## LEON F. GUZMAN LIZARDO

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#### **NEW YORK UNIVERSITY**

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### **Education**

PhD in Economics, New York University, 2018–2024 (expected)
Thesis Title: *Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed.*MA in Economics Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2015–2018
DI in Mathematics, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, 2014–2015
BA in Economics, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, 2010–2013

### References

Professor Alfred Galichon
Professor Quang Vuong
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#### **Teaching and Research Fields**

Primary fields: Applied Microeconomics and Education Economics

Secondary fields: Applied Microeconometrics and Industrial Organization

# **Teaching Experience**

Summer 2023 Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, Lead Instructor Spring 2023 Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen Fall 2022 Microeconomics II, NYU, TA for Maher Said Summer 2022 Microeconomics I, NYU, TA for Debraj Ray

Spring 2022 Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Viplav Saini
Fall 2021 Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Spring 2021 Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Fall 2020 Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Spring 2020 Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Ennio Stachetti

Fall 2019	Statistics, NYU, TA for Lucius Riccio

Spring 2018 Introduction to Economics, PUC, Main Lecturer

Fall 2018 Industrial Organization, PUC, TA for Juan Pablo Montero Spring 2018 Real Analysis for Economists, PUC, TA for Jorge Catepillán

### **Research Experience and Other Employment**

2021 NYU, RA for Alfred Galichon

## **Presentations**

2023	NYU Internal Seminars (Applied Micro and Econometrics)
2022	NYU, Internal Seminars (Applied Micro and Econometrics)

2021 NYU, Internal Seminars (Microeconomic Theory)

2020 ISCI, Taller de Organización Industrial

### Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2018–2023	Dean's Fellowship Program
2018–2023	MacCraken Fellowship

2017 PUC, Economics Excellence Award 2017 PUC Distinguished Thesis Recognition

# Research Papers

"Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed." (Job Market Paper)

The assignment of students to professors in higher education settings typically relies on course enrollment mechanisms based on student choice. Since students' preferences for sections within a course are likely to reflect not only a concern for learning but also a preference for high scores, the resulting assignments may be suboptimal from a learning perspective. I study the implementation of policies aimed at improving learning outcomes by modifying the observed assignment. To achieve this, I estimate a structural model describing the academic path followed by a student through a sequence of mandatory courses in a higher education institution. These estimates are used to evaluate two counterfactual policies. The first set explores dictatorial reassignments of students to professors who do not take into account student preferences in the construction of the matches. The second set of policy counterfactuals aims to influence the student-professor assignment by changing the rules governing the course-enrollment mechanism that mediates students' demands for sections within a course. Substantial improvements in learning outcomes are suggested, as evidenced by average student scores, section dropout rates, and the number of course retakes required for the successful completion of the courses.

"Ramsey pricing revisited: Natural monopoly regulation with evaders" with Martín Besfamille and Nicolás Figueroa

We consider a model featuring a single-product natural monopoly that faces evaders, namely, individuals who may not pay the price. By exerting a costly effort, the firm can deter evasion. To maximize the total surplus, a regulator sets the price, the level of deterrence effort, and socially costly transfers to ensure the monopoly's participation. We obtain a modified Ramsey formula, which clearly shows the mere existence of evaders dampens the use of the price as an instrument to finance the firm's deficit. In fact, we find sufficient conditions ensuring the regulated price is lower than the marginal cost, for any level of the deadweight loss of taxation. Then, we generalize the model to incorporate moral hazard. Finally, we undertake an empirical application of our results, which shows quantitatively that the downward tendency of regulated prices in a context of high evasion is significant.