Transient Execution Emulator

Meltdown and Spectre Behind the Scenes

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Structure

- Topic
- Background
- Our task & approach
- Implementation
- Demos:
  - Meltdown
  - Spectre
- Conclusion

Topic

- Lab builds on SCA lecture
- Meltdown and Spectre mostly patched
- Difficult to experiment with
  - Personal computer often times not usable
- Goal: Vulnerable CPU Emulator that runs on many systems
  - Should offer a gdb-like interface

Background

CPU

- Frontend:
  - Fetches/Decodes instructions, maintains queue
  - Branch prediction
- Execution Engine:
  - Multiple sets of execution units
- Memory Subsystem:
  - Handles memory operations
  - Maintains L1 cache
  - Ensures data is loaded from other caches/memory

Out-of-order execution

- Independent instruction streams
- Tomasulo algorithm:
  - Reservation stations
  - Common Data Bus
- Rollbacks

Speculative execution

- Predict results of branch instructions
- Prevent stalls
- BPU maintains counters
- Rollbacks

Meltdown

- Abuses out-of-order execution
- Meltdown-US-L1:
  - Define oracle array
  - Perform illegal read to steal secret
  - Embded secret-dependent oracle entry into cache
  - Await rollback and measure oracle access times
- Small time window

Spectre

- Abuses speculative execution
- Different variations. Here: prediction of conditional branch instrs.
- Spectre v1: Deliberately train BPU used by victim process
- Make victim leak secret into cache
- Direct consequence of speculative execution

Mitigations: Meltdown

- Disable out-of-order execution
- Intel's microcode mitigation
  - Microprograms
- OS mitigations

Mitigations: Spectre

- Disable speculative execution:
    - Completely disable
    - fence instructions
- Flush entire cache after rollback

Our task

- Develop graphical CPU emulator vulnerable to:
  - Our version of Meltdown-US-L1
  - Spectre v1
- Must support single step, out-of-order, and speculative execution
- Implement Intel's microcode mitigation
- Other mitigations via microprograms
- Target audience: SCA students
  - Or anyone with basic knowledge of TE attacks

Our approach

How we started

- Must-haves, nice-to-haves, future work
- At time of Meltdown/Spectre publication: Skylake
- Filter components needed for our Meltdown/Spectre versions
- Build simplified CPU

Our version



CPU
Frontend
BPU
Instr. Q
Memory Subsystem
Memory
Cache
Execution Engine
Unified RS

Implementation of our emulator

Implementation of our emulator

- overview over our whole emulator
- out-of-order execution
- speculative execution
- fault handling and rollbacks

CPU class


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Parser

- assembler style source code
- arithmetic, branch and memory instructions, fence, rtdsc
- provides an instruction list
- only one type of instructions

CPU components



Out-of-order execution

- Execution Engine
- Tomasulos algorithm
  - unified reservation station
  - instructions wait for their operands
  - keeping track of operands and results

Issuing instructions

- resolve operands and target register
- two kinds of register values: Word and SlotID
- put register content into operand list
- put SlotID into target register

Example Reservation Station

----------[Reservation Stations]--------------

0	addi r1, r0, 0x3	0x0000	0x0003	☑
1	slli r2, r1, 0x8	0x0003	0x0008	☐
2	addi r2, r2, 0x42	RS 001	0x0042	☐
3	sw r2, r0, 0x4	RS 002	0x0000	☐
4	lb r4, r0, 0x5	0x0000	0x0005	☐

Common Data Bus (CDB)

- execute instructions in reservation station
- broadcast the result over the CDB
  - registers
  - reservation station slots
  - at most once per cycle

Speculative execution

- predict outcome of branch instructions
- resume execution based on this prediction
- two central components
  - branch prediction unit (BPU)
  - CPU frontend with instruction queue

Branch Prediction Unit (BPU)

- simplified version
- array of predictions
- 2-bit-saturating counter to handle predictions

CPU frontend with instruction queue

- interface btw. instruction list and execution unit
- especially wrt speculative execution
- manages instruction queue



Faults and Rollbacks

- microarchitectural fault situation that has to be handled bevore we can resume our execution
    - mispredicted branches
    - attempt to access inaccessible memory
- have to handle the effects of transient execution

Rollback

- only rollback the register state and the memory contents
- no rollback in Cache and BPU
- restore register state via snapshots
- prevent memory rollbacks by executing stores in-order
- handle faults in program order

Rollback after mispredicted branch

```
-------[ Program ]------------[ Queue ]----------[ Reservation Stations ]---------

  0 addi  r1, r0, 0x3          ► rdtsc r0 ►
  1 slli  r2, r1, 0x8
  2 addi  r2, r2, 0x42
  3 sw    r2, r0, 0x4
  4 lb    r4, r0, 0x5
  5 addi  r3, r0, 0x83e8
  6 lb    r3, r3, 0x1
  7 fence
  8 subi  r4, r4, 0x1
  9 beq   r4, r0, 8
 10 rdtsc r0

Prediction error at 9: beq r4, r0, 8 (predicted branch taken)
►
```

Thank you for your attention

Do you have any questions so far?

Demo

Demo - Meltdown

```
lb r1, r0, 0xc000
slli r1, r1, 4
lb r2, r1, 0x1000
```

Encode byte into oracle array

```
fence
addi r1, r0, 0
addi r2, r0, 0xFFFF
addi r3, r0, 0x0000
addi r4, r0, 0x0FF0
```

r1	r2	r3	r4
shortest load	shortest load time	current offset	last offset

```
probe:
fence
rdtsc r5
lb r7, r3, 0x1000
fence
rdtsc r6
sub r5, r6, r5
```

Measure access time

```
bgtu r5, r2, skip
addi r1, r3, 0
addi r2, r5, 0
skip:
```

update shortest

```
addi r3, r3, 0x10
bgeu r4, r3, probe
```

increment and loop

```
srli r1, r1, 4
```

shift result

Spectre-Type Attack Demo

- Demonstrate mechanism behind Spectre-type attacks
- BPU can be trained for targeted misprediction
- Requires code sequence that encodes leaked value into cache

Spectre-Type Attack: Overview

- Prepare victim array: 8 elements, all zero
  - Followed by secret value `0x41`
- Victim loops over the array and encodes each value in the cache
  - BPU is trained to predict that the loop continues
- Final loop condition will be mispredicted
  - During transient execution: Additional iteration with out-of-bounds index
  - Secret value accessed and encoded into cache

Spectre-Type Attack: Preparation

```
// Set up array at 0x1000, 8 elements, all zero
addi r1, r0, 0x1000
sb r0, r1, 0
sb r0, r1, 1
sb r0, r1, 2
sb r0, r1, 3
sb r0, r1, 4
sb r0, r1, 5
sb r0, r1, 6
sb r0, r1, 7
// Followed by one out-of-bounds 0x41 value
addi r2, r0, 0x41
sb r2, r1, 8
```

Spectre-Type Attack: Execution

```
// Loop over array, encode every value in cache
addi r2, r0, 0    // r2: Loop index
addi r3, r0, 8    // r3: Array length
loop:
// Load array element
lb r4, r2, 0x1000
// Encode value in cache
slli r4, r4, 4
lb r4, r4, 0x2000
// Increment loop index
addi r2, r2, 1
fence
// Loop while index is in bounds
bne r2, r3, loop
```

Attack Demo

Spectre-Type Attack: Mitigation

- Flush cache after rollback
- Prevents using cache as transmission channel
- Implementation: Inject microcode after rollback
  - Inject `flushall` instruction after mispredicted branch

Mitigation Demo

Conclusion

- Goal: CPU Emulator
  - Out-of-Order Execution
  - Branch Prediction
  - Transient Execution Attacks
  - Mitigations

Further Work

References

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