

Random Number Generators

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Random Bit Generator



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- **Definition** - A Random Bit Generator (RBG) outputs a sequence of statistically **independent** and **unbiased** bits
 - **Statistically independent** means that the probability of emitting a bit (1 or 0) value does not depend on the previous bits
 - **Unbiased** means that the probability of emitting a bit value (1 or 0) is equal to 0.5

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Random Bit Generators



- Random Number Generators (RNGs)
 - Random Bit Generators can be used to generate (uniformly distributed) random numbers
 - A random number in the interval $[0, n]$ can be obtained by generating a bit sequence of length $\lceil \lg n \rceil + 1$ and converting it to an integer;
 - If the resulting number exceeds n , one possible option is to discard it and generate another random bit sequence

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Random Bit Generators



- Classes of RBGs
 - True random bit generators (TRBG)
 - Pseudorandom Bit Generator (PRBG)
 - Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Bit Generator (CSPRBG)

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True Random Bit Generators (TRBGs)



- Based on a physical process
 - Coin flipping, rolling a dice, semiconductor noise, clock jitter, radioactive decay
- The output «cannot» be reproduced
 - $\text{Pr}[\text{flipping a coin 100 times and generate a given 100-long sequence}] = 1/2^{100}$
- Used to generate session keys

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TRBGs



- Classification
 - Hardware-based generators
 - Software-based generators
- Remarks
 - May be subject to observation or manipulation by an adversary
 - May be subject to influence of external factors, and also to malfunction
 - Need to be tested periodically

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TRBG – Hardware-based



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- Examples
 - elapsed time between emission of particles during radioactive decay
 - thermal noise from a semiconductor diode or resistor
 - the frequency instability of a free running oscillator
 - the amount a metal-insulator semiconductor capacity is charged during a fixed period of time
 - air turbulence within a sealed disk drive which causes random fluctuations in disk drive sector read latency times
 - sound from a microphone or video from a camera

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TRBG – Hardware-based



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- Defective generators
 - Biased
 - Probability of emitting a 1 is not equal to 0.5
 - Correlated
 - Probability of emitting a 1 depends on previous bit emitted
- De-skewing
 - Make it possible to generate truly random bit sequences from the output bits of a defective generator
 - A practical technique is to pass the sequence through a cryptographically secure hash function

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TRBG – Software-based



- Examples of random processes
 - the system clock
 - elapsed time between keystrokes or mouse movement
 - content of input/output buffers
 - user input
 - operating system values such as system load and network statistics
- Use mixing functions
 - E.g. Cryptographically secure hash functions

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Random Generators

EXERCISE

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On Deskewing



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- Exercise
 - Suppose that a generator produces biased but uncorrelated bits. Suppose that the probability of a 1 is p , and the probability of a 0 is $1-p$, where p is unknown but fixed, $0 < p < 1$. Remove biases in output bits.

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On Deskewing



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- Exercise #1 – Solution
 - Group the output sequence of such a generator into pairs of bits, with
 - a 10 pair transformed to a 1,
 - a 01 pair transformed to a 0, and
 - 00 and 11 pairs are discarded
 - Then the resulting sequence is both unbiased and uncorrelated

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Pseudo Random Bit Generator (PRBG)



- Definition - A Pseudo Random Bit Generator is a **deterministic** algorithm that, given a truly random binary sequence of length k (seed), outputs a binary sequence of length L (**pseudorandom bit sequence**), $L \gg k$
 - The number of possible sequences is at most 2^k , i.e., a fraction $2^k/2^L$ of all possible sequences
- Security intuition
 - A “small” seed is expanded in a “large” pseudorandom sequence in such a way that an adversary cannot **efficiently** distinguish between outputs of a PRBG and outputs of a TRG

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PRBG



- Typically
 - $s_0 = \text{seed}$
 - $s_{i+1} = f(s_i)$, $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$
- A generalization
 - $s_0 = \text{seed}$
 - $s_{i+1} = f(s_i, s_{i-1}, s_{i-2}, \dots, s_{i-t},)$

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PRBG



- Linear Congruential Generator
 - A popular example
 - Definition
 - $s_0 = \text{seed}$
 - $s_{i+1} = (a \cdot s_i + b) \bmod m, i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$
 - where a, b, m are integer constants
 - ANSI C rand()
 - $s[0] = 12345;$
 - $s[i] = 1103515245 s[i-1] + 12345 \times 2^{31}$

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PRBG



- Linear Congruential Generator
 - Properties
 - Good statistical properties
 - Output approximates a sequence of true random number
 - Mathematical tests (e.g., chi-square test)
 - Largely used in simulation and testing
 - Not suitable for cryptography because it's **predictable**

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LCG predicatibily



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- Assume a prefix s_r, s_{r+1}, s_{r+2} is known
- Define
 - $s_{r+2} = a \cdot s_{r+1} + b \bmod m$
 - $s_{r+1} = a \cdot s_r + b \bmod m$
 - which is a linear system of two linear equations in two unknowns (a and b)

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CSPRBG



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- A CSPRNG is an **unpredictable** PRNG
 - Unpredictability
 - **Informally** - Given a sequence of bits $s_i, s_{i+1}, \dots, s_{i+n-1}$ (a prefix), for some integer n , it is **computationally infeasible** to compute the subsequent bits $s_{i+n}, s_{i+n+1}, \dots$
 - **More formally** - Given a sequence of bits $s_i, s_{i+1}, \dots, s_{i+n-1}$ (a prefix), **there exist no polynomial time algorithm** that can predict the next bit s_{i+n} with better than 50% chance of success
 - **Another property** - Given a sequence of bits $s_i, s_{i+1}, \dots, s_{i+n-1}$ (a prefix), it is infeasible to compute the preceding bits s_{i-1}, s_{i-2}, \dots
 - The need for unpredictability is unique for cryptography

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CSPRBG



- Security Requirements
 - Minimum security requirement
 - Seed length k is so large that a search over 2^k seeds is infeasible
 - General security requirements
 - The output sequence of the generator should be indistinguishable from truly random sequences
 - The output bits should be unpredictable to an adversary with limited computational resources

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CRPRBG



- General Security Requirements
 - A PRBG is said to pass the **polynomial-time statistical test** if no polynomial-time algorithm can correctly distinguish between an output sequence of the generator and a truly random sequence of the same length with probability significantly greater than 0.5
 - A PRBG is said to pass the **next-bit test** if there is no polynomial-time algorithm which, on input of the first t -bits of an output sequence s , can predict the $(t + 1)$ st bit of s with probability significantly greater than 0.5

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CRPRBG



- Universality of the next-bit test
 - A PRBG passes the next-bit test if and only if it passes all polynomial-time statistical tests

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CRPRBG



- CSPRBG Definition
 - A PRBG that passes^(*) the next-bit test is called cryptographically secure pseudorandom bit generator
 - ^(*) possibly under some plausible but unproven mathematical assumption such as the intractability of factoring integers

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CSPRBG



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- Ad-hoc methods, based on one-way functions
 - Hash functions, block ciphers
 - ANSI X9.17, FIPS 186
 - They have not been proven to be CSPRBG, however they are sufficient for most applications
- CSPRBG
 - Assumption that integer factorization is intractable
 - RSA PRBG
 - Blum-Blum-Shub PRBG

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Statistical tests



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- A set of **statistical tests** have been devised to measure the quality of an RBG
 - It is not possible to prove whether a generator is indeed an RBG
 - Tests provide **necessary conditions**
 - Each test operates on a given output sequence and **probabilistically** determines whether it possesses a certain attribute that a truly random sequence would exhibit
 - A generator may be either **rejected** or **accepted** (i.e., not rejected)

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Statistical tests – basic tests

[→]



- Frequency test (monobit test).
 - Determine whether the number of 0's and 1's are approximately the same
- Serial test (two-bit test).
 - Determine whether the number of occurrences of 00, 01, 10, 11 are approximately the same

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Statistical tests – basic tests

[↓]



- Poker test.
 - Determine whether the sequences of length m each appear approximately the same number of times
- Runs test.
 - Determine whether the number of runs of various length is as expected for a random sequence
- Autocorrelation test.
 - Check correlations between the sequence and shifted versions of it

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Statistical tests



- Maurer's universal statistical test
 - Intuition
 - It is not possible to **significantly compress** (without loss of information) the output sequence of a random generator
 - Determine a very general class of possible defects (universality)
 - Including defects detectable by basic tests
 - Require a longer sequence than basic tests but more efficient than basic tests

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