# LEON F. GUZMAN LIZARDO

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## NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

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Placement Director: David Cesarini david.cesarini@nyu.edu 646-413-8576
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## Education

PhD in Economics, New York University, 2018-2024 (expected)
Thesis Title: *Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed.*
MA in Economics, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2015-2017
Especialidad en Matemática, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, 2014-2015
BA in Economics, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, 2010-2013

## References

Professor Alfred Galichon
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Professor Quang Vuong
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Professor Daniel Waldinger
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## Teaching and Research Fields

Primary fields: Education Economics and Industrial Organization

Secondary fields: Applied Econometrics and Applied Theory

## Teaching Experience

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| Summer, 2023 | Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, Lead Instructor |
| Spring, 2023 | Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen |
| Fall, 2022 | Microeconomics II, NYU, TA for Maher Said |
| Summer, 2022 | Microeconomics I, NYU, TA for Debraj Ray |
| Spring, 2022 | Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Viplav Saini |
| Fall, 2021 | Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen |
| Spring, 2021 | Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen |
| Fall, 2020 | Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Erik Madsen |
| Spring, 2020 | Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Ennio Stachetti |
| Fall, 2019 | Introduction to Statistics, NYU, TA for Lucius Riccio |

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| Spring, 2018 | Introduction to Economics, PUC, Main Lecturer |
| Fall, 2018 | Industrial Organization, PUC, TA for Juan Pablo Montero |
| Spring, 2018 | Real Analysis for Economists, PUC, TA for Jorge Catepillán |

**Research Experience and Other Employment**

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| 2021 | NYU, RA for Alfred Galichon |
| 2017-2018 | PUC, Adjunct instructor |
| 2015-2017 | PUC, RA for Nicolás Figueroa and Martín Besfamille |

**Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships**

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| 2018–2023 | Dean's Fellowship Program |
| 2018–2023 | MacCraken Fellowship |
| 2017 | PUC, Economics Excellence Award |
| 2017 | PUC Distinguished Thesis Recognition |

**Research Papers**

*"Matching Students and Professors in Higher Ed."* (Job Market Paper)

I study the measurement of matching effects in higher-education learning technologies, with an emphasis on understanding the learning implications of common course-enrollment mechanisms used to assign students to professors within a course. To achieve this, I construct an empirical model that describes a student's academic path in a standard higher-education institution. Two main conceptual contributions emerge. First, I show how to use sequences of subject-related courses to identify learning production functions when instructors differ in their grading policies, a situation common to most post-secondary settings. Second, I propose a new channel through which heterogeneity in instructors' grading policies can indirectly impact learning outcomes by influencing students' demands for instructors in choice-based course-enrollment mechanisms. I estimate the model using academic records from INTEC, a university in the Dominican Republic. The estimates reveal substantial student-professor matching effects and a strong student preference for expected scores relative to expected learning under a potential professor match. By constructing a counterfactual exercise that reassigns students and professors within a course, I demonstrate how the assignment resulting from INTEC's course-enrollment mechanism, based on both random and choice-based rules, can be significantly improved in terms of learning output, course-dropout rates, and the number of course retakes.

*"Ramsey pricing revisited: Natural monopoly regulation with evaders*" (with Martín Besfamille and Nicolás Figueroa)

We consider a model featuring a single-product natural monopoly that faces evaders, namely, individuals who may not pay the price. By exerting a costly effort, the firm can deter evasion. To maximize the total surplus, a regulator sets the price, the level of deterrence effort, and socially costly transfers to ensure the monopoly's participation. We obtain a modified Ramsey formula, which clearly shows the mere existence of evaders dampens the use of the price as an instrument to finance the firm's deficit. In fact, we find sufficient conditions to ensure the regulated price is lower than the marginal cost for any level of the deadweight loss of taxation. Then, we generalize the model to incorporate moral hazard. Finally, we undertake an empirical application of our results, which shows quantitatively that the downward tendency of regulated prices in a context of high evasion is significant.