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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT  
DIVISION SEVEN

In re M.F., a Person Coming  
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY  
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN  
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KATRINA K.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B299351

(Los Angeles County  
Super. Ct. No. DK17620)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.

Katrina K., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Acting Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Mother Katrina K. appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her son M.F. (Minor). We affirm.

## **FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

In 2016, the juvenile court declared Minor (born in 2014) a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code<sup>1</sup> section 300, subdivision (b), and removed him from Mother's custody. We have previously discussed the factual and procedural history of this case in detail. (See, e.g., *In re M.F.* (Nov. 6, 2017, B277535, B280849) [nonpub. opn.]; *In re M.F.* (June 12, 2018, B284879, B287104) [nonpub. opn.]; *In re M.F.* (Nov. 14, 2018, B288200) [nonpub. opn.].) We discuss only the facts and events pertinent to the order challenged in the present appeal.

In November 2018, this court affirmed the juvenile court's refusal to permit Mother to represent herself at the hearing at which her parental rights were terminated, and we reversed the termination of Mother's parental rights because the court had improperly refused Mother's request for a contested section 366.26 termination hearing. (*In re M.F.*, *supra*, B288200.)

On remand, the court appointed new counsel for Mother because the case had changed departments. Mother attempted to reject counsel, stating that she was "here only for court report. [¶] The substitution of the automatic due process. [¶] In a total adversarial position to order the court to move the summary judgment of any review of affidavits and truth back on the report."

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<sup>1</sup> All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

The court explained to Mother that she could accept the attorney appointed to represent her or hire private counsel, but the court would not permit her to represent herself. Mother interrupted the court, saying, “I have my rights. [¶] I put my affidavit. [¶] I have my rights.”

The court advised Mother, “You are not going to have time in the courtroom if you do not stop talking and have a seat. I am asking you—.”

Mother interrupted the court again. “No. [¶] I stand my rights.”

The court set a new section 366.26 hearing for July 16, 2019. Mother attempted to object, but the court would not permit her to address the court because she was represented by counsel. Mother denied that she was represented and stated that she declined counsel’s services. The court advised her she had to have an attorney. Mother responded that she had rights. At the conclusion of the hearing, Mother said, “I request to have the contract. [¶] I request the 1099—.”

On July 10, 2019, Mother filed a document in which she challenged the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over her son; invoked her rights to raise her son free from governmental interference; asserted that the juvenile court had taken jurisdiction over Minor without declaring her an unfit parent; claimed that the juvenile court was a private corporation that, along with the attorneys and guardians ad litem masqueraded as government, committed extortion, racketeering, criminal conspiracy, and enslavement; demanded proof of jurisdiction over Minor; and required a validated proof of claim addressing 14 issues.

At the termination of parental rights hearing on July 16, 2019, Mother told the court she wanted to discuss her recent

filing. The court advised Mother that her motion was not “connected to anything appropriate” and sought no “relief appropriate under the law.” Mother attempted to argue, but the court told her that she could not speak because she was represented by counsel. Mother again denied that she was represented by an attorney, and her counsel advised the court that Mother had refused to speak with him.

The court proceeded to conduct the hearing. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Minor was adoptable. The court found that it would be detrimental for him to be returned to Mother’s custody and that no exception to adoption applied. The court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals.

## **DISCUSSION**

### **I. Self-Representation**

On appeal, Mother complains that she was represented by counsel at the section 366.26 hearing against her wishes. While parents in dependency proceedings have a statutory right to self-representation, a juvenile court has discretion to deny a parent’s request for self-representation “when it is reasonably probable that granting the request would impair the child’s right to a prompt resolution of custody status *or* unduly disrupt the proceedings.” (*In re A.M.* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 914, 923, 925-926.)

Mother has previously appealed the juvenile court’s refusal to permit her to represent herself. In *In re M.F.*, *supra*, B288200, we concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to permit her to represent herself at the first section 366.26 hearing. The record supported the court’s finding that Mother had continually disrupted the proceedings, and the record

demonstrated that over the course of the dependency proceedings, Mother interrupted hearings with regularity, raised issues not pertinent to the matters pending before the court, and frequently attempted to relitigate already-decided issues. Mother's conduct throughout the litigation supported the court's conclusion that it was reasonably probable that granting her request to represent herself would unduly disrupt the proceedings. The record of the proceedings on remand demonstrates similar behavior. As it was reasonably probable that permitting Mother to represent herself would have impaired Minor's right to a prompt resolution of the issues or would have unduly disrupted the proceedings, the juvenile court did not err when it refused to permit Mother to represent herself at the July 16, 2019, section 366.26 hearing.

## **II. Termination of Parental Rights**

Mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights, but she does not identify any error in the order. Instead, Mother argues that the juvenile court never had jurisdiction over Minor. We have previously affirmed the exercise of juvenile court jurisdiction over Minor under section 300, subdivision (b). (*In re M.F.*, *supra*, B277535, B280849.)

Additionally, Mother complains that the juvenile court did not respond to the document she filed prior to the termination hearing in which she sought the return of Minor to her custody and made other demands. The juvenile court, however, did respond to Mother's filing: it advised Mother that her motion did not raise matters pertinent to the issues presented at the section 366.26 hearing. We find no error in the juvenile court's assessment. Mother has not established any error in the order terminating parental rights.

**DISPOSITION**

The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.

ZELON, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

SEGAL, J.