HOMO PICTOR AND THE DIFFERENTIA OF MAN*

BY HANS JONAS

THE following is part of an essay in philosophical anthropology concerned with determining man's specific difference in the animal kingdom. For heuristic purposes I have assumed the situation of explorers on another planet who wish to ascertain the presence of "men" among the living creatures there. The situation is heuristically ideal because it is ideally rigorous, denying all support of morphological familiarity and with it the temptation to take accidentals of bodily type for essentials of a species of life. Detached from any particular zoology and from kinship relations, the term "man" can refer only to an analogy-of-essence that would justify assigning the name in the face of utter physical dissimilarity. What kind of minimum evidence would be conclusive, and what exactly would it be conclusive for?

Among the possible external clues that offer themselves as criteria, that one has philosophical preference which, in addition to being at once unequivocal and primitive, yields most for a definition of man's nature when interpreted in its internal implications. The argument presented here follows, in the full-length essay, upon a discussion of the relative merits of various such clues—like tools, hearths, tombs. The final choice of image-making as particularly revealing is best justified by its results. Needless to say, no claim to exclusive validity is implied in the choice. A certain hermeneutic advantage, from which I wish to

* AUTHOR'S NOTE—This essay was to be included in a collection planned some years ago in honor of Leo Strauss on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. As not infrequently happens with joint enterprises of this kind, the volume failed to materialize, and my article, after several years in cold storage, was finally returned to me. I publish it now as a belated homage to my old friend. One of the consequences of the unforeseen delay is that a German translation (my own) of this piece has got into print before the original; see "Homo pictor und die differentia des Menschen," in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, XV/2 (1961) pp. 161–76.

profit, lies in the relative simplicity of the phenomenon as compared, for example, with speech. The latter, though it is even more central to the nature of man (as it is certainly more comprehensive in bearing), is also much more complex in its constitution, its evidence accordingly more difficult to assess; besides, in the assumed situation, the question of its identification by outsiders—that is, the physical indifference of symbolic utterance as such, which is not its own evidence—would add a problem of recognition not germane to the issue itself; and finally, like "reason" and "thinking," the concept of "language" has become too controversial and uncertain in contemporary philosophy to serve the elementary enterprise here in mind. There is better hope for prior agreement on what a picture is than on what a word is. In fact, an understanding of the image faculty may contribute something to the understanding of the more elusive phenomenon of speech.

Our explorers enter a cave, and on its walls they discern lines or other configurations that must have been produced artificially, that have no structural function, and that suggest a likeness to one or another of the living forms encountered outside. The cry goes up: "Here is evidence of man!" Why? The evidence does not require the perfection of the Altamira paintings. The crudest and most childish drawing would be just as conclusive as the frescoes of Michelangelo. Conclusive for what? For the more-than-animal nature of its creator; and for his being potentially a speaking, thinking, inventing, in short "symbolical" being. And since it is not a matter of degree, as is technology, the evidence must reveal what it has to reveal by its formal quality alone.

What faculties and attitudes are involved in image-making? For our initial conviction that no mere animal would or could produce an image we may at this stage just adduce the biological uselessness of any mere representation. The artifacts of animals have a direct physical use in the promotion of vital ends, such as nutrition, reproduction, hibernation. A representation, however, changes neither the environment nor the condition of the organism itself. An image-making creature, therefore, is one that indulges

in the making of useless objects, or has ends in addition to the biological ones, or can serve the latter in ways remote from the direct usefulness of instrumental things. Whichever it is (and it may be all three), in the pictorial representation the object is appropriated in a new, nonpractical way, and the very fact that the interest in it can shift to its *eidos* signifies a new object relation.

I

Before we proceed any further we must determine what an image is, or by what properties an object comes to be the image of another object.

1) The most obvious property is that of "likeness." An image is an object that bears a plainly recognizable, or at will discernible, likeness to another object.

2) The likeness is produced with intent: the object bearing it is in respect to that property an artifact. A natural resemblance between two objects does not constitute the one an image of the other.[1] The artificiality (and therewith intendedness) of the likeness in one of the two alike things must be as recognizable as the likeness itself. The external intention of the maker lives on as intrinsic "intentionality" in the product—the intentionality of representation, which communicates itself to the beholder. Thus, while likeness itself is mutual, the image relation using it is one-sided: the artificial thing is an image of the natural, not also the natural an image of the artificial.

3) The likeness is not complete. A duplication of all the properties of the original would result in the duplication of the object itself—in another instance of the same kind of object, not in an

[1] This statement has to be qualified with respect to mirror images, shadows, and the like. A reflection in water is a natural, that is, non-artificial, resemblance, and it is an image of the object that is reflected, while the latter with all its likeness cannot be said to be an image of the former. But here the image is an accompaniment of the object and not an object by itself; and even if it is detachable, like the imprint of an animal form (a potential "image" for the later paleontologist), the likeness is the member of a cause-effect relation rather than a representation.

image. If I copy a hammer in every respect, I have another hammer and not an image of a hammer.

The incompleteness of the likeness must be perceptible, so as to qualify the likeness as "mere likeness." Else the beholder would suppose himself to be in the presence of the object and not of its image only. Such deception, a self-dissimulation of the image, defeats its true meaning, which is to represent, not to simulate, the object. This is the difference between image and imitation. A likeness may indeed deceive me into taking it for the original. That it is only partial may not be obvious to the sense to which it is addressed—vision—because in terms of that sense alone it is deceptively complete. So long as I have not lifted the wax fruit from the bowl, it is for me not the likeness of an apple but an apple. Then the recognition, afforded by touch and smell, that the likeness is after all only partial, and contrived at that, transposes the object from one category to another: not in this case, however, to that of image but to that of fake.

For in this case the deception was intended. In the image it is not: its likeness is avowedly "superficial," in that it reproduces the surface appearance strictly as such and not as a pretense to a likeness also of the substance in which it is embodied. "Unsubstantial" in itself, the likeness concedes their own substantiality to the means of its embodiment. This confinement of the representative intention to the appearing surface is the most basic sense in which all image-likeness is incomplete, for it is constitutive for the genus "image" as such.[2] This incompleteness, then, which we may term the ontological one, is predecided with the image intention in general, and no longer a matter of choice in the particular case.

4) Beyond this basic condition, the "incompleteness" assumes degrees of freedom. Within the dimension constituted by the "ontological incompleteness," the image is again elliptic: much

[2] Rather than being concealed, this kind of incompleteness may be emphasized in the extent to which the material's own quality is permitted to codetermine the appearance of the image.

even of the surface appearance is omitted. Omission implies selection. In its positive aspect, then, the incompleteness of image-likeness means the selection of "representative" or "relevant" or "significant" features of the object, that is, of its appearance to the sense to which the image is addressed. The restriction to this one sense alone as the perceptual medium of representation is itself the first "selection" operative in image-making, and this is generically predetermined by the dominance of vision: man's nature has decided in advance for the visual aspect as representative of things. Confinement to two dimensions introduces a further and more specific level of incompleteness which makes its own selective demands. But within the selective levels thus determined generically (visual representation in the solid, in the flat), there takes place a more arbitrary and particular selection of representative features, and the freedom here increases with the degree of incompleteness defining the generic levels as such: in the flat it is greater than in the solid, the one having inherently more of "abstraction" in it than the other.

At the moment it suffices to define as "representative" such elements as confer recognizability in the absence of completeness. The more successful the selection in this respect, the greater the incompleteness that the representation can afford. The advantage is one not only of economy (simplifying the task of representation) but also of expressiveness, emphasizing as it does the things that matter. Thus a "less" of completeness can mean a "more" of essential likeness. This aspect of incompleteness points to idealization, which need by no means go in the direction of beauty alone. Economy and idealization also put the image character as such beyond doubt: we shall hardly mistake the real object for an image of itself, for in its abundance of the accidental it lacks the symbolic concentration on the essential.

5) With these last remarks we have passed beyond the dimension of "incompleteness" to that of positive difference. Added to dissimilarity as a result of omitting and selecting, there is alteration of the selected features themselves, as a means of heightening the

symbolic similitude, or in order to satisfy visual interests other than representation, or just as the result of inadequate ability. The dissimilarity may range all the way from slight displacements by way of emphasis to the most exaggerated caricature, and from unobtrusive harmonizing to complete assimilation of the "given" to a canon of style. Some such departure from the given is inseparable from the process of its "translation," in view of the human agency involved; and the tolerance allowed in this respect by the image category as such is indefinite. Choice or compulsion, mastery or the lack of it, each and all may have play within this tolerance. The involuntary oversimplifications and distortions of children's drawings, no less than the sovereign exercise of artistic intention, may leave only faint traces of likeness to the depicted object. Yet to artist and spectator alike, even such strained and imperfect likenesses are representations of the object in question. There is almost no limit to the stretch of imagination that the capacity for symbolic understanding may command.

Carried by this capacity beyond the initial terms of image, the representational function may rest progressively less in real similitude than in the mere recognizability of the intention. At first an obvious degree of likeness is necessary to make the intention recognizable, and this is the province of image proper; but with the rise of a symbolic convention an increasing range of substitutions and graphical abbreviations becomes available, with increasing emancipation from "literalness." (One possible fruit of this development is ideographic script.) From the beginning, however, abstraction and stylization are present in the pictorial process as such, as the demands of economy are met by the freedom of transcription. And it is in the exercise of this freedom that the norm of the given object can be abandoned entirely for the creation of shapes never seen: the pictorial faculty opens the road to invention.

6) The object of representation is visual shape. Vision grants the greatest freedom to the mediacy of representation, not only by the wealth of data from which the latter can choose but also

by the number of variables of which visual identities admit. There are many, equally recognizable, visual shapes to the same object, as a result of relative position and perspective: its "aspects"; each of these enjoys an independence from the variation of size due to distance; an independence from variations of color and brightness due to conditions of light; an independence from the completeness of detail, which can merge and disappear in the simultaneous wholeness of an object's view. Through all these variations of sense the form remains identifiable and continuously represents the same thing.

With such phenomenological traits, to which no other sense offers a full analogy, vision itself suggests the idea of representation and, as its means, an idea of "form" whose identity rests entirely in the proportion of its parts. In visual imagery, therefore, the large can be represented by the small, the small by the large, the solid by the plane, the colored by black and white, the continuous by the discrete and vice versa, the full by the mere outline, the manifold by the simple. Sight is the main perceptual medium of representation because it is not only the chief object-sense but also the home ground of abstraction.

7) The image is inactive and at rest, though it may depict movement and action. These it can conjure into a static presence because the represented, the representation, and the vehicle of representation (the imaging thing, or physical carrier of the image) are different strata in the ontological constitution of the image. In spite of its embodiment, the likeness is unsubstantial, like a shadow or a mirror image. It can represent the dangerous without endangering, the harmful without harming, the desirable without satiating. What is represented in the mode of image is, in the image, removed from the causal commerce of things and transposed to a non-dynamic existence that is the image existence proper—a mode of existence to be confounded neither with that of the imaging thing nor with that of the imaged reality. The last two both remain involved in the movement of becoming. As the imaged reality goes on in its course, the body of the image-

thing, starting on its own history, continues to be part of the causal order in whose transactions it assumed its present condition; but considered in its imaging function it ceases to count in its own right. Its substantiality (whose sole requisite is to be stable, so as to preserve the image) is submerged in its symbolic aspect, and therewith is submerged its causal background—not only that of its natural prehistory (its past as a tree, a rock) but also that of becoming, under the artist's hands, its present self. The activity that went into its making is a matter of the past, of which the image-present keeps no record. That present has, as it were, renounced the status of effect, which still implies its cause: dissembling any past, it also presages no future—and out of this non-transient and timeless present the image meets the time-bound beholder in a presence that is equally detached from the process of its own genesis and from that of the beholder's life.[3]

A footprint is a sign of the foot that made it, and as effect tells the story of its causation. A picture, apprehended as picture, is a sign not of the painter's motions but of the object depicted. In the image the causal nexus is cut. Free to depict any causal situation, including that of painting a picture, the image does not represent the causality of its own becoming.[4]

[3] This distinguishes image from pantomime and the symbolism of dance. The difference is similar to that of writing and speech. In miming representation (as in speech), the performer's own body in action is the carrier of the symbolism, which remains bound to the transient act itself. Thus the imagery, enacted in the space and time that actor and spectator share, remains merged with the common causal order in which things happen, interact, and pass. As a real event it has its allotted span within the common time, and is no more. It is indeed repeatable, and by this token its eidetic identity defies the uniqueness of real event; but it has to be repeated in order to be present, and it "is" only while being produced (as is the case with moving pictures).

[4] It may, though, *betray* this causality in its visible technique (the stroke of the brush, the marks of the chisel), as a handwriting may betray the motor performance of the writer; and in both cases this effect can become intentional, that is, co-intended with the representational intention. In that case the image is charged with an expressive function superimposed on the representational one: which is to say that it is more than image. The image function by itself is strictly "objective," and as long as it is kept pure, the self-expression of the maker, which inevitably finds its way into it, remains unintentional and consequently unobtrusive—noticeable, if at all, to trained attention only. In subjectivist stages of civilization the maker's self-

8) The difference between image and imaging thing, with the latter's self-effacement in the former, is matched by the difference between image and imaged object. The complete articulation is threefold. The substratum can be regarded by itself, the image by itself, the object of the image by itself: the image or likeness hovers as a third, ideal entity between the first and the last, both real entities, connecting them in the unique way of representation. It is this double distinction, or the threefold stratification, which makes it possible for the image to enjoy the described mode of a non-causal presence, exempt from the accidents of real event.

In particular, the difference between image and its physical carrier underlies the technical possibility of copying or reproducing in art. If a painting or a statue is accurately copied, we have in the copy not an image of an image but a duplication of one and the same image. The many prints of a snapshot, or of a plate throughout one book edition, are not so many additional images but one image, one representation so and so many times presented, despite the differences in the individual pieces of paper, dye chemicals, and other matter used to embody the likeness.

On the other hand, the difference between image and imaged object underlies the possibility of there being many different likenesses, and thus images, of the same object: as many as its aspects according to all the variables of visual appearance as such (see no. 6, above), and again, as many as the possible transcriptions of these aspects according to the variables of individual selection (no. 4) and alteration (no. 5). Thus, taking only one dimension out of many, that of "angle," we can on principle have an indefinite number of different shots of one person—of each of which we can have an indefinite number of prints.

A third possibility again derives from the ontological difference in question. Not only can one object be represented in an indefinite number of images, but also, and more typically, one image

expression may become a goal and conspicuous by choice (as in the brushwork of baroque painters or of Van Gogh), and with this shift from the representational to the expressive the very role of image changes.

can represent an indefinite number of objects. A figure of *Pinus sylvestris* in a work on botany is a representation not of this or that individual fir tree but of any fir tree of that species. The antelope of the bushman drawing is every antelope remembered, anticipated, identifiable as *an* antelope; the figures of the hunters are every hunting party of bushmen in the past, present, or future. The representation, since it is through form, is essentially general. Image sensibly symbolizes generality poised between the individuality of the imaging thing and that of the imaged objects.

II

If these, then, are the properties of image, what properties are required in a subject for the making or beholding of images? The two, making and beholding, do not differ in the basic condition of their possibility. Making an image involves the ability to behold something as an image; and to behold something as an image and not merely as an object means also to be able to produce one. This is a statement of essence. It does not mean that he who appreciates a painting by Rembrandt is therefore able to produce its like. But it does mean that whoever can perceive a pictorial representation as such is the kind of being to whose nature the representational faculty belongs, regardless of special gifts, actual exercise, and degrees of proficiency attained. What kind of being is this?

The first requirement seems to be the ability to perceive likeness. But we must add forthwith: to perceive it in a certain way. Both man and bird perceive in the scarecrow (assuming its effect to rest on simulating something definite) a likeness to, say, a human figure. For the bird, however, this means mistaking the scarecrow for a man. Either it is so deceived or there is no relation at all: in between there can be only a state of indecision that must be resolved one way or the other. For the bird, this is a mere matter of sensory discrimination. Not so with man. It is not keener visual discrimination that protects man from confounding the likeness with the original, or poorer discrimination that lets him still

accept as a likeness what the bird will dismiss altogether.[5] In fact, perceptiveness or visual discrimination has nothing to do with the matter. Increase of likeness would not, to human judgment, make the scarecrow anything but a better effigy; decrease would not, to the bird, make it pass into "mere effigy." When the deception breaks down, only straw, sticks, and rags remain. For the animal mere similitude does not exist. Where we perceive it, the animal perceives either sameness or otherness, but not *both in one,* as we do in the apprehension of similitude.

Likeness, then, must be perceived as "mere likeness," and this involves more than perception. Indeed, "image" is not a function of perceptual degree of likeness, but a conceptual dimension of its own within which all degrees of likeness can occur. The greatest degree still leaves the image an "image only"; the smallest can still constitute it an image of the object in question so long as the intended reference is recognizable. In all these degrees the image is, through the likeness relation, the image *of* something, of the imaged object, with which even the best likeness never merges.[6] The perceptual equation that underlies the experience of likeness must therefore be qualified by a distinction that is non-perceptual.

That distinction, as we have found, is twofold: the image must be distinguished from its physical carrier; and the image object must be distinguished from both. With these distinctions likeness can be perceived as "likeness only." Through likeness as the intermediary the directly perceived object is apprehended not as

[5] Or, in the latter case, should we have said it is not that man is more easily satisfied with respect to likeness, but that he is more perceptive for it even in faint traces? But then it would have to be the bird that is the more perceptive in the first case—perceptive for likeness, not for difference.

[6] Man can of course be deceived occasionally and confound an image with the real thing; but this merely means that for the moment he does not apply the image category at all, not that to him it has lost its meaning. Contrariwise, it may occur that he fails to perceive a likeness and the very intention of a likeness, and thus fails to recognize the perceptual object as an image; here again the image category simply does not come into play, this time for lack of likeness, and the object is just taken for itself. This also does not mean that the difference between the vehicle of representation and the function of representation has become invalid for the observer.

itself but as standing for another object. It is there only to represent the other entity, and this is only represented; thus, paradoxically, the ideal link, the similitude or *eidos* as such, becomes the real object of apprehension.

The principle here involved on the part of the subject is the mental separation of form from matter. It is this that makes possible the vicarious presence of the physically absent at once with the self-effacement of the physically present. Here we have a specifically human fact, and the reason why we expect neither making nor understanding of images from animals. The animal deals with the present object itself. If it is sufficiently like another object, it is an object of the same kind. The likeness aids the recognition of the object-kind, but is not itself the object of recognition. Recognized is the present object alone as "one such," that is, as familiar in certain properties. These, spotlighted by activation of memory traces, call up in turn their former associates, which enter as expectations into the perceptual picture and, once recognition has taken place, form part of the "presence" of the object. Nothing but this is present, standing entirely for itself, though imbued with past experience. Only reality counts, and reality knows of no representation. In our search, therefore, for the conditions of image-making we are referred from the faculty of perceiving likeness to the more fundamental one of separating *eidos* from concrete reality, or form from matter.

III

To understand this faculty we have first to consider the givenness of reality itself, that is, we have to start from sense perception. *Eidos,* "appearance," is an object of sense, but not its whole object. In perception external objects are apprehended not merely as "such," but also as "there." The qualitative data representing them ("forms" to Aristotle) are felt to be thrust upon the percipient, and in this thrust they convey the affective presence of the objects themselves. Perception is intrinsically awareness of such a self-giving presence—the experience of the reality of the object

as co-existing with me here and now and on its own determining my sensory condition. This element of encounter—the self-communication of the object to my receptivity and its insistence on itself even while in my perceptive hold—is part of the internal evidence over and above the eidetic content of perception, when the latter is to be experience of real things.

But there is this paradox to sense perception: the felt affectiveness of its data, which is necessary for the experience of the "reality" of the real, as this is attested in the reality of my affectedness, must in part be canceled out again in order to permit the apprehension of its "objectivity." The element of encounter is balanced by one of abstraction, without which sensation would not rise to perception. First, in a somewhat stretched sense of the term, there is "abstraction" from the state of sensory stimulation itself in the very fact of one's perceiving the object instead of one's own organic affection. Some sort of disengagement from the causality of the encounter provides the neutral freedom for letting the "other" appear for itself. (The organization of our senses assures this disengagement in advance.) In that appearance the affective basis ("stimulation," "irritation") is canceled, its record neutralized. Second, and in a more accepted sense, perception continuously "abstracts" from the immediate sensory content of affection in allowing the object its identity beyond the change of its views. We see not once this, once that, complex of data, but through both the same thing, "abstracting," as it were, from the differences of successive sensations, or from the sense "material." This visual abstraction makes possible what Kant has called the synthesis of recognition.

Vision, of all senses, most conspicuously realizes in its normal performance this double feat of "abstraction": setting off the self-contained object from the affective condition of sensing, and upholding its identity and unity across the whole range of its possible transformations of appearance, each of which is in itself already an integrated simultaneous manifold. Recognition of the object as one previously known, or as like previously known ones,

does not, therefore, require past sensations to be duplicated in present ones, recalled when so duplicated and found congruent with the present: in that case the same complex of simultaneous visual data, and the same succession of such compound "aspects," would have to be repeated in order to yield recognition of the same or the like, and this condition would rarely be fulfilled. What is equated in such acts of recognition is not similar sense-datum conglomerates but variant phases in the continuous transformation-series of a pattern or configuration. The phase sensibly available now may happen to be identical with one formerly experienced, but this would be the exception rather than the rule: the identity of the configuration as such is perceived across the whole scale of its *possible* visual transformations—and that multidimensional scale, governed by its structural and qualitative laws, itself forms a pattern of a higher order.[7] The several serial variabilities constituting this pattern are continuous, but recognition along each one's stretch, given sufficient familiarity with its law, can take place discontinuously; that is, the intermediate sequence need not be run through in actual experience.

An important observation follows. Within this comprehensive transformation pattern the single aspects (phases) do not stand for themselves, but each acts as a kind of "image"—one of the possible images—of the object. In this quality they allow recognition of the same object, or kind of object; that is, they allow it through a likeness that comprehends unlikeness. For not only are they like-unlike one another, but with none of them, nor with their serial totality, does the apprehended form of the object itself coincide. Thus each view alike represents the object "symbolically" (though *as* a symbol, one view may be superior to others and come to represent the object preferentially—for example, by being more familiar, or more informative, than others).

[7] As indicated before, the pattern is in fact a multiple set of transformation patterns, which can operate singly, concurrently, and interdependently: variation with respect to size, to side, to perspective distortion, to illumination, and so on forms each its own continuous series as one of the attributes of the complete visual schema.

But did we not encounter these selfsame features before, when we analyzed the ontology of image? Thus it turns out that abstraction, representation, symbolism—*something* of the image function—already inheres in the performance of seeing, as the most integrative of the senses. This, in degrees, must then be credited even to some higher animals.

IV

What step then does the image faculty take in man when he proceeds to translate a visual aspect into a material likeness? We see at once that in this step a new level of mediacy is attained, beyond that which belongs to visual recognition of objects as such. The image becomes detached from the object, that is, the presence of the *eidos* is made independent of that of the thing. Vision involved a stepping back from the importunity of environment and procured the freedom of detached survey.[8] A stepping back of the second order takes place when appearance is comprehended *qua* appearance, distinguished from reality, and, with its presence freely commanded, is interposed between the self and the real whose presence is beyond command.

This free possession is first achieved in the internal exercise of imagination, by which, to the best of our knowledge, human memory is distinguished from animal recollection. The latter is joined to actual sensation. It may function on the occasion of a present perception in which a previous one is recognized by way of the quality "familiar" or "known" with which the present experience is imbued. Or, instead of accompanying repetitive perception as it occurs, recall may be evoked by appetite and projectively guide animal action toward a desired repetition ("remembering" the way to yesterday's feeding place), with "recall by familiarity" marking the successful progress of the action. But there is nothing to show that this kind of remembering enjoys an

[8] For a more detailed and more comprehensive analysis of vision and the "image" faculty inherent in it, see my article "The Nobility of Sight," in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* vol. 14, no. 4 (June 1954) pp. 507–19.

imaginary presence of its objects, and everything to argue against the assumption that, if it does, this presence is at the subject's command, to be summoned and dismissed at will. Appetitive need or actual perception governs the reactivation of past experience. Whether this is recalled *as* "past" and is not merely superimposed on the present as a "knowledge" of what to expect or to do now, there is no way of telling with certainty. At any rate, the "recalling" is done not by the subject but by circumstances for the subject.

Human memory exceeds mere recollection of this kind by the freely reproductive faculty of imagination, which has the images of things at its call. That it can also alter them follows almost necessarily from having them in detachment from the actuality of sensation and thereby from the stubborn factuality of the object's own being. Imagination separates the remembered *eidos* from the occurrence of the individual encounter with it, freeing its possession from the accidents of space and time. The freedom so gained—to ponder things in imagination—is one of distance and control at once.

The remembered form can then be translated from internal imagination into an external image, which is again an object of perception—a perception, however, not of the original object but of its representation. It is externalized memory, and not a repetition of experience itself. To some extent it makes actual experience superfluous by making some of its essential content available without it. If the image is made directly "from nature" (probably a later development in pictorial history), memory is as it were anticipated and given in advance a permanent model for the repetitious renewal of its image. Thus externalized, the image defies time more effectively than in its precarious internal conservation. There, what had been saved from the flux of things was entrusted to the flux of self. Externalized again, it abides in itself, its presence independent of the moods and stimulations that rule over the working of memory, and even outlasting the shortness of its maker's life.

In the external representation the image is also made sharable,

the common property of all who look at it. It is an objectification of individual perception comparable to that which is achieved in verbal description; like the latter, it serves communication and, at the same time, benefits perception itself, or *knowledge.* For in the process of depicting the simultaneous appearance part for part, as in the process of describing it, vision is forced to discern and correlate what it first had all in one. The artist sees more than the non-artist, not because he has better vision, but because he does the artist's work, namely, remaking the things he sees: and what one makes one knows. As the remaker of things "in their likeness," pictorial man submits to the standard of truth. An image may be more or less true to the object. The intention to depict things acknowledges them as they are and accepts the verdict of their being on the adequacy of the pictorial homage. The *adaequatio imaginis ad rem,* preceding the *adaequatio intellectus ad rem,* is the first form of theoretical truth—the precursor of verbally descriptive truth, which is the precursor of scientific truth.

But the remaker of things is potentially also the maker of new things, and the one power is not different from the other. The freedom that chooses to render a likeness may as well choose to depart from it. The first intentionally drawn line unlocks that dimension of freedom in which faithfulness to the original, or to any model, is only one decision: transcending actual reality as a whole, it offers its range of infinite variation as a realm of the *possible,* to be made true by man at his choice. The same faculty is reach for the true and power for the new.

And still another power is implied in the pictorial faculty. Images after all have to be made, not merely conceived. Thus their external existence as a result of human activity reveals also a physical aspect of the power that the image faculty wields: the kind of command that man has over his body. This command, whether it terminates in the production of an image, of a thing, or of any other physical action, is itself governed by "image." Indeed, this is but the bodily side of the very image faculty itself, of which we have discussed so far the mental side alone. The

envisaged form is not embodied by the wish, and the inner command of the *eidos,* with all its freedom of mental drafting, would remain ineffective had it not also the power to guide the subject's body in execution. Of this translation of an eidetic pattern into movement of limb, writing is the most familiar example; dance (by designed choreography) is another; and the use of our hand throughout exhibits this motor translation of form in its widest practical range as the condition of all technology. What we here have is a trans-animal, uniquely human fact: eidetic control of motility, that is, muscular action governed not by set stimulus-response pattern but by freely chosen, internally represented and purposely projected *form.* The eidetic control of motility, with its freedom of external execution, complements the eidetic control of imagination, with its freedom of internal drafting. Without the latter, there would be no rational faculty, but without the former, its possession would be futile. Both together make possible the freedom of man. Expressing both in one indivisible evidence, *homo pictor* represents the point in which *homo faber* and *homo sapiens* are conjoined—are indeed shown to be one and the same.

I return once more to the mental side. The Bible tells us (Genesis 2:19) that God created the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air, but left it to Adam to name them. A Haggada to this passage (Genesis Rabba XVII.5) states that God praised the wisdom of Adam before the angels, saying that in giving names to all creatures, to himself, and even to God, Adam had done what the angels could not do. The giving of names to objects is here regarded as the first feat of newly created man and as the first distinctively human act. It was a step beyond creation. He who did it demonstrated by it his superiority over his fellow creatures and foreshadowed his coming mastery over nature. In giving names to "every living creature" created by God, man created species names for the plurality into which each would multiply. The name, becoming general, would preserve the archetypal order of creation in the face of individual multiplicity. Its use in each

individual case would renew the original act of creation in its formal aspect. Thus the symbolic duplication of nature by names is at the same time an ordering of nature according to its generic patterns. Each horse is the original horse, each dog the original dog.

The generality of the name is the generality of the image. The early hunter drew not this or that bison but *the* bison—every possible bison was conjured, anticipated, remembered thereby. The drawing of the image is analogous to the act of calling by name, or rather is the unabridged version of this act, because it spells out in a sensible presence that inner image of which the phonetic sign is an abbreviation and through whose generality alone can the sign relate to the many individuals. Image-making each time reenacts the creative act that is hidden in the residual name: the symbolic making-over-again of the world. It exhibits what the use of names takes for granted: the availability of the *eidos* as an identity over and above the particulars, for human apprehension, imagination, and discourse.

V

Thus our explorers, chancing upon pictorial representation, whether accomplished or poor, can be sure of more than having discovered creatures with a certain peculiarity of behavior ("species S with habits a, b, c . . ., among which is picture-making"). They can be sure of having discovered, in the makers of those likenesses, creatures who enjoy the mental and corporeal freedom we term human; who also give names to things, that is, have language. They can be sure of the possibility of communicating with them. And as a possibility, they can anticipate that the abstraction shown in those likenesses will lead in time to the abstraction of geometrical form and rational concept; and that the motile control implied in their making will, in conjunction with that abstraction, lead in time to technology. The actuality of such developments is unforeseeable, dependent as they are on the accidents of history, but their potentiality is given with that

kind of being of which the pictorial activity is the first visible and unmistakable sign.

The encountering of artificial likenesses, then, is the heuristic experience we have been looking for, and in its inner implications this external criterion points to the differentia of man. We note that the criterion does not demand reason but is content with potential reason (as with potential geometry and the like). The potentiality resides in something that is not itself reason (and so on), and may never happen to advance to it. But if it does it will be an advance within the level constituted by that basic "something" that operates in the earliest attempts at representation. The level of man is the level of the possibilities that are indicated (not defined, and certainly not assured) by the pictorial faculty: the level of a non-animal mediacy in the relation to objects, and of a distance from reality entertained and bridged by that mediacy at the same time. The existence of images, which shows form wrested from fact, is a witness to this mediacy, and in its open promise alone suffices as evidence of human freedom.

Former speculation demanded more concerning what should be regarded as conclusive evidence for *homo sapiens:* at some time, nothing less than figures exemplifying geometrical propositions would suffice. This surely is an unfailing, but also an overexacting, criterion. Where would it leave the bushman? The criterion of attempted sensible likeness is more modest, but also more basic and comprehensive. It is full evidence for the transanimal freedom of the makers. This freedom, in both theoretic and practical respects, of which reason is a more specific development, is distinctive of man. To see the differentia fulfilled in the crudest likeness of an antelope as much as in the figure of the Pythagorean theorem is not to scale down the stature of man. For the gap between animal world-relation and the crudest attempt at representation is infinitely wider than that between the latter and any geometrical construction. It is a metaphysical gap, compared with which the other is one only of degree.