

# **LEON GUZMAN LIZARDO**

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## **NEW YORK UNIVERSITY**

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### **Education**

Ph.D. in Economics, New York University (NYU), 2018-2023 (expected)

Thesis Title: *Matching Students and Instructors in Higher Ed. Settings*

MA. in Economics, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (PUC), 2015-2017

DI. Mathematics, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo (INTEC), 2015

BA. in Economics, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo (INTEC), 2010-2013

### **References:**

Prof. Alfred Galichon  
19 West Fourth St., 6<sup>th</sup> Floor  
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Prof. Daniel Waldinger  
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(212) 992 - 8967 (office)  
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Prof. Quang Vuong  
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### **Teaching and Research Fields**

Primary fields: Education Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Industrial Organization

Secondary fields: Applied Microeconometrics, Applied Microeconomic Theory

## **Teaching Experience**

NYU (2020-2022)

### **Teaching Assistant**

Microeconomics II (MSQE), Prof. Maher Said  
Microeconomics II (MSQE), Prof. Debraj Raj  
Microeconomic Analysis (Undegrad), Prof. Erik Madsen  
Microeconomic Analysis (Undegrad), Prof. Ennio Stachetti  
Intermediate Microeconomics (Undegrad), Viprav Saini  
Intermediate Microeconomics (Undegrad), Erik Madsen  
Statistics (Undegrad), Lucius Riccio

PUC (2018)

### **Main Lecturer**

Introduction to Microeconomics (Undergrad)

PUC (2016-2017)

### **Teaching Assistant**

Industrial Organization (MA), Prof. Juan Pablo Montero  
Real Analysis (MA), Prof. Jorge Catepillán

## **Research Experience and Other Employment**

NYU (2021)

### **Research Assistant**

Prof. Alfred Galichon

PUC (2017-2018)

### **Research Assistant**

Prof. Nicolás Figueroa and Prof. Martín Besfamille

## **Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships**

NYU (2018 - 2023)

Dean's Fellowship Program

NYU (2018-2023)

MacCracken Fellowship

PUC (2017)

Economics Academic Excellence Award

PUC (2017)

Distinguished Thesis Recognition

## **Research Papers**

*Matching Students and Instructors in Higher Ed. Settings* (Job Market Paper)

## **Research in Progress**

*Measuring Tax Progressivity in a Matching Model* (with Facundo Danza)

An income tax is a form of public policy. As any public policy, it should be evaluated to the absence of it. Since income taxes are already prevalent in most countries, this poses

an important challenge to the researcher: dealing with unobservables. We use an imperfect transferable utility (ITU) matching model to respond to such a challenge. The model allows us to give a precise estimation of the relative burden of a tax and decompose the burden in its relevant factors. Two exercises are considered. First, we illustrate, by means of examples, how unemployment, matching, and wage bargaining distortions are created by an income tax. Second, we consider an empirical exercise in which we estimate the (unobserved) no-tax income distribution for a representative sample of US workers. Both exercise highlight the relevance of considering the matching dimension of the labor market to fully recover the effect of an income tax.

*Fare Evasion and Monopoly Regulation* (with Nicolás Figueroa and Martín Besfamille)

This paper features a monopoly that produces a single good but faces heterogeneous consumers that may decide to evade the payment of its price. By exerting a costly effort, the monopoly can increase the detection probability of evaders. To maximize the total surplus, a regulator sets the price to charge and socially costly transfers to ensure that the monopoly breaks-even. In the basic model with unit demands, fixed quality and observable effort, the price is independent of the marginal cost. In particular, we analyze how the optimal regulatory price-effort scheme evolves when the marginal cost of public funds increases. When we incorporate endogenous quality into the model, we find sufficient conditions that imply a non-monotonic relation between price and marginal cost of public funds. We finally extend the model in two directions: i) non unit demand, and ii) moral hazard. In both extensions, we characterize the optimal price-effort scheme, and we discuss how these results depart from the conventional literature of natural monopoly regulation.

**Other Information:**

Citizenship: U.S Citizen