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Placement Director: David Cesarini

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Education

PhD in Economics, New York University, 2018-2024 (expected)

Thesis Title: *Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed.*

MA in Economics, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2015-2017

Especialidad en Matemática, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, 2014-2015

BA in Economics, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, 2010-2013

References

Professor Alfred Galichon

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Professor Quang Vuong

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Professor Daniel Waldinger

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Teaching and Research Fields

Primary fields: Applied microeconomics and Education economics

Secondary fields: Applied econometrics, Industrial organization, and Applied theory

Teaching Experience

Summer, 2023

Spring, 2023

Fall, 2022

Summer, 2022

Spring, 2022

Fall, 2021

Spring, 2021

Fall, 2020

Spring, 2020

Fall, 2019

Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, Lead Instructor

Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen

Microeconomics II, NYU, TA for Maher Said

Microeconomics I, NYU, TA for Debraj Ray

Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Viplav Saini

Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen

Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen

Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen

Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Ennio Stachetti

Introduction to Statistics, NYU, TA for Lucius Riccio

Spring, 2018	Introduction to Economics, PUC, Main Lecturer
Fall, 2018	Industrial Organization, PUC, TA for Juan Pablo Montero
Spring, 2018	Real Analysis for Economists, PUC, TA for Jorge Catepillán

Research Experience and Other Employment

2021	NYU, RA for Alfred Galichon
2017-2018	PUC, Adjunct instructor
2015-2017	PUC, RA for Nicolás Figueroa and Martín Besfamille

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2018–2023	Dean’s Fellowship Program
2018–2023	MacCracken Fellowship
2017	PUC, Economics Excellence Award
2017	PUC Distinguished Thesis Recognition

Research Papers

“Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed.” (Job Market Paper)

The assignment of students to professors in higher education settings typically relies on course enrollment mechanisms based on student choice. Since students' preferences for sections within a course are likely to reflect not only a concern for learning but also a preference for high scores, the resulting assignments may be suboptimal from a learning perspective. I study the implementation of policies aimed at improving learning outcomes by modifying the observed assignment. To achieve this, I estimate a structural model describing the academic path followed by a student through a sequence of mandatory courses in a higher education institution. These estimates are used to evaluate two counterfactual policies. The first set explores dictatorial reassignments of students to professors who do not take into account student preferences in the construction of the matches. The second set of policy counterfactuals aims to influence the student-professor assignment by changing the rules governing the course-enrollment mechanism that mediates students' demands for sections within a course. Substantial improvements in learning outcomes are suggested, as evidenced by average student scores, section dropout rates, and the number of course retakes required for the successful completion of the courses.

“Ramsey pricing revisited: Natural monopoly regulation with evaders” (with Martín Besfamille and Nicolás Figueroa)

We consider a model featuring a single-product natural monopoly that faces evaders, namely, individuals who may not pay the price. By exerting a costly effort, the firm can deter evasion. To maximize the total surplus, a regulator sets the price, the level of deterrence effort, and socially costly transfers to ensure the monopoly's participation. We obtain a modified Ramsey formula, which clearly shows the mere existence of evaders dampens the use of the price as an instrument to finance the firm's deficit. In fact, we find sufficient conditions ensuring the regulated price is lower than the marginal cost, for any level of the deadweight loss of taxation. Then, we generalize the model to incorporate moral hazard. Finally, we undertake an empirical application of our results, which shows quantitatively that the downward tendency of regulated prices in a context of high evasion is significant.