1. ***What is the*** ***coherence theory of truth?真理的融贯论***

A coherence theory of truth states that the truth of any (true) proposition consists in its coherence with some specified set of propositions. According to the coherence theory, the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions.

A version of the coherence theory states that the coherence relation is some form of entailment（蕴含）. Entailment can be understood here as strict logical entailment（严格逻辑上的蕴含，闭集）, or entailment in some looser sense. According to this version, a proposition coheres with a set of propositions if and only if it is entailed by members of the set. Another more plausible version of the theory, held for example in Bradley（布拉德利） (1914), is that coherence is mutual explanatory support between propositions. （命题间的相互解释）

Coherentists generally agree that the specified set（特定闭集） consists of propositions believed or held to be true.

Advocates of the correspondence theory believe that a belief is (at least most of the time) ontologically distinct from the objective conditions which make the belief true. Idealists do not believe that there is an ontological distinction between beliefs and what makes beliefs true. From the idealists’ perspective, reality is something like a collection of beliefs. Consequently, a belief cannot be true because it corresponds to something which is not a belief.  Instead, the truth of a belief can only consist in its coherence with other beliefs. A coherence theory of truth which results from idealism usually leads to the view that truth comes in degrees. A belief is true to the degree that it coheres with other beliefs.

 Coherentists can then maintain that speakers can only make a practice of asserting a proposition under conditions the speakers are able to recognize as justifying the proposition. Coherentists can argue that the only conditions speakers can recognize as justifying a proposition are the conditions under which it coheres with their beliefs. When the speakers make a practice of asserting the proposition under these conditions, they become the proposition’s truth conditions.

1. ***What is the correspondence theory of truth? 真理的符合论***

The correspondence theory, states that the truth conditions of propositions are not (in general) propositions, but rather objective features of the world.

In medieval authors we find a division between “metaphysical” and “semantic” versions of the correspondence theory. The former are indebted to the truth-as-likeness theme suggested by Aristotle’s overall views, the latter are modeled on Aristotle’s more austere definition from Metaphysics 1011b25.

The metaphysical version presented by Thomas Aquinas is the best known: “Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus” (Truth is the equation of thing and intellect)（真理是物智方程）, which he restates as: “A judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external reality”.

Medieval authors who prefer a semantic version of the correspondence theory often use a peculiarly truncated formula to render Aristotle’s definition: A (mental) sentence is true if and only if, as it signifies, so it is (sicut significat, ita est).This emphasizes the semantic relation of significationwhile remaining maximally elusive about what the “it” is that is signified by a true sentence and de-emphasizing the correspondence relation (putting it into the little words “as” and “so”). They refrain from associating true sentences in general with items from a single ontological category.

1. ***What is the*** ***true meaning of equality?平等的真实含义***

‘Equality’ (or ‘equal’) signifies correspondence between a group of different objects, persons, processes or circumstances that have the same qualities in at least one respect, but not all respects, i.e., regarding one specific feature, with differences in other features. ‘Equality’ needs to thus be distinguished from ‘identity’ — this concept signifying that one and the same object corresponds to itself in all its features: an object that can be referred to through various individual terms, proper names, or descriptions. For the same reason, it needs to be distinguished from ‘similarity’ — the concept of merely approximate correspondence. Thus, to say e.g. that men are equal is not to say that they are identical. Equality implies similarity rather than ‘sameness.’

Equality in its prescriptive usage has, a close connection with morality and justice in general and distributive justice in particular.

1.Formal Equality

When two persons have equal status in at least one normatively relevant respect, they must be treated equally with regard to this respect.This is the generally accepted formal equality principle that Aristotle formulated.

### 2.Proportional Equality

According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of equality, numerical and proportional (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1130b-1132b; cf. Plato, Laws, VI.757b-c). A form of treatment of others or as a result of it a distribution is equal numerically when it treats all persons as indistinguishable, thus treating them identically or granting them the same quantity of a good per capita.

### 3.Moral Equality

Against Plato and Aristotle, the classical formula for justice according to which an action is just when it offers each individual his or her due took on a substantively egalitarian meaning in the course of time, viz. everyone deserved the same dignity and the same respect. This is now the widely held conception of substantive, universal, moral equality.

In the modern period, starting in the seventeenth century, the dominant idea was of natural equality in the tradition of natural law and social contract theory. Hobbes (1651) postulated that in their natural condition, individuals possess equal rights, because over time they have the same capacity to do each other harm. Locke (1690) argued that all human beings have the same natural right to both (self-)ownership and freedom. Rousseau (1755) declared social inequality to be a virtually primeval decline of the human race from natural equality in a harmonious state of nature: a decline catalyzed by the human urge for perfection, property and possessions (Dahrendorf 1962). For Rousseau (1755, 1762), the resulting inequality and rule of violence can only be overcome by tying unfettered subjectivity to a common civil existence and popular sovereignty. In Kant's moral philosophy (1785), the categorical imperative formulates the equality postulate of universal human worth. His transcendental and philosophical reflections on autonomy and self-legislation lead to a recognition of the same freedom for all rational beings as the sole principle of human rights (Kant 1797, p. 230).

1. ***What is*** ***libertarianism? 自由意志主义***

Libertarians strongly value individual freedom and see this as justifying strong protections for individual freedom. Thus, libertarians insist that justice poses stringent limits to coercion.While people can be justifiably forced to do certain things (most obviously, to refrain from violating the rights of others) they cannot be coerced to serve the overall good of society, or even their own personal good.

Just as people have strong rights to individual freedom in their personal and social affairs, libertarians argue, they also have strong rights to freedom in their economic affairs. Thus, rights of freedom of contract and exchange, freedom of occupation, and private property are taken very seriously.

It affirms a strong distinction between the public and the private spheres of life; insists on the status of individuals as morally free and equal, something it interprets as implying a strong requirement of individuals sovereignty; and believes that a respect for this status requires treating people as right-holders, including as holders of rights in property.

Most, however, focus more on the idea of self-ownership. Famously, this view is attributed to Robert Nozick (Cohen 1995; but see the discussion below). On this view, the key libertarian starting point is that people have a very stringent (perhaps the most stringent possible) set of rights over their persons, giving them the kind of control over themselves that one might have over possessions they own. This includes (1) rights to control the use of the entity: including a liberty-right to use it as well as a claim-right that others not use it without one's consent, (2) rights to transfer these rights to others (by sale, rental, gift, or loan), (3) immunities to the non-consensual loss of these rights, (4) compensation rights in case others use the entity without one’s consent, and (5) enforcement rights (e.g. rights to restrain persons about to violate these rights).

1. ***What is*** ***liberalism? 古典自由主义***

On this view, the opposite of freedom is domination. To be unfree is to be “subject to the potentially capricious will or the potentially idiosyncratic judgement of another” (Pettit, 1997: 5). The ideal liberty-protecting government, then, ensures that no agent, including itself, has arbitrary power over any citizen.

For classical liberals,liberty and private property are intimately related. classical liberals have insisted that an economic system based on private property is uniquely consistent with individual liberty, allowing each to live her life —including employing her labor and her capital — as she sees fit. Indeed, classical liberals and libertarians have often asserted that in some way liberty and property are really the same thing; it has been argued, for example, that all rights, including liberty rights, are forms of property; others have maintained that property is itself a form of freedom (Gaus, 1994; Steiner, 1994).

1. ***What is the communitarianism?*** ***社群主义***

Communitarians have sought to deflate the universal pretensions of liberal theory. The main target has been Rawls description of the original position as an ‘Archimedean point’ from which the structure of a social system can be appraised, a position whose special virtue is that it allows us to regard the human condition ‘from the perspective of eternity’,[[3](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/notes.html" \l "3)] from all social and temporal points of view. Whereas Rawls seemed to present his theory of justice as universally true, communitarians argued that the standards of justice must be found in forms of life and traditions of particular societies and hence can vary from context to context. Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor argued that moral and political judgment will depend on the language of reasons and the interpretive framework within which agents view their world, hence that it makes no sense to begin the political enterprise by abstracting from the interpretive dimensions of human beliefs, practices, and institutions (Taylor 1985, ch. 1; MacIntyre 1978, chs.18–22 and 1988, ch.1; Benhabib 1992, pp. 23–38, 89n4). Michael Walzer developed the additional argument that effective social criticism must derive from and resonate with the habits and traditions of actual people living in specific times and places.

It is worth emphasizing, however, that contemporary communitarians have not been merely defending parochial attachments to particular non-liberal moralities. Far from arguing that the universalist discourse on human rights should be entirely displaced with particular, tradition-sensitive political language, they have criticized liberals for not taking universality seriously enough, for failing to do what must be done to make human rights a truly universal ideal. These communitarians—let us label them the ‘cosmopolitan critics of liberal universalism’—have suggested various means of improving the philosophical coherence and political appeal of human rights.

Communitarian thinkers in the 1980s such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor argued that Rawlsian liberalism rests on an overly individualistic conception of the self. Whereas Rawls argues that we have a supreme interest in shaping, pursuing, and revising our own life-plans, he neglects the fact that our selves tend to be defined or constituted by various communal attachments (e.g., ties to the family or to a religious tradition) so close to us that they can only be set aside at great cost, if at all.

While liberals may not have been arguing that individuals can completelyextricate themselves from their social context, the liberal valuation of choice still seemed to suggest an image of a subject who impinges his will on the world.[[9](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/notes.html" \l "9)] Drawing on the insights of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, communitarians argued that this view neglects the extent to which individuals are embodied agents in the world. Communitarians argued that a certain moral principle or communal attachment is more valuable simply because it has been chosen following deliberation among alternatives by an individual subject.

1. ***What is the meaning of Aristotle’s concept of motion？ 亚里士多德的动力概念***

Because motion or change (kinêsis) is mentioned in the definition of nature, any discussion of nature will need to rely upon the explanation of motion. One might—erroneously—think that this is an easy task, because Aristotle’s categories (as listed in the Categories and also elsewhere) do contain two related types of entities, action and passion. Aristotle’s discussion of motion in the Physics, however, starts out in a somewhat different manner. When he submits that there is no motion besides the categories (Physics 3.1, at 200b32–201a3), he does not assign motions to the categories of action and passion. After mentioning that the entities in the categories come in oppositions, Aristotle claims a few lines later (at 201a8–9) that there are as many kinds of motion and change as there are kinds of being. This means that motions are grouped here with the entities of the category where they effect change.[[9](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/notes.html" \l "note-9)]

Nevertheless, when making this claim, Aristotle speaks about four kinds of motion and change only—those in substance, in quality, in quantity and in place—whereas the number of the kinds of being should have remained ten.

Aristotle is more intent on characterizing the ontological links which motions have to entities falling into different categories, and to find a general matrix of undergoing and effecting change. This happens in several steps. First Aristotle claims that changes of relations are not changes in their own right; rather they are accidental, as they occur also in entities in which no change occurs at all, if the entity which they stand in relation to undergoes some change.[[13](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/notes.html" \l "note-13)] After these considerations the crucial two categories of action and passion are eliminated: As there are no motions of motions, we can set aside action and passion (items (7) and (8) in the Categories).[[14](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/notes.html" \l "note-14)] This leaves us with the shorter list of relevant categories, (1) substance, (2) quality, (3) quantity, and (4) place.[[15](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/notes.html" \l "note-15)]

Within the four domains where genuine change can occur, change always requires the existence of a potentiality which can be actualised.ut change is neither identical to this potentiality, nor to the lack of a property, nor, without further qualifications, to the actuality which is acquired when the potentiality is actualised (Physics 3.2, 201b33–35). It is a special kind of actuality, the actuality of the potential in so far as it is potential (Physics 3.2, 201a27–29). Aristotle’s formulation strongly suggests that the potentiality actualised in the process of change is not a separate and independent potentiality for motion, alongside the entity’s potentiality for harbouring the end-state of the process: the process, say, house-building, and the end result, the house, are different actualisations of the same potentiality of a set of materials that is buildable into a house.

It is furthermore important to note that potentiality in this discussion throughout excludes actuality. In a formulation closely matching the formulation of the principle of non-contradiction, Aristotle asserts that “some things are the same [=have the same properties, are the same substances] both in potentiality and in actuality, but not at the same time or not in the same respect, as e.g. [a thing is] warm in actuality and cold in potentiality” (Physics 3.1, 201a19–22).[[19](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/notes.html" \l "note-19)] Hence the ability of Aristotle’s definition to pick out the paradoxical entity, which is the actuality of a potentiality that can no longer be present once it has been replaced by the corresponding property in actuality.

1. ***What is Kant's formulation of the Ontological Argument of God? 上帝的本体论证明***

Kant’s formulation of the ontological argument is fairly straightforward, and may be summarized as follows:

1. God, the ens realissimum, is the concept of a being that contains all reality/predicates.
2. Existence is a reality/predicate.
3. Therefore God exists.

Kant’s identification of the errors involved in this argument are so varied that it seems surprising that he is so often simply said to have argued against the use of “existence” as a predicate. His first complaint is that it is “contradictory” insofar as it introduces “existence” into the “concept of a thing which we profess to be thinking solely in reference to its possibility” (A597/B625). This suggests that he thinks that in taking “all reality” to mean or include “existence,” the rational theologist begs the question, and already posits the analytic connection between the concept of the ens realissimum and necessary existence.

At the heart of this complaint is a more general one, to wit, that there is a problem with the attempt to infer anything as necessarily existing. Although, according to Kant, reason is unavoidably led to the notion of an absolutely necessary being, the understanding is in no position to identify any candidate answering to the idea. (cf. A592/B620). Clearly, the ontological argument is designed to show that, in fact, there is one (and only one) candidate answering to this idea, namely, the ens realissimum. But it does so by deducing the necessary existence from the concept of the ens realissimum (a being that contains all reality or predicates) only via the minor premise that “existence” is a predicate or reality. Kant, however, famously denies that existence is a “real predicate,” or determination. Thus, one criticism is that the argument conflates merely logical with real (determining) predicates. A real (determining) predicate is one that enlarges the concept to which it is attached. It seems clear that the locus of the error here, as in the other metaphysical disciplines, is the view that the idea of the ens realissimumprovides us with a concept of an “object” to which it would be appropriate to apply categories or concepts in a determining way. Thus, included in Kant’s criticism is the claim that the category of existence is being subject to a transcendental misemployment (A598/B626). This misapplication of the category is problematic precisely because, according to Kant, we are dealing only with an object of pure thought, whose existence cannot be known (A602/B630).

1. ***What is the*** ***pragmatic coherence theory of truth?***

Pragmatic theories of truth are usually associated either with C.S. Peirce’s proposal that true beliefs will be accepted “at the end of inquiry” or with William James’ proposal that truth be defined in terms of utility. More broadly, however, pragmatic theories of truth focus on the connection between truth and epistemic practices, notably practices of inquiry and assertion. pragmatic theories of truth tend to view truth as a function of the practices people engage in, and the commitments people make, when they solve problems, make assertions, or conduct scientific inquiry.

Pragmatic theories of truth have the effect of shifting attention away from what makes a statement true and toward what people mean or do in describing a statement as true.

Peirce’s pragmatic theory of truth is a byproduct of his pragmatic theory of meaning. The meaning of the concept of “truth” then boils down to the “practical bearings” of using this term: that is, of describing a belief as true.

For Peirce, a true belief is one that is indefeasible and unassailable—and indefeasible and unassailable for all the right reasons: namely, because it will stand up to all further inquiry and investigation.

James, too, stresses that truth represents a kind of satisfaction: true beliefs are satisfying beliefs, in some sense. Unlike Peirce, however, James suggests that true beliefs can be satisfying short of being indefeasible and unassailable: short, that is, of how they would stand up to ongoing inquiry and investigation.

James’ point seems to be this: from a practical standpoint, we use the concept of truth to signal our confidence in a particular idea or belief; a true belief is one that can be acted upon, that is dependable and that leads to predictable outcomes; any further speculation is a pointless distraction.

 Like Peirce, Dewey emphasizes the connection between truth and rigorous scientific inquiry; like James, Dewey views truth as the verified result of past inquiry rather than as the anticipated result of inquiry proceeding into an indefinite future.Dewey insists that only “judgments”—not “propositions”—are properly viewed as truth-bearers. For Dewey, “propositions” are the proposals and working hypotheses that are used, via a process of inquiry, to generate conclusions and verified judgments.

1. ***What is*** ***the consequentialist theories in morality? 道德的结果主义***

Those who use “morality” normatively hold that morality is (or would be) the code that meets the following condition: all rational persons, under certain specified conditions, would endorse it. Indeed, this is a plausible basic schema for definitions of “morality” in the normative sense.

Consequentialist views might not seem to fit the basic schema for definitions of “morality”, since they do not appear to make reference to the notions of endorsement or rationality. But this appearance is deceptive. Mill (1861: 12) himself explicitly defines morality as

the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which [a happy existence] might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured.

And he thinks that the mind is not in a “right state” unless it is in “the state most conducive to the general happiness”—in which case it would certainly favor morality.

Act consequentialists seem to hold that everyone should know that they are morally required to act so as to bring about the best consequences, but even they do not seem to think judgments of moral blame are appropriate if a person is legitimately ignorant of what action would bring about the best consequences (Singer 1993: 228). Parallel views seem to be held by rule consequentialists (Hooker 2001: 72).

The lack of an explicit and widely accepted definition of morality may partially explain the resilience of act-consequentialist accounts of morality.

1. ***What is the Duty-Defined Morality? 被责任规定的道德***

Kant sees law, duty, and obligation as the very heart of morality.In this respect, Kant’s conception of morality defines the domain of morality primarily in terms of an unconditionally binding and inescapable form of obligation. Kant believes that our moral concerns are dominated by the question of what duties are imposed on us by a law that commands with a uniquely moral necessity. Like most eighteenth-century philosophers, he also believes that our moral lives are preoccupied with the question of how to be virtuous over the course of a life, but he defines virtue in terms of the more fundamental concepts of law, obligation, and duty.

Kant locates the foundation of morality in the rational nature that we share with all possible finite rational beings. He argues that morality’s foundation lies in the “autonomy” of the rational will. Kant’s notion of autonomy is one of the more central, distinctive, and influential aspects of his ethics. He defines autonomy as “the property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)” (G 4:440). According to Kant, the will of a moral agent is autonomous in that it both gives itself the moral law (is self-legislating) and can constrain or motivate itself to follow the law (is self-constraining or self-motivating). The source of the moral law is not in the agent’s feelings, natural impulses or inclinations, but in her “pure” rational will, which Kant identifies as the “proper self” (G 4:461). A heteronomous（他律的） will, on the other hand, is governed by something other than itself, such as an external force or authority.

As Kant’s saying: an action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will; hence there is left for the will nothing that could determine it the except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law. (G 4:400). Our rational choice of morality are duty\_defined.

Kant’s catalogue of virtues and vices is organized by his system of duties. These duties are grounded in the moral law, the supreme principle of morality, which impresses itself on imperfect, finite rational beings like us as a categorical imperative.

1. ***What is the meanings of life? 生活的意义（有！）***

美国人罗伯特.所罗门的《大问题》很好地回答了生活的意义是什么？

American Robert Solomon's big question is a good answer to this question.

孩子作为意义：就像许多人所做的那样，一个人当然可以全身心致力于培养自己的孩子，有比较大比例的父母会毫不犹豫的选择这一条。但问题是你作为父母已经找到了生活的意义，那么对于孩子而言呢？生活的意义是什么呢？孩子的孩子？这无疑是一种生活方式，但问题会循环流传下去。

**Children as meaning:** like a lot of people do, a person can be fully committed to cultivating their own children, of course, there is a greater proportion of parents would not hesitate to choose this one. But the problem is that you have found meaning in your life as a parent, so what about the kids? What is the meaning of life? Kids? This is certainly a way of life, but the problem circulates.

上帝作为意义：这是欧洲人传统的回答，但问题是人的意义是上帝，那么上帝的意义呢？上帝为什么创造我们？他指望我们什么？他创造我们为了什么？我们为什么要认为自己是被上帝创造出来的呢？

**God is the meaning**: this is the traditional answer of the European, but the question is the meaning of man is god, what is the meaning of god? Why does god create us? What does he expect of us? What did he create for us? Why do we think we were created by god?

来生作为意义：今世的修行只是为了来生的幸福享受，今生的意义在于来生，那来世的意义呢？

**Afterlife as meaning:**The practice of this world is only for the happiness of the afterlife, the meaning of this life lies in the afterlife, the meaning of the afterlife?

没有任何意义：生活也许是荒谬的，也许人生就象法国哲学家加缪《西西弗斯的神话》中的西西弗斯，不停地将巨石推向山顶，石头因自身的重量从山顶滚下来，西西弗斯再将石头推向山顶，如此，不断地循环。

**Doesn't make any sense:** life may be ridiculous, maybe life is like French philosopher Albert camus in "the myth of Sisyphus" Sisyphus, keep the boulder to the top of the mountain, the stone because of its own weight rolling down from the top of the mountain, Sisyphus again the stone to the top of the mountain, so, constantly cycle.

其实，生活的意义在于我们自己本身的生活当中，而不在于外在的事、物、人或者信仰，神，更不是荒谬的生活没有意义。

或者，生活可以没有意义，但生活却不能没有态度，生活的态度包含你的人生观、世界观以及你对生活意义的认知。

In fact, the meaning of life lies in our own life itself, rather than external things, objects, or faith, god, more is not absurd life is meaningless.

Or, life can be no sense, but life has not without attitude, the attitude of life contains your outlook on life, world outlook as well as your understanding of the meaning of life.

生活是一场游戏。无论过程怎样结果才是最重要的，要的是成功失败，是输赢。他们狂热，他们努力与成功，他们追逐成功。

生活是一个故事。我们是这个故事的主角，这个故事是我们演绎的。我们生活的环境，身边的人事物都是这个故事的一部分。

**Life is a game.** No matter how the process turns out to be the most important thing, it's losing, losing. They are enthusiastic, they try and succeed, they chase success.

**Life is a story.** We are the protagonists of this story, which we deduce. We live in an environment where people are part of the story.

生活是悲剧。悲剧隐喻把生活变成了一个严肃的、不愉快的过程，尽管偶尔也会碰上一些快乐的事情，但生活终将有一个不可抗拒的悲惨结局。在这种观点看来，活得好意味着把一个人的悲剧角色扮演好——英雄式地承受它，也许时而孤独地发出几声哀鸣。（3）那生活还有什么意义呢？无论做什么都逃不过死亡，这是迟早的事。不管什么事我是做还是不做都没有关系，做了最后我会死去，不做最后我还是会死去，做与不做都失去了意义。那么生活也就失去了意义。

**Life is a tragedy.** Tragic metaphor turns life into a serious, unpleasant process, though occasionally meet some happy things, but life will eventually have a irresistible tragic ending. In this view, living well means playing the tragic role of a person -- the heroic one, and perhaps a few mournful sounds. (3) what's the point of living? No matter what you do, you will not escape death. It will happen sooner or later. No matter what I do or don't do, I will die, I will die, I will die, I will die, and I will lose meaning. Then life loses meaning.

**生活是欲望**。生活充满了欲望，我们不满足现有的，我们向往着更好的。当我们的欲望得到了满足时，我们又滋生出了另一个欲望。生活就是一个接一个的欲望。人们总是向往更好的生活，追求更好的生活。正是这样我们的生活才更好我们的社会才更好。正是欲望和欲望的满足才赋予了生活以意义，没有欲望便是已经离开了这个世界。（4）

**Life is a desire**. Life is full of desires, we are not satisfied with what we have, we want to be better. When our desires are met, we breed another desire. Life is one after another. People want to live a better life and pursue a better life. It is this way our life is better that our society is better. ***It is the satisfaction of desire and desire that gives meaning to life, and without desire it has left the world.*** (4)

**生活是各种关系**。生活的意义就在于人与人之间的关系之网；理想地说，生活的意义就是爱。（5）

**Life is all about relationships.** The meaning of life is the **web of relationships between people**. Ideally, ***the meaning of life is love.*** (5)

我认为个人的生活态度是生活是学习，生活是一种成长的经历，活着就是为了开发你个人的潜能，学习可以让人更加的智慧，也可以让人更加地快乐，正如德国哲学家阿兰说的：“如果这个世界上的人都以获得知识作为幸福的基准，那么这个世界一定会到处洋溢着幸福的感觉。”

I think personal attitude to life is life is to learn, life is a kind of growing experience, to live is to develop the potential of your personal, learning can make people more wisdom, also can let a person more happy, just as the German philosopher alain said: "if the people in the world is to acquire knowledge as benchmark of happiness, then the world will be filled with the feeling of happiness."

1. ***What is Kant’s Hypothetical Imperatives?***

Kant holds that the fundamental principle of our moral duties is a categoricalimperative. It is an imperative because it is a command addressed to agents who could follow it but might not. It is categorical in virtue of applying to us unconditionally, or simply because we possesses rational wills, without reference to any ends that we might or might not have.

There are “oughts” other than our moral duties, according to Kant, but these oughts are distinguished from the moral ought in being based on a quite different kind of principle, one that is the source of hypothetical imperatives. A hypothetical imperative is a command that also applies to us in virtue of our having a rational will, but not simply in virtue of this. It requires us to exercise our wills in a certain way given we have antecedently willed an end. A hypothetical imperative is thus a command in a conditional form. But not any command in this form counts as a hypothetical imperative in Kant’s sense.

The condition under which a hypothetical imperative applies to us, is that we will some end. there is at least conceptual room for the idea of a natural or inclination-based end that we must will.

Kant describes the will as operating on the basis of subjective volitional principles he calls “maxims”. Hence, morality and other rational requirements are, for the most part, demands that apply to the maxims that we act on.For anything to count as human willing, it must be based on a maxim to pursue some end through some means. Hence, in employing a maxim, any human willing already embodies the form of means-end reasoning that calls for evaluation in terms of hypothetical imperatives. To that extent at least, then, anything dignified as human willing is subject to rational requirements.

1. ***What is Kant’s*** ***Humanity Formula?***

This formulation states that we should never act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in itself. This is often seen as introducing the idea of “respect” for persons, for whatever it is that is essential to our humanity.

First, the Humanity Formula does not rule out using people as means to our ends. Clearly this would be an absurd demand, since we apparently do this all the time in morally appropriate ways. What the Humanity Formula rules out is engaging in this pervasive use of humanity in such a way that we treat it as a mere means to our ends.

Second, it is not human beings per se but the “humanity” in human beings that we must treat as an end in itself. Our “humanity” is that collection of features that make us distinctively human, and these include capacities to engage in self-directed rational behavior and to adopt and pursue our own ends, and any other rational capacities necessarily connected with these.

Third, the idea of an end has three senses for Kant, two positive senses and a negative sense. An end in the first positive sense is a thing we will to produce or bring about in the world.  An end in this sense guides my actions in that once I will to produce something, I then deliberate about and aim to pursue means of producing it if I am rational.

An end in the negative sense lays down a law for me as well, and so guides action, but in a different way. That is, as an end, it is something I do not act against in pursuing my positive ends, rather than something I produce.

Insofar as the humanity in ourselves must be treated as an end in itself in this second positive sense, it must be cultivated, developed or fully actualized. Hence, the humanity in oneself is the source of a duty to develop one’s talents or to “perfect” one’s humanity.

Finally, Kant’s Humanity Formula requires “respect” for the humanity in persons. Proper regard for something with absolute value or worth requires respect for it. crucially for Kant, persons cannot lose their humanity by their misdeeds – even the most vicious persons, Kant thought, deserve basic respect as persons with humanity.