



Fooling LIME and SHAP: Adversarial Attacks on Post hoc Explanation Methods

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Motivation

- ML has been applied for **critical** decision making
 - Healthcare
 - Criminal justice
 - Finance
- The decision makers must clearly **understand the model behavior** to
 - Diagnose the error and potential biases
 - Decide when and how much these ML models should be trusted

Motivation


- Trade-off between interpretability and accuracy
 - **Simple** models can be easily **interpreted** (e.g., linear regression)
 - **Complex** but also black-box model has much **better performance** (e.g., deep neural network)
- Can a ML method be both **interpretable** and **accurate**?
- **Post hoc** explanation can seemingly solve this problem:
 - First build **complex and accurate** ML models for good performance
 - Then use post hoc explanation for model **interpretation**
- The question is:
 - How robust and reliable is the *post hoc* explanation methods?



Contribution: A framework to ‘fool’ the post hoc explanation method

- A novel framework that can effectively **mask the discriminatory biases** of any black box classifier
 - Fooling the **perturbation based** post hoc explanation method
 - LIME and SHAP
- Allowing an adversarial entity to control and generate an arbitrary desired explanation
- Demonstration using real-world datasets with extremely biased classifier
- Existing post hoc explanation techniques are **NOT** sufficiently robust for ascertaining discriminatory behavior of classifiers in sensitive applications

Perturbation-based post hoc explanation method



Preliminaries & Background


$$\arg \min_{g \in \mathcal{G}} L(f, g, \pi_x) + \Omega(g)$$

where the loss function L is defined as:

$$L(f, g, \pi_x) = \sum_{x' \in X'} [f(x') - g(x')]^2 \pi_x(x')$$

- f is the original classifier and x is the datapoint we want to explain
- g is the explanation we want to learn, $\Omega(g)$ is the “complexity” of g
- π is the proximity measure
- X' is a **synthetic dataset**, consisting of perturbations of x

Intuition





Approach: Set-up

Adversary would like to deploy a biased classifier f !

- Background: the biased model f uses sensitive attributes to make critical decisions
- Requirement: give access of black-box models to customers and regulators who use post-hoc explanations
- Goal: hide bias of the classifier f

Approach: Set-up

What do we need?

- Input: dataset sampled from real-world distribution
- Target Product: an adversarial classifier e
 - f is the biased model to be explained, while ψ is an unbiased model

$$e(x) = \begin{cases} f(x), & \text{if } x \in \mathcal{X}_{dist} \\ \psi(x), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Approach: OOD Detection

Which of the inputs belong to the real-world distribution?

- Build another classifier for OOD detection
 - Assign label “False” (not OOD) to all instance in the dataset \mathbf{X}
 - Perturb all instances in \mathbf{X} and assign them label “True” (OOD)
 - Exceptions: instances too close to observations from \mathbf{X}
 - Combine data and train OOD detection classifier

$$e(x) = \begin{cases} f(x), & \text{if } x \in \mathcal{X}_{dist} \\ \psi(x), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Experiment: Set-up

90% training & 10% test

Dataset	Size	Features	Positive Class	Sensitive Feature
COMPAS	6172	<i>criminal history, demographics, COMPAS risk score, jail and prison time</i>	High Risk (81.4%)	African-American (51.4%)
Communities & Crime	1994	<i>race, age, education, police demographics, marriage status, citizenship</i>	Violent Crime Rate (50%)	White Population (continuous)
German Credit	1000	<i>account information, credit history, loan purpose, employment, demographics</i>	Good Customer (70%)	Male (69%)


Biased classifier f makes predictions purely based on sensitive attributes (race, gender)

Unbiased classifier ψ uses only features uncorrelated with the sensitive attributes

Experiment: Results - COMPAS



Experiment: Results - Communities and Crime



Experiment: Results - German credit

Feature Importance Rank

Gender Loan Rate % Income All Others
% Occurrence

Takeaway from experiments

1. Accuracy of the OOD classifier -> success of the adversarial attack
2. Adversarial classifiers to LIME are ineffective against SHAP explanations
 - a. Any sufficiently accurate OOD classifier is sufficient to fool LIME, while fooling SHAP requires more accurate classifiers
3. SHAP less successful when using two features <- local accuracy property
 - a. Distribute attributions among several features

$$e(x) = \begin{cases} f(x), & \text{if } x \in \mathcal{X}_{dist} \\ \psi(x), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



Conclusions

- Main contribution: A framework for converting any black-box classifier into a *scaffolded* classifier that fools perturbation-based post-hoc explanation techniques like LIME and SHAP
- Effectiveness of this framework demonstrated on sensitive real-world data (criminal justice and credit scoring)
- Perturbation-based post-hoc explanation techniques are not sufficient to test whether classifiers discriminate based on sensitive attributes



Related Works

- Issues with post-hoc explanations:
 - [Doshi-Velez and Kim] identify explainability of predictions as a potentially useful feature of interpretable models.
 - [Lipton] and [Rudin] argues post-hoc explanations can be misleading and are not trustworthy for sensitive applications.
 - [Ghorbani et al.] and [Mittelstadt et al.] identified further weaknesses of post-hoc explanations.
- Adversarial explanations
 - [Dombrowski et al.] and [Heo et al.] show how to change saliency maps in arbitrary ways by imperceptibly changing inputs.



Q&A

- Are the experimental results sufficient to justify the conclusions?
 - In particular, how can we explain the discrepancy in results for LIME vs. SHAP?
- What about fooling other classes of post-hoc explanation methods?
 - Past work: gradient-based methods
- Alternatively, can one design post-hoc explanations that are *adversarially robust*?