

# **State of the Linux Kernel Security Subsystem**

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# Introduction

- Who I am
  - Kernel security maintainer
  - Engineering manager
- Scope
  - Background
  - Discuss Linux-specific security
  - Ongoing developments

# Background

- Linux is a clone of Unix
- Inherits core security model
- DAC
  - Not sufficient for modern systems
    - Malware, bugs etc.
  - User manages own object security
  - Root user overrides security
  - Does not protect against many threats
- Linux kernel has many security extensions...

# Linux Kernel Security Features

- Need to be retrofitted to existing design!
  - Constrained by that design
- Extensions of DAC
  - Access Control Lists (ACLs)
  - Posix Capabilities (privileges)
    - Process-based
    - File capabilities

# Linux Kernel Security Features

- Namespaces
- Seccomp (“mode 2” new in 3.5)
- Netfilter/IPtables
- Cryptographic subsystem
  - Ipsec
  - Disk encryption
    - dm-crypt
    - ecryptfs

# Linux Kernel Security Features

- Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
  - SELinux
  - Smack
  - AppArmor
  - TOMOYO

# Linux Kernel Security Features

- System Hardening
  - ASLR
  - NX
  - /dev/mem restrictions
  - Toolchain hardening
  - Yama LSM (3.4)
    - ptrace\_scope (grsec)
    - Link restrictions (3.6)s

# Linux Kernel Security Features

- Audit
- Keys
- Integrity & platform security
  - IMA/EVM
  - TPM
  - TXT
  - VT-d
  - dm-verity



# Integrity Management Architecture (IMA)

- Detects if files have been maliciously or accidentally altered
- Measures and stores file hashes in TPM
  - Remote attestation
  - Local validation
    - IMA appraisal (3.7)
- Protect security attributes against offline attack (EVM)

# Seccomp Mode 2

- General system call filtering
- Reduces attack surface of kernel
- Not a sandbox!
- BPF filters installed with
  - `prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, prog);`
- Action may be set to trap, kill, errno, trace, allow.
- Also, `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`
  - Prevents privilege granting via `execve()`

# Ongoing Work

- Security requirements also now being driven by mobile and virt
  - SE-Android
  - Tizen (Smack)
  - Svirt
- Integrity management a focus of current work
  - Signed modules
  - UEFI Trusted boot etc.
- Needs work:
  - Usability
  - System hardening

# Conclusion

- Linux kernel security has significantly evolved beyond Unix DAC scheme
- Meets a *very* wide range of security requirements
- Security features are mainstream

# Resources

- Linux Kernel Security Subsystem Wiki
  - [kernsec.org](http://kernsec.org)
- LSM mailing list
- LWN security page
- Linux Security Summit
  - San Diego, USA, Aug 2012 with LinuxCon
  - 2013 To Be Announced!

# Questions?