# Peer-to-peer risk-sharing schemes with heterogeneity and infinite-mean losses

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#### Where do infinite-mean losses arise from?

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- Natural disasters, e.g., earthquakes and hurricanes catastrophic (infinite-mean) losses
- Want: protection **①** against them
- How?

• Traditional insurance:

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  - Centralized:



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• Fails 🛕 due to the uninsurability

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  - Centralized:




- Fails **A** due to the *uninsurability*
- P2P risk sharing:

- Traditional insurance:
  - Centralized:




- Fails **A** due to the *uninsurability*
- P2P risk sharing:
  - Decentralized:



- Traditional insurance:
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
• Does it work?

#### Diversification of infinite-mean losses?


• "Conventional wisdom": diversification is good \(\omega\) (don't put all your eggs \(\begin{align\*}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}}\)...\)

#### Diversification of infinite-mean losses?


- "Conventional wisdom": diversification is good ♪ (don't put all your eggs ●●● in one basket ★...)
- Not quite applicable in this setting, as "diversifying" infinite-mean losses would indeed worsen the outcome (Ibragimov et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2024)!




• n agents, with initial losses  $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ 




•  $\theta_{ij}$  (or just  $\theta_j$ ): proportion of loss  $X_j$  allocated to agent i



ullet  $Y_i$ : loss after risk sharing for agent i



•  $Y_i$ : loss after risk sharing for agent i



→ All (linear) risk allocations:

$$Y_i = \sum_{j=1}^n \theta_{ij} X_j, \quad (\theta_{i1}, \dots, \theta_{in}), (\theta_{1j}, \dots, \theta_{nj}) \in \Delta_n,$$

where 
$$\Delta_n := \{(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n) \in [0, 1]^n : \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i = 1\}.$$

P2P risk sharing with infinite-mean losses

#### Why not diversify infinite-mean losses?

- Chen et al. (2024, Theorem 1):  $X_1 \leq_{\text{st}} \sum_{j=1}^n \theta_j X_j$  for all  $(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n) \in \Delta_n$ 
  - applicable to independent and identically distributed (iid) infinite-mean Pareto losses
  - Pareto losses:  $X \sim \operatorname{Pareto}(\alpha)$  with shape parameter  $\alpha > 0$  (and scale parameter 1), if its CDF is given by  $F(x) = 1 (1/x)^{\alpha}, \quad x \ge 1.$
  - $X \leq_{\mathrm{st}} Y$  refers to the **first-order stochastic dominance**, i.e.,  $\mathbb{P}(X>t) \leq \mathbb{P}(Y>t)$  for all  $t \in \mathbb{R}$


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
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- Idea: How about nonlinear risk allocations and heterogeneous losses?

- **Heterogeneity:** introduced via the **two-group conditions**:
  - 1.  $X_1, \ldots, X_n$  are independent.
  - 2. First m losses  $X_1, \ldots, X_m$  are iid finite-mean.
  - 3. Remaining n-m losses  $X_{m+1},\ldots,X_n$  are iid infinite-mean.



#### • Nonlinearity:


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
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


• Nonlinear risk allocations:  $X_6 = X_6 \wedge d + (X_6 - d)_+$ , where  $x \wedge y := \min\{x,y\}$  and  $x_+ := \max\{x,0\}$ .



#### Nonlinearity:

• Nonlinear risk allocations:  $X_6 = X_6^{\text{finite}} + X_6 - X_6^{\text{finite}}$ , where  $X_6^{\text{finite}} = F_1^{-1}(F_6(X_6))$ , with  $F_i$  being the CDF of  $X_i$  and  $F_i^{-1}$  being its generalized inverse, i.e.,  $F_i^{-1}(p) = \inf\{x \in \mathbb{R} : F_i(x) \geq p\}$ .




# Three P2P risk-sharing schemes

# Scheme [L]

• **Definition:** The scheme [L] is the set of all risk allocations taking the form  $Y_i = \sum_{j=1}^n \theta_{ij} X_j$  for all  $i=1,\ldots,n$ , where  $(\theta_{i1},\ldots,\theta_{in}) \in \Delta_n$  for all  $i=1,\ldots,n$ , and  $(\theta_{1j},\ldots,\theta_{nj}) \in \Delta_n$  for all  $j=1,\ldots,n$ .

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- Risk-sharing rule in focus: Rule [L\*], given by  $Y_i = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{k=1}^m X_k$  for all  $i=1,\ldots,m$ , and  $Y_j = X_j$  for all  $j=m+1,\ldots,n$ .




 First-order stochastic dominance under Pareto losses and two-group conditions:

$$\theta_1 X_1 + \dots + \theta_{m-1} X_{m-1} + (1 - \theta_1 - \dots - \theta_{m-1}) X_m \le_{\text{st}} \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i X_i$$
 for all  $(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n) \in \Delta_n$ .

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• Pareto optimality under Pareto losses and two-group conditions: The rule [L\*] is Pareto optimal in scheme [L] under the preference  $\leq_{sc}$ , defined by  $Y_i \leq_{sc} Z_i$  if

$$\begin{cases} Z_i \leq_{\operatorname{cx}} Y_i & \text{when } Y_i \text{ and } Z_i \text{ both have finite mean,} \\ Z_i \leq_{\operatorname{st}} Y_i & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

where  $\leq_{\mathrm{cx}}$  refers to the **convex order**, i.e.,  $X \leq_{\mathrm{cx}} Y$  if  $\mathbb{E}[\varphi(X)] \leq \mathbb{E}[\varphi(Y)]$  for all convex functions  $\varphi$  such that both expectations are finite.

 Pareto optimality: There does not exist another rule that is an improvement for all agents and a <u>strict</u> improvement for at least one agent.

### Scheme [FR]


• **Definition:** Suppose  $F_j$  is continuous for all j = m + 1, ..., n. The scheme [FR] is the set of all risk allocations with the following form:

$$Y_i = \sum_{k=1}^{m} \theta_{ik} X_k + \sum_{k=m+1}^{n} \theta_{ik} X_k^{\text{finite}}$$

for all  $i = 1, \ldots, m$ , and

$$Y_j = \sum_{k=1}^{m} \theta_{jk} X_k + \sum_{k=m+1}^{n} \theta_{jk} X_k^{\text{finite}} + (X_j - X_j^{\text{finite}})$$

for all  $j=m+1,\ldots,n$ , where  $X_k^{\mathrm{finite}}:=F_1^{-1}(F_k(X_k))$  for all  $k=m+1,\ldots,n$ ,  $(\theta_{i1},\ldots,\theta_{in})\in\Delta_n$  for all  $i=1,\ldots,n$ , and  $(\theta_{1k},\ldots,\theta_{nk})\in\Delta_n$  for all  $k=1,\ldots,n$ .



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$$X_6 - X_6^{\text{finite}} \quad X_6^{\text{finite}}$$

$$X_5 - X_5^{\text{finite}} \quad X_5^{\text{finite}} \quad \stackrel{\blacksquare}{\blacktriangle}$$






 $X_2$ 



# Scheme [FR]

• Risk-sharing rule in focus: Rule [FR\*], given by

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 Improvement for finite-mean agents under two-group conditions:

$$(1/n) \left( \sum_{k=1}^{m} X_k + \sum_{k=m+1}^{n} X_k^{\text{finite}} \right) \le_{\text{cx}} (1/m) \sum_{k=1}^{m} X_k$$

#### Properties of the rule [FR\*]

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- Improvement in finite-mean portion for infinite-mean agents under two-group conditions:
  - Rule [L\*]:  $Y_j = X_j = X_j^{\text{finite}} + (X_j X_j^{\text{finite}})$
  - Rule [FR\*]:

$$Y_j = \frac{1}{n} \left( \sum_{k=1}^m X_k + \sum_{k=m+1}^n X_k^{\text{finite}} \right) + \left( X_j - X_j^{\text{finite}} \right)$$

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### Properties of the rule [FR\*]

- Improvement from "diversification benefits" for infinite-mean agents under Pareto losses and two-group conditions:
  - Simplification under Pareto losses and two-group conditions:  $X_1,\ldots,X_m \overset{\mathrm{iid}}{\sim} \mathrm{Pareto}(\alpha)$  and  $X_{m+1},\ldots,X_n \overset{\mathrm{iid}}{\sim} \mathrm{Pareto}(\beta)$  with  $\alpha>1$  and  $\beta\leq 1 \Rightarrow X_j^{\mathrm{finite}}=X_j^{\beta/\alpha}$  for all  $j=m+1,\ldots,n$ .

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  - Diversification benefits:

Rule	Finite-mean	Infinite-mean	
[L*] [FR*]	$X_j^{\beta/\alpha}$ $\frac{1}{n} \left( \sum_{k=1}^m X_k + \sum_{k=m+1}^n X_k^{\beta/\alpha} \right)$	$X_j - X_j^{\beta/\alpha}$ $X_j - X_j^{\beta/\alpha}$	Comonotonic Mixed with some independent losses

#### Scheme [LS]

• **Definition:** Let  $d \in \mathbb{R}$  be a value such that  $\mathbb{E}[X_{m+1} \wedge d] = \mathbb{E}[X_1]$ . The scheme [LS] is the set of all risk allocations which take the following form:

$$Y_i = \sum_{k=1}^m \theta_{ik} X_k + \sum_{k=m+1}^n \theta_{ik} (X_k \wedge d)$$

for all  $i = 1, \ldots, m$ , and

$$Y_{j} = \sum_{k=1}^{m} \theta_{jk} X_{k} + \sum_{k=m+1}^{n} \theta_{jk} (X_{k} \wedge d) + (X_{j} - d)_{+}$$

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






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# Properties of the rule [LS\*]

• Improvement for finite-mean agents under two-group conditions: If  $X_1 \leq_{\mathrm{st}} X_{m+1}$ , then

$$\frac{1}{n} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{m} X_i + \sum_{j=m+1}^{n} X_j \wedge d \right) \le_{\text{cx}} \frac{1}{n} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{m} X_i + \sum_{j=m+1}^{n} X_j^{\text{finite}} \right)$$

 $\rightarrow$  [LS\*] better than [FR\*] better than [L\*]

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
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  - Improvement in finite-mean portion: Suppose  $X_1 \leq_{\mathrm{st}} X_{m+1}$ . Then  $\mathrm{Var}\left(\frac{1}{n}(\sum_{k=1}^m X_k + \sum_{k=m+1}^n X_k \wedge d)\right) \leq \mathrm{Var}\left(X_j \wedge d\right)$  iff  $n \geq \frac{1}{2}\Big(1 + \sqrt{1 + 4m[(\mathrm{Var}\left(X_1\right))/(\mathrm{Var}\left(X_{m+1} \wedge d\right)) 1]}\Big)$  ( $\approx 5.1098$  when m = 3 and  $\mathrm{Var}\left(X_1\right) = 8\,\mathrm{Var}\left(X_{m+1} \wedge d\right)$ ).

## Properties of the rule [LS\*]

 Improvement from "diversification benefits" for infinite-mean agents under two-group conditions:

Rule	Finite-mean	Infinite-mean	
[L*] [LS*]	$X_{j} \wedge d$ $\frac{1}{n} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{m} X_{k} + \sum_{k=m+1}^{n} X_{k} \wedge d \right)$	$(X_j - d)_+$ $(X_j - d)_+$	Comonotonic Mixed with some independent losses

### Summary of the key results



→ The rule [LS\*] may be considered to be the best one among these three rules.



- Chen, Y., P. Embrechts, and R. Wang (2024). An unexpected stochastic dominance: Pareto distributions, dependence, and diversification. *Operations Research*. Forthcoming.
- Ibragimov, R., D. Jaffee, and J. Walden (2009). Nondiversification traps in catastrophe insurance markets. *The Review of Financial Studies* 22(3), 959–993.