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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

TIMOTHY EUGENE CASE,

Defendant and Respondent.

2d Crim. No. B283838 (Super. Ct. No. 2016045507) (Ventura County)

The People appeal the trial court's order reducing Timothy Eugene Case's nine felony convictions for identity theft under Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a)¹ to misdemeanor shoplifting under section 459.5, subdivision (a). They argue that section 459.5, enacted as part of Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18), does not apply to section 530.5 identity theft offenses involving \$950 or less, and that the trial court erred in reclassifying them as misdemeanors. We recently rejected this argument in *People v. Jimenez* (May 8, 2018, B283858) _ Cal.App.5th _ [2018 Cal.App.

¹ All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

Lexis 410] (*Jimenez*). For the reasons set forth in that opinion, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 4, 2016, Case entered five different stores in Simi Valley and used a stolen credit card to purchase e-cigarette devices, a digital scale, Ziploc baggies, alcohol, two packs of cigarettes, batteries, food and two prepaid cell phones. The total cost of the items was \$849.17. Case knew the credit card was stolen, but denied stealing it from the victim's car.

The People charged Case with seven felony violations of section 530.5, subdivision (a) -- the unauthorized use of the personal identifying information of another. They also charged him with three felony forgery violations (§ 470, subd. (a)), and alleged that he had suffered two prior strike convictions for first degree residential burglary and four prison priors. Case was held to answer as charged. The magistrate denied his motion to reduce the felony charges to misdemeanors.

The trial court granted Case's *Romero*² motion to strike the first degree residential burglary convictions. The People subsequently filed an amended information charging Case with nine felony identity theft violations (§ 530.5, subd. (a)) and alleging the same prior convictions and prison priors. Case pled guilty to the nine felony charges and moved to reduce the convictions to misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47 and *People v. Gonzales* (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858 (*Gonzales*). Case asserted his conduct constituted misdemeanor shoplifting under section 459.5, subdivision (a), as interpreted by our Supreme Court in *Gonzales*.

² People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

The trial court granted Case's motion over the People's objection. It stated that it had reviewed *Gonzales* and *People v. Romanowski* (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (*Romanowski*), and concluded that under the reasoning and holding of those two cases it was "obligated to declare Counts 1 through 9 as misdemeanors." The court accordingly amended those counts to reflect violations of section 459.5.

Following reclassification of the convictions, the trial court sentenced Case to the full six-month term on each of the nine counts, "consecutive to one another and consecutive to each other for a total of four [and] 1/2 years in the county jail." The People appeal.

DISCUSSION

Proposition 47

California voters enacted Proposition 47 in 2014. (*Jimenez*, supra, _ Cal.App.5th at p. _ [2018 Cal.App. Lexis 410 at p. *4].) It "reduced certain theft-related offenses from felonies or wobblers to misdemeanors, unless the offenses were committed by certain ineligible offenders." (*Ibid.*)

"Proposition 47 added several new provisions, including section 459.5, which created the crime of shoplifting." (*Jimenez*, supra, _ Cal.App.5th at p. _ [2018 Cal.App. Lexis 410 at p. *5].) Section 459.5, subdivision (a) provides: "Notwithstanding [s]ection 459, shoplifting is defined as entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars (\$950). Any other entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary." Section 459.5, subdivision (b) expressly limits charging on shoplifting: ""Any act of shoplifting as defined in

subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting. No person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property."" (*Jimenez*, at p. _ [2018 Cal.App. Lexis 410 at pp. *5-6]; see *Gonzales*, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 863.)

No Error in Reducing Case's

Felony Convictions to Misdemeanor Shoplifting
The People contend Case is ineligible for reduction of his
felony convictions to misdemeanor shoplifting because his
offenses constitute identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)), which
remains a felony under Proposition 47. We disagree.

In *Jimenez*, the defendant entered a commercial check-cashing business and cashed two stolen checks valued at less than \$950 each. (*Jimenez*, *supra*, _ Cal.App.5th at p. _ [2018 Cal.App. Lexis 410 at p. *2].) The People charged Jimenez with two counts of felony identity theft. (§ 530.5, subd. (a).) After a jury convicted Jimenez of both charges, he moved to reduce the convictions to misdemeanors. (*Jimenez*, at p. _ [pp. *2-3].) The trial court granted the motion, and the People appealed. (*Id.* at p. _ [pp. *3-4].)

We affirmed the trial court's order. Relying upon *Gonzales*, *Romanowski* and *People v. Garrett* (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 82 (*Garrett*), we concluded that "Jimenez met his burden of establishing that his convictions qualified under Proposition 47 as misdemeanor shoplifting offenses." (*Jimenez, supra*, _ Cal.App.5th at p. _ [2018 Cal.App. Lexis 410 at p. *15].)

First, we analyzed *Garrett*, which addressed the interplay between felony identity theft (§ 530.5) and section 459.5. (*Jimenez, supra*, _ Cal.App.5th at p. _ [2018 Cal.App. Lexis 410 at pp. *6-7].) The defendant in *Garrett* entered a store and attempted to purchase gift cards with a stolen credit card. (*Garrett, supra*, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 84.) After Garrett pled no

contest to commercial burglary, he petitioned for resentencing under Proposition 47. (*Garrett*, at p. 86.) The trial court denied the petition, but the Court of Appeal reversed, rejecting the Attorney General's argument that because Garrett intended to commit felony identity theft, the shoplifting statute did not apply. (*Id.* at pp. 86-90.) The court explained: "[E]ven assuming [Garrett] intended to commit felony identity theft, he could not have been charged with burglary under . . . section 459 if the same act -- entering a store with the intent to purchase merchandise with a stolen credit card -- also constituted shoplifting under [s]ection 459.5." (*Id.* at p. 88.) Based on this reasoning, *Garrett* concluded that the use of a stolen credit card to purchase merchandise valued at \$950 or less constitutes shoplifting under section 459.5. (*Id.* at p. 90; see *Jimenez*, at p. _ [p. *7].)

Next, we discussed the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales. (Jimenez, supra, _ Cal.App.5th at p. _ [2018 Cal.App. Lexis 410 at pp. **7-9].) The defendant in Gonzales had entered a bank and cashed two checks valued at less than \$950 each. (Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 862.) After pleading guilty to second degree burglary, Gonzales petitioned for misdemeanor resentencing under Proposition 47. (Gonzales, at p. 862.) The trial court denied his petition, the Court of Appeal affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. (Ibid.) The court concluded that the electorate "intended that the shoplifting statute apply to an entry to commit a nonlarcenous theft. Thus, [Gonzales's] act of entering a bank to cash a stolen check for less than \$950, traditionally regarded as a theft by false pretenses rather than larceny, now constitutes shoplifting under the statute. [Gonzales] may properly petition for misdemeanor resentencing under . . .

section 1170.18." (Ibid., italics added; see Jimenez, at p. _ [p. *7].)

The Supreme Court rejected the Attorney General's argument that even if Gonzales did engage in shoplifting, he was ineligible for resentencing because he also entered the bank intending to commit felony identity theft under section 530.5, subdivision (a). (Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 876.) The Attorney General claimed that Gonzales's felony burglary conviction could have been based on his separate intent to commit felony identity theft. (*Ibid.*) Relying on *Garrett*, Gonzales responded that section 459.5 precluded such alternate charging. (Gonzales, at p. 876.) Agreeing that Gonzales "has the better view," the Supreme Court determined that "[s]ection 459.5, subdivision (b) requires that any act of shoplifting 'shall be charged as shoplifting and no one charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property.' (Italics added.) A defendant must be charged only with shoplifting when the statute applies. It expressly prohibits alternate charging and ensures only misdemeanor treatment for the underlying described conduct." (*Ibid.*)

Finally, we noted the Supreme Court's view that obtaining a person's identifying information in the course of a theft is not excluded from Proposition 47 relief. (Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 913-914; see Jimenez, supra, _ Cal.App.5th at p. _ [2018 Cal.App. Lexis 410 at pp. *10-11].) Specifically, the court rejected the Attorney General's theory that the offense of theft of an access card (§ 484e) was enacted to protect consumers and thus should be exempt from the petty theft statute (§ 490.2) in Proposition 47. (Romanowski, at pp. 913-914.)

Just as *Romanowski* declined to exempt theft of an access card from the ambit of section 490.2, we rejected the People's

request to exempt identity theft under section 530.5, subdivision (a) from the purview of shoplifting under section 459.5. (*Jimenez*, *supra*, _ Cal.App.5th at p. _ [2018 Cal.App. Lexis 410 at p.*11].) Noting that Jimenez's conduct was identical to Gonzales's conduct, we concluded they both committed "theft by false pretenses," which qualifies as shoplifting under section 459.5, subdivision (a). (*Jimenez*, at p. _ [p. *9].) As *Gonzales* clarified, "[a] defendant must be charged only with shoplifting when [section 459.5] applies." (*Gonzales*, *supra*, 2 Cal.5th at p. 876.)

The same rationale applies here. Case's conduct is similar to Gonzales's conduct and nearly identical to Garrett's conduct. Case entered several commercial establishments during business hours for the purpose of using a stolen credit card to purchase merchandise worth less than \$950. (See Garrett, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 84.) In so doing, he committed "theft by false pretenses," which "now constitutes shoplifting under [section 459.5, subdivision (a).]" (Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 862, 868-869 [shoplifting as defined in section 459.5, subdivision (a) encompasses all thefts, including theft by false pretenses]; Garrett, at p. 89 ["By using a stolen credit card, a thief must falsely represent that he or she is the proper owner of the credit card or has the consent of the owner to use it. Such conduct constitutes 'theft by false pretenses"].) Section 459.5, subdivision (b) makes it clear that "[a]ny act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting," and that "[n]o person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property." (Gonzales, at p. 863, italics added.) The trial court properly concluded, therefore, that Case's acts of shoplifting could not be charged as felony identity theft under section 530.5, subdivision (a). (Gonzales, at p. 862; Garrett, at pp. 89-90.) Under section 495, subdivision (b), they

could be charged only as misdemeanor shoplifting. (*Gonzales*, at pp. 862, 876-877; see 2 Couzens, Bigelow & Prickett, Sentencing Cal. Crimes (The Rutter Group 2017) § 25:4, p. 25-29 ["If section 459.5 applies, the defendant may not be alternatively charged with burglar[y] or identity theft"].)

In sum, we conclude the trial court properly granted Case's motion to reduce his felony identity theft convictions to misdemeanors. Case met his burden of establishing that his convictions qualified under Proposition 47 as misdemeanor shoplifting offenses.³

DISPOSITION

The order granting Case's motion for reduction of his nine felony convictions is affirmed.

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We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

TANGEMAN, J.

³ Because we agree with Case that the trial court correctly granted his motion for the reasons stated in its ruling, we need not reach Case's alternative argument that each identity theft charge constituted petty theft under section 490.2.

Nancy L. Ayers, Judge Superior Court County of Ventura

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