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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re J.F., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

NAKISHA F.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B287386

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. DK21694)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. D. Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.

Nicole A. Williams, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Amir Pichvai for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * *

Nakisha F. (mother) appeals one of two jurisdictional bases for the court asserting dependency jurisdiction over her child J.F., who was removed from her custody at the time of birth due to mother having tested positive for methamphetamines during her pregnancy and mother's severe mental health disabilities. Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the history of substance abuse basis for jurisdiction, though she concedes jurisdiction was proper on the basis she was incapable of caring for J.F. because she was under a conservatorship due to mental illness. She also challenges the dispositional order that she attend a drug and alcohol program.

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mother is "gravely disabled" by mental and emotional problems, including a diagnosis of bipolar and schizophrenia disorder, and was under a conservatorship at the time of J.F.'s detention by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department). Mother resided in a lockdown mental health facility where she could not have J.F. live with her.

The Department's jurisdiction and disposition report stated mother told a social worker the following: "I don't really use drugs; not really, they don't let me use drugs here. In the past, maybe, I'm not saying if I did, pretty sure maybe, well maybe, maybe no, maybe in the past, I don't remember. I don't remember if I used when I was pregnant, I didn't know I was pregnant until I was arrested at the train station and they took me to the hospital, that is when I was told I was pregnant. I don't know if I used when I was pregnant. I tried to get on the train, (laughing) I didn't have a ticket, so they arrested me. That is when I found out I was pregnant. So I don't know if I use drugs, don't remember."

As for her mental health, mother told the social worker she was not sure why she had been inpatient in a mental health unit for so long. “She reported that she has been in a hospital since the age of seventeen, but denied knowing why. She could not recall a time that she lived independently, nor could she recall where she lived prior to being arrested in June 2016. Even though she said she wants to ‘go home,’ when asked, she could not describe where she wanted to go.”

J.F.’s relative caregiver told the social worker that mother “has always lived in halfway houses.” She said that mother “has been in institutions for 20 years and she didn’t understand how the Court or [the Department] could possibly [consider] reunification for mother and baby.” The caregiver said that mother “should never be left alone around children. She said that once, mother put baby powder in a relative’s baby’s mouth to keep her from crying. She said that another family member was right there, so the baby didn’t choke, but mother can never be left alone with any child, much less a baby.”

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, recognizing that mother resided in a locked mental health facility with restricted access to services in the community, the court ordered that “all services ordered are subject to availability at mother’s residential placement, currently La Casa.”

DISCUSSION

Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction based on the allegations of a history of substance abuse but does not challenge jurisdiction based on the allegations concerning her mental health. As a general rule, “a single jurisdictional finding supported by substantial evidence is sufficient to support jurisdiction and render moot a challenge to

the other findings.” (*In re M.W.* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452.) Such is the case here. Since “we cannot render any relief to [mother] that would have a practical, tangible impact on [her] position in the dependency proceeding” (*In re I.A.* (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492), we therefore decline to consider mother’s argument.

The purpose of dependency law is to protect children. (*In re I.A.*, *supra*, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.) “The court asserts jurisdiction with respect to a child when one of the statutory prerequisites listed in [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 300 has been demonstrated.” (*Ibid.*) When a single finding is supported by the evidence, the court may decline to consider other jurisdictional findings. (*Id.* at p. 1492; accord *In re Alexis E.* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [“When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence.”].)

The court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that mother complete a drug and alcohol program, particularly since the order was expressly conditioned upon the availability of services at mother’s residential placement. That mother did not have access to drugs and alcohol in her residential facility does not mean that substance abuse was not an obstacle to reunification. Mother had tested positive for methamphetamines during her pregnancy and was unable to give a clear answer to the question whether she had a history of substance abuse, saying among other things that she was “pretty sure maybe” she

had used drugs in the past and could not remember whether she used drugs during her pregnancy.

There was substantial evidence from which the court could reasonably infer that substance abuse was an obstacle to reunification that had to be addressed in the reunification plan. (See *In re Christopher H.* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008 [“given appellant’s repeated driving under the influence convictions and positive blood test for methamphetamine, the court would have been remiss if it failed to address appellant’s substance abuse even though that problem had not yet affected his ability to care for [the minor]. The court reasonably concluded appellant’s substance abuse was an obstacle to reunification that had to be addressed in the reunification plan.”].)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and orders are affirmed.

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J.

RUBIN, J.