

Instituto Superior Técnico

SEC Report 2


Group 23

André Fonseca 84698 Leonor Loureiro 84736 Sebastião Amaro 84767

Professor: Nuno Anselmo

Date: 16/05/2019

Design



To be able to tolerate faults (crash and byzantine), the system contains several server replicas. The number of replicas (\mathbf{N}) depends on the number of faults (\mathbf{f}) to be tolerated. This system requires $\mathbf{N} = 3\mathbf{f} + 1$ replicas.

To control the access to replicas, a **Modified** version of **(1, N) Byzantine Atomic Register** was implemented, mapping each good to a register. This algorithm is the bottleneck determining the need for 3f+1 Replicas.

(1, N) Byzantine Atomic Register Implementation:

- **Read** operations:
 - GetStateOfGood
- Write Operations:
 - Intention To Sell
 - Transfer Good
- A (1, N) regular register is adapted to (1, N) byzantine regular register
 - The links are replaced with authenticated perfect links
 - The quorum majority of 3f + 1 instead of 2+1
 - The Clients sign the good's id, timestamp, value, good owner's id and writer's id, maintained by the register
- The (1, N) byzantine regular register adapted to a (1, N) byzantine atomic register:
 - Added a writeback phase to read operations

The (1, N) byzantine Atomic Register does not allow different writers nor byzantine clients, requiring the following modifications:

- Before writing to a good, the client must first request the current timestamp of the good. This modification is sufficient because the server only allows write operations from the current owner of the good, at each point in time.
- Instead of a **best effort broadcast**, use a **reliable byzantine broadcast**, which allows the sender to be faulty.
 - The Servers have to communicate between themselves.

Authenticated Perfect Links Implementation:

- Each arriving message's **authentication** is **verified** with the sender's public key
- Each message before being sent is authenticated with the sender's signature
- Modification:
 - Every message contains a unique identifier, a nonce, that makes every message unique and allows for a freshness verification.

Reliable Byzantine Broadcast Implementation:

- Follows the Double Echo Authenticated Broadcast algorithm
 - Uses Authenticated Perfect Links
 - Tolerates faulty clients while maintaining reliability.
- Modifications:
 - Once a write request starts on a certain good, every other request that attempts to write on the same good is denied until the write request is processed and delivered. Provides a safety to writes, ensuring server consistency.

Proof of work implementation:

- In order for the TransferGood message to be approved, it has to contain a proof of work.
 - The client must find the integer that will result in the hash of the message starting with a certain prefix.


Assumptions:

Every client and server in this system has a key pair and know everyone else's public keys.

Protocol:


GetState Of Good

GetStateOfGood



Intention To Sell


IntentionToBuy



Spub: servers's temporary public key
Spriv: servers's temporary private key
U0priv: User0's private key
U1priv: User1's private key
CCpriv: citizen's card private key
Wpriv: last writer's privateKey
wts: good's write timestamp

TransferGood

Buy Good + Transfer Good



Spriv: servers's temporary private key
U0priv: User0's private key
U1priv: User1's private key
Spub: servers's temporary public key
CCpriv: citizen's card private key
wts: good's write timestamp

Properties

Security:

Integrity and Non-repudiation + Authentication

- Provided by the Authenticated Perfect Links, through the use of digital signatures
- (1, N) Byzantine Register, all writes are signed by the writer.

Freshness

• Provided by the Authenticated Perfect Links modification to include a nonce in each message.

Dependability:

The server and client state is **persistent**, updates are all performed **atomically**.

Availability, the servers are **replicated**, requiring only a correct majority to proceed.

Resistant to byzantine faults

Spam Combat, client's computational Investment through the mandatory **proof of work**.

Communication(Authenticated Perfect Links + Reliable Byzantine Broadcast):

Validity: If a correct process p broadcasts a msg m, then every correct process eventually delivers m.

No duplication: no message is delivered more than once to the same process

No creation: no message is delivered unless it was sent

Integrity: If some correct process delivers a message m with sender p and process p is correct, then m was previously broadcast by p

Consistency: If some correct process delivers a message m and another correct process delivers a message m', then m = m'.

Possible threats:

Unauthorized insertion of forged information and modification of information in transit (Man in the middle)

• Prevented by the properties **Integrity and Non-repudiation + Authentication** of the Authenticated perfect links.

Unauthorized replay of information (replay attacks)

Prevented by the freshness property.

Service Overloading (DOS and DDOs)

• These attacks are diminished on **transfer good operation**, that requires the client's computational investment, the **proof of work**.

Malicious Client

- The server is protected from byzantine clients by implementing the reliable byzantine broadcast algorithm.
- Spam attacks are prevented by requiring that the client present the **proof of work** mentioned above.

Quality of Life Improvements and Optimizations

The server uses the notary's Citizen Card to **sign** a **temporary key** pair which is used for signing instead of the CC's key, allowing the Citizen's Card pin to be input only at the start of the server. This optimization also diminishes the chance of the CC's key being broken because it allows the CC's key to be used less often.