

## **LEON F. GUZMAN LIZARDO**

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### **NEW YORK UNIVERSITY**

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Placement Director: David Cesarini

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### **Education**

PhD in Economics, New York University (NYU), 2018-2024 (expected)

Thesis Title: *Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed.*

MA in Economics, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (PUC), 2015-2017

Especialidad en Matemática, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, 2014-2015

BA in Economics, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo (INTEC), 2010-2013

### **References**

Professor Alfred Galichon

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Professor Quang Vuong

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Professor Daniel Waldinger

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### **Teaching and Research Fields**

Primary fields: Education Economics and Industrial Organization

Secondary fields: Applied Econometrics and Applied Theory

### **Teaching Experience**

Summer, 2023

Spring, 2023

Fall, 2022

Summer, 2022

Spring, 2022

Fall, 2021

Spring, 2021

Fall, 2020

Spring, 2020

Fall, 2019

Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, Lead Instructor

Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen

Microeconomics II, NYU, TA for Maher Said

Microeconomics I, NYU, TA for Debraj Ray

Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Viplov Saini

Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen

Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen

Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen

Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Ennio Stachetti

Introduction to Statistics, NYU, TA for Lucius Riccio

Spring, 2018  
Fall, 2018  
Spring, 2018

Introduction to Economics, PUC, Main Lecturer  
Industrial Organization, PUC, TA for Juan Pablo Montero  
Real Analysis for Economists, PUC, TA for Jorge Catepillán

### **Research Experience and Other Employment**

2021	NYU, RA for Alfred Galichon
2017-2018	PUC, Adjunct Instructor of Economics
2015-2017	PUC, RA for Nicolás Figueroa and Martín Besfamille
2014-2015	Ministry of Finance Dominican Republic, Public Debt Analyst

### **Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships**

2018–2023	Dean’s Fellowship Program
2018–2023	MacCraken Fellowship
2017	PUC, Economics Excellence Award
2017	PUC Distinguished Thesis Recognition

### **Research Papers**

*“Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed.”* ([Job Market Paper](#))

Students have considerable choice over their course instructors in higher education, in contrast to primary and secondary school. How does this choice contribute to learning? Do students choose instructors based on how much they expect to learn, the signaling value of grades, or other factors? This paper develops an econometric framework to estimate professor-student match effects in higher-education settings. I extend the literature on teacher value-added by showing how to use sequences of subject-related courses to non-parametrically identify instructor-specific learning production functions when instructors differ in their grading policies. The framework accommodates endogenous course selection and dropout, which are especially relevant in higher education. I estimate the model using academic records from INTEC, a university in the Dominican Republic. Estimates reveal substantial student-professor match effects. However, students do not select the instructor from whom they will learn the most; they place as much weight on expected grades. Relative to the current course enrollment system, assigning students to the predicted learning-optimal instructor would improve learning outcomes by increasing academic achievement and reducing the rate of course repetitions.

*“Ramsey pricing revisited: Natural monopoly regulation with evaders”* (with Martín Besfamille and Nicolás Figueroa)

We consider a model featuring a single-product natural monopoly that faces evaders, namely, individuals who may not pay the price. By exerting a costly effort, the firm can deter evasion. To maximize the total surplus, a regulator sets the price, the level of deterrence effort, and socially costly transfers to ensure the monopoly's participation. We obtain a modified Ramsey formula, which clearly shows the mere existence of evaders dampens the use of the price as an instrument to finance the firm's deficit. In fact, we find sufficient conditions to ensure the regulated price is lower than the marginal cost for any level of the deadweight loss of taxation. Then, we generalize the model to incorporate moral hazard. Finally, we undertake an empirical application of our results, which shows quantitatively that the downward tendency of regulated prices in a context of high evasion is significant.

### **Other Information**

Programming: Python, Stata, Matlab, LaTeX  
Languages: Spanish, English  
Citizenship: United States, Dominican Republic