

# Treatment Effects in Bunching Designs: The Impact of the Federal Overtime Rule on Hours

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## Abstract

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) mandates overtime premium pay for most U.S. workers, but a lack of variation in the rule has made it difficult to assess its impact on hours worked. I use bunching observed at 40 hours in a new administrative dataset of weekly paychecks to estimate this effect. To do so, I develop a framework in which bunching at a choice-set kink is informative about causal effects in a way that is robust across underlying structural models, generalizing previous approaches. Under a non-parametric shape constraint on the distribution of hours and flexible assumptions on choice, a local average treatment effect among bunchers is partially identified. The bounds are informative in the overtime context and suggest that covered hourly workers in the U.S. work an average of at least half an hour less as a result of the FLSA mandate, in weeks that they do work at least 40 hours. This delivers an estimate of the wage elasticity of hours demand of  $-0.04$ .

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# 1 Introduction

Many countries require premium pay for long work hours. In the U.S., this takes the form of the “time-and-a-half” rule: by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), workers must be paid one and a half times their normal hourly wage for any hours they work in excess of 40 within a week. While some workers are exempt from the overtime rule (and some of their employers are not covered by the FLSA), the time-and-a-half rule holds for a majority of the U.S. workforce, including nearly all of its 82 million hourly workers (U.S. Department of Labor, 2019). Given the prevalence of longer workweeks in the U.S., the total number of hours actually paid out as overtime is substantial. Workers in many industries average several overtime hours per week, making overtime the largest form of supplemental pay in the U.S. (Bishow, 2009).<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, only a small literature has addressed the effects of the federal overtime rule on the U.S. labor market. This stands in marked contrast to the large literature on the minimum wage, which was also introduced at the federal level by the FLSA in 1938. A likely reason for this gap is that the overtime rule has varied little since then: the basic parameters have remained throughout as time-and-a-half after 40 hours within a week.<sup>2</sup> This lack of variation has afforded few opportunities to leverage research designs that exploit policy changes over time to identify causal effects, particularly on hours worked.<sup>3</sup> Unlike with the minimum wage, reforms to overtime policy have been rare and have left the central parameters of the rule unchanged.

In this paper, I take a new approach to assessing the effect of the FLSA overtime rule on hours by making use of variation within the rule itself: given a fixed hourly wage, hours in excess of 40 within a week for a single worker are more expensive to the firm than those below 40. Rather than attempt to explicitly control for confounding factors affecting hours or exploit reforms to whom is covered by the rule, I leverage the sharp discontinuity in the marginal cost of a worker-hour at 40 for identification. This methodology requires two ingredients that have so far been absent from the literature: first, high resolution data on the

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<sup>1</sup>Hart (2004) reports an average of 3 overtime hours per week among non-supervisory production workers. See Table E.2 for new estimates by industry from my sample. From a separate representative survey I estimate in Section 3 a grand average of about one overtime hour per week per worker, among all employed.

<sup>2</sup>While there are supplemental state overtime rules that vary somewhat by state (e.g. Minnesota has a 48 hour threshold), these rules bind for relatively few workers since the federal rules supersede the state rules.

<sup>3</sup>A notable exception is Hamermesh and Trejo (2000), who apply a difference-in-differences approach over the expansion of a daily overtime rule in California to include men in 1980, estimating a price elasticity of demand for overtime hours of roughly  $-0.5$ . Costa (2000) and Johnson (2003) also consider the impact of federal overtime regulation on hours worked, studying the phase-in of the FLSA and a supreme court decision clarifying the eligibility of public sector workers, respectively. Quach (2020) looks at recent reforms to eligibility criteria for exemption from the FLSA, estimating effects of the change on employment and the incomes of salaried workers.

hours of individual workers within a single given week, allowing me to observe the distribution of hours close to 40. I obtain this from a novel dataset of paycheck records from a large payroll processing company that records the exact number of hours that a worker was paid for in a given week. Second, my approach requires a way to translate features of the observed hours distribution into credible causal estimates of the rule’s effect, given reasonable assumptions about how weekly work hours are determined.

While wages change only occasionally in the data, I assume that hours are set dynamically each week with the overtime rule introducing a convex kink in labor costs. With firms setting hours (at least for a subset of workers), this leads a mass of paycheck observations to be located exactly at the kink at 40 hours, and the size of this mass is informative about the joint distribution of two *counterfactual* choices: the number of hours the firm would choose for the worker if the worker’s normal wage rate applied to all hours, and the hours that the firm would choose if all hours were paid at the worker’s overtime rate. This generalizes a popular research design that has used bunching at kink points to identify elasticities, which I refer to as the “bunching design”.<sup>4</sup> The bunching design originated in public finance to assess the labor supply effects of taxation (Saez 2010; Chetty et al. 2011), but variations have since been applied in many other settings.<sup>5</sup> In my context, the bunching design uncovers the effect on hours of the wage variation induced by the FLSA overtime rule, providing an estimate of its reduced form causal effect.

One of the main contributions of this paper is thus to extend and reinterpret the kink bunching-design methodology, which has gained popularity with the increasing availability of administrative data and the ubiquity of policy thresholds at which incentives change discontinuously. Here I make four main contributions. First, while bunching designs are typically motivated by a choice model featuring an explicit functional form for decision-makers’ utility, I require only *convexity*, both of the kink itself and agents’ possibly heterogeneous preferences. Secondly, I show that the bunching design can allow for multiple (possibly unknown) underlying margins of choice, yielding a single outcome variable observed to the researcher. Inference about counterfactual choices is thus robust to a large class of choice models, though this robustness can make it difficult to isolate a single structural interpretation of the estimates.<sup>6</sup> This in turn makes a potential out-

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<sup>4</sup>This paper considers only the bunching design for kinks, and not the related method for bunching at *notches* (e.g. Kleven and Waseem 2013). Bunching can also be used to overcome endogeneity in settings where the variable exhibiting bunching is the treatment, as recently shown by Caetano et al. (2020).

<sup>5</sup>Examples include cell phone plan pricing (Huang, 2008), fuel economy standards (Ito and Sallee, 2017), prescription drug spending (Einav et al., 2017) and Social Security (Gelber et al., 2020).

<sup>6</sup>This provides a response to the point made by Einav et al. (2017) that alternative models calibrated from the bunching-design can yield very different predictions about counterfactuals. I define a particular type of counterfactual question that can be answered robustly across a class of such models.

comes framework a natural language for analyzing the bunching design. Third, I propose a way to confront a challenge to identification in the bunching design leveled by Blomquist and Newey (2017)—that it requires extrapolation of observed densities into a region where they are not. To perform this extrapolation I impose a weak non-parametric shape constraint—*bi-log-concavity*—that can be verified within the support of observations and allows the researcher to place bounds on a local average treatment effect among individuals who locate at the kink. Finally, I show that these same restrictions are informative about policy counterfactuals, for example changing the location of the kink or how “sharp” it is.

The empirical context of overtime pay involves an additional challenge that is not typical to the bunching design: the kink occurs at a location that may have independent salience to firms and workers. Bunching in the hours distribution at 40 may arise in part from factors other than the FLSA rule, for example to coordinate the hours of workers across firms. I use two strategies to estimate the amount of bunching at 40 that would exist absent the FLSA, to deliver clean estimates of the rule’s causal effect. First, I use the fact that when hours are paid out as holidays, sick pay, or paid-time off, they do not count towards a week’s 40 hours. This “moves” the location of the kink in total hours paid during weeks when a worker is paid for non-work hours. I outline assumptions under which this yields the bunching that would occur absent the overtime rule. Second, I present a strategy that assumes alternative explanations for bunching are time-invariant to pin down the distinct contribution of the FLSA bunching at 40.

I find that the FLSA indeed has effects on hours worked, as predicted by labor demand theory. My preferred estimate suggests that just one quarter of the bunching observed in the sample (of hourly workers) at 40 is due to the FLSA, and employees working at least 40 hours work, on average, about 30 minutes less than they would absent the time-and-a-half rule. While a detailed analysis of the employment effects of the FLSA is beyond the scope of this paper, a back-of-the-envelope calculation using this estimate suggests that FLSA regulation creates about 700,000 jobs. The implied effects are larger when I use less conservative estimates of the contribution of the FLSA to the observed bunching, and overall I estimate that the local wage elasticity of hours demand close to 40 falls in the range  $-0.04$  to  $-0.19$ . I also estimate that a reform from time-and-a-half to double pay would introduce further hours effects of a similar magnitude to those from the current FLSA, and that lowering the hours threshold from 40 to 35 would nearly eliminate bunching due to the FLSA, in the short run.

These effects speak directly to the substitutability of hours of labor between workers. The primary justifications for hours regulation have been to reduce excessively long work-

weeks, while encouraging hours to be distributed over more workers (Ehrenberg and Schumann, 1982). The potential of using hour reductions as a means to spread employment has taken on increased urgency during the coronavirus pandemic, with renewed interest in policies such as work sharing programs that encourage firms to retain their workers. How well these policies play out in practice hinges on how easily an hour of work can be moved from one worker to another or across time, from the perspective of the firm. The effects of federal overtime policy provide a potentially large body of relevant evidence for this question, and my results suggest that hours demand is relatively inelastic and that hours cannot be easily so reallocated.

The results are also relevant to ongoing efforts to expand coverage of the FLSA overtime rule by increasing the earnings threshold at which some salaried workers are exempt, which has resulted in one recent major reform. In particular, the salary threshold for employers to be free from overtime obligations for executive, administrative or professional workers was increased substantially at the beginning of 2020. Quach (2020) studies this change along with a previous attempt at an increase in 2016 that was never ultimately executed.<sup>7</sup> He finds evidence that salaries are moved up to the threshold and that some workers are reclassified as hourly, accompanied by a modest reduction in employment. This provides strong evidence that firms perceive coverage under the overtime rule as imposing real costs, consistent with the methodology I employ in this paper.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out a motivating conceptual framework that draws on the existing theory and empirical literature on overtime. Section 3 introduces the payroll data I use in the empirical analysis. In Section 4 I describe the empirical strategy, with Appendix A developing some of the supporting formal results. Section 5 applies these results to obtain estimates of effect of the FLSA overtime rule on hours worked, as well as the effects of hypothetical reforms to the FLSA. Section 6 discusses the empirical findings from the standpoint of policy objectives, and 7 concludes.

## 2 Conceptual framework

This section outlines a framework for thinking about the role of overtime policy in determining hours, which then motivates the bunching design identification strategy in Section 4. The framework is centered around two observations from the data in Section 3: weekly hours vary considerably between pay periods for an individual hourly worker, and wages

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<sup>7</sup>The rule, from the Obama Department of Labor, was to increase the threshold to \$913 on December 1st, 2016, but was blocked by a federal judge just a week prior. Nevertheless, Quach (2020) finds that many workers' salaries had already adjusted to the new threshold, and that the effect persisted.

tend to remain fixed with only infrequent adjustment.

I thus propose a conceptual model that views hour determination as a two stage-process. First, workers are hired with an hourly wage set along with an anticipated number of hours they will work per week. Then, with that hourly wage fixed in the short-run, actual scheduling of hours varies by week based on fluctuation in the firm’s demand for labor from each worker. It is at this stage that the bunching design comes into play given the kink in each each week’s costs.

### **Wages and anticipated hours set at hiring**

Both workers and firms can be expected to have preferences over the hours each employee works in a given week. Workers derive utility from non-work time, and firms may not be able to costlessly move hours between workers in production. I bring both sides of the market together through an ex-ante “earnings-hours” posting model, in which employment and compensation per worker  $z^*$  are jointly chosen by the firm on the basis of an endogenous anticipated weekly hours per worker  $h^*$  (for simplicity, I here take workers to be homogeneous within the firm and non-exempt from the FLSA). The model is spelled out explicitly in Appendix D. Each firm faces a labor supply function that takes as arguments the total weekly compensation  $z$  it offers to each new worker, and the number of hours  $h$  they are expected to work per week at hiring.<sup>8</sup> While labor supply is viewed as a function over *total* compensation  $z$  and hours, there is always a unique wage  $w$  associated with a particular  $(z, h)$  pair, such that  $h$  hours at that rate yields earnings of  $z$ , given the FLSA overtime rule

$$w_s(z, h) = \frac{z}{h + \mathbb{1}(h > 40)0.5(h - 40)} \quad (1)$$

I refer to this normal hourly rate of pay  $w$ , which applies to the first 40 hours, as the *straight-time wage* or simply *straight wage*. I assume that upon hiring, a worker’s straight-time wage is set according to Eq. (1) given the firm’s chosen  $z^*$  and  $h^*$ . The bunching design outlined in Section 4 will itself only require that *some* straight-time wage is agreed upon and is fixed in the short-run, a phenomenon that is indeed observed in the data. However, assuming that hourly wages are set based on a target total earnings  $z^*$  will play a role in my overall evaluation of the FLSA, and helps fix ideas.

In particular, the earnings-hours posting model allows us to distinguish different views from the literature on the effects of overtime policy. When employment and straight time

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<sup>8</sup>This labor supply function can be viewed as an equilibrium object that reflects both worker preferences over income and leisure and the competitive environment for labor. In Supplemental Appendix 1, I endogenize this function in a simple extension of the imperfectly competitive Burdett and Mortensen (1998) search model.


wages are set according to (1), the FLSA has no effect on employment or total earnings, if workers are in fact ultimately paid for exactly  $h^*$  hours each week (and provided that the implied  $w_s(z^*, h^*)$  is above any applicable minimum wage). Trejo (1991) calls this the *fixed-job* view of overtime: the job package  $(z^*, h^*)$  posted by the firm is the same as the one that would exist absent the overtime rule, and only the hourly wage rate is affected. In the absence of dynamics or uncertainty, straight-time wages for a generic labor supply curve simply adjust to fully absorb the added cost of overtime premium pay, and hours are unchanged. In Appendix D I give a closed form expression for  $(z^*, h^*)$  when both labor supply and production are iso-elastic:  $h^*$  and  $z^*$  are each increasing in the elasticity of labor supply with respect to earnings, and decreasing in the magnitude of the elasticity of labor supply with respect to pay.

The fixed-jobs view can be contrasted with what Trejo (1991) calls the *fixed-wage* view, in which the firm faces an exogenous straight-time wage when determining hours.<sup>9</sup> An exogenous straight-time wage can arise from a labor supply function that reflects perfect competition on the quantity  $w_s(z, h)$ . In Appendix D I show that in this case  $h^*$  and  $z^*$  are pinned down by the concavity of production with respect to hours and the scale of fixed costs (e.g. training) that do not depend on hours. The fixed-wage job makes the clear prediction that the FLSA will cause a reduction in hours, and bunching at 40. I investigate this prediction in detail in Section 4, while Figure 1 depicts the intuition. The overall effect on employment is positive given plausible assumptions on the substitution between labor and capital (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004), though the total number of labor-hours will decrease (Hamermesh, 1996).

Trejo (1991) and Barkume (2010) investigate whether the fixed-job or fixed-wage model better accords with the observed joint distribution of wages and hours. These studies find evidence that wages do tend to be lower among jobs with overtime pay provisions and more overtime hours. However these estimates could be driven by selection of lower skilled workers into covered jobs with longer hours. In Appendix E, I conduct a novel empirical test of Equation (1) that is instead based on assuming that the conditional distribution of  $z$  is smooth across  $h = 40$ . Consistent with the previous findings, I find evidence of adjustment in wages, but this adjustment is far from complete. Since my data records hours at the paycheck level rather than average or typical hours for a worker, this partial adjustment can be explained by straight wages tending to remain fixed in the short run, while hours vary by week. I now turn to this phenomenon, observed in the data.

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<sup>9</sup>Versions of this idea are considered in Brechling (1965), Rosen (1968), Ehrenberg (1971), Hamermesh (1996), Hart (2004) and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).



**FIGURE 1:** With a given worker's wages fixed at  $w$  labor costs as a function of hours have a convex kink at  $h = 40$ , given the overtime rule. A simple model of hours choice yields bunching when the marginal product of an hour at 40 is between  $w$  and  $1.5w$  for a mass of workers—see Section 4.1.

### Dynamic adjustment to hours by week

While the previous section considers anticipated hours and earnings at hiring, empirically the hours that workers are actually paid for vary considerably from week to week. Indeed the anticipated hours  $h^*$  that affect a worker's wage rate through Equation (1) might place little to no constraint on the hours actually scheduled in a given week.

There are many reasons why hours may vary from week to week throughout a worker's tenure at the firm. As time passes, shocks to product demand or productivity can change the number of weekly hours that would be optimal that week from the firm's perspective. For example, if demand for the firm's products is seasonal or volatile, it may not be worthwhile to hire additional workers only to reduce employment later. Similarly, cross-sectional variation in worker productivity may only become apparent to supervisors after straight wages have been set. In this case, it might be worthwhile for the firm to ask particularly productive workers to work overtime, despite the need to pay their higher overtime rate. Finally, workers may experience time-variation in their desire to work longer hours, and take advantage of overtime premium pay.

I make two main assumptions regarding the choice of a worker  $i$ 's hours  $h_{it}$  in a given week  $t$ . The first is that  $h_{it}$  is a flexible choice variable driven by the firm rather than the worker, and the second is that the firm does not contemplate alternative straight-time wages  $w_{it}$  depending on alternative choices for  $h_{it}$ . In line with the second assumption, in my sample straight-time wages do not change within worker with nearly the frequency that hourly wages do, for my sample of hourly workers. This accords with the long lit-



erature on nominal wage rigidity (see e.g. Grigsby et al. 2020 for recent evidence from payroll data). Mounting evidence that hourly wages are often standardized among workers within a firm despite cross-sectional heterogeneity (Hjort et al., 2020), and bunched at round numbers (Dube et al., 2020), also dovetails with this assumption.

My other main assumption is that a worker’s hours in a given week are in most cases set by the firm rather than the worker. I motivate this through a conceptual framework in which both supply and demand for hours/compensation packages matter in the determination of an initial employment contract, but the firm retains rights to set the final schedule week-to-week given each worker’s agreed-upon hourly wage. This view is supported by available survey evidence,<sup>10</sup> and can be rationalized on the basis of workers generally having less bargaining power: if the worker and firm fail to agree on a worker’s hours, the worker’s outside option may be unemployment while the firm’s outside option is having one less worker or making a costly replacement (Stole and Zwiebel, 1996).

In the empirical strategy presented in Section 4, I assume that in all cases a worker’s hours are set unilaterally by their employer, which eases notation and emphasizes the intuition behind my identification strategy. Appendix B presents a generalization in which some fraction of workers choose their hours, along with intermediate cases in which the firm and worker bargain over hours each week. If some workers have complete control over their hours, the empirical approach described in Section 4 will only be informative about effects of the FLSA among workers whose hours are chosen by the firm. However, the fraction of such workers is small (see footnote 10), despite recent increases in flexible work arrangements.

### 3 Data and descriptive patterns

The main dataset I use comes from a large payroll processing company. They provided anonymized paychecks for the employees of 10,000 randomly sampled employers, for all pay periods in the years 2016 and 2017. At the paycheck level, I observe the check date, straight wage, and amount of pay and hours corresponding to itemized pay types, including normal (“straight-time”) pay, overtime pay, sick leave, holiday pay, and paid time off. The data also include state and industry for each employer. Finally, for the employees, the data include age, tenure, gender, state of residence, pay frequency and their salary if one is stored in the system.

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<sup>10</sup>For example, the 2017-2018 Job Flexibilities and Work Schedules Supplement of the American Time Use Survey asks workers whether they have some input into their schedule, or whether their firm decides it. Only 17% report that they have some input. In a survey of firms, about 10% report that most of their employees have control over their shifts (Society for Human Resource Management, 2018).

### 3.1 Sample description

I construct a final sample based on two desiderata: i) the ability to observe hours within a single week; and ii) a sample only of workers who are non-exempt from the FLSA overtime rule. For the purposes of i), I keep paychecks from workers who are paid on a weekly basis (roughly half of the workers in the sample), and condition on paychecks that contain a record of positive hours for work, vacation, holidays, or sick leave, totaling fewer than 80 hours in a week.<sup>11</sup>

To achieve ii) I focus on hourly workers, since nearly all workers who are paid hourly are subject to FLSA regulation. However, while the data include a field for the employer to input a salary, there is no guarantee that they use it. Therefore, I use a combination of sampling restrictions to ensure I remove all non-hourly workers from the sample. First, I drop workers that ever have a salary on file with the payroll system. Second, I only keep workers at firms for whom *some* workers have a salary on file, reflecting an assumption that employers either don't use the feature at all or use it for all of their salaried employees. I drop paychecks from workers for whom hours are recorded as 40 in every week in the sample,<sup>12</sup> as it is possible that these workers are simply coded as working 40 hours despite being paid on a salary basis. I also drop workers who never receive overtime pay.

I drop observations from California, which has a daily overtime rule that is binding for a significant number of workers, and could confound the effects of the weekly FLSA rule. The final sample includes 630,217 paychecks for 12,488 workers across 566 firms.

Table 1 shows how the final sample compares to survey data that is constructed to be representative of the U.S. labor force. Column (1) reports variable means in the sample used in estimation. Column (3) reports means from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the same years 2016–2017, among those reporting hourly employment. The “has overtime” variable for the CPS sample indicates that the worker usually receives overtime, tips, or commissions.<sup>13</sup> The fourth column reports means for 2016–2017 from the National Compensation Survey (NCS), a representative establishment-level dataset accessed on a restricted basis from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The NCS uses administrative data when available, and reports typical overtime worked at the quarterly level for each job in an establishment. Columns (3) and (4) both lack some variables, as the CPS does not

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<sup>11</sup>This final restriction removes about 2% of the sample after the other restrictions. While a genuine 80 hour workweek is possible, I consider these observations to likely correspond to two weeks of work despite the worker's pay frequency being coded as weekly.

<sup>12</sup>For the purposes of this drop, I count the “40 hours” event as occurring when either hours worked or hours paid is equal to 40.

<sup>13</sup>The hourly wage variable for the CPS may mix straight-time and overtime rates, and is only present in the outgoing rotation group sample. The tenure variable comes from the 2018 Job Tenure Supplement.

specifically ask about number of overtime hours, while the NCS lacks worker-level information such as tenure, age and sex.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Estimation sample	Initial sample	CPS	NCS
Tenure (years)	3.21	2.81	6.34	.
Age (years)	37.15	35.89	39.58	.
Female	0.23	0.46	0.50	.
Weekly hours	38.92	27.28	36.31	35.70
Has overtime (fraction of workers)	1.00	0.37	0.17	0.52
Straight-time wage	16.16	22.17	18.09	23.31
Weekly overtime hours	3.56	0.94	.	1.04
Number of workers in sample	12488	149459	63404	228773

**TABLE 1:** Comparison at the worker level of the sample with representative surveys. Column 1 reports means from the administrative payroll sample used in estimation, Column 2 from the Current Population Survey and Column 3 from the National Compensation Survey). Column 2 uses a larger sample from the payroll data, before sampling restrictions.


The sample I use is somewhat more male, earns lower straight-time wages, and works more overtime than a typical U.S. worker. The NCS does not distinguish between hourly and salaried workers, reporting only an average hourly rate that does not include overtime pay. This effective straight-time wage thus includes many salaried workers, who are on average paid more, likely explaining the higher value than the CPS and payroll samples. Column (2) in Table 1 also reveals that my sampling restrictions can explain why the estimation sample tilts male and has higher overtime hours than the workforce as a whole. In particular, conditioning on workers that are paid on a weekly basis oversamples industries that tend to have more men, and tend to pay somewhat lower wages. Appendix E compares the industry and regional distributions of the estimation sample to the CPS.

## 3.2 Hours and wages

I turn now to the empirical inputs that I use in estimation. Figure 2 reports the empirical distribution of weekly hours in the pooled sample of paychecks. The graphs indicate a large mass of individuals who were paid for exactly 40 hours, amounting to about 11.6% of the sample.<sup>14</sup> Appendix Figure E.10 makes clear that overtime pay is present in nearly all weekly paychecks that report more than 40 hours, in line with the assumption that the workers in my final sample are non-exempt from the FLSA.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup>The second largest mass occurs at 32 hours, and is explained by paid-time-off, holiday, and sick pay hours as discussed in Section 5.

<sup>15</sup>However, I cannot rule out that some of the overtime pay is based on voluntary firm overtime policies.



**FIGURE 2:** Empirical densities of hours worked pooling all paychecks in final estimation sample. Sample is restricted to hourly workers receiving overtime pay at some point (to ensure nearly all are non-exempt from FLSA, see text), and workers having hours variation. The right panel omits the points 40 and 32 to improve visibility elsewhere. Bins have a width of  $1/8$  of an hour, based on the observed granularity of hours (see Appendix Figure E.14 for details).

Recall from the conceptual framework of Section 2 that firms face a kink in labor costs within a given pay period when there is short run wage rigidity, and that this mediates the main causal effect of the FLSA on hours worked. Table 3 documents that while the hours paid in 70% of all pay checks in the final estimation sample differ from those of the last paycheck by at least one hour, just 4% of all paychecks record a different straight-time wage than the previous paycheck for the same worker. This figure is unchanged if I condition on the event of an hours change. Among the roughly 22,500 average wage change events, the average change is about a 45 cent increase. When hours change the magnitude is about 7 hours on average (see Supplemental Figure E.15 for the distribution of hours changes), with no average secular increase in hours over time.

Appendix Table E.5 reports a direct test of the Trejo (1991) model that straight-time wages are related to hours according to Equation (1). In particular, I show that under natural smoothness assumptions, the change in slopes of a regression function of straight wages on hours at 40 identifies the proportion of checks around 40 that reflect the wage-hours relationship described by Equation (1). This exercise suggests that about 25% of checks near 40 hours satisfy this relationship, consistent with straight wages being adjusted in response to overtime pay obligations but being updated only intermittently.

	Mean	Std. dev.	N
Indicator for hours changed from last period	0.84	0.37	630,217.00
Indicator for hours changed by at least 1 hour	0.70	0.46	630,217.00
Indicator for wage changed from last period	0.04	0.19	630,217.00
Indicator for wage changed, if hours changed	0.04	0.19	529,791.00
Difference in hours, if hours changed	-0.02	10.69	529,791.00
Absolute value of hours difference, if hours changed	6.83	8.23	529,791.00
Difference in wage, if wage changed	0.45	26.46	22,501.00

**FIGURE 3:** Changes in hours paid or straight time wages between consecutive paychecks, within worker.

I report some further details on the variation present in the data in Appendix E. Appendix Table E.3 regresses hours, overtime hours, and an indicator for bunching on worker observables, and shows that after controlling for worker and date fixed effects bunching and overtime hours are both predicted by recent hiring at the firm. This lends credibility to the assumption that shocks to labor demand drive variation in hours. Appendix Table E.4 shows that overall, about 63% of variation in total hours can be explained by worker and employer by date fixed effects. Appendix Figure E.2 documents heterogeneity in the prevalence of overtime pay across industry classifications. Industries with the largest average overtime pay include Health Care and Social Assistance, Administrative and Support, and Transportation and Warehousing.

## 4 Empirical strategy: a generalized kink bunching design

In this section I consider the firm facing a “kinked” choice set in the week-to-week choice of hours for a given worker, as depicted in Figure 1. I show that under weak assumptions, firms facing such a kink will make a choice that can be completely characterized by choices they *would* make under two counterfactual choice sets that do not feature the kink, and differ with respect to a single worker’s hourly wage. I then parlay the observable bunching at 40 hours into a statement about the joint distribution of these counterfactuals, which can be interpreted in the language of treatment effects. Finally, I use these treatment effects to estimate my main parameter of interest: the average effect of the FLSA on hours.

The identification results in this section hold in a much more general setting in which a generic decision-maker faces a kinked choice set and has convex preferences. I present this general model in Appendix A, and some of the formal assumptions are given there

rather than in the main text. Throughout this section I refer to a worker  $i$  in week  $t$  as a *unit*: an observation of  $h_{it}$  for unit  $it$  is thus the hours recorded on a single paycheck. Probability statements are to be understood with respect to the pooled distribution of such paychecks across the sample period.

#### 4.1 A benchmark model: hours chosen from marginal productivity

Let us begin with the conceptual framework introduced in Section 2. With the wage fixed, the firm in week  $t$  faces a kinked cost schedule in deciding hours  $h_{it}$  for a given worker. If the firm chooses less than 40 hours, it will pay  $w = w_{it}$  for each hour, where  $w_{it}$  is the straight-time wage.<sup>16</sup> If the firm chooses  $h > 40$ , then it will pay  $40w$  for the first forty hours and  $1.5w(h - 40)$  for the remaining hours, giving the convex shape to Figure 1. Let  $B_{kit}(h) = w_{it}h + .5w_{it}\mathbb{1}(h > 40)(h - 40)$  be the kinked pay schedule for unit  $it$ .

A natural view of weekly hours demand is that firms balance the cost  $B_{kit}(h)$  against the value of  $h$  hours of the worker's labor, in order to maximize profits. Consider a single firm, and let  $F_t(h, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t})$  denote production in dollars this week, where  $h$  are the hours for worker  $i$  and  $\mathbf{h}_{-i,t}$  is the vector of hours for the other workers in the firm. Take  $F$  to be strictly concave in the total hours profile of its workers  $\mathbf{h} = (h, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t})$ , such that the marginal product of an hour  $MPH_{it}(h) = \frac{\partial}{\partial h} F_t(h, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t})$  is declining as a function of  $h$ . If firms maximize weekly profits, they will choose  $h < 40$  when  $MPH$  equals the straight time wage for some such value of  $h$ . This situation is depicted by the leftmost indifference curve in Figure 1. By concavity of production,  $MPH$  declines with  $h$ . If the  $MPH$  is still above  $1.5w$  at  $h = 40$ , for a worker with wage  $w$ , then tangency with the budget constraint  $B_{kit}(h)$  will occur for some  $h > 40$  where  $MPH(h) = 1.5w$ . This is depicted by the rightmost indifference curve in Figure 1. If the  $MPH$  at  $h = 40$  is between  $w$  and  $1.5w$ , then the firm will choose to locate that worker at the corner solution  $h = 40$ .

These predictions may be summarized as follows, separating the cases based on the marginal productivity of a worker's hours at 40:

$$h_{it} = \begin{cases} MPH_{it}^{-1}(w_{it}) & \text{if } MPH_{it}(40) < w_{it} \\ 40 & \text{if } MPH_{it}(40) \in [w_{it}, 1.5w_{it}] \\ MPH_{it}^{-1}(1.5w_{it}) & \text{if } MPH_{it}(40) > 1.5w_{it} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Shocks to the function  $F_t$ , or to the hours  $\mathbf{h}_{-i,t}$  worked by  $i$ 's colleagues within the firm, can be seen as determining which of the three types of outcome occurs in a given week.

<sup>16</sup>A unit's straight-time wage  $w_{it}$  is fixed with respect to the choice of hours this week, but may depend on  $t$  due to e.g. occasional or automatic periodic raises.

While Equation 2 provides fairly general intuition, it is useful to consider a simpler context that ignores interdependencies between workers and assumes that heterogeneity in hours is driven by a scalar productivity parameter:  $F_t(h, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t}) = a_{it} \cdot f(h)$  where  $f' > 0$  and  $f'' < 0$ . Then  $MPH_{it}(h) = a_{it} \cdot f'(h)$ , where the function  $f$  is common across firms, workers, and time periods. If  $f(h)$  is furthermore iso-elastic, we arrive at the canonical bunching-design approach from the literature (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011; Kleven, 2016).<sup>17</sup> The iso-elastic case is illustrative, and I will focus on it as a benchmark, before generalizing. In the iso-elastic model, firm profits take the form:

$$\pi_{it}(z, h) = a_{it} \cdot \frac{h^{1+\frac{1}{\epsilon}}}{1+\frac{1}{\epsilon}} - z \quad (3)$$

where  $\epsilon < 0$  is common across all units  $it$ , and  $c$  are labor costs for worker  $i$  in week  $t$ . Under any linear pay schedule  $z = wh$ , the profit maximizing number of hours is  $\left(\frac{w}{a_{it}}\right)^\epsilon$ , so  $\epsilon$  can be interpreted as the elasticity of hours demand to the wage. Define  $\eta_{it} = a_{it}/w_{it}$ , the ratio of the current productivity factor to the straight-time wage. Then, by Equation (2) hours are ranked across units by their value of  $\eta_{it}$ . Namely,  $h_{it} = \eta_{it}^{-\epsilon}$  if  $\eta_{it} < 40^{-1/\epsilon}$ ,  $h_{it} = 1.5^\epsilon \cdot \eta_{it}^{-\epsilon}$  if  $\eta_{it} > 1.5 \cdot 40^{-1/\epsilon}$ , and  $h_{it} = 40$  if  $\eta_{it}$  falls in the intermediate region  $[40^{-1/\epsilon}, 1.5 \cdot 40^{-1/\epsilon}]$ . If  $\eta_{it}$  is continuously distributed over a region containing this interval, then the observed distribution of  $h_{it}$  will feature a point mass at 40: “bunching” – paired with a density elsewhere.

Now consider identifying the effect of the FLSA, in the context of this iso-elastic model. Let  $h_{0it} = \eta_{it}^{-\epsilon}$  be the hours  $it$  would work if their employer faced the straight-time wage rate for all hours. I will refer to the difference  $h_{it} - h_{0it}$  as the *effect of the kink*—the effect of the FLSA on unit  $it$  when ignoring changes to workers’ straight-time wage, or complementarities between units (I account for effects on wages in Section 6). In the iso-elastic model, the effect of the kink is


$$h_{it} - h_{0it} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } h_{it} < 40 \\ 40 - h_{0it} & \text{if } h_{it} = 40 \\ h_{it} \cdot (1 - 1.5^{-\epsilon}) & \text{if } h_{it} > 40 \end{cases}$$

Given the value of  $\epsilon$ , we could evaluate this effect for any paycheck recording overtime  $h_{it} > 40$  using the worker’s observed hours. We could then easily estimate, for example, the average treatment effect among paychecks having overtime hours.

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<sup>17</sup>Alternatively, they may allow heterogeneous elasticities by taking the kink to be suitably “small”. My approach allows us to relax both assumptions at the same time.

Thus a natural starting place for evaluating the FLSA via the bunching design is to estimate  $\epsilon$ . Assume that we have access to a random sample of paychecks  $h_{it}$ .<sup>18</sup> If we were willing to suppose  $\eta_{it}$  belongs to a parametric family, then the entire model could be estimated by maximum likelihood (Bertanha et al., 2020). The method pioneered by Saez (2010) is more local:  $\epsilon$  is related to the observable bunching probability  $\mathcal{B} = P(h_{it} = 40)$ . Figure 4 depicts the intuition, which is convenient to express in terms of the log-hours distribution.



**FIGURE 4:** The left panel depicts the distribution of observed log hours  $\ln h_{it}$  in the iso-elastic model, while the right panel depicts the underlying full density of  $\ln h_{0it}$ . The full density is related to the observed density by “sliding” the observed density for  $h > 40$  out by the unknown distance  $\delta = |\epsilon| \ln 1.5$ . The density of  $h_{0it}$  is not observed in the missing region between  $\ln 40$  and  $\ln 40 + \delta$ , but the area total therein must equal the observed bunching mass  $\mathcal{B}$ .

If the researcher unwilling to assume anything about the density of  $h_0$  in the missing region of Figure 4, then the data are compatible with any finite  $\epsilon < 0$ , a point emphasized by Blomquist and Newey (2017) and Bertanha et al. (2020). In particular, given the integration constraint that  $\mathcal{B} = P(\ln h_{0it} \in [\ln 40, \ln 40 + \delta])$ , an arbitrarily small  $|\epsilon|$  could be rationalized by a density that spikes sufficiently high just to the right of 40, while an arbitrarily large  $|\epsilon|$  can be reconciled with the data by supposing that the density drops quickly to some very small level throughout the missing region.

Standard methods from the literature use parametric assumptions to point-identify  $\epsilon$  in the iso-elastic model. The approach of Saez (2010) assumes that the density of  $h_{0it}$  (not in logs) is linear through the corresponding region  $[40, 40 \cdot 1.5^{-\epsilon}]$ . The popular method of Chetty et al. (2011) instead fits a global polynomial to the hours distribution. However, neither of these approaches is suitable for the overtime context. The linear method of Saez

<sup>18</sup>The empirical implementation relaxes this and only assumes independence between firms.



(2010) implies monotonicity of the density in the missing region, which is unlikely to hold given that 40 appears to be near the mode of the latent hours distribution. The method of Chetty et al. (2011) ignores the “shift” by  $\delta$  in the right panel of Figure 4, which would be problematic in this setting since the slope of the density is far from zero and the bunching at 40 is exact, rather than diffuse.

My approach instead imposes a non-parametric shape constraint: bi-log-concavity, on the distribution of  $h_{0it}$ . Bi-log-concavity (BLC) generalizes the familiar property of log-concavity, and importantly allows for a peak within the missing region (Dümbgen et al., 2017). I defer a detailed discussion of BLC to Section 4.3, after I generalize from the iso-elastic model, and indeed more generally from a model in which hours are chosen on the basis of productivity alone. The reason for this generalization is two-fold. First, it weakens the assumptions under which the effect of the FLSA on hours can be identified. Second, it enables a range of underlying models that might be used to rationalize the results.

The robustness over structural models is important in the overtime context. The iso-elastic model applied to the data described in Section 3 yields implausible values for  $\epsilon$ , when interpreted in the context of the hours production function from Equation (3). Appendix E.4 reports estimates of the identified set of values for  $\epsilon$  compatible with the data and BLC of  $h_0$ . The bounds are narrow and suggest a value of about  $\epsilon = -0.2$ , when all of the bunching observed at 40 is attributed to the FLSA.<sup>19</sup> This value would suggest that revenue as a function of hours is (up to an affine transformation):  $f(h) = -\frac{1}{4}h^{-4}$ , a production function with an unreasonable degree of concavity. Note that attributing just a portion of the observed bunching at 40 to the FLSA, as I do in Section 5.1 would further reduce the estimate of  $\epsilon$ . The more general separable model in which  $f(h)$  is arbitrary is also not much help here, since estimating the iso-elastic model then identifies an averaged local inverse elasticity of  $f(h)$ . In particular:  $h_{1it} - h_{0it} = h_{0it} (1.5^{\bar{\epsilon}_{it}} - 1)$  where  $\bar{\epsilon}_{it}$  is a unit-specific weighted average of the inverse elasticity of production between  $1.5\eta_{it}$  and  $\eta_{it}$ :  $\bar{\epsilon}_{it} := \int_{\eta_{it}^{-1}}^{1.5\eta_{it}^{-1}} w(m) \cdot \epsilon(g(m)) \cdot dm$  where  $\epsilon(h) := \frac{f'(h)}{f''(h)h}$  is the reciprocal of the local elasticity of production,  $g(m) := (f')^{-1}(m)$  yields the hours  $h$  at which  $f'(h) = m$ , and  $w(m) = \frac{1/m}{\ln 1.5}$  is a positive function integrating to one.

Put simply, the observed bunching is too small to be reconciled with an iso-elastic response in which  $\epsilon$  parameterizes the concavity of production with respect to hours: it is better interpreted as a reduced form elasticity of demand for hours. The next section for-

<sup>19</sup>This estimate is from the pooled sample across all industries. Also reported Appendix E.4, estimation by industry yields bounds on  $\epsilon$  ranging from  $-0.26$  to  $-0.06$ , which are similarly implausible as estimates of concavity of production. The estimates are similar when applying the linear density assumption from Saez (2010).

malizes this idea, by showing how identification in the bunching design generalizes to a class of models that can include additional choice variables that may attenuate the observed labor demand response to overtime pay, as well as incorporate multi-dimensional heterogeneity.

## 4.2 Counterfactual choices in a larger class of choice models

The basic structure of what is observable in the bunching design is preserved when we not only relax the constant-elasticity assumption, but also when we allow the firm to have multiple choice-variables that may be responsive to the incentives created by the kink. Additional margins of response can have the effect of diminishing the hours response that would occur on the basis of production alone, which can explain the small elasticity reported in the last section.

Begin by observing that in the model of the last section, units who work overtime work the number of hours that they would work if their wage was 1.5 times their straight time wage: c.f. Equation (2). This property holds quite generally. Let  $h_{1it}$  be the hours that would be chosen for  $it$  if their straight-time wage were instead equal to  $1.5w_{it}$ .<sup>20</sup> Appendix A presents a generic model of choice for the bunching design in which Equation (2) can be seen as a special case of:

$$h_{it} = \begin{cases} h_{0it} & \text{if } h_{0it} < 40 \\ 40 & \text{if } h_{1it} \leq 40 \leq h_{0it} \\ h_{1it} & \text{if } h_{1it} > 40 \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

This expression says that knowledge of the two counterfactual hours choices  $h_{0it}$  and  $h_{1it}$  are sufficient to pin down the actual hours chosen for any given unit. The worker will work  $h_{0it}$  when  $h_{0it}$  is less than 40,  $h_{1it}$  when it is greater than 40, and be located at 40 if and only if the two counterfactual outcomes “straddle” the kink, falling on either side.

Appendix Lemma 1 shows that Equation 4 holds quite generally when an exogenous change to the hours-pay schedule would cause the firm to re-optimize on a vector  $\mathbf{x}$  of choice variables that includes hours of work  $h$  as a component, and firm preferences are convex in the pair  $(z, \mathbf{x})$ , where  $z$  are this period’s wage costs. To demonstrate the flexibility of this framework, I present some examples beyond the baseline model of the last section. These examples are illustrative, and each could apply to a different subset of units

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<sup>20</sup>Specifically, the counterfactuals  $h_{0it}$  and  $h_{1it}$  replace the cost schedule for this week’s hours with a linear wage  $w_{it}$  or  $1.5w_{it}$ , holding fixed both  $w_{it}$  and the hours of other units. See Section 4.4 for more details.

in the population.<sup>21</sup>

*Example 1: Substitution from bonus pay*

Let the firm's choice vector be  $\mathbf{x} = (h, b)'$ , where  $b \geq 0$  indicates a bonus (or other fringe benefit) paid to the worker. Firms may find it optimal to offer bonuses to improve worker satisfaction and reduce turnover. Suppose firm preferences are:  $\pi(z, h, b) = f(h) + g(z + b - \nu(h)) - z - b$ , where  $z$  continues to denote wage compensation this week,  $z + b - \nu(h)$  is the worker's utility with  $\nu(h)$  a convex disutility from labor  $h$ , and  $g(\cdot)$  increasing and concave. In this model firms will choose the surplus maximizing choice of hours  $h_m := \operatorname{argmax}_h f(h) - \nu(h)$  regardless of the hourly wage, provided that the corresponding optimal bonus is feasible (e.g. non-negative). Bonuses may thus fully adjust to absorb the added costs of overtime pay, such that  $h_0 = h_1 = h_m$ .

*Example 2: Off-the-clock hours and paid breaks*

Suppose firms choose a pair  $\mathbf{x} = (h, o)'$  with  $h$  hours worked and  $o$  hours worked "off-the-clock", such that  $y(\mathbf{x}) = h - o$  are the hours for which the worker is paid. This model can include some firms voluntarily offering paid breaks by allowing  $o$  to be negative. Evasion is harder the larger  $o$  is, which we represent by firms facing a convex evasion cost  $\phi(o)$ , so that firm utility is  $\pi(z, h, o) = f(h) - \phi(o) - z$ . Note that the data observed in our sample are of hours of work  $y(\mathbf{x})$  for which the worker is paid, when this differs from  $h$ . Appendix A describes how Equation 4 still holds, but for counterfactual values of hours paid  $y = h - o$  rather than hours worked  $h$ . The bunching design lets us investigate treatment effects on paid hours, without observing off-the-clock hours or break time  $o$ .

*Example 3: Complementaries between workers or weeks*

Suppose the firm simultaneously chooses the hours  $\mathbf{x} = (h, g)$  of two workers according to production that is iso-elastic in a CES aggregate of the two worker's hours. I focus on the hours  $h$  for the first worker ( $g$  could also denote planned hours next week for the same worker):  $\pi(z, h, g) = a \cdot ((\gamma h^\rho + g^\rho)^{1/\rho})^{1+\frac{1}{\epsilon}} - z$ , where  $\gamma > 0$  reflects a relative productivity shock for the first worker, and  $z$  are labor costs. Let  $g^*$  denote the firm's optimal choice of hours for the second worker. The firm's choice of  $h$  must maximize  $\pi(z, h, g^*)$  subject to  $z = B_k(h)$ , as if the firm faced a single-worker production function of  $f(h) = a \cdot ((\gamma h^\rho + g^{*\rho})^{1/\rho})^{1+\frac{1}{\epsilon}}$ . This function is more elastic than the corresponding

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<sup>21</sup>Appendix B discusses a further example in which the firm and worker bargain over this week's hours. This weekly bargaining can diminish the wage elasticity of hours since overtime pay gives the parties opposing incentives.

single-worker iso-elastic production function with the same  $\epsilon < 0$  provided that  $\rho < 1 + 1/\epsilon$ , since  $\frac{f''(h)h}{f'(h)} = \frac{1}{\epsilon} - \frac{1+1/\epsilon-\rho}{\gamma(h/g^*)^{\rho+1}}$ , attenuating the response to an increase in  $w$  (with  $g^*$  fixed) implied by a given  $\epsilon$ , provided sufficient complementarity.<sup>22</sup>

### 4.3 Identifying treatment effects in the bunching design

Given the definitions in the last two sections, let  $\Delta_{it} = h_{0it} - h_{1it}$ . This is the difference between the firm's choice of hours for a given worker (this week) if they were paid at their straight-time rate for all hours, versus their overtime rate for all hours. I refer to  $\Delta_{it}$  as *it's treatment effect*, interpreting  $h_0$  and  $h_1$  as potential outcomes. A unit's treatment effect can be contrasted with the "effect of the kink" quantity  $h_{it} - h_{0it}$  introduced earlier: the effect of the kink is  $-\Delta_{it}$  for those units working overtime.<sup>23</sup>

Beyond the iso-elastic model,  $\Delta_{it}$  rather than  $\epsilon$  is the quantity of interest in causal analysis. In the iso-elastic model  $\Delta_{it} = h_{0it} \cdot (1 - 1.5^\epsilon)$ ; this model thus delivers treatment effects in logs:  $\ln h_{0it} - \ln h_{1it} = |\epsilon| \cdot \ln 1.5$  that are constant across all units (see Figure 4). In general we can expect  $\Delta_{it}$  to vary across units, and a reasonable parameter of interest is some summary statistic of  $\Delta_{it}$ . To ease notation, let  $k = 40$  denote the location of the kink. We can see that bunching should be in some way informative about the distribution of  $\Delta_{it}$  by using Equation (4) to write the bunching probability as:

$$\mathcal{B} = P(h_{1it} \leq k \leq h_{0it}) = P(h_{0it} \in [k, k + \Delta_{it}]) = P(h_{1it} \in [k - \Delta_{it}, k]) \quad (5)$$

Units bunch when either of their counterfactual outcomes lie within their individual treatment effect of the kink. Note that  $\mathcal{B} = F_1(k) - F_0(k)$  provided that  $h_{0it}$  and  $h_{1it}$  are continuously distributed, where  $F_0$  and  $F_1$  are their cumulative distribution functions.

The existing literature on the bunching design contains few positive identification results that move beyond univariate heterogeneity and explicitly allow responsiveness to vary by individual unit. Saez (2010) and Kleven (2016) consider a "small-kink" approximation that allows one to estimate  $\mathbb{E}[\Delta_{it} | h_{0it} = k]$ , in the present notation.<sup>24</sup> In the over-

<sup>22</sup>This expression overstates the degree of attenuation, since  $h_1$  and  $h_0$  maximize  $f(h)$  above for different values  $g^*$ , which leads to a larger gap between  $h_0$  and  $h_1$  compared with a fixed  $g^*$  by the Le Chatelier principle (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1996). However, given  $\rho < 1 + 1/\epsilon$ , maintaining productivity of the second worker gives the firm enough incentive against decreasing  $h$  that  $h_1/h_0$  still increases on net.

<sup>23</sup>Both of these treatment effects are "partial equilibrium" in the sense that they hold the hours worked by units other than *it* fixed at their actual values. Section 4.4 discusses this further when evaluating the FLSA.

<sup>24</sup>In particular, the density of  $h_0$  is taken to be constant throughout the region  $[40, 40 + \Delta_{it}]$  conditional on each value of  $\Delta_{it}$ , leading to  $\mathbb{E}[\Delta_{it} | h_{0i} = 40] = \mathcal{B} / \lim_{h \uparrow k} f(h)$ , with  $f(h)$  the density of observed hours (see Appendix A for a derivation in my generalized framework). The uniform density assumption is hard to justify except in the limit that the distribution of  $\Delta_{it}$  concentrates around zero. Lemma SMALL in Appendix F makes this claim precise, while connecting the approach from Saez (2010) and Kleven (2016) to a non-

time setting, a 50% increase in the hourly cost of labor is likely to produce large enough effects that this approximation would be quite poor. Blomquist et al. (2019) allow multi-dimensional heterogeneity in a labor supply model under taxation, by assuming the density of counterfactual choices at a kink is linear across tax rates. However this type of assumption can be hard to motivate.

One type of heterogeneity that it is important to allow in the context of overtime is some degree of non-responsiveness to the incentives introduced by the kink at 40 hours, since 40 is a particularly salient hours choice. Let  $K_{it}^* = 1$  indicate a group of units such that  $h_{0it} = h_{1it} = k$ . I refer to these units as “counterfactual bunchers”, since they would locate at the kink even in the counterfactual outcome distributions. These units are not of particular interest, but they complicate measurement of the bunching caused by kink when there is a positive mass  $p := P(K_{it}^* = 1)$  of counterfactual bunchers. In this section, I treat  $p$  as known, and estimate it empirically in Section 5.1. Given  $p$  and the CDF  $F(h)$  of the data, one can construct the conditional distribution for all other units (denoted by  $K_{it}^* = 0$ ) by simply subtracting  $p$  from the observed bunching mass  $\mathcal{B}$  and re-normalizing the distribution, i.e.  $F_{h|K^*=0}(h) = \frac{F(h) - p\mathbb{1}(h \geq k)}{1-p}$ .

I focus on partial identification of the average treatment effect among units who locate at the kink and are not counterfactual bunchers, what I call the “buncher LATE”:

$$\Delta_k^* = \mathbb{E}[\Delta_{it} | h_{it} = k, K_{it}^* = 0]$$

To simplify the discussion, suppose for now that there are no counterfactual bunchers, so that  $\Delta_k^* = \mathbb{E}[\Delta_{it} | h_{it} = k]$ . My approach to identifying bounds on  $\Delta_k^*$  is based on assuming a weakened version of *rank invariance* between  $h_0$  and  $h_1$ :

$$P(F_0(h_{0it}) = F_1(h_{1it})) = 1. \tag{6}$$

Equation (6) says that increasing each unit’s wage by 50% does not change the rank of each unit’s hours: for example, a worker at the median of the  $h_0$  distribution also has a median value of  $h_1$ . This is satisfied by models in which there is perfect positive co-dependence between the potential outcomes, such-as the benchmark model from Section 4.1 with production  $a_{it} \cdot f(h)$ . The left panel of Figure 6 shows an example.

Rank invariance allows us to translate statements about  $\Delta_{it}$  into statements about the marginal distributions of  $h_{0it}$  and  $h_{1it}$ . In particular, under rank invariance the buncher LATE is equal to the quantile treatment effect  $Q_0(u) - Q_1(u)$  averaged across all  $u$  between


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parametric treatment without point identification by Blomquist et al. (2015).

$F_0(k)$  and  $F_1(k) = F_0(k) + \mathcal{B}$ , with  $Q_d$  the quantile function of  $h_{dit}$ :

$$\Delta_k^* = \frac{1}{\mathcal{B}} \int_{F_0(k)}^{F_1(k)} [Q_0(u) - Q_1(u)] du, \quad (7)$$

so long as  $F_0(y)$  and  $F_1(y)$  are continuous and strictly increasing. To place bounds on the buncher LATE, it is thus sufficient to place point-wise bounds on the quantile functions  $Q_0(u)$  and  $Q_1(u)$  throughout the range  $u \in [F_0(k), F_1(k)]$ , as depicted in Figure 5.



**FIGURE 5:** Extrapolating the quantile functions for  $h_0$  and  $h_1$  (blue and orange, respectively) to place bounds on the buncher LATE. The observed portions of each quantile function are depicted by thick curves, while the unobserved portions are indicated by thinner curves. The dashed curves represent upper and lower bounds for this unobserved portion implied by bi-log-concavity (see text below). The buncher LATE is equal to the area shaded in green, divided by the bunching probability  $\mathcal{B}$ . The quantities  $\Delta_0^*$  and  $\Delta_1^*$  are defined in Assumption RANK below.

I obtain such bounds by assuming that both  $h_0$  and  $h_1$  have *bi-log-concave* distributions. Bi-log-concavity is a non-parametric shape constraint that generalizes log-concavity, a property of many common parametric distributions:

**Definition (BLC).** A distribution function  $F$  is *bi-log-concave* (BLC) if both  $\ln F$  and  $\ln(1 - F)$  are concave functions.

If  $F$  is BLC then it admits a strictly positive density that is itself differentiable with the locally bounded derivative:  $\frac{-f(h)^2}{1-F(h)} \leq f'(h) \leq \frac{f(h)^2}{F(h)}$  (Dümbgen et al., 2017). Intuitively, this rules out cases in which the density of either  $h_0$  or  $h_1$  ever spikes or falls *too* quickly

on the interior of its support, leading to non-identification of the type discussed in Section 4.1.<sup>25</sup> The family of BLC distributions includes uniform and linear densities (as assumed by Saez 2010), as well as all globally log-concave distributions such as the normal.<sup>26</sup> Importantly, the BLC property is partially testable in the bunching design, since  $F_0(y)$  is identified for all  $h < k$  and  $F_1(h)$  is identified for all  $h > k$ . Appendix Figure E.9 shows that these observations in the data are indeed consistent with BLC. I will also refer to a random variable as “BLC” if its distribution is BLC. For each  $d \in \{0, 1\}$ , assuming  $h_{dit}$  is BLC yields point-wise upper and lower bounds on the quantile function  $Q_d(u)$  appearing in Equation (7) that depend on  $F_d(k)$  and  $f_d(k)$ , with  $f_d$  the density of  $h_{dit}$ .<sup>27</sup>

Assuming that each of  $h_0$  and  $h_1$  are separately BLC thus allows me to move beyond point-identification based on strong parametric assumptions while simultaneously accommodating heterogeneous treatment effects, requiring only rank invariance. But while rank invariance weakens the homogeneity assumptions typically made in the literature, it is nevertheless a restrictive assumption in the overtime setting. Fortunately, a still weaker assumption proves sufficient for the RHS of (7) to recover the buncher LATE:

**Assumption RANK.** *There exist values  $\Delta_0^*$  and  $\Delta_1^*$  such that  $h_{0it} \in [k, k + \Delta_{it}]$  iff  $h_{0it} \in [k, k + \Delta_0^*]$ , and  $h_{1it} \in [k - \Delta_{it}, k]$  iff  $h_{1it} \in [k - \Delta_1^*, k]$ .*


Note that  $\Delta_0^*$  and  $\Delta_1^*$  are fixed numbers that do not vary by unit  $it$ . If treatment effects were homogeneous with  $\Delta_{it} = \Delta$ , we would have  $\Delta_0^* = \Delta_1^* = \Delta$ , and Assumption RANK would simply echo Equation 5. With heterogeneous effects however, RANK allows ranks to be reshuffled by treatment among bunchers and on either side of the bunching region.<sup>28</sup> For example, suppose that a 50% increase in the wage of worker  $i$  would result in their hours being reduced from  $h_{0it} = 50$  to  $h_{1it} = 45$ . If another worker  $j$ ’s hours are instead reduced from  $h_{0jt} = 48$  to  $h_{1jt} = 46$  under a 50% wage increase, workers  $i$  and  $j$  will switch ranks, without violating RANK. Note also that RANK is compatible with the existence of counterfactual bunchers  $p > 0$ .

<sup>25</sup>Bertanha et al. (2020) propose partial identification in an iso-elastic model by specifying a Lipschitz constant on the density of  $\ln \eta_{it}$ . This yields global rather than local bounds on  $f'$ .

<sup>26</sup>BLC distributions can have multiple modes however, relaxing the unimodality property of log-concave densities (Dümbgen et al., 2017). Note that any polynomial density with real roots is a log-concave function.

<sup>27</sup>It is worth noting that under rank invariance, assuming BLC of  $h_1$  and  $h_0$  is sufficient to calculate bounds on the treatment effect  $Q_1(u) - Q_0(u)$  at any quantile  $u \in [0, 1]$ . However, these bounds quickly widen as one moves away from the kink in either direction. The narrowest bounds for a single rank are obtained for a “median” buncher roughly halfway between  $F_0(k)$  and  $F_1(k)$  when  $f_0(k) \approx f_1(k)$ . However, averaging over a larger group is more useful for meaningful ex-post evaluation of the FLSA, and reduces the sensitivity to departures from rank invariance (see Figure A.2). The buncher LATE balances these considerations.

<sup>28</sup>Given Equation (4), RANK is equivalent to the *rank-similarity* assumption of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005), where the conditioning variable  $V_i$  indicates which of the three cases of Equation (4) hold for the unit.



**FIGURE 6:** The joint distribution of  $(h_{0it}, h_{1it})$ , comparing an example satisfying rank invariance (left) to a case satisfying Assumption RANK (right). RANK allows the support of the joint distribution to “fan-out” from perfect co-dependence of  $h_0$  and  $h_1$ , except when either outcome is equal to  $k$ . The large red dot in the right panel indicates a possible mass  $p$  of counterfactual bunchers. The observable data identifies the red portions of outcome’s marginal distribution (depicted along the bottom and right edges), as well as the total mass  $\mathcal{B}$  in the (shaded) south-east quadrant.

The right panel of Figure 6 shows an example of a distribution satisfying RANK. When RANK is not perfectly satisfied (e.g. when the support of  $(h_0, h_1)$  doesn’t quite narrow to a point at each  $h_d = k$ ),  $\Delta_k^*$  can still be interpreted as an averaged quantile treatment effect across  $[F_0(k), F_1(k)]$ . Appendix Figure A.2 explains that this will then represent a lower bound on the true buncher LATE. Appendix Figure B.3 depicts a case in which some workers choose their hours, resulting in mass in the north-west quadrant.

Theorem 1 gives sharp bounds on the buncher LATE given RANK and bi-log-concavity. It requires two further assumptions that have so far been implicit: hours can be perfectly manipulated by firms, and firms’ preferences are convex over available choice variables. Appendix A gives a formulation of these assumptions for more general kink settings, and shows that bunching still has identifying power without convexity of preferences.

**Assumption CHOICE.** *The outcomes  $h_{0it}$ ,  $h_{1it}$  and  $h_{it}$  reflect choices the firm would make under counterfactual cost constraints  $z \geq B(h)$ , with  $B(h)$  given by  $B_{0it}(h) = w_{it}h$ ,  $B_{1it}(h) = 1.5w_{it}h - 20w_{it}$ , or  $B_{kit} = \max\{B_{0it}(h), B_{1it}(h)\}$  respectively.*

**Assumption CONVEX.** *Firm choices maximize some  $\pi_{it}(z, \mathbf{x})$ , where  $\pi_{it}$  is strictly quasiconcave in  $(z, \mathbf{x})$  and decreasing in  $z$ . Hours  $h$  are a continuous deterministic function of  $\mathbf{x}$ .*

Note that the importance of firms being the decision-maker for a unit enters in the assumption that utility  $\pi$  is decreasing, rather than increasing, in  $z$ . Appendix B relaxes this



to allow some workers to set their hours. The second term in the definition of  $h_{1it}$  keeps the firm indifferent between  $B_1$  and  $B_0$  at  $h = 40$ , and is only necessary for Equation 4 (and the subsequent analysis) to hold when preferences  $\pi$  are not quasi-linear in  $z$ .<sup>29</sup> Since quasi-linearity with respect to costs is implied by firms maximizing profits,  $h_{1it}$  can be thought of as hours under the simple pay schedule  $1.5w_{it}h$ .

**Theorem 1 (bi-log-concavity bounds on the buncher LATE).** *Assume CHOICE, CONVEX, RANK and that  $h_{0it}$  and  $h_{1it}$  are both bi-log-concave conditional on  $K_{it}^* = 0$ . Then:*

1. *Each of  $F(h)$ ,  $F_0(h)$  and  $F_1(h)$  are continuously differentiable for  $h \neq k$ . When  $p > 0$ , define the density  $f_d(y)$  of  $h_{dit}$  at  $y = k$  to be  $f_d(k) = \lim_{h \rightarrow k} f_d(h)$ , for each  $d \in \{0, 1\}$ .*
2. *The buncher LATE  $\Delta_k^* \in [\Delta_k^L, \Delta_k^U]$ , where:*

$$\Delta_k^L := g(F_0(k) - p, f_0(k), \mathcal{B} - p) + g(1 - F_1(k), f_1(k), \mathcal{B} - p)$$

and

$$\Delta_k^U := -g(1 - F_0(k), f_0(k), p - \mathcal{B}) - g(F_1(k) - p, f_1(k), p - \mathcal{B})$$

with  $g(a, b, x) = \frac{a}{bx} (a + x) \ln(1 + \frac{x}{a}) - \frac{a}{b}$ , and the bounds are sharp.

*Proof.* See Appendix F. □

Let  $f(h)$  be the density of the data for  $h \neq k$ . Given  $p$ , the remaining quantities in Theorem 1 are identified:  $F_0(k) = \lim_{h \uparrow k} F(h) + p$ ,  $F_1(k) = F(k)$ ,  $f_0(k) = \lim_{h \uparrow k} f(h)$  and  $f_1(k) = \lim_{h \downarrow k} f(h)$ .<sup>30</sup>

Inspection of the expressions appearing in Theorem 1 reveals that the bounds become wider the larger the net bunching probability  $\mathcal{B} - p$ . A second-order approximation to  $\ln(1 + \frac{x}{a})$  shows that when this probability is small,  $\Delta_k^* \approx \frac{\mathcal{B}-p}{2f_0(k)} + \frac{\mathcal{B}-p}{2f_1(k)}$ . This delivers a “small-bunching” approximation similar to one that has appeared in the literature (e.g. Kleven, 2016), and corresponds to the “excess mass” quantity in Chetty et al., 2011. When  $f_0(k) \approx f_1(k)$  and  $p = 0$ , the bounds will tend to be narrower when  $F_0(k)$  is closer to  $(1 - \mathcal{B})/2$ , i.e. the kink is close to the median of the latent hours distribution.

## 4.4 Estimating policy relevant parameters

The buncher LATE yields an internally-valid answer to a particular causal question, among a well-defined subgroup of the population. Namely: how would hours among bunched

<sup>29</sup>This reflects the well-known observation that the bunching design yields a combination of compensated and uncompensated elasticities (Blomquist et al., 2015; Kleven, 2016).

<sup>30</sup>Since the bounds depend only on the CDFs at  $k$  and data local to  $k$ , point masses elsewhere in the distributions of  $h_0$  and  $h_1$  can be safely ignored provided that they are well-separated from the kink.

units be affected by a counterfactual change from linear pay at the worker's straight-time wage to linear pay at their overtime rate? This section discusses how I use an estimate of this buncher LATE to both evaluate the overall ex-post effect of the FLSA on hours, as well as forecast the impacts of hypothetical changes to the FLSA. This requires some additional assumptions, which I continue to approach from a partial identification perspective.

#### 4.4.1 From the buncher LATE to the ex-post hours effect of the FLSA

To consider the overall ex-post hours effect of the FLSA among covered workers, I proceed in two steps. I first relate the buncher LATE to the average effect of introducing the overtime kink on all units, holding fixed the distributions of counterfactual hours  $h_{0it}$  and  $h_{1it}$ . Then, I allow straight-time wages to be affected by the FLSA, using the buncher LATE again to bound the additional effect of these wage changes on hours.

To motivate this strategy, let us first define the parameter of interest to be the difference in average weekly hours with and without the FLSA:  $\theta := \mathbb{E}[h_{it}] - \mathbb{E}^*[h_{it}^*]$ , where  $h_{it}^*$  indicates the hours unit  $it$  would work absent the FLSA, and the second expectation  $\mathbb{E}^*$  is over the population of observational units of workers that would exist in the no-FLSA counterfactual—but would be eligible were it introduced.<sup>31</sup> I assume that the hours among workers who are hired because of the FLSA are not systematically different from those who would have existed anyways, so that we may rewrite  $\theta$  as an average over individual-level effects in the actual population given the FLSA:  $\theta = \mathbb{E}[h_{it} - h_{it}^*]$ .

Next, I decompose this average effect as:

$$\begin{aligned} \theta = \mathbb{E}[h_{it}(w_{it}, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t}) - h_{0it}(w_{it}^*, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t}^*)] &= \mathbb{E}[\underbrace{h_{it}(w_{it}, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t}) - h_{0it}(w_{it}, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t})}_{\text{"effect of the kink"}}] \\ &+ \mathbb{E}[\underbrace{h_{0it}(w_{it}, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t}) - h_{0it}(w_{it}^*, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t})}_{\text{"wage effects"}}] + \mathbb{E}[\underbrace{h_{0it}(w_{it}^*, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t}) - h_{0it}(w_{it}^*, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t}^*)}_{\text{"interdependencies"}}], \quad (8) \end{aligned}$$

where the notation makes explicit the dependence of  $h$  and  $h_0$  on the worker's straight-time wage  $w_{it}$ , and possibly the hours  $\mathbf{h}_{-i}$  of other workers in their firm. In the notation of the last section:  $h_{it} = h_{it}(w_{it}, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t})$ ,  $h_{0it} = h_{0it}(w_{it}, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t})$  and  $h_{1it} = h_{1it}(w_{it}, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t})$ ; since pay is linear in hours in the no-FLSA counterfactual  $h_{it}^* = h_{0it}(w_{it}^*, \mathbf{h}_{-i,t}^*)$ .

The first term in Equation (8) reflects the "effect of the kink" quantity  $h_{it} - h_{0it}$  examined in Section 4.1, and is the primary object of interest. The second term reflects that straight-time wages  $w_{it}$  may differ from those that workers would face without the FLSA,

<sup>31</sup>Since the FLSA may itself change the population of workers who are covered by it (for instance, by encouraging the hiring of new covered workers), I first define  $\theta$  as this difference in two population quantities. Note that  $h_{it}^*$  in this section differs from the "anticipated" hours quantity  $h^*$  in Section 2.

denoted by  $w_{it}^*$ . The third term is zero when each worker's hours are chosen to solve a separate optimization problem, as in the benchmark model from Section 4.1 with linearly separable production. More generally however, it will capture interdependencies in hours across units, for instance due to non-separability in production. In Appendix C I provide evidence that such effects do not play a large role in  $\theta$ , and I do not attempt to account for them explicitly in estimation.

Turning first to the “effect of the kink” term, note that with straight-wages and the hours of other units fixed, the kink only has *direct* effects on those units working at least  $k = 40$  hours:

$$h_{it} - h_{0it} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } h_{it} < k \\ k - h_{0it} & \text{if } h_{it} = k \\ -\Delta_{it} & \text{if } h_{it} > k \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

and thus  $\mathbb{E}[h_{it} - h_{0it}] = \mathcal{B} \cdot \mathbb{E}[k - h_{0it} | h_{it} = k] - P(h_{it} > k) \mathbb{E}[\Delta_{it} | h_{it} > k]$ . To identify this quantity we must extrapolate from the buncher LATE to obtain an estimate of  $\mathbb{E}[\Delta_{it} | h_{it} > k]$ , the average effect for units who work overtime. To do this, I assume that  $\Delta_{it}$  of units working more than 40 hours are at least as large on average as those who work 40, but that the (reduced-form) *elasticity* of their response is no greater than that of the bunchers. The logic is that assuming a constant percentage change between  $h_0$  and  $h_1$  over units would imply responses that grow in proportion to  $h_1$ , eventually becoming implausibly large. On the other hand, it would be an underestimate to assume high-hours workers, say at 60 hours, have the same effect in levels  $h_0 - h_1$  as those closer to 40.<sup>32</sup> To put bounds on the average effect of the kink among bunchers  $\mathbb{E}[k - h_{0it} | h_{it} = k]$ , I use the bi-log-concavity assumptions from Section 4.3. Details are provided in Supplemental Appendix 4.7.

The “wage effects” term in Equation (8) arises because the straight-time wages observed in the data may reflect some adjustment to the FLSA, as we would expect on the basis of the conceptual framework in Section 2. While the “effect of the kink” term is expected to be negative, this second term will be positive if FLSA causes a reduction in the straight-time wages set at hiring on the basis of expected hours. However, both terms ultimately depend on the same thing: responsiveness of hours to the cost of an hour of work. I thus use the buncher LATE to compute an approximate upper bound on wage effects by assuming that all straight-time wages are adjusted according to Equation (1) with anticipated hours approximated by  $h_{it}$ , and an iso-elastic response. A lower bound on the “wage effects” term is zero. Supplemental Appendix 4.7 gives the explicit formulas and provides a visual depiction of these definitions. Section 5 also reports results with

<sup>32</sup>In the benchmark model, constant treatment effects in levels corresponds to exponential production:  $f(h) = \gamma(1 - e^{-h/\gamma})$  where  $\gamma > 0$  and  $h_{0it} - h_{1it} = \gamma \ln(1.5)$  for all units.

and without this wage effect. The size of the wage effect  $\mathbb{E}[h_{0it} - h_{0it}^*]$  is appreciable but still small in comparison with  $\mathbb{E}[h_{it} - h_{0it}]$ . This is because the average percentage wage change according to Equation (1) is fairly small near 40, where most of the mass is.

#### 4.4.2 Forecasting the effects of policy changes

Apart from ex-post evaluation of the overtime rule, policymakers may also be interested in predicting what would happen if the parameters of overtime regulation were modified. Reforms that have been discussed in the U.S. include decreasing “standard hours”  $k$  at which overtime pay begins from 40 hours to 35 hours,<sup>33</sup> or increasing the overtime premium from time-and-a-half to “double-time” (Brown and Hamermesh, 2019).

I begin by considering changes to standard hours  $k$ . For now, I hold the distributions of  $h_0$  and  $h_1$  fixed across the policy change, and return to changes to the latent hours distributions at the end of this section. Inspection of Equation 4 reveals that as the kink is moved upwards, say from  $k = 40$  hours to  $k' = 44$  hours, some workers who were previously bunching at  $k$  now work  $h_{0it}$  hours: namely those for whom  $h_{0it} \in [k, k']$ . By the same token, some individuals with values of  $h_{1it} \in [k, k']$  now bunch at  $k'$ . Some individuals who were bunching at  $k$  may now bunch at  $k'$ —namely those workers for whom  $h_{1it} \leq k$  and  $h_{0it} \geq k'$ . I assume that the mass of counterfactual bunchers  $p$  remains at  $k = 40$  after the shift.<sup>34</sup> In the case of a reduction in overtime hours, say to  $k' = 35$  this logic is reversed: some workers now work  $h_{1it} \in [k', k]$ , while workers with  $h_{0it} \in [k', k]$  now bunch at  $k'$ . Figure 8 depicts both of these cases.

Quantitatively assessing a change to double-time pay requires us to move beyond the two counterfactual choices  $h_{0it}$  and  $h_{1it}$ : hours that would be worked under straight-wage and time-and-a-half. Let  $h_{it}(\rho)$  be the hours that  $it$  would work if their employer faced a linear pay schedule at rate  $\rho \cdot w_{it}$  (with both the straight-wage  $w_{it}$  and hours of other units fixed at their realized levels). In this notation,  $h_{0it} = h_{it}(1)$  and  $h_{0it} = h_{it}(1.5)$ . Now consider a new overtime policy in which a premium pay factor of  $\rho_1$  is required for hours in excess of  $k$ , e.g.  $\rho_1 = 2$  for a “double-time” policy. Let  $h_{it}^{[k, \rho_1]}$  denote realized hours under this overtime policy, and let  $\mathcal{B}^{[k, \rho_1]} := P(h_{it}^{[k, \rho_1]} = k)$  the observable bunching that would occur.

Theorem 2 allows me to discuss the effects of small changes to  $k$  or  $\rho_1$ . Results for the

<sup>33</sup>Several countries have implemented changes to standard hours; Brown and Hamermesh (2019) provides a review of the evidence.

<sup>34</sup>It is conceivable that some or all counterfactual bunchers locate at 40 because it is the FLSA threshold, while still being non-responsive to the incentives introduced there by the kink. In this case, we might imagine that they would all coordinate on  $k'$  after the change. The effects here should thus be seen as short-run effects before that occurs.




FIGURE 7: The left panel depicts a shift of the kink point downwards from  $k$  to  $k'$ , while right panel depicts a shift of the kink point upwards. See text for details.

effect of changing standard hours  $k$  make use of an explicit assumption that firm preferences are quasi-linear with respect to costs:

**Assumption SEPARABLE.**  $\pi_{it}(z, \mathbf{x})$  is additively separable and linear in  $z$ .

I continue to assume that counterfactual bunchers  $K_{it}^* = 1$  stay at  $k^* := 40$ , regardless of  $\rho$  and  $k$ . Let  $p(k) = p \cdot \mathbb{1}(k = k^*)$  denote the possible mass of counterfactual bunchers as a function of  $k$ .

**Theorem 2 (marginal comparative statics in the bunching design).** *Under Assumptions CHOICE, CONVEX, SEPARABLE and SMOOTH:*

1.  $\partial_k \left\{ \mathcal{B}^{[k, \rho_1]} - p(k) \right\} = f_1(k) - f_0(k)$
2.  $\partial_k \mathbb{E}[h_{it}^{[k, \rho_1]}] = \mathcal{B}^{[k, \rho_1]} - p(k)$
3.  $\partial_{\rho_1} \mathbb{E}[h_{it}^{[k, \rho_1]}] = - \int_k^\infty f_{\rho_1}(h) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{dh_{it}(\rho_1)}{d\rho} \middle| h_{it}(\rho_1) = h \right] dh$

*Proof.* See Appendix A. □

Assumption SMOOTH is a set of regularity conditions which imply that  $h_{it}(\rho)$  admits a density  $f_\rho(h)$  for all  $\rho$  – see Appendix A for details. Theorem 2 also makes use of a stronger version of CHOICE that applies to all  $\rho$ , described therein.

Beginning from the actual FLSA policy of  $k = 40$ ,  $\rho_1 = 1.5$ , the RHS of the first two objects above are point identified from the data, provided that  $p$  is known. Item 1 says that

if the location of the kink is changed marginally, the bunching probability will change according to the difference between the densities of  $h_{1i}$  and  $h_{0i}$  at  $k^*$ , which are in turn equal to the left and right limits of the observed density  $f(h)$  at the kink. This result is intuitive: given continuity of each potential outcome's density, a small increase in  $k$  will result in a mass proportional to  $f_1(k)$  being "swept in" to the mass point at the kink, while a mass proportional to  $f_0(k)$  is left behind. Item 2 aggregates this change in bunching with the changes to non-bunchers as  $k$  is increased. The  $f_0(k)$  and  $f_1(k)$  terms from the change in bunching end up being canceled, and the first-order effect of changing  $k$  is simply to transport the mass of inframarginal bunchers to the new value of  $k$ .<sup>35</sup> Making use of Theorem 2 for a discrete policy change like reducing standard hours to 35 requires integrating across the actual range of hypothesized policy variation. We lose point identification, but can use bi-log-concavity of the marginal distributions of  $h_0$  and  $h_1$  to retain bounds, as depicted by Figure 8.

Now consider the effect of moving from time-and-a-half to double time on average hours worked, in light of item 3. This scenario, similar to ex-post evaluation of the effect of the kink, requires making assumptions about the response of individuals who may locate far from the kink, and for whom the buncher LATE is less directly informative. Note that integrating item 3 over  $\rho$  we can write the average effect on hours from a move to double-time in terms of local average elasticities of response:

$$\mathbb{E}[h_{it}^{[k, \rho_1]} - h_{it}^{[k, \bar{\rho}_1]}] = \int_{\rho_1}^{\bar{\rho}_1} d \ln \rho \int_k^\infty f_\rho(h) h \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{d \ln h_{it}(\rho)}{d \ln \rho} \middle| h_{it}(\rho) = h \right] dh$$

Recall from the iso-elastic model that when the elasticity  $\frac{d \ln h_{it}(\rho)}{d \ln \rho} = \frac{dh_{it}(\rho)}{d\rho} \frac{\rho}{h_{it}(\rho)}$  is constant across  $\rho$  and across units, it is partially identified. Just as an iso-elastic response is likely to overstate responsiveness at large  $h_{it}(\rho)$ , I argue it is likely to understate responsiveness to larger values of  $\rho$ , thus yielding a lower bound on the effect of moving to double-time. For an upper bound on the magnitude of the effect, I assume rather that in levels  $\mathbb{E}[h_{it}(\rho_1) - h_{it}(\bar{\rho}_1) | h_{1it} > k]$  is at least as large as  $\mathbb{E}[h_{0it} - h_{1it} | h_{1it} > k]$ , and that the increase in bunching from a change of  $\rho_1$  to  $\bar{\rho}_1$  is as large as the increase from  $\rho_0$  to  $\rho_1$ . I provide additional details in Supplemental Appendix 4.7.

In these calculations, I have held fixed the distributions of  $h_0$  and  $h_1$ , which can be seen as describing the short-run before adjustment to straight-time wages or other factors that influence these latent hours distributions. In the empirical implementation I account for

<sup>35</sup>Intuitively, in the limit of a small change in  $k$  bunchers who would choose exactly  $k$  under one of the two cost functions  $B_0$  or  $B_1$  cease to "bunch" as  $k$  moves to some  $k' > k$ , but they also do not change their realized value of  $h$  since the counterfactual hours choice that characterizes their new choice is equal to  $k$ .

possible changes to straight wages when considering the average effects of policy changes on hours, as we saw with the ex-post effect of the FLSA. The effect of such corrections for the impact of changing  $k$  on the bunching probability is discussed in Section 6.

## 5 Implementation and Results

This section implements the empirical strategy described in the last section with the sample of administrative payroll data described in Section 3.

### 5.1 Identifying counterfactual bunching at 40 hours

Section 2 has argued that with wages fixed, the overtime kink should lead to bunching at 40 hours a week, while Section 4 has shown that this bunching is useful in identifying treatment effects and the impact of policy changes. However, there are other reasons to expect bunching at 40 hours. For one, 40 may be considered a status-quo choice by firms and/or workers, and it may be chosen even when it is not cost minimizing for the firm. It can also be important for firms to synchronize hours across workers, and thus have them coordinate on some number  $h^*$  of hours. Finally, for any salaried workers who were not successfully removed from the sample, firms may record the number of hours in a pay period as 40 even as actual hours worked vary.

In terms of the empirical strategy from Section A.2, all of these alternative explanations manifest in the same way: a point mass  $p$  at 40 in the distribution of hours that would occur even if workers were paid their straight-time wages for all hours. In the notation introduced in Section 4.3, these “counterfactual bunchers” are demarcated by  $K_{it}^* = 1$ ; I refer to the  $K_{it}^* = 0$  individuals who also locate at the kink as “active bunchers”. The mass of active bunchers is  $\mathcal{B} - p$ . Theorem 1 shows that we can still partially identify the buncher LATE in the presence of counterfactual bunchers, so long as we know how many of the total bunchers are active and how many are counterfactual.

I leverage two strategies to provide plausible estimates for the mass of counterfactual bunchers  $p$ . My preferred estimate uses of the fact that when an employee is paid for hours that are not actually worked—including sick time, paid time off (PTO) and holidays—these hours do not contribute to the 40 hour overtime threshold of the FLSA. For example, if a worker applies PTO to miss a six hour shift, then they are not required to be paid overtime premium until they reach 46 total paid hours in that week, corresponding to 40 hours *worked*. These non-work hours thus shift the position of the kink in paid-hours.

The identifying assumption that I rely on is that individuals who still work 40 hours

a week, even when they are paid for a positive number of non-work hours, are all active bunchers, and would not locate at forty hours in the counterfactuals  $h_{0it}$  and  $h_{1it}$ . This assumption reflects the idea that alternative reasons for bunching at 40 hours besides the overtime kink operate at the level of hours paid, rather than hours worked. Let  $n_{it}$  indicate non-worked hours for worker  $i$  in week  $t$ . Specifically, I make the following two assumptions:

1.  $P(h_{it} = 40 | n_{it} > 0) = P(h_{it} = 40 \text{ and } K_{it}^* = 0 | n_{it} > 0)$
2.  $P(h_{it} = 40 \text{ and } K_{it}^* = 0 | n_{it} > 0) = P(h_{it} = 40 \text{ and } K_{it}^* = 0 | n_{it} = 0)$

The first item states that all of the individuals who locate at the kink, despite having a positive number of non-work hours are indeed active bunchers. I thus know the mass of active bunchers in the  $n_{it} > 0$  conditional distribution of hours. The second item says that the  $n_{it} > 0$  distribution is representative of the unconditional distribution, in the sense that the conditional mass of active bunchers does not vary based on whether non-work hours are positive or zero. Together, these two assumptions imply that  $P(K_{it}^* = 0 \text{ and } h_{it} = 40) = P(h_{it} = 40 | n_{it} > 0)$  and hence that  $p = P(K_{it}^* = 1 \text{ and } h_{it} = 40) = \mathcal{B} - P(h_{it} = 40 | n_{it} > 0)$ .

I focus on paid time off as  $n_{it}$  because it is generally planned in advance, and has somewhat idiosyncratic timing. By contrast sick pay is often unanticipated, so the firm may not be able to re-optimize total hours within a week in which a worker calls in sick. Holiday pay is known in advance, holidays are unlikely to be representative in terms of product demand and other factors important for hours determination, threatening the second assumption.

Figure 8 shows the conditional distribution of hours paid for work when the paycheck contains a positive number of PTO hours ( $n_{it} > 0$ ). The figure reveals that when moving from the unconditional (left panel) to positive-PTO conditional (right panel) distribution, most of the point mass at 40 hours moves away, largely concentrating now at 32 hours (corresponding to the PTO covering a single eight hour shift). Of the total bunching of  $\mathcal{B} \approx 11.6\%$  in the unconditional distribution, I estimate that only about  $P(h_{it} = 40 | n_{it} > 0) \approx 2.7\%$  are active bunchers, leaving  $p \approx 8.9\%$ . Roughly three quarters of the individuals at 40 hours are counterfactual rather than active bunchers.

As a secondary strategy, I estimate an upper bound for  $p$  by using the assumption that the potential outcomes of counterfactual bunchers are relatively immobile over time. The idea is that counterfactual bunchers have behavioral or administrative reasons for being at 40 hours, rather than 40 hours maximizing short run profits. I assume that these external considerations are fairly static over time, preventing latent hours  $h_{0it}$  from changing much






FIGURE 8: The right panel shows a histogram of hours worked when paid time off hours are positive. The left panel shows the unconditional distribution. Bin width is 1/8 hour.

between adjacent pay periods. In particular, assume that in a given period  $t$  nearly all of the counterfactual bunchers are also non-movers from  $t - 1$ , i.e.

$$p = P(h_{0it} = 40) \approx P(h_{0it} = h_{0it-1} = 40) \leq P(h_{it} = h_{i,t-1} = 40)$$

where the inequality follows from  $h_{0it} = 40 \implies h_{it} = 40$  by Lemma 1. The probability  $P(h_{it} = h_{i,t-1} = 40)$  can be directly estimated from the data, yielding  $p \leq 6\%$ .

## 5.2 Estimation and inference

Estimating bounds on the buncher LATE requires estimates of the CDF and density of hours worked, and in particular right and left limits of these objects at the kink. I use the local polynomial density estimator of Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2020) (CJM), which is well suited to estimating a CDF and its derivatives at boundary points. I work with the pooled distribution of paychecks over the full study period. The CJM estimator provides a smoothed estimate of the left limit of the CDF and density at  $k$  as:

$$(\hat{F}_-(k), \hat{f}_-(k)) = \underset{(b_1, b_2)}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{i: h_{it} < k} (F_n(h_{it}) - b_1 - b_2 h_{it})^2 \cdot K\left(\frac{h_{it} - k}{h}\right) \quad (10)$$

where  $F_n(y) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{it} \mathbb{1}(h_{it} \leq y)$  is the empirical CDF function,  $K(\cdot)$  is a kernel function, and  $h$  is a bandwidth. I use a triangular kernel, and choose  $h$  as follows: first, I use CJM's mean-squared error minimizing bandwidth selector to produce a bandwidth choice using the data on either side of  $k = 40$  (for the left and right limits, respectively). I then average the two bandwidths, and use this as the bandwidth in the final calculation of both the right

and left limits, to mitigate any dependence of the estimates on a differential bandwidth choice for each side. In the full sample, the bandwidth chosen by this procedure is about 1.7 hours, and is somewhat larger for subsamples that condition on a single industry.

To construct confidence intervals for parameters that are partially identified (e.g. the buncher LATE), I use the adaptive critical values proposed by Imbens and Manski (2004) and Stoye (2009) that are valid for the underlying parameter. In all cases, estimators of bounds or point identified quantities are functions of inputs that are  $\sqrt{n}$ -asymptotically normal.<sup>36</sup> To easily incorporate sampling uncertainty in both  $(\hat{F}_-(k), \hat{f}_-(k), \hat{F}_+(k), \hat{f}_+(k))$  and in  $\hat{p}$ , I estimate the variances by a cluster non-parametric bootstrap that resamples at the firm level. This allows arbitrary autocorrelation in hours across pay periods for a single worker, and between workers within a firm. All standard errors use 500 bootstrap replications.

### 5.3 Results of the bunching estimator

Table 2 reports treatment effect estimates  $h_{0it} - h_{1it}$ , in a sample that pools across all industries, when  $p$  is either assumed zero or estimated by one of the two methods described in Section 5.1. The first row yields an estimate of the net bunching probability  $\mathcal{B} - p$ , while the second row reports the bounds on the buncher LATE  $\mathbb{E}[h_{0it} - h_{1it} | h_{it} = k]$  based on bi-log-concavity. Within a fixed estimate of  $p$ , the bounds on the buncher LATE are quite informative: the upper and lower bounds are always close to each other and precisely estimated. Appendix E reports estimates based on alternative shape constraints and assumptions about effect heterogeneity, which deliver similar results.<sup>37</sup>

The PTO-based estimate of  $p$  provides the most conservative treatment effect estimates, attributing roughly one quarter of the observed bunching to active rather than counterfactual bunchers. Nevertheless, this estimate still yields a highly statistically significant buncher LATE of about 2/3 of an hour, or 40 minutes. This estimate says that individuals who in fact work 40 hours given the overtime kink in a given pay period would work about 40 minutes more that week in a world in which they were paid their straight-time wage for all hours, compared with a world in which they were paid 1.5 times this wage for all hours. On the other side of the spectrum, if all of the observed bunching mass is

<sup>36</sup>For the effect of changing the kink point, I censor CDF estimates at zero and one. In principle, this could undermine asymptotic normality, but these constraints are not typically binding so I ignore this issue.

<sup>37</sup>In particular, I present a point estimate based on Appendix Proposition 1, which assumes that treatment effects are constant and that the density is linear in the missing region, as well as results under a weaker assumption that the density is monotonic in the missing region. Monotonicity is not likely to hold in the overtime context, since the kink appears to be located at the mode of both the  $h_0$  and  $h_1$  distributions. Nevertheless, the bounds based on monotonicity do not deliver vastly different results.

attributed to active bunchers, corresponding to  $p = 0$ , then the estimated buncher LATE suggests a difference of at least 2.6 hours. The next section expresses these estimates as elasticities, by making the bi-log-concavity assumption on the distribution of log hours rather than hours.<sup>38</sup> In Appendix Table E.5 I report estimates of the buncher LATE for each of the largest industries in the sample, and also present estimates as a function of the assumed mass  $p$  of counterfactual bunchers at 40 hours.

	$p=0$	$p$ from non-changers	$p$ from PTO
Net bunching:	0.116 [0.112, 0.120]	0.057 [0.055, 0.058]	0.027 [0.024, 0.030]
Buncher LATE	[2.614, 3.054] [2.493, 3.205]	[1.324, 1.435] [1.264, 1.501]	[0.640, 0.666] [0.574, 0.736]
Num observations	630217	630217	630217
Num clusters	566	566	566

**TABLE 2:** Estimates of net bunching  $\mathcal{B} - p$  and the buncher LATE:  $\Delta_k^* = \mathbb{E}[h_{0it} - h_{1it} | h_{it} = k, K_{it}^* = 0]$ , across various strategies to estimate counterfactual bunching  $p = P(K_{it}^* = 1)$ . Unit of analysis is a paycheck, and 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (in gray) are clustered by firm.

## 5.4 Estimates of policy effects

I now use estimates of the buncher LATE to estimate the overall causal effect of the FLSA overtime rule, as well as simulate changes based on modifying standard hours or the premium pay factor. Table 3 reports an estimate of the buncher LATE expressed as a reduced form elasticity,<sup>39</sup> which I use as an input in these calculations. The next two rows report bounds on  $\mathbb{E}[h_{it} - h_{it}^*]$  and  $\mathbb{E}[h_{it} - h_{it}^* | h_{1it} \geq 40, K_{it}^* = 0]$ , respectively. The first of these is the overall ex-post effect of the FLSA on hours, averaged over both workers and pay periods, while the second conditions on paychecks for which the FLSA premium has a direct effect (those reporting at least 40 hours aside from counterfactual bunchers). The final row reports an estimate of the effect of moving to double-time pay, also including a

<sup>38</sup> Appendix Table E.11 also shows estimates based on constant treatment effects in logs and monotonicity or linear interpolation.

<sup>39</sup> This is  $\hat{\Delta}_k^* / (40 \ln(1.5))$  where  $\hat{\Delta}_k^*$  is the estimate of the buncher LATE presented in Table 2, which is numerically equivalent to the elasticity implied by the buncher LATE in logs  $\mathbb{E}[\ln h_{0it} - \ln h_{1it} | h_{it} = k, K_{it}^* = 0] / (\ln 1.5)$  estimated under assumption that  $\ln h_0$  and  $\ln h_1$  are BLC.

correction term to account for possible wage changes. I provide details of the calculations in Supplemental Appendix 4.7.


Taking the PTO-based estimate of  $p$  as a lower bound on responsiveness, the estimates suggest that FLSA eligible workers work at least 1/5 of an hour less in any given week than they would absent overtime regulation: about one third the magnitude of the buncher LATE in levels. When I focus on those eligible workers that are directly affected in a given week, the figure is about twice as high: roughly 30 minutes. I estimate that a move to double-time pay would introduce a further reduction that may be comparable to the existing overall ex-post effect, but with substantially wider bounds. These estimates include the effects of possible adjustments to straight-time wages, which tend to attenuate the effects of the policy change. Appendix Table E.12 replicates Table 3 neglecting these wage adjustments, which might be viewed as a short-run response to the FLSA before wages have time to adjust.

	$p=0$	$p$ from non-changers	$p$ from PTO
Buncher LATE as elasticity	[-0.188,-0.161] [-0.198,-0.154]	[-0.088,-0.082] [-0.093,-0.078]	[-0.041,-0.039] [-0.045,-0.035]
Average effect of FLSA on hours	[-1.466, -1.026] [-1.535, -0.977]	[-0.727, -0.486] [-0.762, -0.463]	[-0.347, -0.227] [-0.384, -0.203]
Avg. effect among directly affected	[-2.620, -1.833] [-2.733, -1.750]	[-1.453, -0.972] [-1.518, -0.929]	[-0.738, -0.483] [-0.812, -0.434]
Double-time, average effect on hours	[-2.604, -0.569] [-2.707, -0.547]	[-1.239, -0.314] [-1.285, -0.300]	[-0.580, -0.159] [-0.638, -0.143]

**TABLE 3:** Estimates of the buncher LATE expressed as an elasticity, the average ex-post effect of the FLSA  $\mathbb{E}[h_{it} - h_{it}^*]$ ,<sup>39</sup> the effect among directly affected units  $\mathbb{E}[h_{it} - h_{it}^* | h_{it} \geq k]$  and predicted effects of a change to double-time. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals in gray, clustered by firm.

Figure 9 breaks down estimates of the ex-post effect of the kink by major industry, revealing considerable heterogeneity between industries. The estimates suggest that the industries Real Estate & Rental and Leasing as well as Wholesale Trade see the highest average reduction in hours. The least-affected industries are Health Care and Social Assistance and Professional Scientific and Technical, with the average worker working just about 6 minutes less per week. Appendix Figure E.8 compares the hours distribution for Real Estate & Rental and Leasing with the distribution for of Professional Scientific and Technical, showing that the difference in their effects can be explained by  $\mathcal{B} - p$  being

larger for Real Estate & Rental and Leasing, while the density of hours close to the kink is smaller. Appendix Table E.6 reports numerical values as well as estimates based on assuming all of the bunching is due to the FLSA. Appendix E reports estimates broken down by gender, finding that the FLSA has considerably higher effects on the hours of men.



**FIGURE 9:** 95% confidence intervals for the effect of the FLSA on hours by industry, using PTO-based estimates of  $p$  for each. Dots are point estimates of the upper and lower bounds. The number to the right of each range is the point estimate of the net bunching  $B - p$  for that industry.

Figure 10 looks at the effect of changing the threshold for overtime hours  $k$  from 40 to alternative values  $k'$ . The left panel reports estimates of the identified bounds on  $\mathcal{B}^{[k', \rho_1]}$  as well as point-wise 95% confidence intervals (gray) across values of  $k'$  between 35 and 45, for each of the three approaches to estimating  $p$ . In all cases, the upper bound on bunching approaches zero as  $k'$  is moved farther from 40. This is sensible if the  $h_0$  and  $h_1$  distributions are roughly unimodal with modes around 40: straddling of potential outcomes becomes less and less likely as one moves away from where most of the mass is. Appendix E.11 shows these bounds as  $k'$  ranges all the way from 0 to 80, for the  $p = 0$  case.

Since these estimates do not account for adjustment to straight-time wages, they should be viewed as short-run responses.

When  $p$  is estimated using PTO or non-changers between periods, we see that the upper bound of the identified set for  $\mathcal{B}^{[k', \rho_1]}$  in fact reaches zero quite quickly. Moving standard errors to  $k' = 35$  is predicted to completely eliminate bunching due to the overtime kink in the short run, before any adjustment to latent hours (e.g. through changes to straight-time wages). The right panel of Figure 10 shows estimates for the average effect on hours of changing  $k$ , inclusive of wage effects (see Appendix F for details). Increases to  $k$  cause an increase in hours, as overtime policy becomes less stringent, and reductions to  $k$  reduce hours. The actual size of these effects is not well-identified for changes larger than a couple of hours, however the range of statistically significant effects depends on  $p$ . Even for the preferred estimate of  $p$  from PTO, increasing the overtime threshold as high as 43 hours is estimated to increase average working hours by an amount distinguishable from zero.


## 6 Implications of the estimates for overtime policy

The estimates from the preceding section suggest that FLSA regulation indeed has real effects on hours worked, in line with labor demand theory when wages do not fully adjust to absorb the added cost of overtime hours. When averaged over affected workers and across pay periods, I find that hourly workers in my sample work at least 30 minutes less per week than they would without the overtime rule. A less conservative estimate of the bunching caused by the FLSA suggests the effect is between 1 and 1.5 hours. My preferred estimate of about half an hour is broadly comparable to the few causal estimates that exist in the literature, including Hamermesh and Trejo (2000) who assess the effects of expanding California’s daily overtime rule to cover men in 1980, and Brown and Hamermesh (2019) who use the erosion of the real value of FLSA exemption thresholds over the last several decades.<sup>40</sup> By contrast, my estimates carry the strengths of an approach to identification that does not require a natural experiment, and use much more recent data.

From the perspective of a typical worker, a decrease in working hours of 30 minutes per week may seem modest, but the overall effect of the policy could be quite large. The data suggest that at least about 3% and as many as about 11% of workers’ hours are ad-

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<sup>40</sup>Hamermesh and Trejo (2000) and Brown and Hamermesh (2019) report estimates of  $-0.5$  and  $-0.18$  for the elasticity of overtime hours with respect to the overtime rate. My preferred estimate of  $-0.04$  for the buncher LATE as an elasticity is the elasticity of *total* hours, including the first 40. An elasticity of overtime hours can be computed by multiplying this by the ratio of mean hours to mean overtime hours in the sample, resulting in an estimate of roughly  $-0.45$ .



**FIGURE 10:** Bounds for the bunching that would exist at standard hours  $k$  if it were changed from 40 (left panel), as well as for the impact on average hours (right panel). Bounds of the effect on hours are clipped to the interval  $[-0.5, 0.5]$  for visibility. Pointwise bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals, cluster bootstrapped by firm, are shaded gray.

justed to the threshold introduced by the policy, indicating that the policy may have significant distortionary impacts. But the policy may also have quite substantial effects on

unemployment. While a full assessment of the employment effects of the FLSA overtime rule is beyond the scope of this paper, the hours effects estimated here can be used to construct some back-of-the-envelope calculations.

If the average FLSA eligible worker works approximately 1/3 of an hour less per week because of the rule, hours per worker are reduced by just under 1% on average. If we ignore scale effects of the overtime rule on the total number of labor hours in FLSA-eligible jobs, this would suggest that employment among such jobs is 1% higher than it would be without the overtime premium. This serves as an upper bound, since overall hours worked may decrease due to overtime regulation. Hamermesh (1996) proposes a simple adjustment, based on assuming a value for the rate at which firms substitute labor for capital based on their relative prices, and the possibility of offsetting labor supply effects. In particular, the adjustment assumes the percentage change in employment is  $\Delta \ln E|_{EH} - \eta \cdot \Delta \ln LC \cdot \frac{\eta}{\alpha - \eta}$  where  $\eta$  is a constant-output demand elasticity for labor (rather than capital),  $\alpha$  is a labor supply elasticity, and  $\Delta \ln LC$  is the percentage change in total labor costs from the introduction of the FLSA. Here  $\Delta \ln E|_{EH}$  is the quantity implied by my estimates: the percentage change in employment that would occur were the total number of worker-hours  $EH$  unchanged.

Using plausible values from Hamermesh (1996) for the remaining parameters yields 0.17 percentage points for the substitution term  $\eta \cdot \Delta \ln LC \cdot \frac{\eta}{\alpha - \eta}$ , suggesting that the effect of the FLSA is attenuated from roughly 0.87 percentage points to about a 0.70 percentage point net increase in employment. This would represent about 700,000 jobs, assuming 100 million FLSA eligible workers. A reasonable range of parameter values rules out negative overall employment effects from the FLSA.<sup>41</sup> I can also put an overall upper bound on the size of employment effects, by attributing all of the bunching at 40 to the FLSA and assuming the total number of worker-hours is not reduced at all. By this estimate the FLSA increases employment by at most 3 million jobs, or 3% among covered workers.

This paper has also considered the likely effects of adjusting the two parameters that characterize the FLSA overtime rule: standard hours and the overtime premium factor. The effect of moving to double-pay for overtime is not as precisely identified as the ex-post effect of the FLSA, but estimates suggest an average additional effect on hours that is at least as large as the effect of the current FLSA regulation. I also find that moving time-and-a-half overtime pay to begin at 35 rather than 40 hours would nearly eliminate bunching due to the FLSA, given workers' current wages.<sup>42</sup> While my short run predic-

<sup>41</sup>These "best-guess" values are  $\eta = -0.3$ ,  $\alpha = 0.1$ , and  $\Delta \ln LC$  calibrated assuming 80% of labor costs come from wages with overtime representing 2% of total hours. Generating a negative overall employment response by assuming higher substitution to capital requires  $\eta = -1.25$ , well outside of empirical estimates.

<sup>42</sup>Estimates of the average hours effect for changes to standard hours are consistent with estimates by



tion under this policy counterfactual assumes away changes to straight-time wages, the reduction in bunching is likely to remain after allowing such adjustment over time. With 35 already to the left of the mode of the latent hours distributions  $h_{0i}$  and  $h_{1i}$ , it would become even further from the mode as these distributions move rightward due to lower wages. Moving the overtime premium away from the mode of the distribution of these latent hours choices may thus lead to efficiency benefits that are persistent over time.

## 7 Conclusion

This paper has analyzed the effects of U.S. overtime policy on hours worked by adapting the method of using bunching at kinks to address itself to questions of causal inference. While structural models of choice can help interpret estimates that use bunching at a kink, I have shown that the basic identifying power of the bunching design is robust to a variety of underlying choice models and functional form assumptions. Across such choices, the identified parameter of interest is an appropriately-defined average treatment effect between two counterfactual choices, making the method useful for reduced-form program evaluation. This also opens the door to applying the bunching design in a broader variety of contexts, beyond those in which the researcher is prepared to posit a parametric model of decision-makers' preferences.

By leveraging these insights with a new payroll dataset recording exact weekly hours paid at the individual level, I estimate that U.S. workers subject to the FLSA indeed work shorter hours due to the overtime rule, which may lead to substantial employment effects. Given the large amount of within-worker variation in hours observed in the data, the modest size of the FLSA effects estimated in this paper suggest that firms do face significant incentives to maintain longer working hours, countervailing against the ones introduced by policies intended to reduce them.

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## A Identification in a generalized bunching design

This section develops the formal results used in the paper. While the FLSA will provide a running example throughout, I largely abstract from the overtime context to emphasize the wide applicability of the results. To facilitate comparison with the existing literature on bunching at kinks – which has mostly considered cross-sectional data – I throughout this section suppress time indices and use the single index  $i$  to refer to each unit of observation (a paycheck in the overtime case).

Further, the “running variable” of the bunching design is denoted throughout this section by  $Y$  rather than  $h$ . This is done to emphasize the link to the treatment effects literature, while allowing a distinction that can be in some cases necessary (e.g. a model where hours of pay for work differ from actual hours of work).

### A.1 A generalized bunching-design model

Consider decision-makers  $i$  who choose a point  $(z, \mathbf{x})$  in some space  $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{d+1}$  where  $z$  is a scalar and  $\mathbf{x}$  a vector of  $d$  components, subject to a constraint of the form:

$$z \geq \max\{B_{0i}(\mathbf{x}), B_{1i}(\mathbf{x})\} \quad (\text{A.1})$$

We require that  $B_{0i}(\mathbf{x})$  and  $B_{1i}(\mathbf{x})$  are continuous and weakly convex functions of the vector  $\mathbf{x}$ , and that there exist continuous scalar functions  $y_i(\mathbf{x})$  and a scalar  $k$  such that:

$$B_{0i}(\mathbf{x}) > B_{1i}(\mathbf{x}) \text{ whenever } y_i(\mathbf{x}) < k \quad \text{and} \quad B_{0i}(\mathbf{x}) < B_{1i}(\mathbf{x}) \text{ whenever } y_i(\mathbf{x}) > k$$

The value  $k$  is taken to be common to all units  $i$ , and is assumed to be known by the researcher.<sup>43</sup> In the overtime setting,  $y_i(\mathbf{x})$  represents the hours of work for which a worker is paid in a given week, and  $k = 40$ . Let  $X_i$  be  $i$ 's realized outcome of  $\mathbf{x}$ , and  $Y_i = y_i(X_i)$ . I assume that  $Y_i$  is observed by the econometrician, but not that  $X_i$  is.

In a typical example, the functions  $B_{0i}$ ,  $B_{1i}$  will represent a schedule of some kind of “cost” as a function of the choice vector  $\mathbf{x}$ , with two regimes of costs that are separated by the condition  $y_i(\mathbf{x}) = k$ , characterizing the locus of points at which the two cost functions cross. Let  $B_{ki}(\mathbf{x}) := \max\{B_{0i}(\mathbf{x}), B_{1i}(\mathbf{x})\}$ . Budget constraints like Eq.  $z \geq B_{ki}(\mathbf{x})$  are typically “kinked” because while the function  $B_{ki}(\mathbf{x})$  is continuous, it will generally be non-differentiable at the  $\mathbf{x}$  for which  $y_i(\mathbf{x}) = k$ .<sup>44</sup> While the functions  $B_0$ ,  $B_1$  and  $y$  can all depend on  $i$ , I will often suppress this dependency for clarity of notation.

In the most common cases from the literature,  $\mathbf{x}$  is assumed to be the scalar  $y_i(x) = x$ , i.e. there is no distinction between the “kink variable”  $y$  and underlying choice variables  $\mathbf{x}$ . For example, the seminal bunching design papers Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011) considered progressive taxation with  $z$  being tax liability (or credits), both  $y = x$  corresponding to taxable income, and  $B_0$  and  $B_1$  linear tax functions on either side of a threshold  $y$  between two adjacent tax/benefit brackets. However, even when the functions  $B_0$  and  $B_1$  only depend on  $\mathbf{x}$  through  $y_i(\mathbf{x})$ , the bunching design is compatible with models in which multiple margins of choice respond to the incentives provided by the kink.<sup>45</sup> In fact, the econometrician may be agnostic as to even what the full set of components of  $\mathbf{x}$  are, with  $y(\cdot)$ ,  $B_0(\cdot)$  or  $B_1(\cdot)$  depending only on various subsets of them. The next section will discuss how the bunching design allows us to conduct causal inference on the variable  $Y_i$ , but not directly on the underlying choice variables  $X_i$ .

In the overtime context,  $z$  corresponds to the cost of a single-worker’s labor in a single week, and:

$$B_{0i}(y) := w_i y \quad \text{and} \quad B_{1i}(y) := 1.5w_i y - 20w_i \quad (\text{A.2})$$


The functions  $B_0$  and  $B_1$  are depicted in Figure A.1 for a single worker with wage  $w_i = w$ .  $B_0$  describes a setting in which the worker is paid at their straight-time wage  $w$  for all

<sup>43</sup>This comes at little cost of generality since with heterogeneous  $k_i$  this could be subsumed as a constant into the function  $y_i(\mathbf{x})$ , so long as the  $k_i$  are observed by the researcher.

<sup>44</sup>In particular, the subgradient of  $\max\{B_{0i}(\mathbf{x}), B_{1i}(\mathbf{x})\}$  will depend on whether one approaches from the  $y_i(\mathbf{x}) > k$  or the  $y_i(\mathbf{x}) < k$  side. For example with a scalar  $x$  and linear  $B_0$  and  $B_1$ , the derivative of  $B_{ki}(x)$  discontinuously rises when  $y_i(x) = k$ .

<sup>45</sup>An example from the literature in which a distinction between  $y$  and  $\mathbf{x}$  cannot be avoided is Best et al. (2015). These authors study firms in Pakistan, who pay either a tax on output or a tax on profit, whichever is higher. The two tax schedules cross when the ratio of profits to output crosses a certain threshold that is pinned down by the two respective tax rates. In this case, the variable  $y$  depends both on production and on reported costs, leading to two margins of response to the kink: one from choosing the scale of production and the other from choosing whether and how much to misreport costs.

hours, regardless of whether they work more or less than 40.  $B_1$  describes a setting in which the worker is instead paid at their overtime rate  $1.5w$  for all hours, but the firm is given a subsidy that keeps them indifferent between the two cost schedules at  $y = 40$ . With these definitions, we can see that the actual labor cost to the firm of any number of hours  $h$  is  $B_{ki}(y) := \max\{B_{0i}(y), B_{1i}(y)\}$  for worker  $i$ .



**FIGURE A.1:** Definition of counterfactual cost functions  $B_0$  and  $B_1$  that firms could have faced, absent the overtime kink. Dashed lines show the rest of actual cost function in comparison to the counterfactual as a solid line.

## A.2 Potential outcomes as counterfactual choices

To introduce a notion of treatment effects in the bunching design, I define a pair of potential outcomes as what would occur if the decision-maker faced either of the functions  $B_0$  or  $B_1$  globally, without the kink:

**Definition (potential outcomes).** Let  $Y_{0i}$  be the value of  $y_i(\mathbf{x})$  that would occur for agent  $i$  if they faced the constraint  $z \geq B_0(\mathbf{x})$ , and let  $Y_{1i}$  be the value that would occur under the constraint  $z \geq B_1(\mathbf{x})$ .

The above definition requires outcomes  $y$  and costs  $z$  to be definable at the individual level, but does not require the no-interference condition of the stable unit treatment values assumption (SUTVA). Nevertheless, the interpretation of the treatment effects identified by the bunching design is most straightforward when SUTVA holds. This assumption is standard in the bunching design, though it may be a restrictive one in overtime context where a single firm chooses the hours of multiple workers.<sup>46</sup> I discuss this further in the overtime setting in Section 4.4 and Appendix C.

<sup>46</sup>However I note that SUTVA issues could also occur in canonical bunching designs: for example if



To relate these counterfactual outcomes to choices of the decision-maker, we make explicit the assumption that they control the value of  $y_i(\mathbf{x})$ . For any function  $B$  let  $Y_{Bi}$  be the outcome that would occur under the choice constraint  $z \geq B(\mathbf{x})$ , with  $Y_{0i}$  and  $Y_{1i}$  shorthands for  $Y_{B_{0i}i}$  and  $Y_{B_{1i}i}$ , respectively.<sup>47</sup>

**Assumption CHOICE (perfect manipulation of  $y$ ).** *For any function  $B(\mathbf{x})$ ,  $Y_{Bi} = y_i(\mathbf{x}_{Bi})$ , where  $(z_{Bi}, \mathbf{x}_{Bi})$  is the choice that  $i$  would make under the constraint  $z \geq B(\mathbf{x})$ .*

Assumption CHOICE rules out for example optimization error, which could limit the decision-maker's ability to exactly manipulate values of  $\mathbf{x}$  and hence  $y$ . It also takes for granted that counterfactual choices are unique, and rules out some kinds of extensive margin effects in which a decision-maker would not choose any value of  $Y$  at all under  $B_1$  or  $B_0$ . Assumption CHOICE may be relaxed somewhat while still allowing for meaningful causal inference, but I maintain this assumption throughout (however the decision-maker need not always be the firm only; see Appendix B). Note that CHOICE here differs from the version given in the main text in that it applies to all functions  $B$ , not just  $B_0$ ,  $B_1$  and  $B_k$  (this is useful for Theorem 2).

The central behavioral assumption that allows us to reason about the counterfactuals  $Y_0$  and  $Y_1$  is that decision-makers have convex preferences over  $(c, \mathbf{x})$  and dislike costs  $z$ :

**Assumption CONVEX (strictly convex preferences, monotonic in  $z$ ).** *For each agent  $i$  and function  $B(\mathbf{x})$ , choice is  $(z_{Bi}, \mathbf{x}_{Bi}) = \operatorname{argmax}_{z, \mathbf{x}} \{u_i(z, \mathbf{x}) : z \geq B(\mathbf{x})\}$  where  $u_i(z, \mathbf{x})$  is continuous and strictly quasi-concave in  $(z, \mathbf{x})$ , and strictly decreasing in  $z$ .*

Note that in the overtime setting with firms choosing hours,  $u_i(z, \mathbf{x})$  corresponds to the firm's profit function  $\pi$  as a function of the hours of a particular worker (in a particular period), and costs this week for that worker.

A weaker assumption than convexity that will still have identifying power is simply that agents' choices do not violate the weak axiom of revealed preference:

**Assumption WARP (rationalizable choices).** *Consider two budget functions  $B$  and  $B'$  and any agent  $i$ . If their choice under  $B'$  is feasible under  $B$ , i.e.  $z_{B'i} \geq B(\mathbf{x}_{B'i})$ , then  $(z_{Bi}, \mathbf{x}_{Bi}) = (z_{B'i}, \mathbf{x}_{B'i})$ .*

I make the stronger assumption CONVEX for most of the identification results, but Assumption WARP still allows a version of many of them in which equalities become weak

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spouses choose their labor supply jointly, the introduction of a tax kink may cause one spouse to increase labor supply while the other decreases theirs.

<sup>47</sup>Note that in this notation Assumption CHOICE implies that the actual outcome  $Y_i$  observed by the econometrician is equal to  $Y_{B_{ki}i}$ .

inequalities, indicating a degree of robustness with respect to departures from convexity. Note that the monotonicity assumption in CONVEX implies that choices will always satisfy  $z = B(\mathbf{x})$ , i.e. agents' choices will lay on their cost functions (despite Eq. A.1 being an inequality, indicating "free-disposal").

In the overtime application, the potential outcomes  $Y_{0i}$  and  $Y_{1i}$  are the hours that the firm would choose, respectively, in a situation a) in which there was no overtime premium and the firm always had to pay  $w_i$  for each hour; and b) a situation in which the firm were to pay  $1.5w_i$  for all hours of labor, but receive a subsidy of  $20w_i$  that keeps the firm indifferent between  $B_0$  and  $B_1$  when  $h = 40$  (cf. Eq. A.2). When firm preferences are quasilinear with respect to wage costs, the choice of hours  $Y_1$  will be the same as what the firm would have chosen without the subsidy of  $20w$ .

### Further notes on the general model

I conclude this section with some further remarks on the generality of Eq. (A.1) given the above assumptions. The first is that the budget functions  $B_0$  and  $B_1$  can depend on a subset of the variables that enter into the function for  $y$ , and vice versa. In the former case, this is because the only restriction on the  $B_{di}(\mathbf{x})$  for  $d \in \{0, 1\}$  is that they are continuous and weakly convex in all components of  $\mathbf{x}$ ; thus, having zero dependence on a component of  $\mathbf{x}$  is permissible. This is of particular interest because while the variables entering into the budget functions are generally known from the empirical context generating the kink, the model can allow additional choice variables to enter into the threshold-crossing variable  $y$ , that may not even be known to the econometrician. Section 4.2 provides some examples of this in the overtime setting.

Suppose that  $B_{di}(\mathbf{x}) = B_{di}(\bar{\mathbf{x}})$ , where  $\bar{\mathbf{x}}$  is a sub-vector of the first  $m$  components of  $\mathbf{x}$ , but  $y_i(\mathbf{x})$  is still a function of all  $m + l$  components of  $\mathbf{x}$ . The values of the remaining  $l$  components affect the decision-maker's optimizing choice of  $y$ , because they affect the value of  $y$  and hence which regime of  $B_{di}$  the decision-maker's choice is in. Thus, observed bunching in  $y$  can reflect a response along any of these  $l$  additional margins, even though they correspond to variables that are unobserved or even unknown to the researcher. This can complicate identification of specific structural elasticities, but does not challenge the credibility of causal inference about  $y$ .

### A.3 Observables in the kink bunching design

Lemma 1 outlines the core consequence of convexity of preferences for the relationship between observed  $Y_i$  and the potential outcomes introduced in the last section:

**Lemma 1 (realized choices as truncated potential outcomes).** *Under Assumptions CONVEX and CHOICE:*

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} Y_{0i} & \text{if } Y_{0i} < k \\ k & \text{if } Y_{1i} \leq k \leq Y_{0i} \\ Y_{1i} & \text{if } Y_{1i} > k \end{cases}$$

*Proof.* See Appendix F. □

Lemma 1 says that the pair of counterfactual outcomes  $(Y_{0i}, Y_{1i})$  is sufficient to pin down actual choice  $Y_i$ , which can in fact be seen as an observation of one or the other potential outcome depending on how they relate to the kink point  $k$ . When the  $Y_{0i}$  potential outcome is greater than  $k$  but the  $Y_{1i}$  potential outcome is below – when the potential outcomes “straddle” the kink – the agent will locate choose the corner solution of locating exactly the kink.<sup>48</sup>

Lemma 1 differs from existing approaches to the bunching design in a basic way by expressing the condition for locating at  $Y_i = k$  in terms of the counterfactual choices  $Y_{0i}$  and  $Y_{1i}$ , rather than primitives of the underlying utility functions  $u_i(c, \mathbf{x})$ . The typical approach in the literature has been to assume a particular parametric functional form for  $u_i(c, \mathbf{x})$ , then derive an expression for  $\mathcal{B}$  in terms of such parameters (typically an elasticity parameter). Instead, I treat the underlying utility function  $u_i(c, \mathbf{x})$  as an intermediate step, only requiring the nonparametric restrictions of convexity and monotonicity. By expressing the bunching event in terms of the “reduced-form” quantity  $y_i(\mathbf{x})$ , we need only believe that there exists an underlying model of utility satisfying CONVEX, and do not need to know its form explicitly.

Consider a random sample of observations of  $Y_i$ . Under i.i.d. sampling of  $Y_i$ , the distribution  $F(y)$  of  $Y_i$  is identified. Let  $\mathcal{B} := P(Y_i = k)$  be the observable probability that the agent chooses to locate exactly at  $Y = k$ . By Lemma 1, this is equal to the probability of the event  $Y_{1i} \leq k \leq Y_{0i}$ . With convex preferences, a point mass  $\mathcal{B} > 0$  in the distribution of  $Y_i$  occurs when the straddling event occurs with positive probability.

Let  $\Delta_i = Y_{0i} - Y_{1i}$ . This can be thought of as the treatment effect of a counterfactual change from the choice set under  $B_1$  to the choice set under  $B_0$ . The straddling event can be expressed in terms of  $\Delta_i$  as  $Y_{0i} \in [k, k + \Delta_i]$ . This forms the basic link between the observable quantity  $\mathcal{B}$  and treatment effects. **Proposition 3** states the general result.

**Theorem 3 (relation between bunching and straddling).** *a) Under CONVEX and CHOICE:  $\mathcal{B} = P(Y_{0i} \in [k, k + \Delta_i])$ ; b) under WARP and CHOICE:  $\mathcal{B} \leq P(Y_{0i} \in [k, k + \Delta_i])$ .*

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<sup>48</sup>The opposite situation of  $Y_{0i} \leq k \leq Y_{1i}$ , what we might call “reverse straddling”, is ruled out by WARP when it occurs by at least one strict inequality.

*Proof.* See Appendix F. □

Let  $F_1(y) = P(Y_{0i} \leq y)$  be the distribution function of the random variable  $Y_0$ , and  $F_1(y)$  the distribution function of  $Y_1$ . From Lemma 1 it follows immediately that  $F_0(y) = F(y)$  for all  $y < k$ , and  $F_1(y) = F(y)$  for  $y > k$ . Thus observations of  $Y_i$  are also informative about the marginal distributions of  $Y_{0i}$  and  $Y_{1i}$ . A weaker version of this also holds under WARP rather than CONVEX:

**Corollary (identification of truncated densities).** *Suppose that  $F_0$  and  $F_1$  are continuously differentiable with derivatives  $f_0$  and  $f_1$ , and that  $F$  admits a derivative function  $f(y)$  for  $y \neq k$ . Under WARP and CHOICE:  $f_0(y) \leq f(y)$  for  $y < k$  and  $f_0(k) \leq \lim_{y \uparrow k} f(y)$ , while  $f_1(y) \leq f(y)$  for  $y > k$  and  $f_1(k) \leq \lim_{y \downarrow k} f(y)$ , with equalities under CONVEX.*

*Proof.* See Appendix F. □

*Discussion of treatment effects vs. structural parameters:*

The treatment effects  $\Delta_i$  are “reduced form” in the sense that when the decision-maker has multiple margins of response  $\mathbf{x}$  to the incentives introduced by the kink, these may be bundled together in the treatment effect  $\Delta_i$ . This clarifies a limitation sometimes levied against the bunching design, while also revealing a perhaps under-appreciated strength. On the one hand, it is not always clear “which elasticity” is elicited by bunching at a kink, complicating efforts to identify a elasticity parameter having a firm structural interpretation.

On the other hand, the bunching design can be useful for ex-post policy evaluation and even forecasting effects of small policy changes (as described in Section 4.4), without committing to a tightly parameterized underlying model of choice. The “trick” of Lemma 1 is to express the observable data in terms of counterfactual choices, rather than of primitives of the utility function. The econometrician need not even know the full vector  $\mathbf{x}$  of choice variables underlying agents’ value of  $y$ , they simply need to believe that preferences are convex in them, and verify that  $B_0$  and  $B_1$  are convex in a subset of them. This greatly increases the robustness of the method to potential misspecification of the underlying choice model. Appendix A further elucidates some of these issues through an example from the literature.


## A.4 The buncher LATE when Assumption RANK fails

This section picks up from the discussion in Section 4.3, which introduces the buncher LATE  $\Delta_k^*$  parameter and Assumption RANK, but continues with the notation of this Appendix. When RANK fails (and  $p = 0$  for simplicity), the bounds from Theorem 1 are still

valid for the averaged quantile treatment effect:

$$\frac{1}{\mathcal{B}} \int_{F_0(k)}^{F_1(k)} Q_0(u) - Q_1(u) = \mathbb{E}[Y_{0i}|Y_{0i} \in [k, k + \Delta_0^*]] - \mathbb{E}[Y_{1i}|Y_{1i} \in [k - \Delta_1^*, k]] \quad (\text{A.3})$$

under BLC of  $Y_0$  and  $Y_1$ , where we define  $\Delta_0^* := Q_0(F_1(k)) - Q_1(F_1(k)) = Q_0(F_1(k)) - k$  and  $\Delta_1^* := Q_0(F_0(k)) - Q_1(F_0(k)) = k - Q_1(F_0(k))$ . This can be seen to yield a lower bound on the buncher LATE, as described in Figure A.2 below.



**FIGURE A.2:** When Assumption RANK fails, the average  $E[Y_{0i}|Y_{0i} \in [k, k + \Delta_0^*]]$  will include the mass in the region  $S_0$ , who are not bunchers (blue, NE lines) but will be missing the mass in the region  $A_0$  (green, NW lines) who are. This causes an under-estimate of the desired quantity  $E[Y_{0i}|Y_{1i} \leq k \leq Y_{0i}]$ . Similarly,  $E[Y_{1i}|Y_{1i} \in [k - \Delta_1^*, k]]$  will include the mass in the region  $S_1$ , who are not bunchers but will be missing the mass in  $A_1$ , who are. This causes an over-estimate of the desired quantity  $E[Y_{1i}|Y_{1i} \leq k \leq Y_{0i}]$ .

## A.5 Policy changes in the bunching-design

Consider a bunching design in which the cost functions  $B_0$  and  $B_1$  can be viewed as members of family  $B_i(\mathbf{x}; \rho, k)$  parameterized by a continuum of scalars  $\rho$  and  $k$ , where  $B_{0i}(\mathbf{x}) = B_i(\mathbf{x}; \rho_0, k^*)$  and  $B_{1i}(\mathbf{x}) = B_i(\mathbf{x}; \rho_1, k^*)$  for some  $\rho_1 > \rho_0$  and value  $k^*$  of  $k$ . In the overtime setting  $\rho$  represents a wage-scaling factor, with  $\rho = 1$  for straight-time and

$\rho = 1.5$  for overtime:

$$B_i(y; \rho, k) = \rho w_i y - k w_i (\rho - 1) \quad (\text{A.4})$$

where work hours  $y$  may continue to be a function  $y(\mathbf{x})$  of a vector of choice variables to the firm. Here  $\rho$  represents an arbitrary wage-scaling factor, while  $k$  controls the size of a lump-sum subsidy that keeps  $B_i(k; \rho, k)$  invariant across  $\rho$ .

Assume that  $\rho$  takes values in a convex subset of  $\mathbb{R}$  containing  $\rho_0$  and  $\rho_1$ , and that for any  $k$  and  $\rho' > \rho$  the cost functions  $B_i(\mathbf{x}; \rho, k)$  and  $B_i(\mathbf{x}; \rho', k)$  satisfy the conditions of the bunching design framework from Section 4, with the function  $y_i(\mathbf{x})$  fixed across all such values. That is,  $B_i(\mathbf{x}; \rho', k) > B_i(\mathbf{x}; \rho, k)$  iff  $y_i(\mathbf{x}) > k$  with equality when  $y_i(\mathbf{x}) = k$ , the functions  $B_i(\cdot; \rho, k)$  are weakly convex and continuous, and  $y_i(\cdot)$  is continuous. It is readily verified that Equation (A.4) satisfies these requirements with  $y_i(h) = h$ .<sup>49</sup>

For any value of  $\rho$ , let  $Y_i(\rho, k)$  be agent  $i$ 's realized value of  $y_i(\mathbf{x})$  when a choice of  $(z, \mathbf{x})$  is made under the constraint  $c \geq B_i(\mathbf{x}; \rho, k)$ . A natural restriction in the overtime setting that is that the function  $Y_i(\rho, k)$  does not depend on  $k$ , and some of the results below will require this. A sufficient condition for  $Y_i(\rho, k) = Y_i(\rho)$  is a family of cost functions that are linearly separable in  $k$ , as we have in Equation (A.4), along with quasi-linearity of preferences:

**Assumption SEPARABLE (invariance of potential outcomes with respect to  $k$ ).** *For all  $i, \rho$  and  $k$ ,  $B_i(\mathbf{x}; \rho, k)$  is additively separable between  $k$  and  $\mathbf{x}$  (e.g.  $b_i(\mathbf{x}, \rho) + \phi_i(\rho, k)$  for some functions  $b_i$  and  $\phi_i$ ), and for all  $i$   $u_i(z, \mathbf{x})$  can be chosen to be additively separable and linear in  $z$ .*

Quasilinearity of preferences is a property of profit-maximizing firms when  $c$  represents a cost, thus it is a natural assumption in the overtime setting. However, additive separability of  $B(\mathbf{x}; \rho, k)$  in  $k$  may be context specific: in the example from Best et al. (2015) described in Appendix A, quasi-linearity of preferences is not sufficient since the cost functions are not additively separable in  $k$ . To maintain clarity of exposition, I will keep  $k$  implicit in  $Y_i(\rho)$  throughout the foregoing discussion, but the proofs make it clear when SEPARABLE is being used.

Below I state two intermediate results that allow us to derive expressions for the effects of marginal changes to  $\rho_1$  or  $k$  on hours. Lemma 2 generalizes an existing result from Blomquist et al. (2019), and makes use of a regularity condition I introduce in the proof as Assumption SMOOTH.<sup>50</sup> Counterfactual bunchers  $K_i^* = 1$  are assumed to stay at  $k^*$ ,

<sup>49</sup>As an alternative example, I construct in Appendix A functions  $B_i(\mathbf{x}; \rho, k)$  for the bunching design setting from Best et al. (2015). In that case,  $\rho$  parameterizes a smooth transition between an output and a profit tax, where  $k$  enters into the rate applied to the tax base for that value of  $\rho$ .

<sup>50</sup>Blomquist et al. (2019) derive the special case of Lemma 2 with CONVEX and  $p = 0$ , in the context of a more restricted model of labor supply under taxation. I establish it here for the general bunching design

regardless of  $\rho$  and  $k$ . Let  $p(k) = p \cdot \mathbb{1}(k = k^*)$  denote the possible counterfactual mass at the kink as a function of  $k$ . Let  $f_\rho(y)$  be the density of  $Y_i(\rho)$ , which exists by SMOOTH and is defined for  $y = k^*$  as a limit (see proof).

**Lemma 2 (bunching from marginal responsiveness).** *Assume CHOICE, SMOOTH and WARP. Then:*

$$\mathcal{B} - p(k) \leq \int_{\rho_0}^{\rho_1} f_\rho(k) \mathbb{E} \left[ -\frac{dY_i(\rho)}{d\rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho) = k \right] d\rho$$

*with equality under CONVEX.*

*Proof.* See Appendix F. □

Lemma 2 is particularly useful when combined with a result from Kasy (2017), which considers how the distribution of a generic outcome variable changes as heterogeneous units flow to different values of that variable in response to marginal policy changes.

**Lemma 3 (flows under a small change to  $\rho$ ).** *Under SMOOTH:*

$$\partial_\rho f_\rho(y) = \partial_y \left\{ f_\rho(y) \mathbb{E} \left[ -\frac{dY_i(\rho)}{d\rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho) = y, K_i^* = 0 \right] \right\}$$

*Proof.* See Appendix F. □

The intuition behind Lemma 3 comes from fluid dynamics. When  $\rho$  changes, a mass of units will “flow” out of a small neighborhood around any  $y$ , and this mass is proportional to the density at  $y$  and to the average rate at which units move in response to the change. When the magnitude of this net flow varies with  $y$ , the change to  $\rho$  will lead to a change in the density there.

With  $\rho_0$  fixed at some value, let us index observed  $Y_i$  and bunching  $\mathcal{B}$  with the superscript  $[k, \rho_1]$  when they occur in a kinked policy environment with cost functions  $B_i(\cdot; \rho_0, k)$  and  $B_i(\cdot; \rho_1, k)$ . Lemmas 2 and 3 together imply Theorem 2, which I repeat here:

**Theorem 2 (marginal comparative statics in the bunching design).** *Under Assumptions CHOICE, CONVEX, SMOOTH, and SEPARABLE:*

1.  $\partial_k \left\{ \mathcal{B}^{[k, \rho_1]} - p(k) \right\} = f_1(k) - f_0(k)$
2.  $\partial_k \mathbb{E}[Y_i^{[k, \rho_1]}] = \mathcal{B}^{[k, \rho_1]} - p(k)$

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model where in particular, the  $Y_i(\rho)$  may depend on an underlying vector  $\mathbf{x}$  which are not observed by the econometrician. I also use different regularity conditions.

$$3. \partial_{\rho_1} \mathbb{E}[Y_i^{[k, \rho_1]}] = - \int_k^\infty f_{\rho_1}(y) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{dY_i(\rho_1)}{d\rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho_1) = y \right] dy$$

*Proof.* See Appendix F. □

Assumption SEPARABLE is only necessary for Items 1-2 in Theorem 2, Item 3 holds without it and with  $\frac{\partial Y_i(\rho, k)}{\partial \rho}$  replacing  $\frac{dY_i(\rho)}{d\rho}$ .

## B Incorporating workers that set their own hours

This section considers the robustness of the empirical strategy from Section 4 to a case where some workers are able to choose their own hours. In this case, a simple extension of the model leads to the bounds on the buncher LATE remaining valid, but it is only directly informative about the effects of the FLSA among workers who have their hours chosen by the firm. In this section I follow the notation from the main text where  $h_{it}$  indicate the hours of worker  $i$  in week  $t$ .

Suppose that some workers are able to choose their hours each week without restriction (“worker-choosers”), and that for the remaining workers (“firm-choosers”) their employers set their hours. In general we can allow who chooses hours for a given worker to depend on the period, so let  $W_{it} = 1$  indicate that  $i$  is a worker-chooser in period  $t$ . Additionally, we continue to allow counterfactual bunchers for whom counterfactual hours satisfy  $h_{0it} = h_{1it} = 40$ , regardless of who chooses them. This setup is general enough to also allow a stylized bargaining-inspired model in which choices maximize a weighted sum of quasilinear worker and firm utilities.<sup>51</sup>

I replace Assumption CONVEX from Section 4 allow agents to either dislike pay (firm-choosers), or like pay (worker-choosers):

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<sup>51</sup>In particular, suppose that for any pay schedule  $B(h)$ :

$$h = \operatorname{argmax}_h \beta (f(h) - c) + (1 - \beta)(c - \nu(h)) \quad \text{with} \quad c = B(h) \quad (\text{B.5})$$

where  $f(h) - c$  is firm profits with concave production  $f$ ,  $c - \nu(h)$  is worker utility with a convex disutility of labor  $\nu(h)$ , and  $\beta \in [0, 1]$  governs the weight of each party in the negotiation (this corresponds to Nash bargaining in which outside options are strictly inferior to all  $h$  for both parties, and utility is log-linear in  $c$ ). Rearranging the maximand of Equation (B.5) as  $(1 - 2\beta)c + \{\beta f(h) - (1 - \beta)\nu(h)\}$ , we can observe that this setting delivers outcomes as-if chosen by a single agent with quasi-concave preferences, as  $\beta f(h) - (1 - \beta)\nu(h)$  is concave. For Assumption CONVEX from Section 4 to hold with the assumed direction of monotonicity in costs  $c$ , we would require that  $\beta > 1/2$  for all worker-firm pairs: informally, that firms have more say than workers do in determining hours. However CONVEX\* holds regardless of the distribution of  $\beta$  over worker-firm pairs. If  $\beta_{it} < 1/2$ , paycheck  $it$  will look exactly like a worker-chooser, and if  $\beta_{it} > 1/2$  paycheck  $it$  will look exactly like a firm-chooser.



**Assumption CONVEX\*** (convex preferences, monotonic in either direction). For each  $i, t$  and function  $B(\mathbf{x})$ , choice is  $(c_{Bi}, \mathbf{x}_{Bi}) = \operatorname{argmax}_{c, \mathbf{x}} \{u_i(c, \mathbf{x}) : c \geq B(\mathbf{x})\}$  where  $u_i(c, \mathbf{x})$  is continuous and strictly quasi-concave in  $(c, \mathbf{x})$ , and

- strictly increasing in  $c$ , if  $W_{it} = 1$
- strictly decreasing in  $c$ , if  $W_{it} = 0$

In this generalized model, bunching is prima-facie evidence that firm-choosers exist, because there is no prediction of bunching among worker-choosers provided that potential outcomes are continuously distributed (by contrast,  $k$  is a “hole” in the worker-chooser hours distribution). Indeed under regularity conditions all of the data local to 40 are from firm-choosers (and counterfactual bunchers). To make this claim precise, we assume that for worker-choosers hours are the only margin of response (i.e. their utility depends on  $\mathbf{x}$  only through  $y(\mathbf{x})$ ), and let  $IC_{0it}(y)$  and  $IC_{1it}(y)$  be the worker’s indifference curves passing through  $h_{0it}$  and  $h_{1it}$ , respectively. I assume these indifference curves are twice Lipschitz differentiable, with  $M_{it} := \sup_y \max\{|IC''_{0it}(y)|, |IC''_{1it}(y)|\}$ , where the supremum is taken over the support of hours, and  $IC''$  indicates second derivatives.

**Proposition 1.** Suppose that the joint distribution of  $h_{0it}$  and  $h_{1it}$  admits a continuous density conditional on  $K_{it}^* = 0$ , and that for any worker-chooser  $IC_{0it}$  and  $IC_{1it}$  are differentiable with  $M_{it}/w_{it}$  having bounded support. Then, under CHOICE and CONVEX\*:

- $P(h_{it} = k \text{ and } K_{it}^* = 0) = P(h_{1it} \leq k \leq h_{0it} \text{ and } K_{it}^* = 0 \text{ and } W_{it} = 0)$
- $\lim_{h \uparrow k} f(h) = P(W_{it} = 0) \lim_{h \uparrow k} f_{0|W=0}(h)$
- $\lim_{h \downarrow k} f(h) = P(W_{it} = 0) \lim_{h \downarrow k} f_{1|W=0}(h)$

*Proof.* Omitted for brevity. □

The first bullet of Proposition 1 says that all active bunchers are also firm-choosers, and have potential outcomes that straddle the kink. The second and third bullets state that the density of the data as hours approach 40 from either direction is composed only of worker-choosers. This result on density limits requires the stated regularity condition, which prevents worker indifference curves from becoming too close to themselves featuring a kink (plus a requirement that straight-time wages  $w_{it}$  be bounded away from zero).

Given the first item in Proposition 1, the buncher LATE introduced in Section 4 only includes firm-choosers:

$$\mathbb{E}[h_{0it} - h_{1it} | h_{it} = 40, K_{it}^* = 0] = \mathbb{E}[h_{0it} - h_{1it} | h_{it} = 40, K_{it}^* = 0, W_{it} = 0]$$

Accordingly, I assume rank invariance among the firm-chooser population only:

**Assumption RANK\*** (near rank invariance and counterfactual bunchers). *The following are true:*

$$(a) P(h_{0it} = k) = P(h_{1it} = k) = p$$

$$(b) Y = k \text{ iff } h_0 \in [k, k + \Delta_0^*] \text{ and } W = 0 \text{ iff } h_1 \in [k - \Delta_1^*, k] \text{ and } W = 0, \text{ for some } \Delta_0^*, \Delta_1^*$$

where  $p$  continues to denote  $P(K_{it}^* = 1)$ .

We may now state a version of Theorem 2 that conditions all quantities on  $W = 0$ , provided that we assume bi-log concavity of  $h_0$  and  $h_1$  conditional on  $W = 0$  and  $K = 0$ .

**Theorem 1\*** (bi-log-concavity bounds on the buncher LATE, with worker-choosers). *Assume CHOICE, CONVEX\* and RANK\* hold. If both  $h_{0it}$  and  $h_{1it}$  are bi-log concave conditional on the event  $(W_{it} = 0 \text{ and } K_{it}^* = 0)$ , then:*

$$\mathbb{E}[h_{0it} - h_{1it} | h_{it} = k, K_{it}^* = 0] \in [\Delta_k^L, \Delta_k^U]$$

where

$$\Delta_k^L = g(F_{0|W=0, K^*=0}(k), f_{0|W=0, K^*=0}(k), \mathcal{B}^*) + g(1 - F_{1|W=0, K^*=0}(k), f_{1|W=0, K^*=0}(k), \mathcal{B}^*)$$

and

$$\Delta_k^U = -g(1 - F_{0|W=0, K^*=0}(k), f_{0|W=0, K^*=0}(k), -\mathcal{B}^*) - g(F_{1|W=0, K^*=0}(k), f_{1|W=0, K^*=0}(k), -\mathcal{B}^*)$$

where  $\mathcal{B}^* = P(h_{it} = k | W_{it} = 0, K_{it}^* = 0)$  and


$$g(a, b, x) = \frac{a}{bx} (a + x) \ln \left( 1 + \frac{x}{a} \right) - \frac{a}{b}$$

The bounds are sharp.

*Proof.* Omitted for brevity. □

Theorem 1\* does not immediately yield identification of the buncher-LATE bounds  $\Delta_k^L$  and  $\Delta_k^U$ , as we need to estimate each of the arguments to the function  $g$ . Using that the function  $g$  is homogenous of degree one, the bounds can be rewritten in terms of  $p$ , the identified quantities  $\mathcal{B}$ ,  $P(W_{it} = 0) \lim_{y \uparrow k} f_{0|W=0}(y)$  and  $P(W_{it} = 0) \lim_{y \uparrow k} f_{1|W=0}(y)$ , as well as the two probabilities  $P(h_{it} < 40 \text{ and } W_{it} = 0)$  and  $P(h_{it} > 40 \text{ and } W_{it} = 0)$  (see proof for details).

### A distribution with worker-choosers



**FIGURE B.3:** The joint distribution of  $(h_{0it}, h_{1it})$ , for a distribution including worker-choosers and satisfying assumption RANK\*, cf. Figure 6. See text for description.

Figure B.3 depicts an example of a joint distribution of  $(h_0, h_1)$  that includes worker-choosers and satisfies Assumption RANK\*. The x-axis is  $h_0$ , and the y-axis is  $h_1$ , with the solid lines indicating 40 hours and the dotted diagonal line depicting  $h_1 = h_0$ . The dots show a hypothetical joint-distribution of the potential outcomes, with the (red) cloud south of the 45-degree line being firm-choosers, and the (green and blue) cloud above being worker-choosers. Green x's indicate worker-choosers who choose their value of  $h_0$ , while blue circles indicate worker-choosers who choose their value of  $h_1$ . The orange dot at  $(40, 40)$  represents a mass of counterfactual bunchers.

Observed to the the econometrician is the point mass at 40 as well as the truncated marginal distributions depicted at the bottom and the right of the figure, respectively. The observable  $P(h_{it} \leq h)$  for  $h < 40$  doesn't exactly identify  $P(h_{0it} \leq h)$  because some green x's are missing – these are worker-choosers for whom  $h_1 > 40 > h_0$  and choose to work overtime at their  $h_1$  value. Thus they show up in the data at  $h > 40$  even though they have  $h_0 < 40$ . Similarly, some blue circles are missing from the data above 40 – these are worker-choosers for whom  $h_1 > 40 > h_0$  and choose to work their  $h_0$  value, not working

overtime. The probabilities  $P(h_{it} < 40 \text{ and } W_{it} = 1)$  and  $P(h_{it} > 40 \text{ and } W_{it} = 0)$  can thus only be estimated with some error, with the size of the error depending on the mass of worker-choosers in the northwest quadrant of Figure B.3. However, this has little impact on the results.<sup>52</sup>

Two further caveats of Theorem 1\* are worth mentioning here. First, an evaluation of the FLSA would ideally account for worker-choosers (who are working longer hours as a result of the policy) when averaging treatment effects. However, the proportion of worker-choosers and the size of their hours increases are not identified. Using the buncher LATE to estimate the overall ex-post effect of the FLSA – as described in Section 4.4 – may overstate its overall average net hours reduction. Secondly, note that we can no longer directly verify the bi-log concavity assumption of  $h_0$  for  $h < k$ , and of  $h_1$  for  $h > k$ , by looking at the data. The reason is that the observed data is a mixture of the firm-chooser and worker-chooser distributions, while our BLC assumption regards the subgroup of firm-choosers. If the proportion of worker-choosers is small, then these caveats should have only a minor impact on the interpretation of the results. The first problem is difficult to avoid: estimating the overall effect of the FLSA based on a subset of firm-choosers is inevitably going to miss the fact that overtime pay increases hours for some workers.

## C Interdependencies among hours within the firm

In this section I consider the impact that interdependencies among the hours of different units may have on the estimates, reflected in the third term of Equation (8) from Section 4.4. I develop some structure to guide our intuition of this term, and then present some empirical evidence that it is likely to be small.

The basic issue is as follows: when a single firm chooses hours jointly among multiple units—either across different workers or across multiple weeks, or both—this term may be nonzero and contribute to the overall effect of the FLSA. This can be thought of as a violation of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) in assessing the overall average impact of the FLSA on hours, the effect of which is captured in the third term of Equation (8).

To simplify the notation, I'll assume that such SUTVA violations may occur across workers within a firm in a single week, suppressing the time index  $t$  and focusing on a single firm. As in Section 4.4 let  $\mathbf{h}_{-i}$  denote the vector of actual (observed) hours for all

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<sup>52</sup>The components of the bounds  $\Delta_k^L = L0 + L1$  and  $\Delta_k^U = -U0 - U1$  are not sensitive to the values of the CDF inputs  $F_{0|W=0, K^*=0}(k)$  and  $F_{1|W=0, K^*=0}(k)$ , as can be verified numerically (details available upon request). Intuitively,  $\Delta_k^L$  and  $\Delta_k^U$  mostly depend on the density estimates and the size of the bunching mass.

workers aside from  $i$  within  $i$ 's firm. These hours are chosen according to the kinked cost schedule introduced by the FLSA. Let  $h_{0i}(\cdot)$  denote the hours that the firm would choose for worker  $i$  if they had to pay  $i$ ' straight-wage  $w_i$  for all of  $i$ 's hours, as a function of the hours profile of the other workers in the firm (suppressing dependence on straight-wages in this section). Define  $h_{1i}(\cdot)$  analogously with  $1.5w_i$ . In this notation, the potential outcomes from Section 4 are  $h_{0i} = h_{0i}(\mathbf{h}_{-i})$  and  $h_{1i} = h_{1i}(\mathbf{h}_{-i})$ . As in Section 4.4 let  $(h_i^*, \mathbf{h}_{-i}^*)$  denote the hours profile that would occur absent the FLSA, so that the average ex-post effect of the FLSA is  $\mathbb{E}[h_i - h_i^*]$ .

For concreteness, we may consider the model introduced in the beginning of Section 4 in which hours are chosen to maximize profits with a joint-production function  $F(\mathbf{h})$ . In this case we have that  $(h_i, \mathbf{h}_{-i}) = \operatorname{argmax} \{F(\mathbf{h}) - \sum_j B_{kj}(h_j)\}$ , where the sum is across workers  $j$  in the firm and  $B_{kj}(h) := w_j h + .5w_j \mathbb{1}(h > 40)(h - 40)$ . Similarly  $(h_i^*, \mathbf{h}_{-i}^*) = \operatorname{argmax} \{F(\mathbf{h}) - \sum_j w_j h_j\}$  (where for the moment we ignore changes in  $w_j$ ). Whether  $h_{0i}(\mathbf{h}_{-i})$  is smaller or larger than  $h_i^*$  (with a fixed set of employees) will depend upon whether  $i$ 's hours are complements or substitutes in production with those of each of their colleagues, and with what strength. It is natural to expect that both cases occur. Consider for example a production function in which workers are divided into groups  $\theta_1 \dots \theta_M$  corresponding to different occupations, and:

$$F(\mathbf{h}) = \prod_{m=1}^M \left( \left( \sum_{i \in \theta_m} a_i \cdot h_i^{\rho_m} \right)^{1/\rho_m} \right)^{\alpha_m} \quad (\text{C.6})$$

where  $a_i$  is an individual productivity parameter for worker  $i$ . The hours of workers within an occupation enter as a CES aggregate with substitution parameter  $\rho_m$ , which then combine in a Cobb-Douglas form across occupations with exponents  $\alpha_m$ . The hours of two workers  $i$  and  $j$  belonging to different occupations are always complements in production, i.e.  $\partial_{h_i} F(\mathbf{h})$  is increasing in  $h_j$ . When  $i$  and  $j$  belong to the same occupation  $\theta_m$ , it can be shown that worker  $i$  and  $j$ 's hours are substitutes—i.e.  $\partial_{h_i} F(\mathbf{h})$  is *decreasing* in  $h_j$ —when  $\alpha_m \leq \rho_m$ .

Thus both substitution and complementarity in hours can plausibly coexist within a firm, and it is difficult to sign theoretically the contribution of interdependencies to  $\theta$ . Given that occupations or tasks are not observed in the data, it is also difficult to obtain direct evidence with the aid of structural assumptions like Eq. (C.6). I therefore turn to an indirect empirical test of whether these effects are likely to play a significant role in  $\theta$ .


Figure C.4 shows that in weeks when a worker receives a positive number of sick-pay hours, their individual hours worked for that week decline by about 8 hours on average. Yet I fail to find evidence of a corresponding change in the hours of others in the same

firm. This suggests that short term variation in the hours of a worker's colleagues does not tend to translate into contemporaneous changes in their own (for example, if the firm were dividing a fixed number of hours across workers).

Table C.1 shows another piece of evidence: that my overall effect estimates are similar between small, medium, and large firms. If firms were to compensate for overtime hours reductions by “giving” some hours to similar workers who would otherwise be working less than 40, for instance, then we would expect this to play a larger role in firms where there are a large number of substitutable workers—causing a bias that increases with firm size. I cannot reject that my strategy estimates the same parameter value across the three firm size categories, in my preferred specification of estimating  $p$  using variation in PTO.

	$p=0$		$p$ from PTO	
	Bunching	Effect of the kink	Net Bunching	Effect of the kink
Small firms	0.198 [0.189, 0.208]	[-1.525, -1.455] [-1.676, -1.299]	0.027 [0.023, 0.031]	[-0.231, -0.171] [-0.274, -0.139]
Medium firms	0.103 [0.095, 0.110]	[-1.123, -0.786] [-1.237, -0.710]	0.030 [0.025, 0.035]	[-0.337, -0.224] [-0.407, -0.178]
Large firms	0.050 [0.047, 0.054]	[-0.768, -0.468] [-0.861, -0.414]	0.024 [0.021, 0.028]	[-0.371, -0.224] [-0.444, -0.180]

**TABLE C.1:** Estimates of the ex-post effect of the kink by firm size. “Small” firms have between 1 and 25 workers in my estimation sample, “Medium” have 26 to 50, and “Large” have more than 50. Note that the estimated net bunching caused by the FLSA is similar across firm sizes (right), despite the raw bunching observed in the data differing by firm size category.



**FIGURE C.4:** Event study coefficients  $\beta_j$  and 95% confidence intervals across an instance of a worker receiving pay for non-work hours (either sick pay, holiday pay, or paid time off-‘PTO’). Equation is  $y_{it} = \mu_t + \lambda_i + \sum_{j=-3}^{10} \beta_j D_{it,j} + u_{it}$ , where  $D_{it,j} = 1$  if worker  $i$  in week  $t$  has a positive number of a given type of non-work hours  $j$  weeks ago (after a period of at least three weeks in which they did not),  $\lambda_i$  are worker fixed effects, and  $\mu_t$  are calendar week effects. Rows correspond to choices of the non-work pay type: either sick, holiday, PTO. Columns indicate choices of the outcome  $y_{it}$ . “Colleague hours worked” sums the hours of work in  $t$  across all workers other than  $i$  in  $i$ ’s firm. The timing of holiday and PTO hours appears to be correlated across workers, leading to a decrease in the working hours of  $i$ ’s colleagues in weeks in which  $i$  takes either holiday or PTO pay (center-right and bottom-right graphs). However I cannot reject that colleague work hours are unrelated to an instance of sick pay: before, during and after it occurs (top-right). Since  $i$ ’s hours of work reduce by about 8 hours on average during an instance of sick pay (top-center), this suggests that there is no contemporaneous reallocation of  $i$ ’s forgone work hours to their colleagues.

## D A simple model of wages and “typical” hours

Each firm faces a labor supply curve  $N(z, h)$ , indicating the labor force  $N$  it can maintain if it offers total compensation  $z$  to each of its workers, when they are each expected to work  $h$  hours per week. The firm chooses a pair  $(z^*, h^*)$  based on the cost-minimization

problem:

$$\min_{z,h,K,N} N \cdot (z + \psi) + rK \text{ s.t. } F(Ne(h), K) \geq Q \text{ and } N \leq N(z, h) \quad (\text{D.7})$$

where the labor supply function is increasing in  $z$  while decreasing in  $h$ ,  $e(h)$  represents the "effective labor" from a single worker working  $h$  hours, and  $\psi$  represents non-wage costs per worker. The quantity  $\psi$  can include for example recruitment effort and training costs, administrative overhead and benefits that do not depend on  $h$ . Concavity of  $e(h)$  captures declining productivity at longer hours, for example from fatigue or morale effects. The function  $F$  maps total effective labor  $Ne(h)$  and capital into level of output or revenue that is required to meet a target  $Q$ , and  $r$  is the cost of capital. For simplicity, workers within a firm are here identical and all covered by the FLSA.

To understand the properties of the solution to Equation (D.7), let us examine two illustrative special cases.

### Special case 1: an exogenous competitive straight-time wage

Much of the literature on hours determination has taken the hourly wage as a fixed input to the choice of hours, and assumed that at that wage the firm can hire any number of workers, regardless of hours. This can be motivated as a special case of Equation (D.7) in which there is perfect competition on the straight-time wage, i.e.  $N(z, h) = \bar{N} \mathbb{1}(w_s(z, h) \geq w)$  for some large number  $\bar{N}$  and wage  $w$  exogenous to the firm. Then Equation (D.7) reduces to:

$$\min_{N,h,K} N \cdot (hw + \mathbb{1}(h > 40)(w/2)(h - 40) + \psi) + rK \text{ s.t. } F(Ne(h), K) \geq Q \quad (\text{D.8})$$

By limiting the scope of labor supply effects in the firm's decision, Equation (D.8) is well-suited to illustrating the competing forces that shape hours choice on the production side: namely the fixed costs  $\psi$  and the concavity of  $e(h)$ . Were  $\psi$  equal to zero with  $e(h)$  strictly concave globally, a firm solving Equation (D.8) would always find it cheaper to produce a given level of output with more workers working less hours each. On the other hand, were  $\psi$  positive and  $e$  weakly convex, it would always be cheapest to hire a single worker to work all of the firm's hours. In general, fixed costs and declining hours productivity introduce a tradeoff that leads to an interior solution for hours.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>53</sup>In the fixed-wage special case, these two forces along with the wage are in fact sufficient to pin down hours, which do not depend on the production function  $F$  or the chosen output level  $Q$ . See e.g. Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) for the case in which  $e(h)$  is iso-elastic.



Equation (D.8) introduces a kink into the firm's costs as a function of hours, much as short-run wage rigidity does in my dynamic analysis. However, the assumption that the firm can demand any number of hours at a set straight-time wage rate is harder to defend when thinking about firms long-run expectations, a point emphasized by Lewis (1969). Equilibrium considerations will also tend to run against the independence of hourly wages and hours - a mechanism explored in Supplemental Appendix 1.

### Special case 2: iso-elastic functional forms

By placing some functional form restrictions on Equation (D.7), we can obtain a closed-form expression for  $(z^*, h^*)$ . In particular, when labor supply and  $e(h)$  are iso-elastic, production is separable between capital and labor and linear in the latter, and firms set the output target  $Q$  to maximize profits, Proposition 2 characterizes the firm's choice of earnings and hours:

**Proposition 2.** *When i)  $e(h) = e_0 h^\eta$  and  $N(z, h) = N_0 z^{\beta_z} h^{\beta_h}$ ; ii)  $F(L, K) = L + \phi(K)$  for some function  $\phi$ ; and iii)  $Q$  is chosen to maximize profits, the  $(z^*, h^*)$  that solve Equation (D.7) are:*

$$h^* = \left[ \frac{\psi}{e_0} \cdot \frac{\beta}{\beta - \eta} \right]^{1/\eta} \quad \text{and} \quad z^* = \psi \cdot \frac{\beta_z}{\beta_z + 1} \frac{\eta}{\beta - \eta}$$

where  $\beta := \frac{|\beta_h|}{\beta_z + 1}$ , provided that  $\psi > 0$ ,  $\eta \in (0, \beta)$ ,  $\beta_h < 0$  and  $\beta_z > 0$ . Hours and compensation are both decreasing in  $|\beta_h|$  and increasing in  $\beta_z$ .

*Proof.* Omitted for brevity. □

The proposition shows that the hours chosen depend on labor supply via  $\beta = \frac{|\beta_h|}{1 + \beta_z}$ , which gages how elastic labor supply is with respect to hours compared with earnings. The more sensitive labor supply is to a marginal increase in hours as compared with compensation, the higher  $\beta$  will be and lower the optimal number of hours. The proof of Proposition 2 also shows that unlike Special case 1 of perfect competition on the straight-time wage, when  $N(z, h)$  is differentiable the general model can support an interior solution for hours even without fixed costs  $\psi = 0$ .

*Note:* Broadly speaking, the function  $N(z, h)$  might be viewed as an equilibrium object that reflects both worker preferences over income and leisure and the competitive environment for labor. Thus it is conceivable that equilibrium forces lead to a labor supply function like that of the fixed-wage model, in which the the FLSA has an effect on the hours set at hiring. In Supplemental Appendix 1, I show that the prediction of the fixed-job model that the FLSA has little to no effect on  $h^*$  or  $z^*$  is robust to embedding Equation

(D.7) into an extension of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model of equilibrium with on-the-job search.<sup>54</sup> In the context of the search model, the only effect of the overtime rule on the distribution of  $h^*$  is mediated through the minimum wage, which rules out some of the  $(z^*, h^*)$  pairs that would occur in the unregulated equilibrium. In a numerical calibration, this effect is quite small, suggesting that equilibrium effects play only a minor role in how the FLSA overtime rule impacts anticipated hours or straight-time wages.

## E Additional empirical results

### E.1 A test of the Trejo (1991) model of straight-time wage adjustment

Another way to assess the role of wage rigidity is to test directly whether straight-time wages and hours are plausibly related according to Equation (1). To do this by supposing that some proportion of all paychecks reflect a wage that is determined from the worker's total earnings  $z_{it}$  according to Equation (1), while the others have wages set in some other way. We indicate those paychecks for which the wage is actively adjusted to this period's hours as  $A_{it} = 1$ , and let  $q(h) = P(A_{it} = 1 | h_{it} = h)$ . This nests an extreme version of the fixed-job model of Trejo (1991), in which  $q(h) = 1$  for all  $h$ .

By the law of iterated expectations and some algebra we have that:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} [\ln w_{it} | h_{it} = h] &= q(h) \{ \mathbb{E} [\ln(w_{it}) | h_{it} = h, A_{it} = 0] - \ln(h + 0.5(h - 40)\mathbb{1}(h \geq 40)) \} \\ &\quad - (1 - q(h)) \mathbb{E} [\ln w_{it} | h_{it} = h, A_{it} = 1] \end{aligned}$$

The second term above introduces a kink in the conditional expectation of log wages with respect to hours. If  $\mathbb{E} [\ln z_{it} | h_{it} = h, A_{it} = 0]$ ,  $\mathbb{E} [\ln w_{it} | h_{it} = h, A_{it} = 1]$  and  $q(h)$  are all continuously differentiable in  $h$ , then the magnitude of this kink identifies  $q(40)$ , the proportion of active wage responders local to  $h = 40$ .<sup>55</sup>


$$\lim_{h \downarrow 40} \frac{d}{dh} \mathbb{E} [\ln w_{it} | h_{it} = h] - \lim_{h \uparrow 40} \frac{d}{dh} \mathbb{E} [\ln w_{it} | h_{it} = h] = -\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{q(40)}{40}$$

Figure E.5 reports the results of fitting separate local linear functions to the CEF of log wages on either side of  $h = 40$ . We can reject the hypothesis that the fixed-job model

<sup>54</sup>This remains true even in the perfectly competitive limit of the model, the basic reason being that workers choose to accept jobs on the basis of their known total earnings  $z^*$ , rather than the straight-time wage.


<sup>55</sup>These continuous differentiability assumptions are reasonable, if wage setting according to Equation (1) is the only force introducing non-smoothness in the relationship between wages and hours.

applies to all employees at all times. However, the data appear to be consistent with a proportion  $q(40)$  of about 0.25 of all paychecks close to 40 hours reflecting an hours/wage relationship according to Equation (1). This is consistent with straight wages being updated intermittently to reflect expected or anticipated hours, which vary in practice between pay periods.




**FIGURE E.5:** A kinked-CEF test of the fixed-jobs model presented in Trejo (1991). Regression lines fit on each side with a uniform kernel within 25 hours of the 40.

## E.2 Further characteristics of the sample



**FIGURE E.6:** Industry distribution of estimation sample versus the Current Population Survey sample described in Section 3.



**FIGURE E.7:** Geographical distribution of estimation sample versus the Current Population Survey sample described in Section 3.

Industry	Avg. OT hours	OT % hours	OT % pay	Industry share
Accommodation and Food Services	2.37	0.06	0.11	0.08
Administrative and Support	5.69	0.13	0.18	0.08
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting	3.76	0.11	0.15	0.00
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation	3.87	0.10	0.13	0.00
Construction	3.09	0.07	0.10	0.20
Educational Services	1.83	0.05	0.07	0.00
Finance and Insurance	0.31	0.00	0.01	0.00
Health Care and Social Assistance	4.59	0.12	0.12	0.02
Information	1.67	0.04	0.06	0.00
Manufacturing	3.37	0.08	0.11	0.18
Mining	2.26	0.07	0.12	0.00
Other Services	2.61	0.06	0.09	0.02
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services	2.91	0.07	0.10	0.06
Public Administration	2.36	0.05	0.08	0.00
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing	2.85	0.07	0.09	0.02
Retail Trade	2.83	0.07	0.10	0.08
Transportation and Warehousing	5.24	0.12	0.17	0.04
Utilities	3.80	0.08	0.11	0.00
Wholesale Trade	5.15	0.11	0.14	0.10
Total Sample	3.55	0.08	0.12	0.98

**TABLE E.2:** Overtime prevalence by industry in the sample, including average number of OT hours per weekly paycheck, % OT hours among hours worked, % pay for hours work going to OT, and industry share of total hours in sample.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Work hours=40	OT hours	Total work hours	Work hours=40	OT hours
Tenure	0.000400 (0.95)	0.0515 (3.95)	0.0796 (3.31)		
Age	0.000690 (3.82)	0.00266 (0.74)	0.0250 (3.25)		
Female	0.0140 (2.08)	-1.322 (-9.07)	-1.943 (-6.08)		
Minimum wage worker	0.00121 (0.29)	-1.687 (-2.39)	-5.352 (-4.08)		
Firm just hired				-0.00572 (-2.95)	0.553 (5.78)
Date FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Employer FE	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Worker FE				Yes	Yes
Observations	499619	499619	499619	628449	628449
R squared	0.229	0.264	0.260	0.387	0.515

*t* statistics in parentheses

**TABLE E.3:** Columns (1)-(3) regress hours-related outcome variables on worker characteristics, with fixed effects for the date and employer. Standard errors clustered by firm. Columns (4)-(5) show that bunching and overtime hours among incumbent workers are both responsive to new workers being hired within a firm, even controlling for worker and day fixed effects. “Firm just hired” indicates that at least one new worker appears in payroll at the firm this week, and the new workers are dropped from the regression. “Minimum wage worker” indicates that the worker’s straight-time wage is at or below the maximum minimum wage in their state of residence for the quarter. Tenure and age are measured in years, and age is missing for some workers.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Total work hours	Total work hours	Total work hours
R squared	0.366	0.499	0.626
Date FE		Yes	
Worker FE		Yes	Yes
Employer x date FE	Yes		Yes
Observations	621011	628449	620854

*t* statistics in parentheses

**TABLE E.4:** Decomposing variation in total hours. Worker fixed effects and employer by day fixed effects explain about 63% of the variation in total hours.


### E.3 Additional treatment effect estimates and figures

	$p=0$		$p$ from PTO	
	Bunching	Buncher LATE	Net Bunching	Buncher LATE
Accommodation and Food Services (N=69427)	0.036 [0.029, 0.044]	[0.937, 0.988] [0.734, 1.212]	0.036 [0.029, 0.044]	[0.937, 0.988] [0.734, 1.212]
Administrative and Support (N=49829)	0.062 [0.051, 0.074]	[1.625, 1.771] [1.313, 2.136]	0.009 [0.005, 0.013]	[0.251, 0.255] [0.143, 0.365]
Construction (N=136815)	0.139 [0.128, 0.149]	[2.759, 3.326] [2.341, 3.854]	0.029 [0.022, 0.035]	[0.612, 0.638] [0.442, 0.821]
Health Care and Social Assistance (N=13951)	0.051 [0.034, 0.069]	[1.412, 1.522] [0.570, 2.450]	0.005 [0.000, 0.010]	[0.146, 0.147] [-0.052, 0.348]
Manufacturing (N=112555)	0.137 [0.126, 0.148]	[2.098, 2.521] [1.894, 2.785]	0.018 [0.016, 0.021]	[0.307, 0.316] [0.255, 0.370]
Other Services (N=19263)	0.160 [0.132, 0.188]	[1.804, 2.240] [1.243, 2.996]	0.037 [0.024, 0.049]	[0.452, 0.478] [0.256, 0.693]
Professional, Scientific, Technical (N=47705)	0.136 [0.117, 0.155]	[2.281, 2.737] [1.862, 3.297]	0.010 [0.003, 0.016]	[0.178, 0.180] [0.060, 0.302]
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing (N=13498)	0.187 [0.141, 0.234]	[3.477, 4.478] [2.432, 6.053]	0.097 [0.060, 0.135]	[1.920, 2.215] [1.065, 3.316]
Retail Trade (N=56403)	0.129 [0.112, 0.146]	[3.694, 4.399] [2.447, 5.935]	0.032 [0.024, 0.040]	[0.969, 1.016] [0.550, 1.463]
Transportation and Warehousing (N=25926)	0.091 [0.070, 0.111]	[2.230, 2.530] [1.754, 3.127]	0.015 [0.009, 0.022]	[0.400, 0.409] [0.216, 0.602]
Wholesale Trade (N=66678)	0.126 [0.110, 0.141]	[2.751, 3.299] [2.321, 3.848]	0.046 [0.037, 0.055]	[1.068, 1.149] [0.765, 1.490]
All Industries (N=630217)	0.116 [0.112, 0.121]	[2.614, 3.054] [2.483, 3.217]	0.027 [0.024, 0.029]	[0.640, 0.666] [0.571, 0.740]

**TABLE E.5:** Estimates of the buncher LATE by industry, based on  $p = 0$  (left) or  $p$  estimated from paid time off (right). Estimates are reported only for industries having at least 10,000 observations. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals in gray, clustered by firm.

	$p=0$		$p$ from PTO	
	Bunching	Effect of the kink	Net Bunching	Effect of the kink
Accommodation and Food Services (N=69427)	0.036 [0.029, 0.044]	[-0.368, -0.248] [-0.450, -0.192]	0.036 [0.029, 0.044]	[-0.368, -0.248] [-0.450, -0.192]
Administrative and Support (N=49829)	0.062 [0.051, 0.074]	[-1.190, -0.681] [-1.424, -0.548]	0.009 [0.005, 0.013]	[-0.178, -0.101] [-0.256, -0.057]
Construction (N=136815)	0.139 [0.128, 0.149]	[-1.550, -1.121] [-1.771, -0.944]	0.029 [0.022, 0.035]	[-0.330, -0.219] [-0.422, -0.157]
Health Care and Social Assistance (N=13951)	0.051 [0.034, 0.069]	[-0.633, -0.320] [-1.020, -0.129]	0.005 [0.000, 0.010]	[-0.065, -0.030] [-0.155, -0.012]
Manufacturing (N=112555)	0.137 [0.126, 0.148]	[-1.167, -0.850] [-1.282, -0.766]	0.018 [0.016, 0.021]	[-0.162, -0.110] [-0.192, -0.090]
Other Services (N=19263)	0.160 [0.132, 0.188]	[-0.977, -0.811] [-1.300, -0.538]	0.037 [0.024, 0.049]	[-0.235, -0.176] [-0.345, -0.095]
Professional, Scientific, Technical (N=47705)	0.136 [0.117, 0.155]	[-1.192, -0.959] [-1.411, -0.767]	0.010 [0.003, 0.016]	[-0.090, -0.063] [-0.150, -0.021]
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing (N=13498)	0.187 [0.141, 0.234]	[-1.766, -1.466] [-2.303, -1.002]	0.097 [0.060, 0.135]	[-0.954, -0.725] [-1.378, -0.392]
Retail Trade (N=56403)	0.129 [0.112, 0.146]	[-1.685, -1.342] [-2.274, -0.908]	0.032 [0.024, 0.040]	[-0.434, -0.308] [-0.626, -0.175]
Transportation and Warehousing (N=25926)	0.091 [0.070, 0.111]	[-1.590, -0.998] [-1.935, -0.783]	0.015 [0.009, 0.022]	[-0.274, -0.166] [-0.406, -0.086]
Wholesale Trade (N=66678)	0.126 [0.110, 0.141]	[-2.122, -1.297] [-2.474, -1.088]	0.046 [0.037, 0.055]	[-0.776, -0.476] [-1.016, -0.333]
All Industries (N=630217)	0.116 [0.112, 0.121]	[-1.466, -1.026] [-1.542, -0.972]	0.027 [0.024, 0.029]	[-0.347, -0.227] [-0.386, -0.202]

**TABLE E.6:** Estimates of the hours effect of the FLSA by industry, based on  $p = 0$  (left) or  $p$  estimated from paid time off (right). Estimates are reported only for industries having at least 10,000 observations. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals in gray, clustered by firm. In the case of Accommodation and Food Services,  $P(h_{it} = 40 | \eta_{it} > 0) > \beta$ , so I take the PTO-based estimate to be  $p = 0$ .



**TABLE E.7:** Hours distribution by gender, conditional on different than 40 for visibility (size of point mass at 40 can be read from Figures E.8 and E.9).



	$p=0$	$p$ from non-changers	$p$ from PTO
Net bunching:	0.090 [0.083, 0.098]	0.044 [0.041, 0.048]	0.011 [0.009, 0.012]
Buncher LATE	[1.507, 1.709] [1.387, 1.855]	[0.763, 0.814] [0.706, 0.877]	[0.187, 0.190] [0.150, 0.227]
Buncher LATE as elasticity	[0.093, 0.105] [0.086, 0.114]	[0.047, 0.050] [0.044, 0.054]	[0.012, 0.012] [0.009, 0.014]
Average effect of kink on hours	[-0.633, -0.489] [-0.688, -0.446]	[-0.319, -0.231] [-0.343, -0.213]	[-0.078, -0.054] [-0.094, -0.043]
Num observations	147953	147953	147953
Num clusters	352	352	352

**TABLE E.8:** Hours distribution and results of the bunching estimator among women.

	$p=0$	$p$ from non-changers	$p$ from PTO
Net bunching:	0.124 [0.119, 0.129]	0.060 [0.058, 0.063]	0.031 [0.028, 0.034]
Buncher LATE	[3.074, 3.635] [2.777, 3.991]	[1.560, 1.701] [1.407, 1.869]	[0.828, 0.868] [0.717, 0.986]
Buncher LATE as elasticity	[0.190, 0.224] [0.171, 0.246]	[0.096, 0.105] [0.087, 0.115]	[0.051, 0.053] [0.044, 0.061]
Average effect of kink on hours	[-1.867, -1.271] [-2.060, -1.149]	[-0.921, -0.604] [-1.015, -0.545]	[-0.482, -0.311] [-0.549, -0.269]
Num observations	482264	482264	482264
Num clusters	524	524	524

**TABLE E.9:** Hours distribution and results of the bunching estimator among men.

	$p=0$	$p$ from non-changers	$p$ from PTO
Net bunching:	0.114 [0.109, 0.118]	0.055 [0.054, 0.057]	0.027 [0.024, 0.029]
Treatment effect			
Linear interpolation	2.621 [2.418, 2.825]	1.276 [1.178, 1.374]	0.614 [0.541, 0.686]
Monotonicity bounds	[2.320, 3.014] [2.140, 3.201]	[1.129, 1.467] [1.034, 1.550]	[0.543, 0.705] [0.485, 0.775]
BLC buncher LATE	[2.463, 2.706] [2.311, 2.876]	[1.247, 1.309] [1.171, 1.389]	[0.612, 0.627] [0.547, 0.695]
Num observations	643720	643720	643720
Num clusters	567	567	567


TABLE E.10: Treatment effects in levels with comparison to alternative shape constraints.

	$p=0$	$p$ from non-changers	$p$ from PTO
Net bunching:	0.114 [0.109, 0.118]	0.055 [0.054, 0.057]	0.027 [0.024, 0.029]
Treatment effect			
Linear interpolation	0.162 [0.150, 0.175]	0.079 [0.073, 0.085]	0.038 [0.033, 0.042]
Monotonicity bounds	[0.143, 0.186] [0.132, 0.197]	[0.070, 0.090] [0.064, 0.096]	[0.033, 0.043] [0.030, 0.048]
BLC buncher LATE	[0.152, 0.167] [0.142, 0.177]	[0.077, 0.081] [0.072, 0.086]	[0.038, 0.039] [0.034, 0.043]
Num observations	643720	643720	643720
Num clusters	567	567	567


TABLE E.11: Treatment effects as elasticities with comparison to alternative shape constraints.

	$p=0$	$p$ from non-changers	$p$ from PTO
Buncher LATE as elasticity	[0.161, 0.188] [0.153, 0.198]	[0.082, 0.088] [0.077, 0.093]	[0.039, 0.041] [0.035, 0.046]
Average effect of FLSA on hours	[-1.466, -1.329] [-1.541, -1.260]	[-0.727, -0.629] [-0.769, -0.593]	[-0.347, -0.294] [-0.385, -0.262]
Avg. effect among directly affected	[-2.620, -2.375] [-2.743, -2.259]	[-1.453, -1.258] [-1.532, -1.189]	[-0.738, -0.624] [-0.814, -0.560]
Double-time, average effect on hours	[-2.604, -0.950] [-2.716, -0.904]	[-1.239, -0.492] [-1.293, -0.464]	[-0.580, -0.241] [-0.639, -0.215]


**TABLE E.12:** Estimates of policy effects (replicating Table 3) ignoring the potential effects of changes to straight-time wages.




**FIGURE E.8:** Hours distribution for an industry with a low treatment effect (left), and a high one (right). Both industries exhibit a comparable amount of raw bunching (14% and 19% respectively, see Table E.6). In Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services, much more of the observable bunching is estimated to be counterfactual bunching, using the PTO-based method. Furthermore, the density of hours is higher just to the right of 40, meaning that the remaining bunching can be explained by a very small responsiveness of hours to the FLSA.




**FIGURE E.9:** Validating the assumption of bi-log-concavity away from the kink. The left panel plots estimates of  $\ln F_0(h)$  and  $\ln(1 - F_0(h))$  for  $h < 40$ , based on the empirical CDF of observed hours worked. Similarly the right panel plots estimates of  $\ln F_1(h)$  and  $\ln(1 - F_1(h))$  for  $h > k$ , where I've conditioned the sample on  $Y_i < 80$ . Bi-log-concavity requires that the four functions plotted be concave globally.



**FIGURE E.10:** Histogram of hours worked pooling all paychecks in sample, with one hour bins. Blue mass in the stacks indicate that the paycheck included no overtime pay, while red indicates that the paycheck does include overtime pay.



**FIGURE E.11:** Estimates of the bunching and average effect on hours were  $k$  changed to any value from 0 to 80, assuming  $p = 0$ . Bounds are not informative far from 40.



**FIGURE E.12:** Treatment effect estimates as a function of assumed counterfactual bunching  $p$  at 40, pooling across industries. Confidence intervals depicted here are 95% intervals for each of the bounds separately.




FIGURE E.13: Treatment effect estimates as a function of  $p$ , by each of the largest major industries.

## E.4 Estimates from the iso-elastic model

This section estimates bounds on  $\epsilon$  from the iso-elastic model under the assumption that the distribution of  $h_{0it} = \eta_{it}^{-\epsilon}$  is bi-log-concave.

If  $h_{0it}$  is BLC, bounds on  $\epsilon$  can be deduced from the fact that

$$F_0(40 \cdot 1.5^{-\epsilon}) = F_0(40) + \mathcal{B} = P(h_{it} \leq 40)$$

where  $F_0(h) := P(h_{0it} \leq h)$  and the RHS of the above is observable in the data.  $40 \cdot 1.5^{-\epsilon}$  is the location of this “marginal buncher” in the  $h_0$  distribution. In particular,

$$\epsilon = -\ln(Q_0(F_0(40) + \mathcal{B})/40)/(\ln(1.5))$$

where  $Q_0 := F_0^{-1}$  is guaranteed to exist by BLC (Dümbgen et al., 2017). In particular:

$$\epsilon \in \left[ \frac{\ln \left( 1 - \frac{1-F_0(40)}{40f(40)} \ln \left( 1 - \frac{\mathcal{B}}{1-F_0(40)} \right) \right)}{-\ln(1.5)}, \frac{\ln \left( 1 + \frac{F_0(40)}{40f(40)} \ln \left( 1 + \frac{\mathcal{B}}{F_0(40)} \right) \right)}{-\ln(1.5)} \right]$$

where  $F_0(k) = \lim_{h \uparrow 40} F(h)$  and  $f_0(k) = \lim_{h \uparrow 40} f(h)$  are identified from the data. The bounds on  $\epsilon$  estimated in this way are  $\epsilon \in [-.210, -.167]$  in the full sample.

Since BLC is preserved when the random variable is multiplied by a scalar, BLC of  $h_{0it}$  implies BLC of  $h_{1it} := \eta_{it}^{-\epsilon} \cdot 1.5^\epsilon$  as well. This implication can be checked in the data to the right of 40, since  $\eta_{it}^{-\epsilon} \cdot 1.5^\epsilon$  is observed there. BLC of  $h_{1it}$  implies a second set of bounds on

$\epsilon$ , because:

$$F_1(40 \cdot 1.5^\epsilon) = F_1(40) - \mathcal{B} = P(h_{it} < 40)$$

and the RHS is again observable in the data, where  $F_1(h) := P(h_{1it} \leq h)$ . Here  $40 \cdot 1.5^\epsilon$  is the location of a second “marginal buncher” – for which  $h_0 = 40$  – in the  $h_1$  distribution.

Now we have:

$$\epsilon \in \left[ \frac{\ln \left( 1 + \frac{F_1(40)}{40f_1(40)} \ln \left( 1 - \frac{\mathcal{B}}{F_1(40)} \right) \right)}{\ln(1.5)}, \frac{\ln \left( 1 - \frac{1-F_1(40)}{40f_1(40)} \ln \left( 1 + \frac{\mathcal{B}}{1-F_1(40)} \right) \right)}{\ln(1.5)} \right]$$

where  $F_1(k) = F(k)$  and  $f_1(k) := \lim_{h \downarrow 40} f(h)$  are identified from the data. Empirically, these bounds are estimated as  $\epsilon \in [-.179, -.141]$ . Taking the intersection of these bounds with the range  $\epsilon \in [-.210, -.168]$  estimated previously, we have that  $\epsilon \in [-.179, -.168]$ .<sup>56</sup> The identified set is reduced from a length of .043 to .012, a factor of nearly 4.

Table E.13 reports estimates broken down by industry, as well as estimates that allow counterfactual bunching at the kink to be estimated from PTO (see Section 5).

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<sup>56</sup>Note that this interval differs slightly from the identified set of the buncher LATE as elasticity for  $p = 0$  in Table 3. The latter quantity averages the effect in levels over bunchers and rescales:  $\frac{1}{40 \ln(1.5)} \mathbb{E}[h_{0it}(1 - 1.5^\epsilon) | h_{it} = 40]$ , but the two are approximately equal under  $1.5^\epsilon \approx 1 + .5\epsilon$  and  $\ln(1.5) \approx .5$ .

	$p=0$		$p$ from PTO	
	Bunching	Elasticity	Net Bunching	Elasticity
Accommodation and Food Services (N=69427)	0.036 [0.029, 0.044]	[-0.059, -0.060] [-0.073, -0.073]	0.036 [0.029, 0.044]	[-0.059, -0.060] [-0.073, -0.073]
Administrative and Support (N=49829)	0.062 [0.051, 0.074]	[-0.102, -0.106] [-0.125, -0.125]	0.009 [0.005, 0.013]	[-0.014, -0.017] [-0.020, -0.020]
Construction (N=136815)	0.139 [0.128, 0.149]	[-0.190, -0.180] [-0.218, -0.218]	0.029 [0.022, 0.035]	[-0.034, -0.043] [-0.043, -0.043]
Health Care and Social Assistance (N=13951)	0.051 [0.034, 0.069]	[-0.085, -0.095] [-0.135, -0.135]	0.005 [0.000, 0.010]	[-0.008, -0.010] [-0.018, -0.018]
Manufacturing (N=112555)	0.137 [0.126, 0.148]	[-0.158, -0.127] [-0.177, -0.177]	0.018 [0.016, 0.021]	[-0.018, -0.020] [-0.022, -0.022]
Other Services (N=19263)	0.160 [0.132, 0.188]	[-0.120, -0.123] [-0.167, -0.167]	0.037 [0.024, 0.049]	[-0.024, -0.033] [-0.034, -0.034]
Professional, Scientific, Technical (N=47705)	0.136 [0.117, 0.155]	[-0.140, -0.160] [-0.175, -0.175]	0.010 [0.003, 0.016]	[-0.009, -0.013] [-0.014, -0.014]
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing (N=13498)	0.187 [0.141, 0.234]	[-0.250, -0.230] [-0.355, -0.355]	0.097 [0.060, 0.135]	[-0.115, -0.133] [-0.177, -0.177]
Retail Trade (N=56403)	0.129 [0.112, 0.146]	[-0.256, -0.238] [-0.359, -0.359]	0.032 [0.024, 0.040]	[-0.055, -0.066] [-0.084, -0.084]
Transportation and Warehousing (N=25926)	0.091 [0.070, 0.111]	[-0.124, -0.161] [-0.167, -0.167]	0.015 [0.009, 0.022]	[-0.019, -0.031] [-0.029, -0.029]
Wholesale Trade (N=66678)	0.126 [0.110, 0.141]	[-0.212, -0.163] [-0.248, -0.248]	0.046 [0.037, 0.055]	[-0.067, -0.068] [-0.088, -0.088]
All Industries (N=630217)	0.116 [0.112, 0.121]	[-0.179, -0.168] [-0.190, -0.190]	0.027 [0.024, 0.029]	[-0.037, -0.043] [-0.041, -0.041]

**TABLE E.13:** Estimates of  $\epsilon$  in the iso-elastic model based on assuming  $h_{0it} = \eta_{it}^{-\epsilon}$  is bi-log-concave, by industry. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals in gray brackets, clustered by firm.






FIGURE E.14: Distribution of the largest integer  $m = 1 \dots 10$  that maximizes the proportion of worker  $i$ 's paychecks for which hours are divisible by  $m$ . This can be thought of as the granularity of hours reporting for worker  $i$ .




FIGURE E.15: Distribution of changes in total hours between subsequent pay periods (truncated at -20 and 20).

## F Main Proofs

### F.1 Proof of Lemma 1

For any convex budget function  $B(\mathbf{x})$ ,  $(z_{Bi}, \mathbf{x}_{Bi}) = \operatorname{argmax}_{z, \mathbf{x}} \{u_i(z, \mathbf{x}) \text{ s.t. } z \geq B(\mathbf{x})\}$  exists and is unique since it maximizes the strictly quasi-concave function  $u_i(z, \mathbf{x})$  over the convex domain  $\{(z, \mathbf{x}) : z \geq B(\mathbf{x})\}$ . Furthermore, by monotonicity of  $u(z, \mathbf{x})$  in  $z$  we may substitute in the constraint  $z = B(\mathbf{x})$  and write

$$\mathbf{x}_{Bi} = \operatorname{argmax}_{\mathbf{x}} u_i(B(\mathbf{x}), \mathbf{x})$$

Consider any  $\mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{x}_{Bi}$ , and let  $\tilde{\mathbf{x}} = \theta\mathbf{x} + (1 - \theta)\mathbf{x}^*$  where  $\mathbf{x}^* = \mathbf{x}_{Bi}$  and  $\theta \in (0, 1)$ . Since  $B(\mathbf{x})$  is convex in  $\mathbf{x}$  and  $u_i(z, \mathbf{x})$  is weakly decreasing in  $z$ :

$$u_i(B(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}), \tilde{\mathbf{x}}) \geq u_i(\theta B(\mathbf{x}) + (1 - \theta)B(\mathbf{x}^*), \tilde{\mathbf{x}}) > \min\{u_i(B(\mathbf{x}), \mathbf{x}), u_i(B(\mathbf{x}^*), \mathbf{x}^*)\} = u_i(B(\mathbf{x}), \mathbf{x}) \quad (\text{F.9})$$


where I have used strict quasi-concavity of  $u_i(z, \mathbf{x})$  in the second step, and that  $\mathbf{x}^*$  is a maximizer in the third. This result implies that for any  $\mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{x}^*$ , if one draws a line between  $\mathbf{x}$  and  $\mathbf{x}^*$ , the function  $u_i(B(\mathbf{x}), \mathbf{x})$  is strictly increasing as one moves towards  $\mathbf{x}^*$ . When  $\mathbf{x}$  is a scalar, this argument is used by Blomquist et al. (2015) (see Lemma A2 therein) to show that  $u_i(B(\mathbf{x}), \mathbf{x})$  is strictly increasing to the left of  $\mathbf{x}^*$ , and strictly decreasing to the right of  $\mathbf{x}^*$ . Note that for any (binding) linear budget constraint  $B(\mathbf{x})$ , the result holds without monotonicity of  $u_i(z, \mathbf{x})$  in  $z$ . This is useful for Theorem 2\* in which some workers choose their hours.

Let  $\mathcal{X}_{0i} = \{\mathbf{x} : y_i(\mathbf{x}) \leq k\}$  and  $\mathcal{X}_{1i} = \{\mathbf{x} : y_i(\mathbf{x}) \geq k\}$ . For any function  $B$ , let  $u_{Bi}(\mathbf{x}) = u_i(B(\mathbf{x}), \mathbf{x})$ , and note that

$$u_{B_k i}(\mathbf{x}) = \begin{cases} u_{B_0 i}(\mathbf{x}) & \text{if } \mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}_{0i} \\ u_{B_1 i}(\mathbf{x}) & \text{if } \mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}_{1i} \end{cases}$$

Let  $\mathbf{x}_{ki}$  be the unique maximizer of  $u_{B_k i}(\mathbf{x})$ , where  $Y_i = y_i(\mathbf{x}_{ki})$ . Suppose that  $Y_i < k$ . By continuity of  $y_i(\mathbf{x})$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_{0i}$  is a closed set and  $\mathbf{x}_{ki}$  belongs to the interior of  $\mathcal{X}_{0i}$ . Suppose furthermore that  $Y_{0i} \neq Y_i$ , with  $\mathbf{x}_{0i}$  the maximizer of  $u_{B_0 i}(\mathbf{x})$ . If this were the case, then there would exist a point  $\tilde{\mathbf{x}} \in \mathcal{X}_{0i}$  along the line from  $\mathbf{x}_{0i}$  to  $\mathbf{x}_{ki}$ . By Eq. (F.9) with  $B = B_k$ , we must have  $u_{B_k i}(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}) > u_{B_k i}(\mathbf{x}_{0i})$ . Since  $u_{B_0 i}(\mathbf{x}) = u_{B_k i}(\mathbf{x})$  in  $\mathcal{X}_{0i}$  this means that  $u_{B_0 i}(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}) > u_{B_0 i}(\mathbf{x}_{0i})$ , contradicting the premise that  $\mathbf{x}_{0i}$  maximizes  $u_{B_0 i}(\mathbf{x})$ . Figure F.16 depicts the logic visually. Thus,  $Y_i < k$  implies  $Y_i = Y_{0i}$ . We can similarly show that  $Y_i > k$  implies  $Y_i = Y_{1i}$ . Taking the contrapositive of each of these, we have that  $Y_{1i} \leq k \leq Y_{0i}$  implies that  $Y_i = k$ .

It is easily demonstrated under WARP alone (see the proof of Theorem 3 below) that  $Y_{0i} \leq k$  implies that  $Y_i = Y_{0i}$  and that  $Y_{1i} \geq k$  implies that  $Y_i = Y_{1i}$ . Note that together these imply that  $Y_{0i} < k \leq Y_{1i}$  and  $Y_{0i} \leq k < Y_{1i}$  are both impossible (since we would then have both that  $Y_i < k$  and  $Y_i \geq k$  or that both that  $Y_i \leq k$  and  $Y_i > k$ ). Thus, we can summarize the relationship between observable  $Y_i$  and potential outcomes in the remaining three



**FIGURE F.16:** Depiction of the step establishing  $(Y < k) \implies (Y = Y_0)$  in the proof of Lemma 1. In this example  $z = (x_1, x_2)$  and  $y(\mathbf{x}) = x_1 + x_2$ . We suppress indices  $i$  for clarity. Proof is by contradiction. If  $Y_0 \neq Y$ , then  $\mathbf{x}_k^* \neq \mathbf{x}_0^*$ , where  $\mathbf{x}_k^*$  and  $\mathbf{x}_0^*$  are the unique maximizers of  $u_{B_k}(\mathbf{x})$  and  $u_{B_0}(\mathbf{x})$ , respectively. By Equation F.9, we have that the function  $u_{B_0}(\mathbf{x})$ , depicted heuristically as a solid black curve, is strictly increasing as one moves along the dotted line from  $\mathbf{x}_k^*$  towards  $\mathbf{x}_0^*$ . Similarly, the function  $u_{B_0}(\mathbf{x})$ , depicted as a solid blue curve, is strictly increasing as one moves in the opposite direction along the same line, from  $\mathbf{x}_0^*$  towards  $\mathbf{x}_k^*$ . By the assumption that  $Y < k$ , then using continuity of  $y(\mathbf{x})$  it must be the case that  $\mathbf{x}_k^*$  lies in the interior of  $\mathcal{X}_0$ , the set of  $\mathbf{x}$ 's that make  $y(\mathbf{x}) \leq k$ . This means that there is some interval of the dotted line that is within  $\mathcal{X}_0$  (regardless of whether  $\mathbf{x}_0^*$  is also within  $\mathcal{X}_0$ , or it is not, as depicted). On this interval, the functions  $B_0$  and  $B_k$  are equal, and thus so must be the functions  $u_{B_k}$  and  $u_{B_0}$ . Since the same function cannot be both strictly increasing and strictly decreasing, we have obtained a contradiction.

cases as:

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} Y_{0i} & \text{if } Y_{0i} < k \\ k & \text{if } Y_{1i} \leq k \leq Y_{0i} \\ Y_{1i} & \text{if } Y_{1i} > k \end{cases}$$

## F.2 Proof of Theorem 3

We first prove the statement in b). If  $Y_{0i} \leq k$ , then by CHOICE  $\mathbf{x}_{B_0}$  is in  $\mathcal{X}_0$ , where  $\mathcal{X}_0$  is defined in the proof of Lemma 1. Since  $B_k(\mathbf{x}) = B_0(\mathbf{x})$  for all  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}_0$ , it follows that  $z_{B_0i} \geq B_k(\mathbf{x}_{B_0i})$ , i.e.  $Y_{0i}$  is feasible under  $B_k$ . Note that  $B_{ki}(\mathbf{x}) \geq B_{0i}(\mathbf{x})$  for all  $\mathbf{x}$ . By WARP then  $(z_{B_{ki}}, \mathbf{x}_{B_{ki}}) = (z_{B_{0i}}, \mathbf{x}_{B_{0i}})$ . Thus  $Y_i = y_i(\mathbf{x}_{B_k}) = y_i(\mathbf{x}_{B_0}) = Y_{0i}$ . So  $Y_{0i} \leq k \implies Y_i = Y_{0i}$ . As an implication we have that  $Y_{0i} < k \implies Y_i < k$ .

By the same logic we can show that  $Y_{1i} \geq k \implies Y_i = Y_{1i}$  and thusly that  $Y_{1i} > k \implies Y_i > k$ . Taking the contrapositives, we see that  $Y_i = k \iff Y_i \leq k \& Y_i \geq k$  implies  $Y_{1i} \leq k$  and  $Y_{0i} \geq k$ . Thus  $Y_i = k$  implies  $Y_{1i} \leq k \leq Y_{0i}$  and hence  $\mathcal{B} \leq P(Y_{1i} \leq k \leq Y_{0i})$ .

This holds under CONVEX or WARP since CONVEX implies WARP. However under CONVEX we also have from Lemma 1 that  $Y_{1i} \leq k \leq Y_{0i}$  implies  $Y_i = k$ , and thus  $\mathcal{B} \geq P(Y_{1i} \leq k \leq Y_{0i})$ . Together we have that both  $\mathcal{B} \leq P(Y_{1i} \leq k \leq Y_{0i})$  and  $\mathcal{B} \geq P(Y_{1i} \leq k \leq Y_{0i})$  and hence  $\mathcal{B} = P(Y_{1i} \leq k \leq Y_{0i})$  under CONVEX.

## F.3 Proof of the Corollary to Theorem 3

In the proof of Theorem 3 I showed that under WARP and CHOICE,  $Y_{0i} \leq k \implies Y_i = Y_{0i}$ . Thus, for any  $\delta > 0$  and  $y < k$ :  $Y_{0i} \in [y - \delta, y]$  implies that  $Y_i \in [y - \delta, y]$  and hence  $P(Y_{0i} \in [y - \delta, y]) - P(Y_i \in [y - \delta, y])$  is negative. This implies that  $f_0(y) - f(y) = \lim_{\delta \downarrow 0} \frac{P(Y_{0i} \in [y - \delta, y]) - P(Y_i \in [y - \delta, y])}{\delta} \leq 0$ , i.e. that  $f(y) \geq f_0(y)$ . An analogous argument holds for  $Y_1$ , where we consider the event  $Y_{1i} \in [y, y + \delta]$  any  $y > k$ . Under CONVEX instead of WARP, the inequalities are all equalities, by Lemma 1.

## F.4 Proof of Theorem 1

By Theorem 1 of Dömbgen et al. (2017): for  $d \in \{0, 1\}$  and any  $t$ , bi-log concavity implies that:

$$1 - (1 - F_{d|K^*=0}(k))e^{-\frac{f_{d|K^*=0}(k)}{1 - F_{d|K^*=0}(k)}t} \leq F_{d|K^*=0}(k + t) \leq F_{d|K^*=0}(k)e^{\frac{f_{d|K^*=0}(k)}{F_{d|K^*=0}(k)}t}$$

Defining  $u = F_{0|K^*=0}(k+t)$ , we can use the substitution  $t = Q_{0|K^*=0}(u) - k$  to translate the above into bounds on the conditional quantile function of  $Y_{0i}$ , evaluated at  $u$ :

$$\frac{F_{0|K^*=0}(k)}{f_{0|K^*=0}(k)} \cdot \ln \left( \frac{u}{F_{0|K^*=0}(k)} \right) \leq Q_{0|K^*=0}(u) - k \leq -\frac{1 - F_{0|K^*=0}(k)}{f_{0|K^*=0}(k)} \cdot \ln \left( \frac{1 - u}{1 - F_{0|K^*=0}(k)} \right)$$

And similarly for  $Y_{1i}$ , letting  $v = F_{1|K^*=0}(k-t)$ :

$$\frac{1 - F_{1|K^*=0}(k)}{f_{1|K^*=0}(k)} \cdot \ln \left( \frac{1 - v}{1 - F_{1|K^*=0}(k)} \right) \leq k - Q_{1|K^*=0}(v) \leq -\frac{F_{1|K^*=0}(k)}{f_{1|K^*=0}(k)} \cdot \ln \left( \frac{v}{F_{1|K^*=0}(k)} \right)$$

Note that:

$$\begin{aligned} E[Y_{0i} - Y_{1i} | Y_i = k, K_i^* = 0] &= \frac{1}{\mathcal{B}^*} \int_{F_{0|K^*=0}(k)}^{F_{0|K^*=0}(k) + \mathcal{B}^*} \{Q_{0|K^*=0}(u) - Q_{0|K^*=0}(u)\} du \\ &= \frac{1}{\mathcal{B}^*} \int_{F_{0|K^*=0}(k)}^{F_{0|K^*=0}(k) + \mathcal{B}^*} \{Q_{0|K^*=0}(u) - k\} du + \frac{1}{\mathcal{B}^*} \int_{F_{1|K^*=0}(k) - \mathcal{B}^*}^{F_{1|K^*=0}(k)} \{k - Q_{1|K^*=0}(v)\} dv \end{aligned}$$

where  $\mathcal{B}^* := P(Y_i = k | K^* = 0)$ . A lower bound for  $E[Y_{0i} - Y_{1i} | Y_i = k, K_i^* = 0]$  is thus:

$$\begin{aligned} &\frac{F_{0|K^*=0}(k)}{f_{0|K^*=0}(k)(\mathcal{B}^*)} \int_{F_{0|K^*=0}(k)}^{F_{0|K^*=0}(k) + \mathcal{B}^*} \ln \left( \frac{u}{F_{0|K^*=0}(k)} \right) du + \frac{1 - F_{1|K^*=0}(k)}{f_{1|K^*=0}(k)(\mathcal{B}^*)} \int_{F_{1|K^*=0}(k) - \mathcal{B}^*}^{F_{1|K^*=0}(k)} \ln \left( \frac{1 - v}{1 - F_{1|K^*=0}(k)} \right) dv \\ &= g(F_{0|K^*=0}(k), f_{0|K^*=0}(k), \mathcal{B}^*) + h(F_{1|K^*=0}(k), f_{1|K^*=0}(k), \mathcal{B}^*) \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} g(a, b, x) &:= \frac{a}{bx} \int_a^{a+x} \ln \left( \frac{u}{a} \right) du = \frac{a^2}{bx} \int_1^{1+\frac{x}{a}} \ln(u) du \\ &= \frac{a^2}{bx} \{u \ln(u) - u\} \Big|_1^{1+\frac{x}{a}} \\ &= \frac{a^2}{bx} \left\{ \left(1 + \frac{x}{a}\right) \ln \left(1 + \frac{x}{a}\right) - \frac{x}{a} \right\} \\ &= \frac{a}{bx} (a+x) \ln \left(1 + \frac{x}{a}\right) - \frac{a}{b} \end{aligned}$$

and

$$h(a, b, x) := \frac{1-a}{bx} \int_{a-x}^a \ln \left( \frac{1-v}{1-a} \right) dv = \frac{(1-a)^2}{bx} \int_1^{1+\frac{x}{1-a}} \ln(u) du = g(1-a, b, x)$$

Similarly, an upper bound is:

$$\begin{aligned}
& -\frac{1-F_{0|K^*=0}(k)}{f_{0|K^*=0}(k)(\mathcal{B}^*)} \int_{F_{0|K^*=0}(k)}^{F_{0|K^*=0}(k)+\mathcal{B}^*} \ln\left(\frac{1-u}{1-F_{0|K^*=0}(k)}\right) du \\
& \quad -\frac{F_{1|K^*=0}(k)}{f_{1|K^*=0}(k)(\mathcal{B}^*)} \int_{F_{1|K^*=0}(k)-(\mathcal{B}^*)}^{F_{1|K^*=0}(k)} \ln\left(\frac{v}{F_{1|K^*=0}(k)}\right) dv \\
& = g'(F_{0|K^*=0}(k), f_{0|K^*=0}(k), \mathcal{B}^*) + h'(F_{1|K^*=0}(k), f_{1|K^*=0}(k), \mathcal{B}^*)
\end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
g'(a, b, x) &:= -\frac{1-a}{bx} \int_a^{a+x} \ln\left(\frac{1-u}{1-a}\right) du = -\frac{(1-a)^2}{bx} \int_{1-\frac{x}{1-a}}^1 \ln(u) du \\
&= \frac{(1-a)^2}{bx} \{u - u \ln(u)\} \Big|_{1-\frac{x}{1-a}}^1 \\
&= \frac{1-a}{b} + \frac{1-a}{bx} (1-a-x) \ln\left(1 - \frac{x}{1-a}\right) \\
&= -g(1-a, b, -x)
\end{aligned}$$

and

$$h'(a, b, x) := -\frac{a}{bx} \int_{a-x}^a \ln\left(\frac{v}{a}\right) dv = -\frac{a^2}{bx} \int_{1-\frac{x}{a}}^1 \ln(u) du = g'(1-a, b, x) = -g(a, b, -x)$$

This  $\Delta_k^* \in [\Delta_k^L, \Delta_k^U :]$  were

$$\Delta_k^L := g(F_-(k), f_-(k), \mathcal{B}-p) + g(1-F(k), f_+(k), \mathcal{B}-p)$$

and

$$\Delta_k^U := -g(1-p-F_-(k), f_-(k), p-\mathcal{B}) - g(F(k)-p, f_+(k), p-\mathcal{B})$$

The bounds are sharp as CHOICE, CONVEX and RANK imply no further restrictions on the marginal potential outcome distributions. To obtain the final result, note then that

$$F_{0|K^*=0}(k) = \frac{F_0(k)-p}{1-p} \quad \text{and} \quad F_{1|K^*=0}(k) = \frac{F_1(k)-p}{1-p}$$

$$f_{0|K^*=0}(k) = \frac{f_0(k)}{1-p} \quad \text{and} \quad f_{1|K^*=0}(k) = \frac{f_1(k)}{1-p}$$

$$\mathcal{B}^* := P(Y_i = k | K_i^* = 0) = \frac{\mathcal{B}-p}{1-p}$$

and finally that the function  $g(a, b, x)$  is homogeneous of degree zero. As shown by Düm-bgen et al. (2017), BLC implies the existence of a continuous density function, which as-sures that these density limits exist and are equal to the corresponding potential outcome densities above.

## F.5 Proof of Lemma 2

Let  $\Delta_i^k(\rho, \rho') := Y_i(\rho, k) - Y_i(\rho', k)$  for any  $\rho, \rho' \in [\rho_0, \rho_1]$  and value of  $k$ .

**Assumption SMOOTH (regularity conditions).** *The following hold:*

1.  $P(\Delta_i^k(\rho, \rho') \leq \Delta, Y_i(\rho, k) \leq y)$  is twice continuously differentiable at all  $(\Delta, y) \neq (0, k^*)$ , for any  $\rho, \rho' \in [\rho_0, \rho_1]$  and  $k$ .
2.  $Y_i(\rho, k) = Y(\rho, k, \epsilon_i)$ , where  $\epsilon_i$  has compact support  $E \subset \mathbb{R}^m$  for some  $m$ .  $Y(\cdot, k, \cdot)$  is continuously differentiable on all of  $[\rho_0, \rho_1] \times E$ , for every  $k$ .
3. there possibly exists a set  $\mathcal{K}^* \subset E$  such that  $Y(\rho, k, \epsilon) = k^*$  for all  $\rho \in [\rho_0, \rho_1]$  and  $\epsilon \in \mathcal{K}^*$ . The quantity  $\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\partial Y_i(\rho, k)}{\partial \rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho, k) = y, \epsilon_i \notin \mathcal{K}^* \right]$  is continuously differentiable in  $y$  for all  $y$  including  $k^*$ .

In the remainder of this proof I keep  $k$  be implicit in the functions  $Y_i(\rho, k)$  and  $\Delta_i^k(\rho, \rho')$ , as it will remained fixed. Item 1 of SMOOTH excludes the point  $(0, k^*)$  on the basis that we may expect point masses at  $Y_i(\rho) = k^*$ , as in the overtime setting. Following Section 4, item 3 imposes that all such “counterfactual bunchers” have zero treatment effects, while also introducing a further condition that will be used later in Lemma 3. Let  $K_i^*$  be an indicator for  $\epsilon_i \in \mathcal{K}^*$  and denote  $p = P(K_i^* = 1)$ . Item 1 implies that the density  $f_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, y)$  is continuous in  $y$  whenever  $y \neq k^*$  or  $\Delta \neq 0$ , so I define  $f_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, k^*) = \lim_{y \rightarrow k^*} f_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, y)$  for any  $\rho, \rho'$  and  $\Delta$ . Similarly, we can define the marginal density  $f_\rho(y)$  of  $Y_i(\rho)$  at  $k^*$  to be  $\lim_{y \rightarrow k^*} f_\rho(y)$  for any  $\rho$ .

The main tool in the proof of Lemma 2 will be the following Lemma, which shows that the uniform density approximation of Theorem 6 becomes exact in the limit that the two cost functions approach one another.

**Lemma SMALL (small kink limit).** *Assume CHOICE\*, WARP, and SMOOTH. Then:*

$$\lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \frac{P(Y_i(\rho) \leq k \leq Y_i(\rho')) - p(k)}{\rho' - \rho} = -f_\rho(k) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{dY_i(\rho)}{d\rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho) = k \right]$$

*Proof.* Throughout this proof we let  $f_W$  denote the density of a generic random variable or random vector  $W_i$ , if it exists. Write  $\Delta_i(\rho, \rho') = \Delta_i(\rho, \rho', \epsilon_i)$  where  $\Delta_i(\rho, \rho', \epsilon) := Y(\rho, \epsilon) -$

$Y(\rho', \epsilon)$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
\lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \frac{P(Y_i(\rho) \leq k \leq Y_i(\rho')) - p(k)}{\rho' - \rho} &= \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \frac{P(Y_i(\rho) \in [k, k + \Delta(\rho, \rho')_i]) - p(k)}{\rho' - \rho} \\
&= \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \frac{P(Y_i(\rho) \in (k, k + \Delta(\rho, \rho')_i])}{\rho' - \rho} \\
&= \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \frac{1}{\rho' - \rho} \int_0^\infty d\Delta \int_k^{k+\Delta} dy \cdot f_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, y) \\
&= \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \int_0^\infty d\Delta \int_k^{k+\Delta} dy \cdot \frac{f_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, k) + (y - k)r_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, k, y)}{\rho' - \rho}
\end{aligned} \tag{F.10}$$

where we have used that by item 1 the joint density of  $\Delta_i(\rho, \rho')$  and  $Y_i(\rho)$  exists for any  $\rho, \rho'$  and is differentiable and  $r_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}$  is a first-order Taylor remainder term satisfying

$$\lim_{y \downarrow k} |r_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, y)| = |r_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, k)| = 0$$

for any  $\Delta$ .

I now show that the whole term corresponding to this remainder is zero. First, note that:

$$\begin{aligned}
\left| \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \int_0^\infty d\Delta \int_k^{k+\Delta} dy \cdot \frac{(y - k)r_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, y)}{\rho' - \rho} \right| &= \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \left| \int_0^\infty d\Delta \int_k^{k+\Delta} dy \cdot \frac{(y - k)r_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, y)}{\rho' - \rho} \right| \\
&\leq \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \int_0^\infty d\Delta \int_k^{k+\Delta} dy \cdot \left| \frac{(y - k)r_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, y)}{\rho' - \rho} \right| \\
&\leq \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \int_0^\infty d\Delta \frac{\Delta}{\rho' - \rho} \int_k^{k+\Delta} dy \cdot |r_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, y)|
\end{aligned}$$

where I've used continuity of the absolute value function and the Minkowski inequality. Define  $\xi(\rho, \rho') = \sup_{\epsilon \in E} \Delta(\rho, \rho', \epsilon)$ . The strategy will be show that  $\lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \xi(\rho, \rho') = 0$ , and then since  $r_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, y) = 0$  for any  $\Delta > \xi(\rho, \rho')$  and all  $y$  (since the marginal density  $f_{\Delta(\rho, \rho')}(\Delta)$  would be zero for such  $\Delta$ ). With  $\xi(\rho, \rho')$  so-defined:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{RHS of above} &\leq \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \int_0^{\xi(\rho, \rho')} d\Delta \frac{\xi(\rho, \rho')}{\rho' - \rho} \int_k^{k+\xi(\rho, \rho')} dy \cdot |r_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, y)| \\
&= \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \frac{\xi(\rho, \rho')}{\rho' - \rho} \cdot \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \int_0^{\xi(\rho, \rho')} d\Delta \int_0^{\xi(\rho, \rho')} dy \cdot |r_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, k + y)| \tag{F.11}
\end{aligned}$$

where in the second step I have assumed that each limit exists (this will be demonstrated below). Let us first consider the inner integral of the above:  $\int_k^{k+\xi(\rho, \rho')} dy \cdot |r_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, y)|$ , for any  $\Delta$ . Supposing that  $\lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \xi(\rho, \rho') = 0$ , it follows that this inner integral evaluates to zero, by the Leibniz rule and using that  $r_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, k) = 0$ . Thus the entire second



limit is equal to zero.

Now I prove that  $\lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \xi(\rho, \rho') = 0$  and that  $\lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \frac{\xi(\rho, \rho')}{\rho' - \rho}$  exists. First, note that continuous differentiability of  $Y(\rho, \epsilon_i)$  implies  $Y_i(\rho)$  is continuous for each  $i$  so  $\lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \Delta_i(\rho, \rho') = 0$  point-wise in  $\epsilon$ . We seek to turn this point-wise convergence into uniform convergence over  $\epsilon$ , i.e. that  $\lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \sup_{\epsilon \in E} \Delta(\rho, \rho', \epsilon) = \sup_{\epsilon \in E} \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \Delta(\rho, \rho', \epsilon) = \sup_{\epsilon \in E} 0 = 0$ . The strategy will be to use equicontinuity of the sequence and compactness of  $E$ . Consider any such sequence  $\rho_n \xrightarrow{n} \rho$  from above, and let  $f_n(\epsilon) := Y(\rho, \epsilon) - Y(\rho_n, \epsilon)$  and  $f(\epsilon) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} f_n(\epsilon) = 0$ . Equicontinuity of the sequence  $f_n(\epsilon)$  says that for any  $\epsilon, \epsilon' \in E$  and  $e > 0$ , there exists a  $\delta > 0$  such that  $\|\epsilon - \epsilon'\| < \delta \implies |f_n(\epsilon) - f_n(\epsilon')| < e$ .

This follows from continuous differentiability of  $Y(\rho, \epsilon)$ . Let  $M = \sup_{\rho \in [\rho_0, \rho_1], \epsilon \in E} |\nabla_{\rho, \epsilon} Y(\rho, \epsilon)|$ .  $M$  exists and is finite given continuity of the gradient and compactness of  $[\rho_0, \rho_1] \times E$ . Then, for any two points  $\epsilon, \epsilon' \in E$  and any  $\rho \in [\rho_0, \rho_1]$ :

$$|Y(\rho, \epsilon) - Y(\rho, \epsilon')| = \left| \int_{\epsilon'}^{\epsilon} \nabla_{\epsilon} Y(\rho, \epsilon) \cdot \mathbf{d}\epsilon \right| \leq \int_{\epsilon'}^{\epsilon} |\nabla_{\epsilon} Y(\rho, \epsilon) \cdot \mathbf{d}\epsilon| \leq M \int_{\epsilon'}^{\epsilon} \|\mathbf{d}\epsilon\| \leq M \|\epsilon - \epsilon'\|$$

where  $\mathbf{d}\epsilon$  is any path from  $\epsilon$  to  $\epsilon'$  and I have used the definition of  $M$  and Cauchy-Schwarz in the second inequality. The existence of a uniform Lipschitz constant  $M$  for  $Y(\rho, \epsilon)$  implies a uniform equicontinuity of  $Y(\rho, \epsilon)$  of the form that for any  $e > 0$  and  $\epsilon, \epsilon' \in E$ , there exists a  $\delta > 0$  such that  $\|\epsilon - \epsilon'\| < \delta \implies \sup_{\rho \in [\rho_0, \rho_1]} |Y(\rho, \epsilon) - Y(\rho, \epsilon')| < e/2$ , since we can simply take  $\delta = e/(2M)$ . This in turn implies that whenever  $\|\epsilon - \epsilon'\| < \delta$ :

$$\begin{aligned} |Y(\rho, \epsilon) - Y(\rho_n, \epsilon) - \{Y(\rho, \epsilon') - Y(\rho_n, \epsilon')\}| &= |Y(\rho, \epsilon) - Y(\rho, \epsilon') - \{Y(\rho_n, \epsilon) - Y(\rho_n, \epsilon')\}| \\ &\leq |Y(\rho, \epsilon) - Y(\rho, \epsilon')| + |Y(\rho_n, \epsilon) - Y(\rho_n, \epsilon')| \leq e, \end{aligned}$$

our desired result. Together with compactness of  $E$ , equicontinuity implies that  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\epsilon \in E} f_n(\epsilon) = \sup_{\epsilon \in E} \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} f_n(\epsilon) = 0$ .

We apply an analogous argument for  $\lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \frac{\xi(\rho, \rho')}{\rho' - \rho}$ , where now  $f_n(\epsilon) = \frac{Y(\rho, \epsilon) - Y(\rho_n, \epsilon)}{\rho_n - \rho}$ . For this case it's easier to work directly with the function  $\frac{Y(\rho, \epsilon) - Y(\rho_n, \epsilon)}{\rho_n - \rho}$ , showing that it is Lipschitz in deviations of  $\epsilon$  uniformly over  $n \in \mathbb{N}, \epsilon \in E$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \frac{Y(\rho, \epsilon) - Y(\rho_n, \epsilon)}{\rho_n - \rho} - \frac{Y(\rho, \epsilon') - Y(\rho_n, \epsilon')}{\rho_n - \rho} \right| &= \frac{1}{\rho_n - \rho} \left| \int_{\epsilon'}^{\epsilon} \nabla_{\epsilon} Y(\rho, \epsilon) \cdot \mathbf{d}\epsilon - \int_{\epsilon'}^{\epsilon} \nabla_{\epsilon} Y(\rho_n, \epsilon) \cdot \mathbf{d}\epsilon \right| \\ &\leq \frac{1}{\rho_n - \rho} \left( \left| \int_{\epsilon'}^{\epsilon} \nabla_{\epsilon} Y(\rho, \epsilon) \cdot \mathbf{d}\epsilon \right| + \left| \int_{\epsilon'}^{\epsilon} \nabla_{\epsilon} Y(\rho_n, \epsilon) \cdot \mathbf{d}\epsilon \right| \right) \\ &\leq \frac{2M}{\rho_n - \rho} \int_{\epsilon'}^{\epsilon} \|\mathbf{d}\epsilon\| \leq \frac{2M}{\rho_n - \rho} \|\epsilon - \epsilon'\| \end{aligned}$$

This implies equicontinuity of  $\frac{Y(\rho, \epsilon) - Y(\rho_n, \epsilon)}{\rho_n - \rho}$  with the choice  $\delta = e(\rho_n - \rho)/(2M)$ . As before, equicontinuity and compactness of  $E$  allow us to interchange the limit and the supremum, and thus:

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\xi(\rho, \rho_n)}{\rho_n - \rho} &= \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\sup_{\epsilon \in E} \{Y(\rho, \epsilon) - Y(\rho_n, \epsilon)\}}{\rho_n - \rho} = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\epsilon \in E} \frac{Y(\rho, \epsilon) - Y(\rho_n, \epsilon)}{\rho_n - \rho} \\ &= \sup_{\epsilon \in E} \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{Y(\rho, \epsilon) - Y(\rho_n, \epsilon)}{\rho_n - \rho} = \sup_{\epsilon \in E} \frac{\partial Y(\rho, \epsilon)}{\partial \rho} := M' < \infty \end{aligned}$$

where finiteness of  $M'$  follows from it being defined as the supremum of a continuous function over a compact set. This establishes that the first limit in Eq. (F.11) exists and is finite, completing the proof that it evaluates to zero.

Given that the second term in Eq. (F.10) is zero, we can simplify the remaining term as:

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \frac{P(Y_i(\rho) \leq k \leq Y_i(\rho')) - p(k)}{\rho' - \rho} &= \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \frac{1}{\rho' - \rho} \int_0^\infty f_{\Delta(\rho, \rho'), Y(\rho)}(\Delta, k) \Delta d\Delta \\ &= f_\rho(k) \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \frac{1}{\rho' - \rho} P(\Delta_i(\rho, \rho') \geq 0 | Y_i(\rho) = k) \\ &\quad \cdot \mathbb{E} [\Delta_i(\rho, \rho') | Y_i(\rho) = k, \Delta_i(\rho, \rho') \geq 0] \\ &= f_\rho(k)(k) \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \frac{1}{\rho' - \rho} \mathbb{E} [\Delta_i(\rho, \rho') | Y_i(\rho) = k, \Delta_i(\rho, \rho') \geq 0] \\ &= f_\rho(k)(k) \mathbb{E} \left[ \lim_{\rho' \downarrow \rho} \frac{\Delta_i(\rho, \rho')}{\rho' - \rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho) = k \right] \\ &= f_\rho(k) \mathbb{E} \left[ -\frac{Y_i(\rho)}{d\rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho) = k \right] \end{aligned}$$

where I have used Lemma POS and then finally the dominated convergence theorem. To see that we may use the latter, note that  $\frac{dY_i(\rho)}{d\rho} = \frac{\partial Y(\rho, \epsilon_i)}{\partial \rho} < M$  uniformly over all  $\epsilon_i \in E$ , and  $\mathbb{E} [M | Y_i(\rho) = k] = M < \infty$ .  $\square$

Now we return to the proof of Lemma 2. By item 1 of Assumption SMOOTH, the marginal  $F_\rho(y) := P(Y_i(\rho) \leq y)$  is differentiable away from  $y = k$  with derivative  $f_\rho(y)$ . From the proof of Theorem 3 it follows that  $\mathcal{B} \leq F_{\rho_1}(k) - F_{\rho_0}(k) + p(k)$  with equality

under CONVEX, and thus:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{B} - p(k) &\leq F_{\rho_1}(k) - F_{\rho_0}(k) \\
&= \int_{\rho_0}^{\rho_1} \frac{d}{d\rho} F_{\rho}(k) d\rho \\
&= \int_{\rho_0}^{\rho_1} \lim_{\delta \downarrow 0} \frac{F_{\rho+\delta}(k) - F_{\rho}(k)}{\delta} d\rho \\
&= \int_{\rho_1}^{\rho_0} \lim_{\delta \downarrow 0} \frac{F_{\rho}(k) - F_{\rho+\delta}(k)}{\delta} d\rho \\
&= \int_{\rho_1}^{\rho_0} \lim_{\delta \downarrow 0} \frac{P(Y_i(\rho) \leq k \leq Y_i(\rho + \delta)) - p(k)}{\delta} d\rho \\
&= \int_{\rho_1}^{\rho_0} f_{\rho}(k) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{Y_i(\rho)}{d\rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho) = k \right] d\rho
\end{aligned}$$

where the fourth equality has applied the identity  $1 = P(Y_{0i} \leq k) + P(Y_i(\rho) \leq k \leq Y_i(\rho + \delta)) + P(Y_{1i} > k)$  under CHOICE and WARP to the pair of choice constraints  $B(\rho)$  and  $B(\rho + \delta)$ , noting that  $P(Y_i(\rho) < k) = F_{\rho}(k) - p(k)$ .

## F.6 Proof of Lemma 3

This mostly follows the proof in Kasy (2017) adapted to our setting in which  $y$  is one-dimensional. As in the proof of Lemma 2 I leave  $k$  implicit in the functions  $Y_i(\rho, k)$  and  $Y(\rho, k, \epsilon)$ , as  $k$  remains fixed throughout. One additional subtlety concerns the possibility of a point mass in the distribution of each  $Y_i(\rho)$  at  $k^*$ . Note that Assumption SMOOTH implies a continuous density  $f_{\rho}(y)$  for all  $\rho \in [\rho_0, \rho_1]$  and  $y \neq k^*$ , which is also continuously differentiable in  $\rho$ . We define  $f_{\rho}(k^*) = \lim_{y \rightarrow k^*} f_{\rho}(y)$  in the case that  $p > 0$ .

Consider any bounded differentiable function  $a(y)$  having the property that  $a(k^*) = 0$ , and note that we may write  $A(y) := \frac{d}{d\rho} \mathbb{E}[a(Y_i(\rho))]$  in two separate ways. Firstly:

$$A(y) = \frac{d}{d\rho} \int dy \cdot f_{\rho}(y) \cdot a(y) = \int dy \cdot a(y) \cdot \frac{d}{d\rho} f_{\rho}(y) \quad (\text{F.12})$$

and secondly:

$$A(y) = \frac{d}{d\rho} \mathbb{E}[a(Y_i(\rho, \epsilon_i))] = \int dF_{\epsilon}(\epsilon) \frac{d}{d\rho} a(Y(\rho, \epsilon)) = \int dF_{\epsilon}(\epsilon) a'(Y(\rho, \epsilon)) \cdot \partial_{\rho} Y(\rho, \epsilon) \quad (\text{F.13})$$

The first representation integrates over the distribution of  $Y_i(\rho)$ , while the second integrates over the distribution of the underlying heterogeneity  $\epsilon_i$ . In both cases we are justified in swapping the integral and derivative by boundedness of  $a(y)$ .

Continuing with Eq. (F.13), we may apply the law of iterated expectations over values of  $Y(\rho, \epsilon)$ , and then integrate by parts:

$$\begin{aligned} A(y) &= \int dy f_\rho(y) a'(y) \int dF_{\epsilon|Y(\rho, \epsilon)=y} \partial_\rho Y(\rho, \epsilon) \\ &= \int dy f_\rho(y) a'(y) \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\partial Y(\rho, \epsilon)}{\partial \rho} \middle| Y(\rho, \epsilon) = y \right] \\ &= - \int dy \cdot a(y) \cdot \frac{\partial}{\partial y} \left\{ f_\rho(y) \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\partial Y(\rho, \epsilon)}{\partial \rho} \middle| Y(\rho, \epsilon) = y \right] \right\} \end{aligned}$$

where we've assumed the density  $f_\rho(y)$  vanishes at the limits of  $y$ . Comparing with Eq. (F.12), we see that for this to be true of any bounded differentiable function  $a$  (satisfying  $a(k^*) = 0$ ), we must have

$$\frac{d}{d\rho} f_\rho(y) = - \frac{\partial}{\partial y} \left\{ f_\rho(y) \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\partial Y(\rho, \epsilon)}{\partial \rho} \middle| Y(\rho, \epsilon) = y \right] \right\}$$

point-wise for all  $y \neq k^*$ .

Now consider  $y = k^*$ . First note that

$$\frac{d}{d\rho} f_\rho(k^*) = \frac{d}{d\rho} \lim_{y \rightarrow k^*} f_\rho(y) = \lim_{y \rightarrow k^*} \frac{d}{d\rho} f_\rho(y) = - \lim_{y \rightarrow k^*} \frac{\partial}{\partial y} \left\{ f_\rho(y) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\partial Y(\rho, \epsilon)}{\partial \rho} \middle| Y(\rho, \epsilon) = y \right] \right\}$$

where we can interchange the limit and derivative by the Moore-Osgood theorem, since  $\frac{d}{d\rho} f_\rho(y)$  is uniformly bounded over  $\rho \in [\rho_1, \rho_0]$  by Assumption SMOOTH. Furthermore, for all  $y \neq k^*$ :  $\mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\partial Y(\rho, \epsilon)}{\partial \rho} \middle| Y(\rho, \epsilon) = y \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\partial Y(\rho, \epsilon)}{\partial \rho} \middle| Y(\rho, \epsilon) = y, K_i^* = 0 \right]$ , and the latter of these is continuously differentiable at all  $y$  (including  $y = k^*$ ) by item 3 of Assumption SMOOTH. Thus:

$$\frac{d}{d\rho} f_\rho(k^*) = - \frac{\partial}{\partial y} \left\{ f_\rho(k^*) \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{\partial Y(\rho, \epsilon)}{\partial \rho} \middle| Y(\rho, \epsilon) = k^*, K_i^* = 0 \right] \right\}$$

since  $f_\rho(y)$  is also continuously differentiable at  $y = k^*$ , by SMOOTH and the definition of  $f_\rho(k^*)$  as  $\lim_{y \rightarrow k^*} f_\rho(y)$ .

## F.7 Proof of Theorem 2

This proof follows the notation of Appendix A. Throughout this proof we let  $Y_i(\rho, k) = Y_i(\rho)$ , given Assumption SEPARABLE.

First, consider the effect of changing  $k$  on the bunching probability:

$$\begin{aligned}
\partial_k \{ \mathcal{B} - p(k) \} &= -\frac{\partial}{\partial k} \int_{\rho_0}^{\rho_1} f_{\rho}(k) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{Y_i(\rho)}{d\rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho) = k \right] d\rho \\
&= -\int_{\rho_0}^{\rho_1} \frac{\partial}{\partial k} \left\{ f_{\rho}(k) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{Y_i(\rho)}{d\rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho) = k \right] \right\} d\rho \\
&= \int_{\rho_0}^{\rho_1} \partial_{\rho} f_{\rho}(k) d\rho = f_1(k) - f_0(k)
\end{aligned}$$

I turn now to the total effect on average hours.

$$\begin{aligned}
\partial_k E[Y_i^{[k, \rho_1]}] &= \partial_k \{ P(Y_i(\rho_0) < k) \mathbb{E}[Y_i(\rho_0) | Y_i(\rho_0) < k] \} + k \partial_k \left( \mathcal{B}^{[k, \rho_1]} - p(k) \right) + \mathcal{B}^{[k, \rho_1]} - p(k) \\
&\quad + \partial_k \{ P(Y_i(\rho_1) > k) \mathbb{E}[Y_i(\rho_1) | Y_i(\rho_1) > k] \} \\
&= \partial_k \int_{-\infty}^k y \cdot f_{\rho_0}(y) \cdot dy + k (f_0(k) - f_1(k)) + \mathcal{B}^{[k, \rho_1]} - p(k) + \partial_k \int_k^{\infty} y \cdot f_{\rho_1}(y) \cdot dy \\
&= \cancel{k f_0(k)} + k (\cancel{f_1(k)} - \cancel{f_0(k)}) + \mathcal{B}^{[k, \rho_1]} - p(k) - \cancel{k f_1(k)}
\end{aligned}$$

Meanwhile:

$$\begin{aligned}
\partial_{\rho_1} E[Y_i^{[k, \rho_1]}] &= k \partial_{\rho_1} \mathcal{B}^{[k, \rho_1]} + \partial_{\rho_1} \{ P(Y_i(\rho_1) > k) \mathbb{E}[Y_i(\rho_1) | Y_i(\rho_1) > k] \} \\
&= k \partial_{\rho_1} \mathcal{B}^{[k, \rho_1]} + \int_k^{\infty} y \cdot \partial_{\rho_1} f_{\rho_1}(y) \cdot dy \\
&= -k f_{\rho_1}(k) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{Y_i(\rho_1)}{d\rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho_1) = k \right] - \int_k^{\infty} y \cdot \partial_y \left\{ f_{\rho_1}(y) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{dY_i(\rho_1)}{d\rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho_1) = y \right] \right\} dy \\
&= \cancel{-k f_{\rho_1}(k) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{Y_i(\rho_1)}{d\rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho_1) = k \right]} + \cancel{y f_{\rho_1}(y) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{dY_i(\rho_1)}{d\rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho_1) = y \right] \bigg|_k^{\infty}} \\
&\quad - \int_k^{\infty} f_{\rho_1}(y) \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{dY_i(\rho_1)}{d\rho} \middle| Y_i(\rho_1) = y \right] dy
\end{aligned}$$

where I have used Theorem F.5 and Lemma 3, and then integration by parts along with the boundary condition that  $\lim_{y \rightarrow \infty} y \cdot f_{\rho_1}(y) = 0$ , implied by Assumption SMOOTH.