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Education

PhD in Economics, New York University, 2018-2024 (expected)
Thesis Title: *Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed.*
MA in Economics, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2015-2017
Especialidad en Matemática, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, 2014-2015
BA in Economics, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, 2010-2013

References

Professor Alfred Galichon
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Professor Quang Vuong
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Professor Daniel Waldinger
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Teaching and Research Fields

Primary fields: Applied microeconomics and Education economics

Secondary fields: Applied econometrics, Industrial organization, and Applied theory

Teaching Experience

Summer, 2023	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, Lead Instructor
Spring, 2023	Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Fall, 2022	Microeconomics II, NYU, TA for Maher Said
Summer, 2022	Microeconomics I, NYU, TA for Debraj Ray
Spring, 2022	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Viplav Saini
Fall, 2021	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Spring, 2021	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Fall, 2020	Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen
Spring, 2020	Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Ennio Stachetti
Fall, 2019	Introduction to Statistics, NYU, TA for Lucius Riccio

Spring, 2018	Introduction to Economics, PUC, Main Lecturer
Fall, 2018	Industrial Organization, PUC, TA for Juan Pablo Montero
Spring, 2018	Real Analysis for Economists, PUC, TA for Jorge Catepillán

Research Experience and Other Employment

2021	NYU, RA for Alfred Galichon
2017-2018	PUC, Adjunct instructor
2015-2017	PUC, RA for Nicolás Figueroa and Martín Besfamille

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2018–2023	Dean's Fellowship Program
2018–2023	MacCraken Fellowship
2017	PUC, Economics Excellence Award
2017	PUC Distinguished Thesis Recognition

Research Papers

"Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed." (Job Market Paper)

I study the extent to which commonly used course-enrollment mechanisms, which assign students and professors to classrooms, can lead to inefficient assignments from a learning standpoint. To achieve this, I construct and estimate an empirical model describing both students' learning outcomes along a sequence of courses and their demand for sections within a given course. Two conceptual contributions are derived. The first offers a collection of arguments for the econometric identification of a rich class of learning technologies. These address econometric concerns specific to post-secondary settings, particularly the need to disentangle an instructor's teaching effectiveness and grading policy from the observed distribution of scores. The second contribution consists of proposing a new channel through which heterogeneity in grading policies across instructors can indirectly impact learning outcomes by affecting the student-professor assignment resulting from choice-based course-enrollment mechanisms. The model estimates for a specific higher-education setting highlight the content of these results. The estimates suggest substantial matching effects in the university's learning technology. A counterfactual analysis involving the reassignment of students to professors illustrates how considering these effects can lead to significant improvements in learning and other related variables, such as dropout rates and the number of retakes required to complete a course.

"Ramsey pricing revisited: Natural monopoly regulation with evaders" (with Martín Besfamille and Nicolás Figueroa)

We consider a model featuring a single-product natural monopoly that faces evaders, namely, individuals who may not pay the price. By exerting a costly effort, the firm can deter evasion. To maximize the total surplus, a regulator sets the price, the level of deterrence effort, and socially costly transfers to ensure the monopoly's participation. We obtain a modified Ramsey formula, which clearly shows the mere existence of evaders dampens the use of the price as an instrument to finance the firm's deficit. In fact, we find sufficient conditions ensuring the regulated price is lower than the marginal cost, for any level of the deadweight loss of taxation. Then, we generalize the model to incorporate moral hazard. Finally, we undertake an empirical application of our results, which shows quantitatively that the downward tendency of regulated prices in a context of high evasion is significant.