

# Supplemental Material for “A Vector Monotonicity Assumption for Multiple Instruments”

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## A Results about linear 2SLS

The standard method of combining multiple instruments in applied work is to use some variant of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. In the language of Lemma 3, this corresponds to either letting  $h(z)$  be a linear projection of a treatment indicator on the instruments (what I’ll call linear 2SLS), and letting  $h(z)$  equal the propensity score (what we call “regression on the propensity score, also referred to as fully-saturated” 2SLS).

Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that under conventional IAM monotonicity, regressing  $Y$  on the propensity score function recovers a convex combination of group-specific average treatment effects. In Section B.5, I provide a novel demonstration of this, starting from Lemma 3. However, this result does not extend to vector monotonicity, a property that arises from the fact that VM allows two-way flows between some pairs of points in  $\mathcal{Z}$ .

In this section I demonstrate two special cases of vector monotonicity in which *linear* 2SLS with binary instruments recovers a convex combination of causal effects, focusing on a case with binary instruments and  $\mathcal{Z} = \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\} \cdots \times \{0, 1\}$ . The first special case is one in which each unit is responsive to at most *one* of the instruments:

**Assumption 4 (separable compliance).** *For each unit  $i$  (i.e. with probability one), there exists a  $j \in \{1 \dots J\}$  such that  $D_i(z, z_{-j}) = D_i(z, z'_{-j})$  for all  $z_{-j}, z'_{-j} \in \mathcal{Z}_{-j}$  and  $z \in \{0, 1\}$ , i.e. treatment assignment only depends on the value of  $Z_j$ .*

In the language of Section 3, this corresponds to a case where all units are  $Z_j$  “compliers” for some  $j$  (equivalently, all compliance groups correspond to Sperner families  $\{j\}$  for some  $j$ ).

In the following theorem, we will also use a slight strengthening of the notion of vector monotonicity:

**Assumption 2\* (vector monotonicity with aligned covariances).** *With the  $Z_j$  normalized such that  $\text{Cov}(D_i, Z_{ji}) \geq 0$ , for each  $j \in \{1 \dots J\}$  and  $z_{-j} \in \{0, 1\}^{J-1}$ , we have that  $D_i(1, z_{-j}) \geq D_i(0, z_{-j})$*

Assumption 2\* is stronger than Assumption 2, because when some of the instruments are negatively correlated it is possible that the unconditional covariances are negative, even with  $Z_{ji} = 1$  corresponding to the “pro-treatment” state for instrument  $j$ .<sup>1</sup>

Let  $\rho_{2sls,lin}$  be the linear 2SLS estimand  $\rho_{2sls,lin} := \text{Cov}\left(Y_i, \sum_j \pi_j Z_{ji}\right) / \text{Var}\left(\sum_j \pi_j Z_{ji}\right)$ , where  $\pi_j$  is the population regression coefficient on  $Z_j$  from a linear regression of  $D$  on the  $Z_1 \dots Z_J$ . Our result is then:

**Theorem SM1.** *Under Assumptions 1, 2\*, 4:*

$$\rho_{2sls,lin} = \sum_{j=1}^J w_j \cdot E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) | D_i(1, Z_{-ji}) > D_i^j(0, Z_{-ji})]$$

where the weights  $w_j$  are positive and sum to one:  $w_j = \frac{P(D_i^j(1) > D_i^j(0)) \text{Cov}(D_i, Z_{ji})}{\sum_{j=1}^J P(D_i^j(1) > D_i^j(0)) \text{Cov}(D_i, Z_{ji})}$ .

*Proof.* See Appendix D. □

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<sup>1</sup>Note that under the construction in Section 3.3 from discrete to binary instruments, the resulting vector of binary instruments will satisfy Assumption 2\* so long as if the CEF  $E[D|Z_1 = z_m]$  is monotonic in  $m$ .

*Discussion:* Linear 2SLS always identifies a sum of single instrument IV estimators  $\rho_j := \frac{\text{Cov}(Y_i, Z_{ji})}{\text{Cov}(D_i, Z_{ji})}$  with weights that add to one (but may be negative), since we can write

$$\rho_{2sls,lin} = \frac{\sum_j \pi_j \text{Cov}(Y_i, Z_{ji})}{\sum_j \pi_j \text{Cov}(D_i, Z_{ji})} = \sum_j \left\{ \frac{\pi_j \text{Cov}(D_i, Z_{ji})}{\sum_j \pi_j \text{Cov}(D_i, Z_{ji})} \right\} \cdot \frac{\text{Cov}(Y_i, Z_{ji})}{\text{Cov}(D_i, Z_{ji})}$$

where we've used that  $D_i - \sum_j \pi_j Z_{ji}$  is uncorrelated with each  $Z_{ji}$ .

Separable monotonicity allows linear 2SLS to identify a convex combination of LATEs despite the fact that even under separable compliance each  $\rho_j$  need not put positive weight on all compliance groups when the instruments are correlated. Nevertheless the 2SLS weights are such that the overall weight for each compliance group ends up being positive, despite the fact that each  $\rho_j$  is a linear combination of SLATE's (defined in Section 4.1) that each place negative weight on some groups.

Theorem SM1 also extends to the estimator defined by regression on the propensity score, because under VM and separable compliance it turns out that the propensity score function must be linear, and hence consistently estimated even with a linear first stage:

**Corollary to Theorem SM1.** *Under Assumptions 1, 2\*, and 4:*

$$\frac{\text{Cov}(Y_i, P(Z_i))}{\text{Var}(P(Z_i))} = \rho_{2sls,lin}$$

where  $P(Z_i) := E[D_i|Z_i]$ .

*Proof.* By Assumption 1:

$$E[D_i|Z_i] = \sum_g P(G_i = g) D_g(Z_i) = p_{a.t.} + \sum_{j=1}^J p_{Z_j} Z_{ji}$$

Since the propensity score is linear in the  $Z_{ki}$ , it coincides with the linear projection function used by 2SLS. Now Apply Theorem SM1.  $\square$

A second special case in which linear 2SLS can be justified in a context with VM is when the instruments are independent of one another, or slightly more generally, are what I call “unentangled” in selection:

**Assumption 5 (instruments *unentangled* in selection).** *For  $j \in \{1 \dots J\}$ :*

$$(D_i(0, Z_{-j,i}), D_i(1, Z_{-j,i})) \perp Z_{ji}$$

With these assumptions:

**Lemma 1.** *Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 5:*

$$\rho_j = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) | D_i^j(1) > D_i^j(0)]$$

*Proof.* See Appendix D (note that the proof makes use of Assumption 2\*, but this is implied by Assumption 2 when Assumption 5 holds).  $\square$

Now we can state our result:

**Theorem SM2 (2SLS with unentangled binary instruments).** *Under Assumptions 1, 2\*, and 5, the linear two stage least squares estimand is*

$$\rho_{2sls,lin} = \sum_{j=1}^J w_j E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) | D_i(1, Z_{-j,i}) > D_i(0, Z_{-j,i})]$$

where the coefficients  $w_j$  are positive and sum to unity.

*Proof.* See Appendix D. □

The assumption that the instruments are unentangled is very strong. While it is weaker than full independence of the instruments, it is hard to articulate concretely a case in which it holds without independence of the instrments.

## B Various examples and special cases from the main text

### B.1 PM without VM, with two binary instruments

Suppose there are two binary instruments, and that PM holds but not VM. For VM to be violated, there must be a “flip” in which value of one of the instruments –say  $Z_2$ – is the “pro-treatment” state, depending on the value of the other instrument. In other words, for some choice of which instrument is called  $Z_2$ , and some choice of labeling for the “0” and “1” values of each instrument, we have that:

$$P(D_i(0, 1) \geq D_i(0, 0)) = 1 \text{ and } P(D_i(1, 1) \leq D_i(1, 0)) = 1$$

with both

$$P(D_i(0, 1) > D_i(0, 0) > 0 \text{ and } P(D_i(1, 1) < D_i(1, 0)) > 0$$

This is without loss of generality, given the choice to arbitrarily assign the labels 0, 1.

Now consider the set of possible compliance groups that satisfy PM but not VM, denoted as  $\mathcal{G}^{PM-VM}$ . Any compliance group  $g \in \mathcal{G}^{PM-VM}$  must then be either a complier, always-taker, or never-taker with respect to  $Z_2$ , when  $Z_1 = 0$ . Similarly, any compliance group  $g$  must then be either a “defier”, always-taker, or never-taker with respect to  $Z_2$  when  $Z_1 = 1$ . The set of pairs  $(g_0, g_1)$ , where  $g_0 \in \{c, a, n\}$  and  $g_1 \in \{d, a, n\}$  exhausts the possible compliance groups, since knowing  $g_0$  and  $g_1$  pins down  $D_i(z_1, z_2)$  for all four values of  $z_1, z_2$ . This generates an exhaustive set of 9 possible compliance groups, shown in Table 1.

However, all nine of the compliance groups cannot coexist at the same time. For example, if both odd compliers and  $Z_1$  defiers both exist in the population, there will be two-way flows when varying  $Z_1$  with  $Z_2$  fixed at zero. This is a consequence of what Mogstad, Torgovitsky and Walters (2019) call *logical consistency*, applied to selection. The possibilities separate into two cases, depending on whether there are “odd compliers”

name	$Z_1 = 0, Z_2 = 0$	$Z_1 = 0, Z_2 = 1$	$Z_1 = 1, Z_2 = 0$	$Z_1 = 1, Z_2 = 1$
odd compliers	N	T	T	N
eager compliers	N	T	T	T
1-only	N	T	N	N
reluctant defiers	T	T	T	N
always takers	T	T	T	T
$Z_1$ defiers	T	T	N	N
2-only	N	N	T	N
$Z_1$ compliers	N	N	T	T
never takers	N	N	N	N

**Table 1:** Rows are possible compliance groups in the set  $\mathcal{G}^{PM-VM}$ .  $T$  and  $N$  indicate treatment, or non-treatment, respectively. Not all of these groups can coexist in the population without violating PM.

in the population. If there are odd compliers, then there can be no  $Z_1$  compliers or  $Z_1$  defiers in the population. This leaves seven groups, depicted in Table 2.

If, on the other hand,  $P(G_i = \text{odd complier}) = 0$ , then there can be either  $Z_1$

group name	$Z_1 = 0, Z_2 = 0$	$Z_1 = 0, Z_2 = 1$	$Z_1 = 1, Z_2 = 0$	$Z_1 = 1, Z_2 = 1$
odd compliers	N	T	T	N
eager compliers	N	T	T	T
reluctant defiers	T	T	T	N
1-only	N	T	N	N
2-only	N	N	T	N
always takers	T	T	T	T
never takers	N	N	N	N

**Table 2:** Case 1, when  $P(G_i = \text{odd complier}) > 0$ .

compliers, or  $Z_1$  defiers, but not both. This creates a second type of case. Supposing that  $P(G_i = Z_1 \text{ complier}) > 0$ , there can be no  $Z_1$  defiers, 1-only units, or reluctant defiers. This leaves five possible groups, depicted in Table 3.

group name	$Z_1 = 0, Z_2 = 0$	$Z_1 = 0, Z_2 = 1$	$Z_1 = 1, Z_2 = 0$	$Z_1 = 1, Z_2 = 1$
eager compliers	N	T	T	T
$Z_1$ compliers	N	N	T	T
2-only	N	N	T	N
always takers	T	T	T	T
never takers	N	N	N	N

**Table 3:** Case 2, when  $P(G_i = \text{odd complier}) = 0$  and  $P(G_i = Z_1 \text{ complier}) > 0$ .

The remaining  $P(G_i = Z_1 \text{ defier}) > 0$  case is symmetric with respect to Table 3, up to a relabeling of “0” and “1” for  $Z_1$ : in addition to  $Z_1$  defiers, there can be reluctant defiers, 1-only units, always takers and never takers.

Case 1 and Case 2 have very different implications for identification. In Case 2, the group-specific average treatment effects  $\Delta_g$  are identified for all groups aside from always takers and never takers. However, it can be readily verified that Assumption IAM holds in Case 2.

However, in Case 1, the  $\Delta_g$  for  $g \notin \{a.t., n.t.\}$  are not identified. With three linearly independent Wald ratios, we only have three equations for five unknowns. This is also generally true under VM, that the  $\Delta_g$  are not separately identified. However, here we can also show that the Wald estimands do not even identify the all compliers LATE (ACL). This is shown explicitly in the proof of Proposition 5, but can be seen in a special case by assuming that the 1-only and 2-only groups are not present. Even then we cannot identify the ACL. With this restriction, we would still have  $E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 1)] - E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 0)] = p_{odd}\Delta_{odd} + p_{eager}\Delta_{eager}$ ,  $E[Y_i|Z_i = (1, 0)] - E[Y_i|Z_i = (1, 1)] = p_{odd}\Delta_{odd} + p_{reluct.}\Delta_{reluct.}$ , and  $E[Y_i|Z_i = (1, 0)] - E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 0)] = E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 1)] - E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 0)]$ . Thus the third equation gives no further information beyond the first. The observable conditional means of  $Y_i$  are compatible with any numerical value of the ACL, which is equal to  $p_{odd}\Delta_{odd} + p_{eager}\Delta_{eager} + p_{reluct.}\Delta_{reluct.}$ .

## B.2 The identifying power of Wald ratios with two binary instruments

For points  $z, w \in \mathcal{Z}$  that are ordered component-wise, the standard LATE argument goes through to identify a local average treatment effect. For example, with two binary instruments, there are five unique pairs  $(z, w)$  that are ordered in a vector sense. Table 4 describes these in terms of the compliance groups introduced in Section 3.1. Correspond-

$\mathbf{z}$	$\mathbf{w}$	$\mathbf{D_i(z) > D_i(w) \iff G_i = \dots}$
(1,0)	(0,0)	$Z_1$ complier or eager complier
(0,1)	(0,0)	$Z_2$ complier or eager complier
(1,1)	(0,1)	$Z_1$ complier or reluctant complier
(1,1)	(1,0)	$Z_2$ complier or reluctant complier
(1,1)	(0,0)	any $g \in \mathcal{G}^c$

**Table 4:** Third column indicates which compliance groups  $G_i$  lead to  $D_i(z) > D_i(w)$  with the indicated  $z, w$ . For each row in this Table, a Wald ratio  $\rho_{zw}$  identifies a LATE under Assumption VM. In the two binary instrument vase under VM:  $\mathcal{G}^c = \{Z_1, Z_2, or, and\}$ .

ing to each row in 4 is a LATE that can be identified via a Wald ratio  $\rho_{zw}$ , in a case of two binary instruments under VM. For instance, from the first row,  $\rho_{(1,0),(0,0)}$  is:

$$E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) | G_i \in \{Z_1 \text{ comp.}, \text{reluctant}\}] = \frac{p_{Z_1}}{p_{Z_1} + p_{reluctant}} \Delta_{Z_1} + \frac{p_{reluctant}}{p_{Z_1} + p_{reluctant}} \Delta_{reluctant}$$

Recall that the number of compliance groups under VM scales with the so-called Dedekind numbers  $\mathcal{D}_J$ , which grow much faster than  $(2^J \times (2^J - 1))/2$ , the number of unique Wald estimands. Furthermore, the  $\rho_{zw}$  are not even all linearly-independent: in the example of two binary instruments only three of the five are.

Thus, we can see that it will in general be hopeless to identify  $\Delta_g$  for each compliance group  $g \in \mathcal{G}^c$  separately, because we will lack an order condition on the number of pairs  $(z, w)$  in which there is variation in treatment take-up.<sup>2</sup> The exception is the familiar case of  $J = 1$ , where  $(2^J \times (2^J - 1))/2 = \mathcal{D}_J - 2 = 1$  and IAM and VM are equivalent.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, as discussed in Section 3 under VM, we also can't separately identify the occupancy of the compliance groups  $p_g = P(G_i = g)$  for  $J > 1$ , aside from never-takers and always-takers, without further assumptions. An interesting problem is whether for such identification it is sufficient to assume a linear single index model underlying selection.<sup>4</sup>

Note from the final row of Table 4 that the ACL is identified as a Wald ratio:  $\rho_{(11),(00)}$ . A natural question is whether the other parameters  $\Delta_c$  falling under the purview of Theorem 1 can also be identified from Wald ratios for the various  $(z, w)$  that are ordered as vectors. That this conjecture is true follows from Corollary 1 (just subtract off  $E[Y_i|Z_i = 0, \dots, 0]$  from each term and apply that by  $E[h(Z_i)] = 0$  it follows that the total coefficient  $\sum_{S,z} \lambda_S A_{S,z}$  on  $E[Y_i|Z_i = 0, \dots, 0]$  is equal to zero). Below I give an explicit example.

In a case with two binary instruments, suppose we are interested in  $SLATE_1$ , the average treatment effect among units for whom  $D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})$ . This event is equivalent to the event that  $i$  is a  $Z_1$  complier, or  $i$  is an *and*-complier and  $Z_{2i} = 1$ , or  $i$  is an *or*-complier and  $Z_{2i} = 0$ . If one forms the linear combination:

$$\begin{aligned} & P(Z_{2i} = 1) (E[Y_i|Z_i = (1, 1)] - E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 1)]) \\ & \quad + P(Z_{2i} = 0) (E[Y_i|Z_i = (1, 0)] - E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 0)]) \\ &= P(Z_{2i} = 1) (p_{Z_1} + p_{reluctant}) \left[ \frac{p_{Z_1}}{p_{Z_1} + p_{reluctant}} \Delta_{Z_1} + \frac{p_{reluctant}}{p_{Z_1} + p_{reluctant}} \Delta_{reluctant} \right] \\ & \quad + P(Z_{2i} = 0) (p_{Z_1} + p_{eager}) \left[ \frac{p_{Z_1}}{p_{Z_1} + p_{eager}} \Delta_{Z_1} + \frac{p_{eager}}{p_{Z_1} + p_{eager}} \Delta_{eager} \right] \\ &= P(Z_{2i} = 1) (p_{Z_1} \Delta_{Z_1} + p_{reluctant} \Delta_{reluctant}) + P(Z_{2i} = 0) (p_{Z_1} \Delta_{Z_1} + p_{eager} \Delta_{eager}) \\ &= p_{Z_1} \cdot \Delta_{Z_1} + P(Z_{2i} = 1) p_{reluctant} \cdot \Delta_{reluctant} + P(Z_{2i} = 0) p_{eager} \cdot \Delta_{eager} \end{aligned}$$

Similarly

$$\begin{aligned} & P(Z_{2i} = 1) (E[D_i|Z_i = (1, 1)] - E[D_i|Z_i = (0, 1)]) \\ & \quad + P(Z_{2i} = 0) (E[D_i|Z_i = (1, 0)] - E[D_i|Z_i = (0, 0)]) \\ &= p_{Z_1} + P(Z_{2i} = 1) p_{reluctant} + P(Z_{2i} = 0) p_{eager} \\ &= P(D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})) \end{aligned}$$

<sup>2</sup>Mountjoy (2018) alludes to this point in the context of a closely related monotonicity assumption.

<sup>3</sup>With IAM, we can identify  $\Delta_g$  for all  $g \in \mathcal{G}^c$  that occur with positive probability when the instruments have full support; the number of linearly-independent Walds is and  $|\mathcal{G}^c|$  are both equal to  $2^J - 1$ .

<sup>4</sup>With continuous instruments and an assumption of no never-takers, Theorem 1 of Ichimura and Thompson (1998) would imply identification of  $F_\beta$  up to a scale normalization, in a model where  $D_i = \mathbb{1}(Z_i' \beta_i \geq \beta_{0i})$ , with  $\beta_i \perp Z_i$  (the VM positivity restriction:  $P(\beta_{ji} \geq 0) = 1$  for  $j > 0$ , is not necessary here for identification). Given the marginal distributions of  $\beta_i$  and  $Z_i$ , one could compute  $p_g$  for all  $g \in \mathcal{G}$ .

Thus

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{P(Z_{2i} = 1)(E[Y_i|Z_i = (1, 1)] - E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 1)]) + P(Z_{2i} = 0)(E[Y_i|Z_i = (1, 0)] - E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 0)])}{P(Z_{2i} = 1)(E[D_i|Z_i = (1, 1)] - E[D_i|Z_i = (0, 1)]) + P(Z_{2i} = 0)(E[D_i|Z_i = (1, 0)] - E[D_i|Z_i = (0, 0)])} \\
&= \frac{p_{Z_1}}{D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})} \Delta_{Z_1} + \frac{P(Z_{2i} = 1)p_{reluctant}}{D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})} \Delta_{reluctant} + \frac{P(Z_{2i} = 0)p_{eager}}{D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})} \Delta_{eager} \\
&= \frac{P(G_i = Z_1)}{D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})} \Delta_{Z_1} + \frac{P(Z_{2i} = 1 \& G_i = and)}{D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})} \Delta_{reluctant} + \frac{P(Z_{2i} = 0 \& G_i = or)}{D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})} \Delta_{eager} \\
&= \frac{P(D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i}) \& G_i = Z_1)}{D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})} \Delta_{Z_1} + \frac{P(D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i}) \& G_i = and)}{D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})} \Delta_{reluctant} \\
&\quad + \frac{P(D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i}) \& G_i = or)}{D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})} \Delta_{eager} \\
&= P(G_i = Z_1 | D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})) \Delta_{Z_1} + P(G_i = and | D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})) \Delta_{reluctant} \\
&\quad + P(G_i = or | D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})) \Delta_{eager} \\
&= E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0) | D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i})] = SLATE_1
\end{aligned}$$

To see that this same particular combination of causal effects is operationalized by the 2SLS-like estimator  $\rho_h$  suppose we choose  $h(z)$  such that  $Cov(Z_{1i}, H_i) = 1$ ,  $Cov(Z_{2i}, H_i) = 0$ , and  $Cov(Z_{1i}Z_{2i}, H_i) = P(Z_{2i} = 1)$ . Then, by Lemma 3:

$$\begin{aligned}
\rho_h &= \frac{p_{Z_1} \Delta_{Z_1} + p_{reluctant} P(Z_{2i} = 1) \Delta_{reluctant} + p_{eager} (1 - P(Z_{2i} = 1)) \Delta_{eager}}{p_{Z_1} + p_{reluctant} P(Z_{2i} = 1) + p_{eager} (1 - P(Z_{2i} = 1))} \\
&= \frac{Z_1 \cdot \Delta_{Z_1} + P(Z_{2i} = 1) p_{reluctant} \cdot \Delta_{reluctant} + P(Z_{2i} = 0) p_{eager} \cdot \Delta_{eager}}{P(D_i(1, Z_{2i}) > D_i(0, Z_{2i}))}
\end{aligned}$$

### B.3 Identifying the $\Delta_g$ with $J = 2$ when one is known

Consider differences in the propensity score  $P(z) := E[D_i = z]$  between three of the pairs  $(z, w)$  of instrument values listed in Table 4 above. By the information in Table 4 and the law of iterated expectations, these yield sums of the group occupancies  $p_g := P(G_i = g)$ , e.g:

$$\begin{pmatrix} P(1, 0) - P(0, 0) \\ P(0, 1) - P(0, 0) \\ P(1, 1) - P(0, 0) \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} p_{Z_1} \\ p_{Z_2} \\ p_{eager} \\ p_{reluctant} \end{pmatrix}$$

The choice of the three pairs listed above is arbitrary, but only three such differences can be linearly independent. If a single  $p_g$  were known, say  $p_{Z_1}$ , then the above equation can be appended and written as

$$\begin{pmatrix} p_{Z_1} \\ P(1, 0) - P(0, 0) \\ P(0, 1) - P(0, 0) \\ P(1, 1) - P(0, 0) \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} p_{Z_1} \\ p_{Z_2} \\ p_{eager} \\ p_{reluctant} \end{pmatrix}$$

where the vector on the LHS is identified. The matrix on the RHS is invertible, which leads to identification of the four  $p_g$  for  $g \in \mathcal{G}^c$ .

Now consider the analogous Wald estimands  $\rho_{z,w} := \frac{E[Y_i|Z_i=z] - E[Y_i|Z_i=w]}{E[D_i|Z_i=z] - E[D_i|Z_i=w]}$  between the same three pairs  $(z, w)$ . By the law of iterated expectations, each will provide a weighted



average over group specific treatment effects. Stacking these equations with  $\Delta_{tution}$ , assumed to be known, we have:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \Delta_{Z_1} \\ \rho_{(1,0),(0,0)} \\ \rho_{(0,1),(0,0)} \\ \rho_{(1,1),(0,0)} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} p_{Z_1} & 0 & p_{eager} & 0 \\ 0 & p_{Z_2} & p_{eager} & 0 \\ p_{Z_1} & p_{Z_2} & p_{eager} & p_{reluctant} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \Delta_{Z_1} \\ \Delta_{Z_2} \\ \Delta_{eager} \\ \Delta_{reluctant} \end{pmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{pmatrix} p_{Z_1} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & p_{Z_2} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & p_{eager} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & p_{reluctant} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \Delta_{Z_1} \\ \Delta_{Z_2} \\ \Delta_{eager} \\ \Delta_{reluctant} \end{pmatrix}$$

The diagonal matrix is known from the propensity score calculation above, and is invertible so long as all groups have non-zero size. The binary matrix is again invertible (it is the same as before), and thus the vector of all four  $\Delta_g$  is identified as:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \Delta_{Z_1} \\ \Delta_{Z_2} \\ \Delta_{eager} \\ \Delta_{reluctant} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} 1/p_{Z_1} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1/p_{Z_2} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1/p_{eager} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1/p_{reluctant} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \Delta_{Z_1} \\ \rho_{(1,0),(0,0)} \\ \rho_{(0,1),(0,0)} \\ \rho_{(1,1),(0,0)} \end{pmatrix}$$

#### B.4 The matrix $M_J$ for $J = 3$

	{1}	{2}	{3}	{1,2}	{1,3}	{2,3}	{1,2,3}
{1}	1						
{2}		1					
{3}			1				
{1,2}				1			
{1,3}					1		
{2,3}						1	
{1,2,3}							1
{1},{2}	1	1		-1			
{2},{3}		1	1			-1	
{1},{3}	1		1		-1		
{1},{2},{3}	1	1	1	-1	-1	-1	1
{1,2},{3}			1	1			-1
{1,3},{2}		1			1		-1
{2,3},{1}	1					1	-1
{1,2},{1,3}				1	1		-1
{1,2},{2,3}				1		1	-1
{1,3},{2,3}					1	1	-1
{1,2},{1,3},{2,3}				1	1	1	-2

**Table 5:** The matrix  $M_3$  defined in Section 4. Empty cells indicate a zero.

## B.5 Special cases of Lemma 3 under IAM

When we have a single binary instrument, consider the function  $h(Z_i) = Z_i$ . Under monotonicity, the compliance groups are  $\mathcal{G} = \{\text{never-taker}, \text{always-taker}, \text{complier}\}$ . The functions  $D_{a.t.}(Z_i)$  and  $D_{n.t.}(Z_i)$  are constants, so only the complier term contributes. Since  $D_{complier}(Z_i) = Z_i$ , we have that  $Cov(Y_i, h(Z_i)) = P_{complier}\Delta_{complier}$  and  $Cov(D_i, h(Z_i)) = P_{complier}$ , justifying the traditional Wald IV estimator for  $\Delta_{complier}$ .

In the case of a vector instrument with finite support and with IAM monotonicity, there is a well-defined ordering  $z_1 \dots z_{\mathcal{M}}$  of points in  $\mathcal{Z}$  (where  $\mathcal{M} = |\mathcal{Z}|$ ) such that  $P(D_i(z_m) \geq D_i(z_{m-1})) = 1$  (this ordering may be non-unique if there are no “compliers” between some pairs of points in  $\mathcal{Z}$ ). If we choose  $h(Z_i) = P(Z_i)$ , the propensity score function,  $\rho_h$  is equal to the “regression on the propensity score” estimator  $Cov(Y_i, P(Z_i))/Var(P(Z_i))$  (since  $Cov(D_i, P(Z_i)) = Var(P(Z_i))$ ). Note that under IAM  $G_i$  maps one-to-one with as the smallest  $m$  for which  $D_i(z_m) = 1$  (provided  $i$  is not a never-taker). Thus we can use the notation  $D_m(z) := \mathbb{1}(z \succ z_m)$ , indicating that  $z$  succeeds  $z_m$  in the sequence  $z_1 \dots z_{\mathcal{M}}$ . The weights are positive so long as for all  $m$ :  $Cov(D_m(Z_i), P(Z_i)) \geq 0$ , which occurs iff:

$$\begin{aligned} E[P(Z_i)|D_m(Z_i) = 1] - E[P(Z_i)|D_m(Z_i) = 0] \\ = E[P(Z_i)|Z_i \succ z_m] - E[P(Z_i)|Z_i \preceq z_m] > 0 \end{aligned}$$

This inequality will hold for all  $m$ , since (using independence)  $P(z_m)$  is monotonically increasing in  $m$ . This yields a novel demonstration of fact that the “regression on the propensity score” estimator identifies a convex combination of LATEs, as shown in Imbens and Angrist (1994).

## B.6 Vector monotonicity in Bloom scenarios

In some empirical settings, particular combinations of instrument values and treatment status may be impossible. For example, in a randomized trial of an experimental drug, it may not be feasible to obtain the drug ( $D_i = 1$ ) without being assigned to treatment in the trial ( $Z_i = 1$ ). In the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment analyzed by Angrist (2006), all police officers who were assigned to respond to domestic violence complaint with arrest ( $Z_i = 1$ ) indeed arrested offenders ( $D_i = 1$ ). Such instances are what Angrist and Pischke (2008) refer to as “Bloom scenarios”. In the drug trial example, there are no always-takers. In the domestic violence experiment, there are no never-takers.<sup>5</sup>

In a case with multiple instruments  $Z_1 \dots Z_J$ , a Bloom scenario holding for one of the instruments implies restrictions on the compliance groups that can occur. In this

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<sup>5</sup>In both cases, however there would still typically be imperfect compliance overall. In the drug trial example, if some individuals assigned to treatment do not take the drug, they must be never-takers (or defiers). In the domestic violence experiment, sometimes officers arrested particularly dangerous individuals even when they were assigned to alternative responses.

section, I detail the implications of a single-instrument Bloom scenario with multiple binary instruments satisfying VM.

Consider first a case in which there are no always-takers with respect to  $Z_1$ , that is  $D_i(0, z_{-j}) = 0$  with probability one for any  $z_{-j} \in \mathcal{Z}_{-j}$ . Recall from Section 3 that every compliance group under VM maps to a Sperner family on the set of instrument labels, aside from the group of never-takers. For any such family  $F$ , it must be the case that each set in  $F$  contains 1, since otherwise the compliance group  $F$  would be able to take treatment with  $Z_1 = 0$ . For instance, with two binary instruments, eager compliers ( $F = \{1\}, \{2\}$ ) cannot exist, since they take treatment when  $Z_1 = 0, Z_2 = 1$ . The possible groups in this  $J = 2$  example are: never-takers,  $Z_1$  compliers, and reluctant compliers.

That three compliance groups remain, equal to the number of compliance groups that exist under VM with a single binary instrument, when  $J = 2$  fits a general pattern. With  $J$  instruments and the no-always-takers Bloom condition on  $Z_1$ , the compliance groups can be constructed as follows: take the Sperner family  $F$  associated with any VM compliance group on the instrument labels  $2 \dots J$ , and include “1” in each  $S \in F$ . In addition, there will be never-takers, and thus the total number of compliance groups will be equal to the  $J - 1^{th}$  number  $\mathcal{D}_{J-1}$  in the Dedekind sequence (see Section 3). For instance, with  $J = 3$ , we have:

<b>F on {2,3}</b>	<b>corresponding F on {1,2,3}</b>
$\emptyset$	$\{1\}$
$\{2\}$	$\{1, 2\}$
$\{3\}$	$\{1, 3\}$
$\{2\}, \{3\}$	$\{1, 2\}, \{1, 3\}$
$\{2, 3\}$	$\{1, 2, 3\}$

Together with never-takers, there are  $\mathcal{D}_2 = 6$  compliance groups in this case.

Now consider the opposite case, where there are no never-takers with respect to  $Z_1$ , that is  $D_i(1, z_{-j}) = 1$  with probability one for any  $z_{-j} \in \mathcal{Z}_{-j}$ . In this case any Sperner family corresponding to a compliance group must include a set containing only the label 1, since  $Z_1 = 1$  is sufficient for any unit to take treatment. Similar to the previous case, the number of compliance groups satisfying VM will be  $\mathcal{D}_{J-1}$ , and they can be obtained from the Sperner families corresponding to VM compliance groups for the  $J - 1$  instruments  $Z_2 \dots Z_J$ . In this case, we simply append the set  $S = \{1\}$  to any Sperner family on the

set  $\{2 \dots J\}$ :

<b>F on {2,3}</b>	<b>corresponding F on {1,2,3}</b>
$\emptyset$	$\{1\}$
$\{2\}$	$\{1\}, \{2\}$
$\{3\}$	$\{1\}, \{3\}$
$\{2\}, \{3\}$	$\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}$
$\{2, 3\}$	$\{1\}, \{2, 3\}$

Together with always-takers, there are again  $\mathcal{D}_2 = 6$  compliance groups in total.

In these Bloom scenarios, the identification result of Theorem 1 will still be valid, and estimation can proceed as it does in general. Although the Bloom conditions imply restrictions on the propensity score function (e.g. that  $E[D_i|Z_i = (0, z_2, z_3)] = 0$  in the first example, for all  $z_2, z_3 \in \{0, 1\}$ ), they do not imply any restrictions that threaten Assumption 3. In fact, identification is strengthened in these scenarios since they introduce overidentification restrictions. For example, in the second case considered with three binary instruments and no never takers with respect to  $Z_1$ , the model implies that

$$\begin{aligned} ACL &= \frac{E[Y_i|Z_i = (1, 1, 1)] - E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 0, 0)]}{1 - E[D_i|Z_i = (0, 0, 0)]} = \frac{E[Y_i|Z_i = (1, 0, 1)] - E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 0, 0)]}{1 - E[D_i|Z_i = (0, 0, 0)]} \\ &= \frac{E[Y_i|Z_i = (1, 1, 0)] - E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 0, 0)]}{1 - E[D_i|Z_i = (1, 0, 0)]} = \frac{E[Y_i|Z_i = (1, 0, 0)] - E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 0, 0)]}{1 - E[D_i|Z_i = (0, 0, 0)]} \end{aligned}$$


which implies the overidentification restriction that  $E[Y_i|Z_i = (1, z_2, z_3)] = 0$  does not depend on  $z_2, z_3 \in \{0, 1\}$ . In all cases, it is equal to the unconditional average of the treated potential outcome:  $E[Y_i(1)]$ .

## C Additional Empirical Results


### C.1 Alternative instrment definitions for the returns to schooling

Estimates of the ACL based upon two alternative definitions of instrument  $Z_1$  are also considered for comparison with those in the main text. In “Setting B”, I instead cut  $Z_1$  at the sample median, which is roughly \$2,170 in 1993 dollars, rather than at the 90th percentile. As Appendix Table 1 shows, allowing for this more even split across instrument cells substantially reduces the standard errors of the treatment effect estimators. While the point estimates are somewhat smaller, they are now strongly significant, yielding more informative inference on the returns to schooling (however in this case the first stage results are harder to interpret). In Setting C, I define a discrete “cheapness” variable for  $Z_{1i}$  taking values  $\{0, 1, 2\}$  defined at \$1,000 and \$3,000 in the tuition variable. Figure 2 reports estimates of the ACL in Setting C, in which the discrete cheapness variable is re-expressed as the two binary instruments  $\mathbb{1}(Z_{1i} \geq 1)$  and  $\mathbb{1}(Z_{1i} \geq 2)$ , c.f. Proposition 3. 2SLS is here implemented with the same indicator functions, thus avoiding

any assumption of linearity in  $Z_{1i}$ . The magnitudes of the ACL estimates are further reduced compared with the baseline setting.




**Figure 1:** Estimates applied to Setting B. For each of the three specifications, the figure reports the ACL estimate and the analogous fully-saturated 2SLS model. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.



**Figure 2:** Estimates applied to Setting C. For each of the three specifications, the figure reports the ACL estimate and the analogous fully-saturated 2SLS model. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

		$Z_2 = \text{“close”}$				$Z_2 = \text{“close”}$	
		0	1			0	1
$Z_1 = \text{“cheap”}$	0	484	401	$Z_1 = \text{“cheapness”}$	0	286	156
	1	346	516		1	382	487
					2	162	274

**Table 6:** Cross-tabulations of the instruments for Setting B (left) and Setting C (right). Total  $N = 1,747$ .



**Figure 3:** Empirical distribution of the tuition variable.

## C.2 The effect of children on labor supply

In this section I revisit the analysis of Angrist and Evans (1998), who study the effect of family size on parental labor supply. Angrist and Evans consider two types of instruments that induce exogenous variation in family size among families that have at least two children: i) whether the first two children have the same sex; and ii) whether the second birth was a multiple birth (i.e. twins, triplets, etc.). Since twins account for the overwhelming majority of multiple births, I refer to multiple births as simply “twins”.

If the first two children in a family have the same sex, this may cause some parents to have a third child in an effort to have children of both sexes. If some parents’ furthermore have a preference for having at least one boy, they may respond only to this same sex instrument if the first two are girls, and vice versa if they have a preference for girls. These various sex-preferences can be modeled by two binary instruments for whether mother  $i$  has a third or more children (indicated by  $D_i = 1$ ):  $Z_{1i} = \mathbb{1}(\text{i's first two children are girls})$  and  $Z_{2i} = \mathbb{1}(\text{i's first two children are boys})$ . Vector monotonicity is a reasonable assumption here, saying that  $D_i(1, 0) > D_i(0, 0)$  with probability one and  $D_i(0, 1) > D_i(0, 0)$  with probability one – no mother would have a third child only because her first two kids were of the opposite sex. These two instruments may have distinct “complier” populations, since some parents’ may seek a girl, some may seek a boy, and some may seek at least one of each.

Note that VM places no restrictions on  $D_i(1, 1)$ , since the point  $Z_1 = Z_2 = 1$  can be ruled out of the set  $\mathcal{Z}$  of possible instrument values – this would mean having the first two children be both girls and both boys. As a result, VM and PM are equivalent for these two instruments. Note that IAM can only hold for these two instruments if all mothers who would have a third child with two boys would also have a third child with

two girls, or vice versa. This is a strong restriction, which rules out there being some parents who seek at least one girl, and other parents who seek at least one boy.

Twinning (or triplets, etc.) can be thought of as introducing a third binary instrument for family size:  $Z_{3i} = 1(\text{i's second birth was a multiple birth})$ . As the data as coded to record actual births (not inclusive of pregnancies not carried to term), we have a so-called “Bloom scenario” with respect to  $Z_3$ : all mothers with a multiple birth after their first child have at least three children. The implications of such Bloom scenarios under VM with multiple instruments is considered in Section B.6. All together, there are five possible compliance groups in the population:

group name	$\mathbf{Z}_i = (0, 0, 0)$	$\mathbf{Z}_i = (1, 0, 0)$	$\mathbf{Z}_i = (0, 1, 0)$	$\mathbf{Z}_i = (0, 0, 1)$	$\mathbf{Z}_i = (1, 0, 1)$	$\mathbf{Z}_i = (0, 1, 1)$
girl compliers	N	T	N	T	T	T
boy compliers	N	N	T	T	T	T
same-sex compliers	N	T	T	T	T	T
twin compliers	N	N	N	T	T	T
always-takers	T	T	T	T	T	T

**Table 7:** Compliance groups under VM for three instruments drawn from Angrist and Evans (1998), where  $Z = (\text{twogirls}, \text{twoboys}, \text{twins})$ .

There are only six columns in Table 7, rather than eight ( $2^3$ ), because the points  $Z_i = (1, 1, 0)$  and  $Z_i = (1, 1, 1)$  are excluded from  $\mathcal{Z}$ .<sup>6</sup> Since the support of  $Z_i$  is not rectangular (Assumption 3), we will need to appeal to the more general identification result from Appendix A. For this result, the rectangular support condition is replaced by Assumption 3\*, which states that there exists a family  $\mathcal{F}$  of products of the instruments that are linearly independent and span the space of compliance functions  $D_g(Z_i)$  for  $g \in \mathcal{G}^c$  (here  $\mathcal{G}^c$  consists of the four groups that are not never-takers). From Table 7 a spanning family can be seen to be  $\mathcal{F} = \{\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}, \{1, 3\}, \{2, 3\}\}$ , since we have  $D_{\text{girl}}(z) = z_1 + z_3 - z_1 z_3$ ,  $D_{\text{girl}}(z) = z_2 + z_3 - z_2 z_3$ ,  $D_{\text{twin}}(z) = z_3$ , and  $D_{\text{same-sex}}(z) = D_{\text{girl}}(z) + D_{\text{boy}}(z)$ . In estimation then, I use the vector  $\Gamma_i = (Z_{1i}, Z_{2i}, Z_{3i}, Z_{1i}Z_{3i}, Z_{2i}Z_{3i})'$ .

I use the dataset considered by Angrist and Evans, 1998 drawn from the 1980 U.S. census, creating a sample of 394,840 mothers between the ages of 21 and 35 with multiple children (this nearly replicates the sample in Angrist and Evans 1998, which has 5 fewer observations). Table 8 reports the distribution of the instruments and the (unconditional) propensity score function. Angrist and Evans note that twin births may not be unconditionally exogenous, as they are known to be more likely for older mothers and African-American mothers. For simplicity, I ignore this issue and do not condition on any demographic variables  $X$ .

From the left panel of Table 8, we can see that having two boys as the first two children is about 10% more likely than having two girls, whether or not the second birth was a multiple birth. On the right panel, we see that the data is consistent with vector monotonicity as described above. The proportion of always-takers is identified as 33.6%,

<sup>6</sup>In addition reducing the support of the instruments by two points, this also reduces the number of compliance groups: there is no “reluctant complier” groups for instruments  $Z_1$  and  $Z_2$ .

		$Z_3=\text{twins}$				$Z_2=\text{two boys}$	
		0	1			0	1
$(Z_1, Z_2) =$	(0,0)	193,567	1,725	<i>195,292</i>	$Z_1=\text{two girls}$		
	(1,0)	94,618	803	<i>95,421</i>		.336	.418
	(0,1)	103,275	852	<i>104,127</i>		.436	n/a
		<i>391,460</i>	<i>3,380</i>				

**Table 8:** Cross-tabulation (left) and propensity scores (right) for the three instruments. Propensity scores reported are  $\hat{E}[D_i|Z_i = (z_1, z_2, 0)]$  for  $z_1, z_2 \in \{0, 1\}$ . For all  $z_1, z_2$ :  $\hat{E}[D_i|Z_i = (z_1, z_2, 1)] = 1$  so these values are not reported. Total  $N = 394,840$ .

which given that there are no never-takers implies that the remaining 66.4% of mothers in this population respond to the three instruments in some way. The propensity score estimates imply that the total of girl compliers and same-sex compliers is 10% of the population, and that the total of boy compliers and same-sex compliers is 15.7%. This indicates that there are nearly 6 percentage points more boy compliers than there are girl compliers among U.S. mothers.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	2SLS	ACL	SLATE(girls)	SLATE(boys)	SLATE(twins)
Worked for pay	-0.0889*** (-7.13)	-0.111*** (-6.59)	-0.102*** (-3.67)	-0.182*** (-4.94)	-0.106*** (-5.55)
Hours worked for pay	-3.573*** (-7.68)	-3.970*** (-6.29)	-3.478** (-3.27)	-7.459*** (-5.29)	-3.740*** (-5.23)
Weeks worked for pay	-3.85*** (-6.99)	-4.677*** (-6.37)	-4.122** (-3.29)	-9.486*** (-5.74)	-4.347*** (-5.23)
Labor income (1979 USD)	-512.61*** (-4.07)	-692.8*** (-3.99)	-755.1** (-2.67)	-1539.1*** (-4.15)	-617.1** (-3.12)
Size of compliant pop.	n/a	0.755*** (190.30)	0.0700*** (35.93)	0.0515*** (27.34)	0.634*** (578.59)

$t$  statistics in parentheses, \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table 9:** Treatment effect estimates. Each row indicates a different choice of the outcome variable  $Y_i$ , while columns (1)-(5) correspond to alternative treatment effect estimators. 2SLS is fully saturated, including interactions between the gender instruments and the twin instruments. Estimates of various  $\Delta_c$  (columns 2-5) use the unregualrized estimator  $\hat{\rho}(\hat{\lambda}, 0)$ . Size of compliant population reports estimates of  $P(C_i = 1)$ .  $N = 394,840$ .

I consider four choices of the outcome variable  $Y_i$  drawn from Angrist and Evans, 1998: i) the mother's labor income in the year prior to the census (1979 dollars); ii) weeks worked in the year prior to the census; iii) average hours worked per week, and iv) an indicator for whether mother  $i$  worked for pay (any of i-iii) are positive). Treatment effect estimates are reported in Table 9. Across all four outcome measures, having a third child is estimated to cause a significant reduction in mothers' labor force participation. As a result of having more than two children, mothers who respond to any of the instruments



(the ACL) are 11% less likely to work for pay, work 4 hours less per week and nearly 5 weeks less per year, earning about \$700 less for the year. These estimates are all somewhat larger in magnitude than the corresponding 2SLS estimates.

Columns 3-5 of Table 9 report Set LATEs for each of the three instruments individually. The set of compliers to the twins instrument is much larger than those for the boys or girls instrument (63% vs. 5% or 7% of the population); however the estimated value of SLATE(twins) is similar to that of SLATE(girls) across the outcome variables. By contrast, estimates of the LATE among mothers who respond to the two-boys instrument are much larger in magnitude than all other VM treatment effect parameters (columns 2, 3, and 5). This suggests that the mothers most likely to reduce their labor supply—and by much more—are those who had the third kid as a result of seeking a girl after first having two boys.

Finally, I note that Assumption 1 along with the “Bloom condition” that all mothers with a multiple second birth take treatment implies the overidentification restriction that

$$E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 0, 1)] = E[Y_i|Z_i = (1, 0, 1)] = E[Y_i|Z_i = (0, 1, 1)]$$

(see Section B.6 for details). I test this restriction via an F-test by regressing  $Y_i$  on indicators for the cells  $(1, 0, 1)$  and  $(0, 1, 1)$  and a constant, restricted to the twins subsample. The model implies that both regression coefficients for the cell indicators should be zero. The p-value for the regression F-statistic is about .05 when  $Y_i$  indicates worked for pay, .22 for hours worked for pay, .07 for weeks worked for pay, and .19 for mother’s income. While we only fail to reject the null-hypothesis implied by the model at the 5% level for the worked for pay outcome, these results could be interpreted as providing mild evidence against the validity of the model. One possible explanation is through number of children: mothers who have gender parity between their first two children as well as twins might be more likely to have *four* or more children, as compared with mothers with mixed genders among their first two kids that also have twins. Such logic challenges the exclusion restriction when this setting is considered with a binary definition of treatment and both twinning and sex-mix instruments. The estimates here should thus be interpreted with caution, as the methods in this paper have not yet been extended to cases with multi-valued treatment.

## D Proofs

### D.1 Proof of Appendix Proposition 8

We restate the result here:

**Proposition 1.** *Let the support  $\mathcal{Z}$  of the instruments be discrete and finite. Fix a function  $c(g, z)$ . Let  $\mathcal{P}_{DZ}$  denote the joint distribution of  $Z_i$ . Then the following are equivalent:*

1.  $\Delta_c$  is (point) identified by  $\mathcal{P}_{DZ}$  and  $\{\beta_s\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$ , for some finite set  $\mathcal{S}$  of known or identified (from  $\mathcal{P}_{DZ}$ ) measurable functions  $s(d, z)$ , and  $\beta_s := E[s(D_i, Z_i)Y_i]$

2.  $\Delta_c = \beta_s$  for a single such  $s(d, z)$
3.  $\Delta_c = E[t(D_i, Z_i, Y_i)]$  with  $t(d, z, y)$  a known or identified (from  $\mathcal{P}_{DZ}$ ) measurable function
4.  $\Delta_c$  is identified from the set of CEFs  $\{E[Y_i|D_i = d, Z_i = z]\}$  for  $d \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $z \in \mathcal{Z}$  along with the joint distribution  $\mathcal{P}_{DZ}$

Where the meaning of “identified” here is that the set of values of a parameter that are compatible with a set of empirical estimands is a singleton, regardless of the distribution of the latent variables  $(G_i, Y_i(1), Y_i(0))$  – for all  $\mathcal{P}_{DZ}$  within some class.

*Proof.* We can show each of the following implications:

- **1  $\rightarrow$  4** Any  $\beta_s$  can be written:  $\beta_s = \sum_{d,z} P(D_i = d, Z_i = z) s(d, z) E[Y_i|D_i = d, Z_i = z]$ , and is thus pinned down by the CEFs  $E[Y_i|D_i = d, Z_i = z]$ , the joint distribution  $\mathcal{P}_{DZ}$ , and the known function  $s$ .
- **4  $\rightarrow$  1** Let  $\mathcal{S} = \{s(d, z) = \mathbb{1}(D_i = d)\mathbb{1}(Z_i = z)\}_{d \in \{0,1\}, z \in \mathcal{Z}}$ . Then each  $\beta_s$  is equal to  $P(D_i = d, Z_i = z) E[Y_i|D_i = d, Z_i = z]$  for some  $d, z$ . The coefficient is known from  $\mathcal{P}_{DZ}$ , thus **4.** is a case of **1.**
- **2  $\rightarrow$  1** Immediate, since 3 is a special case of 2 with  $\mathcal{S}$  a singleton
- **4  $\rightarrow$  2** Write any  $E[Y_i|D_i = d, Z_i = z] = E[Y_i(d)|D_i = d, Z_i = z] = P(D_i = d|Z_i = z)^{-1} E[Y_i(d)\mathbb{1}(D_i = d)|Z_i = z] = P(D_i = d|Z_i = z)^{-1} \sum_g P(G_i = g|Z_i = z) E[Y_i(d)\mathbb{1}(D_i = d)|G_i = g, Z_i = z] = P(D_i = d|Z_i = z)^{-1} \sum_{g: D_g(z)=d} P(G_i = g) E[Y_i(d)|G_i = g]$ , where we have used independence.

To eliminate the coefficient, simply write:  $E[Y_i\mathbb{1}(D_i = d)|Z_i = z] = \sum_{g: D_g(z)=d} P(G_i = g) E[Y_i(d)|G_i = g]$ . If we stack the unknown quantities  $P(G_i = g) E[Y_i(d)|G_i = g]$  for all  $g \in \mathcal{G}, d \in \{0, 1\}$  into a vector  $x$ , and the identified quantities  $E[Y_i\mathbb{1}(D_i = d)|Z_i = z]$  for all  $d \in \{0, 1\}, z \in \mathcal{Z}$  into a vector  $b$ , then we have a system of linear equations  $Ax = b$ , where  $A$  is a fixed matrix of entries of the form  $[A]_{dz,g} = \mathbb{1}(D_g(z) = d)$ . Note that the matrix  $A$  here is not the same as the matrix  $A$  defined in Corollary 1 to Theorem 1.

Similarly, as we have seen  $\Delta_c$  can be written as a linear combination of the components of the vector  $z$ . Specifically, from Equation(2):

$$\Delta_c = \sum_g \frac{E[c(g, Z_i)]}{E[c(G_i, Z_i)]} P(G_i = g) \{E[Y_i(1)|G_i = g] - E[Y_i(0)|G_i = g]\}$$

We can now write  $\Delta_c = \theta'_c x$ , where  $\theta_c$  is the vector of coefficients  $\pm \frac{E[c(g, Z_i)]}{E[c(G_i, Z_i)]}$  from the above equation.

The set of vectors  $x$  compatible with the set of identifying restrictions  $Ax = b$  can be written as  $\{A^\dagger b + (I - A^\dagger A)w\}$  for all arbitrary vectors  $w \in \mathbb{R}^{2|\mathcal{G}|}$ , where  $A^\dagger$  is the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of  $A$ . The corresponding set of values for  $\Delta_c$  is  $\{\theta'_c A^\dagger b + \theta'_c (I - A^\dagger A)w\}$ . For this set to be a singleton for all  $w$ , we must either have

$A^\dagger A = 0$  (i.e.  $A$  has full column rank), or the vector  $\theta_c$  must lie in the row space of the matrix  $A$ , so that in either case  $\theta'_c(I - A^\dagger A)$  is equal to the zero vector. If the set were not a singleton, then  $\Delta_c$  would not be expectation identified, since an infinite collection of values of  $\Delta_c$  would be compatible with the full set of restrictions  $Ax = b$ . Thus, by **4.**, we have that  $\Delta_c = \theta'_c A^\dagger b$ . This then implies **2.**, if we take  $s(d, z) = \frac{P(D_i=d|Z_i=z)}{P(D_i=d, Z_i=z)} \cdot [\theta'_c A^\dagger]_{(d,z)}$ , where  $[\theta'_c A^\dagger]_{(d,z)}$  is the component of the vector  $\theta'_c A^\dagger$  corresponding to the pair  $(d, z)$ . Note that  $A^\dagger$  is a known matrix (without looking at the data), and  $\theta_c$  is a known function of the marginal distribution of  $Z_i$ , up to the factor  $E[c(G_i, Z_i)]$ , for a fixed function  $c$ .

It only remains to be shown that  $E[c(G_i, Z_i)]$  is also identified under assumption of **1.** For  $\Delta_c$  to be pinned down for all joint distributions of  $(G_i, Y_i(1), Y_i(0))$ , it must be pinned down in the special case where in which  $Y_i(d) = d$  with probability one. In this case each  $E[Y_i|D_i = d, Z_i = z] = d$ , and  $\Delta_c = 1$ . Thus, using our result above we have that  $E[c(G_i, Z_i)] = E[\tilde{s}(d, z)D_i]$ , where  $\tilde{s}(d, z) := \frac{P(D_i=d|Z_i=z)}{P(D_i=d, Z_i=z)} \cdot [\tilde{\theta}'_c A^\dagger]_{(d,z)}$ , where  $\tilde{\theta}_c := E[c(G_i, Z_i)]\theta_c$ . Unlike  $\theta_c$ ,  $\tilde{\theta}_c$  is pinned down from knowledge of the function  $c$  and the marginal distribution of  $Z_i$ .

- **2**  $\rightarrow$  **3** This is immediate, since  $s(d, z)y$  is a possible function  $t(d, z, y)$ .
- **3**  $\rightarrow$  **2** Consider a joint distribution  $F$  of potential outcomes, compliance groups, and instruments, and an alternative distribution  $F'$ , where the potential outcomes are rescaled by a factor  $b \in \mathbb{R}$ : i.e. if  $(Y_i(1), Y_i(0), G_i) \sim F$  then  $(bY_i(1), bY_i(0), G_i) \sim F'$ . Let  $\Delta_c(\cdot)$  denote the causal parameter  $\Delta_c$  as a function of the joint distribution of  $(Y_i(1), Y_i(0), G_i)$ , fixing  $\mathcal{P}_Z$ . Clearly  $\Delta(F') = b\Delta_c(F)$ . Note that if the distribution of  $Z_i$  is held fixed, the distribution of  $(Y_i, D_i, Z_i)$  under  $F'$  is the same as the distribution of  $(bY_i, D_i, Z_i)$  under  $F$ , since  $Y_i = Y_i(0) + D_i(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0))$ . Thus, by assumption that  $\beta_s = \Delta_c(F')$  when the observables are generated under  $F'$ , we must have that  $E[s(D_i, Z_i, bY_i)] = bE[s(D_i, Z_i, Y_i)]$ . For this to be true for any distribution of  $(D_i, Z_i, Y_i)$ , it must be that  $s(d, z, by) = bs(d, z, y)$  for all  $d, z, y, b$ . Defining  $s(d, z)$  as  $s(d, z, 1)$ , I can then write  $s(d, z, y)$  as  $s(d, z)y$ .<sup>7</sup>

□

## D.2 Proof of Lemma 3

First, note that for any  $z \in \mathcal{Z}$ , since  $Y_i = Y_i(0) + D_i(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0))$  we have that:

$$\begin{aligned} E[Y_i|Z_i = z, G_i = g] &= E[Y_i(0)|Z_i = z, G_i = g] + E[D_i(z)(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0))|Z_i = z, G_i = g] \\ &= E[Y_i(0)|G_i = g] + D_g(z) \cdot E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|G_i = g] \end{aligned}$$

using independence, and thus for any  $z, w \in \mathcal{Z}$ :

$$E[Y_i|Z_i = z, G_i = g] - E[Y_i|Z_i = w, G_i = g] = (D_g(z) - D_g(w)) \cdot E[(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0))|G_i = g]$$

<sup>7</sup>Note that a similar argument with an  $F'$  such that  $(Y_i(1) + b, Y_i(0) + b, G_i, Z_i) \sim F$  reveals that the random variable  $s(D_i, Z_i)$  must be mean zero.

Now:

$$\begin{aligned}
& Cov(Y_i, h(Z_i)) \\
&= E[Cov(Y_i, h(Z_i)|G_i)] \\
&= \sum_g P(G_i = g) Cov(Y_i, h(Z_i)|G_i = g) \\
&= \sum_g P(G_i = g) \sum_z h(z) Cov(Y_i, \mathbb{1}(Z_i = z)|G_i = g) \\
&= \sum_g P(G_i = g) \sum_z h(z) (E[Y_i \mathbb{1}(Z_i = z)|G_i = g] - E[Y_i|G_i = g]P(Z_i = z|G_i = g)) \\
&= \sum_g P(G_i = g) \sum_z h(z) \pi_z \sum_w \pi_w (E[Y_i|Z_i = z, G_i = g] - E[Y_i|Z_i = w, G_i = g]) \\
&= \sum_g P(G_i = g) \left\{ \sum_{z,w} h(z) \pi_z \pi_w (D_g(z) - D_g(w)) \right\} \Delta_g
\end{aligned}$$

where we have used  $Cov(A, B) = E[Cov(A, B|C)] + Cov(E[A|C], E[B|C])$  in the first step. Furthermore

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{z,w} h(z) \pi_z \pi_w (D_g(z) - D_g(w)) &= \sum_z h(z) \pi_z D_g(z) - \left( \sum_z h(z) \pi_z \right) \left( \sum_w \pi_w D_g(w) \right) \\
&= Cov(D_g(Z_i), h(Z_i))
\end{aligned}$$

An analogous sequence of steps shows that the denominator

$$Cov(D_i, h(Z_i)) = \sum_g P(G_i = g) Cov(D_g(Z_i), h(Z_i))$$

### D.3 Proof of Theorem SM1

We start with the  $J = 2$  case to build the intuition, and present the generalization afterwards. Simple algebra shows that the 2SLS estimand can be written

$$\rho_{2sls,lin} = \frac{\pi_1 Cov(Y_i, Z_{1i}) + \pi_2 Cov(Y_i, Z_{2i})}{\pi_1 Cov(D_i, Z_{1i}) + \pi_2 Cov(D_i, Z_{2i})}$$

where  $\pi_1$  and  $\pi_2$  are the population regression coefficients from the first-stage regression of  $D$  on  $Z_1$  and  $Z_2$ .

As we've already shown:

$$\begin{aligned}
E[Y_i|Z_{1i} = 1] - E[Y_i|Z_{1i} = 0] &= E[D_i(1, Z_{2i})(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0))|Z_{1i} = 1] \\
&\quad - E[D_i(0, Z_{2i})(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0))|Z_{1i} = 0]
\end{aligned}$$

By separable monotonicity, we can divide all units into 4 groups: always-takers (a.t.), never-takers (n.t.), compliers for the first instrument ( $Z_1$ ), and compliers for the second

instrument ( $Z_2$ ). Applying the law of total probability to the above expression, only the two complier groups contribute, since  $D_i(1, Z_{2i}) = D_i(0, Z_{2i}) = 0$  for the never-takers and

$$E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|Z_{1i} = 1, a.t.] = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|Z_{1i} = 0, a.t.] = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|a.t.]$$

by the independence assumption. Thus we have:

$$\begin{aligned} E[Y|Z_1 = 1] - E[Y_i|Z_1 = 0] &= p_{Z_1} E[Y(1) - Y(0)|Z_1 = 1, Z_1] \\ &\quad + p_{Z_2} (E[Z_2|Z_1 = 1, G = Z_2] - E[Z_2|Z_1 = 0, G = Z_2]) E[Y(1) - Y(0)|G = Z_2] \\ &= p_{Z_1} E[Y(1) - Y(0)|G = Z_1] + p_{Z_2} \frac{Cov(Z_1, Z_2)}{Var(Z_1)} E[Y(1) - Y(0)|G = Z_2] \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where we've used the independence assumption. The same steps lead to an analogous expression for  $Z_2$ . Now consider the regression coefficient  $\pi_1$ . It is:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_1 &= \frac{1}{Var(Z_1)(1-\rho_{12}^2)} \left[ Cov(D, Z_1) - \frac{Cov(Z_1, Z_2)}{Var(Z_2)} Cov(D, Z_2) \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{1-\rho_{12}^2} \left[ \frac{Cov(D, Z_1)}{Var(Z_1)} - \frac{Cov(Z_1, Z_2)}{Var(Z_1)} \cdot \frac{Cov(D, Z_2)}{Var(Z_2)} \right] \end{aligned}$$

where  $\rho_{12}$  is the Pearson correlation coefficient between  $Z_1$  and  $Z_2$ , and we've simplified  $Cov(Z_1, Z_1) - \frac{Cov(Z_1, Z_2)}{Var(Z_2)} Cov(Z_1, Z_2)$  to  $Var(Z_1)(1 - \rho_{12}^2)$ . By the same steps as those leading to Eq. (1):

$$\frac{Cov(D, Z_1)}{Var(Z_1)} = E[D|Z_1 = 1] - E[D|Z_1 = 0] = p_{Z_1} + p_{Z_2} \frac{Cov(Z_{1i}, Z_{2i})}{Var(Z_{1i})}$$

and

$$\frac{Cov(D, Z_2)}{Var(Z_2)} = E[D_i|Z_2 = 1] - E[D|Z_2 = 0] = p_{Z_2} + p_{Z_1} \frac{Cov(Z_{1i}, Z_{2i})}{Var(Z_{2i})}$$

Thus

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_1 &= \frac{1}{1 - \rho_{12}^2} \left[ p_{Z_1} + \cancel{p_{Z_2} \frac{Cov(Z_1, Z_2)}{Var(Z_1)}} - \frac{Cov(Z_1, Z_2)}{Var(Z_1)} \left( \cancel{p_{Z_2}} + p_{Z_1} \frac{Cov(Z_1, Z_2)}{Var(Z_2)} \right) \right] \\ &= p_{Z_1} \frac{1 - \rho_{12}^2}{1 - \rho_{12}^2} = p_{Z_1} \end{aligned}$$

and similarly  $\pi_2 = p_{Z_2}$ . In other words, under separable monotonicity, the linear regression control in 2SLS is sufficient to isolate the compliers for each instrument (we shall see that this property also holds for  $J > 2$ ).

The 2SLS estimator can now be written, using Equation (1):

$$\begin{aligned}
\rho_{2sls,lin} &= \frac{p_{Z_1} \text{Cov}(Y, Z_1) + p_{Z_2} \text{Cov}(Y, Z_2)}{p_{Z_1} \text{Cov}(D, Z_1) + p_{Z_2} \text{Cov}(D, Z_2)} \\
&= \frac{p_{Z_1} \left( p_{Z_1} + p_{Z_2} \frac{\text{Cov}(Z_1, Z_2)}{\text{Var}(Z_1)} \right)}{p_{Z_1} \text{Cov}(D, Z_1) + p_{Z_2} \text{Cov}(D, Z_2)} \cdot E[Y(1) - Y(0)|G = Z_1] \\
&\quad + \frac{p_{Z_2} \left( p_{Z_2} + p_{Z_1} \frac{\text{Cov}(Z_1, Z_2)}{\text{Var}(Z_2)} \right)}{p_{Z_1} \text{Cov}(D, Z_1) + p_{Z_2} \text{Cov}(D, Z_2)} \cdot E[Y(1) - Y(0)|G = Z_2] \\
&= \frac{p_{Z_1} \text{Cov}(D, Z_1)}{p_{Z_1} \text{Cov}(D, Z_1) + p_{Z_2} \text{Cov}(D, Z_2)} \cdot E[Y(1) - Y(0)|G = Z_1] \\
&\quad + \frac{p_{Z_2} \text{Cov}(D, Z_2)}{p_{Z_1} \text{Cov}(D, Z_1) + p_{Z_2} \text{Cov}(D, Z_2)} \cdot E[Y(1) - Y(0)|G = Z_2]
\end{aligned}$$

Since  $\text{Cov}(D, Z_j) \geq 0$  by Assumption 2\*, the weights are positive.

To show the  $J > 2$  case, note that we now have  $J + 2$  disjoint compliance groups: always-takers, never-takers and compliers for each instrument 1 to  $J$ . We use the notation  $Cj_i$  to indicate the event that  $D_i(1, z_{-j}) > D_i(0, z_{-j})$  for all  $z_{-j}$  and hence  $D_i(1, Z_{-ji}) > D_i(0, Z_{-ji})$ . Equation (1) now generalizes, by the law of iterated expectations, to:

$$E[Y|Z_j = 1] - E[Y|Z_j = 0] = \sum_k p_{Ck} (E[Z_k|Z_j = 1] - E[Z_k|Z_j = 0]) E[Y(1) - Y(0)|Ck]$$

where I've suppressed  $i$  indices. Similarly, we have that

$$E[D|Z_j = 1] - E[D|Z_j = 0] = \sum_k p_{Ck} (E[Z_k|Z_j = 1] - E[Z_k|Z_j = 0]) \quad (2)$$

This latter expression gives us the property that the multiple regression coefficient  $\pi_j = p_{Cj}$  for all  $j$ . The reason is that the vector of regression coefficients  $\pi$  is the unique vector satisfying  $\Sigma\pi = C$ , where  $\Sigma$  is the  $J \times J$  covariance matrix of the instruments and  $C$  is a vector of covariances between the treatment  $D$  and each instrument  $Z_j$ . This can be rewritten as:

$$\sum_k \text{Cov}(Z_k, Z_j) \pi_k = \text{Cov}(D, Z_j)$$

Substituting in the guess that  $\pi_k = p_{Ck}$  yields Equation (2). The 2SLS estimand is:

$$\begin{aligned}
\rho_{2sls,lin} &= \frac{\sum_j \pi_j \text{Cov}(Y, Z_j)}{\sum_j \pi_j \text{Cov}(D, Z_j)} = \frac{\sum_j p_{Cj} \sum_k p_{Ck} \text{Cov}(Z_j, Z_k) E[Y(1) - Y(0)|Ck]}{\sum_j p_{Cj} \text{Cov}(D, Z_j)} \\
&= \frac{\sum_k p_{Ck} \left( \sum_j p_{Cj} \text{Cov}(Z_j, Z_k) \right) E[Y(1) - Y(0)|Ck]}{\sum_j p_{Cj} \text{Cov}(D, Z_j)} \\
&= \frac{\sum_k p_{Ck} \text{Cov}(D, Z_k) E[Y(1) - Y(0)|Ck]}{\sum_j p_{Cj} \text{Cov}(D, Z_j)}
\end{aligned}$$

where we've used that  $\text{Cov}(Y, Z_j) = \sum_k p_{Ck} \text{Cov}(Z_j, Z_k) E[Y(1) - Y(0)|Ck]$  and  $\text{Cov}(D, Z_j) = \sum_k p_{Ck} \text{Cov}(Z_j, Z_k)$ .  $\text{Cov}(D, Z_k)$  is positive for all  $k$  by Assumption 2\*.

#### D.4 Proof of Lemma 1

Fix any  $j \in \{1 \dots J\}$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
E[Y_i|Z_{ji} = 1] - E[Y_i|Z_{ji} = 0] \\
&= E[D_i(1, Z_{ji})(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0))|Z_{ji} = 1] - E[D_i(0, Z_{ji})(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0))|Z_{ji} = 0] \\
&= E[(D_i(1, Z_{ji}) - D_i(0, Z_{ji}))(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0))] \\
&= P(D_i(1, Z_{ji}) > D_i(0, Z_{ji}))E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|D_i(1, Z_{ji}) > D_i(0, Z_{ji})]
\end{aligned}$$

where we've used  $Y_i = Y_i(0) + D_i(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0))$  and Assumption 1 in the first step, and Assumption 5 in the second. Similarly  $E[D_i|Z_{ji} = 1] - E[D_i|Z_{ji} = 0] = P(D_i(1, Z_{ji}) > D_i(0, Z_{ji}))$  and thus

$$\rho_j = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|D_i(1, Z_{ji}) > D_i(0, Z_{ji})]$$

#### D.5 Proof of Theorem SM2

Note that the 2SLS estimand can be written:

$$\rho_{2sls,lin} = \frac{\sum_j \pi_j Cov(Y, Z_j)}{\sum_j \pi_j Cov(D, Z_j)} = \frac{\sum_j \pi_j Cov(D, Z_j)}{\sum_j \pi_j Cov(D, Z_j)} \rho_j$$

Given Lemma 1, it only remains to be shown that  $\pi_j \geq 0$  for all  $j$ . As a vector:

$$\pi = \Sigma^{-1}C$$

where  $\Sigma$  is the  $J \times J$  covariance matrix of the instruments and  $C$  is a vector of covariances between the treatment  $D$  and each instrument  $Z_j$ . A result known as Farkas' Lemma (see e.g. Gale et al. 1951) states the following: for matrix  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$  and vector  $b \in \mathbb{R}^m$ , exactly one of the following is true:

1. There exists an  $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$  such that  $Ax = b$  and  $x \geq 0$
2. There exists a  $y \in \mathbb{R}^m$  such that  $A'y \geq 0$  and  $b'y < 0$

where for any vector, the notation  $\geq 0$  indicates that each of its components is weakly positive, etc. Since  $\Sigma$  is an invertible, square, symmetric matrix, Farkas' Lemma is in our case equivalent to:

$$\pi \geq 0 \iff (\forall y \in \mathbb{R}^J : \Sigma y \geq 0 \implies C'y \geq 0)$$

Now note that element  $j$  of the vector  $\Sigma y$  is equal to  $Cov(Z_j, Z'y)$  and  $C'y$  is equal to  $Cov(Z'y, D)$  where  $Z'y = \sum_{k=1}^J y_k Z_k$  is a linear combination of the instruments. Thus, what we wish to show is that for any  $y \in \mathbb{R}^m$ :

$$E[Z'y|Z_j = 1] \geq E[Z'y|Z_j = 0] \quad \forall j \implies E[Z'y|D = 1] \geq E[Z'y|D = 0]$$

In fact, given the strength of Assumption 5, the left-hand inequality holding for any single  $j$  will be sufficient. By the law of iterated expectations:

$$\begin{aligned}
& E[Z'y|D = 1] - E[Z'y|D = 0] \\
&= \sum_{z \in \{0,1\}} P(Z_j = z|D = 1)E[Z'y|D(z, Z_{-j}) = 1, Z_j = z] \\
&\quad - P(Z_j = z|D = 0)E[Z'y|D(z, Z_{-j}) = 0, Z_j = z] \\
&= P(Z_j = 1|D = 1) \{E[Z'y|D(1, Z_{-j}) = 1, Z_j = 1] - E[Z'y|D(0, Z_{-j}) = 1, Z_j = 0]\} \\
&\quad - P(Z_j = 1|D = 0) \{E[Z'y|D(1, Z_{-j}) = 0, Z_j = 1] - E[Z'y|D(0, Z_{-j}) = 0, Z_j = 0]\} \\
&\quad + E[Z'y|D(0, Z_{-j}) = 1, Z_j = 0] - E[Z'y|D(0, Z_{-j}) = 0, Z_j = 0]
\end{aligned}$$

By Assumptions 2 and 1, for any  $z, d \in \{0, 1\}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
E[Z'y|D(z, Z_{-j}) = d, Z_j = z] &= \sum_{z_{-j} \in \{0,1\}^{L-1}} (z, z_{-j})'y \cdot P(Z_{-j} = z_{-j}|D(z, z_{-j}) = d, Z_j = z) \\
&= \sum_{z_{-j} \in \{0,1\}^{L-1}} (z, z_{-j})'y \cdot P(Z_{-j} = z_{-j}|Z_j = z) \\
&= E[Z'y|Z_j = z]
\end{aligned}$$

and thus  $E[Z'y|D = 1] - E[Z'y|D = 0]$  can be simplified to

$$(E[Z_j|D = 1] - E[Z_j|D = 0]) (E[Z'y|Z_j = 1] - E[Z'y|Z_j = 0])$$

which is positive whenever  $E[Z'y|Z_j = 1] - E[Z'y|Z_j = 0]$  is positive, since  $Cov(D, Z_j) \geq 0$  by Assumption 2\*. While we did not make Assumption 2\* in the statement of this theorem, it is implied by Assumptions 2 and 5, since:

$$\begin{aligned}
Cov(D, Z_j) &= P(Z_j)(1 - P(Z_j)) (E[D|Z_j = 1] - E[D|Z_j = 0]) \\
&= P(Z_j)(1 - P(Z_j)) (E[D(1, Z_{-j})|Z_j = 1] - E[D(0, Z_{-j})|Z_j = 0]) \\
&= P(Z_j)(1 - P(Z_j))E[D(1, Z_{-j}) - D(0, Z_{-j})] \geq 0
\end{aligned}$$

where the third equality follows by Assumption 1 (independence) and the final inequality follows by Assumption 2 and the law of iterated expectations (over  $Z_{-j}$ ).

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