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Language of the Enemy: Impacts of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War on Linguistic and National Identity Paradigms in Ukraine

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LINGUISTIC AND NATIONAL IDENTITY PARADIGMS IN UKRAINE

by

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ABSTRACT

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Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, attempts at nation-building in newly independent Ukraine were stymied by disagreements over two competing narratives of national identity. Both the Eastern Slavic and ethnic Ukrainian national identity complexes evolved over the course of centuries of Russian subjugation of ethnic Ukrainians through imperial control, cultural erasure, and linguistic russification and standardization. This master's thesis examines the oppositional complexes that have long defined conceptions of Ukrainian nationhood and examines how they developed in response to nationality policies imposed by Russian imperial rulers, and evaluates the glottopolitical dimension of recent events, focusing on the Russo-Ukrainian War that resumed in February 2022.

Clashes between proponents of the Eastern Slavic and ethnic Ukrainian national identity complexes in the early years of Ukrainian independence contributed to the politicization of national identity and its components, particularly language. Whereas supporters of the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex believed that independent Ukraine should distance itself from Russia both culturally and linguistically in order to align itself with the West, proponents of the Eastern Slavic national identity complex wished to maintain Ukraine's kinship with Russia and honor the countries' shared cultural and linguistic heritage.

In the absence of one agreed-upon conception of national identity, tensions between the pro-West and pro-Russia camps have fomented in post-independence Ukraine. The two matters at the heart of Ukraine's nationhood debate—the country's relationship with Russia and the ethnic language of the Ukrainian people—have become deeply political. In 2013, those tensions came to a head, resulting in two Ukrainian nationalist movements: the Euromaidan Uprising and the Revolution of Dignity.

President Vladimir Putin of Russia has long maintained an irredentist attitude toward Ukraine that is rooted in the historic view of Ukraine as "Little Russia"—an inferior Slavic state whose

cultural, linguistic, and historical similarities to "Great Russia", coupled with its perceived comparative weakness, beg for intervention from its powerful neighbor. When Euromaidan began in November 2013, Putin utilized the revolution as a justification to invade Ukraine, claiming the uprising threatened Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Crimea and the Donbas. The annexation of Crimea and the Russian Spring in the Donbas marked the first time since Ukrainian independence that Russia acted in direct violation of the country's sovereignty. The ensuing Russo-Ukrainian War completely reshaped Russian-speaking Ukrainians' attitudes toward Russia and in turn resulted in the breakdown of the Eastern Slavic national identity complex and subsequent birth of a new Ukrainian identity paradigm. This new conception of Ukrainian nationhood, which this thesis identifies as the Russophone Ukrainian national identity complex, espoused the same cultural values and historical beliefs as the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex but justified its adherents' use of Russian, viewing the language's long history of use by Ukrainians as evidence of its significance as an ethnic Ukrainian tongue. Although the events of 2014-2015 resulted in Ukrainians' increasingly negative views of Russia, Russian-speaking Eastern Ukrainians continued to view the Russian language as an entity that was independent from the Russian Federation and continued to speak it, despite distancing themselves from Russia politically and culturally.

However, when Russia revived its attack on Ukraine in February 2022, once again violating Ukrainian autonomy in an attempt to reassert its imperial control, Russian-speaking Ukrainians further distanced themselves from their would-be oppressor by severing the last remaining tie: their language practices. In the months since Russia launched its most recent assault on Ukraine, citizens in the country's east have swiftly abandoned the Russian language in favor of Ukrainian.

This large-scale linguistic shift has been well-documented. In order to assess how Eastern Ukrainians' linguistic practices have changed in response to Russia's military mobilization in February 2022, this thesis examines news articles from several Russian-language news sources in Ukraine. The primary sources that will be utilized in this study were selected because they reference both the Russian and/or Ukrainian languages within the context of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. A thematic analysis is presented in order to reveal how Ukrainians' perceptions and usage of the Russian language have shifted as a result of the war.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

When Ukraine gained independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, it seemed that centuries of Russian imperialism in Ukrainian territory had finally been put to an end. However, the effects of nearly four hundred years of colonialism could not be undone overnight, and the nascent republic's attempts at nation-building were soon thwarted as citizens clashed over competing narratives of national identity. As former denizens of the Soviet Union, Ukrainians alive at the time of independence had grown up speaking Russian and looking to Russian leaders during times of geopolitical instability. While some viewed independence as a chance to establish a national identity centered around Ukrainian ethnicity and culture, others were reluctant to abandon their long-held Soviet identity and the cultural narratives and language practices it encompassed. There has been little consensus as to whether Ukrainian nationhood should center itself around a notion of identity that is based on ethnic Ukrainian culture or one that embraces the interconnected history of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. Thus, the question of national identity has remained a point of contention among Ukrainians for more than thirty years.

One of the most prevalent and highly politicized issues in the debate on Ukrainian national identity is language. The politicization of language in Ukraine is not a new phenomenon; rather, the intense glottopolitical divide that has inhibited Ukrainian nation-building since independence is the result of four centuries of linguistic russification promulgated by leaders of three Russian realms: the Tsardom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, and the Soviet Union. Since the early 1600s, Russian rulers have imposed their language and culture on ethnic Ukrainians through language planning policies, educational practices, and forced cultural and linguistic russification. As a direct result of Soviet language and education policies, many

Ukrainians today are fluent in both Russian and Ukrainian, though attitudes toward both languages are heavily dependent on factors such as age, region, and ethnicity. While the dissolution of the USSR catalyzed a Ukrainian nationalist movement that disabused notions of a bilingual state, the Russian language has maintained a strong presence in Ukraine, particularly in the eastern regions of the country. Politicians from those oblasts, who, like their constituents, are primarily Russian speaking, run on pro-Russia, anti-West platforms that promote a conception of Ukrainian nationhood that is in direct opposition to that espoused by the Ukrainian nationalist movement. The result is a head-to-head battle over the question of Ukrainian national identity to which language is central. In weaponizing language for political gain, Ukrainian public officials have exacerbated linguistic tensions, changing attitudes toward language, and the national identity crisis.

On the domestic level, language politicization has had major effects on independent Ukraine. The Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council of Ukraine)'s passage of the 2012 law "On the Principles of State Language Policy in Ukraine", which bolstered the status and usage of Russian throughout central and eastern Ukraine, sparked outrage among Ukrainians who felt that their titular language should retain its status as the country's sole official language and the Russian language served as a symbol of imperialism. The public outcry that stemmed from the passage of the 2012 language law helped to mobilize the Ukrainian pro-Europe movement that resulted in the Euromaidan Uprising and subsequent Revolution of Dignity. Those events, which lasted from November 2013 until February 2014, culminated in the ousting of Ukraine's pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych.

However, Ukrainian glottopolitics have implications that extend beyond the nation's borders and are thus vulnerable to external forces—another result of centuries of Russian

imperial practices. Russian President Vladimir Putin capitalized on the Ukrainian political movements that took place in 2013-14 and used them as a justification for launching a military operation against Ukraine in early 2014, which eventually evolved into the first campaign of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. That year, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula and sent troops to aid allegedly pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas region. Putin claimed that the annexation of Crimea—Russia's first violation of Ukrainian sovereignty since the collapse of the USSR—was a retaliatory move made to protect Russian-speakers in Crimea from a "fictitious Ukrainian threat" (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014, p.263). In reality, Putin's readiness to invade sovereign Ukrainian territory stemmed from both a desire to punish Ukraine for moving toward the West and his own irredentist attitudes toward Crimea, which are predicated on Russia's historical and cultural ties to the peninsula (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014).

Several studies have observed the impacts of major political upheavals on language practices and national identity in Ukraine. A survey conducted by Volodymyr Kulyk during the early 2010s found that a substantial number of interviewees made conscious changes in their language use between the years of 2012 and 2014. The same study also reported a decline in the number of self-identified Russian-speakers and a correlated increase in the number of self-identified Ukrainian-speakers throughout Ukraine over those years (Kulyk, 2018). This change cannot be solely attributed to one event; rather, five major political events occurred between 2012 and the end of 2014 that had the potential to impact Ukrainians' perceptions and use of Russian and Ukrainian. The shift in language practices recorded over that time period, which was catalyzed by both internal and external political events, suggests that Russia's most recent offensive against Ukraine, launched in February 2022, might already have impelled some Ukrainians to adjust their language usage.

The implication of language practices changing in response to geopolitical cleavages is that language is indeed a fundamental component of national identity. To that end, language is often utilized as a tool of homogenization, whether that be forced or voluntary. The language standardization policies imposed upon ethnic Ukrainians by Russian leaders for centuries were intended to subvert and erase Ukrainian culture and languages, and the same can be said for Russia's ongoing military assault against Ukraine.

Abandoning a language in order to differentiate oneself ethnically and culturally from an oppressor, as has been seen on a large scale in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, allows victims of imperialism to reclaim control of their national identity narratives. In the case of Ukraine, recent shifts in language usage reveal how Ukrainian notions of national identity have changed since independence in response to geopolitical and glottopolitical conflicts.

Current Study

This work analyzes the historical interplay between language planning and nationhood in Ukraine, taking the effects of these policies as precedent for changes in language attitudes and practices that have recently occurred within the context of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. Chapter two will begin with a review of literature on national identity formation and the glottopolitical issues that are at the center of independent Ukraine's nation-building crisis, which stem from the view of language as an embodiment of culture. It will delineate two competing conceptions of Ukrainian national identity outlined by Shulman (2005) and discuss how four centuries of language standardization policies imposed upon ethnic Ukrainians by Russian rulers laid a foundation for the Eastern Slavic national identity complex, which submits that Russian is as much a language of ethnic Ukrainians as the titular language. It will then discuss the

fundamental relationship between language and national identity that is so contentious in independent Ukraine.

The literature review will continue with an assessment of Einar Haugen's definition of language planning and the iconic model of linguistic standardization first introduced in his 1966 article *Dialect, Language, Nation.* In addition to laying out the process through which language standardization is achieved (in monolingual contexts), this section will reiterate the fundamental relationship between language and nation as characterized by Haugen. Next, it will address Geeraerts' interpretation of two cultural models that he contended are applicable to language standardization in multilingual settings such as that of Ukraine: the rationalist and romantic models. Geeraerts submitted that the rationalist and romantic models hold contrasting yet equally valid views on language standardization and the function of language within speech communities. The theoretical review will conclude with a review of Kudriavtseva (2021), who applied the rationalist and romantic standardization models submitted by Geeraerts (2016) to post-Soviet Ukraine, where multilingualism is prevalent and deeply political. Kudriavtseva conducted study in which she interviewed students in Kherson, Ukraine about their perceptions of the Russian and Ukrainian languages. She determined that in a speech community, two languages can be held in equal regard when each has a clearly defined use. Kudriavtseva's study, conducted in 2013, demonstrated attitudes toward language in eastern Ukraine prior to the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Chapter three will present the historical background necessary to understand the complexities of the relationship between language and national identity in independent Ukraine, beginning with the early attempts by the rulers of the Tsardom of Muscovy to subjugate ethnic Ukrainian languages and their speakers. In detailing tsarist efforts to weaken ethnic Ukrainian

languages and bolster the use of Russian, chapter three will emphasize the notion that Russian leaders have in fact engaged in centuries of intentional linguistic russification, despite some scholars' suggestions of the contrary. The chapter will continue with the Soviet Union's acquisition of Ukraine and the impacts of Soviet leaders' capricious attitudes toward language policies on the statuses of Russian and Ukrainian in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Next, it will explore the unique relationship (or lack thereof) between language use and ethnicity in Ukraine, which Kulyk (2013) presented as a result of Soviet nationality policy. Chapter three will culminate with a discussion of language legislation in independent Ukraine, its evolution, and its relationship to national identity politics.

Chapter four will discuss the four political events that have had the most significant impacts on changing ideas of national identity and language practices in post-Soviet Ukraine. First, it will present data that quantifies how language practices in Ukraine have changed in response to political cleavages between 2012-2022. Next, it will elaborate on the political events that have had the greatest effects on Ukrainian national identity and language practices between those years, focusing first on two internal conflicts (Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity) and then on two international geopolitical crises (the annexation of Crimea and the Russian Spring).

To do so, the chapter will briefly outline the events that precipitated Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity and the role that the tension between the ethnic Ukrainian and eastern Slavic national identity complexes played in triggering that unrest. It will then examine how Russian President Vladimir Putin used Euromaidan as an excuse for employing ethnonationalist rhetoric against Ukraine that resulted in the mobilization of Russian troops in Crimea and the Donbas. The chapter will briefly outline those military campaigns but will focus on Putin's

revival of the concept of Novorossiya, which has had a vital impact on changing conceptions of Ukrainian national identity. It will conclude by outlining the impacts of those four events on ideations of Ukrainian national identity and language practices so as to gain an understanding of where they stood prior to February 2022, when Putin launched his most recent attack on Ukraine.

The empirical component of this project will begin in chapter five and will evaluate the ways in which Ukrainians' attitudes toward the Russian language have changed as a result of the Russian military campaign launched against Ukraine in early 2022, using news articles as primary sources. Evidence of changes in language attitudes and practices will be determined through a qualitative content analysis of Russian-language newspaper articles published by two Ukrainian news sources, *Kharkiv Today* and *Vesti Ukraine*, between April and July 2022. The results of the thematic analysis, presented in chapter six, will provide a foundation for chapter seven, in which a discussion of changing language practices as a result of Russian aggression within the context of language planning and complexes of national identity will conclude this master's thesis.

Objectives and Hypothesis

Past political conflicts in Ukraine have catalyzed demonstrable changes in citizens' language practices, particularly when Ukrainian sovereignty has been called into question by the country's former imperial ruler, Russia. This came to a head with the failure of the Novorossiya project in 2014, which Taras Kuzio asserted was unsuccessful due to Russia's fundamental misunderstandings of Ukrainians and Ukraine. Kuzio suggested that Novorossiya's failure constituted the final nail in the coffin for a Ukrainian national identity that embraced any characteristics of Russian identity, including the Russian language. In February 2022, Russia

launched yet another military offensive against Ukraine, resuming the Russo-Ukrainian War that began with Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014.

This paper contends that Russia's latest attack has had such an immediate impact on language practices in eastern Ukraine because the failure of the Novorossiya project in 2014 effectively destroyed the eastern Slavic national identity complex. It further submits that the eastern Slavic national identity complex was replaced in 2015 by a new conception of Ukrainian national identity, to which the author refers as the Russophone Ukrainian national identity complex. Whereas its predecessor gained its legitimacy over the course of centuries of imperial Russian subjugation of ethnic Ukrainians, the Russophone Ukrainian national identity complex lacked the foundation necessary to ensure its defense in the event of another Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

When Russia again invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the nascent Russophone Ukrainian national identity complex was shattered, rendering the Russian language incompatible with any remaining conceptions of Ukrainian national identity. As a result, eastern Ukrainians who may have identified with the Russophone Ukrainian national identity complex between the years of 2015 and 2022 were forced once again to reconsider their identity. They were left with two options: the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex, which necessitated a switch to the Ukrainian language, and a pro-Russia separatist identity that allowed for the continued use of Russian at the expense of their support for Ukrainian independence. For many, it appears the choice was clear: large numbers of formerly Russian-speaking Ukrainians have wasted no time in condemning the Russian language as an extension of the enemy, a remnant of imperialism, and a symbol of oppression, joining their western counterparts in abandoning Russian in favor of

Ukrainian and fully internalizing the values embodied by the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex.

Russia's latest invasion of Ukraine has catalyzed the country's rejection of the Russian language and pushed citizens from all regions of Ukraine toward this single conception of nationhood. This pivot toward monolingualism has helped bridge the divide between competing conceptions of national identity that arose and endured as a result of historical Russian imperialism. This will be demonstrated through an assessment of Ukrainian primary sources (news articles) that show how the 2022 Russian invasion has already had a clear and immediate effect on language practices throughout the country. Not only has a large-scale shift to Ukrainian been noted among private citizens, but language and educational policies in traditionally Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine have been quickly rewritten in order to mitigate or prohibit use of the Russian language in public contexts. In turn, this has had a profound effect on the country's conception of national identity and on citizens' linguistic practices.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Background

Paradigms of National Identity: Language, Culture, and Conflict

The Ukrainian National Identity Conflict

National identity is developed through the consolidation of a community's ethos and ethnic history with dominant ideologies and the conscious manipulation of its cultural practices (Smith, 1991, 2009). The unifying nature of national identity derives from its role as both a component of individual social identity and as a tangible notion of sameness that bonds members of a national group (Korostelina, 2013). However, while national identity comprises very real elements of identity such as ethnicity and community, it is fundamentally a social construct and as such, its formation process is vulnerable to competing and even contradictory national narratives. Ultimately, national identity tends to reflect the characteristics of the majority that it represents, which renders it a potential source of conflict between groups with incongruous national narratives (Korostelina, 2013). Clashes motivated by identity arise when members of a society feel that others are imposing characteristics upon them that they don't feel aligned with, or in circumstances where identity is constantly being reimagined (Korostelina, 2013). Such conflicts frequently arise during periods of political transition, which demand inherently that national identity be reexamined at both the state and personal levels. As such, newly independent nations are particularly likely to experience divisions born out of disagreements over identity (Korostelina, 2013).

The shift from imperialism to pluralism that followed Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 was no different, and the country continues to exemplify a state that has suffered the consequences of competing narratives of national identity at the time of independence. Shulman (2005) identified two primary conceptions of national identity as held by

elites in independent Ukraine, which he labeled the Eastern Slavic and ethnic Ukrainian national identity complexes. The Eastern Slavic national identity complex is rooted in the belief that ethnic Russians and Ukrainians share a common history and culture. As such, it promotes close ties between the two nations and prescribes that the Russian language and Russian culture be given equal status to the titular language and ethnic culture of independent Ukraine, given its perception of their sameness (Shulman, 2005). In contrast, the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex views Russian and Ukrainian heritages as two distinct entities, differentiating between the "individualistic and freedom-loving" ethnic Ukrainians and the "collectivistic and authoritarian" Russians (Shulman, 2005, p.69). It also promotes the idea that Ukraine, as a nation that values democracy and individualism, is more closely aligned with the West than it is with Russia (Shulman, 2005). These two complexes have coexisted unharmoniously since Ukraine gained independence in 1991. As a result, identity narratives have become heavily politicized, stymieing the nation-building process and leaving citizens at odds with one another (Korostelina, 2014).

Language and National Identity: The Case of Ukraine

The essential correlation between language and nation is hardly one which is up for dispute. Without a national language, the task of establishing a national identity is rendered impossible (Joseph, 2004). However, when language links a sovereign nation to its historical oppressors, questions of national identity quickly become contentious, particularly when citizens have differing connections to and attitudes toward to the language in question. Such is the case in contemporary Ukraine, where the absence of a singular conception of national identity is a result of competing identity narratives in the post-Soviet era.

Language is a fundamental part of both the Eastern Slavic and ethnic Ukrainian national identity complexes and the political ideologies that they embody. In the east, where the Russian language has continued to predominate as the language of daily life even since independence, political sympathies have often aligned with Russia rather than Europe and the West. In western Ukraine, the national language has long prevailed, and pro-Western, anti-Russian sentiments are common and fiercely defended. However, language attitudes and practices are not static, and in recent years, changing perceptions of the Russian language all across the country have been exacerbated by Russian President Vladimir Putin's attitude of irredentism toward the country.

Language Planning and Standardization Models

Canonical Language Planning Models

In 1959, the eminent American linguist Einar Haugen introduced the term "language planning" (LP) which he defined as "the activity of preparing a normative orthography, grammar, and dictionary for the guidance of writers and speakers in a non-homogeneous speech community (Haugen, 1959). Haugen's emphasis on standardization in his work on language planning heavily informed his definition of LP and, later, the first version of his canonical model of standardization (Ayres-Bennett, 2021). Haugen's work remains seminal to research on language planning, in part due to the simplicity of his model (Ayres-Bennett, 2021).

The article in which Haugen so succinctly defined LP, entitled *Planning for a Standard Language in Modern Norway*, was published in the journal *Anthropological Linguistics.* In that same issue, Haugen's fellow linguist Paul Garvin identified two fundamental properties of standard languages: flexible stability and intellectualization (Garvin, 1959). According to Garvin (1959), flexible stability requires a language to have "appropriate codification" through which it earns its legitimacy, and that said codification be flexible enough "to allow for modification in

line with culture change" (p.28). The second fundamental property Garvin identified, intellectualization, requires "increasing accuracy along an ascending scale of functional dialects from conversational to scientific" (1959, p.28). In the same article, entitled *The Standard Language Problem: Concepts and Methods,* Garvin elaborated upon the four functions of a standard language that he had presented in an earlier paper with Madeleine Mathiot (Ayers-Bennet, 2021). Garvin described three of these functions as symbolic: the unifying function, which occurs when a standard language unites several dialect areas into one language community; the separatist function, which differentiates a language community from its neighbors, and the prestige function, which signifies the prestige that standard languages bestow upon their speakers (Garvin, 1959, p.29). The fourth function, which Garvin identified as the frame-of-reference function, is considered objective rather than symbolic and demarcates a standard language as a frame of reference "for correctness and for the perception and evaluation of poetic speech (1959, p.29). Finally, *The Standard Language Problem* referred to three "attitudes" originally discussed by Weinreich (1953) that Garvin took to be linked to the four functions of standard language: loyalty (linked to the unifying and separatist functions and the attitude of nationalism more broadly); pride (linked to the prestige function); and awareness of the norm (linked to the frame-of-reference function) (Garvin, 1959).

Garvin (1959) informed the first version of Haugen's language standardization model, which he presented in his 1966 article *Dialect, Language, Nation* (Ayers-Bennett, 2021). In *Dialect, Language, Nation,* Haugen sought to establish clearer definitions of the terms "dialect" and "language" in order to outline the way in which "the development of a…dialect into a language is intimately related to the development of writing and the growth of nationalism" (Haugen, 1966, p.922). The article identified a need for better distinctions between the terms as

the relationship between dialect and language shifts based on whether it is assessed through a structural or functional lens (Haugen, 1966, p.926). Of course, it is the functional use of "dialect" and "language" that is of primary interest to sociolinguists as well as was relevant to Haugen's own work, and in this functional context he defined language as "a superimposed norm" (1966, p.927) through which speakers of different dialects are able to communicate. He asserted that languages differ from dialects in their range of function, their prestige, and the sense of loyalty that they invoke in their speakers. (Haugen, 1966). The development of a sense of loyalty as stipulated by the national ideal necessitates "free and…intense communication within the nation" developed through use of a single linguistic code (Haugen, 1966, p.928).

To date, the most enduring contribution of Haugen (1966) is the article's decisive delineation of the processes through which a dialect becomes a standard language. Haugen posited that standardization necessitates four occurrences: selection of a norm; codification of form; elaboration of function; and acceptance by the community. These stages need not be successive and in some cases may be simultaneous or cyclical (Ayers-Bennet, 2021); however, Haugen (1966) did note that without a societally accepted model for a norm, the processes of codification and elaboration are unlikely to yield successful results (p.932). The first process that Haugen identified, selection of a norm, is predicated on a need for communication within a group. Selection of a norm may be impacted by factors such as convenience, for example, when one language is spoken by both the elites and the majority. In instances where the general population is not familiar with the language of the elite, groups must decide between linguistic re-education of an entire population, with "all the effort and disruption of cultural unity that this entails" (Haugen, 1966, p.928), and developing the group's own language. Regardless of the

method through which it is achieved, the goal of this process is to identify a model as a basis for the norm (Ayers-Bennett, 2021).

The objective of codification of form is to minimize variation in the structure of a language; that is, to standardize elements such as phonology, grammar, and lexicon so that a pure version of the language is all that remains (Haugen, 1966). Such a language form, if it were to exist, would eradicate issues of misunderstanding that are the natural result of language differences. This would require a high degree of stability, which Haugen defines as "the slowing down or complete stoppage of linguistic change" (1966, p.931). Of course, total stability is unrealistic as living languages always change over time; therefore, minimal variation in linguistic structure is ideal.

Contrary to codification of form, which emphasizes minimal variation, elaboration of function refers to the quality of inclusivity that is expected from a fully developed language, which makes it adequate for usage across social strata (Haugen, 1966). Haugen ascertained that any dialect that is in use must meet the needs of its speakers but will be insufficient for use within a large society such as a nation. As such, it becomes necessary to supplement the dialect with external resources in order for it to fit the criteria of a developed language. Per Haugen, "There are no limits to the elaboration of language except those set by the ingenuity of man" (1966, p.932). Therefore, a standard language must have a system for developing new words so that it may grow in order to meet the specific needs of each of its speakers. Technology, and writing in particular, facilitates the storage and distribution of vocabulary that is necessary for linguistic elaboration.

Haugen (1966) noted that despite the apparent contradictions between codification of form and elaboration of function, the two processes do overlap in the realm of style. The

elaboration of style is not inherent to the development of a standard language; however, it merits discussion due to its occurrence, which results from the confluence of function and form. If a codification is so rigid that it restricts the use of a language to certain (formal) settings, it will result in a wide gap between written and spoken form that few people are willing to bridge (Haugen, 1966). This may result in diglossia within a community, wherein a sharp contrast between higher and lower styles of a language highlights the societal divide between speakers of the two forms (Švejcer, 1986).

The fourth and final process necessary for language standardization is acceptance by the community (Haugen, 1966). Establishing a new linguistic norm requires either societal acceptance of a vernacular, which inherently favors the group whose dialect is selected as a model, or the construction of a new standard. The societal acceptance of a standard need not be unanimous; rather, the support of a small but influential faction is often enough to elevate a norm from a dialect to a standard (Ayers-Bennett, 2021). In societies where an elite group has a characteristic vernacular, that dialect is likely to prevail as the new norm; however, if influence is relatively equal among different groups, the selection of a norm that elevates the status of one dialect (and by default, its users) over another will inevitably be met with resistance commensurate with the size of the linguistic discrepancy between the chosen norm and other vernaculars (Haugen, 1966, 932). In instances where resistance to a selected norm is so forceful that it stymies acceptance by broader society, it may be possible and necessary to gradually develop a central dialect that avoids alienating any group of speakers and is easy to learn in order to promote societal coherence (Haugen, 1966). If linguistic compromise is not a realistic solution, it may be necessary to develop a new standard through either a comparative, archaizing, or statistical procedure, or to introduce an outside language as a norm (Haugen, 1966).

Some of Haugen's later writings expanded upon the work on language planning and standardization modeling that he introduced and developed in the 1950s and 1960s. *Language Planning, Theory and Practice* (1972) began with a revised definition of language planning, which Haugen wrote "includes the normative work of language academies and committees, all forms of what is commonly known as language cultivation" (1972, p.287), and proposed a framework through which linguists may analyze and evaluate language planning programs. According to this framework, the first step in implementing a language planning program is an evaluation of the background situation, the results of which will inform the development of a program of action tailored to the language planner's goal. He further contended that LP programming is "primarily a matter of form or function" (Haugen, 1972, p.288) –terms used in the first edition of his standardization model to organize "all major problems of language and dialect" (Haugen, 1966, p.933) based on whether they occur at a societal or linguistic level during the standardization process. Haugen's 1974 article presented normalization and cultivation as specific procedures to be used in the implementation of language planning. Normalization necessitates the selection and codification of form while cultivation calls for the elaboration and propagation of functions (Haugen, 1972). Finally, Haugen proposed a framework, which he referred to as the "end result," through which the success of an executed language planning program can be evaluated (Haugen, 1972).

Haugen returned to his model of standardization in the 1980s. In his 1983 article *The Implementation of Corpus Planning: Theory and Practice*, Haugen reaffirmed his conviction of the validity of his 1966 model, though he clarified that the framework was a starting point for language planners that "[says] nothing about the end points, the goals…or the ideals and motivations that guide planners" (1983, p.270). Most notably, he provided several terminological

updates to his 1966 model: the column heading "Form" was replaced with "Norm" and the process of "Acceptance" was abandoned in favor of "Implementation" (Ayers-Bennett, 2021). Haugen devoted much of his 1983 article to reiterating each of the processes in his model, and in defining "Implementation" he drew heavily from his initial description of "Acceptance," though with a greater emphasis on written language that was likely informed by his 1966 article. He also conceded that two terms proposed by colleagues: "correction procedures," suggested by Neustupny (1970), and "evaluation procedures" provided by Rubin (1971) were valuable supplements to the implementation process he had proposed in his original model. External exposure to correction procedures, which are of course inherent to the language acquisition process and require a standard against which language errors can be judged, generally begins at a very young age with one's parents, teachers, and friends before "eventually [becoming] self-administered through reading and general social acculturation" (Haugen, 1983, p.274). Evaluation procedures measure the success of a language program, which, when executed well, results in improved listening, reading, speaking, and writing in the selected standard.

Haugen (1987) presented a third version of his standardization model, which he reiterated should not be taken as a complete theory of LP, but rather a description of what language planners have done. The final iteration of his model is much more detailed than its predecessors and provides an expanded look at the processes that occur during each phase of the standardization process. Different forms of Haugen's model of standardization have remained foundational to language planning and standardization scholarship for over seventy years. While Haugen's contributions to language planning cannot be overemphasized, one of the major shortcomings of his model is its monolingualist approach to standardization. It is therefore

necessary to supplement Haugen's model with a theoretical framework that considers the impact of multilingualism on the implementation and efficacy of language planning processes.

While Einar Haugen's groundbreaking work on language planning and standardization has long been lauded by fellow sociologists, it is arguably the accessibility of his theories that has cemented Haugen's position as part of the sociolinguistic canon. Although the magnitude of Haugen's contribution to the field can hardly be contested, his work is not without its limitations. Later developments in standardization studies have attempted to compensate for oversights in his paradigm, particularly as they pertain to the roles of ideology and multilingualism in standardization (McLelland, 2020). While a review of Haugenian theory is imperative to studies on language standardization and planning, the focus of this study necessitates a further examination of language planning theories that explore the relationship between multilingualism and standardization.

The Rationalist and Romantic Cultural Models of Linguistic Standardization

Geeraerts (2016) suggested that an understanding of both the rationalist and romantic cultural models is imperative to language standardization, as the dialectical relationship between these two paradigms manifests itself in their contrasting conceptions of standardization and language variation. The modern rationalist model is defined by its view of standard language as a neutral function of communication that facilitates linguistic emancipation and participation (Geeraerts, 2016). Rather than dissecting the processes through which a dialect becomes a standard language, Geeraerts identified the distinctions between standard languages and dialects in his presentation of the rationalist model. A standard language is most easily distinguished from a dialect by its generality, which Geeraerts (2016) stated can be observed in three different ways. Unlike dialects, which are inherently restrictive in their breadth of use, standard languages

are geographically and socially general: no group can stake a legitimate claim of ownership over a standard language. In theory, this ensures that the language remains accessible to all; in practice, this is not always the case. Finally, standard languages are thematically universal: they have the ability to encompass "any semantic domain or any linguistic function" (Geeraerts, 2016, p.3), whereas a dialect may lack the functional range necessary for discussions of specific or niche domains of experience. In addition to further elucidating the distinction between dialects and standard languages, Geeraerts (2016) identified two additional properties displayed by standard languages. The first is neutrality: a standard language should be a neutral medium that allows all members of a society to communicate freely irrespective of gender, racial, or economic differences (Geeraerts, 2016). As such, the standard language becomes an instrument of participation and emancipation through which education, culture, and political contribution are made accessible to society at large.

In contrast to the rational model, which identifies emancipation and participation as beholden byproducts of standardization, the romantic model suggests that standard languages are in fact "instruments of oppression and exclusion" (Geeraerts, 2016, p.5). This contradictory finding of the romantic view is in keeping with critical discourse that suggests language standardization exemplifies the "Dialektik der Aufklärung"–the negative dialectic of Enlightenment introduced by Horkheimer and Adorno (1947). Indeed, an examination of standard language generality based upon the romantic model demonstrates how an ideal may come to contradict itself upon achieving actualization. First, with respect to geographic neutrality, Geeraerts (2016) wrote that while standard language might be geographically unbiased ideologically, in practice, processes of language standardization often originate in economically, culturally, and/or politically dominant regions of a society. Rather than serving as

an impartial medium, the standard language instead affirms the dominance of the elite over those farther removed from positions of power (Geeraerts, 2016). Second, rather than being functionally general, standard languages are primarily employed in elite contexts–namely the realms of culture, education, science, administration, and politics. When a linguistic standard serves as the language of the public realm, non-standard language varieties come to be associated with more private spheres of life (Geeraerts, 2016). This is especially true in situations where a language community may not be entirely standardized. The result is a sharp contrast between the functions of standard language and dialect that directly contradicts the rational model's ideal of thematic generality. Finally, while the rationalist model insists that standard languages are socially neutral, the romantic model demonstrates that they are in fact languages of the elite, as functional generality inevitably results in the use of standards in high-status realms, allowing the upper class to improve their proficiency in the standard while further marginalizing those who are isolated from such factions of society (Geeraerts, 2016). Ultimately, according to the romantic model, rather than acting as tools of social neutrality, standard languages are agents of social stratification that grant social mobility to some speakers while harshly discriminating against others (Geeraerts, 2016).

In addition to its contradiction of the rationalist model's emancipatory and participatory conception of standard language, the romantic model is defined by its position that language is primarily a tool of expression rather than communication (Geeraerts, 2016). The romantic model further submits that language embodies identity and enables its expression, and that to demonstrate a preference for one language over another is to deny the identity of those whose language is not embraced as the standard (Geeraerts, 2016). Accordingly, the romantic model

takes a positive view of variety that champions diversity rather than uniformity (per the rationalist model) as a symbol of an egalitarian community (Geeraerts, 2016).

Geeraerts situated his discussion of the rational and romantic cultural models within the context of a "growing emphasis on the international relationship between languages rather than the national relationship between language varieties" (2016, p.13). Both cultural models, in their 20th-century post-modern iterations, allow for what Geeraerts labelled a "shift towards multilingualism" (2016, p.13). The rationalist model, when considered as a multilingual paradigm, essentially presents as diglossia: two or more languages are used in communication, but each has a specialized context that warrants its use. On the other hand, multilingualism, when applied to the romantic model, "correlates with the fragmented identity of the postmodern individual" (Geeraerts, 2016, p.15). According to this view, people might use different languages to express different parts of their identities (Geeraerts, 2016). However, the models' shifts toward multilingualism as identified by Geeraerts will not eliminate tension between them; rather, the specific functions of languages will remain a source of contention, affecting conceptions of language accordingly (2016).

Linguistic Determinism and Models of Standardization in Contemporary Ukraine

Kudriavtseva (2021) applied Geeraerts' rationalist and romantic models of standardization to the language situation in mid-2010s Ukraine, which she described as being emblematic of linguistic determinism in a way that is derived from a distorted view of the romantic model. She presented her theory of determinism within the context of the debate on Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism and identity that arose following Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014, which suggested that beginning a tradition of monolingualism in Ukraine would help the country develop an identity not based on its history of subjugation at the

hands of Russian rulers. Kudriavtseva substantiated her findings using data from a four-month survey conducted in 2017 that assessed language attitudes with respect to the language of school instruction in students aged 15 to 17 in and around the city of Kherson in southern Ukraine.

Linguistic determinism is predicated on an inextricable link between language and identity that is evocative of the romantic model of standardization (Kudriavtseva, 2021). However, the deterministic view of identity is far broader than that of the romantic notion; rather than a mere embodiment of language, identity in the deterministic view encompasses value, moralities, and worldview (Kudriavtseva, 2021). In the case of contemporary Ukraine, recent debates about Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism have centered on how a person's choice to use one of these two languages, whether that be instead of or in addition to their use of the other, correlates to their way of thinking, their ability to identify with and as Ukrainians, their political preferences, and their social values (Kudriavtseva, 2021). In post-Soviet Ukraine, especially in the wake of Euromaidan, the dominant linguistic ideology identifies the Ukrainian language as a symbol of national identity, patriotism, and westernization, while the Russian language has come to be associated with pro-Russian ideals of authoritarianism and colonialism (Kudriavtseva, 2021). The Ukrainian government's subscription to this ideology has manifested itself in recent educational policies as well as in the "revival of selective language purism in the standardization of Ukrainian" (Kudriavtseva, 2021, p.154).

Kudriavtseva reiterated that the ideology of linguistic determinism is based on Polzenhagen & Dirven (2008)'s metaphor of language as an organism, which understands language as a "living creature with a unique character" (2021, p.154). Moschonas (2004) referred to this idea as spirituality. Moschonas' conception of the metaphor suggests that a language is imprinted with the spirit of its speakers–an understanding that is similar to notion of identity as

defined in the romantic model, but which connects identity to "morality, values, worldview, and ways of thought" (Kudriavtseva, 2021, p.154).

Per Kudriavtseva, linguistic determinism has two axioms: the first is spirituality as identified by Moschonas (2004), and the second is what Kudriavtseva referred to as the elitist stance (2021). In the Ukrainian context, the elitist stance concerns both the development of a language standard "in accordance with the spirit of the Ukrainian language" (Yavorska, 2010, p.182), and the selection of a group according to whose ideals the framework of standard Ukrainian will be based. The consequence of Ukrainian intellectual leaders determining the language standard is an "elitist kind of purism" (Kudriavtseva, 2021, p.154) that claims to be based on principles of Ukrainian national identity and authenticity but in actuality is "a kind of anti-Russian purism" (Kudriavtseva, 2021, p.154).

The conclusions drawn from Kudriavtseva's survey data on language attitudes and practices in Ukraine demonstrated a "clear difference" in how students in Kherson appreciated the Russian and Ukrainian languages. Three quarters of the students interviewed by Kudriavtseva identified Ukrainian as their native language, and just over sixty-nine percent (69.3%) stated that they considered Ukrainian to be the most important language in Ukraine (Kudriavtseva, 2021). Fifty-four percent of respondents said that their perception of Ukrainian as the most important language in the country stemmed from it being the language as the state, and another 27.2 percent said that they valued it above Russian as the "'language of the Ukrainian nation' and, as such, the marker of Ukrainian identity" (Kudriavtseva, 2021, p.161). Furthermore, in keeping with Kudriavtseva's predictions based on the romantic model, students reported an appreciation of the Ukrainian language as a tool of unification between all Ukrainian peoples, with whom they were eager to identify. However, only 7.4 percent of students said that

they saw Ukrainian as the language of the country's true patriots. an observation that is in line with the ideology of linguistic determinism. Her findings agreed with those of a large-scale survey conducted by Volodymyr Kulyk in 2017, which, in its assessment of the perceived roles of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, demonstrated that in eastern and southern Ukraine, the Russian language is primarily valued as a means of communication while Ukrainian is valued for its symbolic significance rather than its communicative worth.

Kudriavtseva's findings not only suggested that the rationalist and romantic models of standardization are both applicable to multilingual contexts such as Ukraine, but that they can even apply simultaneously, especially in cases where languages are perceived to have different functions, as was the case in the city of Kherson when her survey was conducted. Kudriavtseva's article concluded by speculating that respondents' evidently positive views of multilingualism might be indicative of waning polarization between linguistic and social groups in the region of interest, which she contended might also be helped by the fact that "Russia is not likely to become a marker of identity, primarily due to the current sociopolitical context defined by the occupation of Crimea and Russian aggression in Ukraine's east" (2021, p.162). However, evidence from more recent data suggests the contrary. This will be presented and discussed in chapters six and seven.

Chapter 3: Historical Background

The long traditions of russification and Russian linguistic imperialism in Ukraine began with the leaders of the Tsardom of Muscovy in the early seventeenth century and was continued by the heads of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Each state was deliberate in its efforts to subjugate if not extinguish ethnic Ukrainian culture, including the languages that ethnic Ukrainians spoke, and each succeeded in doing so, albeit to varying extents.

It is first necessary to differentiate between the terms "russification" and "linguicism". In its broadest sense, russification refers to the practice of replacing one group's cultural traditions with Russian ones (Weeks, 2004). While this includes expanding the use of Russian to the detriment of the local language, this is not the primary goal; rather, language is just one of several cultural components that are inevitable victims of russification.

There are three types of russification according to Thaden (1981): unplanned, administrative, and cultural. He defined unplanned russification as the voluntary adoption of Russian "customs, culture, and language as a result of serving in the army or bureaucracy, marrying Russians, or simply by residing and working where Russian was spoken" (Thaden, 1981, p.8). This is russification's most benign form, and one which primarily occurred in the years prior to Catherine II's ascension to the Russian throne in 1762 (Thaden, 1981). Under Catherine's reign, a more deliberate type of russification—administrative russification—became the norm, which aimed to assimilate the people on the borders of the Russian Empire into the Russian culture "through the gradual introduction of Russian institutions and laws and extension of the use of Russian" both in schools and bureaucracy (Thaden, 1981, p.9). Lastly, cultural russification was championed by Imperial Russian elites who believed that in order for Russia to become a modern nation, it was necessary to integrate the people on the country's borderlands

linguistically and culturally in addition to imparting upon them the beliefs of the Russian Orthodox Church (Thaden, 1981).

Linguicism refers to the "ideologies, structures, and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate, and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources between groups that are defined on the basis of language" (Phillipson, 1992, p.46). Insofar as russification policies have targeted the language practices of those on the peripheries of the Russian Empire or the citizens of the Soviet Union who were not ethnic Russians, russification can be viewed as a form of linguicism. Put more succinctly, linguistic russification in a form of linguicism. However, russification, in its more general (and primary) sense, is distinct. The following chapter refers to both cultural and linguistic russification in addition to linguicism, all of which have impacted modern Ukraine and conceptions of national identity and will specify accordingly.

Scholars of Ukrainian history have suggested that the complex glottopolitical situation in present-day Ukraine is the direct consequence of almost five hundred years of cultural and linguistic russification at the hands of tsarist and Soviet rulers (Kulyk, 2014). This paper contends that efforts to suppress ethnic Ukrainian languages and bolster the status of Russian, which date back to the Cossack Hetmanate, set a precedent for later policies of linguistic russification implemented by the leaders of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, which primarily took the form of standardization and education policies. Soviet-imposed language policies aimed at expanding the use of Russian reached their peak during the 1930s, but later nationality policies were designed to inhibit the growth of a Ukrainian national consciousness and separate the relationship between language and identity in the minds of its citizens (Kulyk, 2014). These policies have had a lasting impact on conceptions of national and ethnic identities

in the countries of the former USSR. In modern Ukraine, the link between language and ethnicity has remained weak, even among those who were born after the Soviet era. The absence of this correlation in the minds of some Ukrainians has allowed the eastern Slavic nationality complex to take root in independent Ukraine; to many, language has never defined nationality and so speaking Russian does not delegitimize Ukrainianness. However, the ethnic Ukrainian nationality complex directly contradicts this; it does not allow for any other language to have the same status as Ukrainian, especially when the other language is one that represents linguicism against ethnic Ukrainian languages and people.

Imperial Russification

Russification in Early Modern Ukraine

In her 2011 article *Linguistic Russification in the Russian Empire,* Aneta Pavlenko contested the idea, widely held among Slavicists, that the leaders of the Russian Empire ever consciously or consistently imposed russification policies non-Russians and claimed statements to the contrary to be "inspired by ideology, rather than history" (Pavlenko, 2011, p.332). Pavlenko identified four periods of language management[1] that comprised the duration of the Russian Empire, only some of which she believed constituted intentional linguistic russification. However, Danylenko and Naienko (2018) argued that Pavlenko's article failed to take Ukraine's internal history into account and in doing so ignored crucial considerations such as Russians' attitudes toward Ukrainians' "religious, cultural, and ethnic particularities" (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.21) that may have underlaid the implementation of those policies. Perhaps most importantly, per Danylenko and Naienko, Pavlenko seemingly failed to consider the lack of

[1] An alternative term for language planning, per Nekavpil and Sherman (2006).

linguistic homogeneity that existed between different groups of ethnic Ukrainians prior to the tsarist regime's implementation of nationalist policies.

In their rebuttal of Pavlenko, Danylenko and Naienko provided an analysis of imperial Russian language planning policies that were implemented in order to subjugate the speakers of three ethnic Ukrainian languages spoken by those living on the borderlands of the Russian Empire–Church Slavonic of the Ukrainian recension, Ruthenian, and a new literary Ukrainian language that was later developed in response to the suppression of Ukrainian Church Slavonic. Russification policies aimed at these languages were imposed by the rulers of two empires: the Tsardom of Muscovy, of which the Cossack Hetmanate became a protectorate in 1654, and the Russian Empire, which succeeded Muscovy in 1721 and into which the Hetmanate was absorbed. Danylenko and Naienko's analysis delineated an internal history of early modern Ukraine and, they claimed, the "special reasons" for Russian rulers' harsher treatment of ethnic Ukrainian languages during the eras of both the Tsardom of Muscovy and the Russian Empire. Danylenko and Naienko supplemented their historiography with a periodization that identified three eras during which russification policies were implemented, which they described as a "history of the assimilation of particular languages employed by Ukrainians throughout…their absorption by the Russian state" (2018, p.23). This "absorption"—Danylenko and Naienko's term for forced linguistic assimilation—can be traced back to 1654, when the Perejaslav Agreement between the Cossack Hetmanate (Cossack Ukraine) and the Tsardom of Muscovy was ratified (2018). The signing of the Perejaslav Agreement placed the Hetmanate under the protection (control) of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (Davis, 2009).

However, tsarist aggression toward ethnic Ukrainian languages predated the signing of the Perejaslav Agreement. In the early seventeenth century, Ukrainian books–nearly all of which

were religious in nature and written in Ukrainian Church Slavonic–were widely popular all across Muscovy, especially among the upper classes (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). They embodied both the prestige of European institutions of learning and the holiness of the Kyivan Cave Monastery, the second-most important Orthodox ecclesiastical entity in central Ukraine (Kohut, 2011). As such, books of Ukrainian origin became a "permanent source of Ukrainian influence throughout the Tsardom of Muscovy" (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.25). However, the growing popularity of these books coincided with mounting suspicions of outside religions (namely Catholicism and Protestantism) throughout Muscovy (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). Though the Ukrainian texts were Orthodox, their use of a language other than Russian and their "foreign" origins began to yield turbulent reception in Muscovy as suspicions grew, with some books receiving Patriarchal recommendations and others condemnation espoused in defense of Orthodoxy (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018).

Such was the case of the *Didactic Gospel* published by Kyryl Trankvillion-Stavrovec'kyj' in 1619, which featured ukrainianisms that religious leaders in Muscovy found to distort "the words of Christ himself" (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.25). On this basis, Trankvillion-Stavrovec'kyj's gospel was deemed heretical, and 60 copies of the work were publicly burned in Moscow on December 4, 1627 (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). As this predated the signing of the Perejaslav Agreement, the tsar did not yet have the power to enact laws explicitly prohibiting the use of Ukrainian; rather, he could only ban the distribution of Ukrainian-language books throughout Muscovy, which he did (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). The tradition of banning and burning books written in Ukrainian Church Slavonic continued throughout the rest of the seventeenth century. In 1688, more than thirty years after the signing of the Perejaslav Agreement, which made the Cossack Hetmanate a protectorate of the Tsardom

of Muscovy and gave the tsar authority over the region, the Kyivan Cave Monastery came under the influence of the Moscow patriarch. In the years that followed, religious texts printed by the Kyiv Monastery and the Chernihiv presses "were either burned or…censored as a result of the direct intervention [by religious leaders in Moscow] into the language of Ukrainian liturgical and polemical works" (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.27).

The turn of the eighteenth century saw a slow but undeniable push to promote Russian at the expense of Ukrainian Church Slavonic (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). On October 5, 1720, Peter I passed a law that forbade the presses in Kyiv and Chernihiv from printing anything other than liturgical books in Ukrainian Church Slavonic. All other books published in the Hetmanate were required to undergo content examinations to ensure that they contained no evidence of the local language (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). In signing the 1720 *ukaz* (decree), Peter I became the first Russian tsar to intervene directly in the Ukrainian cultural space and simultaneously usher in a new era of linguistic russification (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). In the mid-1700s, the Holy Synod banned all publications in Ukrainian Church Slavonic, ending the bilingual opposition between Ukrainian Church Slavonic and Ruthenian that had been integral to Ukrainian cultural identity for centuries (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). In the following decade, educational reforms introduced Great Russian[2] as the new literary standard for priests, a fatal blow for Ukrainian Church Slavonic, as the reforms forced the language out of its one remaining position of prominence. The decades of linguistic russification that took the shape of educational reforms and printing prohibitions had a drastic effect on the sociolinguistic situation in Russian Ukraine, and by the end of the eighteenth century, Ukrainian Church Slavonic had been forced almost entirely out of use in the church and effectively rendered powerless (Danylenko &

[2] In the 19th century, Great Russian referred to today's Russian language, Little Russian referred to the Ukrainian language, and White Russian referred to the Belarusian language.

Naienko, 2018). Ukrainians' inability to revitalize the legacy of Ukrainian Church Slavonic led them to turn to the trend of vernacularization of literary Ukrainian, which would itself be subjected to linguistic russification several decades later.

At the same time that Ukrainian Church Slavonic was being forced out of use, the functional status of Ruthenian, the administrative language of the Hetmanate, was also undergoing fundamental changes as a result of linguistic russification. First, its use was limited to a few select genres of speech generally employed by those of low societal status. Next, its number of speakers shrank drastically as large swaths of the Ukrainian gentry (the Cossack class) switched to Great Russian in order to better assimilate into the Russian nobility (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). Danylenko and Naienko (2018) identified three "consecutive rounds of linguistic russification [of Ruthenian]" that occurred between the years of 1700-1720, 1721-1764, and 1765-1786, respectively and which were contemporaneous with the suppression of Ukrainian Church Slavonic. During those periods, features of Great Russian were imposed on Ruthenian to the extent that the administrative language was fundamentally altered (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). During the first round of Ruthenian's linguistic russification, which took place throughout the first two decades of the eighteenth century, the establishment of the Little Russian College drastically reduced the linguistic autonomy of Ruthenian-speaking Cossacks in the Hetmanate. The first period of ended with the signing of the 1720 decree by Peter I, who denied the existence of a separate Ukrainian Church Slavonic. The second period of russification targeting the Ruthenian language lasted from 1721 until the abolition of the Cossack Hetmanate and subsequent founding of an imperial administrative body, the second Little Russian College, in 1764. Texts from this era demonstrate a clear imposition of the Russian language on official texts. In a further drive toward the complete ban of Ukrainian books, most texts published in

Kyiv and Chernihiv at that time were either subjected to heavy censorship or banned from circulation entirely (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). Over the course of the third period of linguistic russification, which lasted from 1765 until 1786, the administrative language of the former Hetmanate took on so many of the features of the Great Russian language that it more closely resembled Russian than it did its original form (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018).

The so-called russianization of Ruthenian coincided with the absorption of the Hetmanate into the Russian Empire, and by the time Catherine the Great ascended the throne, Russian had replaced Ruthenian as the administrative language of ethnic Ukrainians in the Russian Empire. Danylenko and Naienko (2018) wrote of the russification of Ruthenian "There is no doubt at all that the linguistic russification of Ruthenian…was triggered by the tsarist regime's aims to stamp out distinctive features of Ukrainian identity" (p.33). The russianization of Ruthenian coincided with the replacement of Ukrainian Church Slavonic with literary Russian, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was virtually "no more Ukrainian language available for russification" (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.33). The replacement of Ukrainian Church Slavonic and Ruthenian by the Russian language had a devastating impact on the cultural traditions of Ukrainians, who, in the eighteenth century, reluctantly adopted the use of the Russian literary language that had been "imposed on them by decrees, bans, and career opportunities" (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.33).

The era of russification of the literary Ukrainian language spanned from 1800-1914. At this time, Ukrainian elites were switching to Great Russian, while Cossacks and literate peasants used a "peasant parlance" that was not seen as a threat to the imperial system (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, Russian views of Ukrainians were overwhelmingly positive. The one exception to this was a sense of skepticism

held by the tsarist administration and Russian cultural establishment toward literary Ukrainian, which had attained the status of a language rather than a dialect and had come to be seen as a sophisticated and humorous vernacular employed by the educated (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). Between 1845 and 1847, tsarist authorities were made aware of growing feelings of Ukrainian populist nationalism. Though it was unclear whether such sentiments were widespread enough to generate a revival of Ukrainian identity, the leadership began to attack the orthography of Ukrainian, referred to as Little Russian, which they claimed was developed as a conspiracy to widen the gap between Little Russian and the "all-Russian" or "Great Russian" languages (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). Decrees ratified in 1863, 1876, and 1881 "were all aimed at the elimination of the Ukrainian language from public use" (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.35). The first of these decrees, ratified on July 18, 1863, was spurred by the Polish revolt of 1830-1831, Russia's loss of the Crimean War, and the Polish uprising of 1862-1863, and prohibited the publication of all books in the Ukrainian language with the exception of those that were deemed to belong to the realm of fine literature (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). The Ems Decree, which was ratified on May 18, 1876, introduced additional restrictions on the publication of Ukrainian-language books in the Russian Empire, constrained the import of Ukrainian books from abroad, and "forbade the printing of books, brochures, even musical lyrics…as well as [prohibited] the performance of [Ukrainian language] plays" (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018, p.35). A series of amendments to the Ems Decree, written in 1881, was equally restrictive but never published (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). The decrees of 1863, 1876, and 1881 all served as attempts to eliminate the public use of the Ukrainian language, and as a result, they effectively stymied the process of nation-building in Russian-controlled Ukraine (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). By the end of the nineteenth century, almost no Ukrainian language books were available on the market

(Danylenko & Naienko, 2018). By 1917, the tsarist government had passed over 400 decrees that restricted the use of Ukrainian in various social realms (Danylenko & Naienko, 2018).

Danylenko and Naienko's periodization of linguistic russification in early modern Ukraine demonstrated Russian rulers' conscious and ongoing efforts to eradicate the languages used by ethnic Ukrainians from the period of the Cossack Hetmanate until the dissolution of the Russian Empire. This is evidenced by Russian rulers' indiscriminate suppression of three distinct Ukrainian languages and their overt attempts to promote Russian to those languages' detriment. Ultimately, the russianization and russification of ethnic Ukrainian languages and their speakers laid the groundwork for Soviet russification policies that continue to affect Ukrainian language practices and identity today.

Soviet Russification Policies

Following the 1917 February Revolution, the newly formed Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) embarked on a mission of national identity-building in order to unite ethnic Ukrainian peoples across its land (Horbyk & Palko, 2017). The UNR, which gained independence on January 22, 1918, prioritized de-russification and standardization of Ukrainian, identifying them as goals that would accelerate the development of a Ukrainian national identity and culture. The linguistic and orthographic reforms proposed by the leaders of the UNR were initially postponed due to instability in the region in the aftermath of the civil war but were finally published in 1919 and ultimately approved by the Soviet authorities in 1920 (Horbyk & Palko, 2017), though the Soviet regime was not established in Ukraine until 1921, following the Bolsheviks' successful occupation of the entire territory of Ukraine (Horbyk & Palko, 2017). The early Soviet government prioritized the preservation of the Ukrainian language in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and took active de-russification measures, though this often took the shape of

legislation proclaiming the equal status of the Russian and Ukrainian languages, rather than promoting Ukrainian (Horbyk & Palko, 2017). However, this somewhat positive attitude toward ukrainization was short-lived and the Soviet government's attitudes toward Ukrainian changed drastically in the wake of Stalin's Great Break and subsequent introduction of his first Five Year Plan in 1928-1929 (Horbyk & Palko, 2017). During the following period, widely referred to as the Cultural Revolution, the persecution of class enemies, pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, dissenters, and national deviationists began (Horbyk & Palko, 2017).

In 1930, the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, or SVU, was brought to trial over suspicions that its activities were both conspiratorial and nationalist in nature, an event that Horbyk and Palko described as "the most important event for the cultural and national development of Soviet Ukraine" (2017, p.77) and which had widespread repercussions for Ukrainian language reforms. The SVU's autonomous status, which it had held since 1920, was abolished, and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, which oversaw academic research and language reforms, came under the control of the central Communist Party (Horbyk & Palko, 2017). The SVU trial presented Ukrainian literature as nationalist and promulgated the idea that use of the Ukrainian language was tantamount to counter-revolutionary activity, which severely undermined public trust in ukrainization (Horbyk & Palko, 2017). Following the SVU trial, the process through which language reforms were implemented changed, and the policies of ukrainization curtailed and replaced by an ideology of all-Union uniformity, of which linguistic russification was a major component (Horbyk & Palko, 2017). In 1933, the priorities of the Soviet regime changed drastically, resulting, in part, in a rapid campaign to strengthen the Russian language in Ukrainian public life at the expense of the Ukrainian language, and other minority languages in the Ukrainian SSR (Kulyk, 2014). That year, a special committee was

assembled to assess the progress made in the late 1920s toward a standardized Ukrainian orthography, which resulted in a declaration that the 1928 alphabet reform espoused bourgeois nationalist ideals and constituted “an attempt to tear Ukrainian away from Russian” (Karunyk, 2017, p.98). A retaliatory “anti-reform” adapted the Ukrainian spelling so that it was as close to the Russian spelling as possible (Karunyk, 2017).

The 1933 anti-reform prioritized different principles than those established in the reform of 1928. The goals of the changes included the removal of “artificial barriers" between the Russian and Ukrainian languages; the eradication of provincialisms, archaisms, and parallelisms in Ukrainian; simplification of Ukrainian’s grammatical rules; and a total revision of the spellings of loan words and proper names that were deemed to be politically harmful and therefore incorrect (Karunyk, 2017). The spelling rules outlined by the anti-reform were imperfect. They were rejected by Western Ukrainians and clashed with both the internal linguistic structure of Ukrainian and actual language usage. In 1937, the leader of the anti-reform was unseated during another wave of Stalinist repressions, and complaints against his orthography immediately began to surface (Karunyk, 2017). Furthermore, Russian linguists were reforming their own orthography during the mid-1930s, which necessitated further changes to Ukrainian spelling conventions. In May 1938, an official orthographic committee was appointed by the Ukrainian Council of People’s Commissars. The committee’s primary goal was to correct mistakes and purge the orthography of “nationalist distortions" (Karunyk, 2017, p.100). Between 1938 and 1940, the committee proposed five amendments to Ukrainian orthography. Though none were officially approved, the Ukrainian press planned to implement them immediately, resulting in a “state of language anarchy” in 1940 (Karunyk, 2017, p.101) which officials took advantage of to further impose the rules of Russian orthography on Ukrainian. In 1941, the

German invasion of Ukraine forced the spelling committee to abandon its work (Karunyk, 2017). By this time, orthographic russification, which had peaked in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic during the 1930s, had begun its decline (Karunyk, 2017). In the following decades, the central Soviet government would turn their focus to alternative means of russification through the implementation of language and nationality policies that would have their own drastic impacts on Ukrainian national identity.

In the years after World War II, use of Russian expanded in the Ukrainian SSR, while use of the titular language was reduced (Kulyk, 2014). Large-scale immigration from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to the Ukrainian SSR helped to strengthen Russian's status as a lingua franca, as did the increasing subordination of Ukrainian industries to central governmental ministries, which facilitated the spread of Russian into the realms of higher education and communication (Kulyk, 2014). Throughout the mid-twentieth century, increasing reinforcement of russification in cities allowed the Russian language to dominate in both the public and private spheres, particularly in eastern and central Ukraine, where its use had continued to grow since the tsarist era (Kulyk, 2014). As a result, the use of Ukrainian in cities came to be seen as markers of provincialism or opposition to the regime, a perception that was reinforced by the public repression and defamation of hundreds of Ukrainian-speaking cultural elites who protested the "comprehensive russification of Ukraine" (Kulyk, 2014, p.210) from the 1960s until the 1980s. Notably, this was not the case in the regions of western Ukraine that had been acquired by the Soviet Union during World War II, where the regime, fearful of large-scale nationalist opposition to their rule, demonstrated far higher tolerance of national awareness and preservation of the Ukrainian language than it did in the eastern and central regions of the republic (Kulyk, 2014).

Ukrainian remained the principal language of instruction in primary and secondary schools until the 1950s, when both the government and the public–for whom the use and therefore usefulness of Russian was growing–began to push heavily for increased russification of schools (Kulyk, 2014). In 1958, previous legislation stipulating that children be educated in their native language was overturned, and Russian was made the primary language of instruction in all schools, including those that had previously allowed parents to choose their children's language of instruction. From 1958 onward, titular languages were made optional in Russian-language schools, while Russian remained a mandatory subject in schools where students were taught in languages other than Russian (Kulyk, 2014). The resulting decline in Ukrainian-language education in eastern and central Ukraine from the 1960s through the mid-1980s was exacerbated by a concentrated effort to further Soviet citizens' knowledge of Russian in the late 1970s (Kulyk, 2014). The push was implemented to combat non-Slavic populations' "inadequate" knowledge of Russian but had the most apparent impact on "knowledge and use of the titular languages in Ukraine and Belarus" (Kulyk, 2014, p.211). In the 1989 census, 60 percent of ethnic Ukrainians said that they knew Russian as a second language, while only 33 percent of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine indicated any significant knowledge of the Ukrainian language. Additionally, five percent of ethnic Ukrainians reported that they were not at all proficient in their ethnic tongue (Kulyk, 2014).

Nationhood and the Soviet State

Kulyk (2014) noted that census data from 1959, 1970, and 1989 demonstrated that changes in language competence were not commensurate with any change in linguistic or ethnic identities in Soviet Ukraine. This can be explained by the central government's enduring emphasis on the recognition of separate nations within the USSR that were identified primarily

by their titular languages, “even if individual members of the nations were not necessarily expected to speak those languages” (Kulyk, 2014, p.211). Soviet policies also aimed to underscore the importance of individual senses of belonging to the concept of nationhood (Kulyk, 2014). At the same time as it was implementing aggressive policies of linguistic russification, the Soviet government was also taking care to sustain the numerous national cultures of its citizens, though it did so in a way that took care to emphasize “multinational unity and the primacy of Russian culture as an asset of all ‘brotherly peoples’” (Kulyk, 2014, p.212). The leaders of the Soviet Union continued to uphold the idea of language as the most valuable and natural feature of a nation long after they ceased to prioritize the use of Soviet national languages other than Russian in their nationality policies (Kulyk, 2014). As a result, ethnicity has little bearing on one’s preferred language in Ukraine even today, a phenomenon that Volodymyr Kulyk referred to as “the most peculiar feature of Ukraine’s language situation and the most durable legacy of the Soviet language policy” (2013, p.282).

Language Laws and Policies in Independent Ukraine, 1991-2012

The Language Situation at the Time of Ukrainian Independence

Data from the last census of Soviet Ukraine, conducted in 1989, found that 72.7 percent of the population of the Ukrainian SSR identified as ethnic Ukrainians while slightly more than 22 percent self-identified as ethnic Russians (Krushelnycky, 2003). In response to the question regarding native language in the 1989 census, 12 percent of ethnic Ukrainians identified Russian as their native tongue (this number was as high as 19 percent in cities), and an additional 60 percent said that they knew it as a second language (Kulyk, 2014). The 1989 census further reported that 65 percent of ethnic Ukrainians spoke Ukrainian as their primary language (Kulyk, 2014).

The Law on Languages in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which restored Ukrainian's status as the sole state language of the Ukrainian SSR, was passed by the Verkhovna Rada ten months after the 1989 census was conducted. The new law also mandated that Ukrainian be taught as a second language in all Russian-language schools in the Ukrainian SSR, that it would eventually become the language of instruction in institutions of higher education, and that signage throughout the country would either have to be bilingual or exclusively in Ukrainian (Arel, 1995). However, while the 1989 language law significantly expanded the rights and domains of usage of the Ukrainian language, it also allowed Russian to retain its status as the language of interethnic communication in the Ukrainian SSR, a role normally only conferred upon a national language (Moser & Umland, 2015). Therefore, in protecting the privileged position of the Russian language, the 1989 language law upheld the Ukrainian SSR's tradition of diglossia as well as "diluted the significance" of Ukrainian's improved status (Kulyk, 2013, p.283) In doing so, it laid the foundation for an independent country whose titular language was less powerful and less widely used than the language of its former oppressor and perpetual assailant.

Only one census has been conducted in independent Ukraine. Data from the 2001 census revealed that 77.8 percent of the population in Ukraine at the time identified as ethnically Ukrainian and 17.3 percent identified as ethnically Russian (Moser & Umland, 2015). However, only 67.5 percent of citizens identified Ukrainian as their native language, while 29.6 percent reported their first language to be Russian (Moser & Umland, 2015). The most recent data on ethnicity and language in independent Ukraine are from a survey conducted in December 2015 by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies, a non-governmental organization working on public policy. According to that survey, more than 60 percent of respondents who

identified as ethnically Ukrainian considered the country's titular language to be their first language. An additional 15 percent said that Russian was their native language. Finally, 22 percent of respondents said that they consider both languages to be their mother tongue (Maksimovtsova, 2022).

Languages and the Law in Independent Ukraine

As is the case in many former Soviet republics, the revitalization of the Ukrainian language has been a priority since independence (Goodman, 2009). When the Verkhovna Rada of independent Ukraine ratified the country's new constitution on June 28, 1996, it reaffirmed Ukrainian as the country's sole state language and confirmed its status as the language of intercultural communication (Kobelianska et al., 2018). Article 10 of the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution stated that the "free development, use, and protection of Russian and other languages of national minorities…shall be guaranteed in Ukraine" (The Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). Russian's decline in status, while terminologically drastic, was functionally ambiguously enough that the pro-Russian language camp used it as a justification for their continued use of Russian throughout all social realms as well as their numerous attempts to codify its status as a second official state language (Kulyk, 2013). These efforts persisted beyond Ukraine's first decade of independence but were ultimately unsuccessful due to the approximately equal power of the two parties in the Ukrainian Parliament. However, early failed attempts to have Russian officially recognized as a national language did not deter its proponents, who continue to advocate for its official language status, and whose success at doing so has varied at different times and under different leaders.

Since independence, all language legislation in Ukraine has been passed by the Verkhovna Rada. Another body, the Institute for the Ukrainian Language of the Ukrainian

National Academy of Sciences, has at times been asked to review and provide opinions on draft laws, but ultimately has no influence on their passage or failure[3]. Such was the case with the 1999 law "The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages," which was intended to protect minority language usage in Ukraine and which the Verkhovna Rada adopted in order to fulfill a requirement necessary for Ukraine to become a member state of the Council of Europe (Moser & Umland, 2015). The legislature was initially adopted in 1999, and then repealed in July of 2000 by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (Csernicskó & Fedinec, 2016). The court found that due to improper review, the law was out of compliance with the Ukrainian Constitution and therefore unconstitutional (Moser & Umland, 2015). In 2001, then-president Leonid Kuchma submitted a new draft of the law to the Verkhovna Rada, who in turn requested that the Institute of the Ukrainian Language assess it. Based on the Institute's comments on the draft, the Verkhovna Rada did not codify it into law.

The version of the European Charter for Minority Languages that was ultimately adopted at the end of 2005 went into effect despite Vitaly Radchuk of the Institute of the Ukrainian Language noting that the wording of the Charter still failed to comply with the language of the Ukrainian Constitution. Radchuk also pointed out that the final version of the draft used terminology different from that of the original text, indicating that the Ukrainian-language translation diverged significantly from the original document (Moser & Umland, 2015). Kovalova (2018) contended that the incorrect Ukrainian-language translation of the Charter and the resultant fundamental misunderstanding of the Charter's objectives have caused legal, political, and economic issues in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Charter remains in effect today, and

[3] In 2021, the head of the Institute of the Ukrainian Language of the National Academy of Sciences called for the creation of a Council on the Ukrainian Language under the President of Ukraine, which would be a platform for both the study of languages their construction and the implementation of those studies' results (Korolyov & Grytsenko, 2019).

is in fact “the strongest political instrument to assist [the] Russian language” (Бестерс-Дільґер, 2012, p.40). It has also exacerbated glottopolitical issues, as it legislates support for the 13 minority languages in Ukraine, including Russian, but does not, per Kovalova, adequately protect Ukrainian’s status as the national language (Kovalova, 2018). Shortly after the Charter was ratified, several regions (oblasts*)* in Ukraine where the Russian language predominates declared their intent to elevate Russian to the status of a regional language on the basis of the Charter. The first city to do so was Kharkiv, which adopted its resolution in 2006 (Kovalova, 2018). It was followed by the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Mykolayiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kryvyi Rih, as well as the city of Sevastopol in Crimea.

The European Charter was followed by the passage of the 2012 Law on the Principles of the State Language Policy, a highly contentious law authored by members of the Party of Regions, a pro-Russian party of eastern Ukrainian origins whose base was comprised almost entirely of Russian-speaking Ukrainians. The party’s incredibly effective campaigning prior to the 2010 Ukrainian presidential election had resulted in the victory of their candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, whose political aspirations had seemed completely shot after a humiliating defeat in the 2004 presidential election. Yanukovych had campaigned as a pro-Kremlin politician, but his actions in office were far less decisive, with his policies favoring the interests of the European Union at least as often as they did those of Vladimir Putin and Russia. As a result, he had lost significant support in eastern Ukraine. Just before the 2012 parliamentary elections, Yanukovych pushed the Law on the Principles of the State Language Policy through the Ukrainian Parliament.

“On the Principles of State Language Policy in Ukraine,” commonly referred to as the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko language law (after its authors) or more colloquially as the 2012

language law, legislated the expansion the use of the Russian language throughout Ukraine, particularly in areas where Russian was the language of daily life. Though Kivalov and Kolesnichenko, both allies of President Yanukovych, publicly favored granting national language status to Russian, they knew that they lacked the constitutional majority necessary to do so (Arel, 2017). Instead, they authored a new law, which required only a simple majority to pass, and which they based on a "disingenuous interpretation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages" (Arel, 2017, p.248). The 2012 language law borrowed the phrase "regional or minority language" from the Charter and introduced it into Ukrainian national legislation (Azhniuk, 2017). The Kivalov-Kolesnichenko bill promoted Russian's status to that of a regional language on half of the territory of Ukraine as well as legalized its use and the use of other regional or minority languages "in state offices and local government offices [where] their members constitute at least ten percent of the population of the administrative unit" (Csernicskó & Fedinec, 2016, p.570). However, Russian, with the greatest number of speakers of all the minority groups in Ukraine by far, was the only minority language whose functionality increased as a result of the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko bill. Finally, the bill reaffirmed parents' rights to choose their children's language of instruction in schools, to the extent that schools offering instruction in only one language would have to open classes in other languages if a sufficient number of parents requested such accommodations for their children. The intent was to turn a significant number of Ukrainian schools into bilingual Russian/Ukrainian institutions (Arel, 2017).

For these reasons, the passage of the 2012 language law was seen by nationalists as both an attack on Ukrainian's status as the national language as well as an attempt to reverse state efforts toward linguistic Ukrainization and Ukrainian national identity-building that had been

prioritized ever since Ukrainian was reinstated as the official language of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ambrosio, 2017). Since Ukrainian independence, tacit acceptance of Russian's dominance in the east had been predicated on the notion of a "symbolic preeminence of Ukrainian" (Arel, 2017, p.233). The passage of the 2012 language law abolished any conceptions of Ukrainian's superior language status and destroyed the political equilibrium that had relied upon them (Arel, 2017). Although the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law did not affect Ukrainian's status as the sole state language, it expanded the use of Russian in the public realm to the detriment of the Ukrainian language (Azhniuk, 2017). In the days following the bill's passage, at least thirteen regional and city councils codified Russian as a regional language, while citizens in dozens of other cities, primarily in western Ukraine, publicly protested the new language law and numerous municipal governments submitted appeals to Yanukovych calling for its repeal (Makarets, 2019).

Derussification and Ukrainization in Ukrainian Legislature, 2014-2019

Viktor Yanukovych's tumultuous presidency came to an end following the Revolution of Dignity in February 2014, and the first attempt to repeal his infamous language law by constitutional vote came the day after his ousting (Arel, 2017). However, the bill's repeal was nearly as unpopular as its passage; in southeastern Ukraine, it was seen as an attempt to strip Russian of the status it had gained since 2012, and in western Ukraine, where the law had been met with great resistance when it was signed into law, activists wrote an open letter to interim president Oleksandr Turchynov that voiced their support for the creation of a language and cultural policy designed with the needs of all Ukrainian people in mind (Azhniuk, 2017). Turchynov, as a result, did not sign off on the repeal of the 2012 language law. Instead, a Temporary Special Commission was set up by Parliament. The members of the Commission

drafted several versions of a new language law, none of which were adopted, and eventually, they agreed to abandon their proposal in favor of a draft that had been written during the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk (Azhniuk, 2017). Technically, the Kravchuk draft law is an amended version of the 2012 language law that omits the anti-Ukrainian aspects of the original Kivalov-Kolesnichenko bill. It passed in Parliament as a basis for future language laws but never passed. (Azhniuk, 2017) The 2012 law "On the Principles of State Language Policy in Ukraine" remained in effect until it was declared unconstitutional by the Ukrainian Constitutional Court in February 2018 (Kudriavtseva, 2018).

Laws on Language in the Ukrainian Media

When the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law passed in 2012, it abolished existing quotas for titular language usage in radio and television programs (Kulyk, 2019). In 2016, language activists successfully mobilized against the Ukrainian radio lobby; in November of that year, a new law went into effect that required at least 35 percent of music played on Ukrainian radio stations to be in the Ukrainian language. The law had overwhelmingly positive results; it was immensely popular with language activists and casual listeners alike; many channels well exceeded the 35 percent quota; and any that fell short of the requirement were quickly penalized (Kulyk, 2019). Ukrainian language activists, encouraged by the success of the new radio law, next went after television broadcasting, and in May 2017, Parliament passed a bill that required nationwide broadcasters to air Ukrainian-language programming at least 75 percent of the time and local channels to do so at least 60 percent of the time (Kulyk, 2019). Beyond the two media bills' obvious benefits to the Ukrainian-speaking populace, their passage demonstrated officials' budding willingness to take direction on language legislation from the public, who had displayed

significant enthusiasm for the expansion of Ukrainian as signified by the media bills (Kulyk, 2019).

Laws on Language Use by Civil Servants

Two other laws concerning the use of Ukrainian in the public sphere were passed in December 2015 and May 2017, respectively. The first law required civil servants to master Ukrainian and use it exclusively while on duty. The enactment of this law meant that public servants with low proficiency or lack of confidence in Ukrainian could no longer use Russian to communicate at work. The second bill, passed in May 2017, made it a requirement that anyone applying for a position in the civil service must be able to procure a certificate of fluency in the Ukrainian language (Kulyk, 2019).

On April 25, 2019, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a new language law, entitled the "Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as a State Language." The law's primary purpose was to ensure the "protection and promotion of Ukrainian" (Bilkova et al., 2019, p.8). It also mandated the use of Ukrainian throughout the nation's territory, including by officials and in education (*Ukraine: Legislature Adopts Language Law*, 2019). It also decreed that any efforts to establish official multilingualism in Ukraine would be in violation of the country's constitution (Makarets, 2019). The 2019 language law also established the National Commission on the Standards of the State Language, as well as the position of Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language. The objective of the National Commission on the Standards of the State Language, per the official website of the Ukrainian government, is to verify and uphold the standard for Ukrainian language necessary to acquire Ukrainian citizenship or hold government positions (National Government of Ukraine, 2019). The job of the State Language Protection Commissioner is to protect the language of the state as well as the rights of Ukraine's

citizens to “receive information and services in the spheres of public life…in the state language on the whole territory of Ukraine” as well as “[remove] obstacles and restrictions in using the state language” (National Government of Ukraine, 2020). The establishment of official organs for upholding state language standards were seen by some as a “radical step” in strengthening the Ukrainian language’s position in the country (Maksimovtsova, 2022).

As with earlier language bills, the Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as a State Language caused public outrage. Pro-Russian politicians argued that the 2019 law discriminated against Russian-speakers in eastern Ukraine, and Russian president Vladimir Putin signed a law simplifying eastern Ukrainian’s pathway to Russian citizenship in response to the passage of the 2019 language law (Polityuk, 2019). On January 16, 2022, article 25 of the 2019 language law went into effect, raising concerns once again about the rights of minority languages in Ukraine. Per article 25, all print media outlets registered in Ukraine must publish primarily in the state language. Non-Ukrainian publications must be accompanied by a Ukrainian version “equivalent in content, volume, and method of printing” (Denber, 2022). Online media outlets must design their websites so that visitors are directed to their Ukrainian language content first (Radio Free Europe, 2022). Regional media outlets will not be required to abide by these laws until July 2024.

Laws on Language in Education

In order to understand the implications of Ukraine’s education policies on language, it is important to note how attitudes toward the language of educational instruction have changed since independence. The results of a survey conducted in the year 2000 found that the majority of Ukrainian citizens wanted their children to know both the Russian and Ukrainian languages. While both groups demonstrated preferences toward their own ethnic language, Ukrainian was

generally seen as a more useful language to know (Kulyk, 2017). The overall findings of the study showed that 86 percent of Russian speakers wanted their children or grandchildren to speak Ukrainian, while only 68 percent of Ukrainian speakers expressed a desire for their descendants to know Russian (Kulyk, 2017). A similar study conducted in 2014 found that Ukrainian-language education had significantly more support than Russian-language or bilingual education, which may be explained by a decrease in the perceived value of the Russian language (Kulyk, 2017). Although Russian's value has decreased over the last decade, it is still viewed as an important part of the Ukrainian linguistic repertoire. As such, there is remains a significant interest in its use in the educational sector, primarily among parents for whom it is the predominant language, and members of this group are evenly split between those who have expressed a preference for Russian-only education and those who support bilingual education. Nearly all Ukrainian speakers have expressed a preference for education conducted solely in the Ukrainian language. These predilections for instruction languages can be explained by studies that demonstrate the impact of educational systems on linguistic preservation, development, and even identity formation (Soll et al., 2015).

Minority Language Education Legislation, 2017-2019

In September 2017, then-president Petro Poroshenko signed a new law entitled "On Education," which was described by Ukraine's Minister of Education as a "key instrument" that would raise the standards of the country's educational system to be on par with those of the European Union (Tulup, 2017). However, Article 7 of the bill, titled "Language and Education," caused outrage among speakers of minority languages that was evocative of reactions to the language laws of 2006, 2012, 2015, and 2017. One of the 2017 law's most significant changes to Ukrainian educational policy was a new stipulation that in state schools, Ukrainian would be the

sole language of instruction from fifth grade onward (Radio Free Europe, 2017). The first draft of "On Education" had called for only a slightly greater role of Ukrainian in schools and did not attempt to limit minority language instruction. This was the draft preferred by the Ministry of Education; however, immediately before the votes were cast, a group of pro-Ukrainian deputies and ministry officials made it clear that they would not vote to pass the bill unless it significantly restricted minority language instruction. Rather than risk the bill's failure, which was necessary to begin a much-desired educational reform, the Verkhovna Rada agreed to the pro-Ukrainian camp's conditions (Kulyk, 2019).

The passage of the 2017 education bill reversed nearly three decades of precedent that affirmed the rights of national minority groups to receive education in their native languages (Makarchuk et al., 2020). Indeed, concern over minority groups' proficiency in Ukrainian had been one impetus for the new education law. In 2017, more than half of high school graduates in Zakarpattia, a predominantly Hungarian region in southwestern Ukraine, failed a language exam necessary for entry into a tertiary education program (Tulup, 2017). The new education bill aimed to bolster ethnic minorities' Ukrainian language skills by mandating education in the titular language beyond the elementary level, with no changes to the laws regarding the language of education for students in first through fourth grade (Tulup, 2017).

The Russian and Hungarian ethnic minorities in Ukraine were especially outraged, and the governments of Russia and Hungary both spoke out against the 2017 law on their behalf. The Russian State Duma likened the bill to an act of ethnocide against ethnic Russians in Ukraine (Makarchuk et al., 2020). This was an unsurprising, if antagonistic response given the abysmal state of Russian-Ukrainian relations since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry's response to the 2017 bill was much more unexpected. The

Hungarian government called for a complete closure of the 71 Hungarian-language schools operating in Ukraine by 2022 (Makarchuk et al., 2020). Such an action, however, would violate Article 7 of the 2017 law "On Education," and no efforts have been made to close Hungarian schools to date, nor have any lawsuits regarding the violation of Hungarians' linguistic rights been filed (Makarchuk et al., 2020).

In 2019, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed another education bill into law. "On Secondary Education" which introduced additional measures to be implemented during the country's ongoing educational reform that were written in the interest of the nation's ethnic minorities. Under the new law, private schools in Ukraine are free to choose their language of instruction. With regard to public schools, the law delineates three language models for general secondary education that take the ethnic minority status of students into account. The first model was designed with the indigenous peoples of Ukraine in mind, who do not have a titular state to protect their language and who live in an environment where their ethnic language is not the standard. The largest of these groups is the Crimean Tatars, for whom extra protections are guaranteed by law. Members of Ukraine's Crimean Tatar community can attend school in their indigenous language all the way through 12th grade, and Ukrainian language classes are made available to them (Interfax-Ukraine, 2022).

The second model is intended for schools where the languages of instruction are those that belong to a minority group in Ukraine, but which are also languages of the European Union. As established by the 2017 education law, all education can be conducted in students' minority language until they reach the fifth grade. In the second model, students are educated in both their native language and the state language from fifth grade onward, from which point they will be taught in Ukrainian at least 20 percent of the time. The percentage of their Ukrainian-language

education will increase annually until tenth grade, from which point onward they will receive 60 percent of their instruction in Ukrainian (Interfax-Ukraine, 2022).

The last model proposed by the 2019 law concerns the education of minorities who live in an environment where their language is both the primary instrument of communication and a member of the same language family as Ukrainian. Based on the strict prerequisites for this model, it can be inferred that it is intended to be used by schools whose students are primarily Russian speakers. Per this model, a minimum of 80 percent of schooling must be conducted in Ukrainian beginning in fifth grade (Interfax-Ukraine, 2022).

Chapter 4: Political Upheaval, National Identity, and Language

Language Attitude Changes and Identity Shifts Following Ukrainian Political Conflicts

In December 2021, the Ukrainian non-governmental organization Рейтинг (Rating) conducted their sixth national poll, titled "The Language Issue in Ukraine." The survey utilized CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews) to gather data from a sample population of 1000 respondents aged 18 and older from every oblast in Ukraine, with the exception of the Russian-occupied regions of Crimea and the Donbas. The results demonstrated a steady decline in the number of self-identified Russian speakers since Rating's last polls on language were conducted in 2012. Rating's 2012 language poll found that 40 percent of people polled self-identified as Russian speakers. By December 2021, that number was down to 26 percent (*The Sixth National Poll*, 2022).

The drastic difference between the number of respondents who identified themselves as Russian speakers in 2012 and 2021 can be attributed to several factors. First, it is imperative to note that only the 2012 polls surveyed people living in Crimea and the Donbas–two areas where the Russian language predominates and a relationship with Russia has long been favored over one with the west. Additionally, four major political events transpired between 2012 and 2021 that have had profound impacts on conceptions of Ukrainian national identity: the Euromaidan Uprising (November 2013-February 2014) and ensuing Revolution of Dignity (February 2014), the Russian annexation of Crimea (February 2014-March 2014), and the Russian invasion of the Donbas that came to be known as the Russian Spring (April 2014-February 2022).

Respondents were polled again in March 2022, just weeks after Russia launched its most recent war effort against Ukraine, and the results from that survey showed a further decline in the number of Russian speakers: only 18 percent of respondents reported that Russian was their main

language of communication, a significant decrease from December 2021. A resultant increase in the number of self-described bilinguals, which rose from 15 percent to 32 percent was observed, as was the number of respondents who reported speaking only Ukrainian at home, which increased from 44 percent to 48 percent (*The Sixth National Poll*, 2022).

The results of the poll demonstrate how conceptions of Ukrainian national identity have changed drastically in response to political events in the past decade (Kulyk, 2016). Changes to identity in the wake of Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity included reports of increased self-identification as Ukrainian, a more profound sense of patriotism, stronger attachments to national symbols, greater senses of unity with compatriots, increased willingness to defend or work for the country, and greater confidence in the power of the public to effect positive change in Ukraine (Kulyk, 2016). A growing sense of animosity toward Russia has also developed in response to semi-recent political events (Kulyk, 2016). This is largely the result of Vladimir Putin's increasingly irredentist actions toward Ukraine, which began with his revival of the concept of "Novorossiya" following Euromaidan in 2014 and which continued with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ensuing Russian Spring that same year.

Political Unrest in Ukraine, 2013-2014

Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity

On November 21, 2013, pro-E.U. demonstrators descended on Maidan Square in downtown Kyiv to protest President Viktor Yanukovych's sudden decision not to ratify the European Union-Ukrainian Association Agreement out of a fear of Russian retaliation (Kudelia, 2014). The ensuing protests marked the beginning of Euromaidan, a three-month period of civil unrest that culminated in the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity and subsequent ousting of Yanukovych (Kudelia, 2014).

The protest was in response to "a 180-degree reversal of policy, from a path toward Europe to a return to Kremlin domination" (Zinchenko, 2015). However, the movement was not catalyzed solely by Yanukovych's abrupt egress from talks with the European Union. At its core, the Maidan Uprising was a manifestation of support for a Ukrainian national identity that sympathized with the West and embodied European values rather than those of Russia. Yanukovych's predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko, had fully embraced Westernism, setting Ukraine on a trajectory that promised to strengthen its relationship with Europe. However, when Yanukovych ascended the presidency in 2010, that progress was threatened. Yanukovych, whose pro-Russian platform had won him the election and support of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the country's east, seemed certain to prioritize Ukraine's relationship with Vladimir Putin over its ties to the European Union (Kudelia, 2014).

However, one weakness of the Yanukovych regime (among many) was its "ideological ambiguity" (Kudelia, 2014, p.24). Yanukovych "came to office as the champion of Russian-speaking eastern and southern Ukraine…then, in a stab at triangulation, he suddenly began talking up Ukraine's European roots and its ambitions to join the EU" (Kudelia, 2014, p.24). At the same time, he enacted policies that demonstrated the values espoused by the eastern Slavic national identity complex. Perhaps the most notable of these policies was the passage of the 2012 Law on the Principles of the State Language Policy, which gave Russian official language status in regions with an ethnic Russian majority, and which was immensely unpopular with Ukrainian speakers throughout the country, who felt the law "[threatened] the Ukrainian language and the existence of the Ukrainian people" (Fedinec & Csernicskó, 2017, p.87).

The passage of the 2012 language law had also prompted civil unrest in Kyiv, though the demonstrations had been shorter and less well-attended. Expecting the Euromaidan protest to be

similarly short-lived, Yanukovych first responded to the demonstrators with an "erratic mix of repression, conciliation, and feebly staged counterdemonstrations" (Kudelia, 2014, p.28). On November 19, 2013, after nine days of protests, Yanukovych's government resorted to violence in order to clear demonstrators out of the square; the next day, over 100,000 civilians returned to Maidan Square (Pop-Eleches et al., 2022).

The regime's violence against its own citizens marked a turning point for the Euromaidan movement, though the unrest would take nearly three months to subside. Following police brutality toward civilians, protestors' objectives shifted. Forming a Ukrainian alliance with Europe remained a goal but ousting the Yanukovych regime took priority (Wynnyckyj et al., 2019). As a result, the demographics of the protestors changed; Ukrainians who had not necessarily supported European integration mobilized in response to an increasingly totalitarian regime (Pop-Eleches et al., 2022). The dichotomy between the goals of the protestors who had supported Euromaidan from the outset and those who joined the movement to overthrow the regime "helps explain why the EU frame faded by the protests' later phase but also why wariness of closer ties with Russia, which was shared by both EU supporters and nationalists, remained" following the end of the Revolution of Dignity (Pop-Eleches et al., 2022, p.629).

Though the focus of Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity shifted over time, the events began as a pro-Europe movement that was carried out by Ukrainians who championed Western values and wanted to see them embraced in their own country; in other words, Euromaidan resonated with people who aligned with the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex. However, Ukrainians in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, whose values aligned more closely with the eastern Slavic national identity complex and were by definition more interested in maintaining Ukraine's relationship with Russia felt alienated by the uprising and

revolution (Averianova & Voropaieva, 2020). Protests decrying Euromaidan took place throughout the Donbas; Kremlin advisors utilized these events to stage a growing separatist movement in the region (Risch, 2022). The alleged pro-Russia faction began to gain momentum in the Donbas at the same time that the Russian annexation of Crimea was beginning (Giuliano, 2015).

The Annexation of Crimea and the Russian Spring

Volodymyr Kulyk wrote that Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity primarily affected Ukrainians' senses of nationalism, but that the perception of "the Russian state or even the Russian people as an enemy" only developed in response to Russian mobilization in Crimea and the Donbas (Kulyk, 2016, p.100). Of course, the events are interconnected; Vladimir Putin used Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity as pretenses for mobilizing Russian troops in Crimea, alleging that the ambitions of the demonstrators and the new "nationalist junta" that had replaced the Yanukovych regime threatened Russian speakers living in the Crimean peninsula (Zelinska, 2017, p.4).

However, Euromaidan was merely an excuse for Putin to act on his irredentist attitude toward Ukraine. His justification for the invasion of Crimea marked a new era of Kremlin nationalist rhetoric that allowed Putin to "present himself as the foremost defender of ethnic Russians abroad" (Kolstø, 2016, p.702). This came about through Putin's repeated references to Novorossiya ("New Russia")—a geopolitical imaginary of a place in modern-day Crimea to which he asserted both ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians laid a claim, and which was based on the historic region of Novorossiya on the Black Sea that was developed by imperial Russian colonizers (O'Loughlin et al., 2017).

This display of ethnonationalism previously unseen from Putin gained him voracious support from Russian nationalists. When Russia's annexation of Crimea occurred largely "without military clashes and with no loss of human life" (Kolstø, 2016, p.714) and the "separatist" movement in the Donbas appeared to be gaining traction in March 2014, Putin was faced with a choice between completely abandoning the separatists, supporting them openly, or surreptitiously providing them with weapons and soldiers. The Kremlin opted for the latter (Kolstø, 2016). However, the ensuing conflict in the Donbas—called the Russian Spring—played out much differently than the Crimean annexation. In addition to the Ukrainian troops who mobilized on the Donbas/Russia border, prepared to go to war against Putin's army, the Russian Spring was unique in that it resulted in the mobilization of Ukrainian citizens from around the country and from myriad ethnic and political backgrounds (Melnyk, 2019). Unlike with Crimea, the Ukrainian Army launched a counteroffensive, and "the war dragged on and the casualties kept piling up with no victory in sight" (Melnyk, 2019, p.721).

The Russian Spring culminated in a ceasefire with the signing of the second Minsk Accords on February 12, 2015 (Kudelia, 2022). However, later diplomatic efforts to formally end the conflict were unsuccessful. The Russian Spring only truly came to an end when, in February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military operation against Ukraine that shattered global security architecture in a way unseen for generations (Pszczel, 2022).

Changes in Ukrainian National Identity, 2012-2022

Scholars working on Ukraine agree that the events of 2013-2015 had a large and overwhelmingly positive impact on Ukrainians' national identity and a negative impact on their attitudes toward Russia (Kulyk, 2016). In the wake of Euromaidan, Ukrainians reported improved attitudes toward all attributes of nationhood, including the Ukrainian language.

Negative perceptions of Russia, its government, and its civilians were explicitly tied to the annexation of Crimea and occupation of the Donbas and were exacerbated by Putin's rhetoric and actions in relation to those events (Kulyk, 2016). In 2014, Putin's inclusion of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in his conception of the Russian political community, his rejection of Ukraine as an independent state, and his revival of Novorossiya as a geopolitical imaginary that evoked Russian-Ukrainian reunification incensed Ukrainians throughout the country (Melnyk, 2019). Putin's repudiation of Ukrainian sovereignty, particularly in the wake of a powerful national movement, was especially salient, and likely further contributed to Ukrainians' negative views of Russia in the aftermath of the Russian Spring.

The cumulative effect of these events was the emergence of a new ideation of a Ukrainian national identity (Averianova & Voropaieva, 2020). Taras Kuzio asserted that this "new" Ukrainian national identity evolved as a result of Putin's failed Novorossiya project, which "was based upon Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians exhibiting greater allegiance to the Russian World (Russkiy mir)" than they did toward their own nation and culture (Kuzio, 2019, p.297). According to Kuzio, those stereotypes originate from a fundamental misunderstanding of Ukrainians' idea of nationhood. Unlike the Russian conception of nationhood, which still sees the nations and citizens of the former USSR as part of a united "Russian world", the Ukrainian idea of nationhood has never extended beyond the borders of the ethnic Ukrainian homeland. Most Ukrainians alive during the Soviet era viewed the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, not the Soviet Union, as their country, and fellow Soviet Ukrainians as their countrymen (Kuzio, 2019). However, some eastern and southern Ukrainians did internalize the "Soviet myths of Russian-Ukrainian 'fraternal brotherhood'" (Kuzio, 2019, p.304). This

resulted in the development of what Kuzio called a "mixed Ukrainian-Russian identity" (2019, p.299) that remained prevalent in eastern and southern Ukraine even after independence.

For Russian-speaking Ukrainians in those regions, who have long viewed Russians and Ukrainians as having a shared history, the annexation of Crimea and war in the Donbas in 2014 constituted a betrayal of the Russian/Ukrainian fraternal relationship that was foundational to the eastern Slavic nationality complex (Kuzio, 2019). In the aftermath of that treachery, they were forced to choose between the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex and one that viewed them as part of Novorossiya. Faced with this choice, many eastern Ukrainians, with the exception of those in the Donbas, sided with Ukraine, accepting the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex as their own. As a result, the eastern Slavic national identity complex ceased to exist.

The Language Question

While the annexation of Crimea and Russian Spring had an overwhelmingly negative impact on Ukrainians' attitudes toward Russia, the majority of the population did not report any changes in their attitudes toward the Russian language. The implication of this finding is that as of 2014, Ukrainians continued to perceive the Russian language as compatible with Ukrainian identity (Kulyk, 2016). As such, the new Ukrainian national identity that evolved in the wake of the political cleavages in the mid-2010s espoused all the values of the Ukrainian national identity complex with one major exception: it accepted that some eastern Ukrainians would continue to use the Russian language. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it was no longer attacking a country that embraced or even recognized its remaining cultural ties to Russia; rather, it had attempted to overpower a politically and culturally sovereign nation, mistakenly equating a shared language for sympathy toward Russia's imperial cause.

Chapter 5: Language Use and National Identity in Kharkiv, A Case Study

A Linguistic and Political Overview of Kharkiv

Ukraine's second-largest city by population, the city of Kharkiv is located 18 miles from Ukraine's northeastern border with Russia. The capital of Kharkiv Oblast, Kharkiv has long been a site of opposing historical narratives, having been under the control of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union prior to Ukrainian independence (Pletnyova, 2020). The city's linguistic history is complex: during the 1930s, the Soviet government suppressed and executed Kharkiv's ethnic Ukrainian intelligentsia in order to "[purge the city] of Ukrainophone 'bourgeois nationalism'" (Pletnyova, 2020, p.106). Kharkiv later developed into a major Soviet industrial and scientific hub, where Russian served as the main language of communication, culture, and science, and Ukrainian came to be seen as a low-status provincial language whose use was relegated to the villages outside of Kharkiv (Pletnyova, 2020).

Figure 1: Location of the City of Kharkiv, Ukraine

Since Ukraine gained independence, Kharkiv has maintained close linguistic and political ties to Russia. In the early 1990s, Kharkiv's legislative body declared Russian to be the city's second official language despite lacking the legal grounds to do so; a survey conducted in March 2002 found that 82 percent of respondents supported the measure (Besters-Dilger, 2007). In 2002-2003, university-level classes at Kharkiv University were taught in Russian "virtually without exception", and in 2003, Russian was introduced as the language of instruction in thirty Ukrainian schools (Besters-Dilger, 2007, p.269). Kharkivites have traditionally voted for pro-Russian politicians and were "largely indifferent" to nationalist movements like the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2013 Euromaidan Uprising that attempted to align Ukraine more closely with the West (Pletnyova, 2020). However, they were more decisive when responding to survey questions in the wake of the Russian war in the Donbas; when asked if Kharkiv Oblast belonged to the conceptual Russkiy mir in 2014, only 28.63 percent of the oblast's residents agreed or strongly agreed, while 45.6 percent of residents disagreed or strongly disagreed (O'Loughlin et al., 2016).

Despite the prevalence of the Russian language in Kharkiv and citizens' pro-Russian political leanings and general apathy toward the Ukrainian nationalist movement, some attempts to bolster the status of Russian have been met with resistance. When the Kivalov- Kolesnichenko language law was passed by the Verkhovna Rada in 2012, Kharkiv Oblast was among the regions where Russian gained official regional status. The decision mobilized anti-language law demonstrators, who the Kharkiv District Administrative Court had to ban from protesting on Freedom Square in August 2012 (Interfax-Ukraine, 2012). In 2018, the Kharkiv Regional Council revoked Russian's regional language status (*Харьковский облсовет лишил русский язык статуса регионального*, 2018).

Kharkiv was chosen as a case study for several reasons. First, Kharkiv Oblast shares a border with Russia, and the city of Kharkiv (the oblast's capital) lies approximately twenty miles southwest of that point. The city has held close political ties to Russia for centuries, resulting in a history that is "a blend of both Ukraine and Russia" (Westrate, 2016, p.32). Despite many Kharkivites' split ethno-national identities, its citizens and politicians have generally shown loyalty to Ukraine's central government since independence, if not enthusiastic nationalism (Jarábik & Shapovalova, 2018). Kharkiv's apparent allegiance to Kyiv suggested that the ongoing Russian occupation might have social and glottopolitical repercussions in the region. This includes the abandonment of Russian in favor of Ukrainian, changes to language policies, and initiatives to bolster the Ukrainian language's use in the city of Kharkiv and the surrounding oblast.

Pletnyova (2020) reported on the impacts of Russia's 2014 invasion of the Donbas region on glottopolitics and language attitudes in Kharkiv. Pletnyova determined that Russia's occupation of the Donbas resulted in Kharkivites' extremely polarized attitudes toward both the Russian and Ukrainian languages. The findings of that study set a precedent for Kharkivites' changing language attitudes as a result of Russia's current military aggression toward Ukraine. While the city of Kharkiv has remained out of Russian hands at the time of this writing, parts of the oblast have been under Russian control since the campaign began in February 2022. Therefore, the local news source reported frequently on language use and attitudes in both the Russian- and Ukrainian-controlled parts of Kharkiv Oblast during the data collection period. Finally, it was easy to find and access a news source local to Kharkiv, and the newspaper's online archive contained ample Russian-language content that was relevant to the scope of the present study.

Methodology

Corpus

To determine how attitudes toward the Russian language in Ukraine have been impacted by Russia's ongoing military aggression, this study examined Russian-language articles published on Ukrainian news sites since the occupation began. Two newspapers were selected as sources: one is a local Kharkiv publication, *Kharkiv Today,* and the other, *Vesti Ukraine,* is a national news outlet. Both have sizable online presences, and *Vesti Ukraine* is also available in print.

This project utilized a corpus of ten articles published on two Ukrainian news sites, *Kharkiv Today* and *Vesti Ukraine.* A search through each newspaper's Russian language archive for articles containing the word "язык"—Russian for "language" was used to find the five most recent articles published on each site that referenced the Russian language within the context of Russia's ongoing occupation of Ukraine. The five newest articles on each site that were deemed relevant to the scope study were retrieved for analysis. All articles included in this study were all published over a three-month period between August and July 2022.

This study analyzed articles from two sources: one local news site and one national news site. In doing so, it aimed to assess whether Ukrainians in Kharkiv, where historically, Russian is at least as widely used as Ukrainian, have different attitudes toward the Russian language than their western countrymen in the wake of Russia's most recent invasion of Ukraine. This was to be determined through an assessment of major themes across articles selected for this study. Given the city of Kharkiv's proximity to the war front and Russia's current control of some parts of Kharkiv Oblast, the national newspaper served as somewhat of a control for attitudes toward language as held by Ukrainians living in non-occupied parts of the country.

Once *Kharkiv Today* and *Vesti Ukraine* had been identified as sources, a corpus was assembled by searching the archives of the Russian-language versions of both sites for articles containing the word "язык" (the Russian word for "language"). Both searches yielded hundreds of results, some of which fell beyond the scope of the current study. The five most recent articles containing the search term in a relevant context were selected for inclusion in the corpus. Personal discretion was used to eliminate articles that contained the search term but were contextually irrelevant to the project or that merely alluded to Russia's military operation rather than referred to it explicitly. For example, *Vesti Ukraine* published an article on July 25, 2022, entitled "No More Russian-Language Classes in Lviv." While highly probable that the Lviv city government ended all Russian-language classes in response to the Russian invasion, the article itself made no mention of the war and excluded from the study on that basis.

Sources

Kharkiv Today is a news site that has reported on politics, economics, sports, and culture in the city of Kharkiv and throughout Kharkiv Oblast since 2006. Users can access the site in both Ukrainian and Russian, though it appears that not all information is available in both languages. A search for "російська мова" ("Russian language") in the Ukrainian language-archive yielded only 27 results dating back to 2016, while a search of the Russian language-archive for articles containing the phrase "русский язык" (Russian language) resulted in 92 hits dating back to that same year. The size of *Kharkiv Today*'s daily readership was unclear.

Vesti Ukraine is a national newspaper with a daily readership of 370,000 that prints primarily in Russian, though a Ukrainian-language version is also available. The digital site is fully available in both Russian and Ukrainian. *Vesti* has been in circulation since 2013 and was reported to be the most popular newspaper in Ukraine by the independent market research

company Kantar TNS Ukraine. It describes itself as “the only socio-political newspaper in Ukraine.”

Thematic Analysis

Once the corpus was assembled, a thematic analysis (TA) was conducted to identify patterns in the data. Thematic analysis is a categorizing strategy sometimes employed during qualitative content analysis (QCA). In thematic analyses, researchers generate codes in order to categorize the content of their data. Codes are the smallest units of analysis used to identify relevant information in qualitative data (Braun & Clarke, 2017). Once a researcher has generated their codes, the codes are analyzed in order to identify broader themes within the corpus. Using TA to categorize and summarize data allows researchers to discard superfluous information that is beyond the scope of their work, thereby allowing for the easy identification of important concepts or patterns in the data (Ayres, 2008).

This study followed the six-step process of thematic analysis outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). During the first stage of the process, the corpus was assembled and reviewed, and the main theme of each article was identified. This was followed by a close reading of the data, during which a preliminary search for patterns took place. In step two, codes were identified based on the content of the articles and the focus of the study. Examples of codes generated during step two include “Changes in Language Practices”; “Russian-Occupied Kharkiv”; and “Language and Identity.” Once the data coding-stage was complete, the analysis progressed to step three, where codes were closely examined in order to identify overarching themes in the data. Those themes were reviewed in step four, at which time several drafts of potential thematic maps were assembled. During the last two steps, the thematic analysis was refined and finalized,

and the data report, which comprises chapter six, was written. The program Atlas.ti was used for data coding, thematic analysis, and visualization of results.

Study Limitations

One risk when conducting thematic analyses is the potential for data decontextualization resulting from careless categorization. As context retention is imperative when working with qualitative data, researchers conducting thematic analyses often work with case studies to mitigate the risk of decontextualization (Clarke & Braun, 2017). The city of Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine served as a case study for this project for this purpose.

Another limitation of this project was the small corpus used in analysis. The thematic analysis conducted for this study examined a corpus that was limited to ten Russian-language articles from two Ukrainian news sites. For a more comprehensive assessment of the Ukrainian media's mention of language within the context of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, a larger source repository should be analyzed. Lastly, it is noted that qualitative methods of data analysis, including thematic analysis, are inherently subjective.

Chapter 6: Results

The data used in this study was taken from recent articles published in two Ukrainian newspapers–one national (*Vesti Ukraine*) and one local (*Kharkiv Today*)–that referred to either the Russian or Ukrainian language (or both) as well as the ongoing Russian occupation of Ukraine. Four major thematic categories were identified through a qualitative content analysis: "Attitudes toward Russian"; "Changing Language Practices"; "Russian Occupation of Ukraine"; and "Changes to Education Practices and Policies." The following section will outline and present those themes and their implications will be discussed in chapter 7.

Major Themes in News Articles

Attitudes Toward Russian

Most of the articles analyzed for this study depicted current attitudes toward the Russian language as held by both private citizens and politicians alike. Some depictions of language attitudes were presented in the form of quotes, while others comprised descriptions of people's treatment of Russian speakers or efforts to bolster the Ukrainian language. The media's portrayal of Ukrainians' attitudes toward the Russian language was unsurprisingly overwhelmingly negative.

Three articles quoted statements made by government officials in which they expressed their personal feelings toward the Russian language. The quotes were given within the contexts of the 2019 language law, an initiative to ban the Russian language in schools in Kharkiv, and the arrival and language practices of displaced Ukrainians in the western city of Borislav, respectively. All employees were quoted while speaking in their official capacities and all used strongly anti-Russian rhetoric that reflected feelings of violation and disgust toward the language. On May 10, 2022, *Vesti Ukraine* quoted the mayor of Borislav, a city in Lviv Oblast,

as saying of the eastern Ukrainian refugees who have come to Borislav, "They communicate exclusively in the language of the aggressor and make comments such as 'we don't understand Ukrainian and won't communicate in it.'" The other articles quoting government employees espoused equally negative perceptions of Russian. Taras Kremen, the State Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language, was quoted in an article published by *Kharkiv Today* on July 13 that was entitled "First Leaders of Kharkiv Violate Language Law." Kremen stated, "Government officials' use of a non-state language (Russian), especially in war conditions, is a violation of the rights of the citizens of Ukraine." The third article, "Kharkov Deputies Propose to Ban Russian Language and Literature in Schools," published by *Kharkiv Today* on July 7, 2022, quoted Kharkiv officials, identified only as the deputies of the Kharkov City Council, as saying of their desire to ban Russian language and literature classes from schools, "Russia has transformed the Russian language into a tool for actualizing 'Russkiy mir'; into a weapon against Ukrainian identity. Russian leaders have repeatedly stated that where there is the Russian language, there is Russian territory."

Some articles described the public's reaction to the use of Russian in a way that clearly revealed their negative perception of the language. Reactions to use of Russian fell into two categories: treatment of Russian speakers (as reported across the corpus) and support for Ukrainian. Several articles described treatment toward Russian speakers in Ukraine since the beginning of the 2022 invasion. The overwhelming sentiment was a feeling of animosity toward Ukrainians who chose to speak Russian instead of Ukrainian. In some cases, use of Russian was reported to result in ostracization, such as in Borislav, where the mayor requested that residents, social workers, and those in the service sector not speak to refugees from the east in Russian. The Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language, when quoted in *Kharkiv Today*,

reminded government officials that as of July 16, 2022, use of a non-state language while working in an official capacity could result in "administrative penalties," including warnings and fines. One article from *Vesti Ukraine* reported an occasion in which a citizen reacted to the use of Russian in public with physical violence: "In the center of Ivano-Frankivsk, a street musician was beaten for singing a song in Russian." That incident led to "heated discussions on local [blogs]", with some residents of Ivano-Frankivsk supporting a total ban on the Russian language and others defending Russian-speaking Ukrainians on the war front and noting that Ukraine's Russian-speaking cities have suffered the most from Russia's military campaign.

The final signifier of changing attitudes toward the Russian language was the defense of the Ukrainian language as a response to the use of Russian. Reportage of public defense of Ukrainian fell into two categories: support for bans on Russian and efforts to promote and transition to use of Ukrainian. Data showed that some calls for a Russian language embargo simply took the form of comments on a public blog page, while others were raised by government officials across the country. Two articles, one from *Vesti Ukraine* and one from *Kharkiv Today,* reported that the local government has either banned or intends to ban Russian in public schools. Per a July 5, 2022, article in *Vesti*, the city of Kryvyi Rih, where Russian has historically been used as the language of daily life, has officially banned Russian in public schools, beginning in first grade and continuing through secondary school. In Kharkiv, city council deputies were quoted as being "outraged by reports…of Russian language and literature classes being offered in schools where the language of education is Ukrainian." They were further quoted as calling the exclusion of Russian language and literature courses from Ukrainian schools' curricula as "urgent."

Several articles referred to transitions to Ukrainian as the language of daily life, further confirming that attitudes toward Russian are extremely negative and that citizens do not wish to be associated with Russia or the Russian language. Some pieces quoted individuals making personal changes to their language practices while others reported upon initiatives designed to bolster Ukrainians' knowledge of their titular language. An interview in *Vesti* with a Ukrainian singer, Volodymyr Dantes, quoted the artist as referring to "friends and other artists who used to communicate in Russian." The article focused on his recent switch to songwriting in Ukrainian after previously using Russian in his career. The *Vesti* article about the city of Kryvyi Rih, published on July 5, 2022, reported that two educational initiatives had been developed to help residents learn Ukrainian: an online course called "Speaking Ukrainian Correctly" and Ukrainian language clubs that would be open to the public.



Figure 2: Thematic Analysis of Attitudes Toward the Russian Language

Changing Language Practices

Transitions to Ukrainian as an indicator of attitudes toward Russian necessitates further elaboration, as Russian-speaking Ukrainians' shift in language practices was one of the most prevalent themes identified across the corpus and is indicative of the increasingly negative view that some Ukrainians hold toward the Russian language. The transitions in Ukrainians' language

practices reported in the data fell into three primary categories: switches to Ukrainian in the artistic community; personal and professional use of Ukrainian instead of Russian; and the removal of Russian language and literature classes in educational curricula across the country.

Two of the *Vesti Ukraine* articles examined in this study featured interviews with Ukrainian musicians, both of whom talked about their recent switches to Ukrainian after producing music in Russian in the past. As addressed in the discussion of Figure 1, Volodymyr Dantes, a native of Kharkiv, stated that he had previously written music in Russian because he was unable to write it in Ukrainian, but that he and many Russian-speaking friends are now abandoning Russian in favor of Ukrainian despite a "fear of mistakes." His reason for transitioning to Ukrainian-language music was "to embolden everyone trying to make the switch to Ukrainian." The other artist interviewed, Olya Polyakova, recently recorded her first album entirely in Ukrainian as well as translated some of her earlier songs from Russian. Her producer was quoted in *Vesti* as saying, "Our artists singing in Russian have no other choice but to switch to Ukrainian. Russian-language music will no longer have tools for promotion in Ukraine."

The removal of Russian from educational curricula across the country is another major change to the country's language practices, particularly in eastern Ukrainian cities such as Kharkiv and Kryvyi Rih where Russian has predominated for decades. Officials' emphasis on their desire to completely remove Russian from educational curricula is a significant departure from past practices. An expanded discussion of the theme "Changes to Education Practices and Policies" will precede Figure 4.

The result of these changes to language practices in the unoccupied territories of Ukraine is the increased use of Ukrainian, which was another major theme identified within the corpus. There appeared to be three types of adoption of Ukrainian: voluntary adoption; adoption as a

response to government appeals (not mandated by law); and mandatory adoption under the law. Data from the articles suggested that the Ukrainian singers Volodymyr Dantes and Olya Polyakova both switched to Ukrainian voluntarily, as have many of Dantes' Russian-speaking friends and as did the head of Kryvyi Rih's city military administration, Aleksandr Vilkul. Others have done so at the behest of officials, including Vilkul, who implored citizens of Kryvyi Rih to use the Ukrainian language as their "weapon" against Russia and who spearheaded the city's Ukrainian-language initiatives, as well as the mayor or Borislav, whose request to citizens working in hospitality and the social services sectors to use Ukrainian with Russian-speaking refugees was the topic of a *Vesti* article mentioned previously. Lastly, some Ukrainians' adoption of the titular language has been government-mandated, as in the case of the Kharkiv officials disciplined for defying the state language law, and whose use of Russian was described by the State Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language, Taras Kremen, as a "violation."



Figure 3: Thematic Analysis of Changes in Language Practices in Ukraine

Russian Invasion of Ukraine

The Russian invasion of Ukraine was the next major theme identified throughout the corpus. Most of the articles from *Kharkiv Today* were primarily about the Russian Army's ongoing occupation in Kharkiv Oblast, while publications extracted from *Vesti Ukraine* generally focused on language practices around the country within the context of war. Articles on the invasion generally referred to the physical and cultural repercussions of Russian control. On July 19, 2022, *Kharkiv Today* published an article entitled "Russification of Bridges and Monuments in the Occupied Region of Kharkiv Oblast." The article stated, "In many parts of Kharkiv Oblast, the occupiers have begun to destroy everything reminiscent of Ukraine. They are repainting everything that's blue and yellow in the colors of the Russian Federation." After enumerating the ways that Russia's military has taken to destroying symbols of Ukraine in occupied territory, the article emphasized that "signs at the entrance to Kharkiv Oblast are still in Ukrainian."

Another example of Russia's violation of Ukrainian sovereignty in the occupied territory is the recent installation of a United Russia office in the city of Kupyansk. (United Russia is the political party of Vladimir Putin.) Details were reported in a *Kharkiv Today* article dated June 6, 2022, entitled, "Deputies of the Russian State Duma Visited the Occupied Territory of Kharkiv Oblast." According to the article, which reported on Russia's own reportage of the same event in its state newspapers, the United Russia office was opened to facilitate Russia in "[providing] humanitarian aid" to Kharkivites. The same article reported that Russia had also installed a "temporary chairman of the occupied territory in Kharkiv " whose meeting with representatives of the Russian Duma was the main topic of the article. Per *Kharkiv Today,* the Russian state newspapers cited "humanitarian support" and "collaboration between youth organizations and

initiatives in Kharkiv Oblast and the Russian Federation " as the reasons for the Russians' visit to the occupied territory.

The Russians' erasure of Ukrainian symbols of identity in the occupied territory through the removal of national symbols and the installation of their own government offices and officials goes hand in hand with another form of eradication that has long been synonymous with Russian antagonism of Ukraine: russification. *Kharkiv Today*'s articles refer to two types of russification imposed upon the residents of occupied regions of Kharkiv Oblast. The first is linguistic russification. *Kharkiv Today* published an article entitled "The Russian Language Has Been Made the Sole Sate Language in Occupied Parts of Kharkiv Oblast" on July 7, 2022. The article reported that Russian had been granted official language status in occupied Kharkiv, that Ukrainian had been demoted to regional language status "without mandatory use" and that the occupiers' justification for granting state language status to Russian was made "[taking] into account 'the interests of the majority of citizens.'"

Additional data revealed that cultural russification was another significant theme among data items. Coverage of cultural russification includes newspaper references to the Russian-appointed temporary chairman's efforts to enforce Russian "rules of life" in the occupied territory that include the creation of a new flag and coat of arms that indicate its Russian allegiance as well as an approved exchange rate between Russian rubles and Ukrainian hryvnia. A second example, also extracted from *Kharkiv Today,* discussed plans by Russian officials in the occupied Kharkiv region to switch schools to the Russian education system and send current teachers to Russia for training before they can return to the classroom.



Figure 4: Thematic Analysis of Russian Occupation of Ukraine

Education Practices and Policies

The last major theme identified from the corpus data was newspapers' reportage of changes to educational practices and policies in both the Russian- and Ukrainian-occupied territories. During the time frame in question, both news sites published numerous articles discussing educational policy changes that have been made in light of Russia's ongoing assault against Ukraine. The focus of those articles varied substantially based on news source. *Kharkiv Today* reported primarily on changes implemented by Russian forces in occupied parts of Kharkiv Oblast as part of their renewed attempts at russification, while *Vesti Ukraine*'s coverage focused on anti-Russian changes to educational policies in parts of the country that remain under Ukrainian control. *Kharkiv Today* not only reported on the Russians' proposed changes to the educational curriculum in the regions of Kharkiv that are now under Russian control, but one article also reported on the angle that Russia's state-run news outlets are taking when reporting on the Russian Army's efforts to impose russification policies on the territory that they currently occupy in Ukraine's east.

As reported previously, Russian occupiers in eastern Ukraine are preparing to completely redesign the educational curricula in occupied cities so that students will receive a Russian

education. Furthermore, the plan to send Ukrainian teachers to Russia to re-train them according to Russian educational standards is an extreme measure that further proves the ultimate aim of Russia's campaign: to "reclaim" as much Ukrainian territory as possible, in part by erasing Ukrainian language and history.

In the city of Kharkiv as well as other unoccupied parts of Ukraine, including Kryvyi Rih and cities in the west, educational policies have suddenly taken a drastic anti-Russian position that is in some cases an extreme departure from previous legislation and practices. In Kryvyi Rih, recent legislation has banned Russian-language schools for students in first through fourth grades, as well as secondary education in Russian. In Ukrainian-language schools in the region, Russian is no longer offered as a second language. Given that the city of Kryvyi Rih has long been predominantly Russian speaking, the sudden and drastic measures taken by regional officials to reduce use of Russian by the city's residents have been especially surprising. However, the message is clear: Ukraine is less willing than ever to capitulate to Russia.



Figure 5: Thematic Analysis of Regional Changes to Education Practices and Policies

Chapter 7: Discussion

A qualitative content analysis of ten articles recently published in Russian-language news sources in Ukraine revealed four overarching themes: "Attitudes toward the Russian Language"; "Changes in Language Practices in Unoccupied Ukraine"; "Russian Occupation of Ukrainian Territory"; and "Regional Changes to Educational Practices and Policies." The results of the thematic analysis clearly demonstrate how the Ukrainian public's perceptions of the Russian language and attitudes toward its use have changed since in the six months since Russia launched its most recent military campaign.

Ukrainian as a Standard: The Monolingual Context

The Haugenian Model of Language Standardization

The shifts in language practices observed in the primary source data showed that the Ukrainian language has quickly expanded in the eastern and southeastern parts of the country, where Russian was previously the language of daily life. These changes can be aptly described using terminology first presented by Einar Haugen within the context of his 1966 language planning model. The elimination of Russian language and literature classes from eastern Ukrainian schools in Kharkiv and Kryvyi Rih and the significant increase in the use of Ukrainian by citizens who primarily spoke Russian prior to the invasion was reminiscent of the process that Haugen identified as norm selection. In the case of eastern Ukraine, the need for communication that initiated norm selection was not an absence of a shared language, as Haugen stated is often the case. Rather, it originated from eastern Ukrainians' perceived need to embrace a language that emphasized their Ukrainian identity, instead of relying on one forced upon previous generations by an imperial oppressor. This was evidenced in news pieces recently published in *Kharkiv Today* and *Vesti;* numerous articles referred to Russian-speaking Ukrainians' recent

concerted efforts to learn and use Ukrainian rather than to continue to speak Russian in their day-to-day lives. The widespread embrace of these measures, identified by Haugen as implementation, acknowledged the Ukrainian language as the new linguistic norm in the region.

In *Dialect, Language, Nation,* Haugen referred to "undeveloped languages." The term first appears to be problematic by today's standards, especially in a postcolonial context where the titular language has long been subjugated. However, in the case of eastern Ukraine—where the national language was overshadowed by Russian until the country's third decade of independence—it appears to be fitting. Haugen defined an undeveloped language as one that has not "been employed in all the functions that a language can perform in a society larger than that of the local tribe or peasant village" (Haugen, 1966, p.927). Prior to Russia's February 2022 invasion, this was certainly the case in eastern Ukraine, where the predominance of Russian in schools, the government, and general life did indeed inhibit Ukrainian's ability to function in all the contexts of a large society. (It should be recalled that Russian was an official language in Kharkiv Oblast until May 2021.) One *Kharkiv Today* article reported on local representatives' violation of the Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as a State Language, indicating the extent to which Russian's historical prevalence in Kharkiv has allowed citizens to get by without knowing much (if any) Ukrainian, resulting in them defaulting to Russian even in instances where the use of Ukrainian is mandated by law.

However, numerous other articles showed that despite the challenge that switching to Ukrainian presents, a majority of Russian-speaking Ukrainians have committed to making that adjustment. There is no question that Russia's most recent act of military aggression was the impetus for this major change. Whereas other political upheavals of the past decade catalyzed dramatic shifts in Ukrainian national identity, those changes primarily affected citizens' sense of

connection to Ukrainianness, feelings of patriotism, and attitudes toward Russia. The impacts of those events on language were far less drastic, as discussed in chapter four. The onset of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War was different from other geopolitical conflicts that have occurred in recent Ukrainian history in that it was the only event to trigger a significant change in eastern Ukrainians' language practices.

Russian and Ukrainian as Standards: The Multilingual Context

A further contextualization of the corpus and within the standardization framework presented in chapter two confirmed that Ukraine's current language situation is much more compatible with Haugen's monolingual structure of language standardization than it is with either of the multilingual models discussed by Geeraerts. Geeraerts' paradigm presented two cultural models that suggested how a society usually conceptualizes and utilizes language when more than one standard language is involved. However, the data suggested that Ukrainians have mostly abandoned their use of Russian over the past eight months. As such, Geeraerts' models are largely incompatible with the current language situation in Ukraine.

The Rationalist and Romantic Standardization Models

When examined within the context of Geeraerts' paradigms, the Russian language no longer comfortably fulfils the criteria or functions of a standard language in Ukraine as defined by the rationalist model. Furthermore, Ukraine's current language practices fail to meet the conditions that the romantic model requires. These changes are results of the war. The central tenet of the rationalist model is its conception of language as a tool that primarily serves to enable communication and is separate, or at least detachable, from cultural identity. It denies that language use has any pragmatic implications—that it is solely for communication. The romantic model sees language as inextricable from identity and submits that people use different

languages to express different parts of their identities. It rejects the idea that language use is absent of cultural connotations.

The rationalist model submitted that standard languages are defined by their neutrality, which is demonstrated in three primary ways. First, standard languages are geographically neutral in the sense that they bridge the gap between dialects and that their fundamental purpose is to facilitate cross-communication between separate groups. Russian does meet this criterion—better, in fact, than Ukrainian does. This is a lasting result of Soviet-era language planning policies and the former status of Russian as a lingua franca. However, this dynamic will not endure—a certainty that is unrelated to the 2022 invasion. Even in western Ukraine, many people whose parents were part of the last generation to come of age in the Soviet Union have a working knowledge of Russian, though they are generally loath to use it. As such, they were always unlikely to pass the language on to their own children, even before the revival of Russian irredentism in 2014. While Russian remains geographically neutral in Ukraine, this is a transitory reality.

The rationalist model further necessitates that languages be socially neutral, meaning that they cannot belong to one group. The corpus data revealed that any social neutrality that Russian once held in independent Ukraine is now gone. Any Ukrainians who continue to use the Russian language in the wake of the Russo-Ukrainian War will be defined by their language practices because of what that language has come to represent. This will result in an "us" versus "them" dynamic that will give Russian-speaking Ukrainians ownership of the language, violating Geeraerts' second condition of neutrality. The use of Russian has been rendered unacceptable since the onset of Russia's recent invasion, with the majority of Ukrainians associating the Russian language with their assailants and its usage with support for the invasion and contempt

for Ukraine's independence. This was evidenced in numerous articles within the corpus, wherein interviewees described the Russian language as a "language of the aggressor"; a "tool of oppression"; and a "violation of Ukrainian citizens." Reports of verbal and physical aggression toward Russian speakers in Ukraine—such as in an article published in *Vesti*, which described an occasion during which a Russian speaker in western Ukraine was beaten for his choice of language—present a further case against Russian's neutrality. By definition, a socially neutral language could never incur violence against its speakers, nor would its use be condemned by law or excluded from educational institutions or municipal settings.

Finally, the rationalist model states that standard languages are thematically universal, meaning that their use is not limited to specific semantic domains. Russian does meet this criterion. The native language of millions of people around the world, Russian has the capacity to be used in any semantic context.

According to the paradigm, a standard language's function is ultimately to enable speakers to interact irrespective of any social differences that might otherwise inhibit their communication. As such, they are inherently neutral vehicles of participation and emancipation. In the wake of war, however, Russian once again fails to achieve this. Geeraerts wrote that standard languages should have a mediating function. Through their changing language practices since February, Ukrainians have made clear that the use of Russian itself amounts to a social difference and that it is not one that they are willing to bridge.

More importantly, perhaps, is the emancipatory quality that is inherent to standard languages, through which they contribute to political participation. Russian has embodied this criterion since the invasion began in February 2022, with reports of Ukrainians brazenly confronting Russian soldiers proving especially compelling to Western media. The fact remains

that most Ukrainians do speak at least a little bit of Russian, and as such, they can employ it when necessary. One now-famous example of Russian's usage in an emancipatory context occurred within the first few hours of the invasion on February 24, 2022, when the commander of a Russian warship radioed members of the Ukrainian Navy stationed on Snake Island in the Black Sea, imploring them to surrender or risk bombardment. Ukrainian border guard Roman Hrybov's reply is now notorious: "Русский военный корабль, иди нахуй" ("Russian warship, go fuck yourself").

A Ukrainian civilian became similarly famous after a video went viral wherein she approached a heavily armed Russian solider in the town of Henychesk in Kherson Oblast. The video documented her admonition of the soldier, "Вы оккупанты; вы фашисты" ("You are occupants; you are fascists"), before she handed him a pack of sunflower seeds and said, "Take these seeds and put them in your pocket, so that when you die here, sunflowers will grow" ("Возьмите семечки - положите в карман, чтоб хоть подсолнухи выросли, когда вы здесь ляжете.") Ukrainians' proficiency in Russian has continued to enable mutual (semantic) understanding and communication between Ukrainians and the Russian soldiers condemned to attempting Putin's irredentist fantasy—a feature of linguistic emancipation. However, Russian is overall inconsistent in its ability to meet the criteria of a standard language. This suggests that its lifespan as a standard language in Ukraine (according to the rationalist model) might be coming to an end. It may continue to serve as a tool of communication if and when it is needed to bridge linguistic gaps, but its neutrality has been forsaken and its general use as one of two Ukrainian languages has been severely diminished.

Geeraerts' romantic cultural model of standardization submitted that standard languages are inextricable from the culture they represent and that in a multilingual society, people use

different languages to express various conceptions of their own identities. The romantic model is oppositional to the rationalist model in several ways. First, the romantic model holds that standard languages are inherently biased and facilitate the subjugation of anyone who is not in a position of power. The paradigm points out that the process of language standardization almost always originates in a region that is economically, culturally, or otherwise more powerful than those around it. Such was the case when the rulers of the Tsardom of Muscovy eradicated and/or Russianized Ukrainian Church Slavonic, Ruthenian, and the new literary Ukrainian language in the seventeenth century and when Little Russian (Ukrainian) was banned from use in the Russian Empire. Later, the Soviet Union's occupation of western Ukraine in 1921 similarly enabled the linguistic standardization of ethnic Ukrainians who had never before been exposed to Russian. Just as the romantic model prescribes, the very existence of the Russian language in Ukraine is a relic of Russian dominion and linguistic subjugation—a truth that has been exacerbated by the war and which is oppositional to geographic neutrality. One article analyzed in this study quoted an official on the Kharkiv City Council as saying, "Russia has transformed the Russian language into a tool for actualizing 'Russkiy Mir'"—in other words, Russia sees any place where its titular language is spoken as a rightful part of its territory. Russian has become synonymous not only with the Russian Federation, but with Russian aggression. In keeping with the criteria of standard languages according to the romantic model, the use of Russian connotes speakers' political identity and allegiances.

The romantic model acknowledges that in practice, standard languages are typically used in contexts that bestow upon them a certain level of privilege; namely, they are often employed in educational, political, and administrative settings that are hardly socially neutral, like the rationalist model prescribes. Again, the Russian invasion has prompted the language's exclusion

from these contexts, even in eastern Ukraine. One major theme identified across the corpus was the war's impacts on language in educational contexts. All over the country, the Russian language and Russian culture have been written out of educational curricula. In Kharkiv, officials reported that they were "outraged" by the discovery that the Russian language and Russian literature were being taught in state schools. In the same vein, officials who fail to adhere to the law prohibiting the use of Russian in official capacities have been condemned by their superiors and threatened with fines, as was reported in a *Kharkiv Today* article from spring 2022. The active exclusion of the Russian language from these privileged societal domains, especially in eastern Ukraine, where its use was frequently promoted over the titular language until early 2022, is damning to its already-threatened standard language status.

The final critical element of the romantic model is its view of language as a vehicle of identity expression rather than communication. The content of the corpus makes evident the fact that this is the predominant perception of the Russian language across Ukraine, as enmity toward Russia and the general belief that use of the Russian language is equivocal to support for the invasion has been the driving force behind changing linguistic practices in the months following Russia's military campaign.

Geeraerts (2016) attempted to show that in multilingual contexts, standard languages can usually be defined according to one of two oppositional paradigms: the rationalist model or the romantic model. The data presented in this study showed that changing language practices since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 have resulted in Russian failing to meet the criteria of a standard language according to either model.

The Determinist Model

Kudriavtseva (2021) submitted that the language situation in mid-2010s Ukraine displayed the characteristics of linguistic determinism as based on a distorted view of Geeraerts' romantic model. Like the romantic paradigm, linguistic determinism views language as an identity marker and understands its use to be an expression of self to a greater extent than it is a tool of communication. However, unlike the models submitted by Geeraerts (2016), linguistic determinism has only two central tenets, which Kudriavtseva (2021) identified as the spiritual and elitist stances. According to the spiritual stance, languages communicate the morality, worldview, and ways of thought of their speakers. The elitist stance submits that language is standardized according to linguistic ideals as held by its elite speakers who decide what makes their language "pure" and which in the case of Ukrainian, according to Kudriavtseva (2021), has resulted in a language that is less purely Ukrainian than it is anti-Russian. Kudriavtseva argued that this view of the relationship between language and identity underlaid the passage of laws regarding the use of the Russian language in educational settings in Ukraine in the 2010s.

This evokes the issue that has been at the heart of Ukraine's national identity debate for decades: in Ukraine, language is fundamentally perceived as an extension of one's worldview, and that is why glottopolitical tensions have run so high in the era of Ukrainian independence. This is also what catalyzed such widespread language shift in the wake of Russia's invasion. Kudriavtseva claimed that the federal legislation that mandated that Ukrainian be used as the instructional language in almost all educational settings was predicated on the government's belief that Russian-language education reinforced a pro-Russian worldview. By the same logic, Ukrainian-language education was likelier to produce adult citizens who were sympathetic to Ukrainian ideals. In the months after Russia's invasion, newspapers reported extensively on

Russian-speaking Ukrainians' disavowal of the Russian language in myriad social contexts. Numerous articles reported on Russian language bans in education, the service sector, and other public domains. Additional data extracted from the corpus outlined efforts in historically Russian-speaking cities to bolster residents' knowledge of the Ukrainian language and culture, while several pieces discussed the voluntary shift away from Russian in Ukraine's entertainment sector, where artists recognize that the market for Russian-language content has evaporated almost overnight. The data presented in this study suggests that ultimately, these changes in Russophone Ukrainians' language practices are born out of a belief that language is akin to identity and as such, the use of Russian is tantamount to anti-Ukrainian ideology.

Data-Based Findings

The corpus analysis revealed the relationship between the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and changing language attitudes and practices in the country. Changing attitudes toward language as a result of the ongoing war were primarily observed in eastern Ukraine, where Russian remained dominant in the aftermath of numerous major political events, including Ukrainian independence, Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea, and the Russian Spring, only to lose its privileged status immediately when Russia resumed its attack on Ukraine in February 2022.

Independent Ukraine's language situation has often been described as simply bilingual or diglossic without regard for the complexities that both define the country's linguistic ecology and result from it. Terminological inadequacies aside, in 1991, the citizens of newly independent Ukraine were linguistically heterogenous. Einar Haugen wrote in *Dialect, Language, Nation* that a single standard language is a requisite for the development of a national identity. In the absence

of an agreed-upon conception of nationhood, a country is vulnerable both to internal clashes over identity and outside influences.

Haugen's standardization framework was conceived with a monolingual context in mind and as such did not seem imminently applicable to independent Ukraine. However, the corpus data revealed that in the wake of the 2022 invasion, the titular language has started to undergo the processes of standardization in eastern and southern Ukraine that Haugen's model outlined while the use of Russian drastically decreased. Furthermore, when Russian was examined within the framework of Geeraerts' multilingual models of standard languages according to its current use in eastern Ukraine, it was revealed that the language failed to meet the criteria for a standard language. While Russian remains accessible to most Ukrainians, especially in eastern and southern Ukraine, the Russian invasion has stripped it of the neutrality that a standard language requires.

Nor did Russian meet the requirements for a standard language according to Geeraerts' romantic model. However, the analysis of the data according to those measures did reveal how Ukrainians primarily perceive language as an indicator of identity rather than as a tool of communication, which in turn shed light on why Ukrainian has undergone the process of standardization as a result of the war.

Finally, the data revealed the extent to which changing language practices and attitudes since the onset of the Russian invasion in February have been motivated by a belief in linguistic determinism. Ukrainians' evident view that language is primarily a facet of identity rather than a communicative tool reveals why it has so often been weaponized for political gain and why a single conception of national identity remained out of reach for Ukraine until Russian irredentist actions transformed the language from an identity marker into an emblem of existential threat.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

The idea of monolingualism as a form of resistance to Russia's imperial legacy has long been discussed within Ukraine's private and professional circles (Kudriavtseva, 2021). Proponents of the idea have long argued that beyond expanding the use and power of the Ukrainian language, a shift to monolingualism would promote national unity by reinforcing a singular conception of national identity (Kudriavtseva, 2021). Historically, monolingualism has never seemed like a viable option for Ukraine, a former Soviet republic where much of the population (particularly in eastern and southern Ukraine) retained a preference for Russian after the fall of the USSR and where glottopolitical tensions have long run high. However, in light of Russia's most recent military assault on Ukraine, which began in February 2022 and remains ongoing, a drastic shift in language practices has occurred. A new perception of Russian as the "language of the enemy" has resulted in widespread language shift whereby formerly Russian-speaking Ukrainians have begun using Ukrainian as the language of daily life in order to distance themselves from their country's assailant.

Why has the standardization of Ukrainian only now gained momentum in the regions of Ukraine where Russian predominated for centuries? According to Taras Kuzio, the failure of the Novorossiya project in 2015 was a death blow for the conception of Ukrainian national identity that was founded on belief in a shared Russian-Ukrainian culture and history—what Shulman (2005) coined the eastern Slavic national identity complex. The findings of this paper demonstrate that a new conception of Ukrainian nationhood formed in its absence, which embodied the same values as the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex with regard to culture and history, but which recognized Russian as a Ukrainian language. Although the Novorossiya project damaged the Ukrainian public's opinion of the Russian government and

military, adherents to this new notion of Ukrainian identity—primary Ukrainian Russophones—saw the Russian language as separate from its titular nation and the atrocities it had committed against Ukraine. As such, attitudes toward the Russian language changed only slightly, allowing for a new Ukrainian identity to develop that espoused the same negative views of the Russian Federation as the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex, but justified Ukrainians' right to use the Russian language as their primary tool of communication. Between 2015 and 2022, conceptions of Ukrainian national identity took two forms: the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex defined by Shulman and a new Russophone Ukrainian national identity complex.

When Ukraine gained independence in 1991, the two identity complexes left vying for control of the national narrative remained in such fierce competition because both held legitimacy gained over centuries of development. Western Ukraine underwent its nation-building process in the nineteenth century while under the governance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the leaders of which permitted the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian identity to develop freely (Kuzio, 2019). When the region was seized by the Soviets in the early twentieth century, the concept of a shared Russian-Ukrainian historical narrative was new to its occupants. To them, the notion was merely another example of Soviet propaganda and was therefore excluded from the region's identity development during the communist era. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, western Ukrainians viewed independence as a chance to live in a country that was culturally, historically, and linguistically independent from Russia, as they had prior to 1921. Across the region, citizens abandoned Soviet ideals and the Russian language, which they saw as a symbol of their former oppressor and reverted to the language and cultural practices that Soviet policies had disavowed. This ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex embodied Western values and

since 1991, western Ukrainians have fought to center the national narrative around this conception of identity.

In eastern Ukraine, the dissolution of the Soviet Union did not catalyze language shift because centuries russification and language standardization had secured a place for Russian linguistic and cultural practices in the eastern Ukrainian national identity. Therefore, when Ukraine gained independence, eastern Ukrainians saw no reason to change their cultural identity or language practices, as for them, the language they spoke was just as much a part of Ukrainian identity as the titular language. By the same logic, the Soviet empire's collapse had no negative effects on eastern Ukrainians' acceptance of the idea of the Russian-Ukrainian fraternal relationship, and citizens have vied to have their Russian-Ukrainian culture espoused in Ukraine's national identity narrative since the end of the Soviet era.

However, Russia's assault on eastern Ukraine during the annexation of Crimea and Russian Spring irreparably damaged the Russian-Ukrainian relationship on which the eastern Slavic national identity complex was predicated. In particular, those events revealed that the long-venerated fraternity between Russians and Ukrainians was not seen by Russia as an equal partnership. Rather, it symbolized Russian imperial power and Ukrainian subjugation. This betrayal resulted in the dissolution of the eastern Slavic national identity complex in the mid-2010s.

While the Crimean annexation and Russian Spring proved fatal to any remaining familial ties between Russia and Ukraine and marred many Ukrainians' personal attitudes toward Russia, most people's positions on the Russian language remained unchanged in the aftermath, as reported by Kulyk (2016). This necessitated the development of a new Ukrainian concept of nationhood that embodied the same values as the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex

while still allowing for its adherents' use of Russian. Thus, the Russophone Ukrainian national identity complex was born.

Ultimately, however, this new conception of nationhood lacked the historical legitimacy needed to survive against a renewed Russian attack. When Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the objective of the war was clear: Vladimir Putin wished to "reclaim" Ukraine and successfully realize the aims of the Novorossiya project that had failed in 2014. With Ukrainian sovereignty once again under attack, the Russian language—the last vestige of Russian-Ukrainian solidarity—ceased to be compatible with any conception of Ukrainian national identity. Just like the eastern Slavic national identity complex that preceded it, the Russophone Ukrainian national identity complex disappeared and was replaced by Ukrainian enmity toward Russia and the Russian language. Whereas western Ukraine has long viewed the Russian language as both a symbol and tool of subjugation, eastern Ukrainians' recent repudiation of Russian as the "language of the aggressor" and a "weapon against Ukrainian identity" and the community's resultant acceptance of Ukrainian as the new language of communication is a direct result of Russia's military aggression and likely would not have happened—at least right now—had it not been for Russia's recent invasion of Ukraine.

Haugen expressed the need for a single national language as part of the national ideal. He emphasized that the single language should be the nation's own and that this is in fact a requisite for citizens' loyalty (1966). The question of Russian-speaking Ukrainians' devotion to their country is empirical; however, the events of 2014, 2015, and 2022 suggest a strong connection to the Ukrainian homeland that endures in the face of turmoil. Their willingness to change their language practices speaks to this; as Haugen wrote in *Dialect, Language, Nation,* the linguistic re-education of a population is no small undertaking; it requires immense effort as well as a

willingness to suffer through the disruption of cultural unity. To not only withstand this but to readily submit to it, especially at a time when one's nation is faced with an existential threat, speaks emphatically to Ukrainian commitment to the national ideal.

Having evaluated the historical foundations of the two national identity complexes that competed for acceptance in Ukraine post-independence and their the glottopolitical foundations and implications, this thesis demonstrated how and why Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine has impacted Ukrainian language practices to such a great extent, and why that language shift finally pushed the country into a period wherein the ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex is accepted as the national narrative.

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