housing (Mankiw and Weil (1992)), education, inter-generational transfers, and financial market development (Favilukis (2013)). Section 8 discusses efficiency and policy implications, while Section 9 contains a brief literature review. Finally, Section 10 concludes by discussing some possible extensions. A technical Appendix contains proofs and derivations.

2. THE MODEL

The model combines a Lucas (1978) pure exchange tree economy with a continuous-time OLG Blanchard/Yaari demographic structure. It also embeds rare disaster risk in the tradition of Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006). The goal is to solve for portfolio allocations, asset prices, and the distribution of wealth when the arrival rate of disasters is unknown, and agents must learn about it from their own experiences.

2.1. Environment. The economy consists of a measure 1 continuum of agents, each indexed by the time of birth s , with exponentially distributed lifetimes. Death occurs at Poisson rate δ . When an agent dies, he is instantly replaced by a new agent with zero initial financial wealth. At each instant of time $t > s$, all living agents receive an endowment flow $y_{s,t}$ where $y_{s,t} = \omega Y_t$, and $\omega \in (0, 1)$. This can be interpreted as an agent's labor income. That is, each existing agent receives a constant fraction of the aggregate

endowment.⁵ Agents have no bequest motive. There is a representative firm that pays out dividend $D_t = (1 - \omega)Y_t$. In order to focus on between-cohort inequality, I assume agents only differ in the timing of birth, but are otherwise identical. That is, agents face only one source of idiosyncratic uncertainty, i.e., their birth and death dates. The exogenous aggregate endowment process is driven by two aggregate shocks. It is governed by the following jump-diffusion process

$$\frac{dY_t}{Y_{t-}} = \mu dt + \sigma dZ_t + \kappa_t dN_t(\lambda_t) \quad (2.1)$$

where Y_{t-} denotes the endowment right before a jump occurs, if there is one, μ is the drift absent disasters, and σ denotes the volatility of the 1-dimensional Brownian motion Z_t , which satisfies the usual conditions. It is defined on a probability space $(\Omega^Z, \mathcal{F}^Z, \mathcal{P}^Z)$. N_t is a Poisson process with hazard rate λ_t , defined on a probability space $(\Omega^N, \mathcal{F}^N, \mathcal{P}^N)$. I then define $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{P})$ as the product probability space, and the filtration of the combined history as $\{\mathcal{F}_t\} = \{\mathcal{F}^B \times \mathcal{F}^N\}$. The jump process N_t follows

$$dN_t = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{with probability } \lambda_t dt. \\ 0, & \text{with probability } 1 - \lambda_t dt. \end{cases} \quad (2.2)$$

That is, at each instant, there is λ_t probability that a disaster happens. When it happens, the jump size κ_t can take on two values. With p^* probability, the realization of a disaster size is κ_h (a severe disaster), and with $(1 - p^*)$ probability, the disaster size is κ_l (a mild disaster). I assume that $\kappa_t \in (-1, 0)$, which captures the fact that there is a decline in endowment value when a disaster happens, but ensures that dividends remain strictly positive. The hazard rate λ_t itself follows a random process, and is assumed to also take on two values, a high hazard rate λ_h and a low hazard rate λ_l . It is characterized by an i.i.d Bernoulli distribution,

$$\lambda_t = \begin{cases} \lambda_h, & \text{with probability } \pi^*. \\ \lambda_l, & \text{with probability } 1 - \pi^*. \end{cases} \quad (2.3)$$

I assume that the market is dynamically complete, and that investors can trade continuously in the capital market to hedge against both regular economic risk, as well as disaster risk. To complete the market, agents need three securities (in addition to their life insurance policies): a bond, an equity, and a disaster-contingent asset. The bond value follows

$$dB_t = r_t B_t dt \quad (2.4)$$

⁵This assumption follows Gârleanu and Panageas (2015). It is a reduced form way to capture the co-movement of the real economy and the financial market. Since the model focuses on the financial market, I abstract away from life cycle labor income profiles.

The risky asset value follows

$$\frac{dS_t + D_t dt}{S_{t-}} = \mu_t^S dt + \sigma^S dZ_t + \kappa_t^S dN_t(\lambda_t) \quad (2.5)$$

where r_t , μ_t^S , σ^S as well as κ_t^S are endogenous objects, and are determined in equilibrium. Finally, the disaster-contingent security value is P_t , and follows the stochastic process

$$\frac{dP_t}{P_{t-}} = \mu_t^P dt + \kappa_t^P dN_t(\lambda_t) \quad (2.6)$$

This asset is in zero net supply. By convention, I assume the disaster-contingent security pays off during normal times, but suffers a loss during disasters. That is, by holding the disaster-contingent security, the investor gets rewarded μ_t^P fraction of of the asset value at each instant, but the asset value drops by a magnitude of $\kappa_t^P P_t$ upon a disaster shock. The initial price P_0 and the jump size κ_t^P can be chosen freely, but the drift μ_t^P is determined endogenously. The real world counterpart of this security would be a catastrophe bond or a hybrid security whose value depend on the adverse state of the economy ⁶.

Investors observe the aggregate endowment process and know the values of μ , σ , λ_h , λ_l and κ_t . However, they do not observe π^* , and must learn about it from their own limited lifetime experience. The specific choice of which parameters to learn about is supported by continuous-time filtering theory. As noted by Merton (1980), uncertainty about σ decreases as sampling frequency increases. It disappears in the continuous time limit. Although uncertainty about drift parameter μ does not dissipate, agents can still learn about it relatively quickly, and achieve asymptotic convergence. In contrast, uncertainty about disaster risk does not even disappear in an infinite horizon. To see how learning works, we need to consider optimal filtering of a jump-diffusion process.

2.2. Filtering and Information Processing. Investors have common knowledge about the size of the disaster. However, they remain uncertain about the likelihood of disasters. They must revise their beliefs sequentially, in real-time. When an investor is born at time s , he is endowed with prior probability $\pi_{s,s}$ of the hazard rate. For $t > s$, his evolving beliefs are fully summarized by the conditional mean $\bar{\lambda}_{s,t} = \mathbb{E}_{s,t}[\lambda_t]$, where the expectation $\mathbb{E}_{s,t}[\lambda_t] = \pi_{s,t}\lambda_h + (1 - \pi_{s,t})\lambda_l$ denotes the expectation with respect to the time s born agent's own filtration $\mathcal{P}_{s,t}$ at time t . I will specify how the prior is chosen in the quantitative section. For now, let us focus on belief updating.

⁶In an incomplete market without disaster-contingent security, equilibrium bond and equity returns change drastically (See Dieckmann (2011) for a comparison of asset pricing implications in complete vs. incomplete market with rare disasters). Since the focus here is on portfolio reallocation rather than asset pricing, I focus on the benchmark complete market setting.

Lemma 2.1. *The evolution of the beliefs about π^* by a Bayesian learning agent (denoted by $\pi_{s,t}$) is given by*

$$d\pi_{s,t}|_{dN_t=0} = -(\lambda_h - \lambda_l)\pi_{s,t}(1 - \pi_{s,t})dt \quad (2.7)$$

$$d\pi_{s,t}|_{dN_t=1} = \frac{\lambda_h \pi_{s,t}}{\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}} - \pi_{s,t} \quad (2.8)$$

Proof. This is a direct application of the optimal filtering of a jump-diffusion process from Liptser, Shiryaev, and Shiryaev (2001) Theorem 19.6, and is later applied in Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2011) and Koulovatianos and Wieland (2011). \square

Notice that when there is no jump, an agent's beliefs about the probability of a disaster follow a deterministic trend, with a negative drift of $-(\lambda_h - \lambda_l)(1 - \pi_{s,t})$. Calm economic times gradually improve agents' optimism, albeit at a slow pace. However, when a disaster occurs, beliefs shift discontinuously, and jump from $\pi_{s,t}$ to $\frac{\lambda_h \pi_{s,t}}{\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}}$. That is, the perceived likelihood of a disaster occurring is suddenly amplified by a magnitude of $\frac{\lambda_h}{\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}}$.⁷

2.3. Optimization. Agents continuously choose a non-negative consumption process $c_{s,t}$, the fraction of wealth allocated to the risky asset market $\alpha_{s,t}^S$, and the fraction of wealth devoted to the disaster-contingent security $\alpha_{s,t}^P$. They continuously update their beliefs about disaster risk, and dynamically trade assets given the return process and their beliefs, in order to maximize a logarithmic flow utility over consumption goods.⁸ They start with zero financial wealth, and accumulate wealth over the life cycle. An annuity contract *ala* Yaari (1965) entitles $\delta w_{s,t}$ of earnings to living agents, while a competitive insurance company collects any remaining wealth upon the unexpected death of the agent. Formally, the problem of an agent at time s can be stated as

$$\max_{c_{s,t}, \alpha_{s,t}^S, \alpha_{s,t}^P} \mathbb{E}_{s,t} \left[\int_s^\infty e^{-(\rho+\delta)(t-s)} \log(c_{s,t}) dt \right] \quad (2.9)$$

s.t:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dw_{s,t}}{w_{s,t-}} = & \left(r_t + \delta + \alpha_{s,t}^S(\mu_t^S - r_t) + \alpha_{s,t}^P(\mu_t^P - r_t) + y_{s,t} - \frac{c_{s,t}}{w_{s,t-}} \right) dt + \alpha_{s,t}^S \sigma^S dZ_{s,t} \\ & + (\alpha_{s,t}^S \kappa_t^S + \alpha_{s,t}^P \kappa_t^P) dN_{s,t}(\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}) \end{aligned} \quad (2.10)$$

⁷One might argue that Bayesian learning is contradicted by evidence of a 'recency bias'. That is, it is debatable whether agents weight past observations of disasters in a statistically optimal manner. However, since I am primarily interested in generational belief differences, what matters is not the specific learning algorithm at an individual level, but the cross-sectional differences in weights on the same event.

⁸As we shall see later, log preferences deliver two key advantages. First, they imply a constant savings rate, which allows me to focus on the portfolio choice channel. Second, a log investor's portfolio does not need to include a hedging term (Gennotte (1986)). That is, his optimal portfolio is "myopic". Both these simplifications are driven by the exact offsetting of income and substitution effects.

where $\mathbb{E}_{s,t}$ denotes the expectation of generation s evaluated at time t . The resulting HJB equation associated with this problem is a nonlinear partial differential equation. With the presence of aggregate shocks, it is not likely to have a closed-form solution. To bypass this problem, I exploit the fact that the market is dynamically complete for all cohorts. This allows me to employ the martingale approach (Cox and Huang (1989)). This allows me to convert the dynamic programming problem into a static problem as follows

$$\max_{c_{s,s}} \mathbb{E}_{s,s} \left[\int_s^\infty e^{-(\rho+\delta)(t-s)} \log(c_{s,t}) dt \right] \quad (2.11)$$

s.t:

$$\mathbb{E}_{s,s} \left[\int_s^\infty e^{-\delta(t-s)} \xi_{s,t} c_{s,t} dt \right] = \mathbb{E}_{s,s} \left[\int_s^\infty e^{-\delta(t-s)} \xi_{s,t} \omega Y_t dt \right] \quad (2.12)$$

where $\xi_{s,t}$ denotes the individual state price density.

From the first order condition (FOC) of consumption, we obtain

$$\frac{e^{-(\rho+\delta)(t-s)}}{c_{s,t}} = y_s e^{-\delta(t-s)} \xi_{s,t} \quad (2.13)$$

where y_s denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the agent's lifetime budget constraint. We can then relate $c_{s,t}$ to the initial consumption allocation $c_{s,s}$ using the following equation

$$c_{s,t} = c_{s,s} e^{-\rho(t-s)} \frac{\xi_{s,s}}{\xi_{s,t}} \quad (2.14)$$

To see how the consumption process evolves, we can first solve for the stochastic process of the state price density.

Lemma 2.2. *By exploiting the fact that the regular Brownian motion and the compensated Poisson process are martingales under the agent's own filtration, one can derive the individual state price density process as follows*

$$\frac{d\xi_{s,t}}{\xi_{s,t-}} = (\bar{\lambda}_{s,t} - \lambda_{s,t}^N - r_t) dt - \theta_{s,t} dZ_{s,t} + \left(\frac{\lambda_{s,t}^N}{\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}} - 1 \right) dN_{s,t}(\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}) \quad (2.15)$$

where $\theta_{s,t}$ denotes the perceived market price of risk of the regular Brownian shock, and $\lambda_{s,t}^N$ is the perceived market price of disaster risk. It then follows that the true state price density follows

$$\frac{d\xi_t}{\xi_{t-}} = (\bar{\lambda}_t - \lambda_t^N - r_t) dt - \theta_t dZ_t + \left(\frac{\lambda_t^N}{\bar{\lambda}_t} - 1 \right) dN_t(\bar{\lambda}_t) \quad (2.16)$$

Define the disagreement process $\eta_{s,t} = \frac{\xi_t}{\xi_{s,t}}$. We then have

$$\frac{d\eta_{s,t}}{\eta_{s,t-}} = \left(\frac{1}{1+\bar{\kappa}} \lambda_{s,t} - \lambda_t^N \right) dt + \left[\frac{1+\bar{\kappa}}{\bar{\kappa}} \left(-\frac{2\lambda_t^N}{\lambda_t} - 1 \right) - 1 \right] dN(\bar{\lambda}_t) \quad (2.17)$$

where $\bar{\kappa} = p^* \kappa_h + (1 - p^*) \kappa_l$.

Proof. See Appendix A.3. □

As expected, the disagreement process $\eta_{s,t}$ does not depend on the regular Brownian shock, but only the disaster shock. When no disaster hits, the disagreement process has a deterministic drift, which depends on how likely the agent perceives the disaster is likely to happen, as well as on the market price of disaster risk. Since we know that $c_{s,t} = (y_s \xi_{s,t})^{-1}$, knowing the process of the state price density is equivalent to knowing the process of consumption. Ito's lemma then delivers

$$\frac{dc_{s,t}}{c_{s,t-}} = (\theta_{s,t}^2 - \bar{\lambda}_{s,t} + \lambda_{s,t}^N + r_t)dt + \theta_{s,t}dZ_{s,t} + \left(\frac{\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}}{\lambda_{s,t}^N} - 1 \right) dN_{s,t}(\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}) \quad (2.18)$$

This is useful, because due to log utility, consumption is linear in financial wealth, i.e., $c_{s,t} = (\rho + \delta)w_{s,t}$. This implies that the stochastic process of the optimally invested wealth follows

$$\frac{dw_{s,t}}{w_{s,t-}} = (\theta_{s,t}^2 - \bar{\lambda}_{s,t} + \lambda_{s,t}^N + r_t)dt + \theta_{s,t}dZ_{s,t} + \left(\frac{\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}}{\lambda_{s,t}^N} - 1 \right) dN_{s,t}(\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}) \quad (2.19)$$

Given the above individual optimal decisions, we are now ready for aggregation.

2.4. Aggregation. I start by defining a Walrasian equilibrium in this economy.

Definition 2.3. *Given preferences, initial endowments, and beliefs, an equilibrium is a collection of allocations $(c_{s,t}, \alpha_{s,t}^S, \alpha_{s,t}^P)$ and a price system $(r_t, \mu_t^S, \mu_t^P, \kappa_t^S, \kappa_t^P)$ such that the choice processes $(c_{s,t}, \alpha_{s,t}^S, \alpha_{s,t}^P)$ maximize agents' utility subject to their budget constraints, and the market for consumption goods, bonds, risky asset and the disaster-contingent security all clear, i.e.,*

$$Y_t = \int_{-\infty}^t \delta e^{-\delta(t-s)} c_{s,t} ds \quad (2.20)$$

$$S_t = \int_{-\infty}^t \delta e^{-\delta(t-s)} \alpha_{s,t}^S w_{s,t} ds \quad (2.21)$$

$$0 = \int_{-\infty}^t \delta e^{-\delta(t-s)} \alpha_{s,t}^P w_{s,t} ds \quad (2.22)$$

$$0 = \int_{-\infty}^t \delta e^{-\delta(t-s)} (1 - \alpha_{s,t}^S - \alpha_{s,t}^P) w_{s,t} ds \quad (2.23)$$

By using the market-clearing condition for consumption goods, we can derive the stochastic processes for ξ_t . Let us conjecture that the fraction of aggregate endowment consumed by a newborn agent at time t is a fixed fraction $\beta_t = \frac{c_{t,t}}{Y_t} = \beta$.⁹ We can then

⁹Appendix B.1 verifies this conjecture, and derives an explicit expression for β .

rewrite the goods market clearing condition as

$$\xi_t Y_t = \int_{-\infty}^t \beta \delta e^{-(\rho+\delta)(t-s)} \xi_s Y_s \frac{\eta_{s,t}}{\eta_{s,s}} ds \quad (2.24)$$

Define $\eta_t = e^{(\rho+\delta(1-\beta))t} \xi_t Y_t$, we can then rewrite the above into

$$\eta_t = \int_{-\infty}^t \beta \delta e^{-\beta\delta(t-s)} \eta_s \frac{\eta_{s,t}}{\eta_{s,s}} ds \quad (2.25)$$

Defining $\mu_{s,t}^\eta$ and $\kappa_{s,t}^\eta$ as the drift and jump coefficients of $\eta_{s,t}$ we are now ready to derive the dynamics of η_t . Applying Ito's lemma and Leibniz's rule, we obtain

$$\frac{d\eta_t}{\eta_t} = \bar{\mu}_t^\eta dt + \bar{\kappa}_t^\eta dN_t(\bar{\lambda}_t) \quad (2.26)$$

where the weighted average coefficients are defined as

$$\bar{\mu}_t^\eta = \mathbb{E}_{s,t}(\mu_{s,t}^\eta) = \int_{-\infty}^t f_{s,t} \mu_{s,t}^\eta ds; \quad \bar{\kappa}_t^\eta = \mathbb{E}_{s,t}(\kappa_{s,t}^\eta) = \int_{-\infty}^t f_{s,t} \kappa_{s,t}^\eta ds \quad (2.27)$$

and the wealth share $f_{s,t}$ is defined as

$$f_{s,t} = \beta \delta e^{-\beta\delta(t-s)} \left(\frac{\eta_s}{\eta_{s,s}} \right) \left(\frac{\eta_{s,t}}{\eta_{s,s}} \right) = \delta e^{-\delta(t-s)} \frac{c_{s,t}}{Y_t} \quad (2.28)$$

Since we know the dynamics of Y_t , we can then back out the dynamics of the state price density.

$$\frac{d\xi_t}{\xi_t} = (\bar{\mu}_t^\eta - \mu + \sigma^2 - \rho - \delta(1-\beta)) dt - \sigma dZ_t + \left(\frac{1 + \bar{\kappa}_\eta}{1 + \bar{\kappa}} - 1 \right) dN_t(\lambda_t) \quad (2.29)$$

Since we know that the state price density also has to follow eqn.(2.16), it directly gives the solution of equilibrium prices.

Proposition 1. *In equilibrium, the short term interest rate, the market price of risk for the regular Brownian shock, and the market price of disaster risk are given by*

$$r_t = \underbrace{\rho + \delta(1-\beta)}_{\text{effective patience with OLG}} + \underbrace{\mu - \sigma^2}_{\text{risk adjusted growth}} + \underbrace{\frac{\bar{\kappa}}{1 + \bar{\kappa}} \mathbb{E}_{s,t}(\bar{\lambda}_{s,t})}_{\text{market view of disaster risk}} ; \quad (2.30)$$

$$\theta_t = \theta = \sigma; \quad (2.31)$$

$$\lambda_t^N = \frac{\mathbb{E}_{s,t}(\lambda_{s,t})}{1 + \bar{\kappa}} \quad (2.32)$$

The closed form solutions for prices have intuitive interpretations. Let's start with the equilibrium interest rate. As always, the risk free rate increases when agents are less patient. In a world of finite lives, the effective patience lessens due to death risk. Moreover, the equilibrium interest rate increases when the endowment process has a higher rate of growth and a lower volatility, which is captured in the second term. The third term reflects

a flight to safety motive coming from the market view of disaster risk, which is itself an endogenous object. It depends on the wealth-weighted distribution of beliefs. Since $\bar{\kappa} < 0$, this implies that the equilibrium interest rate decreases with market average pessimism. The desire to save in the form of safe asset during disasters drives down the return on the safe asset, leading to a low equilibrium interest rates during disaster episodes, as observed in the data (See Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro, and Ursúa (2013)). Notice that the first and second term are both constants, so variations in the interest rate are totally driven by variations in market pessimism about disasters. The market price of the regular Brownian risk is less interesting in this log-utility model. Since the disagreement is only about disaster risk, and agents have common beliefs about the regular Brownian risk, the market price of risk is therefore the same as the standard solution with log preferences, which simply equates to the volatility of the risk. Finally, the market price of disaster risk increases with the market view of the disaster likelihood. Lastly, λ_t^N also increases with the magnitude of the negative jump.

2.5. Portfolio Allocations and Wealth Dynamics. This subsection discusses the key predictions of the model. Namely, how does the experience of a rare disaster influence lifetime savings and portfolio allocations, and how do these decisions influence an agent's wealth accumulation. Recall that the optimally invested wealth follows

$$\frac{dw_{s,t}}{w_{s,t^-}} = (\theta_{s,t}^2 - \bar{\lambda}_{s,t} + \lambda_t^N + r_t)dt + \theta_{s,t}dZ_{s,t} + \left(\frac{\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}}{\lambda_{s,t}^N} - 1 \right) dN_{s,t}(\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}) \quad (2.33)$$

Recall also that the budget constraint follows

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dw_{s,t}}{w_{s,t^-}} = & \left(r_t + \alpha_{s,t}^S(\mu_t^S - r_t) + \delta + \alpha_{s,t}^P(\mu_t^P - r_t) + y_{s,t} - \frac{c_{s,t}}{w_{s,t^-}} \right) dt + \alpha_{s,t}^S \sigma^S dZ_{s,t} \\ & + (\alpha_{s,t}^S \kappa_t^S + \alpha_{s,t}^P \kappa_t^P) dN_{s,t}(\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}) \end{aligned} \quad (2.34)$$

Since the market is complete, we can match coefficients with the wealth process in these two stochastic differential equations. The share of wealth invested in the risky asset market and the disaster-contingent security at time t for an agent born at time s are given by the following expressions respectively

$$\alpha_{s,t}^S = \frac{\theta_{s,t}}{\sigma^S} = \frac{\theta_t}{\sigma^S} \quad (2.35)$$

$$\alpha_{s,t}^P = \frac{1}{\kappa_t^P} \left(\frac{\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}}{\lambda_t^N} - 1 \right) - \frac{\kappa_t^S \theta_t}{\kappa_t^P \sigma^S} \quad (2.36)$$

Notice that all generations invest the same fraction of wealth in risky asset. However, pessimistic generations hold less disaster-contingent security, as reflected in a higher $\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}$. To complete the calculation, we still need to characterize μ_t^S , σ^S , κ_t^S and κ_t^P .

2.6. Equity Premium Dynamics.

Proposition 2. *The equilibrium coefficients in the risky asset price and the disaster-contingent security are given by*

$$\sigma^S = \sigma \quad (2.37)$$

$$\kappa_t^S = \kappa_t \quad (2.38)$$

$$\mu_t^S - r_t = \sigma^2 + \bar{\mu}_t^\eta \quad (2.39)$$

$$\mu_t^P - r_t = -\frac{\kappa_t}{1 + \bar{\kappa}} \mathbb{E}_{s,t}(\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}) \quad (2.40)$$

Proof. See Appendix A.4. □

The model produces an endogenous time-varying equity premium, both for the risky asset as well as for the disaster-contingent security. When market pessimism rises, risky asset and disaster-contingent security must pay higher average returns to clear the market. This has interesting implications for inequality. Following a disaster shock, scarred investors find safe asset investment more attractive. The increased aggregate demand of safe asset then generates a decline in equilibrium interest rate, which then increases equity premium. This general equilibrium effect of prices amplifies the initial partial equilibrium effect. Not only does the scarred generation accumulate wealth at a slower pace due to less risk-taking, but they also sacrifice higher asset returns when it is the best time to buy the risky asset and the disaster-contingent security.

Corollary 2.4. *The share of wealth invested in the risky asset market and the disaster-contingent security at time t for an agent born at time s are given by the following expressions respectively*

$$\alpha_{s,t}^S = 1 \quad (2.41)$$

$$\alpha_{s,t}^P = \frac{1}{\bar{\kappa}} \left(\frac{\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}}{\mathbb{E}(\bar{\lambda}_{s,t})} (1 + \bar{\kappa}) - 1 \right) - 1 \quad (2.42)$$

If $\lambda_{s,t} > \mathbb{E}(\lambda_{s,t})$, generation s is more pessimistic relative to the average generation, and invest a lower share of their wealth in risky portfolios, vice versa.

The resulting portfolio choice solutions are rather intuitive. Due to log utility of homogeneous beliefs on the Brownian motion risk, all investors invest all shares in risky asset. However, pessimistic generations invest a lower share of their wealth in the disaster contingency assets.

3. EVOLUTION OF THE JOINT AGE-WEALTH DISTRIBUTION

This section studies the main object of interest, i.e, the evolution of the *joint* age-wealth distribution. Note that with aggregate shocks, the Kolmogorov Forward equation,

which characterizes the evolution of the wealth distribution follows a *stochastic* partial differential equation, and the distribution changes continuously. However, one can still study the long-run stationary distribution by averaging out those shocks across time, and compares its properties relative to the rational expectation economy.

Proposition 3. *The dynamics of the joint distribution of wealth and belief $n(w, \lambda)$ follows*

$$dn = -\frac{\partial}{\partial w}(n\hat{\mu}wdt + n\hat{\sigma}wdZ) + \frac{1}{2}\frac{\partial^2}{\partial w^2}(n\hat{\sigma}^2w^2)dt + [n(w(1 + \hat{\kappa}), t) - n(w, t)]dN \quad (3.43)$$

Let $p(w) = \mathbb{E}_{s,t}n(w, \lambda)$ denote the long run stationary distribution of wealth, and define $\tilde{w}_{s,t} = \frac{w_{s,t}}{\omega Y_t}$. To a first order perturbation approximation, the long-run stationary distribution of $x = \log(\tilde{w})$ (eliminating all subscripts) is given by

$$p(x) \approx \underbrace{Ge^{\zeta_0 x}}_{RE} \underbrace{[\zeta_1 x + g_1]^{-1} [e^{(\lambda_h - \lambda^0)\zeta_1 x} - e^{(\lambda_l - \lambda^0)\zeta_1 x}]}_{Learning} \quad (3.44)$$

where ζ_0 and ζ_1 are constants. Moreover,

$$\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} p(x) > \lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} p^{RE}(x) \quad (3.45)$$

Proof. See Appendix B. □

That is, we can decompose the long-run stationary distribution into two pieces. The first piece features the standard resulting distribution of log of wealth as in the rational expectation economy. The second piece reflects experiential learning, which produces a fatter tail compared with the RE economy. As wealth becomes larger, the experiential learning economy has more inequality compared with the Rational Expectation economy.

We can also compare the difference by plotting the numerical solution of the long-run stationary distribution of log of normalized wealth by examining Figure 2. The blue line denotes the distribution under (full sample) Rational Expectations. In this case, the growth of wealth is homogeneous across all generations, and the stationary distribution is exponential. In this economy, the old are richer simply because they have lived longer and have had more time to accumulate wealth. The red line plots the stationary distribution under experiential learning. The reason why the experiential learning economy features a fatter tail compared with the RE economy is pretty intuitive: it is due to the “scale dependence” of wealth accumulation (See Gabaix, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2016)). In this economy, the older are on average richer, who are also accumulating their wealth faster compared with the poorer and younger household. This is true both in normal times as well as in disaster times. Recall that during normal times, the older households have observed more data over their lifetime, and therefore take on more risk compared with the younger household. During disaster times, even though all generations become more




FIGURE 2. Long-Run Age Distribution of Log Normalized Wealth

pessimistic, it is the young generation’s beliefs that are hit the most, because they have less life time experience, and would therefore over-extrapolate information from the disaster. Therefore, “scale dependence” is even stronger during disaster times.

4. SIMULATIONS

In this section, I take the policy functions and prices derived in the previous section, and simulate sample paths, using the benchmark parameters in Table 1. The specific choice of parameters will be discussed in detail in the quantitative section. For now, let us focus on what happens to cohort behaviors after a disaster shock. To start, I shut down general equilibrium effects by fixing prices at their Rational Expectations equilibrium values. I assume that all agents start trading at age 20. When the trading age of the agent is 10 years old (30 years biological age) , I introduce a one time disaster shock. Figure 3 plots the responses to the shock.

As one can see, with log utility and complete markets, the agent invests all their wealth into the risky asset, and then borrows to purchase the disaster-contingent security. If one inspects the disaster-contingent security premium, one can see that its drift exceeds the risk free rate. Therefore, shorting to purchase the disaster-contingent security yields positive net returns during normal times. The agent’s wealth grows steadily overtime. Suddenly, at $t = 10$, a disaster strikes, which drastically brings down the endowment




FIGURE 3. Simulated Time Paths of Policy Functions and Prices

value. This does not affect his/her risky asset share, because the risky asset only prices in regular Brownian risk, which is not affected by the disaster. However, due to learning from experience, the agent's pessimism rises, which then triggers him/her to reduce his exposure to the disaster-contingent security. Notice also that it takes more than several years for him/her to get back to the same level of optimism level before the disaster. For comparison, a useful benchmark economy is the case of Rational Expectations, plotted in the blue line. In that world, the perceived likelihood of disasters is the same for all agents. In a complete market, this implies that nobody would be trading the disaster-contingent security, since they all have the same beliefs. The last two subplots show the response of prices after the disaster. As one can see, the interest rate plummets suddenly after the disaster due to increased precautionary savings. The reduction of the equilibrium interest rate also drives up both the risky asset risk premium and the disaster premium (labeled as security 1 and security 2 premium, respectively). However, the quantitative effects are rather small. For example, the equilibrium interest rate drops only 0.01298% after the shock. Therefore, the general equilibrium effect in this model is rather small compared to the partial equilibrium effect.

5. CALIBRATION

In this section, I calibrate the above model to the US data, and examine its quantitative implications for the dynamics of generational wealth inequality. Before presenting the results, it is important to discuss the benchmark parameters being used.

TABLE 1. Benchmark Parameter Values

Parameters	Value	Source
ρ	1%	Empirical Estimate 1%-2%, chosen to match interest rate
δ	1.67%	average trading life expectancy of 60 years
ω	0.92	Dividend income share from NIPA
μ	2%	Shiller's S&P 500 dividend growth
σ	11.07%	Shiller's S&P 500 dividend volatility
κ_h	-0.35	Average Disaster size from international sample (Barro (2006))
κ_l	-0.043	Real GDP drop from peak to trough in financial crisis
p^*	0.3261	Match 3-months US treasury bill interest rate (1989-2020)
π^*	0.89%	Match annual disaster intensity from (Barro (2006))
λ^H	24%	Upper bound of disaster intensity in (Barro (2006))
λ^L	1.5%	Lower bound of disaster intensity in (Barro (2006))

The birth and death rate $\delta = 1.67\%$ is calibrated such that the average trading life is from 20 to 80 years old, implying an average trading life expectancy of 60 years. The parameter ω follows from Gârleanu and Panageas (2015), which is chosen to match the fraction of capital income from the total income in the US. The drift coefficient μ and volatility coefficient σ is estimated using real dividend data from Shiller's data set absent disaster periods. The calibration of the two hazard rates $\lambda^H = 24\%$ and $\lambda^L = 1.5\%$ represent the upper and lower bounds of disaster rate, respectively, following Barro (2006). The weight $\pi^* = 0.89\%$ is chosen such that the average rare disaster likelihood is 1.7%, which corresponds to the empirical estimate of disaster frequencies from Barro (2006) of an international sample of 35 countries over 100 years. Barro (2006) also finds that the mean contraction rate upon a disaster is about 35% after counting trend growth in GDP, so is the value of κ_h in my model. I assume that the Great Depression in 1930 features a percentage output reduction of κ_h . κ_l is then calibrated to match the percentage output reduction in the 2007-2009 financial crisis using data from the St. Louis Fed, which features a smaller but still significant output drop. Next, empirical estimate of discount rate is around 1% to 2%. However, a 2% discount rate generates a model implied interest rate that is too high compared with the data. Therefore, I set $\rho = 1\%$. Moreover, I calibrate the weight parameter p^* to match the interest rate, measured by the average 3-months US treasury bill constant maturity rate in the US between 1989 January to 2020 March, which is around 2.4% annually. Finally, I assume that all agents start with a fixed prior that is equal to the Rational Expectations value.

Using the above parameters, I first compute the long-run average distribution of wealth and beliefs by simulation. The continuous time economy is discretized into discrete time with annual frequencies. I simulate the economy with 30000 initial agents for 2000 years. Each year, each living agent is endowed with ω fraction of aggregate endowment, and the wealth share weighted average of prices are computed, and fed back into the growth of wealth for each living agent. Then, δ fraction of the random sample of agents are dropped out at the end of each year, which is then replaced by the newborns, who are endowed with zero financial wealth but a fixed fraction of aggregate dividend, and their beliefs are reset to the prior in the next period. For surviving agents, their beliefs and wealth are updated. Prices are again computed by the wealth weighted average, and the process carries on for 2000 years. At the end of the simulation, the first 1000 years are discarded as a burn-in periods, while the last 1000 years of data are used to get the average joint age-wealth distribution. This is then used as the initial distribution in 1920, where I start the calibration from. Next, I assume that two disasters happened after 1920. In 1933, the Great Depression reduces the output by a percentage of κ_h , and in 2009, the financial

crisis reduces the output by a percentage of κ_l . I then re-run the simulation for 100 years to examine the response of the wealth distribution between 1920 to 2020.




FIGURE 4. Calibrated Path of Old to Young Wealth Ratio

Figure 4 is the main result of the paper. It plots the calibrated path of the old to young wealth ratio (65 and over vs. 35 and under). There are several interesting patterns that emerge. As one can see, right after the 1933 Depression, the old to young wealth ratio first went down sharply. This reflects a pure price effect, where the old generations, who were also more invested in the stock market, lost a fortune during the Great Depression. More interestingly, this initial sudden reduction is then followed by a more gradual tranquil decrease of old to young wealth ratio all the way until around 1970-1980s. This reflects the lingering “belief scarring” effect. As time goes by, the young people that experienced the Great Depression (the “Depression babies”) become older. Over the life cycle, their conservative portfolio strategies cause them to lose wealth relative to the newer generations that have not experienced the Great Depression. This effect last quite a long while, until the “depression babies” almost disappear from the stock market scene, and finally the wealth ratio starts going back up. After 1970-1980s, the optimistic boomers gradually start to take off, and invest more heavily than the GenX and the Millennials. This gradual rise in generational inequality is again interrupted in the financial crisis, where the old boomers lost wealth again due to the stock market crash. In the last few years, this ratio

mildly trended up again when the asset prices recovers.




FIGURE 5. Model vs. Data

To see how the model implied old to young wealth ratio compares with the data, we can examine Figure 5. An eyeball econometric test would tell that the model generates a qualitative pattern of old to young wealth ratio consistent with the data, with a rise before the financial crisis and a decline after the financial crisis. However, I will leave the quantitative interpretation to the next subsection.

5.1. Belief inheritance, or experiential learning? One might argue that different generations could have different priors, depending on the influence of the environment, especially their parents. After all, pessimism begets pessimism. For example, even though boomers were relatively lucky during their own lifetime, they could have been influenced by the pessimism of their depression era parents. Similarly, a millennial might have an optimistic boomer parent, which allows him to confront his dismal prospects with a degree of optimism. In other words, inter-generational belief transfers might dampen this paper's key mechanism. However, such belief inheritance is hard to measure with data. The closest attempt has been Charles and Hurst (2003), who uses PSID data along with survey measures to get estimates of risk tolerance across generations. However, since the PSID only asks participants to choose three levels of risk tolerance, this measure is rather rough, and it is also unclear to what extent the measure reflects risk aversion (which is intrinsic in preferences) vs. beliefs (which reflect agents' subjective estimates of the market return).

Since this paper focuses on the belief channel, I continue to fix all agents' risk aversion at the same level. To see how the result might be altered by having different priors, I now set all the newborn's priors to be equal to the market average beliefs at the time they are born, and see how that changes the result.




FIGURE 6. Fixed Prior vs. Market Based Prior

Figure 6 plots the comparison of the old to young wealth ratio by comparing the benchmark economy (with a fixed prior) to an economy where prior beliefs are equal to the market average beliefs at that time. As one can see, the qualitative increase of the old to young wealth ratio still holds, although its level is slightly different. The change in the level of inequality with a market-based prior is complicated, and in general depends on parameters. I briefly discuss forces that could increase as well decrease it. There are two main forces that generate increased inequality. First, since disasters are rare, the average market-based beliefs are more optimistic than the fixed rational expectation prior, therefore it produces more optimism for everyone, which naturally contributes to more risk taking and higher inequality. Second, a market-based prior implies that we add one more dimension of agent heterogeneity, which amplifies the heterogeneity of wealth growth differences for all agents, which also contributes to higher inequality (See Gabaix, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2016)). On the other hand, as discussed in the previous paragraph, if the lucky generations (those that do not experience disasters in their own lifetime) happen to be born at a time when the market is pessimistic, they would have to balance between the

pessimistic prior and the more optimistic lifetime experience, which could dampen generational inequality compared with the benchmark model. Therefore, the general prediction of how changing priors change generational inequality is ambiguous.

TABLE 2. Model vs. Data

Δ of O/Y Wealth Ratio	1989-2016	1989-2009	2009-2016
Data	70.06%	84.55%	-7.85%
Model (Fixed Prior)	8.21%	10.01%	-1.64%
Model (Market Based Prior)	6.72%	9.86%	-2.86%

However, our attention is on the model’s ability to explain the *rise* in generational inequality. Table 2 compares the model performance relative to the data. In both cases, generational inequality trends up after the mid 1980s, albeit with different magnitudes. This is understandable, since the model singles out experiential learning as the only mechanism driving generational inequality, while in reality, many other channels have contributed to this increase. Therefore, a better statistic to evaluate the fit of the model is to ask how much of the rise can be explained by the model. Since generational inequality is not always increasing after 1980s, it is useful to split the sample into before and after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and examine how the model performs respectively. From 1989 to 2009, the old to young wealth ratio rose by 84.55%, while the model generates an increase of 10.01%, which is around 12% of the increase. However, the model does even a better job after the financial crisis. In the data, the old to young wealth ratio decreased by 7.85% during this period of time, while the model generates a decrease of 1.64%. This amounts to almost 21% of the decrease. Using the market based prior, the model generates an increase of generational inequality of similar magnitude compared with the data before the financial crisis, and does even better after the financial crisis.

5.2. Comments on the Baby Boomers. One might argue that the increase in overall inequality in recent decades could well be a result of an increasing cohort size of senior citizens, i.e., when the baby boomers get old, they also become on average richer. In partial equilibrium, this does not matter because the model is calibrated to the old to young wealth ratio for the *median* household, i.e., the cohort size effect is eliminated. However, in general equilibrium, the increased cohort size of the boomers matters. A large cohort could imply an increased price impact, which in turn influences the return for everyone in the economy. After all, popular press and the media have long discussed whether the retirement of the boomers is likely to trigger a fall in stock prices, which could harm the millennials. Similar asset market meltdown hypothesis has been debated in the

academic community as well.¹⁰ In the model, an increase in the cohort size of the optimistic boomers is likely to push up the equilibrium interest rate and decrease the equity premium, thus reducing the financial gains for everyone. If this is the case, generational inequality would be dampened. However, as mentioned before, such general equilibrium effects are rather small, amounting to only 0.01298% on interest rate changes from peak to trough. Therefore we are safe to take the result from the benchmark calibration as a reasonable approximation to the real world.

5.3. Comments on Savings rate. In general, wealth accumulation is driven by *two* choices, saving and portfolio allocation. By assuming log utility, this paper focuses on the portfolio allocation channel. However, it is possible that generational belief differences influences savings rate as well, which in turn influences generational wealth inequality. Interestingly, data from Moody’s Analytics shows that the savings rate has been declining for all age groups from early 1990, and went slightly back up after the financial crisis, particularly for the millennials. Therefore, if one were to examine the effect of savings on generational inequality, one would expect that the old to young wealth ratio would *decrease* during this period. This shows that the portfolio choice channel would have been more important in recent years if savings rates are declining. To be more specific about how disasters might alter the savings rate, The Appendix further examines how the savings rate responds to experienced stock market returns, controlling other factors. In all regression specifications, there is no significant correlation between previous stock returns and the savings rate. This provides further empirical support that it is reasonable to fix savings rate as constant in this model.

5.4. Robustness: A US-specific experience. The benchmark calibration relies on the Barro (2006) estimates of disaster frequency and size, which are based on an international sample of 35 countries over 100 years. Such disasters (defined as contraction of GDP of more than at least 15%) add up to only 60 cases in his sample, which points to an average disaster probability of 1.7% per year. There are at least two reasons for doing this. First, since rare disasters are by definition rare, it is hopeless to just rely on the experience of US itself to “estimate” the frequency and size of disasters. Second, economic disasters are becoming increasingly global in the last century, with the main drivers being world wars, the Great Depression, the Asian financial crisis, and the Latin American debt crisis. The strong correlation of international disasters makes it defensible to use global data to infer disaster estimates for the US. Nevertheless, the US is still a relatively tranquil country. Therefore, it pays off to see how a reduced disaster size influences the results.

¹⁰See Poterba (2001), Abel (2001).

TABLE 3. Robustness: Alternative Disaster Parameters (1989-2016)

	Data	Benchmark	$\kappa_h = -0.33$
% Δ O/Y wealth ratio	84.55%	10.01%	8.33%
Δ Top 1% wealth share	61.95%	12.23%	8.78%
Corr(Risky Share, Age)	0.3644	0.6537	0.6537

Table 3 examines how the model performs in other dimensions of the data other than the old to young wealth ratio.¹¹ As stated in the benchmark calibration results, the benchmark model is able to explain 12% to 21% of the changes of the old to young wealth ratio from 1989 to 2016. The model also predicts an increase of 1.1223 times of increase of the top 1% wealth share increase, while in the data it's 1.6195 times. This is a fairly encouraging result, given that the model focuses only on between-cohort heterogeneity, and has been silent about all other heterogeneity that are potentially important for explaining increases in top shares, i.e., changes in taxes, labor income, technology, etc. We can also examine the life-cycle property of portfolio shares from the model. We know that on average, the old witness more data and grow more optimistic about stock returns, which makes them to invest a higher share of their wealth in the risky asset. A positive correlation between risky share and age are seen both in the model and in the data from PSID, albeit with different levels. In the model, such correlation amounts to 0.6537, while in the data, it is only 0.3644. This is not surprising, since the data also consists of many retired households who cash out from the market to finance retirement consumption, while the model focuses on before-retirement investment patterns.

Next, we need to check the robustness of these results to alternative parameter values. As mentioned above, the US has been a relatively tranquil country. In principle, one can either vary the disaster size or the disaster frequency. However, since there are only 1-2 disasters per 100 years in the US, I will stick to the international estimates for the disaster frequency, and vary the disaster size. In Barro (2006), the per capita reduction of real GDP, adjusted by trend growth is 35% in the international sample. However, the Great depression features a slightly smaller reduction, which totals 33%. By using $\kappa_h = -0.33$ and re-doing the calibration, one can see that the predicted changes in the old to young wealth ratio is now slightly lower, albeit still amounts 10% of the increase. The predictions on other moments do not change much in response to the changes in κ_h .

¹¹I used the Saez and Zucman top income database to get the top 1% share in the data, which ends in 2016. The risky share and age correlation is estimated from the PSID, where the 2017 data is used to approximate its value in 2016.

6. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

In this section, I provide further empirical evidence on generational belief differences, portfolio choice and wealth inequality.

6.1. Evidence on life cycle portfolio choices. One implication of this model is that it links portfolio choice decisions directly to experienced stock market crashes. This produces testable restrictions on observed life cycle portfolios. To examine this, I use portfolio choice data from the SCF, and compare the mean risky portfolio share for all ages in the 1983 and the 2016 waves respectively.¹²




FIGURE 7. Life Cycle Risky Share By Age (SCF Data)

Figure 7 shows several interesting patterns: First, life cycle risky portfolio choices increase with age in both years. Second, this positive slope is steeper in 2016 than in 1983.

¹²The 1983 Survey of Consumer Finance wave has less information on asset positions, but still provides relatively detailed information on stock and bond holdings. To construct a proxy for the bond share, I therefore define risk free asset holdings as the total amount in checking accounts, money market and call accounts, savings accounts, certificate of deposits, bonds, and life insurance. Risky assets are then defined as total amounts in stock and mutual funds. The 2016 wave has richer information. I define risky assets as the total amount in stock holding in the Roth IRA, roll-over IRA, regular or other IRA, Keogh accounts, stock holding in the savings accounts, direct holding in publicly traded stocks, stock holding in annuity accounts, and stock mutual funds. Risk free assets are defined as the sum of checking account, Certificate of deposit, non-stock savings in the savings account, bond mutual fund, government bond mutual fund, other bond mutual funds, savings bonds, other bonds, state and municipal bonds, foreign bond, corporate bonds, cash, non-stock holding in annuity accounts, life insurance. I then define wealth as the sum of risky and risk free assets, net debt values.

Third, old people in 1983 in fact decrease their share further, in contrast to old people in 2016, who continue to increase their shares. Interestingly, my model provides a rationale for these patterns. Remember that in 1983, old people are the depression babies. Even though they built optimism gradually after the Great Depression, they are still not as optimistic as the younger people at that time. However, in 2016, when boomers are getting older, they are much more optimistic than the young millennials. Even though both generations experienced the recent financial crisis, the boomers were less scarred compared with the less experienced millennials. My model traces these belief changes to portfolio choice changes directly.

6.2. Generational belief differences vs. Inequality. In the model section, I consider the Great Depression and the Great recession as the only two disasters during the last 100 years in the US (the next SCF will allow us to incorporate a third disaster, i.e., the Covid pandemic). This makes the model analytically tractable, but it neglects the potential impacts of smaller disasters on the wealth distribution. In this section, I provide additional empirical evidence on generational belief differences and its correlation with top wealth shares. Figure 8 plots the magnitude of rare stock market crashes measured by the percentage reduction of S&P 500 values from peak to trough. It uses monthly data from Shiller’s stock market index ranging from 1871.01 to 2016.12. As one can see, such events have been rather rare, and that the the Great Depression has so far the largest size of stock market crash, which features a 84.76% loss of stock value in total.¹³ However, even before the Great Depression, the US economy has not been tranquil. There was a 1907 banking crisis, and a 1873 stock market crash before that. However, the generations that were born between the end of the Great Depression and 1980s have enjoyed a Golden age of the US economy, with no major crisis. In contrast, the young people in recent years have witnessed more crisis, from the 1987 stock market crash, to the 2000 tech bubble burst, to the financial crisis, and even more recently, the Covid crisis. Those traumatic events could have left profound mental impacts, and scarred the economic optimism of those generations. To illustrate this, Figure 9 plots the pessimism index from 1941 to 2020 using the same data, contrasting differences in pessimism between the old (60-70 years old) and the young (20-30 years old).¹⁴ The depression score $P_{i,t}$ for generation i at

¹³In his famous book “The Greatest Generation” (Brokaw (2000)), Tom Brokaw dubbed the young people during that period of time as the greatest generation, who not only survived through the stock market crash, but also lived through extreme social turmoil, high income inequality, and eventually WWII.

¹⁴Note that the stock market data only goes back to 1871. Therefore, to understand the experience of a 70 year old, the index only makes sense from 1941 and onward.




FIGURE 8. Stock Market Crash




FIGURE 9. Pessimism Index

time t is defined as a lifetime weighted average of depression loss, or more precisely,

$$P_{i,t}(\lambda) = \sum_{k=1}^{age_{i,t}-1} \omega_{i,t}(k, \lambda) \mathbb{1}(Depression_{t-k} = 1) L_{t-k} \quad (6.46)$$

where $\omega_{i,t}(k, \lambda) = \frac{(age_{i,t}-k)^\lambda}{\sum_{k=1}^{age_{i,t}-1} (age_{i,t}-k)^\lambda}$ and L_{t-k} denotes the percentage loss in year $t-k$. The depression experience weighting function is identical to the return experience weighting function *à la* Malmendier and Nagel (2011), with the weighting parameter $\lambda = 1.5$ that they estimated using the SCF data, and is discussed in detail in Appendix A.1. Here, I use the same experience weighting function to construct the pessimism index, and define disasters where the peak to trough stock market value drop of more than 20%.





FIGURE 10. Top 1% wealth share

FIGURE 11. Top 1% wealth share
s. Relative Optimism

Interesting patterns emerge in Figure 9. Before mid 1980s, both the young and the old become more optimistic, but the young generations become optimistic at a much faster speed. While the old are still digesting trauma from the Great depression, and possibly also the 1873 stock market crash as well the 1907 panic, the young who luckily escaped those events are getting increasingly more optimistic relative to the old. This pattern continued to last until mid 1980s. Then the table turned. With smaller crashes in 1987s, the dotcom bust, and the 2007-2009 financial crisis, doubts were raised by the young people. Although both the recent young and the old generations have experienced these disasters, the young generations have less experience, and therefore would over-extrapolate from the disaster. In summary, the old were more pessimistic than the young before 1980s, but became more optimistic after 1980s. So why is this depression score interesting? Remember, the famous U-shaped pattern of inequality also features a turning point around 1980s!

To see the connection, Figure 10 plots the evolution of the top 1% wealth share in the United States using the Saez and Zucman (2016) data ¹⁵ Figure 11 plots the same statistics against relative optimism, defined as the difference between the young depression score and the old depression score. An obvious positive correlation emerges. At times when the old is more optimistic than the young, the top share is on average higher.

One might argue that households' beliefs not only react to extreme disastrous events, but could also revise gradually during normal times. After all, if generations experience both boom and bust, optimism induced by the boom might undo the depressing effect of the bust. Here, I examine in more detail if the generational belief differences are robust by considering overall experienced returns rather than only disaster experience. To capture this idea, I ask the following question: In each year t , what is the subjective expected return for each cohort i implied by the model? Let r_t represent the actual realized annual return in year t , the expected annual return $er_{i,t}$, becomes

$$er_{i,t} = prob(De\text{pression} = 1)_{i,t} * \kappa_t + (1 - prob(De\text{pression} = 1)_{i,t}) \sum_{k=1}^{age_{i,t}-1} \omega_{i,t}(k, \lambda) r_{t-k} \quad (6.47)$$

where

$$prob(De\text{pression} = 1) = \sum_{k=1}^{age_{i,t}-1} \omega_{i,t}(k, \lambda) \mathbb{1}(De\text{pression} = 1) \quad (6.48)$$

and

$$\omega_{i,t}(k, \lambda) = \frac{(age_{i,t} - k)^\lambda}{\sum_{k=1}^{age_{i,t}-1} (age_{i,t} - k)^\lambda} \quad (6.49)$$

¹⁵I use the top income database top 1% net private wealth share data. Two years of missing values (1963 and 1965) are imputed with linear interpolation.

This captures the idea that the expected returns are the weighted average of the return during disaster times as well as normal times, with changing subjective likelihood of the disaster governed by the experience of the household. I use the monthly total real stock return of S&P 500 from Shiller's dataset, and convert returns into annual frequency.¹⁶ Since there is no stock market return data before 1871.01, I compute the beliefs for all cohort in 1871 assuming that no disasters happens before that, so that disaster likelihood decreases gradually with age. Figure 12 compares the expected return for old vs. young.




FIGURE 12. Expected Return: Old vs. Young

Up until the 1980s, the young expected higher returns than the old. This is understandable, because while the old struggled with the aftermath of the Great depression and possibly earlier crashes, the young cohort did not have those experiences. Notice that their expected return dropped in the later part of this period due to a slight downturn in the stock market in 1960-1970s, there was no major disasters during this period, and the they are still much more optimistic than the old. However, the table turned during the 1980s. With the 1987 crash, the 2000 dotcom bubble bust, and even more so the recent

¹⁶Malmendier and Nagel (2011) uses the arithmetic mean return to measure experienced returns. For a behavioral investor who cares about gains and losses from a reference point, this could well capture the experience of his/her investment returns. However, a more rational investor who cares about the final wealth position would take a slightly different view. Such an investor would instead take the geometric mean instead of the arithmetic mean to measure his/her return experience. In Appendix A.2, I show that although there is slight difference in these two measures, the qualitative pattern of the expected returns of old vs. young still holds.

financial crisis, the new young generation become traumatized. Taking into account of possible future crashes, they even start to expect negative returns. Notice that there is a short period where the young people's optimism are boosted (i.e., the stock market boom in the 1990s), but it is not enough to undo the negative effect of the two recent crisis they experience. Although the old, especially the boomers, have had similar experience, they still have the memory of the good old times, and are more optimistic about the returns.

7. ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS

7.1. What about housing? A natural question to ask might be: what about housing? After all, the last few decades have witnessed large swings in housing prices. Given that older people are more likely to be home owners than the young people, changes in housing prices and home ownership seem likely to account for the majority of changes in generational inequality (Kuhn, Schularick, and Steins (2017)), Rognlie (2016)).

To disentangle overall wealth from housing wealth, I now use the quarterly Survey of Consumer Finance data on generational wealth distribution summarized by the Federal Reserve Board to examine how much housing value matters for generational inequality. Figure 13 plots the generational wealth ratio with and without housing, measured by median wealth ratio of the 55-69 group and the under 40 years old age group. The blue line measures wealth ratio using net worth, and the red line provides the same measure excluding housing value (defined as real estate value minus the mortgage value).

An interesting observation from this graph is that housing matters the most before and after the financial crisis. However, the overall increase of this ratio during this entire period remains stable and robust.

7.2. Financial Market Development. One obvious concern could be that the financial market became much more developed after the 1980s, which produced an increase in stock market participation. This increases the growth rate of wealth of everyone, but is also disproportionately benefiting the older more, since they have more wealth to be invested than the young. While I acknowledge that the extensive margin of financial inclusion could be an essential aspect in generational inequality, it does not capture the intensive margin of portfolio allocation. To examine this, I now focus on stock market participants, and study the life cycle behavior of portfolio allocation in 1984 and 2017 using PSID data. If the “belief scarring” channel exists, the slope of life cycle risky stock share would be very different in these two years. As expected, in both years, stock share as a fraction of wealth increases with age, and the slope has also become steeper. In 1984, the correlation of stock




FIGURE 13. Net Worth Ratio Excluding Housing (PSID)

share and age was only 0.2708, but in 2017, the correlation rises to 0.4579. This suggests that the extensive margin of stock market participation cannot be the only mechanism that drives recent increase in generational inequality.

7.3. Relaxed Borrowing Constraints. The development in financial markets also relaxed borrowing constraint in the US since early 1980s. There are two aspects of the argument: First, since the old are usually not hand to mouth, they can leverage on existing wealth, and profit from higher returns in the stock market. Second, the loosening borrowing constraint has led the young to decumulate wealth instead of saving, whose effect on increasing wealth inequality is well documented in Favilukis (2013). Polarization occurs when the former makes the older richer, while the latter makes the younger poorer. Thus, it pays off to examine the difference between the gross and the net wealth. Suppose we see that gross wealth inequality has not increased between cohorts, but net wealth inequality has increased, then it is more likely that loosening borrowing constraints are the main driver of cross-cohort inequality. To examine this, I use the PSID data to compute gross wealth ratio. Again, in 1984, the wealth ratio of the two groups was 3.346 times, but in 2009¹⁷, the ratio has increased to 8.856 times. This suggests that there are forces other than loosening borrowing constraint that are contributing to the divergence of wealth between the young and the old.

¹⁷PSID has different definition of debt after that year.

7.4. Direct and Indirect Inter-generational Transfers. Inheritance and other inter-generational transfers play a potentially crucial role in generational inequality (See Boar (2020)). Perhaps the millennials have nothing to worry about, since they will inherit their parents' houses and bank accounts. On the other hand, the increased cost of life extending medical treatments might cause boomers to exhaust all their wealth before they die. This section examines if the results of the paper are robust to inter-generational transfers. Evidence suggests that inheritances have doubled since the 1980s (Alvaredo, Garbinti, and Piketty (2017)). However, this rise has an equalizing effect on wealth distribution (Wolff (2002)) because even though the overall amount of inheritance has been rising, the share of wealth in inheritance has been declining dramatically during this period. One might argue that even though the overall inequality could be equalized, generational inequality might not, because older people are on average more likely to have inheritance than younger people. To examine the robustness of the old to young wealth ratio, I again use PSID data and compare the old to young wealth ratio (above 65 vs. under 35) with and without inheritance. In 1995, inheritance makes no different to this ratio, which has a value of 6.05¹⁸, while in 2013, there is only slight difference. The old to young wealth ratio is 17.23 after inheritance, and becomes 17.41 before inheritance. Therefore, the ratio does not differ much by varying direct transfers that in the form of inheritance.

But what about indirect transfers that take the form of education expenses? After all, college tuition has become much more expensive over the last two to three decades. Capelle (2019) shows that the US higher education system has contributed greatly to increased inter-generational immobility with rising tuition fees. If the older parents are paying tuition for their kids, it serves as a direct wealth transfer to the young people, which could decrease the real old to young wealth ratio. To check this, I subtract cumulative education expenses from net wealth, with the assumption that these are the tuition paid to finance the education of their kids. Since wealth is a stock variable, but education expense is a flow variable, I adjust the cumulative education expense by four times of the yearly reported education expense assuming that these expenses occur due to the four year college education. Interestingly, without taking into account tuition expense, the old to young wealth ratio grew from 8.26 times to 13.5 times, which is about a 63% increase. If one subtract wealth by education expense, the ratio went from 9.269 times to 15.756 times, which is around 70% of increase. So in fact, the rise in college tuition makes the younger generation even poorer. One possible interpretation of this is that the tuition-paying parents are mostly middle aged instead of being over 65 years

¹⁸The earliest information on inheritance value starts in 1995. However, there is no wealth data in that year. A linear interpolation is taken between the two surveys in 1994 and 1999 to impute the 1995 wealth level

old, and when they reach 65 years and beyond, their college-educated kids have already graduated, so even though the tuition expense might affect the family budget while the parents are in the middle age, it does not affect the 65 years older group that much. At the same time, the rising education expense pushes young people to take out higher values of student loans, which further drags down their bank account. Of course, the young might recoup this expense in the form of higher future labor income, but that is uncertain.

Finally, since we are discussing generational inequality in the U.S, we must briefly consider social security. In the U.S, the social security program has been expanded hugely over the last several decades (See Bourne, Edwards, et al. (2019)). Since it primarily operates on a pay-as-you-go system, secular changes in demographics and productivity potentially induce large generational redistribution, depending on whether unfunded liabilities are financed by tax increases or benefit cuts (Kotlikoff and Burns (2005)). The type of social security that matters for generational inequality comes in the form of retirement wealth. One might argue that if we were to incorporate social security wealth into the definition of wealth, generational inequality might not be that bad, because even if young people might look poor on paper, they might still have a lot of retirement wealth to spare in the future. To examine this, I re-calculate the old to young wealth ratio in PSID in 1989 and 2013. Without retirement wealth, the old to young wealth ratio increased from 4.3 times to 17.42 times. If one adds retirement wealth into overall wealth, the increase is a little milder, which features 4.32 times in 1989 and 11.14 times in 2013. That is, even though the increase is milder, there is still significant rise in generational inequality from the 1980s.

7.5. Increased Supply of Data. One might ask, why learning from experience? Wouldn't standard Bayesian learning that incorporates all historical data also generate wealth dispersion, if everyone becomes more optimistic when more data become available? Perhaps pessimism induced by the Great Depression makes everyone more pessimistic and invest less, which reduces inequality at the beginning, and then overtime, optimism builds, everyone becomes more optimistic and invests more again, thus the economy exhibits rising inequality. This argument might sound plausible at a glance. After all, it seems consistent with the famous U-shaped pattern of inequality that we have seen in the last century. However, this explanation is in contrast with the data on survey expectations. If we think that investors learn not just from their own limited experience, but can pay attention to all the historical data, then overtime, as more data reaches to them, their beliefs should become increasingly homogeneous, even if they start out having very different prior. The monthly Shiller's data starting from 1989 on stock market crash optimism index shows that this is simply not the case. It measures the percent of the population who attach

little probability (strictly less than 10%) to a stock market crash in the next six months. This is a direct measure of beliefs about stock market disaster likelihood. Each index is derived from the responses to a single question that has been asked consistently through time since 1989 to a consistent sample of respondents. Figure 14 plots the standard error of the measure for the institutional as well as the individual data. Using standard error as a measure of belief heterogeneity, Clearly, there is no evidence that beliefs are in any foreseeable future converging. If anything, it slightly diverges more after the recent financial crisis.




FIGURE 14. Measure of Belief Convergence: Standard Error of Cash Confidence Index

8. EFFICIENCY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In this paper, inequality is generated within a complete markets economy. In contrast, most other models studying inequality consider incomplete markets economies (i.e., Hugget or Bewley models). Does this imply that inequality here is efficient? Perhaps not. In fact, with heterogeneous beliefs, there has been a debate about the Pareto criterion, which dates back to the 1970s Starr (1973), Harris (1978) and Hammond (1981). This early work highlighted that when beliefs are different, ex-ante efficiency might not correspond to ex-post efficiency. This issue is present in my model as well. With heterogeneous priors and experiential learning, each investor considers their own beliefs to be correct. Each thinks they would be better off with speculation ex ante. However, ex post consumption

is excessively volatile from a social welfare point of view. Indeed, from behind the veil of ignorance, all investors agree that they cannot all have correct beliefs. They know that their future perceived welfare gains are likely to be spurious. Another limitation of the conventional Pareto criteria lies in the assumption that the planner has the ability to know the true data generating process, which is not realistic either. Recent work has proposed new Pareto criteria in evaluating efficiency with heterogeneous priors. For example, to address the problem of whose beliefs to evaluate under, Brunnermeier, Simsek, and Xiong (2014) propose an enhanced version of the Pareto criterion by suggesting a belief-neutral efficiency criterion, where an allocation is efficient if it's efficient under any convex combination of agents' beliefs. To address the problem of incomplete knowledge of the planner, Walden and Heyerdahl-Larsen (2015) proposes an incomplete knowledge efficiency criterion to evaluate efficiency and distortion from a planner's point of view. Another practical criterion related to financial regulation is Gayer, Gilboa, Samuelson, and Schmeidler (2014), who propose a no betting criterion to assess whether speculative trading should take place or not.

9. LITERATURE REVIEW

This paper is related to four strands of literature. First, it is largely inspired by the recent macro literature that examines the implications of deviations from rational expectations. As shown in a seminal paper by Woodford (2013), although the literature hasn't reached an unequivocal verdict regarding what expectation formation rules researchers should adopt, a promising approach that relies on a statistically modest deviation from rational expectations is to assume that beliefs are refined through induction from observed history. The over-weighting of personal experiences has long been discussed in the psychology literature, named as availability bias as in Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Compared with a full Bayesian approach, such belief formation mechanism exhibits strong over extrapolation behavior (See Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) for a survey). Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2015) and Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2018) rationalize a set of asset pricing anomalies when an over-extrapolative investor interact with a rational agent in the financial market. Evidence of over extrapolation is pervasive. In financial markets, it is supported by a seminal paper Malmendier and Nagel (2011), who uses data from Survey of Consumer Finance and provides strong empirical support that personal experience in the stock market has a prolonged impact on how much they invest in risky assets later in their lives. In particular, those that experienced the 1930s great depression were less willing to participate in the stock market, and invest significantly less even if they participate. Such belief formation is not only present in the stock market, but

also influences households' expectation formation of inflation, labor market, housing market as well as overall business cycle conditions. (Malmendier and Nagel (2015), Wee (2016), Malmendier and Shen (2018) Kozlowski, Veldkamp, and Venkateswaran (2020) and Kuchler and Zafar (2019)). However, those papers are most suited for studying macroeconomic aggregate and asset prices, but not so much on wealth distribution. Acedański (2017) attempts to solve a heterogeneous expectations model *a la* Krusell and Smith (1998) to study wealth distribution. It focuses on exogenous forecasting rules and stationary wealth distribution, while my paper uses embeds endogenous heterogeneous beliefs and focuses on the dynamics of wealth distribution.

Second, this paper attempts to generate heterogeneous beliefs when individuals learn from their own experience. Most macro-finance models with heterogeneous beliefs focus on *exogenous* heterogeneous beliefs. Classic work includes Basak (2005), Harrison and Kreps (1979), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Borovička (2020), just to name a few. Since their focus is on asset prices, belief heterogeneity could be taken as an input without having to model where it comes from. In this paper, beliefs are essentially *endogenous*, which for my purpose helps to link observable demographic structures with inequality. Nevertheless, this is not the first paper to do so. Recent advancement has studied the aggregate implication of heterogeneous generational bias stemming from learning from experience. The fact that younger people update their beliefs more frequently than the old has interesting implications on asset prices. Ehling, Graniero, and Heyerdahl-Larsen (2017) develop an elegant asset pricing model with learning from experience in a stationary diffusion environment. Malmendier, Pouzo, and Vanasco (2019) solves a similar problems in an incomplete market. Schraeder (2015) considers a noisy-rational expectation model with generational bias when agents have CARA preferences, and Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2016) solves such model with Epstein-Zin preference, albeit with two generations.

Third, this paper is related to recent literature on disaster risk in the tradition of Barro (2006). The incorporation of risk of rare disasters naturally generates a disaster premium, which significantly reduces the level of risk aversion needed in matching empirically plausible equity premium. Various extensions of disaster risk models also helps to solve the equity premium puzzle, the volatility puzzle, return predictability, etc (See Tsai and Wachter (2015) for a survey). When disaster risk is unknown and agents must infer its distribution from historical data, Koulovatianos and Wieland (2011) shows that pessimism is triggered upon the realization of a rare disaster, and rationalizes a prolonged period of decline in P-D ratio. Moreover, they prove that although asymptotic beliefs are unbiased, one never reaches full optimism of disaster risk as one would under rational expectation.

It is the slow arrival of information of disasters that keeps learning away from reaching infinite precision. In my model, the realization of a large negative shock (e.g., the Great Depression) would trigger such response from investors that experienced it, thus generating heterogeneous generational bias in the disaster risk distribution. Although there are several interesting papers that combines heterogeneous beliefs or attitudes towards disaster risk in both complete and incomplete markets (Bates (2008), Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2010), Dieckmann (2011), Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012)), these models builds on two-agents and focus on cases with dogmatic beliefs, while my model features a continuum of heterogeneous agents with learning agents that constantly update their beliefs optimally, and focus on the evolution of wealth distribution.

Last but not least, this paper contributes to the recent advancement of HACT (heterogeneous agent continuous time) models that link distributional considerations with macroeconomics (Gabaix, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2016), Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2017) and Ahn, Kaplan, Moll, Winberry, and Wolf (2018)). However, studying belief heterogeneity in such framework is still a relatively new area. Two recent papers attempt to incorporate endogenous heterogeneous beliefs into such a framework (Kasa and Lei (2018), Lei (2019)), and rationalize “state dependence” in the growth rate of wealth, which rationalizes why inequality has been growing at such a fast speed after 1980s. However, they focus on inequality within cohort with private equities. Here, I generalize those models, and am able to solve distribution across cohort, and solve a model with aggregate shock and public equity. Finally, by tracing rare disasters all the way back to the Great depression, it allows me to jointly explain both the dip of wealth inequality after the Great depression, as well as the rise of inequality after the 80s.

10. CONCLUSION

We live in a world with finite lives and limited data. This paper bridges the gap between the experiential learning literature, which is traditionally a behavioral finance literature, and the macroeconomic literature on wealth inequality. It highlights how stock market disasters like the Great Depression could have a prolonged impact on generational inequality through the channel of learning from experience. I build and solve a general equilibrium model with learning from experience agents, and examine the qualitative as well as quantitative implications for long-run wealth differences between cohorts. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that combines learning from experience with wealth inequality, which should spark interest in many possible extensions. For example, future research could extend this framework with nominal rigidity to explore the role of monetary

policy when agents are learning from inflation experience (which also exhibits strong recency bias as documented by Malmendier and Nagel (2016)). One can also generalize the current framework to incorporate features in the housing market, such as borrowing and collateral constraints, to study the distributional effect of learning from housing market experience, etc. When generational beliefs differences matters, it opens doors to policy makers to combat inequality. An example would be a mandatory pension fund designed to improve wealth accumulation of the scarred generations by helping them to invest in stocks, when they fear to do so by themselves.

APPENDIX A. APPENDIX

A.1. The experience weighting function. Figure 15 plots and compares the weights used to construct the pessimism index in 1980 by comparing a typical depression baby (age 70) and a typical boomer (age 30) as an example, with a weighting parameter $\lambda = 1.5$ estimated by Malmendier and Nagel (2011). Notice that $\lambda > 0$ implies that households exhibit recency bias, so the weights decreases with the number of days before today. Two things are noticeable. First, although both generations over-weigh recent data, the young people over-weigh even more. This is because they live through a shorter life span. Second, the depression babies still has the hangover of the Great depression happened 47-51 years ago, while a boomer would put zero weight on that.




FIGURE 15. Historical weights: Depression babies vs. Boomers

A.2. Robustness check on experienced return. The following two figures plots the generational belief differences using two different measures of experienced returns.




FIGURE 16. Using experienced annual return




FIGURE 17. Using average cumulative annual return

A.3. Proof of Lemma 2.2. See Dieckmann (2011) for the proof of eqn.(2.15) and eqn.(2.16). The derivation of $\xi_{s,t}$ process follows first by applying the Girsanov theorem for the jump process, s.t:

$$dN_{s,t} - \bar{\lambda}_{s,t}dt = dN_t(\bar{\lambda}_t) - \bar{\lambda}_t dt \quad (\text{A.50})$$

With the change of measure, we can rewrite eqn.(2.15) into

$$\frac{d\xi_{s,t}}{\xi_{s,t}^-} = \left(\bar{\lambda}_{s,t} - \lambda_{s,t}^N - r_t + \left(\frac{\lambda_{s,t}^N}{\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}} - 1 \right) (\lambda_{s,t} - \bar{\lambda}_t) \right) dt - \theta_{s,t} dZ_t + \left(\frac{\lambda_{s,t}^N}{\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}} - 1 \right) dN_t(\bar{\lambda}_t) \quad (\text{A.51})$$

Then the SDE for $\eta_{s,t}$ follows directly from the application of multidimensional jump-diffusion version of the Ito's lemma. Notice that all agents agree on the diffusion risk, therefore we can simplify the solution by imposing $\theta_{s,t} = \theta_t$, and that $dZ_{s,t} = dZ_t$. We can further simplify the expression by noticing that by definition, the market price of the jump risk is defined by $\lambda_{s,t}^N = \frac{\lambda_{s,t}}{1+\bar{\kappa}}$. Applying Ito's lemma again on $\eta_{s,t} = \frac{\xi_t}{\xi_{s,t}}$, we have

$$\frac{d\eta_{s,t}}{\eta_{s,t}} = \left(\frac{1}{1+\bar{\kappa}} \lambda_{s,t} - \lambda_t^N \right) dt + \left[\frac{1+\bar{\kappa}}{\bar{\kappa}} \left(-\frac{2\lambda_t^N}{\lambda_t} - 1 \right) - 1 \right] dN(\bar{\lambda}_t) \quad (\text{A.52})$$

A.4. Proof of proposition 2. To get the coefficient of the stock price, we can write down the formula for stock prices, i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned}
S_t &= \frac{1}{\xi_t} \mathbb{E}_t \left[\int_t^\infty \xi_u D_u du \right] \\
&= \frac{1}{\xi_t} \mathbb{E}_t \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-(\rho+\delta(1-\beta))u} \eta_u du \right] \\
&= \frac{1}{\xi_t} \eta_t \int_t^\infty e^{-(\rho+\delta(1-\beta))u} du \\
&= \frac{1}{\rho + \delta(1 - \beta)} Y_t
\end{aligned} \tag{A.53}$$

That is, stock price to dividend ratio is a constant, i.e.,

$$\frac{dS_t}{S_{t-}} = \frac{dY_t}{Y_{t-}} \tag{A.54}$$

Recall that the compounded stock market value follows the following process

$$\frac{dS_t + D_t dt}{S_{t-}} = \mu_t^S dt + \sigma^S dZ_t + \kappa_t^S dN_t(\lambda_t) \tag{A.55}$$

Matching coefficients, one get

$$\mu^S = \mu + \rho + \delta(1 - \beta); \quad \sigma^S = \sigma; \quad \kappa_t^S = \kappa_t \tag{A.56}$$

Now let's turn to the pricing of the disaster insurance product. By definition, we have

$$\mu_t^P = -\kappa_t^P \lambda_t^N + r_t = -\frac{\kappa_t}{1 + \bar{\kappa}} \mathbb{E}_{s,t}(\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}) + r_t \tag{A.57}$$

APPENDIX B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3

I first derive the stationary KFP equation with a general jump diffusion process of any random variable $w_{s,t}$

$$\frac{dw_{s,t}}{w_{s,t-}} = \hat{\mu}_{s,t} dt + \hat{\sigma}_{s,t} dZ_t + \hat{\kappa}_{s,t} dN_t \tag{B.58}$$

where dZ_t and dN_t represent aggregate Brownian motion and jump shocks. To simplify notation, I will now eliminate all subscripts in the following texts. Let $f(w)$ be any function of w , $n(w)$ be the density function of w , and let $A(t+dt)$ denotes the conditional expectation of $f(w)$ at $t+dt$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned}
A(t+dt) &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(w) n_{t+dt} dw \\
&= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} (f(w) + df(w)) n(w) - \delta f(w) n(w) dw \\
&= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(w) (1 - \delta) n(w) dw + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} df(w) n(w) dw
\end{aligned} \tag{B.59}$$

We then have

$$d(A(t)) = - \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \delta n(w) f(w) dw + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} df(w) n(w) dw. \quad (\text{B.60})$$

Applying Ito's lemma for the jump diffusion process of w , we can get

$$df(w) = f'(w)[\hat{\mu}w dt + \hat{\sigma}w dZ] + \frac{1}{2}f''(w)\hat{\sigma}^2w^2 dt + [f(w(1 + \hat{\kappa})) - f(w)]dN \quad (\text{B.61})$$

Using integration by parts, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} df(w) n(w) dw &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \left[f'(w) [\hat{\mu}w dt + \hat{\sigma}w dZ] + \frac{1}{2}f''(w)\hat{\sigma}^2w^2 dt \right] n(w) dw \\ &\quad + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} [f(w(1 + \hat{\kappa})) - f(w)] n(w) dN dw \\ &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(w) \left[-\frac{\partial}{\partial w} (n(w)\hat{\mu}w dt + n(w)\hat{\sigma}w dZ_t) + \frac{1}{2}f(w)\frac{\partial^2}{\partial w^2} (n(w)\hat{\sigma}^2w^2) dt \right] \\ &\quad + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} [n(w(1 + \hat{\kappa})) - n(w)] f(w) dN dw \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.62})$$

Notice that the way I write down changes in $A(t)$ in (B.60) fixes the density of w in the state space and calculate with Ito's Lemma how $f(w)$ will change. One can also approximate $d(A(t))$ by linearly extrapolating the density at each point, that is,

$$d(A(t)) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(w) \frac{\partial n}{\partial t} dt dw = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} df(w) n(w) dw \quad (\text{B.63})$$

Plugging in the expression in eqn. (B.62), and equating the integrands, we get

$$dn = -\frac{\partial}{\partial w} (n\hat{\mu}w dt + n\hat{\sigma}w dZ) + \frac{1}{2}\frac{\partial^2}{\partial w^2} (n\hat{\sigma}^2w^2) dt - \delta n + [n(w(1 + \hat{\kappa}), t) - n(w, t)]dN \quad (\text{B.64})$$

As one can see, the distribution of this variable is stochastic, and that there is no closed form solution in general. However, we can still ask the question, what is the long-run stationary distribution of this variable in this economy? That is, what is the solution of $dp(w) = \mathbb{E}_t(dn(w)) = 0$?¹⁹ By averaging out the KFP equation, we then have

$$-\frac{\partial}{\partial w} (\mathbb{E}(\hat{\mu})wp(w)) + \frac{\partial^2}{\partial w^2} \left(\frac{\mathbb{E}(\hat{\sigma}^2)}{2} w^2 p(w) \right) - \delta p(w) + \lambda(p^J - p) = 0 \quad (\text{B.65})$$

I now apply this stationary KFP to the variables of interest in this model. Since the aggregate economy is growing exponentially, and the newborn gets a constant share of it, we will need to normalize wealth to get a stationary distribution. Therefore, instead of examining the stationary distribution of absolute wealth, we will instead work with the

¹⁹The expectation is taken as the time-series average.

following normalized variable:

$$\tilde{w}_{s,t} = \frac{w_{s,t}}{\omega Y_t} \quad (\text{B.66})$$

That is, the absolute wealth normalized by the newborn's endowment. Since agents are born with zero financial wealth, we have $\tilde{w}_{s,s} = \frac{\omega Y_s}{\omega Y_s} = 1$. This variable has a stationary distribution absent aggregate shocks. Recall that, after imposing the market clearing condition, the individual wealth dynamics follows the following

$$\frac{dw_{s,t}}{w_{s,t-}} = \left(\sigma^2 + r - \bar{\lambda}_{s,t} + \lambda_t^N + \delta + (\lambda_{s,t} - \bar{\lambda}_t^0) \left(\frac{\lambda_{s,t}}{\lambda_t^N} - 1 \right) \right) dt + \sigma dZ + \left(\frac{\bar{\lambda}_{s,t}}{\lambda_t^N} - 1 \right) dN_t \quad (\text{B.67})$$

Applying Ito's lemma for the jump-diffusion processes, we then have

$$\frac{d\tilde{w}_{s,t}}{\tilde{w}_{s,t-}} = \left(\sigma^2 + r - \bar{\lambda}_{s,t} + \lambda_t^N + \delta + (\lambda_{s,t} - \bar{\lambda}_t^0) \left(\frac{\lambda_{s,t}}{\lambda_t^N} - 1 \right) - \mu \right) dt + \left(\frac{\lambda_{s,t}}{\mathbb{E}(\lambda_{s,t})} (1 + \kappa_t) - 1 \right) dN_t \quad (\text{B.68})$$

which in short-hand can be written as

$$\frac{d\tilde{w}_{s,t}}{\tilde{w}_{s,t-}} = \hat{\mu}(\lambda_{s,t}) dt + \hat{\kappa}(\lambda_{s,t}) dN_t \quad (\text{B.69})$$

It turns out to be easier to work with log of wealth. Define $x = \log(\tilde{w})$. With Ito's lemma, we can rewrite the above into

$$dx = \hat{\mu} dt + \log(1 + \hat{\kappa}) dN_t \quad (\text{B.70})$$

Recall that our final goal is to compute the long-run average marginal density of log wealth $p(x)$, which can be seen as

$$p(x) = \int_0^\infty n(x, \lambda) d\lambda \quad (\text{B.71})$$

Notice that we can further decompose the joint density $n(\cdot)$ into the product of the marginal density of belief and the conditional density of wealth, i.e.,

$$n(x, \lambda) = n_1(x|\lambda) n_2(\lambda) \quad (\text{B.72})$$

From eqn. (B.70), we can write down the dynamics of $n_1(x|\lambda)$, i.e.,

$$0 = -\frac{\partial n_1}{\partial x} \hat{\mu} + \lambda^0 (n_1(\log(1 + \hat{\kappa}) + x) - n_1) - \delta n_1 \quad (\text{B.73})$$

We can guess and verify a solution $n_1 = A e^{\zeta x}$, where $\zeta = \frac{\lambda^0 \hat{\kappa} - \delta}{\hat{\mu}}$ and that A is the normalizing constant of the conditional distribution. We can further approximate ζ around $\lambda = \lambda^0 = 0$, and get

$$\zeta \approx \zeta_0 + (\lambda - \lambda^0) \zeta_1 \quad (\text{B.74})$$

where $\zeta_0 = \frac{\bar{\kappa}\lambda^0 - \delta}{d}$ and $\zeta_1 = \frac{\bar{\kappa}d - \bar{\kappa}(\bar{\kappa}\lambda^0 - \delta)}{d^2}$, and where $a = \frac{1+\bar{\kappa}}{\mathbb{E}(\lambda_{s,t})}$, $c = -2 - \frac{\lambda^0}{\lambda^N}$, $d = \sigma^2 + r + \lambda^N + \delta + \lambda^0 - \mu$.

To compute $n_2(\lambda_{s,t})$, recall that

$$d\lambda_{s,t} = (\lambda_{s,t^-} - \lambda_l)(\lambda_{s,t} - \lambda_h)dt - (\lambda_{s,t^-} - \lambda_h)(\lambda_{s,t^-} - \lambda_l)\frac{(1 + \lambda_{s,t^-})}{\lambda_{s,t^-}}dN_t \quad (\text{B.75})$$

Writing out the stationary KFP of $\lambda_{s,t}$ and again abstract away from super(sub)scripts, we can get

$$0 = -\frac{\partial n_2}{\partial \lambda}(\lambda - \lambda_h)(\lambda - \lambda_l) - n_2(2\lambda - \lambda_l - \lambda_h + \delta) + \lambda^0(n_2^J - n_2) \quad (\text{B.76})$$

We can guess and verify the following approximate exponential solution

$$n_2(\lambda) \approx e^{g_0 + g_1\lambda + \frac{g_2}{2}\lambda^2} \quad (\text{B.77})$$

We can then substitute this into the above ODE, and match the constants. This ensures that the marginal density is non-negative, and that we are looking for a solution around $\lambda = 0$.

In the end, we can simply get the marginal distribution of log wealth by integrating the product of the conditional distribution of wealth and the marginal distribution of beliefs, i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} p(x) &= G_0 e^{(\zeta_0 - \lambda^0 \zeta_1)x} \int_{\lambda_l}^{\lambda_h} e^{\lambda \zeta_1 x} e^{g_0 + g_1 \lambda + \frac{g_2}{2} \lambda^2} d\lambda \\ &= \underbrace{G e^{\zeta_0 x}}_{RE} \underbrace{[\zeta_1 x + g_1]^{-1} [e^{(\lambda_h - \lambda^0) \zeta_1 x} - e^{(\lambda_l - \lambda^0) \zeta_1 x}]}_{Learning} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.78})$$

Let $p^{RE}(x)$ denote the long run stationary distribution of log normalized wealth in the rational expectation economy, we then have

We then have

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} \frac{p(x)}{p^{RE}(x)} &= \lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} [\zeta_1 x + g_1]^{-1} [e^{(\lambda_h - \lambda^0) \zeta_1 x} - e^{(\lambda_l - \lambda^0) \zeta_1 x}] \\ &= \lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} \zeta_1^{-1} [-(\lambda_l - \lambda^0) \zeta_1 e^{(\lambda_l - \lambda^0) \zeta_1 x}] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.79})$$

where the second equality uses the L'hôpital's rule. Recall that $\zeta_1 = \frac{\bar{\kappa}d - \bar{\kappa}(\bar{\kappa}\lambda^0 - \delta)}{d^2}$. With the calibrated parameter values, we then know that $\zeta_1 < 0$. Therefore, the above expression goes to infinity when $x \rightarrow \infty$. We then have

$$\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} p(x) > \lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} p^{RE}(x) \quad (\text{B.80})$$

That is, the experiential learning economy has a fatter right tail of wealth distribution compared with the standard RE economy.

B.1. Verification of Newborn Consumption Share. We start by defining β_t , i.e.,

$$\beta_t = \frac{c_{t,t}}{Y_t} = \frac{(\rho + \delta)w_{t,t}}{Y_t} \quad (\text{B.81})$$

where the second equality comes from consumption smoothing of a log agent. Since agents are born without financial wealth, $W_{t,t}$ is essentially the present value of all future earnings.

$$\begin{aligned} W_{t,t} &= \frac{1}{\xi_t} \mathbb{E}_t \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta(u-t)} \xi_u \omega Y_u du \right] \\ &= \omega Y_t \mathbb{E}_t \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-(\rho + \delta + \delta(1-\beta))(u-t)} \frac{\bar{\eta}_u}{\bar{\eta}_t} du \right] \\ &= \frac{\omega Y_t}{\rho + \delta + \delta(1-\beta)} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.82})$$

where the second equality uses the definition of $\bar{\eta}_t$, and the third equality follows from the fact that the disagreement process $\bar{\eta}_t$ is a martingale. We then have a fixed point for β , i.e.,

$$\beta = \frac{1}{\rho + \delta + \delta(1-\beta)} \quad (\text{B.83})$$

This renders the two solutions

$$\beta_{1,2} = \frac{\rho + 2\delta}{2\delta} \pm \frac{\sqrt{\rho^2 + 4(\rho + \delta)\delta(1-\omega)}}{2\delta} \quad (\text{B.84})$$

However, since the stock price is $S_t = \frac{1-\omega}{\rho + \delta(1-\beta)} Y_t$, we know that $\beta < \frac{\rho + \delta}{\delta}$ has to hold. This eliminates the positive root of β , while the negative root can satisfy the constraint. So the value of β is

$$\beta = \frac{\rho + 2\delta}{2\delta} - \frac{\sqrt{\rho^2 + 4(\rho + \delta)\delta(1-\omega)}}{2\delta} \quad (\text{B.85})$$

B.2. Savings rate Response to Stock Market Scarring. The table shows the OLS regression results of contemporaneous savings rate on historical moving average of the following variables: stock return, GDP growth rate, inflation and federal funds rate. The stock return data is taken from Robert Shiller S&P 500 total real price return monthly data set, and all the rest of the variables come from St Louis Federal Reserve data set. All variables are converted to annualized value with quarterly frequency. Model 1 uses the 1 year moving average of the independent variables, while Model 2, 3 and 4 uses the 3 year, 5 year and 10 year moving average.

TABLE 4. Dependent Variable: Savings Rate

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Stock return	0.277 (0.576)	0.078 (0.597)	-0.108 (0.442)	0.105 (0.443)
GDP growth rate	0.332*** (0.081)	0.359*** (0.084)	0.273*** (0.070)	-0.047 (0.064)
Inflation	0.518*** (0.085)	0.401*** (0.088)	0.360*** (0.065)	-0.300*** (0.054)
Federal Fund rate	-0.094 (0.083)	-0.398*** (0.094)	-0.633*** (0.070)	0.232*** (0.055)
Constant	6.101*** (0.492)	8.099*** (0.606)	9.604*** (0.548)	6.258 (0.563)
N	220	196	172	112
R ²	0.225	0.156	0.373	0.272

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

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