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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re DANIEL A., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.	B287981 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. DK08992)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOCELYN A., Defendant and Appellant.	

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Sherri Sobel, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.

Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Mother Jocelyn A. appeals from the juvenile court's termination of her parental rights over her sons Daniel A. and Chris V., Jr. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2014, Daniel and Mother, age 16, lived with her 18-year-old boyfriend, Chris V., Sr., and his family. Daniel came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services on December 29, 2014, shortly before his second birthday, when he was hospitalized with a brain injury. Mother claimed that while supervised by Chris, Sr., Daniel fell from a bed, hit his head, and lost consciousness. Daniel, however, was observed to have signs of prior physical abuse, including earlier subdural hematomas, bruises, and multiple bite marks on his body. Mother displayed no attachment to Daniel.

Daniel was detained from Mother. DCFS filed a petition alleging that Daniel came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b) (failure to protect), and (e) (serious physical abuse of a child under five years old).

The maternal grandmother denied knowing how Daniel was injured. She told DCFS that on December 20, 2014, she and the maternal uncle saw Daniel over Mother's objection. They noticed that Daniel had two bumps on his forehead, a large scratch in the middle of his forehead, a petechial hemorrhage on his throat that was the size of a quarter, and blood on his left eye. Mother said Daniel had fallen off a park slide. Daniel was

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[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

vomiting. The maternal grandmother arranged for a neighbor to massage Daniel's stomach.

The maternal grandmother told DCFS that she also arranged for a neighbor to massage Daniel on December 28, 2014, because Mother said Daniel was vomiting again. The neighbor told the maternal grandmother about the bite marks on Daniel's body and asked why she would allow Daniel to be mistreated. The maternal grandmother considered calling the police or DCFS, but Mother said she would deal with the situation and would not allow it to happen again. The maternal grandmother allowed Mother and Daniel to leave because the maternal uncle said he would not allow Daniel to return to Mother's home. The maternal uncle, however, left Daniel with Mother when she cried and reassured him that she would take better care of the child. According to the maternal grandmother, the maternal uncle feared Daniel would be removed from Mother and placed in foster care if they reported his injuries.

The maternal uncle gave DCFS similar information. He had seen bumps on Daniel's head two weeks earlier, but Mother said Daniel had fallen from a slide. The maternal uncle had been suspicious the previous weekend when Mother refused to let him see Daniel, so he insisted on seeing the child. He took Mother and Daniel to the maternal grandmother's home, where the bite marks were discovered by a neighbor. The maternal uncle did not look at the bite marks and said he thought they were "little." He would never have let Mother take Daniel if he had seen the bite marks. He allowed Mother to take Daniel because "she seemed sincere" when she said she would take better care of him. The maternal uncle doubted that the incident that led to Daniel's

hospitalization was an accident. He, too, wished to be considered for placement.

Mother wanted Daniel to be placed with the maternal grandmother, and if she could not return to Chris, Sr.'s home she preferred to live with the maternal uncle.

Upon inspection, the maternal grandmother's apartment appeared clean, organized, and sufficient to accommodate a child. However, placement with her could not be considered at that time because she had prior inconclusive protective services referrals. The maternal grandmother's first referral to DCFS had taken place when Mother was only three days old. When asked about Mother, the maternal grandmother said that Mother blamed her for "several childhood abuses" that Mother suffered at the hands of the maternal grandfather, and that Mother also alleged that a brother—not the maternal uncle involved here—had sexually abused her when she was younger. DCFS had determined this allegation of abuse was substantiated.

The maternal uncle rented a room in a home. Although the room was clean and contained clothes and toys for Daniel, because his landlady refused to live scan the home could not be considered for placement.

A. 2015

At the hearing on January 5, 2015, Mother's counsel did not oppose detention. The juvenile court gave DCFS discretion to detain Daniel with any appropriate relative or any non-relative extended family member, and it ordered DCFS to assess the maternal grandmother, the maternal uncle, and the maternal grandmother's brother-in-law for placement. Daniel was placed in foster care. Mother was given monitored visits.

Further investigation of Mother strongly suggested that Daniel's injuries were non-accidental. DCFS believed that Daniel was "not safe to return to the care of the mother. There are concerns that the mother committed deliberate and neglectful acts against the child Daniel[,] who was found to have inflicted trauma. The mother continues to give inconsistent and unreasonable explanations for the child's injuries." Daniel's injuries had been inflicted on separate occasions. The bilateral chronic subdural hematomas were more than one month old. His retinal bleeding was more recent. When Mother learned that the chronic subdural hematomas occurred well before the child's hospitalization, she then remembered a fall that she had not previously reported. Chris, Sr. told DCFS that he had observed that Daniel had bite marks and a bruise around December 15, 2014, but Mother, the child's primary caregiver, claimed to have been unaware of the bite marks until December 24. Mother's accounts of care she had obtained for Daniel were contradicted by his medical records. Multiple family members expressed concerns about Mother's ability to care for the child. DCFS observed that Mother did not appear suspicious of anyone despite the evidence that Daniel had been severely abused.

In March and April 2015 reports, DCFS related its assessments of the potential relative caregivers. The maternal uncle's live scan revealed a 2013 arrest. He had moved to a new home in February, and he said he would either contact DCFS if the other adults in the home would agree to live scan or he would move out if they would not. He did not contact DCFS. DCFS expressed concern that the maternal uncle had observed Daniel's injuries but had failed to take any action or report the abuse.

The maternal grandmother's brother-in-law expressed interest in caring for Daniel, but he never live scanned.

DCFS reported that the maternal grandmother was not an appropriate placement for Daniel because Mother lived with her; a sibling who had just been released from jail was planning to stay at the home, meaning that maternal grandmother, Mother, and Mother's sibling would all be living in an apartment that consisted of a bedroom, kitchen, and bathroom; and the maternal grandmother had seen Daniel's injuries but failed to protect him. The maternal grandmother also had an open referral from December 2014 alleging that Mother was a victim of sexual abuse and general neglect.

At the July 2015 jurisdiction hearing, the court sustained the allegations of the petition and found that Daniel was described by section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (e). The court ordered DCFS to prepare a supplemental report which would include relative placement.

Before the August 2015 disposition hearing, DCFS reported to the court that the social worker had submitted a request for the evaluation of the maternal grandmother to the DCFS section that assessed prospective relative placements.[2] At disposition, the juvenile court ordered that if the ASFA referral was approved, Daniel was to be placed with the maternal grandmother. The court denied Mother reunification services,

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[2] The parties describe these assessment requests as "ASFA referrals." "ASFA" is the acronym for the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq.), which establishes federal guidelines for foster care and relative care placements. (*In re Darlene T.* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 929, 932, fn. 1.)

ordered permanent placement services, and set a hearing under section 366.26 for December 2015.

The ASFA referral for the maternal grandmother was denied. The ASFA assessment supervisor stated that Daniel could not be placed with the maternal grandmother because Mother, a minor, needed to live with her mother. Mother said she lived with the maternal uncle.

In November 2015 DCFS again contacted the maternal grandmother's brother-in-law, who said he lacked the documents to live scan but was interested in adopting Daniel. He had no relationship with Daniel.

As of December 2015, the maternal grandmother remained interested in adopting Daniel. After a home visit DCFS requested discretion to permit overnight and/or weekend visits with her. At the same time, DCFS determined that Daniel was adoptable and assigned his case to an adoption social worker. DCFS recommended adoption as the most appropriate permanent plan for Daniel.

Mother, along with the maternal uncle and maternal grandmother, visited Daniel weekly for two to three hours. Mother behaved appropriately during visits. Daniel preferred his grandmother and uncle to his mother.

On December 11, 2015, the court continued the section 366.26 hearing until April 2016. At the request of Minor and Mother, the court instructed DCFS to submit an ASFA referral for the maternal grandmother because Mother no longer resided with her. The court authorized DCFS to liberalize Daniel's visits with the maternal grandmother.

On December 20, 2015, Mother gave birth to Chris V., Jr. Chris, Sr. was his father. DCFS was unaware of the baby.

B. 2016

In February 2016, DCFS advised the court that it had been unable to submit a new ASFA referral for the maternal grandmother as ordered by the court because the maternal uncle, with whom Mother was reportedly residing, had an outstanding criminal charge on his live scan results. Because the maternal uncle was a person with significant contact with the family, court dockets were needed to determine whether a criminal waiver was required for Daniel to be placed with the maternal grandmother. The maternal uncle refused to go to court to get the relevant documents because he feared being detained on an outstanding warrant. DCFS stated it would continue to assist the maternal uncle in obtaining the documents and would submit a new ASFA referral for the maternal grandmother if possible, but it noted that a criminal waiver would not be approved if the maternal uncle had an outstanding warrant.

As of February 2016, Mother had not visited Daniel in what the foster mother described as "a long time."

DCFS resolved the issue of the possible need for a criminal waiver for the maternal uncle, and on March 16, 2016, it requested an assessment of the maternal grandmother's home for placement. The following day, DCFS learned of Chris, Jr.'s birth and that he and Mother were living with Chris, Sr. at his family's home. When DCFS attempted to locate the baby, Mother lied repeatedly about where she was living. First, she said she lived with the maternal uncle, then said she lived with the maternal grandmother but had not told the social worker because she knew she was not supposed to live there. Mother admitted living with Chris, Sr. only after Chris, Sr. informed DCFS of her residence. Mother said that she would live with the maternal grandmother,

and the maternal grandmother consented. Mother's return to the maternal grandmother's home created uncertainty as to whether the ASFA referral would be approved.

On March 18, 2016, DCFS learned that Mother had confessed to abusing Daniel and was arrested the previous month. While Mother's account of the December incident was consistent with Daniel's injuries, she claimed to have shaken Daniel only once; his injuries suggested multiple traumas.

DCFS detained Chris, Jr. from his parents and filed a petition alleging he was subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j) (abuse of sibling). In addition to allegations concerning the risk from the abuse and neglect of Daniel, the petition included allegations that Chris, Sr.'s substance abuse interfered with his care and supervision of Chris, Jr.

Both the section 366.26 hearing for Daniel and a pre-release investigation hearing concerning Chris, Jr.'s grandmothers were scheduled for April 8, 2016. Chris, Jr.'s paternal grandmother declined to be considered for placement. The maternal grandmother wanted both children. DCFS recommended that Chris, Jr. not be released to the maternal grandmother because Mother lived with her, and placement of Chris, Jr. in the home would create a high risk of harm given the severe abuse she had inflicted on Daniel. Daniel's overnight visits with the maternal grandmother had been discontinued until her home was deemed appropriate. DCFS reported to the court that placement with the maternal grandmother was unlikely to be approved because Mother resided in the home. DCFS also reported that the ASFA unit had received letters

expressing concern that the maternal grandmother could not care for Daniel and Chris, Jr. and for her own young children.

By April 2016, Mother's visitation had become inconsistent and she had not seen Daniel for approximately one month.

At the April 8, 2016 hearing, the court declined to release Chris, Jr. to the maternal grandmother. It continued Daniel's section 366.26 hearing until August 2016. In light of Mother's approaching 18th birthday and her willingness to leave her mother's home, the court ordered DCFS to hold a meeting with Mother and the maternal grandmother to assess whether a safety plan could be developed that would make it possible for the children to be placed with the maternal grandmother if Mother moved out upon turning 18.

The maternal grandmother's home was not approved for placement. The initial reason for the April 2016 ASFA denial was that Mother, the offending parent, was living in the home, and she was not complying with court orders or demonstrating that she wanted to reunify with her children. Even if Mother had not been living there, however, the maternal grandmother's home would not have been approved because she had received several negative reference letters, she showed a lack of parenting skills, and she did not accept responsibility for her children's failures.

On April 20, 2016, the children were placed together in foster care.

The court held the jurisdiction hearing for Chris, Jr. in May 2016. Prior to the hearing, DCFS provided a report detailing the parents' changing accounts of how Daniel was injured. DCFS reported that Daniel had told the maternal grandmother that he remembered when Mother would try to "eat him" and "throw him in the trash." Daniel said that someone was with Mother when

she did those things, and the maternal grandmother believed the other person was Chris, Sr. The maternal grandmother questioned why Mother was the only one criminally charged as a result of the abuse of Daniel. She confirmed that she had seen bruises on Daniel and marks on his face, and that she had known he had bite marks "all over his body" days before his hospitalization. The maternal grandmother said she would protect the children from Mother if they were placed with her.

Mother visited Chris, Jr. weekly.

In May 2016, the juvenile court found that Chris, Jr. was described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j).

In late June 2016, DCFS advised the court that Mother visited the children once in May and had not yet visited them in June. Mother said she had enrolled in services but provided no further information, and the maternal grandmother thought Mother appeared to be under the influence. Maternal grandmother felt Mother did not care about her children as much as she should.

On June 22, 2016, the juvenile court declared Chris, Jr. a dependent of the juvenile court. Chris, Sr. was granted reunification services but Mother was not. Both parents received monitored visitation. The court ordered DCFS to assess the maternal grandmother for placement.

In July 2016 DCFS updated the court on placement issues. The maternal grandmother had reported that she was appealing the denial of her home as an appropriate placement. The ASFA unit would not conduct a new assessment until a decision was made on the maternal grandmother's appeal. DCFS had explained its concerns to Mother and Mother had promised to provide DCFS with her current address, but she did not do so.

DCFS recommended that the children not be placed with the maternal grandmother until the appeal was resolved and Mother provided an alternate residence that DCFS could verify.

The maternal grandmother's appeal hearing was scheduled to take place on October 20, 2016. She told DCFS that she had not received a call on that date.

As of January 2017, Mother had visited the children once in October 2016, at which time she appeared "very detached from her children and did not make any attempts to have a quality visit with her children." Mother had not visited or had any contact with the children since that visit. In January 2017 she told DCFS that she had discontinued her visits because she was using drugs.

The maternal grandmother had moved out of state and was no longer visiting the children, although she telephoned the foster parents occasionally to inquire about the children and to speak with Daniel. She continued to express a desire to adopt Daniel. The maternal uncle, who had been visiting the children since late October 2016, was "very appropriate and affectionate" but displayed a preference for Daniel. He expressed interest in adopting the children and told DCFS he was searching for a larger home for them. The social worker reported that an ASFA referral would be submitted when the maternal uncle found a new home, although there were concerns that Mother was living intermittently with him.

On January 26, 2017, the court held a permanent plan review hearing for Daniel and a six-month review hearing for Chris, Jr. The court terminated Chris, Sr.'s reunification services. The court ordered an adoptive home study for the children and directed DCFS to follow up on both the maternal

grandmother's appeal and the ASFA referral for the maternal uncle. The court set the section 366.26 hearing for both children for May 31, 2017.

Prior to the progress hearing in late February 2017, DCFS informed the court that the maternal grandmother's appeal of the ASFA denial had been dismissed months earlier because she did not call in for the hearing as instructed. DCFS had attempted to follow up with the maternal uncle regarding placement, but he did not respond.

As of May 2017, Mother scheduled weekly visits, but she canceled them frequently and had visited only four times in the prior 90 days. Mother said she was determined to regain custody of her children, but she had not enrolled in any services, and her criminal case remained pending.

After several continuances, the court conducted the children's section 366.26 hearing on November 28, 2017. During the months before the hearing was held, DCFS advised the court that the maternal uncle, though interested in adoption, did not have appropriate housing. The maternal uncle and Mother continued to visit the children inconsistently, canceling approximately two visits per month. During the monitored visits, Mother and the maternal uncle focused primarily on Daniel and interacted minimally with Chris, Jr. Mother explained that she felt less comfortable interacting with Chris, Jr. because he was very attached to the caregivers and viewed them as his parents.

On November 28, 2017, over Mother's objection that the parental bond exception applied, the court terminated parental rights. Mother appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Relative Placement

"The relative placement preference, codified in section 361.3, provides that whenever a new placement of a dependent child must be made, preferential consideration must be given to suitable relatives who request placement. [Citation.]" (*In re Antonio G.* (2007) 159 Cal.App.4th 369, 376.) Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to independently evaluate the maternal grandmother and maternal uncle as potential relative placements prior to terminating Mother's parental rights.

DCFS argues that Mother lacks standing to raise this issue because on appeal from a termination of parental rights, a parent may raise placement issues "only if the placement order's reversal advances the parent's argument against terminating parental rights." (*In re K.C.* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 238 [parent whose parental rights had been terminated did not have standing to appeal order denying paternal grandparent's request for placement of the child].) Relying on *In re A.K.* (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492, DCFS contends that a parent's interest in a dependency proceeding is reunification with his or her children, and that because Mother did not receive reunification services with the children, she could not reunify with them, so decisions about placement of the children did not affect her legal interest.

Until parental rights are terminated, all parents have an interest in their children's companionship, care, custody and management. Although that interest is not paramount after reunification services have been terminated or if reunification services were not granted, that interest is still extant. The placement of a child with a relative has the potential to alter the

juvenile court's determination of the child's best interests and the appropriate permanency plan for that child, and may affect a parent's interest in his or her legal status with respect to the child. (*In re Esperanza C.* (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1053-1054.) Accordingly, a parent has standing to appeal pre-termination orders concerning their children's placement. (*Ibid.*; see also *In re H.G.* (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 9-10 [same with respect to challenge to § 387 placement order].) Mother has standing to raise the relative placement issue on appeal. To the extent *In re A.K.*, *supra*, 12 Cal.App.5th 492 may be read to state a broad rule that a parent whose reunification services have been terminated has no standing to appeal subsequent orders, we respectfully decline to follow it.

DCFS also argues that Mother forfeited the issue of relative placement by failing to raise it during the dependency proceedings or at the termination of parental rights hearing, and also that her notice of appeal was insufficient because it did not mention relative placement. We find no defect in the notice of appeal. As the possible placement of the children with maternal relatives was addressed at many court hearings, and Mother repeatedly expressed her desire for the children to be placed with the maternal grandmother, we address Mother's argument on the merits.

Even if the juvenile court failed to independently evaluate the maternal grandmother and maternal uncle for placement prior to the termination of parental rights, any error was harmless because no reasonable court would have allowed the children to be placed with either relative under the circumstances of the case. Mother abused Daniel so severely that she was denied reunification services as to both children, and she never

participated in treatment or took any action to demonstrate that she no longer endangered them. Given the risk that Mother posed, the children could not be placed where she would have access to them, yet Mother lived with both relatives during the dependency proceedings and appeared to come and go at will. She lied repeatedly about where she was living and never provided information so that her residence could be verified. The maternal grandmother and the maternal uncle, moreover, could not be trusted to deny Mother access to the children, as they had known that Daniel was being abused but neither reported the abuse nor protected him from Mother. Finally, the maternal uncle does not appear to ever have located housing in which the adults would agree to live scan, and the maternal grandmother failed to pursue her appeal of the denial of her home for placement. Under these circumstances no reasonable court could have concluded that placing the children with either relative was in their best interest. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(1); *In re Stephanie M.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 320 [even when the relative preference applies, it does not "overcome the juvenile court's duty to determine the best interest of the child"].)

II. Termination of Parental Rights

At a hearing under section 366.26, the court must select and implement a permanent plan for a dependent child. Where there is no probability of reunification with a parent, adoption is the preferred permanent plan. (*In re Derek W.* (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826.) To implement adoption as the permanent plan, the juvenile court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Then, in the absence of evidence that termination of parental rights would be

detrimental to the child under statutorily-specified exceptions (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(B)), the juvenile court "shall terminate parental rights." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)

One of the statutory exceptions to termination is contained in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which permits the court to order some other permanent plan if "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." The "benefit" prong of the exception requires the parent to prove he or she has maintained regular visitation and his or her relationship with the child promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. (*In re Marcelo B.* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643.)

A showing the child derives some benefit from the relationship is not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory preference for adoption. (*In re Angel B.* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466.) No matter how loving and frequent the contact, and notwithstanding the existence of an "'emotional bond'" with the child, "'the parents must show that they occupy "a parental role" in the child's life.'" (*In re K.P.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621; *In re I.W.* (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527.)

The parent has the burden of proving the exception applies. (*In re I.W.*, *supra*, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527.) The court's decision a parent has not satisfied this burden may be based on either or both of two component determinations—whether a beneficial parental relationship exists and whether the existence of that relationship constitutes "a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child."

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); see *In re K.P.*, *supra*, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 622; *In re Bailey J.* (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314.) When the juvenile court finds the parent has not established the existence of the requisite beneficial relationship, our review is limited to determining whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the parent on this issue as a matter of law. (*In re I.W.*, at pp. 1527-1528.)

Here, although the juvenile court's comments were brief and indirect, we understand them to indicate that the court found Mother had not established a beneficial relationship with the children. After counsel for the children argued that the evidence did not establish a parent-child bond, the juvenile court responded, "I am in agreement as well. It does appear that Mom enjoys her kids and her kids enjoy her. That isn't really the same thing, is it? [¶] They come easily, they go easily, and she's never progressed enough to even have one unmonitored visit with her children . . . ."

Mother contends that the evidence established regular visitation and contact with the children under the first prong of the parent-child bond exception as a matter of law; she is incorrect. Mother initially visited the children regularly, but her visits soon became inconsistent. As of February 2016 she had not seen Daniel "for a long time," and in April 2016 Mother had not visited Daniel in a month. Mother visited the children only once in May 2016 and had not visited them again as of June 22, 2016. Mother visited once in October 2016, but appeared very detached and made little effort. Mother did not see the children again for at least three months. She visited the children four times in 90 days in early 2017, and she regularly canceled scheduled visits. (See *In re J.C.* (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 531 [regular visitation

is not established when there are significant lapses in visitation].)

The evidence also did not demonstrate that Mother occupied a parental role with respect to the children. She had been observed not to be attached to Daniel when he was in the hospital. Daniel preferred his uncle and grandmother to Mother. Mother required assistance to redirect Daniel during her visits, and the caregiver had to step in and discipline him because Mother would let him do whatever he wanted so that he enjoyed the visits. Mother acknowledged that Chris, Jr. was attached to the caregivers and saw them as his parents.

While it appeared that Mother's visits were enjoyable, the court found that the emotional bond between Mother and the children did not rise to the level of a parental relationship. Nothing in the evidence Mother cites, or in this record as a whole, compels a different conclusion as a matter of law. She has not demonstrated that the evidence of a beneficial parent-child relationship "was (1) 'uncontradicted and unimpeached' and (2) 'of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding [in her favor].' [Citation.]" (*In re I.W.*, *supra*, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) Mother has failed to meet her burden on appeal.[3]

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[3] Mother also contends that the detriment to the children of severing the parent-child relationship outweighed the benefits to them of adoption, but our conclusion that she has not established a beneficial relationship with them as a matter of law makes it unnecessary to address this contention.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court's November 28, 2017 order is affirmed.

ZELON, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

SEGAL, J.