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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re NICOLE H., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JEFF H. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

B244779

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. CK95126)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Philip Soto, Judge. Affirmed.

Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Jeff H.

Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Teresa F.

John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Appellants Teresa F. (Mother) and Jeff H. (Father) appeal the juvenile court's dispositional order removing their then 12-year old daughter, Nicole H., from their custody. Father also appeals the court's jurisdictional findings, and asserts that the original removal order was not properly issued because it was signed by a referee only. Father further contends that the court abused its discretion by ordering that he participate in drug and alcohol testing, an anger management program, and individual counseling. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The family came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) on June 12, 2012.¹ A referral had been made alleging emotional abuse of Nicole, neglect due to drug use (marijuana), and violent behavior on the part of Father toward a mentally disabled person. At the time, Mother and Nicole were living in one bedroom of a three bedroom house in Whittier. The owner, Michael Veronin, lived in another bedroom, and roommate Jill Lippincott rented the third bedroom. Michael Veronin's brother, William, lived in a shed on the property.²

After multiple unsuccessful attempts to contact the family, including stopping by the Whittier house and leaving her a card and a letter, the caseworker arranged a family interview on June 21. Mother denied any drug use and agreed to submit to an on-demand drug test. She stated that Father had not been living with

¹ There had been prior referrals in 1998, 2002, and 2006. The 2006 referral was for physical abuse of Nicole by Father. Before it could be investigated, Mother moved to Chino and the matter was reassigned to San Bernardino County, where it was closed as unfounded.

² William Veronin is mentally disabled due to schizophrenia and paranoia. Because they share a surname, the brothers will be referred to by their first names.

her and Nicole for three or four months. Father concurred that he was not living in the household.³ He denied having a drug history and denied smoking marijuana. He stated that his only criminal conviction, for robbery and mayhem, had occurred long before.⁴ He denied any physical altercations with William. He also submitted to an on-demand drug test.⁵ The caseworker interviewed Nicole, who denied any drug or alcohol use in the home, and denied witnessing any fighting between her parents or between Father and William. Nicole said she was never left unsupervised by her parents and that she felt safe at home with Mother. Nicole was not detained.

On the day of her visit to the home, the caseworker had been unable to access the housemates' bedrooms or the garage because Mother did not have the keys. Mother agreed to make arrangements for the caseworker to return on another day to inspect those areas. On June 25, before the home re-inspection could occur, Mother's housemates, Michael Veronin and Jill Lippincott, and a third party, Jerry Miller, went to DCFS's office to meet with the caseworker and provide information about the family. Michael reported that Father lived at the Whittier house and had moved into the garage without Michael's consent. Michael felt intimidated by Father due to his demeanor and verbal threats. Father had once said to Michael, "If I go down, you go down with me." Michael said that Father had hit William "a number of times." Michael further reported that he and his brother

³ At the first hearing in this matter, Father and Mother reported having the same address. Father has never provided an alternate address.

⁴ According to records subsequently located by the caseworker, Father had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine in 1993, and arrested for being in possession of a controlled substance twice in 1995 and once in 2008. In addition, his record reflected convictions for attempted murder in 1987 and burglary in 1997.

⁵ Both Mother's and Father's tests were negative. Father subsequently provided a second negative test, administered on June 22.

William were current users of methamphetamine supplied by Father, and that Father and Mother were current users of methamphetamine, as well as marijuana. Michael was aware that Nicole had found “smoking pipes” in the home.⁶

Lippincott also reported having observed Father engage in violent behavior toward William, sometimes in Nicole’s presence. She reported that Mother and Father used drugs -- marijuana and methamphetamine. She based this on having seen dealers drop by the garage, having smelled drugs when she passed by, and having seen paraphernalia and lines of white powder in the bathrooms. Lippincott claimed that both Mother and Father had threatened her, and said that Nicole had been missing a considerable amount of school. She expressed concern that Nicole may have been coached prior to being interviewed by the caseworker.

Miller reported that Father had a violent temper and also reported seeing Father physically abuse William in Nicole’s presence. Miller further stated that he had witnessed Mother and Father smoking methamphetamine with a pipe. He believed Mother and Father had used drugs immediately after testing for the caseworker because they had locked themselves in the garage that night.

On June 27, the caseworker returned to the home and learned that Miller, his girlfriend, and her child had moved into the living room of the home, and that Nicole had been sent to stay with a family friend and then with maternal aunt Leticia R., who lived in Ontario. In addition, Jacqueline G., Mother’s adult daughter and Nicole’s half-sibling, had arrived in the area and advised the

⁶ Michael denied that he or William used drugs in the presence of Nicole. According to Michael, in 2011, while Father was living there but before Mother moved in, the home had been raided by the police due to the presence of drugs, and that there were “wors[e] elements” living in the home at that time.

caseworker of her plan to take Nicole to live with her in Arizona.⁷ On this occasion, the parents refused to submit to an on-demand drug test.

On July 5, and again on August 16, 2012, the caseworker submitted applications and declarations for authorization for removal of Nicole, which resulted in the issuance of removal orders.⁸ Despite several attempts between July 5 and August 17, the caseworker was unable to locate Mother and Father to serve them. She subsequently heard that Jacqueline had taken Nicole to Arizona.⁹ On August 17, Mother was served. She indicated her willingness to move out of the Whittier house and be with Nicole on her own. In the meantime, the caseworker had been in contact with Jacqueline, who had agreed to return Nicole to California

⁷ Jacqueline reported that her biological father and Mother had abused drugs during her childhood, causing the family to become homeless. After Jacqueline's biological father was imprisoned, Mother got together with Father, whom Jacqueline believed to be a drug dealer. Father had been verbally abusive to Jacqueline during her childhood.

⁸ There are three removal orders in the original record, two dated July 5, 2012, and one dated August 16, 2012. One of the July 5 removal orders was signed by a referee (Donna Levin) only. The other July 5 removal order was signed by both a judge (R. Diaz) and a referee (Donna Levin). That order stated it was good for 10 days and was apparently never served. The August 16 order in the original record was signed by a referee (Sheri Sobel) only. We granted respondent's motion to augment the record to include a version of the August 16 order that had also been signed that same day by a judge (Tim Saito). Subsequently, we granted Father's motion to augment to include the version of the August 16 order served on Mother on August 17, 2012. It was the version signed by Referee Sobel only.

The orders provided DCFS with authority to "enter the child's location . . . in order to serve the authorization to remove the child, take the child into protective custody, and deliver the child to the appropriate Los Angeles County child welfare agency representative."

⁹ Mother and Father had signed a document purporting to give Jacqueline temporary custody. During this period, a caseworker contacted Mother and Father and inquired whether they would be willing to participate in voluntary family maintenance services. They declined the offer, contending there was no need because Nicole was not living with them. They also said they were planning to move to Orange County.

once the court issued a removal order and Mother was served. On August 21, Jacqueline surrendered custody of Nicole to the maternal aunt Leticia. On August 22, DCFS filed a petition seeking assertion of jurisdiction over Nicole under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.¹⁰

At the detention hearing on August 22, 2012, the court ordered Nicole detained from her parents and granted DCFS discretion to place the child with any appropriate relative or extended family member.¹¹ Mother objected to the detention and asked the court to release Nicole to her or, at a minimum, to permit unmonitored visitation. The court denied her requests.

The family was re-interviewed for the jurisdictional report. Nicole continued to deny having witnessed Father engage in violent altercations with anyone or having witnessed any drug use by her parents. However, she had observed Lippincott and Miller smoking marijuana and found a glass pipe in Miller's belongings, which she gave to Father. She had heard her parents arguing with Miller about the pipe and with Miller and Lippincott about their using drugs in front of her. She also recalled Mother getting into an altercation with a friend of Lippincott's named Crystal, during which Crystal struck Mother. Nicole stated that she had been sent to live outside the Whittier home when DCFS began investigating the referral because her parents did not want DCFS to intervene.

Mother continued to deny drug use on her part or Father's and to deny observing any violence between Father and William. She reported that on the occasion of her altercation with Crystal, Crystal had been drinking and smoking methamphetamine and marijuana. Father continued to deny having engaged in violent behavior with anyone. He reported that in June 2012, Crystal had gotten

¹⁰ Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

¹¹ DCFS formally placed her with Leticia.

into an argument with Mother after drinking and using drugs, but he did not believe Nicole had witnessed the incident. He claimed that Lippincott was making false allegations against him and Mother because they had confronted her over her and Crystal's drug use.¹² He denied using drugs at any point in his life. When confronted with the record of his conviction, Father claimed he had just been "holding" methamphetamine for a friend.

Mother's sister Leticia reported that Mother had had a drug problem for 20 years, beginning with marijuana and progressing to cocaine and methamphetamine. Leticia believed Father also had a history of marijuana, cocaine and methamphetamine use going back many years. Leticia had no personal knowledge of current drug use by Mother or Father or anyone else in the Whittier house. She had learned that Nicole had missed or was tardy 50 days during the prior school year.

Jacqueline reported that when she had lived with Mother and Father during her childhood, she had regularly engaged in verbal arguments with Father. She had not been physically abused, but once Father threatened to "kill her and bury her in the desert." At that time, Mother had a problem with methamphetamine abuse, and Jacqueline believed she received her supply from Father. Mother and Father did not use drugs in front of her, but Jacqueline had noticed methamphetamine or cocaine residue or "lines" around the house and described Mother and Father as often "zoned out." Neither seemed to care if she went to school or what else she did, even if she stayed out all night. Jacqueline had little

¹² Father subsequently claimed the caseworker had misrepresented what he had said in the interview. He denied knowledge that anyone in the home had been using drugs prior to Nicole finding the pipe, which he claimed had occurred shortly before he and Mother had sent her to live elsewhere.

knowledge of what had transpired in the Whittier house, but when she visited, it was “filthy” and Mother seemed disoriented, paranoid and angry.

The caseworker noted that “fleeing and changing jurisdictions” to avoid DCFS investigation of the family’s circumstances had been a tactic used by the parents in the past, and stated that she was doubtful the parents had removed Nicole from the house for her safety or that they had only recently become aware of their housemates’ drug use. The caseworker also expressed concern with respect to the parents’ “complete and total denial of any substance abuse issues,” which would cause them to be “resistant to making any sort of positive change in their lives.” The caseworker found Father’s credibility, particularly with respect to his drug use, to be “poor at best.” DCFS recommended that Nicole be detained and that the parents receive reunification services.

At the jurisdictional hearing on September 24 and October 12, 2012, Mother acceded to jurisdiction. Father contested. He testified that he had lived in the house prior to September 2011, and had moved out when Mother and Nicole moved in. He denied ever using methamphetamine or marijuana. He stated that when he learned Nicole had found a drug pipe in the house, he destroyed it and moved her out of the house.

The court found true that Mother had an unresolved history of substance abuse which rendered her periodically unable to care for Nicole; that Father had a history of illicit drug use and of convictions for possession of controlled substances, and was a current user of methamphetamine and marijuana; and that on prior occasions, Mother and Father possessed, used, and were under the influence of methamphetamine and marijuana while Nicole was in their care. It found that drug pipes had been found in the home, within access of Nicole, “creat[ing] a

detrimental and endangering home environment [for her].”¹³ In addition, the court found that Mother and Father created a detrimental and endangering home environment for Nicole by allowing unrelated adults whom the parents knew abused illicit drugs to reside in or frequent the home (referring to William and Michael Veronin and Jill Lippincott). The court specifically found that these adults had used drugs in Nicole’s presence.¹⁴

At the hearing, the court acknowledged that there was “some shaky evidence with regards to some of the witnesses,” but stated that there was enough from other witnesses and strong circumstantial evidence to support the sustained allegations: “Under the circumstances where all of these drugs are in the house, where the child is in the house, where the parents are connected with the house by either living there or being there frequently enough and being found with drug paraphernalia, such as a drug pipe, from those bits of direct evidence we’re able to put together by circumstantial evidence proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”

Turning to disposition, the court ordered Nicole removed from her parents’ custody. Mother was directed to participate in a drug and alcohol program, weekly drug and alcohol testing, and individual counseling to address child safety and protection. Father was ordered to participate in a drug and alcohol program, random drug testing, an anger management program, parenting classes, and individual counseling.¹⁵ Both parents appealed.

¹³ The court found that it had been Father who created that environment.

¹⁴ At the request of DCFS, an allegation that Father had a history of engaging in violent altercations with William in the presence of Nicole or struck William in Nicole’s presence were stricken, as were allegations that Mother had failed to protect Nicole by allowing Father to reside in the home and have unlimited access to her.

¹⁵ Father protested that he was spending \$300 per week in fuel costs to visit and participate in the ordered programs and stated that participation was interfering with his treatment for a “life-threatening disease.” He did not identify the nature of the illness.

DISCUSSION

A. Removal Order

Father contends that the court's pre-petition removal order was procedurally invalid because it was not signed by a judge, and that it was substantively unsupported because there was no evidence of an immediate need to detain Nicole. For the reasons discussed, we disagree.

As the Fourth Amendment guarantees that “parents will not be separated from their children without due process of law except in emergencies,” social workers “may remove a child from the custody of its parent without prior judicial authorization only if the information they possess at the time of the seizure is such as provides reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury.” (*Moodian v. County of Alameda Social Services Agency* (2002) 206 F.Supp.2d 1030, 1033, 1034, quoting *Wallis v. Spencer* (9th Cir. 2000) 202 F.3d 1126, 1138; accord, *M.L. v. Superior Court* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 520, 527 [“Social workers constitutionally may remove a child from the custody of a parent without prior judicial authorization if the information they possess at the time of seizure provides reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger.”]; see § 306 [social worker may take temporary custody of minor without warrant if he or she has reasonable cause to believe minor “is in immediate danger of physical or sexual abuse or the physical environment poses an immediate threat to the child’s health or safety”].) Here, Nicole was not in imminent danger as she had been taken to Arizona by her half-sister Jacqueline and was not then residing with her parents. Accordingly, the caseworker appropriately sought and obtained a court order prior to detaining Nicole.

Section 249 provides that “[n]o order of a referee removing a minor from his home shall become effective until expressly approved by a judge of the juvenile

court.’” The Supreme Court has said that “[t]he requirement of approval by a juvenile court judge derives from the constitutional mandate that referees are restricted to performing “subordinate judicial duties.’”” (*In re Clifford C.* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1085, 1089, quoting Cal. Const., art. VI, § 22.)

Father contends the removal order was “void from its inception” and “did not provide a legal basis for [Nicole’s] removal,” because the copy of the August 16 order in the original clerk’s transcript signed by Referee Sobel did not contain a judge’s signature. However, respondent augmented the record with a copy of a removal order that had been approved and signed by Judge Saito on the same day it was approved and signed by Referee Sobel. Father questions its authenticity, but counsel for respondent represented that it was a true and correct copy of the removal order. We see no reason to doubt that it is genuine.

Moreover, as the court held in *In re Jesse W.* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, the failure to comply with section 249 is not a fundamental jurisdictional defect rendering the removal order or any subsequent orders void. (*In re Jesse W.*, *supra*, at pp. 358-359.) “[T]he statute says a referee’s removal order is not ‘effective’ until approved by a judge (§ 249); it does not say the order is ‘void’ or ‘invalid’ if not approved.” (*Id.* at p. 357.) “Because a referee acts ‘with the same powers as a judge of the juvenile court’ (§ 248), with or without a judge countersigning, and the countersignature does not reflect substantive review by the judge but only attests to the order’s authenticity [citation],” the court “reject[ed] the notion that lack of compliance with section 249 deprives a referee of fundamental jurisdiction and, in turn, invalidates further orders in the proceedings.” (*Id.* at p. 359.)

Father presented evidence that the copy of the order served on Mother on August 17 did not contain a judicial signature. However, he advances no argument to support that he or Mother was prejudiced by this omission. The augmented record reflects that the order had been signed by a judge on August 16 and thus

was “““effective””” or legally operative prior to being served on Mother. (See *In re John H.* (1978) 21 Cal.3d 18, 26.) The served order gave Mother notice that DCFS intended to remove Nicole from her custody and provided all the information she needed to seek a hearing before a judge challenging the removal. The missing judicial signature did not deprive her of any procedural or substantive right.

Father contends there was no need to remove or detain Nicole at all because in July and August, she was safely with her half-sister in Arizona. While Nicole may not have been at risk of imminent harm, there was evidence she had been sent to Arizona not for her safety, but simply to thwart DCFS’s investigation. Indeed, this is what Nicole reported to DCFS. Given Mother’s past history of removing Nicole from the jurisdiction during an investigation of abuse, the court was entitled to conclude Nicole remained at risk while in her parents’ legal custody.

B. *Jurisdiction*

In order to assert jurisdiction over a minor, the juvenile court must find that he or she falls within one or more of the categories specified in section 300. (*In re Veronica G.* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 179, 185.) DCFS bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the minor comes under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. (*Ibid.*; *In re Shelley J.* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.) “We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for sufficiency of the evidence.

[Citations.] We review the record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusions, and we resolve all conflicts and make all reasonable inferences from the evidence to uphold the court’s orders, if possible. [Citation.]” (*In re David M.* (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 828.) A finding is not supported by substantial evidence if it is based solely on

unreasonable inferences, speculation, or conjecture. (*In re H.B.* (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 115, 120.)

Section 300, subdivision (b) permits the court to adjudge a child a dependent of the juvenile court where: “The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, . . . or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s . . . substance abuse.” A true finding under subdivision (b) requires proof of: “(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” (*In re Rocco M.* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.)

Mother acceded to jurisdiction on the grounds asserted in the petition. Father contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s jurisdictional findings as they pertain to him. He asserts that there was no substantial evidence that he currently used or abused drugs, that he did so in the presence of Nicole, or that any drug use caused him to neglect Nicole. Moreover, he contends that to the extent the jurisdictional findings were based on the actions of other adults in the household, he could not be held responsible because he had separated from Mother and moved out.

There was substantial evidence that Father had a long-term drug problem and was currently using drugs. Father’s lengthy criminal record reflected a conviction for possession of methamphetamine in 1993 and arrests for being in possession of controlled substances on three more recent occasions. Jacqueline stated that Father had used drugs when she lived with him. Leticia had stated that

Father and Mother had a long-term history of using drugs that continued throughout their relationship. William reported that police had raided the house because of the presence of drugs in 2011, when Father was living there without Mother and Nicole. Miller and Lippincott both stated that they had observed Father using methamphetamine and marijuana at the Whittier house. Father claims these witnesses were unreliable and points to the evidence that he tested clean on two occasions. We cannot discount the witnesses' statements as we do not judge credibility on appeal. Nor do the tests exonerate Father. They were administered on consecutive days, more than a week after Father learned his family was being investigated by DCFS. They fail to establish that he was not a drug user.¹⁶

Nor does the possibility that Father may not have used drugs in Nicole's presence negate the court's jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) that there was a substantial risk the girl would suffer serious harm as a result of her parents' inability to adequately supervise or protect her due to their substance abuse. As Jaqueline reported, drug abusing parents are frequently "zoned out," leaving their children without proper care or supervision. Contrary to Father's contention that Nicole had never been neglected, the evidence established that she had missed a substantial number of days of school, and that the family home was filthy. Juvenile dependency proceedings are intended both "to protect children who are currently being abused or neglected" and "to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.'" (*In re T.V.* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133, italics omitted, quoting § 300.2.) Accordingly, "[t]he court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction" (*In re T.V., supra*, at p. 133.) As section 300.2 provides: "The provision of a home environment free from the negative

¹⁶ We note that Father declined to test on June 27.

effects of substance abuse is a necessary condition for the safety, protection and physical and emotional well-being of the child.”

The evidence further established that Father had failed to protect Nicole from living in a household where she was surrounded by adult drug users and where drugs and paraphernalia were left in areas she could easily access. Lippincott reported seeing “lines of white powder” in the bathroom. Nicole had found a drug pipe in the home and reported seeing adults in the home smoking marijuana. Father claims he should not be held responsible for the acts of other adults because he was not living in the Whittier house. But multiple witnesses attested to the fact that he was living in the garage, and he never reported a different address. In addition, regardless of where Father was living, there was substantial evidence that he had knowledge of the conditions in the house. Michael reported that he and his brother were methamphetamine users and that Father supplied him with drugs. Thus, the evidence clearly established that Father was aware of the dangerous environment in which Nicole was being raised. The court’s jurisdictional findings were well supported by the evidence presented.

C. Disposition

After finding that a child is a person described in one of the subdivisions of section 300 and therefore the proper subject of dependency jurisdiction, the court must determine “the proper disposition to be made of the child.” (§ 358, subd. (a).) “A dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents . . . with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence . . . [¶] . . . [that] [t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be

protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent's . . . physical custody." (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) To support its dispositional order removing custody from a parent, "the court may consider the parent's past conduct as well as present circumstances." (*In re Cole C.* (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917.) "The . . . child need not have been actually harmed for removal to be appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child." (*Ibid.*; accord, *In re Kristin H.* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1656-1658; see also *In re Y.G.* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 109, 116 [juvenile court may "consider a broad class of relevant evidence in deciding whether a child is at substantial risk from a parent's failure or inability to adequately protect or supervise the child[]"].) On review of the court's dispositional findings, "we employ the substantial evidence test, however bearing in mind the heightened burden of proof." (*In re Kristin H., supra*, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1654.)

The evidence that supported jurisdiction also supports that Nicole was in a detrimental and endangering home environment, where she was exposed to dangerous drugs and drug abusers on a continual basis. In addition, the evidence of the condition of the home and the fact that she was missing a substantial amount of school time indicated her parents were ignoring her needs and not properly caring for her. That they had sent her to Arizona to live with Jacqueline did not alleviate the necessity of removing her from her parents' custody. Absent a court order, Mother and Father could have brought her back to the Whittier house at any time. Although the court did not articulate it at the hearing, the order contains reference to the appropriate standard -- clear and convincing evidence -- to order removal at the dispositional phase, and the evidence supported that finding.

The evidence also supported that Father was directed toward the appropriate services. Section 362 empowers the juvenile court to "make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support" of a

dependent child, including orders directing parents or guardians to participate in counseling or education programs. (§ 362, subds. (a), (c).) “The court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion.” (*In re Christopher H.* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.) “Of course, the juvenile court’s discretion in fashioning reunification orders is not unfettered. Its orders must be ‘reasonable’ and ‘designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.’” (*In re Nolan W.* (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1229, quoting § 362, subd. (c).) “‘The reunification plan “‘must be appropriate for each family and be based on the unique facts relating to that family.’” [Citation.]” (*In re Nolan W.*, *supra*, at p. 1229, quoting *In re Christopher H.*, *supra*, at p. 1006.) “The whole point of reunification is the elimination of those conditions which led to the assumption of jurisdiction by the juvenile court.” (*In re Rebekah R.* (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1638, 1655.)

The court had before it evidence that Father was a long-term drug abuser in need of treatment and regular testing. Father’s anger issues were attested to by Michael, Jacqueline and others who had been the subject of his threats and seen him behave aggressively. The court’s dispositional order was supported by the evidence and by its jurisdictional findings.

DISPOSITION

The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MANELLA, J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, Acting P. J.

SUZUKAWA, J.