that must be transmitted between agents along with opinions, rather than our use of an uncertainty interval not visible to others.

The ability of the ASC model to produce the same qualitative effects observed in the RPM model and experimentally is illustrated in the simulations of Figure 5. For the proper rhetorical issue (coincident references), both policy sides exhibit equal polarization that increases with disagreement level and with the complete network showing more polarization than the chain (Figure 5a,b). The improper rhetorical issue (offset references), however, shows substantial polarization for positive policies and little for negative ones (Figure 5c,d). The polarization shift for the ASC model is lower than for the RPM model because, in the former, the proximate majority does yield some ground to the minority member. Figure 5 also clearly shows that our models can predict depolarizing shifts for some groups even when the dominant behavior is polarizing, unlike the informational, normative, and extremist-tilting theories.

Quantitative Model Application to Experiment Data

Prior to presenting data-driven simulation results, we derive the rhetorical function, $\rho(w)$, to be used in the simulations. If the proper rhetorical issue were used, we could simply invert Equation 1 to solve for the subjective probability of a favorite spread victory:

$$p(w) = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{8\alpha w} \pm \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{1 + \frac{1}{16\alpha^2 w^2}}, \tag{5}$$

where the + (−) sign implies bets on the favorite (underdog). $p(w)$ is plotted in Figure 2. Its shape suggests that even professional gamblers who do not engage in heuristic issue substitution would exhibit RIA-based polarization.

Issue substitution requires calculating the subjective probability of a favorite game victory. The game and spread victor gambles both depend upon the margin of victory,