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Placement Director: David Cesarini	david.cesarini@nyu.edu	646-413-8576
Graduate Administrator: Ian Johnson	ian.johnson@nyu.edu	212 998-8901

Education

PhD in Economics, New York University, 2018–2024 (expected)
Thesis Title: *Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed.*
MA in Economics Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2015–2018
DI in Mathematics, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Doming0, 2014–2015
BA in Economics, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, 2010–2013

References

Professor Alfred Galichon
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Professor Quang Vuong
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Professor Daniel Waldinger
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Teaching and Research Fields

Primary fields: Applied Microeconomics and Education Economics

Secondary fields: Applied Microeconometrics and Industrial Organization

Teaching Experience

Summer 2023	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, Lead Instructor
Spring 2023	Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Fall 2022	Microeconomics II, NYU, TA for Maher Said
Summer 2022	Microeconomics I, NYU, TA for Debraj Ray
Spring 2022	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Viplav Saini
Fall 2021	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Spring 2021	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Fall 2020	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Spring 2020	Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Ennio Stachetti

Fall 2019	Statistics, NYU, TA for Lucius Riccio
Spring 2018	Introduction to Economics, PUC, Main Lecturer
Fall 2018	Industrial Organization, PUC, TA for Juan Pablo Montero
Spring 2018	Real Analysis for Economists, PUC, TA for Jorge Catepillán

Research Experience and Other Employment

2021	NYU, RA for Alfred Galichon

Presentations

2023	NYU Internal Seminars (Applied Micro and Econometrics)
2022	NYU, Internal Seminars (Applied Micro and Econometrics)
2021	NYU, Internal Seminars (Microeconomic Theory)
2020	ISCI, Taller de Organización Industrial

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2018–2023	Dean's Fellowship Program
2018–2023	MacCraken Fellowship
2017	PUC, Economics Excellence Award
2017	PUC Distinguished Thesis Recognition

Research Papers

"Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed." (Job Market Paper)

The assignment of students to professors in higher education settings typically relies on course enrollment mechanisms based on student choice. Since students' preferences for sections within a course are likely to reflect not only a concern for learning but also a preference for high scores, the resulting assignments may be suboptimal from a learning perspective. I study the implementation of policies aimed at improving learning outcomes by modifying the observed assignment. To achieve this, I estimate a structural model describing the academic path followed by a student through a sequence of mandatory courses in a higher education institution. These estimates are used to evaluate two counterfactual policies. The first set explores dictatorial reassignments of students to professors who do not take into account student preferences in the construction of the matches. The second set of policy counterfactuals aims to influence the student-professor assignment by changing the rules governing the course-enrollment mechanism that mediates students' demands for sections within a course. Substantial improvements in learning outcomes are suggested, as evidenced by average student scores, section dropout rates, and the number of course retakes required for the successful completion of the courses.

"Ramsey pricing revisited: Natural monopoly regulation with evaders" with Martín Besfamille and Nicolás Figueroa

We consider a model featuring a single-product natural monopoly that faces evaders, namely, individuals who may not pay the price. By exerting a costly effort, the firm can deter evasion. To maximize the total surplus, a regulator sets the price, the level of deterrence effort, and socially costly transfers to ensure the monopoly's participation. We obtain a modified Ramsey formula, which clearly shows the mere existence of evaders dampens the use of the price as an instrument to finance the firm's deficit. In fact, we find sufficient conditions ensuring the regulated price is lower than the marginal cost, for any level of the deadweight loss of taxation. Then, we generalize the model to incorporate moral hazard. Finally, we undertake an empirical application of our results, which shows quantitatively that the downward tendency of regulated prices in a context of high evasion is significant.