# IGL without sharps

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17 December 2024 Available at: leonardopacheco.xyz/slides/prooftheory2024.pdf INTRODUCTION


## INTUITIONISTIC GÖDEL-LÖB LOGIC

- ▶ GL:  $\Box(\Box P \to P) \to \Box P$
- ▶ iGL: GL on an intuitionistic base, only boxes See [3] for more on iGL.
- ▶ IGL: GL on an intuitionistic base, boxes and diamonds First developed by Das, van der Giessen and Marin [2]

**IGL** 


INTRODUCTION 000

Das, van der Giessen, and Marin proved:



INTRODUCTION 000

# We prove completeness with less determinacy:



$$\begin{split} \operatorname{id} & \overline{\mathbf{R}, \Gamma, x : P \vdash \Delta, x : P} \\ \operatorname{tr} & \frac{\mathbf{R}, xRy, yRz, xRz, \Gamma \vdash \Delta}{\mathbf{R}, xRy, yRz, \Gamma \vdash \Delta} \\ & \wedge 1 \frac{\mathbf{R}, \Gamma, x : A \land B, x : A, x : B \vdash \Delta}{\mathbf{R}, \Gamma, x : A \land B \vdash \Delta} \\ & \rightarrow 1 \frac{\mathbf{R}, \Gamma, x : A \rightarrow B \vdash \Delta, x : A}{\mathbf{R}, \Gamma, x : A \rightarrow B, x : B \vdash \Delta} \end{split}$$

# SOME RULES OF cmℓIGL — II

# SOME RULES OF cmℓIGL — III

Non-invertible rules:

$$\rightarrow$$
r  $\frac{\mathbf{R}, \Gamma, x : A \vdash x : B}{\mathbf{R}, \Gamma \vdash \Delta, x : A \rightarrow B}$ 

$$\Box \mathbf{r} \frac{\mathbf{R}, xRy, \Gamma \vdash y : A}{\mathbf{R}, \Gamma \vdash \Delta, x : \Box A}$$
 (*y* is fresh)

# LOOPS

Loop  $v_S$  from  $\mathbf{R}, \Gamma \vdash \Delta$  to  $\mathbf{R}', \Gamma' \vdash \Delta'$ :

- ▶ if  $x : \varphi \in \Gamma'$  then  $v_S(x) : \varphi \in \Gamma$ ;
- if  $x : \varphi \in \Delta'$  then  $v_S(x) : \varphi \in \Delta$ ;
- ightharpoonup if xR'y then  $v_S(x)Rv_S(y)$ ;
- ► for each x in  $\mathbf{R}'$ , v(x) = x or xRv(x)
- ▶ if there is  $x \in Var(R')$  such that  $xRv_S(x) \in \mathbf{R}$ .

# **IGL** PROVES $\Box(\Box P \rightarrow P) \rightarrow \Box P$

$$l(S) = S' \text{ and } v_S(x) = x, v_S(y) = z.$$

### PREDICATE KRIPKE FRAMES

Tuple  $M = \langle W, \preceq, \{D_w\}_{w \in W}, \{Pr_w\}_{w \in W}, \{R_w\}_{w \in W} \rangle$  such that:

- 1. W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
- 2. the intuitionistic relation  $\leq$  is a partial order on W;
- 3.  $\{D_w\}_{w\in W}$  is a family of domains  $D_w\subseteq Var$ ;
- 4.  $\{Pr_w\}_{w\in W}$  is a family of mappings  $Pr_w: \text{Prop} \to \mathcal{P}(D_w)$ ;
- 5.  $\{R_w\}_{w\in W}$  is a family of modal relations  $R_w\subseteq D_w\times D_w$ ;
- 6. all relations are monotone in  $\leq$ , i.e., if  $w \leq w'$ , then we have  $D_w \subseteq D_{w'}$ ,  $Pr_w \subseteq Pr_{w'}$ , and  $R_w \subseteq R_{w'}$ .

# PREDICATE IGL FRAMES

#### Define

- $\blacktriangleright$   $(w,d) \leq_M (w',d')$  if  $w \leq w'$  and d=d';
- $\blacktriangleright$   $(w,d)R_M(w',d')$  if w=w' and  $dR_wd'$ ;

where  $d \in D_w$  and  $d' \in D_{w'}$ .

## M is a $\mathcal{P}$ IGL-model if the following conditions hold:

1.  $M = \langle W, \preceq, \{D_w\}_{w \in W}, \{Pr_w\}_{w \in W}, \{R_w\}_{w \in W} \rangle$  is a Kripke structure:

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- 2. for all  $w \in W$ ,  $R_w$  is transitive; and
- 3. the composition  $\prec_M \circ R_M$  is reverse well-founded.

If  $M = \langle W, \preceq, \{D_w\}_{w \in W}, \{Pr_w\}_{w \in W}, \{R_w\}_{w \in W} \rangle$ , then

- $\blacktriangleright$   $M, w \models x : P \text{ iff } x \in Pr_w(P).$
- $\blacktriangleright$   $M, w \not\models x : \bot$ .
- $ightharpoonup M, w \models x : A \land B \text{ iff } M, w \models x : A \text{ and } M, w \models x : B.$
- $\blacktriangleright$   $M, w \models x : A \lor B \text{ iff } M, w \models x : A \text{ or } M, w \models x : B.$
- $\blacktriangleright$   $M, w \models x : A \rightarrow B$  iff for all  $w' \succeq w$ , if  $M, w' \models x : A$  then  $M, w' \models x : B.$

SEMANTICS

- $\blacktriangleright$   $M, w \models x : \Box A$  iff, for all  $w' \succeq w$  and for all  $y \in D_{w'}$ , if  $xR_{w'}y$  then  $M, w' \models y : A$ .
- $ightharpoonup M, w \models x : \Diamond A \text{ iff there is } y \in D_w \text{ such that } xR_w y \text{ and }$  $M, w \models y : A.$

# **IGL** DOES NOT PROVE $\Diamond P \rightarrow \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)$

$$\operatorname{id}_{\wedge r} \frac{ \operatorname{tr} \frac{xRy, yRz, xRz, x: \Diamond P, y: \Diamond P, y: P, z: P \vdash y: \bot(*)}{\Diamond 1} \frac{xRy, yRz, x: \Diamond P, y: \Diamond P, y: P, z: P \vdash y: \bot}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash y: \bot} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash y: \bot} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: \partial P, y: P \vdash y: \bot} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P), y: \neg \Diamond P} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond (P \land \neg \Diamond P)} \frac{(*)}{xRy, x: \Diamond P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond P, y: P, y: P \vdash x: \Diamond P, y: P, y:$$

SEMANTICS

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INTRODUCTION

# $\mathsf{cm}\ell\mathsf{IGL} \vdash \varphi \mathsf{IMPLIES} \, \mathcal{P}\mathsf{IGL} \models \varphi$

#### Lemma

 $\mathsf{cm}\ell\mathsf{IGL} \vdash \varphi \text{ implies } m\ell\mathsf{IGL} \vdash \varphi.$ 

### Proof.

Unfold the cyclic proof of  $\varphi$  into a non-wellfounded proof.

#### Lemma

 $m\ell \mathsf{IGL} \vdash \varphi \text{ implies } \mathcal{P} \mathsf{IGL} \models \varphi.$ 

## Proof.

Follows from Das, van der Giessen and Marin's paper.

Given a sequent  $\mathbf{R}, \Gamma \vdash \Delta$ , we define a game:

- ► Two players: Prover and Denier.
- ▶ Start on the sequent  $\mathbf{R}, \Gamma \vdash \Delta$ .
- ▶ When discussing a sequent *S*, Prover has two choices:
  - ▶ Pick an inference rule

$$\frac{S_1 \cdots S_n}{S}$$

- and then Denier picks some  $S_i$ .
- ▶ Draw a progressing loop from *S* to a previous sequent.
- ► Infinite plays are won by Denier.

#### Lemma

*If Prover wins this game, then*  $\mathbf{R}, \Gamma \vdash \Delta \in \mathsf{cm}\ell\mathsf{IGL}$ .

Suppose  $\mathbf{R}, \Gamma \vdash \Delta$  is not provable and let  $\tau$  be a winning strategy for Denier.

We build a tree *T* as follows:

- ▶ The root is  $\mathbf{R}, \Gamma \vdash \Delta$ .
- ► If *S* is non-saturated, let

$$\frac{S_1 \cdots S_n}{S}$$
,

be an inference saturating S. Add above S the sequent  $S_i$  picked by  $\tau$ .

► If *S* is saturated, add above *S* all the premises of the applicable non-invertible rules.

#### Lemma

If  $S_0$  is a non-saturated sequent in T, there is no path starting in  $S_0$  where all sequents are non-saturated.

## THE COUNTERMODEL

Let  $M = \langle W, \preceq, \{D_S\}_{S \in S}, \{Pr_S\}_{S \in S}, \{R_S\}_{S \in W} \rangle$  be defined as follows:

- ▶ *W* is the set of saturated sequents of *T*.
- $ightharpoonup \leq$  is the tree ordering of T.
- $\triangleright$   $D_{vv}$  is the set of variables occurring in w.
- $ightharpoonup Pr_S(P)$  is the set of variables labeling P in  $\Gamma_S$ .
- $ightharpoonup xR_Sy$  iff it occurs in **R**.

#### Lemma

M is an PIGL-model.

## TRUTH LEMMA

### Lemma

For all sequents  $w \in W$ ,

- $\blacktriangleright$  if  $x:\varphi\in\Gamma_w$  then  $M,w\models x:\varphi$ ; and
- if  $x : \varphi \in \Delta_w$  then  $M, w \not\models x : \varphi$ .

#### Lemma

Suppose **R**,  $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$  is not provable, then the constructed model does *not validate*  $\mathbf{R}, \Gamma \vdash \Delta$ .

# RESULTS

### Theorem

 $\Sigma^0_1$ -Det proves the Kripke completeness of IGL.

#### Theorem

IGL is recursively enumerable.

# **OPEN QUESTIONS**

Question

Is IGL recursive?

Question

Does IGL have the finite model property?

Question

Does IGL have a finite Hilbert-style axiomatization?

### REFERENCES

- [1] Aguilera, Pacheco, "IGL without sharps", preprint soon<sup>TM</sup>.
- [2] Das, van der Giessen, Marin, "Intuitionistic Gödel-Löb logic, à la Simpson: labelled systems and birelational semantics", 2024.
- [3] Van der Giessen, "Uniform Interpolation and Admissible Rules: Proof-theoretic investigations into (intuitionistic) modal logics", 2022.