1. ***What is the*** ***coherence theory of truth?真理的融贯论***

The coherence theory begins by rejecting the correspondence theory, insisting

that the very notion of correspondence to the facts not only fails to account for truth

in mathematics and logic but even fails to account for ordinary factual truth. All we have are reasons for believing—evidence,arguments, principles, and our various beliefs themselves. But why do we need anything more? Indeed, when we talk about truth, what we mean is simply this: what is true is simply that statement or belief that best coheres with, or fits into, the overall network of our experience and beliefs. We accept a principle as true because it fits with our other principles. We accept an argument because it follows from what we believe and leads to conclusions we can accept. We agree on the evidence because it fits into our hypotheses, because it fits together, because it adds up to a coherent picture. Nothing else is needed to give us the truth.

Of course, our evidence is always incomplete, and the beliefs that we already

accept are not always sufficient to allow us to know with certainty whether some new

belief should be accepted. In fact, there may be occasions (for instance, a religious

conversion) in which the whole network of our beliefs exhibits a significant shift or

turnaround or disruption. But this is not to be taken as our inability to ever reach the truth; quite to the contrary, what it means is that the truth is within our grasp, and that with experience we change our beliefs precisely to grasp it more exactly.

融贯论发端于对符合论的反驳，它认为与事实相符合的说法不仅不能解释数学和逻辑中的真理，而且也不能解释日常事实。我们所拥有的只是一些相信的理由——证据、论证、原理以及我们的各种信念本身。但我们为什么还需要更多的东西呢？的确，当我们谈论真理的时候，我们的意思其实是这样的：真的就意味着最能与我们的经验和信念的整体网络相一致。我们之所以接受一个原理，是因为它能与我们的其他原理相匹配；我们之所以接受一则论证，是因为它源自我们所相信的东西，并且由它所导出的结论我们能够接受；我们之所以能够就证据达成一致，是因为它与我们的假设相合，而且能够形成一幅融贯的图像。除此以外，我们不需要其他任何东西赋予我们真理。

当然，我们的证据总是不完备的，我们已经持有的信念并不总能足以使我们确切地知道某些新的信念是否应当接受。事实上，我们的整张信念之网有时（比如说一次宗教皈依）会发生一次重要的转变或崩溃，但这并不说明我们没有能力达到真理；正好相反，这恰恰意味着真理就在我们的掌握之中，我们改变信念就是为了更精确地把握它。

1. ***What is the correspondence theory of truth? 真理的符合论***

The correspondence theory of truth; that is, a statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts.

We have already seen that some statements are true whether or not they correspond

to the facts. We have also seen that basic principles of philosophy are of

this sort; they are not matters of fact but something else—perhaps (according to

the rationalists) truths of reason, perhaps (according to the skeptics) mere matters

of opinion that cannot be justified at all. But in either case, what has become

clear to us is that our initial conception of truth—the idea that a statement is true

if and only if it corresponds to the facts—is inadequate. Let’s give this conception

of truth a name: the correspondence theory of truth. But there are other kinds of

truth, as we have seen, such as the true statements of mathematics and logic, that

don’t obviously correspond to “facts” about the world. We need a more general

theory that will include them.

So far we have talked primarily about the basic means for reaching the truth,

setting aside the question as to what truth is. But the statement of the correspondence

theory of truth and its presupposed two-world view forces us to take this

secondary question much more seriously. Indeed, what good is a theory of truth if

it gives us no indication of how—or even whether—we can ever know the truth?

With that in mind, philosophers have often shifted their attention from a statement

or belief being true to our reasons (or justification) for accepting it as true.

我们已经看到，对于有些陈述来说，无论是否与事实相符合，它都是真的。我们也已经知道，哲学的原理就属于这种类型，它们不是“事实”，而是某种别的东西——也许（在唯理论者看来）是“理性真理”，也许（在怀疑论者看来）仅仅是—些无法进行辩护的意见。不过无论是哪种情况，我们关于真理的最初看法都是不恰当的。让我们给这种看法起一个名字：**真理的符合论**——也就是说，一条陈述为真，当且仅当它与事实相符合。但正如我们已经看到的，还有其他类型的真理存在着，比如数学和逻辑中的真陈述，因此，我们需要一个更为一般的理论来同时包含这些真陈述和哲学中的真陈述（如果存在这样的陈述的话）。

到目前为止，我们主要讨论的是真理，而没有讨论应当怎样去发现真理。但真理的符合论和它所预设的两个世界的假设却迫使我们更加严肃的看待后者。的确，如果一种真理理论无法对我们怎样——或是否——认识真理提供帮助，那它又有什么用处呢？正因如此，哲学家们才经常把注意力从一个陈述或信念本身的真转到我们接受它为真的理由。这种侧重点的转移所带来的后果就是，对真理本身问题的回答逐渐被相信一个陈述或信念为真的理由取代了。换句话说，相信某种东西为真的理由现在己经间接地表明就是真理了。

1. ***What is the*** ***true meaning of equality?平等的真实含义***

What is most important for justice, however, in both Marxist society and our

own, is the concept of equality. On the one hand, it is obvious to everyone that

all people are not equal in every sense. Some are born healthy, wealthy, and smart;

others are born wretched, impoverished, and disabled. People have different talents,

different looks, different capacities. Nevertheless, justice insists that they are

all equal. What does this mean?

It means, first of all, that they are all equal before the law. Again, the blindfolded

figure of justice signifies that justice does not recognize individual differences

in rank and privilege; justice sees everyone as equal. In theory, at least,

the same laws apply to everyone and in the same way. A judge is obliged to hand

out the same sentence to a rich man as to a poor man, to a homeless person as

to a movie star, if they have committed the same crime. Two people doing the

same job deserve the same salary, and it does not matter if one is male and the

other female, if one is black and the other white, if one is tall and the other is

short. Indeed, this sense of “same job, same pay” is defended in American courts

because it is so important to our sense of justice and the good society.

对于正义来说，无论是在马克思主义的社会还是我们自己的社会，**平等**的概念都是最重要的。一方面，所有的人显然不是在任何意义上都平等的。某些人生来就健康、富有和聪慧，而另一些人生来就命苦、贫困和残疾。人们有不同的天分、不同的相貌、不同的才能。然而，正义却强调人们是平等的，这是什么意思呢？

首先，它意味着在法律面前人人平等。正义再次以蒙住双眼的形象来表明，它并不重视在等级和特权上的个体差异，正义平等地看待所有人。至少从理论上说，同样的法律以同样的方式适用于所有人。无论是富人还是穷人，是丑陋的流浪汉还是电影明星，只要他们犯了同样的罪行，法官就有义务对他们施以同样的判决。只要两个人做同样的工作，就应当得到同样的报酬，至于是男人还是女人，是黑人还是白人，是高还是矮，这都无关紧要。事实上，“同工同酬”已被写入法律，因为它对我们的正义感和好的社会是如此重要。

What equality means, many writers say, is equal opportunity. But here, too, there are problems. When we try to insist that everyone should be equal, we run up against the unavoidable fact that people are from birth unequal in abilities and advantages, and even the most radical and topsy-turvy restructuring of the society would leave this largely so. Besides that, our feeling that people ought to be rewarded (and punished) for what they do and our sense that people should get to keep what they have result in further inequalities among individuals. There is no equality of opportunity because the same circumstances that give some people ample advantage over others give them much greater opportunities, too. “It takes money to make money” goes an old piece of wisdom, and no one can doubt that even a mediocre, lazy child who goes to a first-rate prep school has a better

chance at opportunities for the future than bright, energetic, but disadvantaged

children in an inner-city school. Equal opportunity seems as elusive as equality.

许多学者说，平等就意味着**平等的机会**。但是这也有问题。当我们试图强调人人平等的时候，便会碰到一个无法避免的事实：人们在能力和优势上生来就是不平等的，甚至是最激进、最具颠覆性的社会重组也得在很大程度上保留这一点。此外，我们从情感上认为人们应该因其所作所为而受到奖惩，而且也感到人们应该能够保有他们所拥有的东西，这两点都与平等的含义相冲突。因此，我们便退回到机会平等的观念。但是残酷的现实再一次摆在我们面前。机会的平等根本就不存在，因为给予某些人更多优势的同样的环境也给了他们更多的机会。“花钱去赚钱”是一种古老的智慧，没有人会怀疑，即便去一流预科学校的是一个资质平平的懒孩子，他将来也会比贫民区学校里聪明伶俐的孩子拥有更多的机会。机会平等似乎与平等一样是闪烁其词的。

One notion of equality, however, should stand in front of all these other

notions. It precedes equality before the law and is more important than equality

of incomes and even opportunities. And that is the notion of equality of

respect—the presumption that we will view everyone we meet with the vague

but immensely meaningful idea that he or she, like ourselves, is a human being

with feelings and thoughts, hopes and worries, affections and concerns.

It is not a political or even a social sense of equality as much as a deeply felt

personal one, taught to most of us in the United States from childhood as an essential

part of being a citizen of a classless society, whatever the inequalities in

income, wealth, and power among us. But if we fully appreciate the importance

of such mutual respect, perhaps some of the other inequalities in our social

lives will gradually be corrected.

但是有一种平等观念应当位居其他平等观念之前。它先于法律面前的平等，也比收入乃至机会的平等更为重要。这就是平等尊重的观念，即我们应以这样一种模糊而极有意义的观念来看待每一个人：他们和我们自己一样都是有情感和思想、希望和忧虑、激情和牵挂的人。与其说这是一种政治的甚或社会意义上的平等，不如说是为我们所深切感受到的个人意义上的平等。我们中的大多数人从小就受到这样的教育，要成为一个“无阶级的”社会的公民，这是首要的一点，无论我们在收入、财富、权力上有多么不平等。如果我们充分意识到相互尊重的重要性，也许我们社会生活中的其他不平等就会逐渐得到纠正。

1. ***What is*** ***libertarianism? 自由意志主义***

Libertarianism is the view that people are defined as selves by a strong set

of natural rights as individuals, including the right to be left alone and not to be

interfered with, the right to keep what one has or has earned, and the right to be

free from government interference in all things except when absolutely necessary

to the general good. Libertarians tend to be strongly against taxes and big government

and strongly for individual freedoms of all kinds. For the libertarian, the self

is largely independent, and people establish themselves as selves by what they do

with this freedom.

自治论自由主义认为人们是被作为个体所拥有的一系列自然权利所规定的自我，这些自然权利包括不被打扰、不被干预的权利，保有既得或赚得的财富的权利，以及在所有的事情上免于政府干预的权利，除非这些干预对于普遍的善是绝对必要的。自治论自由主义者倾向于强烈反对征税和大型政府，并且强烈支持所有类型的个人自由。对于自治论自由主义者来说，自我是非常独立的，人们通过拥有这种自由的所作所为建立起自我。

1. ***What is*** ***liberalism? 古典自由主义***

The view of liberalism also holds that people are defined as selves by a strong

set of natural rights, but the set of rights is quite different from the rights defended

by the libertarian. Whereas libertarians emphasize the right not to be interfered

with and the “negative rights” that this implies (for example, the right not to be

prevented from speaking one’s mind), the liberal emphasizes people’s “positive”

rights to the benefits of society (decent housing, education, food, health care,

security). Whereas libertarians stress minimal and local government (“That gov’t

is best which governs least”), liberals tend to support a strong centralized government

to administer social programs. For the liberal, the self is the bearer of rights

to a decent life, which become the obligation of society.

自由主义也认为人们是被作为个体所拥有的一系列自然权利所规定的自我，但是这些权利非常不同于自治论自由主义者所捍卫的那些权利。自治论自由主义者强调不被干预的权利，而自由主义者则强调享有社会福利的权利（适当的住房，教育、食品、医疗保健、安全等）。自治论自由主义者强调最小和地方政府（“最好的政府是管得最少的政府），自由主义者则倾向于建立一个强有力的中央集权政府去管理社会项目。对于自由主义者来说，自我是过一种得体生活的权利的载体，而保证这种权利正是社会的责任。

1. ***What is the communitarianism?*** ***社群主义***

The communitarian view rejects the one-sided liberal and libertarian emphasis

on rights and stresses the concept of duty instead. What defines a citizen is not

his or her rights but rather his or her duties (“Ask not what your country can do

for you, but what you can do for your country”). In the communitarian view, the

self sometimes becomes a function of society rather than an independent entity.

G. W. F. Hegel, for example, attacked the very idea of a social-contract theory

because such a theory claims that there are individual selves who are capable of

entering into a contractual agreement before the origins of society in which such

agreements are possible. This, he insists, is nonsense. The self must be defined by

society; there is no self outside of society. At its extreme, this view sometimes leads

to totalitarianism (or fascism), which holds that the individual self is literally

nothing, that the whole self is defined by—and is the property of—the state.

(Hegel himself rejected this conclusion.)

We should note that for all three positions on the spectrum, the self is (at

least in part) a product of society. Each of us is a citizen as well as a particular

individual.

共同体主义拒斥自由主义和自治论自由主义所强调的单方面的权利，而把重点转向了义务概念。这种观点认为，是义务而不是权利定义了公民（“要问的不是国家能为你做些什么，而是你能为国家做些什么”）。在共同体主义看来，自我有时成了社会的一种功能而不是独立的实体。比如黑格尔就攻击社会契约论的观点，因为这种理论声称存在着个体的自我，他们能够在使这种协定成为可能的社会产生之前就达成一种契约式的协定。他认为这是一派胡言。自我必须由社会来规定，社会之外的自我是不存在的。这种观点走向极端有时会导致极权主义（或者法西斯主义），即认为个体的自我根本就是不存在的，整体的自我是由国家来规定的，而且也是国家的属性（黑格尔本人拒斥这一结论）。但是对于所有这三种立场来说，自我（至少部分上）是社会的产物，他既是一个公民，又是一个独特的个体。

1. ***What is the meaning of Aristotle’s concept of motion？ 亚里士多德的动力概念***

Because motion or change (kinêsis) is mentioned in the definition of nature, any discussion of nature will need to rely upon the explanation of motion. One might—erroneously—think that this is an easy task, because Aristotle’s categories do contain two related types of entities, action and passion. Aristotle’s discussion of motion in the Physics, however, starts out in a somewhat different manner. When he submits that there is no motion besides the categories (Physics 3.1, at 200b32–201a3), he does not assign motions to the categories of action and passion. After mentioning that the entities in the categories come in oppositions, Aristotle claims a few lines later (at 201a8–9) that there are as many kinds of motion and change as there are kinds of being. This means that motions are grouped here with the entities of the category where they effect change.

因为亚里士多德的动力概念是在对本质的定义中所提出的，任何对于本质的讨论都依赖于对于动力的解释。一个可能的不正确的认识是，由于亚里士多德的十个范畴中含有主动和被动这两个相关的实体，因此这变成一个容易的任务（对动力的解释）。然而，亚里士多德在他的《物理学》中，对动力概念进行了一种不同于十范畴方式的探讨。当他说在十范畴之外没有动力时，并没有将动力归入主动和被动这两个范畴之中。在提出属于不同范畴的实体之内产生对立之后，亚里士多德宣称有多少种存在，就有多少种动力概念。这表明，动力概念根据范畴效用的变革的划分而划分。

Nevertheless, when making this claim, Aristotle speaks about four kinds of motion and change only—those in substance, in quality, in quantity and in place—whereas the number of the kinds of being should have remained ten.

然而，当这样宣称时，亚里士多德只提及了四种动力——实体，质量，数量和地点（所在）——然而，存在本身的范畴依然是十种。

Aristotle is more intent on characterizing the ontological links which motions have to entities falling into different categories, and to find a general matrix of undergoing and effecting change. This happens in several steps. First Aristotle claims that changes of relations are not changes in their own right; rather they are accidental, as they occur also in entities in which no change occurs at all, if the entity which they stand in relation to undergoes some change.[[13](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/notes.html" \l "note-13)] After these considerations the crucial two categories of action and passion are eliminated: As there are no motions of motions, we can set aside action and passion (items (7) and (8) in the Categories).[[14](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/notes.html" \l "note-14)] This leaves us with the shorter list of relevant categories, (1) substance, (2) quality, (3) quantity, and (4) place.[[15](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/notes.html" \l "note-15)]

亚里士多德更倾向于描述动力与不同类别的实体之间的本体论联系，并寻找经历和影响变化的一般准则。有这样几步。首先，亚里士多德认为联系的变化本身并不是变化;相反，它们是偶性的，因为它们也发生在永恒不变的实体中，如果它们所代表的实体发生了某种变化。在这种宣称之下，最关键的两种范畴（主动和被动）被消除了：因为他们没有推动动力变化的动力。这使得我们能减少相关的范畴：实体，质量，数量，和地点（所在）。

Within the four domains where genuine change can occur, change always requires the existence of a potentiality which can be actualised. But change is neither identical to this potentiality, nor to the lack of a property, nor, without further qualifications, to the actuality which is acquired when the potentiality is actualised (Physics 3.2, 201b33–35). It is a special kind of actuality, the actuality of the potential in so far as it is potential (Physics 3.2, 201a27–29). Aristotle’s formulation strongly suggests that the potentiality actualised in the process of change is not a separate and independent potentiality for motion, alongside the entity’s potentiality for harbouring the end-state of the process: the process, say, house-building, and the end result, the house, are different actualisations of the same potentiality of a set of materials that is buildable into a house.

在能够发生真正变革的四个领域中，变革总是要求存在一种可以实现的潜力。但是，变化既不等于这种可能性，也不等于这种属性的缺乏，也不等于(没有进一步的条件)当这种可能性实现时所获得的现实性(物理学3.2,201b33-35)。它是一种特殊的现实性，就潜能的存在而言，潜能的存在就是势(物理3.2,201a27-29)。亚里士多德的动力因律表明,潜能的实现过程中并不是一个单独而独立的动力潜能，而是:这个构建的过程，和最终的结果, 是在相同的潜能和质料下不同的实现。

It is furthermore important to note that potentiality in this discussion throughout excludes actuality. In a formulation closely matching the formulation of the principle of non-contradiction, Aristotle asserts that “some things are the same [=have the same properties, are the same substances] both in potentiality and in actuality, but not at the same time or not in the same respect, as e.g. [a thing is] warm in actuality and cold in potentiality” (Physics 3.1, 201a19–22).[[19](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/notes.html" \l "note-19)] Hence the ability of Aristotle’s definition to pick out the paradoxical entity, which is the actuality of a potentiality that can no longer be present once it has been replaced by the corresponding property in actuality.

此外，值得注意的是，在整个讨论过程中，潜在的可能性排除了现实性。在这个近非矛盾的原则中,亚里士多德声称,“有些东西是相同的(=有相同的属性,是相同的物质)在潜力和现实,但不同时在相同的方面,如,在现实中的温暖和在潜能助攻的冷。因此，亚里士多德的定义能够指出矛盾的实体，这是一种可能性的现实性，一旦它被现实中相应的性质所取代，这种可能性就不再存在了。

1. ***What is Kant's formulation of the Ontological Argument of God? 上帝的本体论证明***

5.1 The Ontological Argument

Kant's formulation of the ontological argument is fairly straightforward, and may be summarized as follows:

1. God, the ens realissimum, is the concept of a being that contains all reality/predicates.
2. Existence is a reality/predicate.
3. Therefore God exists.

康德的本体论证明是相当直接的，可以被总结成这三条：

1. 上帝，这个最高的实在的存在者，是一个包含了所有实体和是的存在概念。
2. 存在就是现实/是。
3. 因此上帝存在

Kant's identification of the errors involved in this argument are so varied that it seems surprising that he is so often simply said to have argued against the use of “existence” as a predicate. His first complaint is that it is “contradictory” insofar as it introduces “existence” into the “concept of a thing which we profess to be thinking solely in reference to its possibility” (A597/B625). This suggests that he thinks that in taking “all reality” to mean or include “existence,” the rational theologist begs the question, and already posits the analytic connection between the concept of the ens realissimum and necessary existence.

康德对这一论点中所涉及的错误的认识是如此不同，以至于他常常被简单地说成反对使用“存在”作为谓词，这似乎令人惊讶。他的第一个驳斥是，它是“矛盾的”，因为它把“存在”引入了“一个我们自称仅仅根据其可能性来思考的事物的概念”(A597/B625)。这表明他认为，理性的神学家在把“一切实在”理解为“存在”或包含“存在”时，回避了这个问题，并且已经假定了“实在”概念与必要存在之间的分析联系。

At the heart of this complaint is a more general one, to wit, that there is a problem with the attempt to infer anything as necessarily existing. Although, according to Kant, reason is unavoidably led to the notion of an absolutely necessary being, the understanding is in no position to identify any candidate answering to the idea. (cf. A592/B620). Clearly, the ontological argument is designed to show that, in fact, there is one (and only one) candidate answering to this idea, namely, the ens realissimum. But it does so by deducing the necessary existence from the concept of the ens realissimum (a being that contains all reality or predicates) only via the minor premise that “existence” is a predicate or reality. Kant, however, famously denies that existence is a “real predicate,” or determination. Thus, one criticism is that the argument conflates merely logical with real (determining) predicates. A real (determining) predicate is one that enlarges the concept to which it is attached. It seems clear that the locus of the error here, as in the other metaphysical disciplines, is the view that the idea of the ens realissimum provides us with a concept of an “object” to which it would be appropriate to apply categories or concepts in a determining way. Thus, included in Kant's criticism is the claim that the category of existence is being subject to a transcendental misemployment (A598/B626). This misapplication of the category is problematic precisely because, according to Kant, we are dealing only with an object of pure thought, whose existence cannot be known (A602/B630).

这个驳斥中最重要的，也是最普遍的，即是，当我们把任何东西指认为必要的存在的时候，就出现了一个问题。康德认为，虽然理性不可避免地导致绝对必要存在的概念，但知性却不能指出任何与这一概念相符合的对象。显然，本体论的论证是为了表明，事实上，有一个且只有一个可能回答这个想法，即绝对的存在（最高的实在的存在者）。但它只是通过一个小前提，即"存在"是一个谓词或实在，从"实在"(一个包含所有实在或谓词的存在)的概念中推论出必要的存在。然而，康德否认存在是一种“真实的谓词”或决定。因此，就产生这样一种批判，该论证仅仅将逻辑谓词与实际谓词(决定谓词)合并在一起。实(定)谓词是扩大其所附概念的谓词。很明显，这里错误的根源，正如在其他形而上学的学科中一样，是这样一种观点，即实在的存在者的概念为我们提供了一个“对象”的概念，在这个“对象”中，以一种确定的方式应用范畴或概念是恰当的。因此，在康德的批判中包含了存在的范畴受到先验误用的主张(A598/B626)。这种对范畴的误用是有问题的，因为根据康德的观点，我们所讨论的只是一个纯粹的思想的对象，它的存在是不可知的(A602/B630)。

1. ***What is the*** ***pragmatic coherence theory of truth?***

Grant an idea or belief to be true, what concrete difference will its being

true make in anyone’s actual life? . . . What, in short, is the truth’s

cash-value in experiential terms?

— William James, 1907

**假定一种观念或信念为真，它的真能给一个人的实际生活带来什么样的具体变化呢？……简而言之，怎样才能用经验术语来表达真理的现金值呢？**

**——威廉·詹姆士，《实用主义》，1907**

**Of Fact and Truth**

In the realm of truth-processes facts come independently and determine our beliefs provisionally. But these beliefs make us act, and as fast as they do so, they bring into sight or into existence new facts which re-determine the beliefs accordingly. So the whole coil and ball of truth, as it rolls up, is the product of a double influence. Truths emerge from facts; but they dip forward into facts again and add to them; which facts again create or reveal new truth (the word is indifferent) and so on indefinitely. The “facts” themselves meanwhile are not true. They simply are. Truth is the function of the beliefs that start and terminate among them.

The case is like a snowball’s growth; due as it is to the distribution of the snow’s growth, due as it is to the distribution of the snow on the one hand, and to the successive pushes of the boys on the other, with these factors co-determining each other incessantly.— William James, Pragmatism, 1907

**事实与真理**

**在真理过程的领城中，许多事实都独立地发生，并且暂时决定着我们的信念。这些信念促使我们行动起朱，而在它们这样作用的同时，又会使新的事实得以出现或者存在，然后这些新的事实又这样反过来决定信念，因此，如此缠绕起来的全部真理线球，就是双重影响的产物。真理从事实中显现，但又浸入事实之中而增加事实；这些事实又会创造或者揭示新的真理（用什么样的词是无关紧要的），如此无限地类推下去。同时，“事实”本身并不是真的，它们只是存在着而已。其理是信念的功能，而这种信念则起于事实，终于事实。**

**这就像雪球变大一样，一方面是因为有雪分布着，另一方面是由于小孩的不断推动；这两个因素彼此不断地互相决定着。**

**——威廉·詹姆士，《实用主义》，1907**

The pragmatic theory supplements the coherence theory with a practical

proviso—namely, that among the reasons for accepting a statement or a belief as

true is whether it allows us to function better, whether it suggests fruitful lines

of inquiry to be pursued in the future—whether it “works,” in the words of the

most famous defender of the theory, the American pragmatist William James. One

hypothesis in science, for instance, may not have any more evidence for it than

another, and it may fit into our overall beliefs no better than do a number of others;

but it may well be more easily testable, encourage further experimentation in the

same field, or suggest interesting possibilities not suggested by other hypotheses. To

say that a view is true, therefore, is to say that it is the most useful the most promising

explanation available to us. We get the most benefit out of it in dealings with the

world. But the value of a view is not just its scientific promise. It might be its social

or spiritual value as well—for example, in our views of morality and religion.

实用论为融贯论补充了一条附加的实践条件，即接受一条陈述或一种信念为真的理由之一，就是它是否能让我们更好地行动，是否能为未来提供富有成效的出路。用这个理论最著名的拥护者美国实用主义者威廉·詹姆士的话来说，就是它是否“管用”。比如，也许有一种科学假说并非拥有比其他假说更多的证据，或者并不比其他假说更能与我们的整体信念相协调，但它可能更容易检验，在同一领域能够鼓励更多的实验，或者能够提出其他假说无法提出的各种有趣的可能性。因此，说一种观点是真的，就是说它是我们所能获得的最有价值和最有前途的解释。但一种观点的价值可能并不仅在于它的科学前景，而且还在于它的社会价值或精神价值——比如我们对道德和宗教的看法就是如此

1. ***What is*** ***the consequentialist theories in morality? 道德的结果主义***

“The road to Hell,” we are told, “is paved with good intentions.” What good is

a good will, we might ask, if it does not produce good consequences—that is, if

it does not make people (in general) happy or, at least, protect them from pain

and suffering? Of course, because people usually do what they intend to do, even

allowing for mistakes and the usual amount of stupidity in the world, good intentions

usually lead to good consequences. But are the intentions good because

of the consequences, or do the consequences count as good (at least in part)

because of the goodness of the intentions? Kant insists on the priority of the

good intentions. Consequentialist moral theorists, however, insist that it is what

actually happens that makes an act (and its consequences) good or bad. A good

act, whatever its intentions, is one that has the happiest (or at least the least miserable) results.

人们常说：“通往地狱的路是由善良的意愿铺成的。”我们也许会问，如果“善良意志”不能产生好的结果，也就是说，如果它并不能使人们（普遍地）幸福，或至少是使他们免受苦难，那么它又何善之有呢？当然，即使考虑到世界上通常发生的糊涂事和错误，由于人们基本上会按照他们的意图去做事情，所以好的意图通常也会产生好的后果。但是，究竟意图是由于其后果才是好的，还是后果之所以算是好的（至少部分地）在于其意图是好的？康德主张好的意图优先于后果，后果论道德理论家则强调实际发生的事情决定了一个行为（及其后果）的好坏。好的行为是能够产生最大的幸福（或至少是最小的不幸）的行为，这与它的意图无关。

The clearest case of a consequentialist moral theory in the modern Western

world is a still dominant view called utilitarianism, first formulated in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by a number of British philosophers and

social thinkers, including Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill

(1806–1873). Utilitarianism is a goal-oriented moral theory because it places all of

its emphasis on the actual consequences of moral rules and principles, and insists

that they be justified only by appeal to how happy they make us. The duty-defined

morality theorists, on the other hand, do not ask whether being moral will make

us happier; they insist that we ought to be moral for the sake of being moral. Of

course, duty-defined morality theorists also want to be happy and want us all to

be happy, too, but they separate, as the utilitarians do not, moral questions of

what is right from merely practical questions of what will benefit or harm us.

近代最为明确的后果主义道德理论被称为**功利主义**，它现在仍然占据着主导地位。这种理论是由**杰里米·边沁（1748-1832）**和**约翰·斯图亚特·密尔**等一些英国哲学家和社会思想家于18、19世纪提出来的。功利主义很显然是一种目的论道德理论，因为它不遗余力地强调道德规则和原则的实际后果，认为它们的正当性只能通过它们能给我们带来多大幸福来判断。而义务论道德理论家不去问道德地行动是否会使我们更幸福，而是说我们应当为了有道德而有道德。当然，义务论理论家也想得到幸福，并想让我们所有的人都幸福，但他们却将“什么是正当的”这类道德问题与“什么将对我们有利或有害”这类实用问题区分开来，而功利主义者则不然。

For utilitarians, however, questions of what will benefit or harm us count for everything; as Mill said succinctly, “The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people actually do desire it.” The goal of morality, according to Mill, Bentham, and almost all other utilitarians, is to make people happy, to give them pleasure and spare them pain. Indeed, Bentham developed a happiness calculus precisely in order to calculate, for any action or policy, what the consequences in terms of pleasure and pain would be. He considers a number of factors, such as how intense and how lasting the pleasure (or pain) produced by an action would be, how certain it is that we would attain it, how quickly it would result, how much ongoing pleasure (or pain) would result, how many people would be affected, and the extent to which pleasure and pain are likely to be mixed. Thus, if we wanted to evaluate the previously described action that Kant rejected as immoral and irrational, we would not ask, “What if everyone were to lie?” but rather, “What would be the actual consequences of my lying in this situation?” Bentham would essentially add up the beneficial results of the action, using a quantitative point system, subtract the painful consequences from this, and see whether the action was therefore relatively desirable or not. Because this system is quantitative, it could also be used to compare the relative merits of alternative courses of action.

对于功利主义者来说，什么会对我们有利或有害才是最重要的。密尔曾经简洁地说：“任何东西之为可欲（desirable**[可欲]**），其唯一可能的根据，就是人们实际上欲求（desire）它。”按照密尔、边沁以及其他大多数功利主义者的看法，道德的目的就在于使人们幸福，给予人们快乐，减轻人们的痛苦。为了计算任何行为和法律可能产生的快乐和痛苦，边沁甚至还提出了一套精确的“幸福计算法”。于是，如果我们要评价上一节中被康德认为是“不道德的”和“非理性的”从而应当拒斥的那些行为，我们就不会问“如果每个人都撒谎会是什么样子”，而要问“如果我在这种情况下撒谎会产生什么样的实际后果”。边沁实际上是用一种数量点数制把行为产生的利益全部加起来，再减去这一后果产生的痛苦，来看这一行为是否可取。

1. ***What is the Duty-Defined Morality? 被责任规定的道德***

The least complicated example of a duty-defined morality would be the Ten Commandments,

which simply give us a list of our duties. Such orders were called by

Immanuel Kant categorical imperatives—an imperative simply being an order

or a commandment and categorical meaning “without qualification.” They are

categorical, or without qualification, because they offer no reasons or conditions;

they just tell us what it is that we must do or not do. It is the authority of the

principle itself—or the authority by which it is given to us—that is the sole reason

needed to obey it. In addition, of course, obeying the principle might in fact

be good for us; indeed, it might even be the precondition for the stability of our

society. But a duty-defined morality insists that it is the status of the principle

itself, whatever its consequences and whatever personal reasons we might find in

addition for obeying it, that is its justification for us.

Duty-defined morality may appeal to a number of authorities, and these

authorities may be either within us or outside of us. The traditional Judeo-Christian

moral theory makes the authority and the source of morality (God) wholly outside

of us (although there may be some inner reminder as well, such as conscience). But

duty-defined morality may be secular as well as religious, and the king, the president,

the state in general, or the local oracle or prophet may serve as source and

authority of moral principles. When people say, “You must obey; it’s the law,” they

are appealing to the state (or the law) as an authority to be obeyed, even if the consequences

of the law in question are such that we might all be better off if there were

no such law. And within the family, it is often the case that, without understanding

the purpose or the consequences of an order, young children are expected to obey

the authority of their parents just because the parents are, in that small context, the

authorities who define the rules for their children, presumably in accordance with

the established rules and values of their society.

义务论道德最简单的例子就是“十诫”，它仅仅为我们提供了一张义务的清单。这些指示被伊曼努尔·康德称为**绝对命令**——“命令”只是一个指示或诫律，“绝对”则意味着“无条件”。他们是绝对的或无条件的，因为它们不提供任何理由或条件，它们只是告诉我们什么是必须做的，什么一定不能做。原则本身的权威——或者它被给予我们所基于的权威——就是遵守它所需要的唯一理由。当然，遵守原则也许在实际情况中对我们有利，这甚至是我们社会稳定的前提。但义务论道德坚持认为，对我们来说，道德原则本身的地位就是它的正当理由，无论其后果是什么，无论我们可能找到什么样的个人原因，我们都只能遵守它。

义务论道德可以诉诸某些权威，这些权威既可能在我们之内，也可能在我们之外。传统的犹太-基督教道德理论把这种权威和道德的来源（上帝）完全置于我们之外（尽管也许还有某些像良心这样的内在的东西）。但义务论道德既可以是宗教性的，也可以是世俗性的，国王、总统、国家、当地的圣贤或先知都可以作为道德原则的来源和权威。当人们说“你必须遵守，因为这是法律”时，他们就是在诉诸国家（或“法律”）作为必须遵守的权威，即使这种法律的后果并不好，以至于没有这样的法律我们也许会生活得更好。在家庭中经常会出现这样的情况，即使幼小的孩子不理解指示的目的或后果，他们也被要求服从他们父母的权威，这只是因为在那个小环境中，父母就是那些可能按照社会既定的规则和价值来给孩子确立规则的权威。

1. ***What is the meanings of life? 生活的意义（有！）***

美国人罗伯特.所罗门的《大问题》很好地回答了生活的意义是什么？

American Robert Solomon's big question is a good answer to this question.

孩子作为意义：就像许多人所做的那样，一个人当然可以全身心致力于培养自己的孩子，有比较大比例的父母会毫不犹豫的选择这一条。但问题是你作为父母已经找到了生活的意义，那么对于孩子而言呢？生活的意义是什么呢？孩子的孩子？这无疑是一种生活方式，但问题会循环流传下去。

**Children as meaning:** like a lot of people do, a person can be fully committed to cultivating their own children, of course, there is a greater proportion of parents would not hesitate to choose this one. But the problem is that you have found meaning in your life as a parent, so what about the kids? What is the meaning of life? Kids? This is certainly a way of life, but the problem circulates.

上帝作为意义：这是欧洲人传统的回答，但问题是人的意义是上帝，那么上帝的意义呢？上帝为什么创造我们？他指望我们什么？他创造我们为了什么？我们为什么要认为自己是被上帝创造出来的呢？

**God is the meaning**: this is the traditional answer of the European, but the question is the meaning of man is god, what is the meaning of god? Why does god create us? What does he expect of us? What did he create for us? Why do we think we were created by god?

来生作为意义：今世的修行只是为了来生的幸福享受，今生的意义在于来生，那来世的意义呢？

**Afterlife as meaning:**The practice of this world is only for the happiness of the afterlife, the meaning of this life lies in the afterlife, the meaning of the afterlife?

没有任何意义：生活也许是荒谬的，也许人生就象法国哲学家加缪《西西弗斯的神话》中的西西弗斯，不停地将巨石推向山顶，石头因自身的重量从山顶滚下来，西西弗斯再将石头推向山顶，如此，不断地循环。

**Doesn't make any sense:** life may be ridiculous, maybe life is like French philosopher Albert camus in "the myth of Sisyphus" Sisyphus, keep the boulder to the top of the mountain, the stone because of its own weight rolling down from the top of the mountain, Sisyphus again the stone to the top of the mountain, so, constantly cycle.

其实，生活的意义在于我们自己本身的生活当中，而不在于外在的事、物、人或者信仰，神，更不是荒谬的生活没有意义。

或者，生活可以没有意义，但生活却不能没有态度，生活的态度包含你的人生观、世界观以及你对生活意义的认知。

In fact, the meaning of life lies in our own life itself, rather than external things, objects, or faith, god, more is not absurd life is meaningless.

Or, life can be no sense, but life has not without attitude, the attitude of life contains your outlook on life, world outlook as well as your understanding of the meaning of life.

生活是一场游戏。无论过程怎样结果才是最重要的，要的是成功失败，是输赢。他们狂热，他们努力与成功，他们追逐成功。

生活是一个故事。我们是这个故事的主角，这个故事是我们演绎的。我们生活的环境，身边的人事物都是这个故事的一部分。

**Life is a game.** No matter how the process turns out to be the most important thing, it's losing, losing. They are enthusiastic, they try and succeed, they chase success.

**Life is a story.** We are the protagonists of this story, which we deduce. We live in an environment where people are part of the story.

生活是悲剧。悲剧隐喻把生活变成了一个严肃的、不愉快的过程，尽管偶尔也会碰上一些快乐的事情，但生活终将有一个不可抗拒的悲惨结局。在这种观点看来，活得好意味着把一个人的悲剧角色扮演好——英雄式地承受它，也许时而孤独地发出几声哀鸣。（3）那生活还有什么意义呢？无论做什么都逃不过死亡，这是迟早的事。不管什么事我是做还是不做都没有关系，做了最后我会死去，不做最后我还是会死去，做与不做都失去了意义。那么生活也就失去了意义。

**Life is a tragedy.** Tragic metaphor turns life into a serious, unpleasant process, though occasionally meet some happy things, but life will eventually have a irresistible tragic ending. In this view, living well means playing the tragic role of a person -- the heroic one, and perhaps a few mournful sounds. (3) what's the point of living? No matter what you do, you will not escape death. It will happen sooner or later. No matter what I do or don't do, I will die, I will die, I will die, I will die, and I will lose meaning. Then life loses meaning.

**生活是欲望**。生活充满了欲望，我们不满足现有的，我们向往着更好的。当我们的欲望得到了满足时，我们又滋生出了另一个欲望。生活就是一个接一个的欲望。人们总是向往更好的生活，追求更好的生活。正是这样我们的生活才更好我们的社会才更好。正是欲望和欲望的满足才赋予了生活以意义，没有欲望便是已经离开了这个世界。（4）

**Life is a desire**. Life is full of desires, we are not satisfied with what we have, we want to be better. When our desires are met, we breed another desire. Life is one after another. People want to live a better life and pursue a better life. It is this way our life is better that our society is better. ***It is the satisfaction of desire and desire that gives meaning to life, and without desire it has left the world.*** (4)

**生活是各种关系**。生活的意义就在于人与人之间的关系之网；理想地说，生活的意义就是爱。（5）

**Life is all about relationships.** The meaning of life is the **web of relationships between people**. Ideally, ***the meaning of life is love.*** (5)

我认为个人的生活态度是生活是学习，生活是一种成长的经历，活着就是为了开发你个人的潜能，学习可以让人更加的智慧，也可以让人更加地快乐，正如德国哲学家阿兰说的：“如果这个世界上的人都以获得知识作为幸福的基准，那么这个世界一定会到处洋溢着幸福的感觉。”

I think personal attitude to life is life is to learn, life is a kind of growing experience, to live is to develop the potential of your personal, learning can make people more wisdom, also can let a person more happy, just as the German philosopher alain said: "if the people in the world is to acquire knowledge as benchmark of happiness, then the world will be filled with the feeling of happiness."

1. ***What is Kant’s*** ***Hypothetical Imperatives?***

Corresponding to material principles, on Kant’s view, are what he calls hypothetical imperatives, a hypothetical imperative is a principle of rationality that says that I should act in a certain way if I choose to satisfy some desire. If maxims in general are rules that describe how one does act, then imperatives in general prescribe how one should act. An imperative is hypothetical if it says how I should act only if I choose to pursue some goal in order to gratify a desire. This, for example, is a hypothetical imperative: if you want coffee, then go to the cafe. This hypothetical imperative applies to you only if you desire coffee and choose to gratify that desire. Insofar as I act only on material principles or hypothetical imperatives, I do not act freely, but rather I act only to satisfy some desire(s) that I have, and what I desire is not ultimately within my control.

在康德看来，与物质原则相对应的，是他所说的假设性命令，假设性命令是理性原则，即如果我选择满足某种欲望，我就应该以某种方式行动。祈使句是假设性的，如果它说我应该如何行动，只有当我选择追求某个目标，以满足欲望。例如，这是一个假设的祈使句:如果你想喝咖啡，那就去咖啡馆。只有当你想喝咖啡并选择满足这个愿望时，这个假设的命令才适用于你。只要我只根据物质原则或假设的必要条件行事，我就不会自由行动，而只是为了满足我所拥有的一些欲望，而我所渴望的最终并不是我所能控制的。

1. ***What is Kant’s*** ***Humanity Formula?***

This formulation states that we should never act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in itself. This is often seen as introducing the idea of “respect” for persons, for whatever it is that is essential to our humanity. First, the Humanity Formula does not rule out using people as means to our ends. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any life that is recognizably human without the use of others in pursuit of our goals. What the Humanity Formula rules out is engaging in this pervasive use of humanity in such a way that we treat it as a mere means to our ends. Second, it is not human beings per se but the “humanity” in human beings that we must treat as an end in itself. Our “humanity” is that collection of features that make us distinctively human, and these include capacities to engage in self-directed rational behavior and to adopt and pursue our own ends, and any other rational capacities necessarily connected with these.Third, the idea of an end has three senses for Kant, two positive senses and a negative sense. An end in the first positive sense is a thing we will to produce or bring about in the world. Finally, Kant’s Humanity Formula requires “respect” for the humanity in persons.And, crucially for Kant, persons cannot lose their humanity by their misdeeds – even the most vicious persons, Kant thought, deserve basic respect as persons with humanity.

这一提法指出，我们绝不应以这样一种方式行事，即我们对待人类，无论是在自己身上还是在别人身上，都只把它当作一种手段，而永远把它当作一种目的本身。这往往被看作是引进了对人的“尊重”的概念，因为无论对我们人类的本质是什么。首先，人性准则并不排除把人作为达到目的的手段。的确，很难想象没有别人来追求我们的目标，有哪一种生活是可以被认出是人类的。人性公式所排除的是，我们对人性的这种普遍使用，使我们把它仅仅当作达到目的的一种手段。第二，我们必须把人本身当作目的，而不是人本身，而是人的“人性”。我们的“人性”是一系列特征的集合，这些特征使我们成为独特的人类，这些特征包括参与自我导向的理性行为的能力，采取和追求我们自己的目标的能力，以及任何其他与这些目标必然相关的理性能力。第三，对于康德来说，目的的概念有三种意义，两种积极意义和一种消极意义。第一个积极意义上的目的是我们要在这个世界上创造或实现的。最后，康德的人性公式要求“尊重”人的人性。而且，对康德来说，至关重要的是，人不能因为他们的恶行而丧失人性——康德认为，即使是最邪恶的人，作为有人性的人也应该得到基本的尊重。