Personalized Marketing with Latent Confounders

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Inspiration for Personalized Marketing

- Personalization is founded on the premise that individuals have heterogenous response to actions.
- Personalization algorithms aim to improve decision-making by identifying and exploiting this heterogeneity.


One Treatment Fits All Patients Therapy Advisors official Advisors official

Personalized Treatments



Estimating Treatment Effects: Non-Personalized Paradigm

A/B Tests are 'gold standard' in the One-Treatment-Fits-All paradigm because they remove the influence of unobserved confounders (variables that influence both the treatment and the outcome).



Estimating Treatment Effects: Non-Personalized Paradigm

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Estimating Treatment Effects: Personalized Paradigm

- In the presence of unobserved confounders (most plausible scenario), experimental data is likely not 'gold standard' for estimating heterogenous treatment effects.
- A coherent fusion of experimental and observational data that results from a counterfactual-based decision criterion is likely to outperform other approaches.
- In what follows, I'll use a Personalized Marketing problem as a motivating example to discuss the statements above.

The Business Setting

- Business objective: Sell a credit card to new-to-RBC clients.
- Current campaign: One-Treatment-Fits-All paradigm. All new-to-RBC clients who visited the RBC public site, get a credit card offer + iPad incentive.



• Future campaign: Personalize the incentive. Identify which new-to-RBC clients should receive an iPad incentive in the future to maximize the expected profitability of the campaign.

Data Generating Process




Figure: 'True' Causal Graph (current campaign).

Data Generating Process




Figure: 'True' Causal Graph (current campaign).

$$P(m,r) = 0.25 \ \forall \ m \in M, r \in R$$

 $V := M \oplus R$
 $I := V$

	R = 0		R = 1	
	M = 1	M = 0	M = 1	M = 0
	0.25 0.50	0.50 0.10	0.45 0.05	0.05 0.30

Table: $E[\pi|M,R,I]$. Highlighted cells reflect (new-to-RBC) client's 'natural' choice to visit the Public site or not.

Approach 1: Empirical Decision Criterion (EDC)

$$\mathsf{EDC} \to \operatorname*{argmax}_{I \in \mathsf{0},1} E[\pi|I,M]$$

$$E[\pi|I=1, M=1] = 0.25$$

 $E[\pi|I=0, M=1] = 0.05$
 $E[\pi|I=1, M=0] = 0.05$
 $E[\pi|I=0, M=0] = 0.10$

	R =	= 0	R =	= 1
	M = 1	M = 0	M = 1	M = 0
/ = 1	0.25	0.50	0.45	0.05
<i>I</i> = 0	0.50	0.10	0.05	0.30

Table: $E[\pi|M, R, I]$.

Approach 1: Empirical Decision Criterion (EDC)

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 $E[\pi|I=0, M=1] = 0.05$
 $E[\pi|I=1, M=0] = 0.05$

 $E[\pi | I = 0, M = 0] = 0.10$

	R =	= 0	R =	= 1
	M = 1	M = 0	M = 1	M = 0
	0.25 0.50	0.50 0.10	0.45 0.05	0.05 0.30

Table: $E[\pi|M, R, I]$.

Decision Rule:

- If Visit Site \land Married \rightarrow Purchase Incentive \rightarrow $E[\pi] = 0.25$
- If Visit Site \land Not Married \rightarrow No Purchase Incentive \rightarrow $E[\pi] = 0.30$

Expected profit =
$$\boxed{0.275}$$
 = $(0.25+0.30)/2$.



Approach 2: Post-Visit Randomization (PVR)




Figure: Causal DAG with post-visit randomization.

Approach 2: Post-Visit Randomization (PVR) - cont'd

$$\mathsf{PVR} \to \operatorname*{argmax}_{I \in 0,1} E[\pi | do(I), M, V = 1]$$

$$E[\pi|do(I=1), M=1, V=1] = 0.25$$

 $E[\pi|do(I=0), M=1, V=1] = 0.50$
 $E[\pi|do(I=1), M=0, V=1] = 0.05$
 $E[\pi|do(I=0), M=0, V=1] = 0.30$

	R = 0		R = 1	
	M = 1	M = 0	M = 1	M = 0
	0.25 0.50	0.50 0.10	0.45 0.05	0.05 0.30

Table: $E[\pi|M,R,I]$.

Approach 2: Post-Visit Randomization (PVR) - cont'd

$$\mathsf{PVR} \to \operatorname*{argmax}_{I \in 0,1} E[\pi| do(I), M, V = 1]$$

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 $E[\pi|do(I=0), M=1, V=1] = 0.50$
 $E[\pi|do(I=1), M=0, V=1] = 0.05$
 $E[\pi|do(I=0), M=0, V=1] = 0.30$

	R = 0		R = 1	
	M = 1	M = 0	M = 1	M = 0
/ = 1 / = 0	0.25 0.50	0.50 0.10	0.45 0.05	0.05 0.30

Table: $E[\pi|M,R,I]$.

Decision Rule:

- If Visit Site \land Married \rightarrow No Purchase Incentive \rightarrow $E[\pi] = 0.50$
- If Visit Site \land Not Married \rightarrow No Purchase Incentive \rightarrow $E[\pi] = 0.30$

Expected profit = $\boxed{0.40}$ = (0.50+0.30)/2.



Approach 3: A/B Test on All New-to-RBC Clients




Figure: Causal DAG with A/B Test on All New-to-Bank Clients.

Approach 3: A/B Test on All New-to-RBC Clients - cont'd

$$\mathsf{ABT} \to \operatorname*{argmax}_{I \in 0,1} E[\pi| do(I), M]$$

$$E[\pi|do(I=1), M=1] = 0.350 = (0.25 + 0.45)/2$$

$$E[\pi|do(I=0), M=1] = 0.275 = (0.50 + 0.05)/2$$

$$E[\pi|do(I=1), M=0] = 0.275 = (0.50 + 0.05)/2$$

$$E[\pi|do(I=0), M=0] = 0.200 = (0.10 + 0.30)/2$$

	R = 0		R = 1	
	M = 1	M = 0	M = 1	M = 0
/ = 1 / = 0	0.25 0.50	0.50 0.10	0.45 0.05	0.05 0.30

Table: $E[\pi|M,R,I]$.

Approach 3: A/B Test on All New-to-RBC Clients - cont'd

$$\mathsf{ABT} \to \operatorname*{argmax}_{I \in 0,1} E[\pi| do(I), M]$$

$E[\pi do(I=1), M=1] = 0.350 = (0.25 + 0.45)/2$
$E[\pi do(I=0), M=1] = 0.275 = (0.50 + 0.05)/2$
$E[\pi do(I=1), M=0] = 0.275 = (0.50 + 0.05)/2$
$E[\pi do(I=0), M=0] = 0.200 = (0.10 + 0.30)/2$

	R = 0		R = 1	
	M = 1	M = 0	M = 1	M = 0
/ = 1 / = 0	0.25 0.50	0.50 0.10	0.45 0.05	0.05 0.30

Table: $E[\pi|M,R,I]$.

Decision Rule:

- If Married \rightarrow Purchase Incentive \rightarrow $E[\pi] = 0.35$
- If Not Married \rightarrow Purchase Incentive \rightarrow $E[\pi] = 0.275$

Expected profit =
$$\boxed{0.315}$$
 = $(0.35+0.275)/2$.



Approach 4: Regret Decision Criterion (RDC)

$$\mathsf{RDC} o \operatorname*{argmax}_{a' \in \ 0,1} E[\pi_{a'} | I = a, M]$$

Approach 4: Regret Decision Criterion (RDC)

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{RDC} &\to \underset{a' \in \ 0,1}{\operatorname{argmax}} \ E\big[\pi_{a'}|I = a,M\big] \\ &P(\pi_{a'},M) = P(\pi_{a'},M,a') + P(\pi_{a'},M,a) \\ &= P(\pi_{a'}|M,a')P(M,a') + P(\pi_{a'}|M,a)P(M,a) \end{aligned}$$

$$P(\pi_{a'}|M) = P(\pi_{a'}|M,a')P(a'|M) + P(\pi_{a'}|M,a)P(a|M) \\ &= P(\pi|M,a')P(a'|M) + P(\pi_{a'}|M,a)P(a|M) \text{ (Consistency)}$$

$$P(\pi_{a'}|M,a) = \frac{1}{P(a|M)} \Big[P(\pi_{a'}|M) - P(\pi|M,a')P(a'|M)\Big]$$

$$= \underbrace{\frac{1}{P(a|M)} \underbrace{\Big[P(\pi|M,do(a')) - P(\pi|M,a')P(a'|M)\Big]}_{\text{observational}}$$

Approach 4: Regret Decision Criterion (RDC) - cont'd

$$P(\pi_{I=1}|M=1, I=0) =$$

$$\begin{split} \frac{1}{P(I=0|M=1)} \Big[P\Big(\pi|M=1, do(I=1)\Big) - \\ P(\pi|M=1, I=1) P(I=1|M=1) \Big]. \\ &= \frac{1}{1/2} (0.350 - 0.25 \times \frac{1}{1/2}) = \textbf{0.45} \end{split}$$

	R = 0		R = 1	
	M = 1	M = 0	M = 1	<i>M</i> = 0
	0.25 0.50	0.50 0.10	0.45 0.05	0.05 0.30

$$P(\pi_{I=1}|M=0, I=0) = 0.50$$

$$P(\pi_{I=0}|M=1, I=1) = 0.50$$

$$P(\pi_{I=0}|M=0, I=1) = 0.30$$

Table: $E[\pi|M,R,I]$.

Decision Rule:

- If Visit Site \land Married \rightarrow No Purchase Incentive \rightarrow $E[\pi] = 0.50$
- If Visit Site \wedge Not Married \rightarrow No Purchase Incentive \rightarrow $E[\pi] = 0.30$
- If Not Visit Site \land Married \rightarrow Purchase Incentive \rightarrow $E[\pi] = 0.45$
- ullet If Not Visit Site \wedge Not Married o Purchase Incentive o $E[\pi]=$ **0.50**

Expected profit = 0.4375 = (0.50 + 0.30 + 0.45 + 0.50)/4

Summary of Methods

Criterion	Decision Rule	$E[\pi]$
EDC		.2750
	• If Visit Site \land Married \rightarrow Purchase Incentive	
	• If Visit Site \wedge Not Married \rightarrow No Purchase Incentive	
PVR	Never Purchase Incentive	.4000
ABT	Always Purchase Incentive	.3150
RDC		.4375
	 If Visit Site ∧ Married → No Purchase Incentive 	
	• If Visit Site \wedge Not Married \rightarrow No Purchase Incentive	
	• If Not Visit Site \wedge Married \rightarrow Purchase Incentive	
	• If Not Visit Site \wedge Not Married \rightarrow Purchase Incentive	
Oracle		.4375

Remarks

- If the goal is to learn personalized actions, experimental data alone is sub-optimal in the presence of unobserved confounders.
- Combining experimental and observational data under a Regret Decision Criterion (RDC) can provide information about the unobserved confounders, and hence outperform alternative optimization criteria.
- The expression derived from RDC works only in the binary treatment case.
 RDC-type randomization (Forney et al., 2017) was proposed to estimate counterfactual expressions empirically from an arbitrary number of treatments.

References

- Elias Bareinboim, Andrew Forney, and Judea Pearl. 2015. Bandits with unobserved confounders: a causal approach. In Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems - Volume 1 (NIPS'15).
 - ► Implementation: https://github.com/leoguelman/mabuc
- Forney, A., Pearl, J.; Bareinboim, E.. (2017). Counterfactual Data-Fusion for Online Reinforcement Learners. Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Machine Learning, in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 70:1156-1164